Hugo of St. Victor: DIDASCALICON

Philosophia est amor sapientiae, quae nullius indigens, vivax mens et sola rerum primaeva ratio est. haec definitio magis ad etymologiam nominis spectat. philos enim Graece, amor dicitur Latine, sophia, sapientia, et inde philosophia tracta est, id est, amor sapientiae.

Philosophy is the love of sapience, which, needing no one, is a vivacious mind and the sole primeval reason of things. this definition looks rather to the etymology of the name. for philos in Greek is called “love” in Latin, and sophia “sapience”; and from that philosophy is derived, that is, the love of sapience.

quod autem additur, quae nullius indigens, vivax mens, et sola rerum primaeva ratio est, divina sapientia significatur, quae propterea nullius indigere dicitur, quia nihil minus continet, sed semel et simul omnia intuetur praeterita, praesentia et futura. Vivax mens idcirco appellatur quia quod semel in divina fuerit ratione nulla umquam oblivione aboletur. [751B] primaeva ratio rerum est quia ad eius similitudinem cuncta formata sunt.

But as to what is further added, “which, needing nothing, a living mind, and the sole primeval reason of things, is,” divine wisdom is signified, which for that reason is said to be in need of nothing, because it contains nothing deficient, but once and all at once beholds all things—past, present, and future. It is therefore called a “living mind” because whatever has once been in the divine reason is never abolished by any oblivion. [751B] it is the primeval reason of things because to its similitude all things have been formed.

dicunt quidam quod illud unde agunt artes semper maneat. hoc ergo omnes artes agunt, hoc intendunt, ut divina similitudo in nobis reparetur, quae nobis forma est, Deo natura, cui quanto magis conformamur tanto magis sapimus. tunc enim in nobis incipit relucere, quod in eius ratione semper fuit, quodque in nobis transit, apud illum incommutabile consistit.

Some say that that from which the arts act abides always. Therefore this all the arts do, this they intend: that the divine likeness be restored in us, which is for us form, for God nature, to which the more we are conformed, the more we are wise. For then there begins to shine back in us that which has always been in his reason, and what passes in us, with him stands immutable.

aliter: Philosophia est ars artium, et disciplina disciplinarum, id est, ad quam omnes artes et disciplinae spectant. ars dici potest scientia, quae artis praeceptis regulisque consistit, ut est in scriptura, disciplina, quae dicitur plena, ut est in dotrina. vel ars dici potest, quando aliquid verisimile atque opinabile tractatur, [751C] disciplina, quando de his, quae aliter se habere non possunt, veris disputationibus aliquid disseritur.

otherwise: Philosophy is the art of arts, and the discipline of disciplines, that is, to which all arts and disciplines look. art can be called a science, which consists in the precepts and rules of art, as it is in scripture, discipline, which is called full, as it is in doctrine. or art can be said, when something plausible and opinable is treated, [751C] discipline, when, concerning those things which cannot be otherwise, something is discussed by true disputations.

quam differentiam Plato et Aristoteles esse voluerunt inter artem et disciplinam. vel ars dici potest, quod fit in subiecta materia et explicatur per operationem, ut architectura, disciplina vero, quae in speculatione consistit et per solam explicatur ratiocinationem, ut logica. aliter: [752A] Philosophia est meditatio mortis, quod magis convenit Christianis, qui saeculi ambitione calcata, conversatione disciplinali, similitudine futurae patriae vivunt.

such a difference Plato and Aristotle wished to exist between art and discipline. or “art” can be said
to be what is done in a subject matter and is explicated through operation, as architecture; but “discipline,” which consists in speculation and is explicated through
ratiocination alone, as logic. otherwise: [752A] Philosophy is a meditation on death, which more befits Christians, who, with the secular ambition trampled underfoot, by disciplinary
conduct, live by the likeness of the future fatherland.

aliter: Philosophia est disciplina omnium rerum divinarum atque humanarum rationes probabiliter investigans. sic omnium studiorum ratio ad philosophiam spectat. administratio non omnis philosophica est, et ideo philosophia aliquo modo ad omnes res pertinere dicitur.

otherwise: Philosophy is the discipline investigating the rationales of all divine and human things according to probability. Thus the rationale of all studies looks toward philosophy. Not every administration is philosophical, and therefore philosophy is said in some way to pertain to all things.

Philosophia dividitur in theoricam, practicam, mechanicam et logicam. hae quattuor omnem continent scientiam. theorica interpretatur speculativa; practica, activa, quam alio nomine ethicam, [752B] id est, moralem dicunt, eo quod mores in bona actione consistant; mechanica, adulterina, quia circa humana opera versatur; logica, sermocinalis, quia de vocibus tractat.

Philosophy is divided into the theoretical, practical, mechanical, and logical. these four contain all science. the theoretical is interpreted as speculative; the practical, active, which by another name they call ethical, [752B] that is, moral, on the ground that mores consist in good action; the mechanical, adulterine, because it is engaged about human works is engaged; the logical, sermocinal, because it treats of voices.

theorica dividitur in theologiam, mathematicam et physicam. hanc divisionem Boethius facit aliis verbis, theoricen secans in intellectibilem et intelligibilem et naturalem, per intellectibilem significans theologiam, per intelligibilem, mathematicam, per naturalem, physicam. denique intellectibile ita definit.

the theoretical is divided into theology, mathematics, and physics. Boethius makes this division in other words, cutting the theoretical into the intellectible and the intelligible and the natural, by “intellectible” signifying theology, by “intelligible,” mathematics, by “natural,” physics. finally he defines “intellectible” thus.

CAPUT II

CHAPTER 2

De theologia.

On theology.

Intellectibile est quod unum atque idem per se in propria semper divinitate consistens, nullis umquam sensibus, sed sola tantum mente intellectuque capitur. [752C] quae res ad speculationem Dei atque ad animi incorporalitatem considerationemque verae philosophiae indagatione componitur, quam, inquit, Graeci theologiam nominant. dicta autem theologia quasi sermo habitus de divinis, theos enim Deus, logos sermo vel ratio interpretatur.

It is intelligible that the one and the same thing, abiding by itself always in its own divinity, is grasped by no senses ever, but only by mind and understanding alone. [752C] This matter is composed, by investigation, for the speculation of God and for the incorporeality of the soul and the consideration of true philosophy, which, he says, the Greeks name theology. And theology is so called as if a discourse held about divine things; for theos is interpreted “God,” logos “discourse” or “reason.”

theologia igitur est, quando aut ineffabilem naturam Dei [753A] aut spirituales creaturas ex aliqua parte profundissima qualitate disserimus.

theology, therefore, is when
we discourse either on the ineffable nature of God [753A] or on spiritual creatures, in some respect, as to their most profound quality.

CAPUT III

CHAPTER 3

De mathematica.

On mathematics.

Mathematica autem doctrinalis scientia dicitur. mathesis enim quando t habet sine aspiratione, interpretatur vanitas, et significat superstitionem illorum, qui fata hominum in constellationibus ponunt. unde et huiusmodi mathematici appellati sunt.

Mathematics, moreover, is called a doctrinal science. for mathesis, when it has t without aspiration, is interpreted as vanity, and signifies the superstition of those who place the fates of men in the constellations. whence also such people have been called mathematici.

quando autem t habet aspiratum, doctrinam sonat. haec autem est, quae abstractam considerat quantitatem. abstracta enim quantitas dicitur, quam intellectu a materia separantes, vel ab aliis accidentibus, ut est, par, impar, et huiuscemodi, in sola ratiocinatione tractamus, quod doctrina facit, non natura.

When, however, the t is aspirated, it sounds “doctrine.” This, moreover, is that which considers abstract quantity.
For abstract quantity is called that which, separating by the intellect from matter, or from other accidents, such as even, odd, and
of this kind, we treat in ratiocination alone—which doctrine effects, not nature.

[753B] hanc Boethius intelligibilem appellat, quae primam partem, intellectibilem, cogitatione atque intelligentia comprehendit, quae sunt omnium caelestium operum supernae divinitatis, et quidquid sub lunari globo beatiore animo atque puriore substantia valet, et postremo humanarum animarum, quae omnia cum prioris illius intellectibilis substantiae fuissent, corporum tactu ab intellectibilibus ad intelligibilia degenerarunt, ut non magis ipsa intelligantur, quam intelligant, et intelligentiae puritate tunc beatiora sint, quoties sese intellectibilibus applicarint. spirituum namque et animarum natura, quia incorporea et simplex est, intellectibilis substantiae particeps est. sed quia per instrumenta sensuum [753C] non uniformiter ad sensibilia comprehendenda descendit, eorumque similitudinem per imaginationem ad se trahit, in eo quodammodo suam simplicitatem deserit, quo compositionis rationem amittit.

[753B] this Boethius calls intelligible, which comprehends the first part, the intellectible,
by cogitation and intelligence—those things which are of all the heavenly works of the supernal divinity, and whatever under the lunar globe has force by a more blessed soul and a purer substance,
and lastly of human souls—all of which, when they had been of that prior intellectible substance, by the touch of bodies degenerated from the intellectibles to the intelligibles, so that they are not more themselves to be understood than to understand, and by the purity of intelligence are then more blessed, as often as they have applied themselves to the intellectibles. For the nature of spirits and of souls, because it is incorporeal and simple, is a participant of intellectible substance. But because through the instruments of the senses it does not descend uniformly to comprehend sensibles,
[753C] and draws their likeness to itself through imagination, in this it in a certain way deserts its own simplicity, wherein the rationale of composition is lost.

neque enim omnimodo simplex dici potest, quod composito simile est. eadem igitur res diversis respectibus intellectibilis simul et intelligibilis est. intellectibilis eo quod incorporea sit natura, et nullo sensu comprehendi possit.

nor indeed can that be called altogether simple which is similar to a composite. therefore the same thing, in different respects, is at once intellectible and intelligible. intellectible in that its nature is incorporeal, and can be comprehended by no sense.

intelligibilis vero ideo, quod similitudo quidem est sensibilium, nec tamen sensibilis. intellectibile est enim, quod nec sensibile est, nec similitudo sensibilis. intelligibile autem quod ipsum quidem solo percipitur intellectu, sed non solo intellectu percipit, quia imaginationem vel sensum habet, quo ea quae sensibus subiacent comprehendit.

intelligible for this reason, that it is indeed a likeness of sensibles, yet not itself sensible. Intellectible is, in fact, that which is neither sensible, nor a likeness of something sensible. But intelligible is that which itself indeed is perceived by intellect alone, yet does not perceive by intellect alone, because it has imagination or sense, by which it comprehends the things that lie under the senses.

tangendo ergo corpora degenerat, [753D] quia, dum invisibiles corporum formas per sensuum passiones procurrit easque attactas per imaginationem in se trahit, toties a sua simplicitate scinditur, quoties aliquibus contrariae passionis qualitatibus informatur. cum vero ab hac distractione ad puram intelligentiam conscendens in unum se colligit, fit beatior intellectibilis substantiae participatione.

therefore by touching bodies it degenerates, [753D] because, while it runs through the invisible forms of bodies by the passions of the senses, and, having touched them, draws them into itself through imagination, it is so many times torn from its own simplicity as many times as it is informed by certain qualities of a contrary passion. But when, from this distraction, ascending to pure intelligence, it gathers itself into one, it becomes more blessed by participation in intelligible substance.

CAPUT IV

CHAPTER 4

De quaternario animae.

On the quaternary of the soul.

Huius quoque progressionis regressionisque rationem ipse etiam numerus docet. dic: "ter unum fiunt tria," dic: "ter tria fiunt novem," dic: "ter novem fiunt viginti septem," dic: "ter viginti septem fiunt octoginta unum." ecce tibi in quarto gradu unitas prima occurrit, idemque evenire videbis, [754A] si usque ad infinitum duxeris multiplicationem, ut semper in quarto gradu unitas emineat. rectissime autem simplex animae essentia unitate exprimitur, quae ipsa quoque incorporea est.

The reason of this progression and regression also the number itself teaches. say: "thrice one become three," say: "thrice three become nine," say: "thrice nine become twenty-
seven," say: "thrice twenty-seven become eighty-one." lo, to you in the fourth degree unity first occurs, and you will see the same happen, [754A] if you carry the multiplication on to infinity, so that always in the fourth degree unity stands out. But most rightly the simple essence of the soul is expressed by unity, which itself also is incorporeal.

ternarius quoque propter indissolubile mediae unitatis vinculum congrue ad animam refertur, sicut quaternarius, quia duo media habet ideoque dissolubilis est, proprie ad corpus pertinet. prima igitur progressio animae est qua de simplici essentia sua, quae monade figuratur, in virtualem ternarium se extendit, ubi iam per concupiscentiam aliud appetat, aliud per iram contemnat, per rationem inter utrumque discernat. et recte a monade in triadem profluere dicitur, quia omnis essentia naturaliter prior est potentia sua.

the ternary also, on account of the indissoluble bond of the middle unity, is fittingly referred to the soul, whereas the quaternary, because it has two middles and is therefore dissoluble, properly pertains to the body. therefore the first progression of the soul is that by which, from its simple essence, which is figured by the monad, it extends itself into a virtual ternary, where already through concupiscence it seeks one thing, through anger it contemns another, and through reason it discerns between the two. and rightly it is said to flow forth from the monad into the triad, because every essence is naturally prior to its potency.

[754B] rursum, quod eadem unitas in ternario multiplicante ter invenitur, hoc significat, quoniam anima non per partes, sed tota in singulis suis potentiis consistat. neque enim vel rationem solam vel iram solam vel concupiscentiam solam tertiam partem animae dicere possumus, cum nec aliud, nec minus sit in substantia ratio quam anima, nec aliud, nec minus ira quam anima, nec aliud, nec minus concupiscentia quam anima, sed una eandemque substantia secundum diversas potentias suas diversa sortitur vocabula. deinde a virtuali ternario secunda progressione ad regendam humani corporis musicam descendit, quae novenario componitur, quia novem sunt foramina in humano corpore quibus secundum naturalem contemperantiam influit et effluit [754C] omne quo idem corpus vegetatur et regitur.

[754B] Again, that the same unity is found, in the ternary multiplying, three times, signifies this: that the soul does not subsist by parts, but whole in each of its powers. For we cannot call reason alone or ire alone or concupiscence alone a third part of the soul, since reason is neither other, nor less, in substance than the soul, nor is ire other or less than the soul, nor concupiscence other or less than the soul, but one and the same substance, according to its diverse powers, obtains diverse names. Then from the virtual ternary, by a second progression, it descends to govern the music of the human body, which is composed by a novenary, because there are nine foramina in the human body through which, according to natural contemperation, everything flows in and flows out [754C] whereby that same body is nourished and governed.

hic quoque ordo est, quia prius naturaliter anima potentias suas habet quam corpori commisceatur. postea autem in tertia progressione per sensus iam extra se profusa ad visibilia haec, quae per viginti septem, qui solidus numerus est et trina dimensione ad similitudinem corporis extenditur, figurantur dispensanda, per infinitas actiones dissipatur. in quarta autem progessione soluta a corpore ad puritatem simplicitatis suae revertitur, ideoque in quarta multiplicatione, ubi ter viginti septem in octoginta unum excrevit, monas in summo apparet, ut evidenter clareat quod anima post huius vitae terminum, qui per octoginta designatur, ad unitatem suae simplicitatis redeat, a qua prius discesserat cum ad humanum corpus regendum descendebat.

here too there is an order, because first naturally the soul has its powers before it is commingled with the body. afterwards, however, in the third progression, through the senses now poured forth outside itself toward these visible things, which are figured to be dispensed by twenty-seven, which is a solid number and by triple dimension is extended to the likeness of the body, it is dissipated through infinite actions. in the fourth progression, however, released from the body it returns to the purity of its simplicity, and therefore in the fourth multiplication, where three times twenty-seven has grown into eighty-one, the monad appears at the summit, so that it may be plainly evident that the soul, after the limit of this life, which is designated by eighty, returns to the unity of its simplicity, from which it had previously departed when it was descending to rule the human body.

quod autem in octoginta meta humanae vitae naturaliter consistat, [754D] propheta declarat: Si, inquit, in valetudine octoginta anni, et amplius eorum labor et dolor. hanc quadruplam progressionem illum quaternarium animae, de quo supra locuti sumus, quidam intelligendum putant cumque, ad differentiam quaternarii corporis, quaternarium animae appellatum.

But that the goal of human life naturally stands at 80, [754D] the prophet declares: “If,” he says, “in health 80 years,
and what is beyond them is toil and pain.” Some think that this quadruple progression is to be understood as that quaternary of the soul, of which we spoke above; and that, in distinction from the quaternary of the body, it is called the quaternary of the soul.

CAPUT V

CHAPTER 5

De quaternario corporis.

On the quaternary of the body.

Nam corpori quoque suum assignant quaternarium. sicut monas animae, ita dias corpori congruit. dic: "bis duo fiunt quattuor," dic: "bis quattuor fiunt octo," dic: "bis octo fiunt sedecim," dic: "bis sedecim fiunt triginta duo." hic in quarto loco similiter idem numerus, id est binarius, a quo multiplicatio initium sumpsit, tibi occurrit, [755A] idemque si in infinitum processeris, indubitanter continget ut quarto semper gradu binarius emineat.

For to the body too they assign its quaternary. Just as the monad befits the soul, so the dyad befits the body. say: "twice two make four," say: "twice four make eight," say: "twice eight make sixteen," say: "twice sixteen make thirty-two." here, in the fourth place, likewise the same number, that is, the binary (two), from which the multiplication took its beginning, meets you, [755A] and the same will, if you proceed into infinity, unhesitatingly befall, namely that at the fourth step the binary always stands out.

et hic est quaternarius corporis, in quo intelligi datur omne quod a solubilibus compositionem accipit ipsum quoque esse dissolubile. vides nunc satis aperte, ut puto, quomodo animae de intellectibilibus ad intelligibilia degenerant, quaudo a puritate simplicis intelligentiae, quae nulla corporum fuscatur imagine, ad visibilium imaginationem descendunt rursumque beatiores fiunt, quando se ab hac distractione ad simplicem naturae suae fontem colligentes, quasi quodam optimae figurae signo impressae, componuntur. est igitur, ut apertius dicam, intellectibile in nobis id quod est intelligentia, intelligibile vero id quod est imaginatio.

and this is the quaternary of the body, in which it is given to be understood that everything which receives its composition from things dissoluble is itself also dissoluble. you see now quite openly, as I think, how souls degenerate from the intellectibles to the intelligibles, when from the purity of simple intelligence, which is darkened by no image of bodies, they descend to the imagination of visibles, and again they become more blessed, when, gathering themselves from this distraction back to the simple fount of their nature, as if impressed with a certain seal of the best form, they are composed. therefore, to speak more plainly, the intellectible in us is that which is intelligence, but the intelligible is that which is imagination.

[755B] intelligentia vero est de solis rerum principiis, id est, Deo, ideis, et hyle, et de incorporeis substantiis, pura certaque cognitio. imaginatio est memoria sensuum ex corporum reliquiis inhaerentibus animo, principium cognitionis per se nihil certum habens. sensus est passio animae in corpore ex qualitatibus extra accidentibus.

[755B] intelligence
indeed is a pure and certain cognition concerning the sole principles of things, that is, God, ideas, and hyle, and concerning incorporeal substances. imagination is a memory of the senses from the remnants of bodies adhering to the soul, a principle of cognition having in itself nothing certain. sense is a passion of the soul in the body from qualities befalling from without.

CAPUT VI

CHAPTER 6

De quadrivio.

On the quadrivium.

Cum igitur, ut supradictum est, ad mathematicam proprie pertineat abstractam attendere quantitatem, in partibus quantitatis species eius quaerere oportet. quantitas abstracta nihil est aliud nisi forma visibilis secundum lineamentarem dimensionem animo impressa, quae in imaginatione consistit, cuius geminae sunt partes: [755C] una continua, ut arbor, lapis, quae magnitudo dicitur, alia discreta, ut grex, populus, quae multitudo appellatur. rursus multitudinis alia sunt per se, ut tres, quattuor, vel quilibet alter numerus, alia ad aliquid ut duplum, dimidium, sesquialterum, sesquitertium, vel quodlibet tale.

since therefore, as was aforesaid, it pertains properly to mathematics to attend to abstract quantity, in the parts of quantity one ought to seek its species. abstract quantity is nothing other than a visible form, according to linear dimension, impressed upon the mind, which consists in the imagination, of which the parts are twin: [755C] one continuous, as a tree, a stone, which is called magnitude; the other discrete, as a flock, a people, which is called multitude. again, of multitude some are per se, as three, four, or any other number; others are relative to something, as double, half, sesquialter, sesquitertian, or anything of the sort.

magnitudinis vero alia sunt mobilia, ut sphaera mundi, alia immobilia, ut terra. multitudinem ergo quae per se est arithmetica speculatur, illam autem quae ad aliquid est, musica. immobilis magnitudinis geometria pollicetur notitiam.

Of magnitude, indeed,
some things are mobile, such as the sphere of the world; others are immobile, such as the earth. Therefore the multitude which is in itself is investigated by arithmetic; but that which is relative to something, by music. Geometry promises knowledge of immobile magnitude.

mobilis vero scientiam astronomicae disciplinae peritia vindicat. mathematica igitur dividitur in arithmeticam, musicam, geometriam, astronomiam.

But the expertise of the astronomical discipline claims the knowledge of the mobile. Mathematics therefore is divided into arithmetic, music, geometry, astronomy.

CAPUT VII

CHAPTER 7

[755D] De arithmetica.

[755D] On arithmetic.

Ares Graece, virtus interpretatur Latine, rithmus numerus; inde arithmetica virtus numeri dicitur. virtus autem numeri est, quod ad eius similitudinem cuncta formata sunt.

aretê in Greek, virtue is interpreted in Latin, arithmos number; hence arithmetic is called the virtue of number. but the virtue of number is that, according to its similitude, all things have been formed.

CAPUT VIII

CHAPTER 8

De musica.

On music.

Musica ab aqua vocabulum sumpsit, eo quod nulla euphonia, id est, bona sonoritas, sine humore fieri possit.

Music took its vocable from water, for no euphony, that is, good sonority, can be made without moisture.

CAPUT IX

CHAPTER 9

De geometria.

On geometry.

Geometria mensura terrae interpretatur, eo quod haec disciplina primum ab Aegyptiis reperta sit, quorum terminos cum Nilus inundatione sua limo obduceret et confunderet limites, perticis et funibus terram mensurare coeperunt. deinde a sapientibus etiam ad spatia maris et caeli et aeris et quorumlibet corporum mensuranda deducta sunt et extensa. [756A]

Geometry is interpreted as the measurement of the earth, because this discipline was first discovered by the Egyptians, whose boundaries, when the Nile with its inundation covered with mud and confused the limits, they began to measure the land with poles and with ropes. Then by the wise it was also derived and extended to the measuring of the spaces of the sea and of the sky and of the air and of whatever bodies [756A]

CAPUT X

CHAPTER 10

De astronomia.

On astronomy.

Astronomia et astrologia in hoc differre videntur, quod astronomia de lege astrorum nomen sumpsit, astrologia autem dicta est quasi sermo de astris disserens. nomia enim lex et logos sermo interpretatur. ita astronomia videtur esse quae de lege astrorum et conversione caeli disserit, regiones, circulos, cursus, ortus et occasus siderum, et cur unumquodque ita vocetur, investigans.

Astronomy and astrology seem to differ in this, that astronomy took its name from the law of the stars, but astrology is so called as if a discourse expounding on the stars. For nomia is interpreted “law” and logos “discourse.” Thus astronomy seems to be that which discours(es) concerning the law of the stars and the conversion of the heaven, investigating the regions, circles, courses, risings and settings of the stars, and why each is so called.

astrologia autem quae astra considerat secundum nativitatis et mortis et quorumlibet aliorum eventuum observantiam, quae partim naturalis est, partim superstitiosa; naturalis in complexionibus corporum, [756B] quae secundum superiorum contemperantiam variantur, ut sanitas, aegritudo, tempestas, serenitas, fertilitas et sterilitas; superstitiosa, in contingentibus et his quae libero arbitrio subiacent, quam partem mathematici tractant.

astrology, however, which considers the stars according to the observation of birth and of death and of any other events, which is partly natural, partly superstitious; natural in the complexions of bodies, [756B] which are varied according to the co-tempering of the superiors, such as health, sickness, tempest, serenity, fertility and sterility; superstitious, in contingent things and in those which are subject to free will, which part the mathematicians treat.

CAPUT XI

CHAPTER 11

De arithmetica.

On arithmetic.

Arithmetica materiam habet parem et imparem numerum. par numerus alius est pariter par, alius pariter impar, alius impariter par. impar quoque numerus tres habet species.

Arithmetic has as its material the even and the odd number. An even number is of one kind evenly even, another evenly odd, another oddly even. The odd number too three has species.

prima est primus et incompositus, secunda secundus et compositus, tertia per se secundus et compositus, ad alios comparatus primus et incompositus.

the first is prime and incomposite, the second secondary and composite, the third, in itself secondary and composite, but when compared to others, prime and incomposite.

CAPUT XII

CHAPTER 12

De musica.

On music.

Tres sunt musicae: mundana, humana, instrumentalis. Mundana, alia in elementis, alia in planetis, alia in temporibus; [756C] in elementis, alia in pondere, alia in numero, alia in mensura; in planetis, alia in situ, alia in motu, alia in natura; in temporibus, alia in diebus, vicissitudine lucis et noctis, alia in mensibus, crementis detrimentisque lunaribus, alia in annis, mutatione veris, aestatis, autumni, et hiemis. humana musica, alia in corpore, alia in anima, alia in connexu utriusque; in corpore, alia est in vegetatione, secundum quam crescit quae omnibus nascentibus convenit, alia est in humoribus, ex quorum complexione humanum corpus subsistit, quae sensibilibus communis est, alia in operationibus, quae specialiter rationalibus congruit, quibus mechanica praeest, quae, si modum non excesserint bonae sunt, ut inde non nutriatur cupiditas unde infirmitas foveri debet, [756D] sicut Lucanus in laudem Catonis refert:

Three musics are: mundane, human, instrumental. The mundane, one in the elements, another in the planets, another in the times; [756C] in the elements, one in weight, another in number, another in measure; in the planets, one in position, another in motion, another in nature; in the times, one in the days, by the vicissitude of light and night, another in the months, by lunar increments and detriments, another in the years, by the change of spring, summer, autumn, and winter. human music, one in the body, another in the soul, another in the connection of both; in the body, one is in vegetation, according to which it grows, which belongs to all that are born, another is in the humors, from whose complexion the human body subsists, which is common to sensible beings, another in operations, which specially befits rational beings, over which mechanics presides, which, if they do not exceed the measure, are good, so that desire be not nourished from where weakness ought to be cherished, [756D] as Lucan relates in praise of Cato:

Huic epulae vicisse famem, magnique penates Submovisse hiemem tecto: pretiosaque vestis Hirtam membra super, Romani more Quiritis, Induxisse togam.

For him a banquet was to have vanquished hunger, and the mighty Penates to have driven winter from the roof: and a precious garment over rough limbs, in the manner of the Roman Quiris, to have assumed the toga.

musica in anima alia est in virtutibus, ut est iustitia, pietas, et temperantia, alia in potentiis, ut est ratio, ira, et concupiscentia. musica inter corpus et animam est illa naturalis amicitia qua anima corpori non corporeis vinculis, sed affectibus quibusdam colligatur, ad movendum et sensificandum ipsum corpus, secundum quam amicitiam nemo carnem suam odio habuit. musica haec est, ut ametur caro, sed plus spiritus, ut foveatur corpus, [757A] non perimatur virtus.

music in the soul is partly in the virtues, as justice, piety, and temperance, partly in the powers, as reason, ire, and concupiscence. music between body and soul is that natural amity by which the soul is bound to the body not by corporeal bonds, but by certain affections, to move and to sensify the body itself, according to which amity no one has hated his own flesh. this music is, that the flesh be loved, but the spirit more, that the body be cherished, [757A] not let virtue be destroyed.

musica instrumentalis alia in pulsu, ut fit in tympanis et chordis, alia in flatu, ut in tibiis et organis, alia in voce, ut in carminibus et cantilenis. tria quoque sunt genera musicorum: unum quod carmina fingit, aliud quod instrumentis agitur, tertium quod instrumentorum opus carmenque diiudicat.

music
instrumental: one in striking, as happens on tympana and strings, another in blowing, as on pipes and organs, another in voice, as in songs and cantilenas. there are also three kinds
of musicians: one that fashions songs, another that is performed on instruments, a third that judges the work of instruments and of song.

CAPUT XIII

CHAPTER 13

De geometria.

On geometry.

Geometria tres habet partes, planimetriam, altimetriam, cosmimetriam. planimetria planum metitur, id est, longum et latum, et extenditur ante et retro, dextrorsum et sinistrorsum. altimetria altum metitur et extenditur sursum et deorsum.

Geometry has three parts, planimetry, altimetry, cosmimetry. planimetry measures the plane, that is, length and breadth, and it is extended forward and backward, rightward and leftward. altimetry measures height and is extended upward and downward.

[757B] nam et mare altum dicitur, id est, profundum, et arbor alta, id est, sublimis. cosmos mundus interpretatur, et inde dicta est cosmimetria, id est mensura mundi. haec metitur sphaerica, id est, globosa et rotunda, sicut est pila et ovum, unde etiam a sphaera mundi propter excellentiam dicta est cosmimetria, non quia tantum de mundi mensura agat, sed quia mundi sphaera inter omnia sphaerica dignior sit.

[757B] for both the sea is called “high,” that is, deep, and a tree “high,” that is, lofty. “cosmos” is interpreted as “world,” and from that it is called cosmimetry, that is, the measure of the world. This measures spherical things, that is, globose and round, such as a ball and an egg, whence also from the sphere of the world, on account of excellence, it is called cosmimetry, not because it deals only with the measure of the world, but because the sphere of the world among all spherical things is more worthy.

CAPUT XIV

CHAPTER 14

De astronomia.

On astronomy.

Nec contrarium est, quod superius immobilem magnitudinem geometriae attribuimus et mobilem astronomiae, quia hoc secundum primam inventionem dictum est, secundum quam etiam geometria mensura terrae dicitur. [757C] vel possumus dicere quod id quod geometria in sphaera mundi considerat, id est, dimensio regionum et circulorum caelestium, immobile sit, secundum hoc quod ad geometricam considerationem pertinet. geometria enim non considerat motum, sed spatium.

nor is it contrary that above we attributed an immobile magnitude to geometry and a mobile to astronomy, because this was said according to the first invention,
according to which also geometry is called the measure of the earth. [757C] or we can say that that which geometry considers in the sphere of the world, that is,
the dimension of the regions and of the celestial circles, is immobile, according to this, insofar as it pertains to geometric consideration. for geometry does not consider
motion, but space.

quod autem astronomia speculatur mobile sit, id est, cursus astrorum et intervalla temporum. sicque universaliter dicemus immobilem magnitudinem geometriae esse subiectam, mobilem astronomiae, quia, licet ambae de eadem re agant, una tamen contemplatur id quod permanet, altera id quod transit speculatur.

but what astronomy speculates upon is mobile, that is, the courses of the stars and the intervals of time. and so, universally, we shall say that the immobile magnitude is subject to geometry, the mobile to astronomy, because, although both deal with the same matter, yet the one contemplates that which remains, the other speculates upon that which passes.

CAPUT XV

CHAPTER 15

Definitio quadrivii.

Definition of the quadrivium.

Arithmetica est igitur numerorum scientia. musica est divisio sonorum et vocum varietas. aliter, musica sive harmonia est plurium dissimilium in unum redactorum concordia.

arithmetic is therefore the science of numbers. music is the division of sounds and the variety of voices. otherwise, music or harmony is the concord of several dissimilars brought into one reduced.

[757D] geometria est disciplina magnitudinis immobilis formarumque descriptio contemplativa, per quam uniuscuiusque termini declarari solent. aliter, geometria est fons sensuum et origo dictionum. astronomia est disciplina investigans spatia, motus et reditus caelestium corporum certis temporibus.

[757D] geometry is the discipline of immobile magnitude and a contemplative description of forms, through which the limits of each thing
are wont to be set forth. otherwise, geometry is a fount of meanings and the origin of expressions. astronomy is a discipline investigating the spaces, motions, and returns of the heavenly bodies at fixed
times.

CAPUT XVI

CHAPTER 16

De physica.

On physics.

Physica causas rerum in effectibus suis et effectus a causis suis investigando considerat.

Physics, by investigating, considers the causes of things in their effects, and the effects from their causes.

Unde tremor terris, qua vi maria alta tumescant. Vires herbarum, animos irasque ferarum, Omne genus fruticum, lapidum quoque reptiliumque.

Whence the tremor to the earth, by what force the high seas swell. The powers of herbs, the spirits and ires of wild beasts, Every genus of shrubs, and of stones and of reptiles as well.

physis natura interpretatur, [758A] unde etiam in superiori divisione theoricae physicam naturalem Boethius nominavit. haec etiam physiologia dicitur, id est, sermo de naturis disserens, quod ad eandem causam spectat. physica aliquando large accipitur aequipollens theoricae, secundum quam acceptionem philosophiam quidam in tres partes dividunt, id est, physicam, ethicam, logicam, in qua divisione mechanica non continetur, sed restringitur philosophia circa physicam, ethicam, logicam.

physis is interpreted as nature, [758A] whence also in the foregoing division of the Theoretic Boethius named it natural physics. this is also called physiology, that is, a discourse discoursing about natures, which looks to the same cause. physics is sometimes taken broadly as equipollent to the Theoretic, according to which acceptation some divide philosophy into three parts, that is, physics, ethics, logic, in which division the mechanical is not contained, but philosophy is restricted to physics, ethics, logic.

CAPUT XVII

CHAPTER 17

Quid sit proprium uniuscuiusque artis.

What is proper to each art.

Cum vero omnes artes ad unum philosophiae tendant terminum, non una tamen via omnes currunt, [758B] sed singulae suas proprias quasdam considerationes habent, quibus ab invicem differunt. logica consideratio est in rebus, attendens intellectus rerum, sive per intelligentiam, ut neque sint haec neque horum similitudines, sive per rationem, ut non sint haec sed horum tamen similitudines. considerat ergo logica species et genera rerum.

Although indeed all arts tend toward one terminus of philosophy, nevertheless they do not all run by one road, [758B] but each has certain proper considerations of its own, by which they differ from one another. logical consideration is about things, attending to the understanding of things, whether through intellection, such that neither these nor their likenesses exist, or through reason, such that these are not, but nevertheless likenesses of these are. therefore logic considers the species and genera of things.

mathematicae autem proprium est actus confusos inconfuse per rationem attendere. verbi gratia, in actu rerum, non invenitur linea sine superficie et soliditate. nullum enim corpus sic solummodo longum est, ut latitudine vel altitudine careat, sed in omni corpore haec tria simul sunt.

but the proper function of mathematics is to attend, by reason, to confused acts without confusion. for example, in the actual order of things, no line is found without surface and solidity. for no body is in such a way only long as to lack breadth or height; but in every body these three are together at once.

ratio tamen attendit sine superficie et crassitudine lineam pure per se, quod est mathematicum, [758C] non quia in re ita vel sit vel esse possit, sed quia ratio saepe actus rerum considerat, non ut sunt, sed sicut esse possunt, non in se, sed quantum ad ipsam rationem, id est, ut ratio pateretur esse. secundum quam considerationem dictum est continuam quantitatem in infinita decrescere, et discretam crescere in infinitum. talis est enim vivacitas rationis, ut omne longum in longa dividat, latum in lata, et cetera, utque ipsi rationi nihil carens intervallo intervallum generet.

nevertheless reason attends to a line without surface and thickness
purely by itself, which is mathematical, [758C] not because in reality it either is or can be thus, but because reason often considers the acts of things, not as they are, but as they can be,
not in themselves, but as far as regards reason itself, that is, as reason would allow them to be. According to which consideration it has been said that continuous quantity
decreases to the infinite, and that discrete (quantity) increases to the infinite. For such is the vivacity of reason, that it divides every length into lengths, breadth into breadths, and so forth, and that for reason itself
even what lacks any interval generates an interval.

physicae autem est proprium actus rerum permixtos impermixte attendere. actus enim corporum mundi non sunt puri, sed compositi ab actibus purorum, quos physica, cum per se non inveniantur, pure tamen et per se considerat. purum scilicet actum ignis, [758D] sive terrae, sive aeris, sive aquae, et ex natura uniuscuiusque per se considerata, de concretione et efficientia totius iudicat.

but it is proper to physics to attend to the mixed acts of things in an unmixed way. for the acts of the bodies of the world are not
pure, but composite from the acts of the pure elements, which physics, although they are not found by themselves, nevertheless considers purely and by themselves. namely the pure act of fire, [758D] or of earth,
or of air, or of water; and from the nature of each considered by itself, it judges concerning the concretion and the efficiency of the whole.

hoc etiam praetereundum non est, quod sola physica proprie de rebus agit, ceterae omnes de intellectibus rerum. logica tractat de ipsis intellectibus secundum praedicamentalem constitutionem; mathematica vero, secundum integralem compositionem, et ideo logica quandoque utitur pura intelligentia, mathematica autem nunquam sine imaginatione est, ideoque nihil vere simplex habet. quia enim logica et mathematica priores sunt ordine discendi quam physica, et ad eam quodammodo instrumenti vice funguntur quibus unumquemque primum informari oportet antequam physicae speculationi operam det, necesse fuit ut non in actibus rerum, ubi fallax experimentum est, sed in sola ratione, [759A] ubi inconcussa veritas manet, suam considerationem ponerent, deinde ipsa ratione praevia ad experientiam rerum descenderent.

this also must not be passed over, that only
physics properly deals with things, all the others with the intellects of things. logic treats of the intellects themselves according to the predicamental constitution; mathematics,
on the other hand, according to integral composition, and therefore logic sometimes uses pure intelligence, but mathematics is never without imagination, and so
it has nothing truly simple. for since logic and mathematics are prior in the order of learning than physics, and serve it in a certain way in the stead of an instrument
with which each person must first be informed before he devote effort to the speculation of physics, it was necessary that they should place their consideration not in the acts of things, where experiment is fallacious,
but in reason alone, [759A] where unshaken truth remains, and then, with reason itself as forerunner, descend to the experience of things.

postquam igitur demonstravimus quomodo divisio theoricae, quam ponit Boethius, superiori conveniat, breviter nunc utrasque repetimus, ut singula utriusque verba divisionis invicem conferamus.

After, then, we have shown how the division of the theoretical, which Boethius sets forth, agrees with the preceding, we now briefly rehearse both of them, so that we may compare in turn the individual terms of each division.

CAPUT XVIII

CHAPTER 18

Collatio supradictorum.

Collation of the foregoing.

Theorica dividitur in theologiam, mathematicam, et physicam. vel aliter, theorica dividitur in intellectibilem, intelligibilem, et naturalem. vel aliter, theorica dividitur in divinalem, in doctrinalem, et philologiam.

Theoretical science is divided into theology, mathematics, and physics. or otherwise, the theoretical is divided into the intellectible, the intelligible, and the natural. or otherwise, the theoretical is divided into divinal, into doctrinal, and into philology.

[759B] eadem est igitur theologia, intellectibilis et divinalis, eadem est mathematica, intelligibilus et doctrinalis, eademque physica, philologia, et naturalis. sunt qui has tres theoricae partes mystice quodam Palladis nomine, quae dea sapientiae fingitur esse, significari putant. dicitur enim Tritona, quasi tritoona, id est, tertia cognitio, videlicet Dei, quam intellectibilem nominavimus, et animarum, quam intelligibilem diximus, et corporum, quam naturalem appellavimus.

[759B] therefore the same is theology, the intellectible and the divinal; the same is mathematics, the intelligible and the doctrinal; and likewise physics, philology, and the natural. there are those who think that these three theoretical parts are signified mystically by a certain name of Pallas, who is feigned to be the goddess of wisdom. for she is called Tritona, as it were tritoona, that is, “third knowledge,” namely of God, which we have named intellectible, and of souls, which we have called intelligible, and of bodies, which we have called natural.

et merito ab his tribus tantum sapientia vocabulum sumit, quia, licet tres reliquas, id est, ethicam, mechanicam, logicam, congrue ad sapientiam referre possimus, expressius tamen logicam, propter vocis eloquentiam, mechanicam et ethicam, propter circumspectionem morum et operum, prudentiam sive scientiam appellamus. [759C] solam autem theoricam, propter speculationem veritatis rerum, sapientiam nominamus.

and deservedly from these three alone it takes the appellation wisdom, because, although we can suitably refer the three remaining, that is, ethics, mechanics, and logic, to wisdom, yet more expressly we call logic, on account of the eloquence of speech, and mechanics and ethics, on account of the circumspection of morals and works, prudence or science. [759C] But the theoretical alone, on account of the speculation of the truth of things, we name wisdom.

CAPUT XIX

CHAPTER 19

Item.

Likewise.

Practica dividitur in solitariam, privatam et publicam; vel aliter, in ethicam, oeconomicam et politicam; vel aliter, in moralem et dispensativam et civilem. una est solitaria, ethica et moralis; una rursum, privata, oeconomica et dispensativa. eademque publica, politica atque civilis.

The Practical is divided into solitary, private, and public; or otherwise, into ethical, economic, and political; or otherwise, into moral and dispensative and civil. one is solitary, ethical, and moral; again one, private, economic, and dispensative. and the same public, political, and civil.

oeconomus interpretatur dispensator. inde oeconomica dicta est dispensativa. polis Graece, Latine civitas dicitur; inde politica dicta est, id est, civilis.

Oeconomus is interpreted as dispensator; hence the oeconomic is called dispensative. Polis in Greek is called civitas in Latin; hence the political is called civil.

quando ethicam partem constituimus practicae, stricte accipienda est ethica in moribus uniuscuiusque personae, et est eadem quae solitaria. [759D] solitaria igitur est quae sui curam gerens cunctis sese erigit, exornat augetque virtutibus, nihil in vita admittens quo non gaudeat, nihil faciens paenitendum. privata est quae familiaris officium mediocri componens dispositione distribuit.

when we constitute the ethical part of the practical, ethics is to be taken strictly in the morals of each individual person, and it is the same as the solitary. [759D] therefore the solitary is that which, caring for itself, in all respects lifts itself up, adorns and increases itself with virtues, admitting nothing in life at which it does not rejoice, doing nothing to be repented of. the private is that which, ordering the household duty, apportions it with a moderate disposition.

publica est quae reipublicae curam suscipiens, cunctorum saluti suae providentiae sollertia, et iustitiae libra, et fortitudinis stabilitate, et temperantiae patientia medetur. solitaria igitur convenit singularibus, privata patribus familias, politica rectoribus urbium. practica actualis dicitur, eo quod res propositas operationibus suis explicet.

the public is that which, undertaking the care of the commonwealth, ministers to the welfare of all by the skill of its providence, and by the balance of justice, and by the steadfastness of fortitude, and by the patience of temperance. therefore the solitary suits individuals, the private suits fathers of families, the political suits rulers of cities. the practical is called actual, because it explicates the proposed things by its operations.

moralis dicitur per quam mos vivendi honestus appetitur, et instituta ad virtutem tendentia praeparantur. dispensativa dicitur cum domesticarum rerum sapienter ordo disponitur. [760A] civilis dicitur per quam totius civitatis utilitas administratur.

moral is called that by which an honorable manner of living is sought, and institutions tending toward virtue are prepared. dispensative
is called when the order of domestic affairs is wisely arranged. [760A] civil is called that by which the utility of the whole city is administered.

CAPUT XX

CHAPTER 20

Divisio mechanicae in septem.

Division of mechanics into seven.

Mechanica septem scientias continet: lanificium, armaturam, navigationem, agriculturam, venationem, medicinam, theatricam. ex quibus tres ad extrinsecus vestimentum naturae pertinent, quo se ipsa natura ab incommodis protegit, quattuor ad intrinsecus, quo se alendo et fovendo nutrit, ad similitudinem quidem trivii et quadrivii, quia trivium de vocibus quae extrinsecus sunt et quadrivium de intellectibus qui intrinsecus concepti sunt pertractat. hae sunt septem ancillae quas Mercurius a Philologia in dotem accepit, [760B] quia nimirum eloquentiae, cui iuncta fuerit sapientia, omnis humana actio servit, sicut Tullius in libro rhetoricorum de studio eloquentiae dicit: Hoc tuta, hoc honesta, hoc illustris, hoc eodem vita iucunda fiat.

Mechanics contains seven sciences: wool-working, armature, navigation, agriculture, venation (hunting), medicine, theatrics. of which three pertain to the outward garment of nature, by which nature itself protects itself from inconveniences; four to the inward, by which, by nourishing and cherishing itself, it is nourished, in the likeness indeed of the trivium and quadrivium, because the trivium treats of voices which are external and the quadrivium of intellects which are conceived within. these are the seven handmaids which Mercury received as a dowry from Philology, [760B] because surely to eloquence, to which wisdom has been joined, every human action serves, just as Tullius in the book of rhetoric concerning the pursuit of eloquence says: By this let life be safe, by this honorable, by this illustrious, and by this same pleasant.

nam hinc ad rem publicam plurima commoda veniunt, si moderatrix omnium praesto est sapientia. hinc ad eos qui ipsam adepti sunt, laus, honos, dignitas, confluit. hinc amicis quoque eorum certissimum et tutissimum praesidium est.

for from this to the commonwealth very many benefits come, if wisdom, the moderatrix of all, is at hand. from this to those who have attained her, praise, honor, dignity, flows together. from this also for their friends there is the most certain and safest protection.

hae mechanicae appellantur, id est, adulterinae, quia de opere artificis agunt, quod a natura formam mutuatur. sicut aliae septem liberales appellatae sunt, vel quia liberos, id est, expeditos et exercitatos animos requirunt, quia subtiliter de rerum causis disputant, vel quia liberi tantum antiquitus, [760C] id est, nobiles, in eis studere consueverant, plebei vero et ignobilium filii in mechanicis propter peritiam operandi. in quo magna priscorum apparet diligentia, qui nihil intentatum linquere voluerunt, sed omnia sub certis regulis et praeceptis stringere.

these are called mechanical, that is, adulterine, because they deal with the work of the artificer, which borrows its form from nature. just as the other seven
are called liberal, either because they require free minds, that is, unencumbered and well-exercised, since they dispute subtly about the causes of things, or because only the free
in antiquity, [760C] that is, the nobles, were accustomed to study in them, whereas the plebeians and the sons of the ignoble in the mechanical arts, on account of expertise in working. in this the great diligence of the ancients
appears, who wished to leave nothing unattempted, but to compress everything under certain rules and precepts.

mechanica est scientia ad quam fabricam omnium rerum concurrere dicunt.

Mechanics is the science to which they say the fabrication of all things converges.

CAPUT XXI

CHAPTER 21

Prima: lanificium.

First: wool-working.

Lanificium continet omnia texendi, consuendi, retorquendi genera, quae fiunt manu, acu, fuso, subula, girgillo, pectine, alibro, calamistro, chilindro, sive aliis quibuslibet instrumentis, ex quacumque lini vel lanae materia et omni genere pellium erasarum vel pilos habentium, cannabis quoque, vel suberis, iuncorum, pilorum, floccorum, [760D] aut alia qualibet re huiuscemodi, quae in usum vestimentorum, operimentorum, linteorum, sagorum, sagmatum, substratoriorum, cortinarum, matularum, filtrorum, chordarum, cassium, funium, redigi potest. stramina quoque ex quibus galeros et sportulas texere solent homines. haec omnia studia ad lanificium pertinent.

Wool-working comprises all kinds of weaving, sewing, and re-twisting, which are done by hand, with a needle, a spindle, an awl, a girgillus, a comb, an alibrum, a calamister, a cylinder, or with any other instruments whatsoever, from whatever material of flax or of wool and from every kind of hides, scraped or bearing hair, and also from hemp, or cork, of rushes,
of hairs, of flock, [760D] or any other thing of this sort, which can be rendered for the use of garments, coverings, linens, cloaks, pack-saddles, underlays, curtains, pots, filters, cords, nets, ropes. straw, too, from which men are wont to weave hats and little baskets. all these pursuits pertain to wool-working.

CAPUT XXII

CHAPTER 22

Secunda: armatura.

Second: armor.

Secunda est armatura. arma aliquando quaelibet instrumenta dicuntur, sicut dicimus arma belli, arma navis, id est, instrumenta belli et navis. ceterum proprie arma sunt quibus tegimur, ut scutum, thorax, galea, vel quibus percutimus, ut gladius, bipennis, sarisa.

Second is armature. arms are sometimes called any instruments, just as we say the arms of war, the arms of a ship, that is, the instruments of war and of a ship. furthermore, properly arms are those with which we are covered, such as shield, thorax, helmet, or those with which we strike, such as sword, bipennis, sarisa.

tela autem sunt quibus iaculari possumus, ut hasta, sagitta. dicta autem arma ab armo, [761A] id est, bracchio, quia bracchium muniunt quod ictibus opponere solemus. tela autem dicuntur a Graeco telon, id est, longum, eo quod longa sint huiusmodi, unde et protelare, id est, prolongare dicitur.

but missiles are those with which we can javelin-cast, such as the spear and the arrow. But arms are so called from armo, [761A] that is, the arm, because they fortify the arm which we are accustomed to oppose to blows. But missiles are said to be from the Greek telon, that is, long, because things of this sort are long, whence also to protelar, that is, to prolong, is said.

armatura igitur quasi instrumentalis scientia dicitur, non tantum ideo quod instrumentis operando utatur, quantum quod de praeiacenti alicuius massae materia aliquod, ut ita dicam, instrumentum efficiat. ad hanc omnis materia lapidum, lignorum, metallorum, harenarum, argillarum pertinet. haec duas habet species, architectonicam et fabrilem.

Armature, therefore, is called a kind of instrumental science, not so much because in working it uses instruments
as because from the material of some pre-existing mass it fashions, so to speak, an instrument. To this pertains all material of stones, woods,
metals, sands, clays. This has two species, the architectonic and the fabrile.

architectonica dividitur in caementariam, quae ad latomos et caementarios, et in carpentariam, quae ad carpentarios et tignarios pertinet, aliosque huiusmodi utriusque artifices, in dolabris et securibus, lima et assiculo, [761B] serra et terebro, runcinis, artavis, trulla, examussi, polientes, dolantes, sculpentes, limantes, scalpentes, compingentes, linientes in qualibet materia, luto, latere, lapide, ligno, osse, sabulo, calce, gypso, et si qua sunt similia operantium. fabrilis dividitur in malleatoriam, quae feriendo massam in formam extendit, et in exclusoriam, quae fundendo massam in formam redigit. unde exclusores dicti sunt, qui de confusione massae noverunt formam vasis exprimere.

the architectonic is divided into masonry, which pertains to stonecutters (latomoi) and
masons, and into carpentry, which pertains to carpenters and tignarii (timber-workers), and other artisans of both kinds of this sort, with mattocks and axes, with a file and a small board, [761B]
with a saw and a borer, with planes, drawknives, a trowel, a spirit-level, polishers, hewers, carvers, filers, engravers, joiners, smoothers in whatever material, in mud, brick,
stone, wood, bone, sand, lime, gypsum, and, if there are any similar materials in which they work. the fabrile (craft) is divided into the malleatory, which by striking stretches the mass into a form, and into the exclusory, which by pouring reduces the mass into a form. whence “exclusors” are called those who know how to express the form of a vessel out of the confusion of the mass.

CAPUT XXIII

CHAPTER 23

Tertia: navigatio.

Third: navigation.

Navigatio continet omnem in emendis, vendendis, mutandis, domesticis sive peregrinis mercibus negotiationem. haec rectissime quasi quaedam sui generis rhetorica est, [761C] eo quod huic professioni eloquentia maxime sit necessaria. unde et hic qui facundiae praeesse dicitur, Mercurius, quasi mercatorum kirrius, id est, Dominus appellatur.

Navigation contains all negotiation in buying, selling, exchanging, with domestic or foreign wares. this is most rightly, as it were, a certain rhetoric of its own kind, [761C] because to this profession eloquence is most necessary. whence also he who is said to preside over eloquence—Mercury—, as though the merchants’ kirrius, that
is, Lord, is called.

haec secreta mundi penetrat, litora invisa adit, deserta horrida lustrat, et cum barbaris nationibus et linguis incognitis commercia humanitatis exercet. huius studium gentes conciliat, bella sedat, pacem firmat, et privata bona ad communem usum omnium immutat.

this penetrates the secrets of the world, approaches unvisited shores, surveys grim deserts, and with barbarian nations and unknown tongues exercises the commerce of humanity. the pursuit of this conciliates peoples, calms wars, makes peace firm, and transforms private goods to the common use of all.

CAPUT XXIV

CHAPTER 24

Quarta: agricultura.

Fourth: agriculture.

Agricultura quattuor species habet: arvum agrum, qui sationi deputatur; et consitum, qui arboribus vacat, ut vineta, pomaria, nemora; pascuum, ut prata, tempe, tesqua; floridum, ut horti et rosaria.

Agriculture has four species: the arable field, which is deputed to sowing; and the planted kind, which is free for trees, such as vineyards, orchards, groves; the pasture, such as meadows, valleys (tempe), wastelands (tesqua); the florid kind, such as gardens and rose-gardens.

CAPUT XXV

CHAPTER 25

[761D] Quinta: venatio.

[761D] Fifth: hunting.

Venatio dividitur in ferinam, aucupium et piscaturam. ferina multis modis exercetur, retibus, pedicis, laqueis, praecipitiis, arcu, iaculis, cuspide, indagine, pennarum odore, canibus, accipitribus. aucupium fit laqueis, pedicis, retibus, arcu, visco, hamo.

Hunting is divided into beast-hunting, fowling, and fishing. Beast-hunting is practiced in many ways: with nets, foot-snares, nooses, precipices, the bow, javelins, the spear-point, the encircling drive,
by the smell of feathers, with dogs, with hawks. Fowling is done with nooses, foot-snares, nets, the bow, bird-lime, and the hook.

piscatura fit sagenis, retibus, gurgustiis, hamis, iaculis. ad hanc disciplinam pertinet omnium ciborum, saporum, et potuum apparatus. nomen tamen accepit ab una parte sua, quia antiquitus plus venatione vesci solebant, sicut adhuc in quibusdam regionibus, ubi rarissimus usus panis est, carnem pro cibo et mulsum vel aquam pro potu habent.

Fishing is done with seines, nets, fish-traps, hooks, and harpoons. To this
discipline belongs the preparation of all foods, flavors, and drinks. Nevertheless it has received its name from one of its parts, because in antiquity they used more to live by hunting,
as still in certain regions, where the use of bread is very rare, they have meat for food and mulsum (honeyed wine) or water for drink.

cibus in duo dividitur, in panem et obsonium. panis dictus est, vel quasi ponis, quia omnibus mensis apponitur, [762A] vel a Graeco pan, quod est omne, quia nullum convivium bonum sine pane ducitur. panis multa sunt genera, azymus, fermentatus, subcinericius, rubigus, spongia, placenta, clibanicus, dulcia, siligeneus, amolum, simila, et cetera multa.

food is divided in two, into bread and
obsonium. bread is so called, either as if “ponis,” because it is set before all tables, [762A] or from the Greek pan, which is “all,” because no banquet is considered good without bread. there are many kinds of bread: azyme, leavened, subcinerary (ash-baked), rubiginous, sponge-cake, placenta-cake, clibanical (oven-baked), sweets, siliginous (of fine wheat), amolum (starch), simila (semolina), and many others.

obsonium dicitur quasi adiunctum pani, quod nos cibarium dicere possumus. huius multa sunt genera, carnes, pulmenta, mulsa, holera, fructus. carnes aliae sunt assae, aliae frixae, aliae elixae, aliae crudae, aliae salsae.

obsonium is called, as it were, an adjunct to bread, which we can call provision. Of this there are many kinds: meats, relishes, mulsa (honey-wines), greens, fruits. meats are of some kinds roasted, others fried, others boiled, others raw, others salted.

aliae dicuntur succidia, lardum quoque sive taxea, perna vel petasunculus, axungia, arvina, adeps. pulmenti item multa sunt genera, Lucaniae farcimen, minutal, afrotum, mortisia Galatiae, et cetera quaecumque princeps coquorum excogitare potuit. [762B] mulsa habent lac, colostrum, babdutam, butyram, caseum, serum.

others are called succidia, lard likewise or taxea, ham or little ham, axungia, tallow (arvina), fat (adeps). Likewise there are many kinds of pulmentum (relish): the Lucanian sausage, minutal (a minced stew), afrotum, the mortisia of Galatia, and whatever else the chief of the cooks was able to devise. [762B]
the dairy-products include milk, colostrum, babduta, butter, cheese, whey.

holerum et fructuum nomina enumeret qui potest? sapores alii calidi sunt, alii frigidi, alii amari, alii dulces, alii sicci, alii humidi. potus alii tantum sunt potus, id est, qui humectant tantum, non nutriunt, ut aqua; alii potus et cibus, id est, qui humectant et nutriunt, ut vinum.

Who can enumerate the names of vegetables and fruits? Flavors are some hot, others frigid, others bitter, others sweet, others dry, others humid. Drinks: some are only drink, that is, those which only moisten, do not nourish, like water; others are both drink and food, that is, those which moisten and nourish, like wine.

rursum, qui cibus sunt, alii naturaliter sunt cibus, ut vinum et sicera quaelibet; alii accidentaliter, ut cervisia, medones. venatio igitur continet omnia pistorum, carnificum, coquorum, cauponum officia.

again, the things which are food, some are naturally food, as wine and any sicera; others incidentally, as beer and meads. therefore hunting comprises all the offices of bakers, butchers, cooks, and innkeepers.

CAPUT XXVI

CHAPTER 26

Sexta: medicina.

Sixth: medicine.

[762C] Medicina dividitur in duas partes, occasiones et operationes. occasiones sex sunt: aer, motus et quies, inanitio et repletio, cibus et potus, somnus et vigiliae, et accidentia animae. quae ideo occasiones esse dicuntur, quia faciunt et conservant sanitatem, si temperata fuerint; si intemperata fuerint, infirmitatem.

[762C] Medicine is divided into two parts, occasions and operations. the occasions are six: air, motion and rest, inanition and repletion, food and drink, sleep and vigils, and the accidents of the soul. which for this reason are said to be occasions, because they make and conserve health, if they have been tempered; if they have been intemperate, infirmity.

accidentia animae ideo dicuntur occasio sanitatis vel infirmitatis, quia aliquando vel commovent calorem impetuose, ut ira, vel leniter, ut delectationes, vel attrahunt et celant aut impetuose, ut terror et timor, aut leniter, ut angustia. et sunt quae commovent naturalem virtutem intus et extra, ut est tristitia. omnis operatio medicinae aut intus fit aut extra: intus, ut ea quae ore, naribus, auribus sive ano intromittuntur, ut potiones, vomitationes, pulveres etc., quae bibendo, vel masticando, vel attrahendo sumuntur; [762D] foris, ut epitimata, cataplasmata, emplastra, chirurgia, quae duplex est: in carne, ut incidere, suere, urere; in osse, ut solidare et iuncturae reddere.

the accidents of the soul are therefore called an occasion of health or infirmity, because sometimes they either stir heat impetuously, as wrath, or gently, as delights; or they draw it and conceal it either impetuously, as terror and fear, or gently, as distress. And there are those which stir the natural virtue within and without, as sadness does. Every operation of medicine is done either within or without: within, such things as are introduced by the mouth, nostrils, ears, or anus, as potions, vomitings, powders, etc., which are taken by drinking, by chewing, or by drawing in; [762D] without, such as epithems, cataplasms, plasters, surgery, which is twofold: in the flesh, to cut, to sew, to burn; in the bone, to consolidate and to restore the joints.

nec moveat quemquam quod cibum et potum inter attributa medicinae annumero, quae superius venationi attribui, quia secundum diversos respectus hoc factum est. vinum namque in botro agriculturae est, in peno, celararii, in gustu, medici. similiter ciborum apparatus ad pistrinum, macellum, coquinam pertinet; virtus saporis, ad medicinam.

Let it trouble no one that I reckon food and drink among the attributes of medicine, which above I attributed to hunting, because this was done according to different respects.
For wine, on the cluster, belongs to agriculture; in the pantry, to the cellarer; in the tasting, to the physician.
Likewise the preparation of foods pertains to the bakery, the butcher’s market, the kitchen; the virtue of savor, to medicine.

CAPUT XXVII

CHAPTER 27

Septima: theatrica.

Seventh: theatrical.

Theatrica dicitur scientia ludorum a theatro ubi populus ad ludendum convenire solebat, non quia in theatro tantum ludus fieret, sed quia celebrior locus fuerat ceteris. [763A] fiebant autem ludi alii in theatris, alii in gabulis, alii in gymnasiis, alii in amphicircis, alii in arenis, alii in conviviis, alii in fanis. in theatro gesta recitabantur vel carminibus, vel personis, vel larvis, vel oscillis in gabulis choreas ducebant et saltabant.

Theatrical is called the science of games from the theater where the people were accustomed to come together to play, not because play took place only in the theater, but because it had been a more celebrated place than the others. [763A] however, games were held, some in theaters, some on gables, some in gymnasia, some in amphitheaters, some in arenas, some at banquets, some in fanes. in the theater deeds were recited either with songs, or with personae, or with masks, or with oscilla; on the gables they led round-dances and danced.

in gymnasiis luctabantur. in amphicircis cursu certabant vel pedum, vel equorum, vel curruum, in arenis pugiles exercebantur. in conviviis, rhythmis et musicis instrumentis et odis psallebant et alea ludebant.

in the gymnasia they wrestled. in the amphitheaters they contended in racing, whether of feet, or of horses, or of chariots, in the arenas pugilists were exercised. in banquets, with rhythms and musical instruments and odes they sang, and they played at dice.

in fanis tempore solemni deorum laudes canebant. ludos vero idcirco inter legitimas actiones connumerabant, quia temperato motu naturalis calor nutritur in corpore, et laetitia animus reparatur; vel, quod magis videtur, [763B] quia necesse fuit populum aliquando ad ludendum convenire, voluerunt determinata esse loca ludendi, ne in diversoriis conventicula facientes probrosa aliqua aut facinorosa perpetrarent.

in the fanes
at a solemn time they sang the praises of the gods. but games, indeed, for this reason they counted among legitimate actions, because by tempered motion the natural heat is nourished in the body, and
the spirit is repaired by joy; or, as seems more likely, [763B] because it was necessary that the people should at times come together for playing, they wanted the places of playing to be determined,
lest, making conventicles in inns, they might perpetrate some opprobrious or criminal things.

CAPUT XXVIII

CHAPTER 28

De logica quae est quarta pars philosophiae.

On logic, which is the fourth part of philosophy.

Logica dividitur in grammaticam et in rationem disserendi. gramma Graece, littera interpretatur Latine, inde dicta est grammatica, id est, litteralis scientia. littera proprie est figura quae scribitur; elementum, sonus qui pronuntiatur.

Logic is divided into Grammar and into the method of discoursing. gramma in Greek, letter is interpreted in Latin; hence it is called grammatica, that is, literal science. letter properly is the figure which is written; element, the sound which is pronounced.

ceterum hic large accipienda est littera, ut et vocem et scripturam intelligamus, utrumque enim ad grammaticam pertinet. quidam dicunt grammaticam non esse partem philosophiae, sed quasi quoddam appendicium et instrumentum ad philosophiam. [763C] de ratione autem disserendi Boethius dicit quod et pars esse possit et instrumentum ad philosophiam, sicut pes, manus, lingua, oculi, etc., partes sunt corporis et instrumenta.

But here the letter is to be taken broadly, so that we may understand both voice and writing, for each belongs to grammar. Certain people say that grammar is not a part of philosophy, but as it were a kind of appendix and instrument for philosophy. [763C] As for the method of discoursing, Boethius says that it can be both a part and an instrument for philosophy, just as the foot, hand, tongue, eyes, etc., are parts of the body and instruments.

grammatica simpliciter agit de vocibus, id est, secundum se inventionem et formationem, compositionem, inflectionem, prolationem, et cetera ad pronuntiationem tantum pertinentia pertractans. ratio disserendi agit de vocibus secundum intellectus.

grammar simply deals with voices, that is, thoroughly treating, according to themselves, invention and formation, composition, inflection, utterance, and the rest pertaining only to pronunciation. the method of arguing deals with voices according to intellects.

CAPUT XXIX

CHAPTER 29

De grammatica.

On grammar.

Grammatica dividitur in litteram, syllabam, dictionem et orationem. vel aliter grammatica dividitur in litteras, id est, id quod scribitur, et voces, id est, id quod pronuntiatur. vel aliter, grammatica dividitur in nomen, verbum, participium, pronomen, [763D] adverbium, praepositionem, coniunctionem, interiectionem, vocem articulatam, litteram, syllabam, pedes, accentus, posituras, notas, orthographiam, analogiam, etymologiam, glossas, differentias, barbarismum, soloecismum, vitia, metaplasma, schemata, tropos, prosas, metra, fabulas, historias.

Grammar is divided into the letter, syllable, diction, and oration. or otherwise grammar is divided into letters, that is, that which is written, and voices, that is, that which
is pronounced. or otherwise, grammar is divided into noun, verb, participle, pronoun, [763D] adverb, preposition, conjunction, interjection,
articulated voice, letter, syllable, feet, accents, positures, notes, orthography, analogy, etymology, glosses, differences, barbarism,
solecism, faults, metaplasm, schemata, tropes, prose, meters, fables, histories.

quorum idcirco expositionem transeo, quia et prolixior esset quam huius schedulae brevitas expetat, et quia etiam in hoc opusculo, divisiones tantum rerum et nomina investigare proposui, ut tantummodo quoddam principium doctrinae lectori conderetur. qui autem haec scire desiderat, legat Donatum, Servium, Priscianum De accentibus et Priscianum De duodecim versibus Vergilii, et Barbarismum, et Isidorum etymologiarum.

therefore I pass over the exposition of these, because it would also be more prolix than the brevity of this little schedule demands, and because also in this little opuscule I have proposed to investigate only the divisions of things and the names, so that only a certain beginning of doctrine might be founded for the reader. but whoever desires to know these things, let him read Donatus, Servius, Priscian On Accents and Priscian On the Twelve Verses of Vergil, and Barbarism, and Isidore’s Etymologies.

CAPUT XXX

CHAPTER 30

[764A] De ratione disserendi.

[764A] On the method of disserting.

Ratio disserendi integrales partes habet inventionem et iudicium, divisivas vero demonstrationem, probabilem, sophisticam. demonstratio est in necessariis argumentis et pertinet ad philosophos. probabilis pertinet ad dialecticos et ad rhetores; sophistica, ad sophistas et cavillatores.

The method of discoursing has integral parts: invention and judgment; and its divisional parts are the demonstrative, the probable, the sophistic. demonstration is in necessary arguments and pertains to philosophers. the probable pertains to dialecticians and to rhetors; the sophistic, to sophists and cavillators.

probabilis dividitur in dialecticam et rhetoricam, quarum utraque integrales partes habet inventionem et iudicium. quia enim ipsum genus, id est, dissertivam, integraliter constituunt, necesse est ut in compositione omnium specierum eius simul inveniantur. inventio est quae docet invenire argumenta et constituere argumentationes.

the probable is divided into dialectic and rhetoric, of which each has the integral parts, invention and judgment. For since they constitute the very genus, that is, the dissertative, integrally, it is necessary that in the composition of all its species they be found together. Invention is that which teaches how to find arguments and to constitute argumentations.

scientia iudicandi, quae de utroque iudicare docet. [764B] quaeri potest, si inventio et iudicium sub philosophia contineantur. videntur enim neque sub theorica, neque sub practica, neque sub mechanica, neque sub logica, de qua magis videretur contineri.

The science of judging,
which teaches to judge concerning both. [764B] It can be asked whether invention and judgment are contained under philosophy. For they seem to be neither under the theoretical, nor under the practical,
nor under the mechanical, nor under logic, under which they would seem rather to be contained.

sub logica non continentur, quia neque per grammaticam neque per dissertivam. per dissertivam non continentur, cum integraliter eam constituant. nulla autem res esse possit simul integralis et divisiva pars eiusdem generis.

they are not contained under logic, because neither through grammar nor through the dissertive. Through
the dissertive they are not contained, since they constitute it integrally. no thing, however, can be at once an integral and a divisive part of the same genus.

sicque philosophia non omnem scientiam continere videtur. sed sciendum quod scientia duobus modis accipi solet, id est, pro aliqua disciplinarum, sicut cum dico dialecticam esse scientiam, id est, artem vel disciplinam, et pro qualibet cognitione, sicut cum dico scientiam habere eum qui scit aliquid. verbi gratia, si scio dialecticam, scientiam habeo, [764C] et si scio natare, scientiam habeo, et si scio Socratem esse Sophronisci filium, scientiam habeo.

and thus philosophy
does not seem to contain every science. But it should be known that science is wont to be taken in two ways, that is, for some one of the disciplines, as when I say that dialectic is a science, that is, an art or discipline; and for any cognition, as when I say that he has science who knows something. For example, if I know dialectic, I have science; [764C] and if I know how to swim, I have science; and if I know that Socrates is the son of Sophroniscus, I have science.

et universaliter omnis qui aliquid scit, potest dici scientiam habere. sed tamen aliud est, cum dico, dialectica est scientia, id est, ars vel disciplina, atque aliud cum dico, scire quod Socrates est Sophronisci filius est scientia, id est, cognitio. de omni scientia quae est ars vel disciplina, verum est dicere quod sit pars philosophiae divisiva, non autem universaliter dici potest, quod omnis scientia quae est cognitio, pars sit philosophiae divisiva.

and universally everyone who knows something can be said
to have knowledge. But yet it is one thing, when I say, dialectic is a science, that is, an art or discipline, and another when I say, to know that Socrates is the son of Sophroniscus is
science, that is, cognition. Of every science which is an art or discipline, it is true to say that it is a divisive part of philosophy; but it cannot be said universally
that every science which is cognition is a divisive part of philosophy.

est tamen prorsus omnis scientia sive disciplina sive quaelibet cognitio pars philosophiae, vel divisiva vel integralis. disciplina autem est scientia quae absolutum finem habet, in quo propositum artis perfecte explicatur, [764D] quod scientiae inveniendi vel iudicandi non convenit, quia neutra per se absoluta est, et ideo disciplina dici non possunt, sed partes disciplinae, id est dissertivae. rursum quaeritur si inventio et iudicium eaedem sint partes dialecticae et rhetoricae, quod inconveniens videtur, ut duo opposita genera eisdem prorsus constituantur partibus.

yet nevertheless absolutely every science, whether discipline or any cognition whatever, is a part of philosophy, either divisive or integral. A discipline, however, is a science which has an absolute end, in which the purpose of the art is perfectly unfolded, [764D] which does not befit the sciences of discovering or of judging, because neither is absolute in itself; and therefore they cannot be called disciplines, but parts of a discipline, that is, dissertative. In turn it is asked whether invention and judgment are the same parts of dialectic and rhetoric, which seems unfitting, that two opposite genera should be constituted by exactly the same parts.

dici ergo potest has duas voces aequivocas esse ad partes dialecticae et rhetoricae, vel, quod fortassis melius est, dicamus inventionem et iudicium proprie partes esse dissertivae et sub his vocibus univocari, in inferioribus tamen huius generis quibusdam proprietatibus, a se invicem differre. quae tamen differentiae per has voces non discernuntur, quia per eas non secundum hoc quod species componunt, [765A] sed secundum hoc quod partes sunt generis significantur. grammatica est scientia loquendi sine vitio; dialectica, disputatio acuta verum a falso distinguens.

it can therefore be said that these two terms are equivocal with respect to the parts of dialectic and rhetoric; or, what perhaps is better, let us say that invention and judgment are properly parts of the dissertative discipline and are taken univocally under these terms, yet in the lower levels of this genus they differ from one another by certain properties. These differences, however, are not discerned by these terms, because by them things are signified not according to this, that they compose species, [765A] but according to this, that they are parts of the genus. Grammar is the science of speaking without fault; dialectic, an acute disputation distinguishing the true from the false.

rhetorica est disciplina ad persuadendum quaeque idonea.

rhetoric is the discipline for persuading, and suitable for each and every matter.