Cicero: PHILOSOPHIA

[1] Vtrum difficilius aut maius esset negare tibi saepius idem roganti an efficere id quod rogares diu multumque, Brute, dubitavi. Nam et negare ei quem unice diligerem cuique me carissimum esse sentirem, praesertim et iusta petenti et praeclara cupienti, durum admodum mihi videbatur, et suscipere tantam rem, quantam non modo facultate consequi difficile esset sed etiam cogitatione complecti, vix arbitrabar esse eius qui vereretur reprehensionem doctorum atque prudentium.

[1] I have long and much doubted, Brutus, whether it would be harder or greater to refuse you as you were repeatedly asking the same thing, or to accomplish that which you were requesting for a long time and with much urgency. For both to deny one whom I loved uniquely and by whom I felt myself to be most dear, especially when he was both asking for just things and desiring preeminent ones, seemed to me very hard; and to undertake so great a matter—such as it would be difficult not only to attain by ability but even to embrace in thought—I scarcely judged to be the part of one who would fear the reprehension of the learned and the prudent.

[2] Quid enim est maius quam, cum tanta sit inter oratores bonos dissimilitudo, iudicare quae sit optima species et quasi figura dicendi? Quod quoniam me saepius rogas, aggrediar non tam perficiendi spe quam experiendi voluntate; malo enim, cum studio tuo sim obsecutus, desiderari a te prudentiam meam quam, si id non fecerim, benevolentiam.

[2] What, indeed, is greater than, since there is so great a dissimilarity among good orators, to judge what is the best species and, as it were, figure of speaking? Since you ask me this rather often, I will undertake it not so much with the hope of perfecting as with the will of experimenting; for I prefer, since I have complied with your zeal, that my prudence be missed by you rather than, if I should not do this, my benevolence.

[3] Quaeris igitur idque iam saepius quod eloquentiae genus probem maxime et quale mihi videatur illud, quo nihil addi possit, quod ego summum et perfectissimum iudicem. In quo vereor ne, si id quod vis effecero eumque oratorem quem quaeris expressero, tardem studia multorum, qui desperatione debilitati experiri id nolent quod se assequi posse diffidant.

[3] You ask, then—and that now repeatedly—what genus of eloquence I most approve, and of what sort that seems to me to be, to which nothing can be added, which I judge the highest and most perfect. In this I fear lest, if I accomplish what you wish and shall have expressed that orator whom you seek, I may slow the studies of many, who, debilitated by despair, will be unwilling to try that which they are diffident of being able to attain.

[4] Sed par est omnis omnia experiri, qui res magnas et magno opere expetendas concupiverunt. Quod si quem aut natura sua [aut] illa praestantis ingeni vis forte deficiet aut minus instructus erit magnarum artium disciplinis, teneat tamen eum cursum quem poterit; prima enim sequentem honestum est in secundis tertiisque consistere. Nam in poetis non Homero soli locus est, ut de Graecis loquar, aut Archilocho aut Sophocli aut Pindaro, sed horum vel secundis vel etiam infra secundos;

[4] But it is fitting that all should try everything, who have coveted great things and things greatly to be sought. But if anyone either by his own nature or that force of outstanding talent should by chance fail, or be less furnished with the disciplines of the great arts, let him nonetheless hold to that course which he can; for, following the first, it is honorable to stand in second or even third place. For among poets there is not room for Homer alone (to speak of the Greeks), or Archilochus or Sophocles or Pindar, but for those either second to these or even below the seconds;

[5] nec vero Aristotelem in philosophia deterruit a scribendo amplitudo Platonis, nec ipse Aristoteles admirabili quadam scientia et copia ceterorum studia restinxit.

[5] nor indeed did Plato’s amplitude in philosophy deter Aristotle from writing, nor did Aristotle himself, with a certain admirable science and copiousness, extinguish the studies of the others.

II. Nec solum ab optimis studiis excellentes viri deterriti non sunt, sed ne opifices quidem se ab artibus suis removerunt, qui aut Ialysi, quem Rhodi vidimus, non potuerunt aut Coae Veneris pulchritudinem imitari, nec simulacro Iovis Olympii aut doryphori statua deterriti reliqui minus experti sunt quid efficere aut quo progredi possent; quorum tanta multitudo fuit, tanta in suo cuiusque genere laus, ut, cum summa miraremur, inferiora tamen probaremus.

2. Not only were excellent men not deterred from the best studies, but not even the craftsmen removed themselves from their arts—those who either could not imitate the Ialysus, which we saw at Rhodes, or the beauty of the Coan Venus; nor, deterred by the simulacrum of Olympian Jove or the statue of the Doryphorus, did the rest make trial any the less of what they could accomplish or how far they could advance; of whom there was so great a multitude, and so great praise in each one’s own kind, that, while we admired the highest, we nevertheless approved the inferior.

[6] In oratoribus vero, Graecis quidem, admirabile est quantum inter omnis unus excellat; ac tamen, cum esset Demosthenes, multi oratores magni et clari fuerunt et antea fuerant nec postea defecerunt. Qua re non est cur eorum qui se studio eloquentiae dediderunt spes infringatur aut languescat industria; nam neque illud ipsum quod est optimum desperandum est et in praestantibus rebus magna sunt ea quae sunt optimis proxima.

[6] Among orators, at least among the Greeks, it is admirable how much one excels among all; and yet, though there was Demosthenes, many great and renowned orators were—and had been before—and they did not fail thereafter. Therefore there is no reason why the hope of those who have devoted themselves to the study of eloquence should be broken or their industry grow languid; for neither must that very thing which is best be despaired of, and in preeminent matters great are the things that are nearest to the best.

[7] Atque ego in summo oratore fingendo talem informabo qualis fortasse nemo fuit. Non enim quaero quis fuerit, sed quid sit illud, quo nihil esse possit praestantius, quod in perpetuitate dicendi non saepe atque haud scio an numquam, in aliqua autem parte eluceat aliquando, idem apud alios densius, apud alios fortasse rarius.

[7] And I, in shaping the supreme orator, will fashion such a one as perhaps no one has been. For I do not seek who he was, but what that is, than which nothing can be more preeminent, which in the perpetuity of speaking not often, and I scarcely know whether ever, yet in some part at times shines forth—the same among some more densely, among others perhaps more rarely.

[8] Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit unde illud ut ex ore aliquo quasi imago exprimatur; quod neque oculis neque auribus neque ullo sensu percipi potest, cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur. Itaque et Phidiae simulacris, quibus nihil in illo genere perfectius videmus, et eis picturis quas nominavi cogitare tamen possumus pulchriora;

[8] But I thus set it down: there is nothing in any kind so beautiful, but that there is something more beautiful—the thing from which that is, so that, as from some face, a likeness is, as it were, expressed; which can be perceived neither by eyes nor by ears nor by any sense; we embrace it only by thought and by mind. And so, both in the simulacra of Phidias, than which we see nothing more perfect in that kind, and in those paintings which I have named, nevertheless we can think of things more beautiful;

[9] nec vero ille artifex cum faceret Iovis formam aut Minervae, contemplabatur aliquem e quo similitudinem duceret, sed ipsius in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam, quam intuens in eaque defixus ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat.

[9] nor indeed did that artificer, when he was fashioning the form of Jove or of Minerva, contemplate some person from whom he might draw the similitude; but in his own mind there resided a certain preeminent species of beauty, which, gazing upon and fixed upon it, he was directing his art and hand toward the similitude of that.

III. Vt igitur in formis et figuris est aliquid perfectum et excellens, cuius ad cogitatam speciem imitando referuntur eaque sub oculos ipsa [non] cadit, sic perfectae eloquentiae speciem animo videmus, effigiem auribus quaerimus.

3. As therefore in forms and figures there is something perfect and excellent, to the conceived form of which things are referred by imitating, and this itself does [not] fall under the eyes, so we see with the mind the form of perfected eloquence, we seek the image with the ears.

[10] Has rerum formas appellat ideas ille non intellegendi solum sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister Plato, easque gigni negat et ait semper esse ac ratione et intellegentia contineri; cetera nasci occidere fluere labi nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quicquid est igitur de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis formam speciemque redigendum.

[10] Those forms of things that most weighty author and teacher Plato calls ideas, and he denies that they are begotten and says that they always are and are contained by reason and intelligence; the rest are born, perish, flow, slip, nor remain longer in one and the same state. Whatever there is, therefore, about which there is disputation by reason and by method, must be brought back to the ultimate form and species of its kind.

[11] Ac video hanc primam ingressionem meam non ex oratoriis disputationibus ductam sed e media philosophia repetitam, et eam quidem cum antiquam tum subobscuram aut reprehensionis aliquid aut certe admirationis habituram. Nam aut mirabuntur quid haec pertineant ad ea quae quaerimus—quibus satis faciet res ipsa cognita, ut non sine causa alte repetita videatur—aut reprehendent, quod inusitatas vias indagemus, tritas relinquamus.

[11] And I see that this my first ingress has been drawn not from oratorical disputations but fetched back from the very midst of philosophy, and that indeed, both ancient and somewhat obscure, it will be likely to have either something of reprehension or at least of admiration. For either they will marvel what these things pertain to in relation to what we seek—the matter itself, once known, will satisfy them, so that it may seem not without cause to have been fetched from on high—or they will reprehend, because we track out unwonted ways and leave the trodden.

[12] Ego autem et me saepe nova videri dicere intellego, cum pervetera dicam sed inaudita plerisque, et fateor me oratorem, si modo sim aut etiam quicumque sim, non ex rhetorum officinis sed ex Academiae spatiis exstitisse; illa enim sunt curricula multiplicium variorumque sermonum, in quibus Platonis primum sunt impressa vestigia. Sed et huius et aliorum philosophorum disputationibus et exagitatus maxime orator est et adiutus; omnis enim ubertas et quasi silva dicendi ducta ab illis est nec satis tamen instructa ad forensis causas, quas, ut illi ipsi dicere solebant, agrestioribus Musis reliquerunt.

[12] But I both understand that I often seem to be saying new things, when I am saying very old things but unheard by most, and I confess that I, an orator—if indeed I am, or whoever I am—have arisen not from the workshops of the rhetors but from the walks of the Academy; for those are the courses of multiple and various discourses, in which first the footprints of Plato were imprinted. Yet by the disputations both of this man and of the other philosophers the orator has been both most harried and helped; for all the richness and, as it were, the forest of speaking has been drawn from them, and yet it has not been sufficiently equipped for forensic causes, which, as they themselves were wont to say, they left to the more rustic Muses.

[13] Sic eloquentia haec forensis spreta a philosophis et repudiata multis quidem illa adiumentis magnisque caruit, sed tamen ornata verbis atque sententiis iactationem habuit in populo nec paucorum iudicium reprehensionemque pertimuit: ita et doctis eloquentia popularis et disertis elegans doctrina defuit.

[13] Thus this forensic eloquence, scorned and repudiated by the philosophers, indeed lacked those many and great aids, but nevertheless, adorned with words and sentences, it had ostentation among the people and did not fear the judgment and reprehension of a few: thus both to the learned a popular eloquence and to the eloquent an elegant learning was lacking.

IV.

[14] Positum sit igitur in primis, quod post magis intellegetur, sine philosophia non posse effici quem quaerimus eloquentem, non ut in ea tamen omnia sint, sed ut sic adiuvet ut palaestra histrionem; parva enim magnis saepe rectissime conferuntur. Nam nec latius atque copiosius de magnis variisque rebus sine philosophia potest quisquam dicere;—

[14] Let it therefore be laid down in the first place—which will be understood more later—that without philosophy the eloquent person whom we seek cannot be brought to effect, not that, however, all things are in it, but that it thus assists as the palaestra assists the histrion; for small things are very often most rightly compared with great things. For neither more broadly and more copiously about great and various matters can anyone speak without philosophy;—

[15] si quidem etiam in Phaedro Platonis hoc Periclem praestitisse ceteris dicit oratoribus Socrates, quod is Anaxagorae physici fuerit auditor; a quo censet eum, cum alia praeclara quaedam et magnifica didicisse tum uberem et fecundum fuisse gnarumque, quod est eloquentiae maximum, quibus orationis modis quaeque animorum partes pellerentur; quod idem de Demosthene existimari potest, cuius ex epistulis intellegi licet quam frequens fuerit Platonis auditor;—

[15] if indeed even in Plato’s Phaedrus Socrates says that Pericles in this surpassed the other orators, namely that he had been a hearer of Anaxagoras the physicist (natural philosopher); from whom he judges that he not only learned certain other illustrious and magnificent things, but also became abundant and fecund and knowledgeable of—what is the greatest thing for eloquence—by what modes of speech the several parts of souls are impelled; and the same can be thought of Demosthenes, from whose letters it may be understood how frequent a hearer of Plato he was;—

[16] nec vero sine philosophorum disciplina genus et speciem cuiusque rei cernere neque eam definiendo explicare nec tribuere in partis possumus nec iudicare quae vera quae falsa sint neque cernere consequentia, repugnantia videre, ambigua distinguere. Quid dicam de natura rerum, cuius cognitio magnam orationi suppeditat copiam, de vita, de officiis, de virtute, de moribus? Satisne sine multa earum ipsarum rerum disciplina aut dici aut intellegi potest?

[16] Nor indeed, without the discipline of philosophers, can we discern the genus and species of each thing, nor explicate it by defining, nor distribute it into parts; nor can we judge what is true and what is false, nor discern consequences, see repugnancies, distinguish ambiguities. What shall I say of the nature of things, the knowledge of which supplies great copiousness to oratory, of life, of duties, of virtue, of morals? Can it be either said or understood sufficiently without much discipline in those very matters?

[17] Ad has tot tantasque res adhibenda sunt ornamenta innumerabilia; quae sola tum quidem tradebantur ab eis qui dicendi numerabantur magistri; quo fit ut veram illam et absolutam eloquentiam nemo consequatur, quod alia intellegendi alia dicendi disciplina est et ab aliis rerum ab aliis verborum doctrina quaeritur.

[17] To these so many and so great matters, innumerable ornaments must be applied; which alone, at that time at least, were being handed down by those who were counted as masters of speaking; whence it comes about that no one attains that true and absolute eloquence, because the discipline of understanding is one thing and that of speaking another, and the doctrine of things is sought from some, of words from others.

[18] Itaque M. Antonius, cui vel primas eloquentiae patrum nostrorum tribuebat aetas, vir natura peracutus et prudens, in eo libro quem unum reliquit disertos ait se vidisse multos, eloquentem omnino neminem. Insidebat videlicet in eius mente species eloquentiae, quam cernebat animo, re ipsa non videbat. Vir autem acerrimo ingenio—sic enim fuit—multa et in se et in aliis desiderans neminem plane qui recte appellari eloquens posset videbat;

[18] Therefore M. Antonius, to whom the age of our fathers was assigning even the foremost place of eloquence, a man by nature very acute and prudent, in that one book which he left says that he saw many men articulate, but absolutely no one eloquent. Evidently there was seated in his mind a form of eloquence, which he discerned with his mind, but did not see in the thing itself. But the man, of the keenest genius—for so indeed he was—desiring many things both in himself and in others, plainly saw no one who could rightly be called eloquent;

[19] quod si ille nec se nec L. Crassum eloquentem putavit, habuit profecto comprehensam animo quandam formam eloquentiae, cui quoniam nihil deerat, eos quibus aliquid aut plura deerant in eam formam non poterat includere. Investigemus hunc igitur, Brute, si possumus, quem numquam vidit Antonius aut qui omnino nullus umquam fuit; quem si imitari atque exprimere non possumus, quod idem ille vix deo concessum esse dicebat, at qualis esse debeat poterimus fortasse dicere.

[19] but if that man thought neither himself nor L. Crassus eloquent, he surely had comprehended in his mind a certain form of eloquence; and since nothing was lacking to it, he could not include within that form those to whom one thing or several were lacking. Let us therefore investigate this figure, Brutus, if we can—the one whom Antonius never saw, or who altogether never existed at all; and if we cannot imitate and express him (which the same man said was scarcely granted even to a god), yet perhaps we shall be able to say what he ought to be like.

VI.

[20] Tria sunt omnino genera dicendi, quibus in singulis quidam floruerunt, peraeque autem, id quod volumus, perpauci in omnibus. Nam et grandiloqui, ut ita dicam, fuerunt cum ampla et sententiarum gravitate et maiestate verborum, vehementes varii, copiosi graves, ad permovendos et convertendos animos instructi et parati—quod ipsum alii aspera tristi horrida oratione neque perfecta atque conclusa consequebantur, alii levi et structa et terminata—, et contra tenues acuti, omnia docentes et dilucidiora, non ampliora facientes, subtili quadam et pressa oratione limati; in eodemque genere alii callidi, sed impoliti et consulto rudium similes et imperitorum, alii in eadem ieiunitate concinniores, id est faceti, florentes etiam et leviter ornati.

[20] There are, altogether, three genera of speaking, in each of which certain men have flourished, but equally—and this is what we want—very few in all. For there have been, so to speak, grandiloquent men, with breadth and with the gravity of sentiments and the majesty of words—vehement, various, copious, grave, equipped and prepared to move and to turn minds—some achieving this with a rough, gloomy, bristling speech, neither perfected nor rounded off, others with a smooth, structured, and terminated (periodic) manner; and, conversely, there are the slender and acute, teaching everything and making things more lucid, not more ample, refined by a certain subtle and compressed diction; and in this same genus some are shrewd, but unpolished and by design like the rustic and unskilled, others, in the same leanness, more neat—that is, witty—flourishing too and lightly adorned.

[21] Est autem quidam interiectus inter hos medius et quasi temperatus nec acumine posteriorum nec fulmine utens superiorum, vicinus amborum, in neutro excellens, utriusque particeps vel utriusque, si verum quaerimus, potius expers; isque uno tenore, ut aiunt, in dicendo fluit nihil adferens praeter facilitatem et aequabilitatem aut addit aliquos ut in corona toros omnemque orationem ornamentis modicis verborum sententiarumque distinguit.

[21] There is, however, a certain style interposed between these, a middle and as it were temperate one, using neither the acumen of the latter nor the thunderbolt of the former, neighbor to both, excelling in neither, a participant in each—or rather, if we seek the truth, lacking both; and it flows in speaking with one tenor, as they say, bringing in nothing besides facility and equability, or it adds a few rounded swellings, as in a wreath, and marks off the whole oration with moderate ornaments of words and sentences.

[22] Horum singulorum generum quicumque vim in singulis consecuti sunt, magnum in oratoribus nomen habuerunt. Sed quaerendum est satisne id quod volumus effecerint.

[22] Of these several genera, whoever have attained the force in each taken singly have held a great name among orators. But it must be inquired whether they have sufficiently effected that which we desire.

VII. Videmus enim fuisse quosdam qui idem ornate et graviter, idem versute et subtiliter dicerent. Atque utinam in Latinis talis oratoris simulacrum reperire possemus!

7. For we see that there were certain men who spoke both ornately and gravely, and likewise shrewdly and subtilly. And would that among the Latins we could find the simulacrum of such an orator!

Esset egregium non quaerere externa, domesticis esse contentos.

It would be outstanding not to seek external things, to be content with domestic things.

[23] Sed ego idem, qui in illo sermone nostro qui est eitus in Bruto multum tribuerim Latinis, vel ut hortarer alios vel quod amarem meos, recordor longe omnibus unum me anteferre Demosthenem, quem velim accommodare ad eam quam sentiam eloquentiam, non ad eam quam in aliquo ipse cognoverim. Hoc nec gravior exstitit quisquam nec callidior nec temperatior. Itaque nobis monendi sunt ei quorum sermo imperitus increbruit, qui aut dici se desiderant Atticos aut ipsi Attice volunt dicere, ut mirentur hunc maxime, quo ne Athenas quidem ipsas magis credo fuisse Atticas; quid enim sit Atticum discant eloquentiamque ipsius viribus, non imbecillitate sua metiantur.

[23] But I, the same man who in that our discourse which has been issued in the Brutus have attributed much to the Latins, whether that I might encourage others or because I loved my own people, recall that I set one man, Demosthenes, far before all; whom I would wish to accommodate to that eloquence which I conceive, not to that which I myself have recognized in anyone. In him no one has existed graver, nor more shrewd, nor more temperate. And so those must be warned by us, whose inexpert talk has become rife, who either desire to be called Attic or themselves wish to speak Attically, that they admire this man most of all, than whom not even Athens herself do I believe to have been more Attic; let them learn what “Attic” is, and let them measure eloquence by his strengths, not by their own imbecility.

[24] Nunc enim tantum quisque laudat quantum se posse sperat imitari. Sed tamen eos studio optimo iudicio minus firmo praeditos docere quae sit propria laus Atticorum non alienum puto.

[24] For now each person praises only so far as he hopes he is able to imitate. Yet I do not think it out of place to teach those endowed with the best zeal but with judgment less firm what the proper praise of the Attics is.

VIII. Semper oratorum eloquentiae moderatrix fuit auditorum prudentia. Omnes enim qui probari volunt voluntatem eorum qui audiunt intuentur ad eamque et ad eorum arbitrium et nutum totos se fingunt et accommodant.

8. The prudence of the auditors has always been the moderatrix of the eloquence of orators. For all who wish to be approved look to the will of those who listen, and to that—and to their arbiterment and nod—they fashion and accommodate themselves wholly.

[25] Itaque Caria et Phrygia et Mysia, quod minime politae minimeque elegantes sunt, asciverunt aptum suis auribus opimum quoddam et tamquam adipatae dictionis genus, quod eorum vicini non ita lato interiecto mari Rhodii numquam probaverunt [Graecia autem multo minus], Athenienses vero funditus repudiaverunt; quorum semper fuit prudens sincerumque iudicium, nihil ut possent nisi incorruptum audire et elegans. Eorum religioni cum serviret orator, nullum verbum insolens, nullum odiosum ponere audebat.

[25] And so Caria and Phrygia and Mysia, because they are least polished and least elegant, adopted, suited to their ears, a certain opulent and, as it were, adipose kind of diction; which their neighbors, the Rhodians, with not so broad a sea interposed, never approved [Greece, however, far less], while the Athenians indeed repudiated it from the foundations; whose judgment has always been prudent and sincere, so that they could endure to hear nothing except the incorrupt and the elegant. When the orator was serving their scruple, he dared to set down no word out of the ordinary, no odious word.

[26] Itaque hic, quem praestitisse diximus ceteris, in illa pro Ctesiphonte oratione longe optima summissius a primo, deinde, dum de legibus disputat, pressius, post sensim incendens iudices, ut vidit ardentis, in reliquis exsultavit audacius. Ac tamen in hoc ipso diligenter examinante verborum omnium pondera reprehendit Aeschines quaedam et exagitat inludensque dura odiosa intolerabilia esse dicit; quin etiam quaerit ab ipso, cum quidem eum beluam appellat, utrum illa verba an portenta sint; ut Aeschini ne Demosthenes quidem videatur Attice dicere.

[26] And so this man, whom we have said to have excelled the rest, in that oration on behalf of Ctesiphon, by far the best, was more subdued at the outset; then, while he disputes about the laws, more compressed; afterward, gradually kindling the judges, when he saw them ablaze, in the remaining parts he exulted more boldly. And yet Aeschines, even with him in this very matter diligently examining the weight of all the words, finds fault with certain points and worries them, and, mocking, says they are harsh, odious, intolerable; nay more, he asks of the man himself—indeed he calls him a beast—whether those are words or portents; so that to Aeschines not even Demosthenes seems to speak Attically.

[27] Facile est enim verbum aliquod ardens, ut ita dicam, notare idque restinctis iam animorum incendiis inridere. Itaque se purgans iocatur Demosthenes: negat in eo positas esse fortunas Graeciae, hocine an illo verbo usus sit, hucine an illuc manum porrexerit. Quonam igitur modo audiretur Mysus aut Phryx Athenis, cum etiam Demosthenes exagitetur ut putidus?

[27] For it is easy to mark, so to speak, some burning word and to deride it when the conflagrations of minds are now extinguished. And so, in self-excuse, Demosthenes jokes: he denies that the fortunes of Greece are staked on this—whether he used this word or that, whether he stretched his hand this way or that. In what manner, then, would a Mysian or a Phrygian be heard at Athens, when even Demosthenes is agitated as putrid?

Cum vero inclinata ululantique voce more Asiatico canere coepisset, quis eum ferret aut potius quis non iuberet auferri?

But when he had begun to sing with a drooping and ululating voice in the Asiatic manner, who would bear him, or rather who would not order him to be carried off?

IX.

[28] Ad Atticorum igitur auris teretes et religiosas qui se accommodant, ei sunt existimandi Attice dicere. Quorum genera plura sunt; hi unum modo quale sit suspicantur. Putant enim qui horride inculteque dicat, modo id eleganter enucleateque faciat, eum solum Attice dicere.

[28] Therefore those who accommodate themselves to the polished and scrupulous ears of the Attics are to be reckoned to speak Attically. Of which there are several kinds; these people surmise only one kind, what sort it is. For they think that he who speaks horridly and uncultivatedly, provided he does it elegantly and enucleately, is the only one who speaks Attically.

Errant, quod solum; quod Attice, non falluntur.

They err, in that it is the only one; in that it is Attic, they are not deceived.

[29] Istorum enim iudicio, si solum illud est Atticum, ne Pericles quidem dixit Attice, cui primae sine controversia deferebantur; qui si tenui genere uteretur, numquam ab Aristophane poeta fulgere tonare permiscere Graeciam dictus esset. Dicat igitur Attice venustissimus ille scriptor ac politissimus Lysias—quis enim id possit negare?—, dum intellegamus hoc esse Atticum in Lysia, non quod tenuis sit atque inornatus, sed quod [non] nihil habeat insolens aut ineptum; ornate vero et graviter et copiose dicere aut Atticorum sit aut ne sit Aeschines neve Demosthenes Atticus.

[29] By the judgment of those men, if only that is Attic, not even Pericles spoke Attically, to whom the first ranks were, without controversy, awarded; who, if he were using a tenuous kind, would never have been said by the poet Aristophanes to flash, to thunder, to confound Greece. Let, then, speak Attically that most charming and most polished writer Lysias—who indeed could deny that?—, provided we understand this to be the Attic thing in Lysias, not that he is tenuous and unadorned, but that he has [not] nothing insolent or inept; but to speak ornately and gravely and copiously either belongs to the Attics, or else let neither Aeschines nor Demosthenes be Attic.

[30] Ecce autem aliqui se Thucydidios esse profitentur: novum quoddam imperitorum et inauditum genus. Nam qui Lysiam sequuntur, causidicum quendam sequuntur non illum quidem amplum atque grandem, subtilem et elegantem tamen et qui in forensibus causis possit praeclare consistere. Thucydides autem res gestas et bella narrat et proelia, graviter sane et probe, sed nihil ab eo transferri potest ad forensem usum et publicum.

[30] Behold, however, some profess themselves to be Thucydidean: a certain novel and unheard-of genus of the unskilled. For those who follow Lysias follow a certain court-pleader, not indeed ample and grand, yet subtle and elegant, and one who can stand out excellently in forensic cases. Thucydides, however, narrates deeds and wars and battles—gravely, to be sure, and rightly—but nothing can be transferred from him to forensic and public use.

Ipsae illae contiones ita multas habent obscuras abditasque sententias vix ut intellegantur; quod est in oratione civili vitium vel maximum.

Those very speeches themselves contain so many obscure and recondite thoughts that they are scarcely intelligible; which, in civil oratory, is a fault of the very greatest.

[31] Quae est autem in hominibus tanta perversitas, ut inventis frugibus glande vescantur? An victus hominum Atheniensium beneficio excoli potuit, oratio non potuit? Quis Porro umquam Graecorum rhetorum a Thucydide quicquam duxit?

[31] But what such perversity is there in men, that, with grain discovered, they should feed on acorns? Or could the way of life of men be cultivated by the benefaction of the Athenians, but oratory could not? Furthermore, which of the Greek rhetors ever drew anything from Thucydides?

"At laudatus est ab omnibus." Fateor; sed ita ut rerum explicator prudens severus gravis; non ut in iudiciis versaret causas, sed ut in historiis bella narraret;

"But he was praised by all." I admit it; but in such a way as a prudent, severe, grave explicator of affairs; not so as to handle causes in the courts, but to narrate wars in histories;

[32] itaque numquam est numeratus orator, nec vero, si historiam non scripsisset, nomen eius exstaret, cum praesertim fuisset honoratus et nobilis. Huius tamen nemo neque verborum neque sententiarum gravitatem imitatur, sed cum mutila quaedam et hiantia locuti sunt, quae vel sine magistro facere potuerunt, germanos se putant esse Thucydidas. Nactus sum etiam qui Xenophontis similem esse se cuperet, cuius sermo est ille quidem melle dulcior, sed a forensi strepitu remotissimus.

[32] and so he was never numbered an orator, nor indeed, if he had not written history, would his name exist, although he had been honored and noble. Yet no one imitates this man’s gravity of words or of thoughts; rather, when they have uttered certain mutilated and gaping things, which they could have done without a teacher, they suppose themselves to be genuine Thucydideses. I even encountered someone who desired to be like Xenophon, whose discourse is indeed sweeter than honey, but is most remote from the forensic din.

[33] Referamus nos igitur ad eum quem volumus incohandum et ea demum eloquentia informandum quam in nullo cognovit Antonius. X. Magnum opus omnino et arduum, Brute, conamur; sed nihil difficile amanti puto. Amo autem et semper amavi ingenium studia mores tuos.

[33] Let us therefore return to him whom we wish to be begun, and at length to be shaped by that eloquence which Antonius recognized in no one. 10. We undertake a great and indeed arduous work, Brutus; but I think nothing difficult to one who loves. Moreover I love, and have always loved, your ingenuity, studies, and mores.

Incendor porro cotidie magis non desiderio solum, quo quidem conficior, congressus nostros, consuetudinem victus, doctissimos sermones requirens tuos, sed etiam incredibili fama virtutum admirabilium, quae specie dispares prudentia coniunguntur.

I am inflamed moreover daily more and more not only by longing, by which indeed I am consumed, seeking our meetings, the custom of living, your most learned discourses, but also by the incredible fame of admirable virtues, which, though different in appearance, are joined by prudence.

[34] Quid enim tam distans quam a severitate comitas? Quis tamen umquam te aut sanctior est habitus aut dulcior? Quid tam difficile quam in plurimorum controversiis diiudicandis ab omnibus diligi?

[34] For what is so distant as affability from severity? Who, however, has ever been esteemed either more saintly or sweeter than you? What is so difficult as, in adjudicating the controversies of very many, to be loved by all?

Consequeris tamen ut eos ipsos quos contra statuas aequos placatosque dimittas. Itaque efficis ut, cum gratiae causa nihil facias, omnia tamen sint grata quae facis. Ergo omnibus ex terris una Gallia communi non ardet incendio; in qua frueris ipse te, cum in Italiae luce cognosceris versarisque in optimorum civium vel flore vel robore.

You nevertheless achieve that those very people whom you set yourself against you dismiss equitable and placated. And thus you effect that, although you do nothing for the sake of favor, yet all the things you do are pleasing. Therefore, of all the lands, Gaul alone does not burn with the common conflagration; in which you enjoy yourself, since you are known in the light of Italy and you move among either the flower or the strength of the best citizens.

Iam quantum illud est, quod in maximis occupationibus numquam intermittis studia doctrinae, semper aut ipse scribis aliquid aut me vocas ad scribendum!

Now how great is that, that amid the greatest occupations you never intermit the studies of doctrine, and always either you yourself write something or you summon me to writing!

[35] Itaque hoc sum adgressus statim Catone absoluto quem ipsum numquam attigissem tempora timens inimica virtuti, nisi tibi hortanti et illius memoriam mihi caram excitanti non parere nefas esse duxissem—, sed testificor me a te rogatum et recusantem haec scribere esse ausum. Volo enim mihi tecum commune esse crimen, ut, si sustinere tantam quaestionem non potuero, iniusti oneris impositi tua culpa sit, mea recepti; in quo tamen iudici nostri errorem laus tibi dati muneris compensabit.

[35] Therefore I have undertaken this straightway, Cato having been completed—whom I would never have even touched, fearing times inimical to virtue, unless I had judged it a nefas not to obey you exhorting and stirring up the memory of that man dear to me—, but I testify that I, asked by you and yet refusing, have dared to write these things. For I want the “crime” to be common to me with you, so that, if I shall not be able to sustain so great a question, the fault may be yours for having imposed an unjust onus, mine for having received it; in which, nevertheless, the error of our iudicium will be compensated by the commendation of the munus given to you.

XI.

11.

[36] Sed in omni re difficillimum est formam, qui charakter Graece dicitur, exponere optimi, quod aliud aliis videtur optimum. Ennio delector, ait quispiam, quod non discedit a communi more verborum; Pacuvio, inquit alius: omnes apud hunc ornati elaboratique sunt versus, multo apud alterum neglegentius; fac alium Accio; varia enim sunt iudicia, ut in Graecis, nec facilis explicatio quae forma maxime excellat. In picturis alios horrida inculta, abdita et opaca, contra alios nitida laeta conlustrata delectant.

[36] But in every matter it is most difficult to set forth the form—what in Greek is called character—of the best, because one thing seems best to some, another to others. “I am delighted with Ennius,” says someone, “because he does not depart from the common manner of words”; “With Pacuvius,” says another: “with this man all the verses are ornate and elaborated; in the other, much more negligently”; set down another for Accius; for judgments are various, as among the Greeks, nor is there an easy explanation which form most excels. In paintings some are delighted by things rough, uncultivated, hidden and opaque, whereas others by things bright, cheerful, and illumined.

Quid est quo praescriptum aliquod aut formulam exprimas, cum in suo quidque genere praestet et genera plura sint? Hac ego religione non sum ab hoc conatu repulsus existimavique in omnibus rebus esse aliquid optimum, etiam si lateret, idque ab eo posse qui eius rei gnarus esset iudicari.

What is there by which you would set forth some prescript or express a formula, since each thing excels in its own genus and the genera are multiple? By this scruple I was not driven back from this attempt and I judged that in all matters there is something best, even if it were hidden, and that it could be judged by one who was cognizant of that matter.

[37] Sed quoniam plura sunt orationum genera eaque diversa neque in unam formam cadunt omnia, laudationum [scriptionum] et historiarum et talium suasionum, qualem Isocrates fecit Panegyricum multique alii qui sunt nominati sophistae, reliquarumque scriptionum [rerum] formam, quae absunt a forensi contentione eiusque totius generis quod Graece epideiktikon nominatur, quia quasi ad inspiciendum delectationis causa comparatum est, non complectar hoc tempore; non quo neglegenda sit; est enim ilia quasi nutrix eius oratoris quem informare volumus et de quo molimur aliquid exquisitius dicere.

[37] But since there are more genera of orations and they are diverse, and not all fall into one form, of laudations [writings] and histories and such persuasions as the Panegyric which Isocrates made and many others who are called sophists, and the form of the remaining writings [matters], which are apart from forensic contention and of that whole genus which in Greek is named epideictic, because it is, as it were, arranged for viewing for the sake of delectation, I shall not include at this time; not that it ought to be neglected; for that is as it were the nurse of that orator whom we wish to inform and about whom we are endeavoring to say something more exquisite.

XII. Ab hac et verborum copia alitur et eorum constructio et numerus liberiore quadam fruitur licentia.

12. From this both the abundance of words is nourished, and their construction and cadence enjoy a certain freer license.

[38] Datur etiam venia concinnitati sententiarum et arguti certique et circumscripti verborum ambitus conceduntur, de industriaque non ex insidiis sed aperte ac palam elaboratur, ut verba verbis quasi demensa et paria respondeant, ut crebro conferantur pugnantia comparenturque contraria et ut pariter extrema terminentur eundemque referant in cadendo sonum; quae in veritate causarum et rarius multo facimus et certe occultius. In Panathenaico autem Isocrates ea se studiose consectatum fatetur; non enim ad iudiciorum certamen, sed ad voluptatem aurium scripserat.

[38] Indulgence too is granted to the concinnity of sentences and a sharp, definite, and circumscribed circuit of words is allowed, and by design—not by ambush but openly and plainly—it is worked out that words answer words as if measured off and equal; that things at odds are often brought together and contraries compared; and that the finals are terminated alike and in their falling carry back the same sound—things which in the reality of causes we both do much more rarely and certainly more covertly. In the Panathenaicus, however, Isocrates confesses that he zealously pursued these; for he had written not for the contest of trials, but for the pleasure of the ears.

[39] Haec tractasse Thrasymachum Calchedonium primum et Leontinum ferunt Gorgiam, Theodorum inde Byzantium multosque alios, quos logodaidalous appellat in Phaedro Socrates; quorum satis arguta multa, sed ut modo primumque nascentia minuta et versiculorum similia quaedam nimiumque depicta. Quo magis sunt Herodotus Thucydidesque mirabiles; quorum aetas cum in eorum tempora quos nominavi incidisset, longissime tamen ipsi a talibus deliciis vel potius ineptiis afuerunt. Alter enim sine ullis salebris quasi sedatus amnis fluit, alter incitatior fertur et de bellicis rebus canit etiam quodam modo bellicum; primisque ab his, ut ait Theophrastus, historia commota est, ut auderet uberius quam superiores et ornatius dicere.

[39] They report that Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian first handled these matters and Gorgias the Leontine, then Theodorus of Byzantium, and many others whom Socrates in the Phaedrus calls logodaedali; of whom many things are quite acute, but, as things just now and first being born, minute, and some rather like little verses, and over-painted. All the more are Herodotus and Thucydides wonderful; although their age fell in the times of those I have named, they themselves were very far from such delights, or rather inanities. The one flows without any roughnesses like a calmed river; the other is borne along more impetuously, and when he sings of martial matters he even in a certain way sings a battle-chant; and by these first, as Theophrastus says, history was stirred, so that it dared to speak more copiously than its predecessors and more ornately.

XIII.

13.

[40] Horum aetati successit Isocrates, qui praeter ceteros eiusdem generis laudatur semper a nobis, non numquam, Brute, leniter et erudite repugnante te; sed concedas mihi fortasse, si quid in eo laudem cognoveris. Nam cum concisus ei Thrasymachus minutis numeris videretur et Gorgias, qui tamen primi traduntur arte quadam verba iunxisse, Theodorus autem praefractior nec satis, ut ita dicam, rotundus, primus instituit dilatare verbis et mollioribus numeris explere sententias; in quo cum doceret eos qui partim in dicendo partim in scribendo principes exstiterunt, domus eius officina habita eloquentiae est.

[40] To the age of these succeeded Isocrates, who beyond the rest of the same kind is always praised by us, though sometimes, Brutus, you gently and eruditely resist; but you will perhaps concede to me, if you have recognized anything I praise in him. For since Thrasymachus seemed to him cut short with minute rhythms, and Gorgias as well—who yet are handed down as the first to have yoked words together by a certain art—while Theodorus was more unbending and not sufficiently, so to speak, rounded, he first set about dilating with words and filling out his sentences with softer rhythms; and herein, since he taught those who became leaders partly in speaking and partly in writing, his house was held a workshop of eloquence.

[41] Itaque ut ego, cum a nostro Catone laudabar, vel reprehendi me a ceteris facile patiebar, sic Isocrates videtur testimonio Platonis aliorum iudicia debere contemnere. Est enim, ut scis, quasi in extrema pagina Phaedri his ipsis verbis loquens Socrates: Adulescens etiam nunc, o Phaedre, Isocrates est, sed quid de illo augurer libet dicere. Quid tandem?

[41] And so, just as I, when I was being praised by our Cato, could easily endure being reprehended by the rest, so Isocrates seems, by the testimony of Plato, to owe it to himself to contemn the judgments of others. For, as you know, it is, as it were, on the last page of the Phaedrus, Socrates speaking in these very words: “Isocrates is still even now a youth, O Phaedrus, but what I am pleased to say, by way of augury, about him. What then?”

Inquit ille. Maiore mihi ingenio videtur esse quam ut cum orationibus Lysiae comparetur, praeterea ad virtutem maior indoles; ut minime mirum futurum sit si, cum aetate processerit, aut in hoc orationum genere cui nunc studet tantum quantum pueris reliquis praestet omnibus qui umquam orationes attigerunt aut, si contentus his non fuerit, divino aliquo animi motu maiora concupiscat; inest enim natura philosophia in huius viri mente quaedam. Haec de adulescente Socrates auguratur.

Said he. He seems to me to be of a greater genius than to be compared with the orations of Lysias, and, moreover, to have a greater endowment toward virtue; so that it will be by no means a wonder if, when he has advanced in age, either in this genre of orations which he now studies he should so excel as to surpass all the other boys who have ever touched orations, or, if he is not content with these, by some divine motion of spirit he should covet greater things; for there is by nature a certain philosophy in this man’s mind. Socrates augurs these things about the adolescent.

[42] At ea de seniore scribit Plato et scribit aequalis et quidem exagitator omnium rhetorum hunc miratur unum; me autem qui Isocratem non diligunt una cum Socrate et cum Platone errare patiantur. Dulce igitur orationis genus et solutum et fluens, sententiis argutum, verbis sonans est in illo epidictico genere quod diximus proprium sophistarum, pompae quam pugnae aptius, gymnasiis et palaestrae dicatum, spretum et pulsum foro. Sed quod educata huius nutrimentis eloquentia [est] ipsa se postea colorat et roborat, non alienum fuit de oratoris quasi incunabulis dicere.

[42] But these things about the elder Plato writes, and he writes as a peer, and indeed, though an exagitator of all rhetors, he admires this one alone; but as for me, let those who do not esteem Isocrates allow me to err together with Socrates and with Plato. Therefore the kind of speech that is sweet, both unbound and flowing, sharp with sententiae, resounding with words, is in that epideictic genre which we said is proper to sophists, more suited to pomp than to battle, dedicated to the gymnasia and the palaestra, scorned and driven from the forum. But since eloquence, reared on these nutriments, [is] afterward colors and strengthens itself, it was not alien to speak about the orator’s, as it were, incunabula.

Verum haec ludorum atque pompae; nos autem iam in aciem dimicationemque veniamus.

But these things are for games and pomp; but let us now come into the battle line and combat.

XIV.

14.

[43] Quoniam tria videnda sunt oratori: quid dicat et quo quidque loco et quo modo, dicendum omnino est quid sit optimum in singulis, sed aliquanto secus atque in tradenda arte dici solet. Nulla praecepta ponemus, neque enim id suscepimus, sed excellentis eloquentiae speciem et formam adumbrabimus; nec quibus rebus ea paretur exponemus, sed qualis nobis esse videatur.

[43] Since three things must be attended to by the orator: what he should say, and in what place each thing, and in what mode, it must in general be stated what is best in each, but somewhat otherwise than is wont to be said in the transmission of the art. We shall set down no precepts, for we have not undertaken that, but we shall adumbrate the appearance and form of excellent eloquence; nor shall we set forth by what means it is procured, but what sort it seems to us to be.

[44] Ac duo breviter prima; sunt enim non tam insignia ad maximam laudem quam necessaria et tamen cum multis paene communia. Nam et invenire et iudicare quid dicas magna illa quidem sunt et tamquam animi instar in corpore, sed propria magis prudentiae quam eloquentiae: qua tamen in causa est vacua prudentia? Noverit igitur hic quidem orator, quem summum esse volumus, argumentorum et rationum locos.

[44] And, first, two things briefly; for they are not so much distinguished for the greatest praise as necessary, and yet almost common with many. For both to invent and to judge what you will say are indeed great matters and, as it were, the counterpart of the mind in the body; but they belong more properly to prudence than to eloquence: yet in what cause is prudence void? Let this orator, then, whom we wish to be consummate, know the topics of arguments and reasons.

[45] Nam quoniam, quicquid est quod in controversia aut in contentione versetur, in eo aut sitne aut quid sit aut quale sit quaeritur:—sitne, signis; quid sit, definitionibus; quale sit, recti pravique partibus; quibus ut uti possit orator, non ille vulgaris sed hic excellens, a propriis personis et temporibus semper, si potest, avocet controversiam; latius enim de genere quam de parte disceptare licet, ut quod in universo sit probatum id in parte sit probari necesse;--

[45] For since, whatever it is that is engaged in controversy or in contention, the inquiry in it is whether it be, or what it is, or of what sort it is:—whether it be, by signs; what it is, by definitions; of what sort it is, by the parts of the right and the wrong; in order that the orator may be able to use these, not that vulgar one but this excellent one, let him always, if he can, call the controversy away from the proper persons and times; for it is permitted to dispute more broadly concerning the genus than concerning the part, so that what has been approved in the universal must be proved in the part;--

[46] haec igitur quaestio a propriis personis et temporibus ad universi generis rationem traducta appellatur thesis. In hac Aristoteles adulescentis non ad philosophorum morem tenuiter disserendi, sed ad copiam rhetorum in utramque partem, ut ornatius et uberius dici posset, exercuit; idemque locos—sic enim appellat—quasi argumentorum notas tradidit unde omnis in utramque partem traheretur oratio.

[46] therefore this question, transferred from particular persons and times to the consideration of the universal genus, is called a thesis. In this Aristotle exercised young men, not in the philosophers’ manner of discussing thinly, but to the copiousness of rhetors on both sides, so that it might be said more ornately and more abundantly; and he likewise handed down topics—so he calls them—, as it were the notes of arguments, whence every oration might be drawn in either direction.

XV.

15.

[47] Faciet igitur hic noster—non enim declamatorem aliquem de ludo aut rabulam de foro, sed doctissimum et perfectissimum quaerimus—, ut, quoniam loci certi traduntur, percurrat omnis, utatur aptis, generatim dicat; ex quo emanent etiam qui communes appellantur loci. Nec vero utetur imprudenter hac copia, sed omnia expendet et seliget; non enim semper nec in omnibus causis ex isdem locis eadem argumentorum momenta sunt.

[47] Therefore our man will do this—for we are seeking not some declaimer from a school or a brawler from the forum, but a most learned and most perfect man—: since definite loci are handed down, let him run through them all, use the apt ones, and speak by kinds; from which there also flow forth the loci that are called commonplaces. Nor indeed will he use this copia imprudently, but he will weigh and select everything; for neither always nor in all causes do the same weights of arguments arise from the same loci.

[48] Iudicium igitur adhibebit nec inveniet solum quid dicat sed etiam expendet. Nihil enim est feracius ingeniis, eis praesertim quae disciplinis exculta sunt. Sed ut segetes fecundae et uberes non solum fruges verum herbas etiam effundunt inimicissimas frugibus, sic interdum ex illis locis aut levia quaedam aut causis aliena aut non utilia gignuntur.

[48] Therefore he will apply judgment, and he will not only invent what he should say but also weigh it. For nothing is more fertile than minds, especially those which have been cultivated by disciplines. But just as fecund and rich grainfields pour forth not only produce but even herbs most inimical to the produce, so at times from those loci there are generated either certain trifles, or things alien to the causes, or not useful things.

[49] Quorum ab oratoris iudicio dilectus nisi magnus adhibebitur, quonam modo ille in bonis haerebit et habitabit suis aut molliet dura aut occultabit quae dilui non poterunt atque omnino opprimet, si licebit, aut abducet animos aut aliud adferet, quod oppositum probabilius sit quam illud quod obstabit?

[49] Unless a great selection be applied by the orator’s judgment, how will he adhere to and inhabit his own good points, or mollify the hard ones, or conceal what cannot be washed away, and, if it be permitted, altogether crush them; or lead the minds away, or bring forward something else which, being set in opposition, is more probable than that which will stand in the way?

[50] Iam vero ea quae invenerit qua diligentia conlocabit? Quoniam id secundum erat de tribus. Vestibula nimirum honesta aditusque ad causam faciet inlustris; cumque animos prima adgressione occupaverit, infirmabit excludetque contraria; de firmissimis alia prima ponet alia postrema inculcabitque leviora.

[50] Now indeed, with what diligence will he arrange those things which he has discovered? Since that was the second of the three. He will assuredly fashion honorable vestibules and make the approaches to the case illustrious; and when by the first approach he has seized their minds, he will weaken and shut out the opposing points; of the firmest he will set some first and others last, and he will inculcate the lighter ones.

XVI.

16.

[51] Atque in primis duabus dicendi partibus qualis esset summatim breviterque descripsimus. Sed, ut ante dictum est, in his partibus, etsi graves atque magnae sunt, minus et artis est et laboris; cum autem et quid et quo loco dicat invenerit, illud est longe maximum, videre quonam modo; scitum est enim, quod Carneades noster dicere solebat, Clitomachum eadem dicere, Charmadam autem eodem etiam modo dicere. Quod si in philosophia tantum interest quem ad modum dicas, ubi res spectatur, non verba penduntur, quid tandem in causis existimandum est quibus totis moderatur oratio?

[51] And in the first two parts of speaking we have sketched what it should be summarily and briefly. But, as was said before, in these parts, although they are weighty and great, there is less both of art and of labor; whereas, when one has found both what he is to say and in what place to say it, then by far the greatest thing is to see in what manner; for it is a neat saying, what our Carneades used to say, that Clitomachus said the same things, but Charmadas said them in the same way as well. But if in philosophy so much turns on the manner in which you speak, where the matter is regarded and words are not weighed, what, pray, is to be thought in cases, the whole of which is governed by oration?

[52] Quod quidem ego, Brute, ex tuis litteris sentiebam, non te id sciscitari, qualem ego in inveniendo et in conlocando summum esse oratorem vellem, sed id mihi quaerere videbare, quod genus ipsius orationis optimum iudicarem: rem difficilem, di immortales, atque omnium difficillimam. Nam cum est oratio mollis et tenera et ita flexibilis ut sequatur quocumque torqueas, tum et naturae variae et voluntates multum inter se distantia effecerunt genera dicendi:

[52] This indeed, Brutus, I perceived from your letters: that you were not inquiring what sort of man I would wish the supreme orator to be in inventing and in collocating, but you seemed to me to be asking this of me—what genus of the oration itself I judge best: a difficult matter, immortal gods, and the most difficult of all. For since speech is soft and tender and so flexible that it follows wherever you twist it, then both diverse natures and wills, very far differing among themselves, have produced genera of speaking:

[53] flumen aliis verborum volubilitasque cordi est, qui ponunt in orationis celeritate eloquentiam; distincta alios et interpuncta intervalla, morae respirationesque delectant: quid potest esse tam diversum? Tamen est in utroque aliquid excellens. Elaborant alii in lenitate et aequabilitate et puro quasi quodam et candido genere dicendi; ecce aliqui duritatem et severitatem quandam in verbis et orationis quasi maestitiam sequuntur; quodque paulo ante divisimus, ut alii graves alii tenues alii temperati vellent videri, quot orationum genera esse diximus totidem oratorum reperiuntur.

[53] a river of words and volubility is dear to some, who place eloquence in the celerity of oration; distinct and interpuncted intervals, pauses and respirations delight others: what can be so diverse? Yet in each there is something excellent. Others elaborate in lenity and equability and in a pure, as it were, and candid kind of diction; behold, some follow a certain hardness and severity in words and a kind of sadness of oration; and that which a little before we divided, that some would wish to seem grave, others tenuous, others temperate, as many kinds of orations as we said there are, just so many orators are found.

XVII.

17.

[54] Et quoniam coepi iam cumulatius hoc munus augere quam a te postulatum est—tibi enim tantum de orationis genere quaerenti respondi etiam breviter de inveniendo et conlocando—, ne nunc quidem solum de orationis modo dicam sed etiam de actionis: ita praetermissa pars nulla erit, quando quidem de memoria nihil est hoc loco dicendum, quae communis est multarum artium.

[54] And since I have already begun to augment this task more copiously than was requested by you—for to you asking only about the kind of oratory I also responded briefly about invention and disposition—, not now either will I speak only about the mode of oratory but also about delivery: thus no part will be passed over, since indeed nothing about memory is to be said in this place, which is common to many arts.

[55] Quo modo autem dicatur, id est in duobus, in agendo et in eloquendo. Est enim actio quasi corporis quaedam eloquentia, cum constet e voce atque motu. Vocis mutationes totidem sunt quot animorum, qui maxime voce commoventur.

[55] As to how it is delivered, that is, in two ways: in acting and in speaking. For action (delivery) is, as it were, a certain eloquence of the body, since it consists of voice and movement. The changes of the voice are just as many as those of the feelings, which are moved most by the voice.

Itaque ille perfectus, quem iam dudum nostra indicat oratio, utcumque se adfectum videri et animum audientis moveri volet, ita certum vocis admovebit sonum; de quo plura dicerem, si hoc praecipiendi tempus esset aut si tu hoc quaereres. Dicerem etiam de gestu, cum quo iunctus est vultus; quibus omnibus dici vix potest quantum intersit quem ad modum utatur orator.

And so that perfect man, whom our discourse has long since indicated, however he will wish to seem affected and the mind of the hearer to be moved, so will he apply a certain sound of the voice; about which I would say more, if this were a time for prescribing or if you were asking this. I would speak also about gesture, with which the countenance is joined; and with all these it can scarcely be said how much it matters in what manner the orator employs them.

[56] Nam et infantes actionis dignitate eloquentiae saepe fructum tulerunt et diserti deformitate agendi multi infantes putati sunt; ut iam non sine causa Demosthenes tribuerit et primas et secundas et tertias actioni; si enim eloquentia nulla sine hac, haec autem sine eloquentia tanta est, certe plurimum in dicendo potest. Volet igitur ille qui eloquentiae principatum petet et contenta voce atrociter dicere et summissa leniter et inclinata videri gravis et inflexa miserabilis;

[56] For both the inarticulate have often, by the dignity of action (delivery), borne the fruit of eloquence, and many articulate men, by the deformity of acting (delivering), have been thought inarticulate; so that now not without cause did Demosthenes assign first and second and third place to action (delivery); for if there is no eloquence without this, while this, without eloquence, is so great, certainly it has the greatest power in speaking. Therefore he who will seek the primacy of eloquence will wish, with a contained voice, to speak fiercely, and with a lowered voice gently, and, when inclined, to seem weighty, and, when bent, pitiable;

[57] mira est enim quaedam natura vocis, cuius quidem e tribus omnino sonis, inflexo acuto gravi, tanta sit et tam suavis varietas perfecta in cantibus. XVIII. Est autem etiam in dicendo quidam cantus obscurior, non hic e Phrygia et Caria rhetorum epilogus paene canticum, sed ille quem significat Demosthenes et Aeschines, cum alter alteri obicit vocis flexiones; dicit plorare etiam Demosthenes istum quem saepe dicat voce dulci et clara fuisse.

[57] for there is a certain wondrous nature of the voice, in which indeed, out of the three tones altogether—inflected, acute, and grave—there is so great and so pleasant a variety perfected in songs. 18. There is moreover in speaking also a certain more obscure chant, not that epilogue of the rhetors from Phrygia and Caria, almost a little song, but that which Demosthenes and Aeschines indicate, when the one casts in the other’s teeth the inflections of the voice; Demosthenes says that that fellow even weeps, whom he often says to have had a sweet and clear voice.

[58] In quo illud etiam notandum mihi videtur ad studium persequendae suavitatis in vocibus: ipsa enim natura, quasi modularetur hominum orationem, in omni verbo posuit acutam vocem nec una plus nec a postrema syllaba citra tertiam; quo magis naturam ducem ad aurium voluptatem sequatur industria.

[58] In this matter that too seems to me to be noted for the zeal of pursuing suavity in voices: for nature herself, as though she were modulating human speech, has placed an acute in every word, not more than one, and not beyond the third syllable from the last; whereby industry the more follows nature as leader toward the pleasure of the ears.

[59] Ac vocis quidem bonitas optanda est; non est enim in nobis, sed tractatio atque usus in nobis. Ergo ille princeps variabit et mutabit: omnis sonorum tum intendens tum remittens persequetur gradus. Idemque motu sic utetur, nihil ut supersit.

[59] And indeed the goodness of the voice is to be desired; for it is not within our control, but the handling and use are within our control. Therefore that leading man will vary and change: he will pursue all the gradations of sounds, now intensifying, now relaxing. And he will use motion likewise in such a way that nothing is superfluous.

In gestu status erectus et celsus; rarus incessus nec ita longus; excursio moderata eaque rara; nulla mollitia cervicum, nullae argutiae digitorum, non ad numerum articulus cadens; trunco magis toto se ipse moderans et virili laterum flexione, bracchii proiectione in contentionibus, contractione in remissis.

In gesture, a posture erect and lofty; an infrequent pacing and not so long; an excursion moderate, and that too rare; no softness of the neck, no subtleties of the fingers, no joint falling to the number; governing himself rather by the whole trunk and with a manly flexion of the flanks, with projection of the arm in contentions, with contraction in relaxed parts.

[60] Vultus vero, qui secundum vocem plurimum potest, quantam adferet tum dignitatem tum venustatem! In quo cum effeceris ne quid ineptum sit aut vultuosum, tum oculorum est quaedam magna moderatio. Nam ut imago est animi vultus, sic indices oculi; quorum et hilaritatis et vicissim tristitiae modum res ipsae de quibus agetur temperabunt.

[60] The countenance indeed, which next to the voice has the greatest power, how much both dignity and venusty will it bring! In which, when you have ensured that there is nothing inept or grimacing, then there is a certain great moderation of the eyes. For as the face is the image of the mind, so the eyes are its indices; and the very matters that are being dealt with will temper the measure both of cheerfulness in them and, in turn, of sadness.

XIX.

19.

[61] Sed iam illius perfecti oratoris et summae eloquentiae species exprimenda est. Quem hoc uno excellere [id est oratione], cetera in eo latere indicat nomen ipsum; non enim inventor aut compositor aut actor qui haec complexus est omnia, sed et Graece ab eloquendo rhetor et Latine eloquens dictus est; ceterarum enim rerum quae sunt in oratore partem aliquam sibi quisque vindicat, dicendi autem, id est eloquendi, maxima vis soli huic conceditur.

[61] But now the form of that perfect orator and the pattern of highest eloquence must be expressed. His very name indicates that he excels in this one thing [that is, in oration], while the rest lie hidden in him; for he is not called an inventor or a compositor or an actor who has embraced all these things, but both in Greek, from speaking out, he is called a rhetor, and in Latin an eloquent man; for of the other matters that belong to the orator each person claims some part for himself, but the greatest force of speaking, that is, of eloquence, is conceded to this man alone.

[62] Quamquam enim et philosophi quidam ornate locuti sunt—si quidem et Theophrastus a divinitate loquendi nomen invenit et Aristoteles Isocratem ipsum lacessivit et Xenophontis voce Musas quasi locutas ferunt et longe omnium quicumque scripserunt aut locuti sunt exstitit et suavitate et gravitate princeps Plato—, tamen horum oratio neque nervos neque aculeos oratorios ac forensis habet.

[62] Although indeed certain philosophers also spoke ornately—since in fact Theophrastus even derived his very name from the divinity of his speaking, and Aristotle challenged Isocrates himself, and they report that in the voice of Xenophon the Muses, as it were, spoke, and by far, of all who have written or spoken, Plato stood forth as the prince in both suavity and gravity—nevertheless the oration of these men has neither the sinews nor the stings that are oratorical and forensic.

[63] Loquuntur cum doctis, quorum sedare animos malunt quam incitare, et de rebus placatis ac minime turbulentis docendi causa non capiendi loquuntur, ut in eo ipso, quod delectationem aliquam dicendo aucupentur, plus non nullis quam necesse sit facere videantur. Ergo ab hoc genere non difficile est hanc eloquentiam, de qua nunc agitur, secernere.

[63] They speak with the learned, whose minds they prefer to sedate rather than to incite, and they speak about pacified and least turbulent matters for the sake of teaching, not of captivating, so that in this very point, that they hunt for some delectation by speaking, they seem to some to do more than is necessary. Therefore from this kind it is not difficult to separate this eloquence, which is now being treated.

[64] Mollis est enim oratio philosophorum et umbratilis nec sententiis nec verbis instructa popularibus nec vincta numeris, sed soluta liberius; nihil iratum habet, nihil invidum, nihil atrox, nihil miserabile, nihil astutum; casta, verecunda, virgo incorrupta quodam modo. Itaque sermo potius quam oratio dicitur. Quamquam enim omnis locutio oratio est, tamen unius oratoris locutio hoc proprio signata nomine est.

[64] For the oration of philosophers is soft and shadowy, neither equipped with popular sentences nor popular words, nor bound by numbers (rhythms), but more freely unloosed; it has nothing angry, nothing envious, nothing dire, nothing pitiable, nothing crafty; chaste, modest, in a way an uncorrupted virgin. And so it is called conversation rather than oration. For although every locution is an oration, nevertheless the locution of the orator alone is marked by this proper name.

[65] Sophistarum, de quibus supra dixi, magis distinguenda similitudo videtur, qui omnes eosdem volunt flores quos adhibet orator in causis persequi. Sed hoc differunt quod, cum sit his propositum non perturbare animos, sed placare potius nec tam persuadere quam delectare, et apertius id faciunt quam nos et crebrius, concinnas magis sententias exquirunt quam probabilis, a re saepe discedunt, intexunt fabulas, verba altius transferunt eaque ita disponunt ut pictores varietatem colorum, paria paribus referunt, adversa contrariis, saepissimeque similiter extrema definiunt.

[65] Of the sophists, of whom I spoke above, the resemblance seems rather to need distinguishing: they all wish to pursue the same flowers that the orator employs in causes. But they differ in this, that, since their aim is not to perturb minds but rather to placate them, and not so much to persuade as to delight—and they do this more openly than we do and more frequently—they seek out sentences more concinnous than probable, they often depart from the matter, they weave in fables, they transfer words more loftily and dispose them as painters do a variety of colors, matching like with like, opposites with contraries, and very often similarly defining the extremities.

XX.

20.

[66] Huic generi historia finitima est, in qua et narratur ornate et regio saepe aut pugna describitur; interponuntur etiam contiones et hortationes, sed in his tracta quaedam et fluens expetitur, non haec contorta et acris oratio. Ab his non multo secus quam a poetis haec eloquentia quam quaerimus sevocanda est. Nam etiam poetae quaestionem attulerunt, quidnam esset illud quo ipsi differrent ab oratoribus: numero maxime videbantur antea et versu, nunc apud oratores iam ipse numerus increbruit.

[66] Neighbor to this kind is history, in which both narration is done ornately and a region or a battle is often described; speeches to the assembly and exhortations are also interposed, but in these a certain drawn-out and flowing manner is sought, not this contorted and sharp oration. From these, not much less than from poets, the eloquence which we seek must be called away. For even poets have brought a question, what indeed that was by which they themselves differed from orators: formerly they seemed chiefly by rhythm and by verse; now among orators rhythm itself has already grown frequent.

[67] Quicquid est enim quod sub aurium mensuram aliquam cadit, etiam si abest a versu—nam id quidem orationis est vitium—numerus vocatur, qui Graece rhythmos dicitur. Itaque video visum esse non nullis Platonis et Democriti locutionem, etsi absit a versu, tamen quod incitatius feratur et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum quam comicorum poetarum; apud quos, nisi quod versiculi sunt, nihil est aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis. Nec tamen id est poetae maximum, etsi est eo laudabilior quod virtutes oratoris persequitur, cum versu sit astrictior.

[67] For whatever it is that falls under some measure of the ears, even if it is far from verse—for that indeed is a fault of oratory—is called “number,” which in Greek is called rhythmos (“rhythm”). And so I see it has seemed to some that the diction of Plato and Democritus, although it is apart from verse, yet because it is borne along more impetuously and uses the very brightest lights of words, ought rather to be thought a poema than the poems of the comic poets; among whom, except that there are little verses, there is nothing else unlike everyday speech. Nor, however, is that the greatest thing of the poet, although he is for that more praiseworthy, in that he pursues the virtues of the orator, while he is more constrained by verse.

[68] Ego autem, etiam si quorundam grandis et ornata vox est poetarum, tamen in ea cum licentiam statuo maiorem esse quam in nobis faciendorum iungendorumque verborum, tum etiam non nulli eorum voluntati vocibus magis quam rebus inserviunt; nec vero, si quid est unum inter eos simile—id autem est iudicium electioque verborum—, propterea ceterarum rerum dissimilitudo intellegi non potest; sed id nec dubium est et, si quid habet quaestionis, hoc tamen ipsum ad id quod propositum est non est necessarium. Seiunctus igitur orator a philosophorum eloquentia, a sophistarum, ab historicorum, a poetarum explicandus est nobis qualis futurus sit.

[68] I, however, even if the voice of certain poets is grand and ornate, yet in it I hold there is a greater license than for us in the making and the joining of words; and moreover not a few of them serve their own will with words rather than with things; nor indeed, if there is one thing among them that is similar—that is the judgment and choice of words—on that account can the dissimilarity of the other things not be understood; but that is not in doubt, and, if it has any question, yet this very point is not necessary for what has been proposed. Therefore the orator, separated from the eloquence of philosophers, of sophists, of historians, of poets, must be explained by us as to what he will be like.

XXI.

21.

[69] Erit igitur eloquens—hunc enim auctore Antonio quaerimus—is qui in foro causisque civilibus ita dicet, ut probet, ut delectet, ut flectat. Probare necessitatis est, delectare suavitatis, flectere victoriae: nam id unum ex omnibus ad obtinendas causas potest plurimum. Sed quot officia oratoris, tot sunt genera dicendi: subtile in probando, modicum in delectando, vehemens in flectendo; in quo uno vis omnis oratoris est.

[69] Therefore, eloquent—this is the man we seek, with Antonius as author—is he who in the forum and in civil causes will speak so as to prove, to delight, to bend. To prove is of necessity, to delight of suavity, to bend of victory: for that one thing above all has the greatest power for securing causes. But as many as are the duties of the orator, so many are the kinds of speaking: subtle in proving, moderate in delighting, vehement in bending; in this one lies the whole force of the orator.

[70] Magni igitur iudici, summae etiam facultatis esse debebit moderator ille et quasi temperator huius tripertitae varietatis; nam et iudicabit quid cuique opus sit et poterit quocumque modo postulabit causa dicere. Sed est eloquentiae sicut reliquarum rerum fundamentum sapientia. Vt enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilius quam quid deceat videre.

[70] Therefore that moderator, and as it were temperer, of this tripartite variety ought to be a man of great judgment and also of the highest capacity; for he will both discern what is needed for each, and he will be able to speak in whatever manner the case shall demand. But the foundation of eloquence, as of the remaining things, is wisdom. For as in life, so in oratory, nothing is more difficult than to see what is fitting.

Prepon appellant hoc Graeci, nos dicamus sane decorum; de quo praeclare et multa praecipiuntur et res est cognitione dignissima; huius ignoratione non modo in vita sed saepissime et in poematis et in oratione peccatur.

The Greeks call this Prepon, let us indeed call it decorum; about which both excellent and many precepts are prescribed, and the matter is most worthy of cognizance; by ignorance of this one errs not only in life but very often both in poems and in oration.

[71] Est autem quid deceat oratori videndum non in sententiis solum sed etiam in verbis. Non enim omnis fortuna, non omnis honos, non omnis auctoritas, non omnis aetas nec vero locus aut tempus aut auditor omnis eodem aut verborum genere tractandus est aut sententiarum semperque in omni parte orationis ut vitae quid deceat est considerandum; quod et in re de qua agitur positum est et in personis et eorum qui dicunt et eorum qui audiunt.

[71] Moreover, what is fitting for the orator must be seen not only in sentiments but also in words. For not every fortune, not every honor, not every authority, not every age, nor indeed every place or time or auditor is to be handled by the same kind either of words or of sentiments; and always, in every part of an oration as in life, what is fitting must be considered; which is based both in the matter that is being dealt with and in the persons, both of those who speak and of those who hear.

[72] Itaque hunc locum longe et late patentem philosophi solent in officiis tractare—non cum de recto ipso disputant, nam id quidem unum est—, grammatici in poetis, eloquentes in omni et genere et parte causarum. Quam enim indecorum est, de stillicidiis cum apud unum iudicem dicas, amplissimis verbis et locis uti communibus, de maiestate populi Romani summisse et subtiliter! XXII.

[72] Therefore this topic, extending far and wide, philosophers are accustomed to treat in duties— not when they dispute about the right itself, for that indeed is one—, grammarians in poets, men of eloquence in every genus and part of causes. For how indecorous it is, when you speak about eaves-drippings before a single judge, to use most ample words and commonplaces, but about the majesty of the Roman people, submissively and subtilly! 22.

Hic genere toto, at persona alii peccant aut sua aut iudicum aut etiam adversariorum, nec re solum sed saepe verbo; etsi sine re nulla vis verbi est, tamen eadem res saepe aut probatur aut reicitur alio atque alio elata verbo.

Here, some err in the whole genus; but as to persona, they err either in their own, or in that of the judges, or even of their adversaries—and not only in the matter but often in the word; and although without the matter there is no force of the word, nevertheless the same matter is often either approved or rejected when borne forth by one word or another.

[73] In omnibusque rebus videndum est quatenus; etsi enim suus cuique modus est, tamen magis offendit nimium quam parum; in quo Apelles pictores quoque eos peccare dicebat qui non sentirent quid esset satis. Magnus est locus hic, Brute, quod te non fugit, et magnum volumen aliud desiderat; sed ad id quod agitur illud satis. Cum hoc decere—quod semper usurpamus in omnibus dictis et factis, minimis et maximi—cum hoc, inquam, decere dicimus, illud non decere, et id usquequaque quantum sit appareat in alioque ponatur aliudque totum sit, utrum decere an oportere dicas;

[73] And in all things one must consider the extent; for although each thing has its own measure, nevertheless excess offends more than defect; in which matter Apelles used to say that even painters err who do not sense what is enough. This is a great field, Brutus—as you know—and calls for another large volume; but for the business at hand that is enough. When with this “to be seemly” (decere)—which we are always employing in all sayings and doings, in the least and in the greatest—when, I say, we declare that this does “seemly-fit,” that does not, and when it appears everywhere how great a thing it is, and one thing is set in relation to another and the whole issue is whether you say “to be seemly” or “to be obligatory/one ought” (oportere);

[74] oportere enim perfectionem declarat offici, quo et semper utendum est et omnibus, decere quasi aptum esse consentaneumque tempori et personae; quod cum in factis saepissime tum in dictis valet, in vultu denique et gestu et incessu, contraque item dedecere; quod si poeta fugit ut maximum vitium, qui peccat etiam, cum probi orationem adfingit improbo stultove sapientis; si denique pictor ille vidit, cum in immolanda Iphigenia tristis Calchas esset, tristior Vlixes, maereret Menelaus, obvolvendum caput Agamemnonis esse, quoniam summum illum luctum penicillo non posset imitari; si denique histrio quid deceat quaerit, quid faciendum oratori putemus?—Sed cum hoc tantum sit, quid in causis earumque quasi membris faciat orator viderit: illud quidem perspicuum est, non modo partis orationis sed etiam causas totas alias alia forma dicendi esse tractandas.

[74] for “it is necessary” declares the perfection of duty, which must be employed both always and by all, while “it is seemly” signifies, as it were, what is apt and consonant to the time and the person; which holds most often in deeds and also in words, finally in the countenance and in gesture and in gait, and conversely likewise “it is unseemly”; and if the poet shuns this as a greatest vice—who even errs when he ascribes the speech of an upright man to a wicked one, or of a wise man to a fool— if, finally, that painter perceived that, when in the sacrificing of Iphigenia Calchas was sad, Ulysses sadder, Menelaus was grieving, the head of Agamemnon had to be veiled, since he could not imitate with the brush that highest grief; if, finally, the actor inquires what is seemly, what are we to think must be done by the orator?—But since this is so great a matter, let the orator see what he should do in cases and in their, as it were, members: this at least is clear, that not only the parts of a speech but even entire cases are to be handled, some with one and others with another form of speaking.

XXIII.

23.

[75] Sequitur ut cuiusque generis nota quaeratur et formula: magnum opus et arduum, ut saepe iam diximus; sed ingredientibus considerandum fuit quid ageremus, nunc quidem iam quocumque feremur danda nimirum vela sunt. Ac primum informandus est ille nobis quem solum quidem vocant Atticum.

[75] It follows that the note and the formula of each kind be sought: a great and arduous work, as we have already said often; but when we were entering upon it, it had to be considered what we should do; now indeed, whithersoever we are borne, the sails must surely be spread. And first that type must be formed for us which they indeed call the only Attic.

[76] Summissus est et humilis, consuetudinem imitans, ab indisertis re plus quam opinione differens. Itaque eum qui audiunt, quamvis ipsi infantes sint, tamen illo modo confidunt se posse dicere. Nam orationis subtilitas imitabilis illa quidem videtur esse existimanti, sed nihil est experienti minus.

[76] He is submissive and lowly, imitating custom, differing from the uneloquent more in reality than in reputation. And so those who hear him, although they themselves be infants, nevertheless in that mode are confident that they can speak. For the subtlety of the discourse, to one considering, indeed seems imitable; but to one experiencing it, nothing is less so.

Etsi enim non plurimi sanguinis est, habeat tamen sucum aliquem oportet, ut, etiam si illis maximis viribus careat, sit, ut ita dicam, integra valetudine.

For although it is not of the greatest blood, yet it ought to have some juice, so that, even if it lacks those very greatest strengths, it may be, so to speak, in entire health.

[77] Primum igitur eum tamquam e vinculis numerorum eximamus. Sunt enim quidam, ut scis, oratorii numeri, de quibus mox agemus, observandi ratione quadam, sed alio in genere orationis, in hoc omnino relinquendi. Solutum quiddam sit nec vagum tamen, ut ingredi libere, non ut licenter videatur errare.

[77] First, then, let us remove him, as it were, from the fetters of numbers. For there are certain, as you know, oratorical numbers, about which we shall soon speak, to be observed by a certain method, yet in another kind of oration; in this one they must be wholly left aside. Let it be something unbound, yet not vague, so that it may seem to advance freely, not to stray licentiously.

Verba etiam verbis quasi coagmentare neglegat. Habet enim ille tamquam hiatus et concursus vocalium molle quiddam et quod indicet non ingratam neglegentiam de re hominis magis quam de verbis laborantis.

Let him even neglect to, as it were, cement words to words. For that, as it were, hiatus and concourse of vowels has a certain softness, and something that indicates a not unpleasing negligence, of a man laboring more about the matter than about the words.

[78] Sed erit videndum de reliquis, cum haec duo ei liberiora fuerint, circuitus conglutinatioque verborum. Illa enim ipsa contracta et minuta non neglegenter tractanda sunt, sed quaedam etiam neglegentia est diligens. Nam ut mulieres esse dicuntur non nullae inornatae, quas id ipsum deceat, sic haec subtilis oratio etiam incompta delectat; fit enim quiddam in utroque, quo sit venustius, sed non ut appareat. Tum removebitur omnis insignis ornatus quasi margaritarum, ne calamistri quidem adhibebuntur;

[78] But there will have to be consideration of the remaining matters, when these two have been made freer for him, the circuit and the conglutination of words. For those very things, compacted and minute, are not to be handled negligently; yet a certain negligence too is diligent. For as some women are said to be unadorned, for whom that very thing is becoming, so this subtle oration even unadorned delights; for there comes to be something in each, whereby it is more charming, but not so as to appear. Then every conspicuous ornament, as it were of pearls, will be removed; not even curling-irons will be employed;

[79] fucati vero medicamenta candoris et ruboris omnia repellentur; elegantia modo et munditia remanebit. Sermo purus erit et Latinus, dilucide planeque dicetur, quid deceat circumspicietur; XXIV. unum aberit, quod quartum numerat Theophrastus in orationis laudibus: ornatum illud, suave et adfluens.

[79] but the cosmetic medicaments of whiteness and redness will all be driven away; elegance only and neatness will remain. The speech will be pure and Latin, it will be spoken clearly and plainly, regard will be had to what is becoming; 24. one thing will be lacking, which Theophrastus numbers as the fourth in the praises of oration: that ornament, suave and affluent.

Acutae crebraeque sententiae ponentur et nescio unde ex abdito erutae; ac—quod in hoc oratore dominabitur verecundus erit usus oratoriae quasi supellectilis.

Acute and frequent maxims will be set forth, and dug up I-know-not-whence out of the hidden; and—what will predominate in this orator— there will be a modest use of oratorical, as it were, furniture.

[80] Supellex est enim quodam modo nostra, quae est in ornamentis, alia rerum alia verborum. Ornatus autem verborum duplex: unus simplicium alter conlocatorum. Simplex probatur in propriis usitatisque verbis, quod aut optime sonat aut rem maxime explanat; in alienis aut translatum et factum aliunde ut mutuo, aut factum ab ipso ac novum aut priscum et inusitatum; sed etiam inusitata ac prisca sunt in propriis, nisi quod raro utimur.

[80] For our furnishings, in a certain way, are in ornaments, some of things and some of words. But the ornament of words is twofold: one of simple words, the other of collocated ones. The simple is approved in proper and customary words, which either sounds best or most clearly explains the matter; in alien ones, either transferred and made from elsewhere as by a loan, or made by oneself and new, or ancient and unaccustomed; yet the unaccustomed and the ancient also belong among the proper, except that we use them rarely.

[81] Conlocata autem verba habent ornatum, si aliquid concinnitatis efficiunt, quod verbis mutatis non maneat manente sententia; nam sententiarum ornamenta quae permanent, etiam si verba mutaveris, sunt illa quidem permulta, sed quae emineant pauciora. Ergo ille tenuis orator, modo sit elegans, nec in faciendis verbis erit audax et in transferendis verecundus et parcus et in priscis in reliquisque ornamentis et verborum et sententiarum demissior; ea translatione fortasse crebrior, qua frequentissime sermo omnis utitur non modo urbanorum, sed etiam rusticorum: si quidem est eorum gemmare vitis, sitire agros, laetas esse segetes, luxuriosa frumenta.

[81] But words set together have ornament, if they achieve some concinnity, which does not remain when the words are changed while the sentence remains; for the ornaments of sentences which do remain, even if you were to change the words, are indeed very many, but fewer are those that stand out. Therefore that slender orator, provided he be elegant, will not be bold in making words, and in transfers (metaphors) will be modest and sparing, and in archaic words and in the remaining ornaments both of words and of sentences more low-lying; perhaps more frequent in that translation which all speech most frequently employs, not only of townsmen but even of rustics: since it is theirs to say “the vine to bud,” “the fields to thirst,” “the crops to be glad,” “luxuriant grains.”

[82] Nihil horum parum audacter, sed aut simile est illi unde transferas, aut si res suum nullum habet nomen, docendi causa sumptum, non ludendi videtur. Hoc ornamento liberius paulo quam ceteris utetur hic summissus, nec tam licenter tamen quam si genere dicendi uteretur amplissimo; XXV. itaque illud indecorum, quod quale sit ex decoro debet intellegi, hic quoque apparet, cum verbum aliquod altius transfertur idque in oratione humili ponitur quod idem in alia deceret.

[82] None of these is timidly done, but either it is like that from which you transfer, or, if the thing has no name of its own, it seems taken up for the sake of teaching, not of playing. With this ornament the subdued speaker will use himself a little more freely than with the others, yet not so licentiously as if he were employing the most ample genus of speaking; 25. therefore that indecorum—which ought to be understood in its quality from decorum—appears here too, when some word is transferred on a loftier level and that is placed in a humble oration which would be fitting in another.

[83] Illam autem concinnitatem, quae verborum conlocationem inluminat eis luminibus quae Graeci quasi aliquos gestus orationis schemata appellant, quod idem verbum ab eis etiam in sententiarum ornamenta transfertur, adhibet hic quidem subtilis, quem nisi quod solum ceteroqui recte quidam vocant Atticum, sed paulo parcius; nam sic ut in epularum apparatu a magnificentia recedens non se parcum solum sed etiam elegantem videri volet, et eliget quibus utatur;

[83] But that concinnity, which illuminates the collocation of words with those lights which the Greeks, as if certain gestures of oration, call schemata—the same word is by them also transferred to the ornaments of sentences—this the subtle style indeed applies, whom certain people, apart from this alone, rightly call Attic, but a little more sparingly; for just so, in the apparatus of banquets, a man withdrawing from magnificence will wish to seem not sparing only but even elegant, and he will choose what things he uses;

[84] sunt enim pleraque apta huius ipsius oratoris de quo loquor parsimoniae. Nam illa de quibus ante dixi huic acuto fugienda sunt: paria paribus relata et similiter conclusa eodemque pacto cadentia et immutatione litterae quasi quaesitae venustates, ne elaborata concinnitas et quoddam aucupium delectationis manifesto deprehensum appareat;

[84] for indeed most things are apt to the very parsimony of this orator himself of whom I speak. For those things about which I spoke before must be shunned by this acute man: pairs set against pairs and similarly concluded and falling in the same fashion, and graces as if sought out by a mutation of a letter, lest a labored concinnity and a certain bird-catching of delectation, manifestly detected, should appear;

[85] itemque si quae verborum iterationes contentionem aliquam et clamorem requirent, erunt ab hac summissione orationis alienae; ceteris promiscue poterit uti, continuationem verborum modo relaxet et dividat utaturque verbis quam usitatissimis, translationibus quam mollissimis; etiam illa sententiarum lumina adsumet, quae non erunt vehementer inlustria. Non faciet rem publicam loquentem nec ab inferis mortuos excitabit nec acervatim multa frequentans una complexione devinciet. Valentiorum haec laterum sunt nec ab hoc, quem informamus, aut exspectanda aut postulanda; erit enim ut voce sic etiam oratione suppressior.

[85] Likewise, if any repetitions of words should require some contention and clamor, they will be alien to this submissiveness of speech; he will be able to use the rest promiscuously, provided he somewhat relax and divide the continuation of words, and use words as most usual as possible, metaphors as soft as possible; he will also take up those lights of sententiae which will not be vehemently illustrious. He will not make the commonwealth speak, nor will he rouse the dead from the lower regions, nor, piling up many things in heaps, will he bind them fast in one single complexion. These things belong to stronger lungs, and from this man whom we are forming they are neither to be expected nor demanded; for he will be, in voice as likewise in discourse, more suppressed.

[86] Sed pleraque ex illis convenient etiam huic tenuitati, quamquam isdem ornamentis utetur horridius; talem enim inducimus. Accedet actio non tragica nec scaenae, sed modica iactatione corporis, vultu tamen multa conficiens; non hoc quo dicuntur os ducere, sed illo quo significant ingenue quo sensu quidque pronuntient.

[86] But most of those things will also be fitting to this very tenuity, although he will use the same ornaments more roughly; for such a one we are introducing. There will be an action not tragic nor of the stage, but with a moderate gesticulation of the body, yet accomplishing much by the countenance; not to draw the mouth in that way in which things are spoken, but in that by which they signify ingenuously with what feeling they pronounce each thing.

XXVI.

26.

[87] Huic generi orationis aspergentur etiam sales, qui in dicendo nimium quantum valent; quorum duo genera sunt, unum facetiarum, alterum dicacitatis. Vtetur utroque; sed altero in narrando aliquid venuste, altero in iaciendo mittendoque ridiculo, cuius genera plura sunt; sed nunc aliud agimus.

[87] Upon this kind of oration there will be sprinkled also witticisms, which in speaking avail immensely; of which there are two kinds, one of facetiousness, the other of dicacity. He will use both; but the one in narrating something charmingly, the other in cracking and letting fly a jest, of which there are many kinds; but now we are attending to something else.

[88] Illud admonemus tamen ridiculo sic usurum oratorem ut nec nimis frequenti ne scurrile sit, nec subobsceno ne mimicum, nec petulanti ne improbum, nec in calamitatem ne inhumanum, nec in facinus ne odii locum risus occupet, neque aut sua persona aut iudicum aut tempore alienum. haec enim ad illud indecorum referuntur.

[88] We nevertheless admonish that the orator use ridicule in such a way that it be neither too frequent, lest it be scurrilous; nor somewhat obscene, lest it be mime-like; nor petulant, lest it be improper; nor upon calamity, lest it be inhuman; nor upon crime, lest laughter occupy the place of hatred; and that it be not out of keeping either with his own persona, or with the judges, or with the time. For these things are referred to that indecorum.

[89] Vitabit etiam quaesita nec ex tempore ficta, sed domo adlata, quae plerumque sunt frigida. Parcet et amicitiis et dignitatibus, vitabit insanabilis contumelias, tantum modo adversarios figet nec eos tamen semper nec omnis nec omni modo. Quibus exceptis sic utetur sale et facetiis, ut ego ex istis novis Atticis talem cognoverim neminem, cum id certe sit vel maxime Atticum.

[89] He will also avoid jests that are sought-out and not ex tempore but brought from home, which are for the most part cold. He will spare both friendships and dignities, he will avoid insults that are incurable; he will only just pin his adversaries, and yet not them always, nor all, nor in every manner. With these things excepted, he will so employ salt and facetiae that, of those new Attics, I have known no one such—since that is certainly the most Attic quality of all.

[90] Hanc ego iudico formam summissi oratoris, sed magni tamen et germani Attici; quoniam quicquid est salsum aut salubre in oratione, id proprium Atticorum est. E quibus tamen non omnes faceti: Lysias satis et Hyperides, Demades praeter ceteros fertur, Demosthenes minus habetur; quo quidem mihi nihil videtur urbanius, sed non tam dicax fuit quam facetus; est autem illud acrioris ingeni, hoc maioris artis.

[90] This I judge to be the form of the subdued orator, yet a great and genuine Attic one; since whatever is witty or salubrious in speech is the proper mark of the Attics. Of whom, however, not all are facetious: Lysias enough, and Hyperides; Demades is reported beyond the rest; Demosthenes is held to have less—than whom indeed nothing seems to me more urbane—but he was not so biting in jest as he was witty; now that is of a keener genius, this of a greater art.

[91] Vberius est aliud aliquantoque robustius quam hoc humile de quo dictum est, summissius autem quam illud de quo iam dicetur amplissimum. Hoc in genere nervorum vel minimum, suavitatis autem est vel plurimum. Est enim plenius quam hoc enucleatum, quam autem illud ornatum copiosumque summissius.

[91] There is another style richer and somewhat more robust than this humble one about which it has been spoken, but more modest than that most ample one about which there will now be speech. In this kind there is the very least of sinews, but the very most of sweetness. For it is fuller than this enucleated one, but more modest than that ornate and copious one.

XXVII.

27.

[92] Huic omnia dicendi ornamenta conveniunt plurimumque est in hac orationis forma suavitatis. In qua multi floruerunt apud Graecos, sed Phalereus Demetrius meo iudicio praestitit ceteris, cuius oratio cum sedate placideque liquitur, tum inlustrant eam quasi stellae quaedam translata verba atque immutata. Translata dico, ut saepe iam, quae per similitudinem ab alia re aut suavitatis aut inopiae causa transferuntur; immutata, in quibus pro verbo proprio subicitur aliud quod idem significet sumptum ex re aliqua consequenti.

[92] To this kind all the ornaments of speaking are fitting, and in this form of speech there is the very greatest suavity. In it many flourished among the Greeks, but Demetrius of Phalerum, in my judgment, excelled the rest; whose speech, while it flows sedately and placidly, is then illuminated, as if by certain stars, by words translated and altered. Translated I call, as so often already, those which by likeness are transferred from another thing either for the sake of pleasantness or of poverty; altered, those in which, in place of the proper word, another is put which signifies the same, taken from some consequent matter.

[93] Quod quamquam transferendo fit, tamen alio modo transtulit cum dixit Ennius arce et urbe orba sum, alio modo, [si pro patria arcem dixisset; et] horridam Africam terribili tremere tumultu [cum dicit pro Afris immutate Africam]: hanc hypallagen rhetores, quia quasi summutantur verba pro verbis, metonymian grammatici vocant, quod nomina transferuntur;

[93] Although this is done by transference, yet he transferred in one way when Ennius said “I am bereft of citadel and city,” in another way, [if he had said “citadel” in place of “fatherland”; and] “horrid Africa trembles with terrible tumult” [when he says “Africa” for “Africans,” with “Africa” changed]: this the rhetors call hypallage, because, as it were, words are substituted for words; the grammarians call it metonymy, because names are transferred;

[94] Aristoteles autem translationi et haec ipsa subiungit et abusionem nem, quam katachresin vocat, ut cum minutum dicimus animum pro parvo; et abutimur verbis propinquis, si opus est vel quod delectat vel quod decet. Iam cum fluxerunt continuo plures translationes, alia plane fit oratio; itaque genus hoc Graeci appellant allegorian: nomine recte, genere melius ille qui ista omnia translationes vocat. Haec frequentat Phalereus maxime suntque dulcissima; et quamquam translatio est apud eum multa, tamen immutationes nusquam crebriores.

[94] Aristotle, moreover, subjoins to translation even this very thing, namely the abuse which he calls catachresis, as when we say a minute mind for a small one; and we take liberties with neighboring words, if there is need, either because it delights or because it befits. Now, when several translations have flowed continuously, the discourse plainly becomes another; and so the Greeks call this kind allegory: rightly in name, but in the genus better is he who calls all these translations. These the Phalerean most frequents, and they are most sweet; and although translation is abundant with him, nevertheless nowhere are the mutations more frequent.

[95] In idem genus orationis—loquor enim de illa modica ac temperata—verborum cadunt lumina omnia, multa etiam sententiarum; latae eruditaeque disputationes ab eodem explicabuntur et loci communes sine contentione dicentur. Quid multa? E philosophorum scholis tales fere evadunt; et nisi coram erit comparatus ille fortior, per se hic quem dico probabitur.

[95] Into the same genus of oratory—for I speak of that moderate and temperate one—fall all the lights of words, and many also of thoughts; broad and erudite disputations will be explicated by the same man, and commonplaces will be spoken without contention. Why more? From the schools of the philosophers such men for the most part emerge; and unless that stronger one is matched with him face to face, this one whom I speak of will be approved on his own.

[96] Est enim quoddam etiam insigne et florens orationis pictum et expolitum genus, in quo omnes verborum, omnes sententiarum inligantur lepores. Hoc totum e sophistarum fontibus defluxit in forum, sed spretum a subtilibus, repulsum a gravibus in ea de qua loquor mediocritate consedit.

[96] For there is also a certain eminent and florid kind of speech, painted and polished, in which all the charms of words, all the charms of thoughts are enlinked. This whole style flowed from the fountains of the sophists into the forum, but, spurned by the subtle and repulsed by the weighty, it settled in that mediocrity of which I speak.

XXVIII.

28.

[97] Tertius est ille amplus copiosus, gravis ornatus, in quo profecto vis maxima est. Hic est enim, cuius ornatum dicendi et copiam admiratae gentes eloquentiam in civitatibus plurimum valere passae sunt, sed hanc eloquentiam, quae cursu magno sonituque ferretur, quam suspicerent omnes, quam admirarentur, quam se adsequi posse diffiderent. Huius eloquentiae est tractare animos, huius omni modo permovere.

[97] The third is that ample, copious, grave, adorned style, in which indeed the greatest force resides. For this is the one whose ornament of speaking and abundance, the nations, having admired, have allowed eloquence to prevail most in the commonwealths; but this eloquence, which is borne along with great course and sound, which all look up to, which they admire, which they despair of being able to attain. It belongs to this eloquence to handle minds, to this to move them in every way.

Haec modo perfringit, modo inrepit in sensus; inserit novas opiniones, evellit insitas.

This now breaks through, now creeps into the senses; it inserts new opinions, it plucks out the implanted.

[98] Sed multum interest inter hoc dicendi genus et superiora. Qui in illo subtili et acuto elaboravit ut callide arguteque diceret, nec quicquam altius cogitavit, hoc uno perfecto magnus orator est, et si non maximus; minimeque in lubrico versabitur et, si semel constiterit, numquam cadet. Medius ille autem, quem modicum et temperatum voco, si modo suum illud satis instruxerit, non extimescet ancipites dicendi incertosque casus; etiam si quando minus succedit, ut saepe fit, magnum tamen periculum non adibit: alte enim cadere non potest.

[98] But there is much difference between this genus of speaking and the preceding. He who in that subtle and acute style has labored to speak cleverly and wittily, and has considered nothing loftier, with this one thing perfected is a great orator, if not the greatest; and he will by no means be engaged on slippery ground and, if he has once taken his stand, he will never fall. But that middle kind, which I call moderate and temperate, if only he has sufficiently equipped his own manner, will not dread the two-edged and uncertain chances of speaking; even if at times it succeeds less, as often happens, nevertheless he will not incur great danger: for he cannot fall from a great height.

[99] At vero hic noster, quem principem ponimus, gravis acer ardens, si ad hoc unum est natus aut in hoc solo se exercuit aut huic generi studuit uni nec suam copiam cum illis duobus generibus temperavit, maxime est contemnendus. Ille enim summissus, quod acute et veteratorie dicit, sapiens iam, medius suavis, hic autem copiosissimus, si nihil aliud est, vix satis sanus videri solet. Qui enim nihil potest tranquille, nihil leniter, nihil partite definite distincte facete dicere, praesertim cum causae partim totae sint eo modo partim aliqua ex parte tractandae si is non praeparatis auribus inflammare rem coepit, furere apud sanos et quasi inter sobrios bacchari vinulentus videtur.

[99] But indeed this man of ours, whom we set as the chief—grave, keen, ardent—if he is born for this one thing, or has exercised himself in this alone, or has studied this kind alone, and has not tempered his own copiousness with those two kinds, is most to be contemned. For that subdued one, in that he speaks acutely and veteran-like, is already wise; the middle one is suave; but this man, most copious, if he is nothing else, is wont hardly to seem quite sane. For he who can say nothing tranquilly, nothing gently, nothing by parts, definitely, distinctly, wittily—especially since cases are partly wholly, partly in some part, to be handled in that way—if he begins to inflame the matter with ears unprepared, seems to rave among the sane and, as it were, to revel, wine-besotted, among the sober.

[100] Tenemus igitur, Brute, quem quaerimus, sed animo; nam manu si prehendissem, ne ipse quidem sua tanta eloquentia mihi persuasisset ut se dimitterem. XXIX. Sed inventus profecto est ille eloquens, quem numquam vidit Antonius.

[100] Therefore, Brutus, we hold the one we seek, but in mind; for if I had grasped him with my hand, not even he himself with his so great eloquence would have persuaded me to let him go. 29. But indeed that eloquent man has been found, whom Antonius never saw.

Quis est igitur is? Complectar brevi, disseram pluribus. Is est enim eloquens, qui et humilia subtiliter et alta graviter et mediocria temperate potest dicere. Nemo is, inquies, umquam fuit.

Who then is he? I will embrace it briefly; I will dissert upon it at greater length. For he is the eloquent man who can speak humble things subtly, high things gravely, and middle things temperately. “No such man,” you will say, “ever existed.”

Ne fuerit.

Let there not have been.

[101] Ego enim quid desiderem, non quid viderim disputo redeoque ad illam Platonis de qua dixeram rei formam et speciem, quam etsi non cernimus, tamen animo tenere possumus. Non enim eloquentem quaero neque quicquam mortale et caducum, sed illud ipsum, cuius qui sit compos, sit eloquens; quod nihil est aliud nisi eloquentia ipsa, quam nullis nisi mentis oculis videre possumus. Is erit igitur eloquens, ut idem illud iteremus, qui poterit parva summisse, modica temperate, magna graviter dicere.

[101] For I, indeed, am disputing what I desire, not what I have seen, and I return to that Platonic form and species of the thing, about which I had spoken, which, although we do not discern, nevertheless we can hold in mind. For I seek neither an eloquent man nor anything mortal and caducous, but that very thing itself, by the possession of which whoever is a partaker is eloquent; which is nothing other than eloquence itself, which we can see with no eyes save those of the mind. He, therefore, will be eloquent, to repeat that same point, who will be able to speak small matters in a low key, moderate matters temperately, great matters gravely.

[102] Tota mihi causa pro Caecina de verbis interdicti fuit: res involutas definiendo explicavimus, mus, ius civile laudavimus, verba ambigua distinximus. Fuit ornandus in Manilia lege Pompeius: temperata oratione ornandi copiam persecuti sumus. Ius omne retinendae maiestatis Rabiri causa continebatur: ergo in ea omni genere amplificationis exarsimus.

[102] The entire case for me on behalf of Caecina was about the words of the interdict: by defining we unfolded entangled matters, we praised the civil law, we distinguished ambiguous words. Pompey had to be adorned in the Manilian Law: with a temperate oration we pursued an abundance of adornment. The whole law of maintaining majesty was contained in the case of Rabirius: therefore in that we blazed forth in every kind of amplification.

[103] At haec interdum temperanda et varianda sunt. Quod igitur in accusationis septem libris non reperitur gentis? Quod in Habiti?

[103] But these things must sometimes be tempered and varied. What, then, of genre is not to be found in the seven books of the accusation? What in that on Habitus?

Quod in Corneli? Quod in plurimis nostris defensionibus? Quae exempla selegissem, nisi vel nota esse arbitrarer vel ipsi possent legere qui quaererent.

What in Cornelius? What in very many of our defenses? What examples would I have selected, unless I thought either that they were well-known, or that they themselves could read them who were inquiring.

Nulla est enim ullo in genere laus [oratoris] cuius in nostris orationibus non sit aliqua si non perfectio, at conatus tamen atque adumbratio.

For there is in no kind any praise of the [orator] of which in our orations there is not some—if not perfection, yet at least an effort and an adumbration.

[104] Non adsequimur; at quid sequi deceat videmus. Nec enim nunc de nobis, sed de re dicimus; in quo tantum abest ut nostra miremur, et usque eo difficiles ac morosi sumus, ut nobis non satis faciat ipse Demosthenes; qui quamquam unus eminet inter omnis in omni genere dicendi, tamen non semper implet auris meas; ita sunt avidae et capaces et saepe aliquid immensum infinitumque desiderant.

[104] We do not attain; but we see what it is fitting to follow. For we are speaking now not about ourselves, but about the matter; in which it is so far from the case that we admire our own works, and we are to such a degree difficult and morose, that not even Demosthenes himself satisfies us; who, although he alone stands out among all in every genre of speaking, nevertheless does not always fill my ears; so avid and capacious are they, and often they desire something immense and infinite.

XXX.

30.

[105] Sed tamen, quoniam et hunc tu oratorem cum eius studiosissimo Pammene, cum esses Athenis, totum diligentissime cognovisti nec eum dimittis e manibus et tamen nostra etiam lectitas, vides profecto illum multa perficere, nos multa conari, illum posse, nos velle quocumque modo causa postulet dicere. Nam ille magnus et successit ipse magnis et maximos oratores habuit aequalis; nos minus.

[105] But yet, since both this orator you, together with his most devoted Pammenes, when you were at Athens, have come to know wholly and most diligently, nor do you let him out of your hands, and yet you also read our works, you surely see that he accomplishes many things, we attempt many; that he is able, we are willing to speak in whatever manner the case demands. For he is great, and he himself succeeded the great, and he had the greatest orators as equals; we, less.

Magnum fecissemus, si quidem potuissemus quo contendimus pervenire in ea urbe in qua, ut ait Antonius, auditus eloquens nemo erat.

We would have accomplished something great, if indeed we had been able to arrive at that which we contend for, in that city in which, as Antonius says, no eloquent man was heard.

[106] Atqui si Antonio Crassus eloquens visus non est aut sibi ipse, numquam Cotta visus esset, numquam Sulpicius, numquam Hortensius; nihil enim ample Cotta, nihil leniter Sulpicius, non multa graviter Hortensius; superiores magis ad omne genus apti, Crassum dico et Antonium. Ieiunas igitur huius multiplicis et aequabiliter in omnia genera fusae orationis auris civitatis accepimus, easque nos primi, quicumque eramus et quantulumcumque dicebamus, ad huius generis [dicendi] audiendi incredibilia studia convertimus.

[106] And yet, if Crassus did not seem eloquent to Antonius, or to himself in his own judgment, then never would Cotta have seemed so, nor Sulpicius, nor Hortensius; for Cotta nothing on a grand scale, Sulpicius nothing gently, Hortensius not many things gravely; their predecessors were more fitted to every kind—I mean Crassus and Antonius. We therefore found the ears of the state jejune for this oration, multiple and equably poured out into all genera, and we, the first—whoever we were and however little we spoke—turned those ears to an incredible zeal for hearing this kind of [speaking].

[107] Quantis illa clamoribus adulescentuli diximus [de supplicio parricidarum], quae nequaquam satis defervisse post aliquanto sentire coepimus: Quid enim tam commune quam spiritus vivis, terra mortuis, mare fluctuantibus, litus eiectis? Ita vivunt, dum possunt, ut ducere animam de caelo non queant; ita moriuntur ut eorum ossa terram non tangant; ita iactantur fluctibus ut numquam adluantur; ita postremo eiciuntur ut ne ad saxa quidem mortui conquiescant, et quae sequuntur; sunt enim omnia sic ut adulescentis non tam re et maturitate quam spe et exspectatione laudati. Ab hac etiam indole iam illa matura: "Vxor generi, noverca filii, filiae paelex."

[107] With what shouts did we, young men, speak those things [about the punishment of parricides], which some time afterward we began to perceive had by no means cooled sufficiently: For what is so common as breath to the living, earth to the dead, the sea to those tossed by waves, the shore to those cast up? Thus they live, while they can, in such a way that they cannot draw breath from the sky; thus they die so that their bones do not touch the earth; thus they are tossed by the waves so that they are never laved; thus at last they are cast out so that not even against the rocks do they, though dead, find rest; and what follows; for all these things are such as to be praised in a young man not so much for reality and maturity as for hope and expectation. From this same disposition even then were those already mature: "A wife to the son-in-law, a stepmother to the son, a mistress to the daughter."

[108] Nec vero hic erat unus ardor in nobis ut hoc modo omnia diceremus. Ipsa enim illa [pro Roscio] iuvenilis redundantia multa habet attenuata, quaedam etiam paulo hilariora, ut pro Habito, pro Cornelio compluresque atiae. Nemo enim orator tam multa ne in Graeco quidem otio scripsit quam multa sunt nostra, eaque hanc ipsam habent quam probo varietatem.

[108] Nor indeed was there a single ardor in us such that we spoke everything in this manner. For that very same youthful redundancy [in the speech for Roscius] contains many things attenuated, and some even a little more cheerful, as in the speech for Habitus, for Cornelius, and several others. For no orator, not even in Greek leisure, has written so many pieces as numerous as are ours, and these have that very variety which I approve.

XXXI.

31.

[109] An ego Homero, Ennio, reliquis poetis et maxime tragicis concederem ut ne omnibus locis eadem contentione uterentur crebroque mutarent, non numquam etiam ad cotidianum genus sermonis accederent: ipse numquam ab illa acerrima contentione discederem? Sed quid poetas divino ingenio profero? Histriones eos vidimus quibus nihil posset in suo genere esse praestantius, qui non solum in dissimillimis personis satis faciebant, cum tamen in suis versarentur, sed et comoedum in tragoediis et tragoedum in comoediis admodum placere vidimus: ego non elaborem?

[109] Shall I concede to Homer, Ennius, the remaining poets, and most of all the tragic [poets], that they should not employ the same contention in all places and should frequently shift, sometimes even approach the quotidian kind of speech; while I myself should never depart from that most keen contention? But why do I bring forward poets of divine ingenium? We have seen actors than whom nothing could be more outstanding in their own genus, who not only gave satisfaction in utterly dissimilar personae—although they were still moving within their own—but we have also seen a comedian very much please in tragedies and a tragedian in comedies: shall I not labor?

[110] Cum dico me, te, Brute, dico; nam in me quidem iam pridem effectum est quod futurum fuit; tu autem eodem modo omnis causas ages? Aut aliquod causarum genus repudiabis? Aut in isdem causis perpetuum et eundem spiritum sine ulla commutatione obtinebis?

[110] When I say myself, I mean you, Brutus; for in my case indeed what was to be has long since been effected; but will you in the same way plead all causes? Or will you repudiate some class of causes? Or in the same cases will you maintain a perpetual and identical spirit without any change?

Demosthenes quidem, cuius nuper inter imagines tuas ac tuorum, quod eum credo amares, cum ad te in Tusculanum venissem, imaginem ex aere vidi, nil Lysiae subtilitate cedit, nihil argutiis et acumine Hyperidi, nil levitate Aeschini et splendore verborum.

Demosthenes indeed, whose bronze image I recently saw among your portraits and those of your forebears, when I had come to you at your Tusculan—because I believe you loved him—yields nothing to Lysias in subtlety, nothing to Hyperides in arguties and acumen, nothing to Aeschines in levity and in the splendor of words.

[111] Multae sunt eius totae orationes subtiles, ut contra Leptinem; multae totae graves, ut quaedam Philippicae; multae variae, ut contra Aeschinem falsae legationis, ut contra eundem pro causa Ctesiphontis. Iam illud medium quotiens vult arripit et a gravissimo discedens eo potissimum delabitur. Clamores tamen tum movet et tum in dicendo plurimum efficit, cum gravitatis locis utitur.

[111] Many of his entire orations are subtle, as against Leptines; many entire are grave, as certain Philippics; many are variegated, as against Aeschines on the False Embassy, as against the same man for the cause of Ctesiphon. Now that middle style he seizes whenever he wishes, and, departing from the most grave, he most especially glides down to it. Yet he then stirs clamors and then in speaking accomplishes the most, when he uses passages of gravity.

[112] Sed ab hoc parumper abeamus, quando quidem de genere, non de homine quaerimus: rei potius, id est eloquentiae vim et naturam explicemus. Illud tamen quod iam ante diximus meminerimus, nihil nos praecipiendi causa esse dicturos atque ita potius acturos ut existimatores videamur loqui, non magistri. In quo tamen longius saepe progredimur, quod videmus non te haec solum esse lecturum, qui ea multo quam nos qui quasi docere videmur habeas notiora, sed hunc librum etiam si minus nostra commendatione, tuo tamen nomine divulgari necesse est.

[112] But let us depart from this for a little while, since indeed we are inquiring about the kind, not about the man: let us rather explicate the matter, that is, the force and nature of eloquence. Let us, however, remember what we have already said before, that we will say nothing for the sake of precept-giving, and that we will act rather in such a way that we seem to speak as evaluators, not as masters. In this, however, we often go farther, because we see that not you alone will read these things—you who have them much better known than we who seem, as it were, to teach—but that this book, even if less by our commendation, must nevertheless be publicized under your name.

XXXII.

32.

[113] Esse igitur perfecte eloquentis puto non eam tantum facultatem habere quae sit eius propria, fuse lateque dicendi, sed etiam vicinam eius ac finitimam dialecticorum scientiam adsumere. Quamquam aliud videtur oratio esse aliud disputatio, nec idem loqui esse quod dicere, ac tamen utrumque in disserendo est: disputandi ratio et loquendi dialecticorum sit, oratorum autem dicendi et ornandi. Zeno quidem ille, a quo disciplina Stoicorum est, manu demonstrare solebat quid inter has artis interesset; nam cum compresserat digitos pugnumque fecerat, dialecticam aiebat eius modi esse; cum autem deduxerat et manum dilataverat, palmae illius similem eloquentiam esse dicebat.

[113] Therefore I think that to be perfectly eloquent is to have not only that faculty which is its own proper one, of speaking copiously and broadly, but also to take up the neighboring and bordering scientia of the dialecticians. Although discourse seems to be one thing and disputation another, nor is to speak the same as to say, and yet both are in discussing: let the method of disputation and of speaking be the dialecticians’, but of orators, of saying and of ornamenting. Zeno, indeed, from whom the disciplina of the Stoics is, used to demonstrate with his hand what the difference between these arts was; for when he had compressed his fingers and had made a fist, he used to say dialectic was of that kind; but when he had drawn them out and had widened his hand, he used to say eloquence was like that palm.

[114] Atque etiam ante hunc Aristoteles principio artis rhetoricae dicit illam artem quasi ex altera parte respondere dialecticae, ut hoc videlicet differant inter se quod haec ratio dicendi latior sit, illa loquendi contractior. Volo igitur huic summo omnem quae ad dicendum trahi possit loquendi rationem esse notam; quae quidem res, quod te his artibus eruditum minime fallit, duplicem habuit docendi viam. Nam et ipse Aristoteles tradidit praecepta plurima disserendi et postea qui dialectici dicuntur spinosiora multa pepererunt.

[114] And even before him Aristotle, at the beginning of the art of rhetoric, says that that art, as it were, answers from the other side to dialectic, so that they differ from each other in this, namely, that this method of declaring is broader, that of speaking more constricted. I wish, therefore, that to this consummate orator every mode of speaking that can be drawn to declaring be known; which matter, as it by no means escapes you, trained in these arts, has had a twofold way of teaching. For both Aristotle himself handed down very many precepts of disputing, and afterwards those who are called dialecticians brought forth many more thorny things.

[115] Ego eum censeo qui eloquentiae laude ducatur non esse earum rerum omnino rudem, sed vel illa antiqua vel hac Chrysippi disciplina institutum. Noverit primum vim, naturam, genera verborum et simplicium et copulatorum; deinde quot modis quidque dicatur; qua ratione verum falsumne sit iudicetur; quid efficiatur e quoque, quid cuique consequens sit quidve contrarium; cumque ambigue multa dicantur, quo modo quidque eorum dividi explanarique oporteat. Haec tenenda sunt oratori —saepe enim occurrunt—, sed quia sua sponte squalidiora sunt, adhibendus erit in his explicandis quidam orationis nitor.

[115] I judge that the one who is led by the praise of eloquence should not be altogether raw in these matters, but trained either in that ancient discipline or in this discipline of Chrysippus. Let him know first the force, nature, and kinds of words, both simple and copulative; then in how many modes each thing is said; by what method it is judged whether it is true or false; what is effected from each, what is consequent to each and what contrary; and, since many things are spoken ambiguously, in what way each of them ought to be divided and explained. These things must be held by the orator —for they often occur—, but because they are of themselves rather squalid, there must be applied in expounding these a certain polish of speech.

XXXIII.

33.

[116] Et quoniam in omnibus quae ratione docentur et via primum constituendum est quid quidque sit—nisi enim inter eos qui disceptant convenit quid sit illud quod ambigitur, nec recte disseri umquam nec ad exitum perveniri potest—, explicanda est saepe verbis mens nostra de quaque re atque involuta rei notitia definiendo aperienda est, si quidem est definitio oratio, quae quid sit id de quo agitur ostendit quam brevissime; tum, ut scis, explicato genere cuiusque rei videndum est quae sint eius generis sive formae sive partes, ut in eas tribuatur omnis oratio.

[116] And since in all things that are taught by reason and by method it must first be constituted what each thing is—for unless among those who discept, it is agreed what that is which is in question, neither can it ever be discoursed rightly nor can it come to an exitus—our mind must often be explicated in words about each matter, and the involved knowledge of the thing must be opened by defining, if indeed a definition is a discourse which shows, as briefly as possible, what that is about which the case is being handled; then, as you know, with the genus of each thing explicated, it must be seen what are the forms or the parts of that genus, so that the whole discourse may be apportioned into them.

[117] Erit igitur haec facultas in eo quem volumus esse eloquentem, ut definire rem possit nec id faciat tam presse et anguste quam in illis eruditissimis disputationibus fieri solet, sed cum explanatius tum etiam uberius et ad commune iudicium popularemque intellegentiam accommodatius; idemque etiam, cum res postulabit, genus universum in species certas, ut nulla neque praetermittatur neque redundet, partietur ac dividet. Quando autem id faciat aut quo modo, nihil ad hoc tempus, quoniam, ut supra dixi, iudicem esse me, non doctorem volo.

[117] There will therefore be this faculty in him whom we wish to be eloquent: that he can define the matter, and not do this so tightly and narrowly as is accustomed to be done in those most erudite disputations, but both more explanatory and also more copious, and more accommodated to the common judgment and popular intelligence; and likewise also, when the matter shall require, he will partition and divide the universal genus into definite species, so that nothing is either omitted or redundant. As to when he should do that, or in what manner—nothing for the present; since, as I said above, I wish to be a judge, not a teacher.

[118] Nec vero a dialecticis modo sit instructus et habeat omnis philosophiae notos ac tractatos locos. Nihil enim de religione, nihil de morte, nihil de pietate, nihil de caritate patriae, nihil de bonis rebus aut malis, nihil de virtutibus aut vitiis, nihil de officio, nihil de dolore, nihil de voluptate, nihil de perturbationibus animi et erroribus, quae saepe cadunt in causas et ieiunius aguntur, nihil, inquam, sine ea scientia quam dixi graviter ample copiose dici et explicari potest.

[118] Nor indeed should he be instructed only by dialecticians and have the loci of all philosophy known and handled. For nothing about religion, nothing about death, nothing about piety, nothing about charity of the fatherland, nothing about good things or bad, nothing about virtues or vices, nothing about duty, nothing about pain, nothing about pleasure, nothing about the perturbations of the mind and errors, which often fall into cases and are argued rather jejunely, nothing, I say, can be said and explained weightily, amply copiously without that knowledge which I have mentioned.

XXXIV.

34.

[119] De materia loquor orationis etiam nunc, non de ipso genere dicendi. Volo enim prius habeat orator rem de qua dicat, dignam auribus eruditis, quam cogitet quibus verbis quidque dicat [aut quo modo]—quem etiam, quo grandior sit et quodam modo excelsior, ut de Pericle dixi supra, ne physicorum quidem esse ignarum volo. Omnia profecto, cum se a caelestibus rebus referet ad humanas, excelsius magnificentiusque et dicet et sentiet.

[119] I am speaking about the subject matter of the oration even now, not about the very kind of speaking. For I wish that the orator should first have a thing about which he may speak, worthy of learned ears, rather than ponder with what words he should say each thing [or in what manner]—and I do not wish him, that he may be grander and in a certain way more exalted, as I said above about Pericles, to be ignorant even of the physicists (natural philosophers). Surely, when he brings himself back from celestial things to human ones, he will both speak and feel more loftily and more magnificently.

[120] Cum illa divina cognoverit, nolo ignoret ne haec quidem humana. Ius civile teneat, quo egent causae forenses cotidie. Quid est enim turpius quam legitimarum et civilium controversiarum patrocinia suscipere, cum sis legum et civilis iuris ignarus?

[120] When he has come to know those divine things, I do not want him to be ignorant of these human ones either. Let him command civil law, which forensic causes need every day. For what is more disgraceful than to undertake the patronage of legitimate and civil controversies, when you are ignorant of the laws and of civil law?

Cognoscat etiam rerum gestarum et memoriae veteris ordinem, maxime scilicet nostrae civitatis, sed etiam imperiosorum populorum et regum inlustrium; quem laborem nobis Attici nostri levavit labor, qui conservatis notatisque temporibus, nihil cum inlustre praetermitteret, annorum septingentorum memoriam uno libro conligavit. Nescire autem quid ante quam natus sis acciderit, id est semper esse puerum. Quid enim est aetas hominis, nisi ea memoria rerum veterum cum superiorum aetate contexitur?

Let him also know the order of deeds done and of ancient memory, most especially, of course, of our state, but also of imperial peoples and illustrious kings; which labor our Atticus’s labor has lightened for us, who, with the times preserved and noted, while he omitted nothing illustrious, collected the memory of seven hundred years into one book. Not to know what happened before you were born—that is to be always a boy. For what is the age of a man, unless it is woven together by the memory of old things with the age of those before?

Commemoratio autem antiquitatis exemplorumque prolatio summa cum delectatione et auctoritatem orationi adfert et fidem.

The commemoration of antiquity and the prolation of examples with the highest delectation brings authority and credibility to the oration.

[121] Sic igitur instructus veniet ad causas, quarum habebit genera primum ipsa cognita. Erit enim ei perspectum nihil ambigi posse in quo non aut res controversiam faciat aut verba: res aut de vero aut de recto aut de nomine, verba aut de ambiguo aut de contrario. Nam si quando aliud in sententia videtur esse aliud in verbis, genus est quoddam ambigui quod ex praeterito verbo fieri solet, in quo quod est ambiguorum proprium res duas significari videmus.

[121] Thus, then, so equipped he will come to causes, the kinds of which he will have first themselves known. For it will be clear to him that nothing can be in doubt in which it is not either the matter that makes the controversy or the words: the matter either about the true, or about the right, or about the name; the words either about the ambiguous or about the contrary. For if ever one thing seems to be in the sense (sententia) and another in the words, this is a certain kind of ambiguity which is wont to arise from an omitted (passed-over) word, in which, as is proper to ambiguities, we see two things signified.

XXXV.

35.

[122] Cum tam pauca sint genera causarum, etiam argumentorum praecepta pauca sunt. Traditi sunt e quibus ea ducantur duplices loci: uni e rebus ipsis, alteri adsumpti. Tractatio igitur rerum efficit admirabilem orationem; nam ipsae quidem res in perfacili cognitione versantur.

[122] Since the kinds of causes are so few, the precepts of arguments likewise are few. The loci from which these are drawn are transmitted as twofold: some from the things themselves, others assumed. The handling, therefore, of the things produces an admirable oration; for the things themselves are engaged in very easy cognition.

Quid enim iam sequitur, quod quidem artis sit, nisi ordiri orationem, in quo aut concilietur auditor aut erigatur aut paret se ad discendum; rem breviter exponere et probabiliter et aperte, ut quid agatur intellegi possit; sua confirmare, adversaria evertere, eaque efficere non perturbate, sed singulis argumentationibus ita concludendis, ut efficiatur quod sit consequens eis quae sumentur ad quamque rem confirmandam; post omnia peroratione inflammantem restinguentemve concludere? Has partis quem ad modum tractet singulas difficile dictu est hoc loco; nec enim semper tractantur uno modo.

For what, indeed, now follows that is of the art, except to begin the oration, in which either the auditor is conciliated or is aroused or prepares himself for learning; to set forth the matter briefly, plausibly, and openly, so that what is being done can be understood; to confirm one’s own points, to overturn the adversary’s, and to effect these things not perturbately, but by concluding the individual argumentations in such a way that what is consequent is brought about from those things that are taken up for confirming each matter; after all, to conclude with a peroration inflaming or extinguishing? How one should handle each of these parts it is difficult to say in this place; for they are not always handled in one way.

[123] Quoniam autem non quem doceam quaero, sed quem probem, probabo primum eum qui quid deceat viderit. Haec enim sapientia maxime adhibenda eloquenti est, ut sit temporum personarumque moderator. Nam nec semper nec apud omnis nec contra omnis nec pro omnibus nec cum omnibus eodem modo dicendum arbitror.

[123] Since, however, I seek not whom I may teach, but whom I may approve, I will first approve the one who has seen what is seemly. For this wisdom is most to be applied to the eloquent man, that he be a moderator of times and of persons. For I judge that one must not speak in the same way either always, or before everyone, or against everyone, or for everyone, or with everyone.

XXXVI. Is erit ergo eloquens qui ad id quodcumque decebit poterit accommodare orationem. Quod cum statuerit, tum ut quidque erit dicendum ita dicet, nec satura ieiune nec grandia minute nec item contra, sed erit rebus ipsis par et aequalis oratio.

36. He will therefore be eloquent who can accommodate his oration to whatever will be seemly. When he has determined this, then he will speak as each thing must be said, neither rich matters jejunely nor grand things minutely, nor likewise the reverse, but the oration will be on a par and equal with the things themselves.

[124] Principia verecunda, nondum elatis incensa verbis, sed acuta sententiis vel ad offensionem adversarii vel ad commendationem sui. Narrationes credibiles nec historico sed prope cotidiano sermone explicatae dilucide. Dein si tenuis causa est, tum etiam argumentandi tenue filum et in docendo et in refellendo, idque ita tenebitur, ut quanta ad rem tanta ad orationem fiat accessio.

[124] Beginnings modest, not yet inflamed with uplifted words, but sharp in sententiae, either to the offense of the adversary or to the commendation of oneself. Narrations credible and expounded clearly, not in a historical but in an almost everyday manner of speaking. Then, if the cause is slender, then also a slender thread of argumentation, both in teaching and in refuting; and this will be maintained thus, that as great an accession be made to the speech as to the matter.

[125] Cum vero causa ea inciderit in qua vis eloquentiae possit expromi, tum se latius fundet orator, tum reget et flectet animos et sic adficiet ut volet, id est ut causae natura et ratio temporis postulabit. Sed erit duplex eius omnis ornatus ille admirabilis, propter quem ascendit in tantum honorem eloquentia. Nam cum omnis pars orationis esse debet laudabilis, sic ut verbum nullum nisi aut grave aut elegans excidat, tum sunt maxime luminosae et quasi actuosae partes duae: quarum alteram in universi generis quaestione pono, quam, ut supra dixi, Graeci appellant thesin, alteram in augendis amplificandisque rebus, quae ab isdem auxesis est nominata.

[125] When, however, a case shall occur in which the force of eloquence can be brought forth, then the orator will pour himself out more widely, then he will rule and bend minds and so affect them as he wishes—that is, as the nature of the case and the reason of the time will demand. But the whole of that admirable ornament of his, on account of which eloquence has ascended into so great an honor, will be twofold. For while every part of the oration ought to be laudable, such that no word falls except either weighty or elegant, yet there are two parts most luminous and, as it were, active: of which I place one in the question of a universal kind, which, as I said above, the Greeks call a thesis; the other in enlarging and amplifying matters, which by those same men is named auxesis.

[126] Quae etsi aequabiliter toto corpore orationis fusa esse debet, tamen in communibus locis maxime excellet; qui communes sunt appellati eo quod videntur multarum idem esse causarum, sed proprii singularum esse debebunt. At vero illa pars orationis, quae est de genere universo, totas causas saepe continet. Quicquid est enim illud in quo quasi certamen est controversiae, quod Graece krinomenon dicitur, id ita dici placet, ut traducatur ad perpetuam quaestionem atque uti de universo genere dicatur, nisi cum de vero ambigitur, quod quaeri coniectura solet.

[126] Although it ought to be evenly diffused through the whole body of the oration, nevertheless it will excel especially in the commonplaces; which are called “common” because they seem to be the same for many causes, yet they ought to be proper to each several one. But indeed that part of the oration which is about the universal genus often contains whole causes. For whatever it is wherein, as it were, the contest of the controversy lies—what in Greek is called the krinomenon—it is my pleasure that it be stated in such a way that it be transferred to a perpetual question and be treated as about the universal genus, except when there is doubt about the truth, which is usually inquired by conjecture.

[127] Dicetur autem non Peripateticorum more—est enim illorum exercitatio elegans iam inde ab Aristotele constituta—, sed aliquanto nervosius et ita de re communia dicentur, ut et pro reis multa leniter dicantur et in adversarios aspere. Augendis vero rebus et contra abiciendis nihil est quod non perficere possit oratio; quod [et] inter media argumenta faciendum est quotiescumque dabitur vel amplificandi vel minuendi locus, et paene infinite in perorando.

[127] But it will be spoken not in the manner of the Peripatetics—for theirs is an elegant exercise, established already by Aristotle—, but somewhat more sinewy; and thus things will be said about the common matter, so that many things may be said gently on behalf of the defendants and against the adversaries harshly. But in augmenting things and, conversely, in casting them down, there is nothing which the oration cannot accomplish; which [also] must be done among the middle arguments whenever there is given a place either for amplifying or for diminishing, and almost infinitely in the peroration.

XXXVII.

37.

[128] Duo restant enim, quae bene tractata ab oratore admirabilem eloquentiam faciunt. Quorum alterum est, quod Graeci ethikon vocant, ad naturas et ad mores et ad omnem vitae consuetudinem accommodatum; alterum, quod idem pathetikon nominant, quo perturbantur animi et concitantur, in quo uno regnat oratio. Illud superius come iucundum, ad benevolentiam conciliandam paratum; hoc vehemens incensum incitatum, quo causae eripiuntur: quod cum rapide fertur, sustineri nullo pacto potest.

[128] Two things remain, indeed, which, when well handled by the orator, produce admirable eloquence. Of these, the one is what the Greeks call ethikon, adapted to natures and to mores and to the entire consuetude of life; the other, which they likewise name pathetikon, by which minds are disturbed and stirred, in which alone speech reigns. The former is affable, pleasant, prepared for conciliating goodwill; the latter vehement, inflamed, impelled, by which cases are snatched away: and when it is borne swiftly, it can by no means be withstood.

[129] Quo genere nos mediocres aut multo etiam minus, sed magno semper usi impetu saepe adversarios de statu omni deiecimus. Nobis pro familiari reo summus orator non respondit Hortensius; a nobis homo audacissimus Catilina in senatu accusatus obmutuit; nobis privata in causa magna et gravi cum coepisset Curio pater respondere, subito adsedit, cum sibi venenis ereptam memoriam diceret.

[129] In which kind we are mediocre, or much even less; yet, having always used great impetus, we have often cast our adversaries down from every standing. For us, on behalf of a familiar defendant, the greatest orator, Hortensius, did not respond; by us the most audacious man, Catiline, accused in the senate, was struck dumb; for us, in a private cause great and grave, when Curio the father had begun to respond, he suddenly sat down, saying that his memory had been snatched from him by venoms.

[130] Quid ego de miserationibus loquar? Quibus eo sum usus pluribus quod, etiam si plures dicebamus, perorationem mihi tamen omnes relinquebant; in quo ut viderer excellere non ingenio sed dolore adsequebar. Quae qualiacumque in me sunt—me [enim] ipsum paenitet quanta sint—, sed apparent in orationibus, etsi carent libri spiritu illo, propter quem maiora eadem illa cum aguntur quam cum leguntur videri solent.

[130] What am I to say about miserations? I employed these all the more because, even when several of us were speaking, nevertheless they all left the peroration to me; in which I managed to seem to excel not by genius but by grief. Whatever these qualities are in me—for [indeed] I myself am sorry at how great they are—yet they appear in the orations, although books lack that spirit on account of which those same things are wont to seem greater when they are performed than when they are read.

XXXVIII.

38.

[131] Nec vero miseratione solum mens iudicum permovenda est—qua nos ita dolenter uti solemus ut puerum infantem in manibus perorantes tenuerimus, ut alia in causa excitato reo nobili, sublato etiam filio parvo, plangore et lamentatione complerimus forum—, sed est faciendum etiam ut irascatur iudex mitigetur, invideat faveat, contemnat admiretur, oderit diligat, cupiat fastidiat, speret metuat, laetetur doleat; qua in varietate duriorum accusatio suppeditabit exempla, mitiorum defensiones meae.

[131] Nor indeed by commiseration alone must the minds of the judges be moved—a means which we are accustomed to employ so dolorously that, in our peroration, we have held an infant boy in our hands; that, in another case, when a noble defendant was roused, with his little son also lifted up, we filled the forum with beating and lamentation—, but it must also be brought about that the judge grow angry, be softened, envy, favor, despise, admire, hate, love, desire, feel distaste, hope, fear, rejoice, grieve; in which variety the prosecution will supply examples of the sterner, my defenses of the gentler.

[132] Nullo enim modo animus audientis aut incitari aut leniri potest, qui modus a me non temptatus sit,—dicerem perfectum, si ita iudicarem, nec in veritate crimen arrogantiae extimescerem; sed, ut supra dixi, nulla me ingeni sed magna vis animi inflammat, ut me ipse non teneam; nec umquam is qui audiret incenderetur, nisi ardens ad eum perveniret oratio. Vterer exemplis domesticis, nisi ea legisses, uterer alienis vel Latinis, si ulla reperirem, vel Graecis, si deceret. Sed Crassi perpauca sunt nec ea iudiciorum, nihil Antoni, nihil Cottae, nihil Sulpici; dicebat melius quam scripsit, Hortensius.

[132] For in no way can the mind of the hearer either be incited or softened, with any method left unattempted by me,—I would call it perfect, if I so judged, nor in truth would I dread the charge of arrogance; but, as I said above, it is not any talent of mine but a great force of spirit that inflames me, so that I do not restrain myself; nor would the one who listened ever be kindled, unless a burning speech reached him. I would use home-grown examples, if you had not read them; I would use others, whether Latin, if I could find any, or Greek, if it were fitting. But of Crassus there are very few, and not those of trials; nothing of Antonius, nothing of Cotta, nothing of Sulpicius; Hortensius spoke better than he wrote.

[133] Verum haec vis, quam quaerimus, quanta sit suspicemur, quoniam exemplum non habemus, aut si exempla sequimur, a Demosthene sumamus et quidem perpetuae dictionis ex eo loco unde in Ctesiphontis iudicio de suis factis, consiliis, meritis in rem publicam adgressus est dicere. Ea profecto oratio in eam formam quae est insita in mentibus nostris includi sic potest, ut maior eloquentia ne requiratur quidem.

[133] But as to this force which we seek, let us surmise how great it is, since we do not have an example; or, if we follow examples, let us take them from Demosthenes, and indeed of continuous discourse, from that passage where, in the trial of Ctesiphon, he set about to speak concerning his own deeds, counsels, and merits toward the commonwealth. That oration, assuredly, can be included within that form which is in-sown in our minds, in such a way that greater eloquence is not even required.

XXXIX.

39.

[134] Sed iam forma [ipsa] restat et charakter ille qui dicitur; qui qualis esse debeat ex his quae supra dicta sunt intellegi potest. Nam et singulorum verborum et conlocatorum lumina attigimus; quibus sic abundabit, ex ore nullum nisi aut elegans aut grave exeat, ex omnique genere frequentissimae translationes erunt, quod eae propter similitudinem transferunt animos et referunt ac movent huc et illuc, qui motus cogitationis celeriter agitatus per se ipse delectat. Et reliqua ex conlocatione verborum quae sumuntur quasi lumina magnum adferunt ornatum orationi; sunt enim similia illis quae in amplo ornatu scaenae aut fori appellantur insignia, non quia sola ornent, sed quod excellant.

[134] But now the form [itself] remains and that character which is said; what it ought to be can be understood from the things that have been said above. For we have touched upon the lights both of individual words and of those set together; with these he will so abound that nothing issues from his mouth unless it be either elegant or weighty, and from every kind there will be most frequent transfers (metaphors), because by likeness they transfer minds and carry them back and move them hither and thither—a motion of thought which, quickly stirred, delights by itself. And the remaining lights which are taken from the collocation of words bring great ornament to the speech; for they are similar to those things which, in the ample adornment of the stage or the forum, are called insignia, not because they alone adorn, but because they excel.

[135] Eadem ratio est horum quae sunt orationis lumina et quodam modo insignia: cum aut duplicantur iteranturque verba aut leviter commutata ponuntur, aut ab eodem verbo ducitur saepius oratio aut in idem conicitur aut utrumque, aut adiungitur idem iteratum aut idem ad extremum refertur aut continenter unum verbum non in eadem sententia ponitur; aut cum similiter vel cadunt verba vel desinunt; aut cum sunt contrariis relata contraria; aut cum gradatim sursum versus reditur; aut cum demptis coniunctionibus dissolute plura dicuntur; aut cum aliquid praetereuntes cur id faciamus ostendimus; aut cum corrigimus nosmet ipsos quasi reprehendentes; aut si est aliqua exclamatio vel admirationis vel questionis; aut cum eiusdem nominis casus saepius commutantur.

[135] The same rationale applies to those things which are the lights of oration and in a certain manner insignia: when either words are doubled and iterated or set forth slightly changed, or the discourse is more often drawn from the same verb or is gathered into the same, or both; or the same thing is adjoined repeated, or the same is referred at the end; or, in succession, one word is placed not in the same sense; or when words either fall similarly or end similarly; or when contraries are set against contraries; or when, step by step upward, one returns; or when, the conjunctions removed, more things are said in a loose manner; or when, in passing over something, we show why we do it; or when we correct ourselves as if reproving; or if there is some exclamation either of admiration or of question; or when the cases of the same noun are more often changed.

[136] Sed sententiarum ornamenta maiora sunt; quibus quia frequentissime Demosthenes utitur, sunt qui putent idcirco eius eloquentiam maxime esse laudabilem. Et vero nullus fere ab eo locus sine quadam conformatione sententiae dicitur; nec quicquam est aliud dicere nisi omnis aut certe plerasque aliqua specie inluminare sententias: quas cum tu optime, Brute, teneas, quid attinet nominibus uti aut exemplis? Tantum modo notetur locus.

[136] But the ornaments of sentences are greater; and because Demosthenes makes use of these most frequently, there are those who think that on that account his eloquence is most laudable. And indeed hardly any passage from him is delivered without a certain conformation of the sentence; and to speak is nothing else than to illuminate all, or at least most of them, the sentences with some kind of appearance. Since you, Brutus, hold these very well, what need is there to use names or examples? Only let the place be noted.

XL.

40.

[137] Sic igitur dicet ille, quem expetimus, ut verset saepe multis modis eadem et una in re haereat in eademque commoretur sententia; saepe etiam ut extenuet aliquid, saepe ut inrideat; ut declinet a proposito deflectatque sententiam; ut proponat quid dicturus sit; ut, cum transegerit iam aliquid, definiat; ut se ipse revocet; ut quod dixit iteret; ut argumentum ratione concludat; ut interrogando urgeat; ut rursus quasi ad interrogata sibi ipse respondeat; ut contra ac dicat accipi et sentiri velit; ut addubitet ecquid potius aut quo modo dicat; ut dividat in partis; ut aliquid relinquat ac neglegat; ut ante praemuniat; ut in eo ipso in quo reprehendatur culpam in adversarium conferat;

[137] Thus, then, will he speak, the one whom we seek, that he may often turn the same things over in many modes and stick in one and the same matter and dwell upon the same thought; often also that he may attenuate something, often that he may deride; that he may decline from the proposed point and deflect the thought; that he may set forth what he is going to say; that, when he has already transacted something, he may define it; that he may recall himself; that he may iterate what he has said; that he may conclude the argument by reason; that he may press by questioning; that, again, as if to matters put to him, he may himself answer; that he may wish it to be received and felt contrary to what he says; that he may be in doubt whether anything rather, or in what manner, he should say; that he may divide into parts; that he may leave something and neglect it; that he may fortify beforehand; that in that very point in which he is blamed he may transfer the fault onto his adversary;

[138] ut saepe cum eis qui audiunt, non numquam etiam cum adversario quasi deliberet; ut hominum sermones moresque describat; ut muta quaedam loquentia inducat; ut ab eo quod agitur avertat animos; ut saepe in hilaritatem risumve convertat; ut ante occupet quod videatur opponi; ut comparet similitudines; ut utatur exemplis; ut aliud alii tribuens dispertiat; ut interpellatorem coerceat; ut aliquid reticere se dicat; ut denuntiet quid caveant; ut liberius quid audeat; ut irascatur etiam, ut obiurget aliquando; ut deprecetur, ut supplicet, ut medeatur; ut a proposito declinet aliquantum; ut optet, ut exsecretur; ut fiat eis apud quos dicet familiaris.

[138] that he often, with those who are listening, sometimes even with the adversary, as if deliberate; that he describe the talk and mores of men; that he introduce certain mute things as speaking; that he avert minds from that which is being transacted; that he often turn matters to hilarity and laughter; that he forestall beforehand what seems likely to be opposed; that he compare similitudes; that he use examples; that, assigning one thing to one person and another to another, he distribute; that he restrain an interrupter; that he say that he keeps something back; that he give warning what they should beware; that he dare something more freely; that he be angry as well, that he scold sometimes; that he deprecate, that he supplicate, that he heal; that he decline somewhat from the proposed course; that he wish, that he execrate; that he become familiar to those before whom he will speak.

[139] Atque alias etiam dicendi quasi virtutes sequetur: brevitatem, si res petet; saepe etiam rem dicendo subiciet oculis; saepe supra feret quam fieri possit; significatio saepe erit maior quam oratio: saepe hilaritas, saepe vitae naturarumque imitatio. XLI. Hoc in genere—nam quasi silvam vides—omnis eluceat oportet eloquentiae magnitudo.

[139] And he will also follow other, as it were, virtues of speaking: brevity, if the matter shall demand; often too he will set the matter before the eyes by speaking; often he will carry it beyond what can be done; signification will often be greater than the speech; often cheerfulness, often imitation of life and of natures. 41. In this kind—for you see, as it were, a forest—the whole greatness of eloquence ought to shine forth.

[140] Sed haec nisi conlocata et quasi structa et nexa verbis ad eam laudem quam volumus aspirare non possunt. De quo cum mihi deinceps viderem esse dicendum, etsi movebant iam me illa quae supra dixeram tamen eis quae sequuntur perturbabar magis. Occurrebat enim posse reperiri non invidos solum, quibus referta sunt omnia, sed fautores etiam laudum mearum, qui non censerent eius viri esse, de cuius meritis senatus tanta iudicia fecisset comprobante populo Romano quanta de nullo, de artificio dicendi litteris tam multa mandare.

[140] But these things, unless placed and as it were structured and bound with words, cannot aspire to that praise which we desire. About which, since I saw that I must speak next, although I was already moved by those matters which I had said above, nevertheless I was more disturbed by the things that follow. For it occurred to me that there could be found not only the envious—by whom everything is crammed—but even supporters of my praises, who would judge it not to be the part of that man, concerning whose merits the Senate had made such judgments, with the Roman People approving, as about no one, to commit so many matters about the art of speaking to letters.

Quibus si nihil aliud responderem nisi me M. Bruto negare roganti noluisse, iusta esset excusatio, cum et amicissimo et praestantissimo viro et recta et honesta petenti satis facere voluissem.

To which, if I were to reply nothing else except that I did not wish to refuse M. Brutus when he asked, it would be a just excuse, since I wished to satisfy a most amicable and most preeminent man, requesting what was right and honest.

[141] Sed si profiterer—quod utinam possem!—Me studiosis dicendi praecepta et quasi vias quae ad eloquentiam ferrent traditurum, quis tandem id iustus rerum existimator reprehenderet? Nam quis umquam dubitavit quin in re publica nostra primas eloquentia tenuerit semper urbanis pacatisque rebus, secundas iuris scientia? Cum in altera gratiae, gloriae, praesidi plurimum esset, in altera praescriptionum cautionumque praeceptio, quae quidem ipsa auxilium ab eloquentia saepe peteret, ea vero repugnante vix suas regiones finisque defenderet.

[141] But if I were to profess—would that I could!—to hand down to the devotees of speaking the precepts and, as it were, the roads which lead to eloquence, who, pray, that is a just evaluator of things would find fault with it? For who ever doubted that in our commonwealth eloquence has always held the first rank in urbane and peaceful affairs, and jurisprudential science the second? Since in the former there was very much of favor, glory, and protection, in the latter the instruction of prescriptions and cautions—which indeed itself would often seek aid from eloquence, but with eloquence opposing would scarcely defend its own regions and bounds.

[142] Cur igitur ius civile docere semper pulchrum fuit hominumque clarissimorum discipulis floruerunt domus: ad dicendum si quis acuat aut adiuvet in eo iuventutem, vituperetur? Nam si vitiosum est dicere ornate, pellatur omnino e civitate eloquentia; sin ea non modo eos ornat penes quos est, sed etiam iuvat universam rem publicam, cur aut discere turpe est quod scire honestum est aut quod posse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum est docere?

[142] Why, then, has it always been fair to teach the civil law, and have the houses of the most illustrious men flourished with disciples: yet if someone should whet or aid the youth in that for speaking, is he to be censured? For if it is a vice to speak ornately, let eloquence be utterly expelled from the state; but if it not only adorns those in whose possession it is, but also helps the whole commonwealth, why is it either shameful to learn what it is honorable to know, or not glorious to teach that which it is most beautiful to be able to do?

XLII.

42.

[143] "At alterum factitatum est, alterum novum." Fateor; sed utriusque rei causa est. Alteros enim respondentes audire sat erat, ut ei qui docerent nullum sibi ad eam rem tempus ipsi seponerent, sed eodem tempore et discentibus satis facerent et consulentibus; alteri, cum domesticum tempus in cognoscendis componendisque causis, forense in agendis, reliquum in sese ipsis reficiendis omne consumerent, quem habebant instituendi aut docendi locum? Atque haud scio an plerique nostrorum oratorum [contra atque nos] ingenio plus valuerint quam doctrina; itaque illi dicere melius quam praecipere, nos contra fortasse possumus.

[143] "But one of the two has been habitually done, the other is new." I confess it; but there is a reason for each thing. For it was enough to hear the former as respondents, so that those who taught set aside no time for that business for themselves, but at the same time gave satisfaction both to the learners and to those consulting; the latter, since they consumed their domestic time in getting to know and composing cases, their forensic time in conducting them, and all the remainder in refreshing themselves, what room had they for training or teaching? And I hardly know whether most of our orators [contrary to us] have prevailed more by inborn talent than by learning; and thus they could speak better than prescribe, whereas we, on the contrary, perhaps can.

[144] "At dignitatem docere non habet." Certe, si quasi in ludo; sed si monendo, si cohortando, si percontando, si communicando, si interdum etiam una legendo, audiendo, nescio [cur] cum docendo etiam aliquid aliquando [si] possis meliores facere, cur nolis? An quibus verbis sacrorum alienatio fiat docere honestum est, [ut est]: quibus ipsa sacra retineri defendique possint non honestum est?

[144] "But it does not have the power to teach dignity." Certainly, if as in a school; but if by admonishing, if by exhorting, if by questioning, if by sharing, if at times even by reading together, by listening, I do not know [why], when by teaching you can also sometimes [if] you can make them better in some respect, why you would not wish to? Or is it honorable to teach by what words the alienation of sacred rites is effected, [as it is]; but by what words the sacred rites themselves can be retained and defended is not honorable?

[145] "At ius profitentur etiam qui nesciunt; eloquentiam autem illi ipsi qui consecuti sunt tamen ea se valere dissimulant." Propterea quod prudentia hominibus grata est, lingua suspecta. Num igitur aut latere eloquentia potest aut id quod dissimulat effugit aut est periculum ne quis putet in magna arte et gloriosa turpe esse docere alios id quod ipsi fuerit honestissimum discere?

[145] "But the law is professed even by those who do not know; eloquence, however, those very men who have attained nevertheless dissimulate that they are strong in it." For this reason, because prudence is pleasing to men, the tongue is suspect. Can, then, eloquence either lie hidden, or escape by the very thing it dissimulates, or is there danger lest someone think that, in a great and glorious art, it is base to teach others that which it was most honorable for themselves to learn?

[146] Ac fortasse ceteri tectiores; ego semper me didicisse prae me tuli. Qui enim possem, cum [et] afuissem domo adulescens et horum studiorum causa maria transissem et doctissimis hominibus referta domus esset et aliquae fortasse inessent in sermone nostro doctrinarum notae cumque vulgo scripta nostra legerentur, dissimulare me didicisse? Quid [erat cur] probarem nisi quod parum fortasse profeceram?

[146] And perhaps the others are more close‑mouthed; I have always carried openly that I had learned. For how indeed could I, since I had [also] been away from home as a youth, and had crossed the seas for the sake of these studies, and the house was filled with most learned men, and perhaps there were in our discourse some marks of doctrines, and since our writings were read by the public, conceal that I had learned? What [was there why] I should have to justify, except that perhaps I had progressed too little?

XLIII. Quod cum ita sit, tamen ea quae supra dicta sunt plus in disputando quam ea de quibus dicendum est dignitatis habuerunt.

43. Since this is so, nevertheless the things which have been said above have had more dignity in disputation than those about which we must speak.

[147] De verbis enim componendis et de syllabis prope modum dinumerandis et dimetiendis loquemur; quae etiam si sunt, sicuti mihi videntur, necessaria, tamen fiunt magnificentius quam docentur. Est id omnino verum, at proprie in hoc dicitur. Nam omnium magnarum artium sicut arborum altitudo nos delectat, radices stirpesque non item; sed esse illa sine his non potest.

[147] For we will speak about composing words and about syllables almost to the point of being enumerated and measured out; which things, even if they are, as they seem to me, necessary, nevertheless are performed more magnificently than they are taught. That is altogether true, but it is properly said with reference to this. For in all the great arts, just as with trees, the height delights us, the roots and stocks not so; yet the former cannot exist without the latter.

Me autem sive pervulgatissimus ille versus, qui vetat artem pudere proloqui quam factites, dissimulare non sinit qui delecter, sive tuum studium a me hoc volumen expressit, tamen eis quos aliquid reprehensuros suspicabar respondendum fuit.

But as for me, whether that most widespread verse, which forbids the art to be ashamed to proclaim what you practice, does not allow me, who am delighted, to dissemble, or whether your zeal has drawn from me this volume, nevertheless a reply had to be made to those whom I suspected would reprehend something.

[148] Quod si ea quae dixi non ita essent, quis tamen se tam durum agrestemque praeberet qui hanc mihi non daret veniam, ut cum meae forenses artes et actiones publicae concidissent, non me aut desidiae, quod facere non possum, aut maestitiae, cui resisto, potius quam litteris dederem? Quae quidem me antea in iudicia atque in curiam deducebant, nunc oblectant domi; nec vero talibus modo rebus qualis hic liber continet, sed multo etiam gravioribus et maioribus; quae si erunt perfectae, profecto maximis rebus forensibus nostris [et externis] inclusae [et domesticae] litterae respondebunt. Sed ad institutam disputationem revertamur.

[148] But even if the things I have said were not so, who, however, would show himself so hard and rustic as not to grant me this indulgence: that, when my forensic arts and public actions had collapsed, I should devote myself to letters rather than to either idleness—which I cannot practice—or melancholy, which I resist? These indeed formerly led me into trials and into the Curia; now they oblect me at home—nor, in truth, only with matters such as this book contains, but with much weightier and greater ones; which, if they are perfected, assuredly letters, enclosed among our very greatest forensic concerns [and external] enclosed [and domestic], will correspond. But let us return to the discussion we set in place.

XLIV.

44.

[149] Conlocabuntur igitur verba, aut ut inter se quam aptissime cohaereant extrema cum primis eaque sint quam suavissimis vocibus, aut ut forma ipsa concinnitasque verborum conficiat orbem suum, aut ut comprehensio numerose et apte cadat. Atque illud primum videamus quale sit, quod vel maxime desiderat diligentiam, ut fiat quasi structura quaedam nec tamen fiat operose; nam esset cum infinitus tum puerilis labor; quod apud Lucilium scite exagitat in Albucio Scaevola:

[149] Therefore the words will be arranged either so that the endings cohere with the beginnings as aptly as possible and be in voices as sweet as possible, or so that the very form and concinnity of the words fashion their own orb, or so that the comprehensio falls rhythmically (numerously) and aptly. And let us first see of what sort this is which most of all demands diligence: that there be, as it were, a certain structure, and yet it not be made laboriously; for the toil would be both infinite and puerile—something which Scaevola cleverly lashes in Albucius in Lucilius.

quam lepide lexis compostae ut tesserulae omnes
arte pavimento atque emblemate vermiculato!

how charmingly the lexeis are composed, like all the little tesserae,
by art into a pavement and a vermiculated emblem!

[150] Nolo haec tam minuta constructio appareat; sed tamen stilus exercitatus efficiet facile formulam componendi. Nam ut in legendo oculus sic animus in dicendo prospiciet quid sequatur, ne extremorum verborum cum insequentibus primis concursus aut hiulcas voces efficiat aut asperas. Quamvis enim suaves gravesque sententiae tamen, si in condite positis verbis efferuntur, offendent auris, quarum est iudicium superbissimum.

[150] I do not wish this construction so minute to appear; yet a practiced style will easily effect a formula of composing. For as in reading the eye, so in speaking the mind will look ahead to what follows, lest the concourse of the last words with the first of the next produce either gaping voices or harsh ones. For although the sentences be suave and grave, nevertheless, if they are uttered with words placed in a crude fashion, they will offend the ears, whose judgment is most supercilious.

Quod quidem Latina lingua sic observat, nemo ut tam rusticus sit qui vocalis nolit coniungere.

The Latin tongue indeed observes this so, that no one is so rustic as to be unwilling to join vowels.

[151] In quo quidam etiam Theopompum reprehendunt, quod eas litteras tanto opere fugerit, etsi idem magister eius Isocrates fecerat; at non Thucydides, ne ille quidem haud paulo maior scriptor Plato nec solum in eis sermonibus qui dialogoi dicuntur, ubi etiam de industria id faciendum fuit sed in populari oratione, qua mos est Athenis laudari in contione eos qui sint in proeliis interfecti; quae sic probata est, ut eam quotannis, ut scis, illo die recitari necesse sit. In ea est crebra ista vocalium concursio, quam magna ex parte ut vitiosam fugit Demosthenes.

[151] In this respect some even reprehend Theopompus, because he so greatly shunned those letters, although the same had been done by his master Isocrates; but not Thucydides, nor indeed Plato, a writer greater by no small measure, and not only in those discourses which are called dialogoi, where that too had to be done deliberately, but in the popular oration by which it is the custom at Athens that in the assembly those who have been slain in battles be praised; which has been so approved that, as you know, it must be recited every year on that day. In it there is frequent concourse of vowels, which Demosthenes for the most part avoided as a fault.

XLV.

45.

[152] Sed Graeci viderint; nobis ne si cupiamus quidem distrahere voces conceditur. Indicant orationes illae ipsae horridulae Catonis, indicant omnes poetae praeter eos qui, ut versum facerent, saepe hiabant, ut Naevius:

[152] But let the Greeks see to that; for us, it is not granted to separate the sounds, not even if we should desire to do so. Those somewhat rough little orations of Cato themselves indicate it; all the poets indicate it, except those who, in order to make a verse, often gaped, as Naevius.

        vos, qui accolitis Histrum         fluvium atque algidam
         et ibidem:
         quam numquam vobis Grai atque barbari.
        At Ennius saepe
        Scipio invicte,
        et semel quidem nos:
         hoc motu radiantis etesiae in vada ponti.

        you, who dwell near the Hister river and the algid
         and in the same place:
         which never to you the Graians and barbarians.
        But Ennius often
        Scipio, invincible one,
        and once indeed we:
         by this motion the radiant Etesian winds into the shallows of the sea.

[153] Hoc idem nostri saepius non tulissent, quod Graeci laudare etiam solent. Sed quid ego vocalis? Sine vocalibus saepe brevitatis causa contrahebant, ut ita dicerent: multi' modis, in vas' argenteis, palmi' crinibus, tecti' fractis.

[153] Our people would not more often have tolerated this same thing, which the Greeks even are accustomed to laud. But why am I talking about vowels? They often contracted without vowels for the sake of brevity, so that they would say thus: multi' modis, in vas' argenteis, palmi' crinibus, tecti' fractis.

Quid vero licentius quam quod hominum etiam nomina contrahebant, quo essent aptiora? Nam ut duellum bellum, [et] duis bis, sic Duellium cum qui Poenos classe devicit Bellium nominaverunt, cum superiores appellati essent semper Duellii. Quin etiam verba saepe contrahuntur non usus causa sed aurium.

What, indeed, is more licentious than that they even contracted the names of men, so that they might be more apt? For just as duellum [became] bellum, [and] duis bis, so they named Duellius—the one who defeated the Carthaginians with a fleet—Bellius, although the former ones had always been appellated Duellii. Nay more, words too are often contracted not for the sake of use, but of the ears.

Quo modo enim vester Axilla Ala factus est nisi fuga litterae vastioris? Quam litteram etiam e maxillis et taxillis et paxillo et vexillo consuetudo elegans Latini sermonis evellit.

How indeed did your Axilla become Ala, unless by the flight of a more massive letter? Which letter the elegant custom of Latin speech has also wrenched out from maxillis and taxillis and paxillo and vexillo.

[154] Libenter etiam copulando verba iungebant, ut sodes pro si audes, sis pro si vis. Iam in uno capsis tria verba sunt. Ain pro aisne, nequire pro non quire, malle pro magis velle, nolle pro non velle, dein etiam saepe et exin pro deinde et pro exinde dicimus.

[154] They also gladly joined words by coupling, as sodes for si audes, sis for si vis. Already in the single capsis there are three words. Ain for aisne, nequire for non quire, malle for magis velle, nolle for non velle; then too we often say dein and exin for deinde and for exinde.

Quid, illud non olet unde sit, quod dicitur cum illis, cum autem nobis non dicitur, sed nobiscum? Quia si ita diceretur, obscaenius concurrerent litterae, ut etiam modo, nisi autem interposuissem, concurrissent. Ex eo est mecum et tecum, non cum me et cum te, ut esset simile illis nobiscum atque vobiscum.

What? Does it not smell of its origin, that it is said “cum illis,” but with us it is not said “cum nobis,” but “nobiscum”? Because if it were so said, the letters would run together more obscenely—as, even just now, unless I had interposed “autem,” they would have run together. From this comes “mecum” and “tecum,” not “cum me” and “cum te,” so that it might be like those “nobiscum” and “vobiscum.”

XLVI.

46.

[155] Atque etiam a quibusdam sero iam emendatur antiquitas, qui haec reprehendunt. Nam pro deum atque hominum fidem deorum aiunt. Ita credo hoc illi nesciebant: an dabat hanc consuetudo licentiam? Itaque idem poeta qui inusitatius contraxerat:

[155] And moreover antiquity is now emended too late by certain people, who reprehend these things. For, instead of “by the faith of gods and men,” they say “of the gods.” So, I suppose, those men did not know this: or did consuetude give this license? And so the same poet who had more unusually contracted:

        patris mei meum factum pudet
        pro meorum factorum, et
        texitur, exitium examen rapit

        my deed puts my father to shame
        for my deeds, and
        is woven; the swarm snatches ruin

pro exitiorum, non dicit liberum, ut plerique loquimur, cum cupidos liberum aut in liberum loco dicimus, sed ut isti volunt:

in place of 'of destructions', he does not say 'liberum', as most of us speak, when we say 'desirous of children' or 'in the place of children', but as those men wish:

neque tuom umquam in gremium extollas liberorum ex te genus,

nor ever lift into your lap a race of children from yourself,

et idem:

and the same:

namque Aesculapi liberorum.

for indeed of Aesculapius’s children.

At ille alter in Chryse non solum:

But that other at Chryse not only:

cives, antiqui amici maiorum meum,

citizens, ancient friends of my ancestors,

quod erat usitatum, sed durius etiam:

which was usual, but even harsher:

consilium socii, augurium atque extum interpretes;

the counsel of an ally, interpreters of augury and of the entrails;

idemque pergit:

and the same proceeds:

postquam prodigium horriferum, portentum pavos;

after a horrific prodigy, a portent, peacocks;

quae non sane sunt in omnibus neutris usitata. Nec enim dixerim tam libenter armum iudicium,—etsi est apud eundem:

which indeed are not really customary in all neuters. For I would not so willingly say armum judgment,—although it is found in the same author:

nihilne ad te de iudicio armum accidit?

Has nothing about the judgment of arms reached you?

[156] quam centuriam fabrum et procum, ut censoriae tabulae loquuntur, audeo dicere, non fabrorum aut procorum; planeque duorum virorum iudicium aut trium virorum capitalium aut decem virorum stlitibus iudicandis dico numquam. Et quid dixit Accius?

[156] I dare to say “the century of fabrum and of procum,” as the censorial tablets speak, not “of fabrorum or of procorum”; and plainly I never say “the judgment of two men” or “of the three men for capital cases” or “of the ten men for suits to be judged.” And what did Accius say?

video sepulcra duo duorum corporum;

I see two sepulchers of two bodies;

idemque

and the same

mulier una duum virum.

one woman of two men.

Quid verum sit intellego; sed alias ita loquor ut concessum est, ut hoc [vel] pro deum dico vel pro deorum, alias ut necesse est, cum trium virum, non virorum, et sestertium nummum, non sestertiorum nummorum, quod in his consuetudo varia non est.

I understand what is true; but at other times I speak as it is conceded, so that I say this [or] “pro deum” or “pro deorum,” at other times as it is necessary, with “trium virum, not virorum,” and “sestertium nummum, not sestertiorum nummorum,” because in these the custom is not varied.

XLVII.

47.

[157] Quid quod sic loqui, nosse, iudicasse vetant, novisse iubent et iudicavisse? Quasi vero nesciamus in hoc genere et plenum verbum recte dici et imminutum usitate. Itaque utrumque Terentius:

[157] What of the fact that they forbid speaking thus—nosse, iudicasse—and bid novisse and iudicavisse? As though indeed we did not know that in this kind both the full word is rightly said and the diminished is customarily used. And so Terence uses both:

eho tu, cognatum tuom non noras?

hey you, did you not know your kinsman?

Post idem

Afterwards the same

Stilponem inquam noveras.

You had known Stilpo, I say.

Sient plenum est, sint imminutum; licet utare utroque.

Let them be full, let them be diminished; you are permitted to use either.

Ergo ibidem:

Therefore in the same place:

quae quam sint cara post carendo intellegunt,

which they understand how dear they are after going without,

quamque attinendi magni dominatus sient.

and how onerous the maintaining of great dominion is.

Nec vero reprehenderim

Nor indeed would I reprehend

scripsere alii rem

others have written the matter

et scripserunt esse verius sentio, sed consuetudini auribus indulgenti libenter obsequor.

and I feel that they have written more truly, but I gladly defer to the custom indulgent to the ears.

isdem campus habet

the same plain has

inquit Ennius; et in templis: EIDEM PROBAVIT; at isdem erat verius, nec tamen eisdem ut opimius; male sonabat isdem: impetratum est a consuetudine ut peccare suavitatis causa liceret. Et posmeridianas quadrigas quam postmeridianas quadriiugas libentius dixerim et me hercule quam me hercules. Non scire quidem barbarum iam videtur, nescire dulcius.

says Ennius; and in the temples: EIDEM PROBAVIT; but isdem was truer, nor yet eisdem as more choice; isdem sounded ill: it was obtained from custom that it be permitted to err for the sake of suavity. And posmeridianas quadrigas rather than postmeridianas quadriiugas I would more willingly say, and me hercule rather than me hercules. Not to know indeed now seems barbarous, not to know is sweeter.

Ipsum meridiem cur non medidiem? Credo, quod erat insuavius.

The meridian itself why not medidian? I believe, because it was less suave.

[158] Vna praepositio est af, quae nunc tantum in accepti tabulis manet ac ne his quidem omnium, in reliquo sermone mutata est; nam amovit dicimus et abegit et abstulit, ut iam nescias a'ne verum sit an ab an abs. Quid si etiam abfugit turpe visum est et abfer noluerunt, aufugit et aufer maluerunt? Quae praepositio praeter haec duo verba nullo alio in verbo reperietur.

[158] One preposition is af, which now remains only in the receipt-books, and not even in all of these; in the rest of speech it has been altered; for we say amovit and abegit and abstulit, so that now you do not know whether a is the true form or ab or abs. What if even abfugit seemed unsightly and they did not want abfer; they preferred aufugit and aufer? Which preposition, apart from these two verbs, will be found in no other verb.

Noti erant et navi et nari, quibus cum IN praeponi oporteret, dulcius visum est ignotos, ignavos, ignaros dicere quam ut veritas postulabat. Ex usu dicunt et e re publica, quod in altero vocalis excipiebat, in altero esset asperitas, nisi litteram sustulisses, ut exegit, edixit; refecit, rettulit, reddidit: adiuncti verbi prima littera praepositionem commutavit, ut subegit, summovit, sustulit.

Known were both navi and nari; and although IN ought to be prefixed to these, it seemed sweeter to say ignotos, ignavos, ignaros than as truth demanded. They say ex usu and e re publica, because in the one a vowel was following, in the other there would be asperity unless you had removed a letter, as exegit, edixit; refecit, rettulit, reddidit: the first letter of the adjoined verb commuted the preposition, as subegit, summovit, sustulit.

XLVIII.

48.

[159] Quid in verbis iunctis? Quam scite insipientem non insapientem, iniquum non inaequum, tricipitem non tricapitem, concisum non concaesum! Ex quo quidam pertisum etiam volunt, quod eadem consuetudo non probavit.

[159] What of words joined? How neatly “insipientem” not “insapientem,” “iniquum” not “inaequum,” “tricipitem” not “tricapitem,” “concisum” not “concaesum”! Whence some even want “pertisum,” a thing which that same consuetude has not approved.

Quid vero hoc elegantius, quod non fit natura, sed quodam instituto? Indoctus dicimus brevi prima littera, insatius producta, inhumanus brevi, infelix longa. Et, ne multis, quibus in verbis eae primae litterae sunt quae in sapiente atque felice, producte dicitur, in ceteris omnibus breviter; itemque composuit, consuevit, concrepuit, confecit.

What, indeed, is more elegant than this, which does not come to be by nature but by a certain institute? We say indoctus with the first letter short, insatius with it lengthened, inhumanus short, infelix long. And, to be brief, in whatever words those first letters are which are in sapiens and felix, it is pronounced lengthened; in all the rest, short; and likewise composuit, consuevit, concrepuit, confecit.

Consule veritatem: reprehendet; refer ad auris: probabunt. Quaere cur ita sit: dicent iuvare. Voluptati autem aurium morigerari debet oratio.

Consult truth: it will reprehend; refer it to the ears: they will approve. Ask why it is so: they will say it helps. Speech, however, ought to be compliant to the pleasure of the ears.

[160] Quin ego ipse, cum scirem ita maiores locutos esse, ut nusquam nisi in vocali aspiratione uterentur, loquebar sic, ut pulcros, Cetegos, triumpos, Cartaginem dicerem; aliquando, idque sero, convicio aurium cum extorta mihi veritas esset, usum loquendi populo concessi, scientiam mihi reservavi. Orcivios tamen et Matones, Otones, Caepiones, sepulcra, coronas, lacrimas dicimus, quia per aurium iudicium licet. Burrum semper Ennius, numquam Pyrrhum;

[160] Indeed I myself, when I knew that the elders had spoken thus, that they employed aspiration nowhere except on a vowel, used to speak so, that I would say pulcros, Cetegos, triumpos, Cartaginem; at some point, and that late, when by the outcry of the ears the truth had been extorted from me, I granted the usage of speaking to the people, I reserved the knowledge to myself. Yet we say Orcivios and Matones, Otones, Caepiones, sepulcra, coronas, lacrimas, because it is permitted by the judgment of the ears. Burrum always Ennius, never Pyrrhum;

vi patefecerunt Bruges,

by force they opened Bruges,

non Phryges, ipsius antiqui declarant libri. Nec enim Graecam litteram adhibebant, nunc autem etiam duas, et cum Phrygum et Phrygibus dicendum esset, absurdum erat aut etiam in barbaris casibus Graecam litteram adhibere aut recto casu solum Graece loqui; tamen et Phryges, et Pyrrhum aurium causa dicimus.

not Phryges, the very books of the ancient himself declare. For they did not employ the Greek letter, now however even two; and when Phrygum and Phrygibus had to be said, it was absurd either even in barbarian cases to apply the Greek letter or to speak in Greek only in the nominative case; nevertheless we also say both Phryges, and Pyrrhum for the sake of the ears.

[161] Quin etiam, quod iam subrusticum videtur, olim autem politius, eorum verborum, quorum eaedem erant postremae duae litterae, quae sunt in optimus, postremam litteram detrahebant, nisi vocalis insequebatur. Ita non erat ea offensio in versibus quam nunc fugiunt poetae novi. Sic enim loquebamur:

[161] Moreover—even what now seems somewhat rustic, but formerly more polished—they used to remove the last letter of those words whose last two letters were the same as those in optimus, unless a vowel followed. Thus there was not that offense in verses which the new poets now avoid. For thus we spoke:

qui est omnibu' princeps

who is princeps to all

non omnibus princeps, et:

not the chief to all, and:

vita illa dignu' locoque

worthy of that life and of the place

non dignus. Quod si indocta consuetudo tam est artifex suavitatis, quid ab ipsa tandem arte et doctrina postulari putamus?

not worthy. But if unlearned custom is so much an artificer of suavity, what do we suppose is to be demanded from art and doctrine themselves at last?

[162] Haec dixi brevius quam si haec de re una disputarem—est enim locus hic late patens de natura usuque verborum—longius autem quam instituta ratio postulabat.

[162] I have said these things more briefly than if I were disputing these matters as one subject—for this place is widely open on the nature and use of words—yet more at length than the instituted plan demanded.

XLIX. Sed quia rerum verborumque iudicium in prudentia est, vocum autem et numerorum aures sunt iudices, et quod illa ad intellegentiam referuntur, haec ad voluptatem, in illis ratio invenit, in his sensus artem. Aut enim neglegenda fuit nobis voluntas aurium, quibus probari nitebamur, aut ars eius conciliandae reperienda.

49. But since the judgment of things and of words is in prudence, whereas of voices and of numbers the ears are the judges, and because those are referred to understanding, these to pleasure, in those reason finds art, in these sense finds art. For either the inclination of the ears—by which we were striving to be approved—had to be neglected by us, or an art of conciliating it had to be discovered.

[163] Duae sunt igitur res quae permulceant auris, sonus et numerus. De numero mox, nunc de sono quaerimus. Verba, ut supra diximus, legenda sunt potissimum bene sonantia, sed ea non ut poetae exquisita ad sonum, sed sumpta de medio.

[163] There are therefore two things which soothe the ears, sound and number (rhythm). Of number presently; now we inquire about sound. Words, as we said above, ought chiefly to be chosen as well-sounding, but not, as poets, exquisite for sound, rather taken from the common stock.

Qua pontus Helles, [supera Tmolum ac Tauricos: locorum splendidis nominibus inluminatus est versus, sed proximus inquinatus insuavissima littera:

Where the sea is the Hellespont, [surpass Tmolus and the Tauric ranges: the verse is illuminated by the splendid names of places, but the next is befouled by a most unsavory letter:

finis frugifera et efferta arva Asiae tenet.

the frontier holds the frugiferous and well-laden fields of Asia.

[164] Qua re bonitate potius nostrorum verborum utamur quam splendore Graecorum, nisi forte sic loqui paenitet:

[164] Wherefore let us use rather the goodness of our words than the splendor of the Greeks, unless perhaps it pains us to speak thus:

qua tempestate Helenam Paris

at which time Paris took Helen

et quae sequuntur. Immo vero ista sequamur asperitatemque fugiamus:

and what follows. Nay rather, let us follow those and let us flee harshness:

habeo istanc ego perterricrepam

I have that one thunder-crashing

itemque:

likewise:

versutiloquas malitias.

crafty-loquacious malices.

Nec solum componentur verba ratione, sed etiam finientur, quoniam id iudicium esse alterum aurium diximus. Et finiuntur aut ipsa compositione et quasi sua sponte, aut quodam genere verborum, in quibus ipsis concinnitas inest; quae sive casus habent in exitu similis sive paribus paria redduntur sive opponuntur contraria, suapte natura numerosa sunt, etiam si nihil est factum de industria.

Not only will words be composed by reason, but they will also be brought to an end, since we have said that that is the other judgment of the ears. And they are brought to an end either by the composition itself and, as it were, of their own accord, or by a certain kind of words, in which concinnity inheres; which, whether they have cases with like endings at the exit, or like is rendered to like, or contraries are opposed, are by their very nature rhythmical (numerous), even if nothing has been done by design.

[165] In huius concinnitatis consectatione Gorgiam fuisse principem accepimus; quo de genere illa nostra sunt in Miloniana: Est enim, iudices, haec non scripta, sed nata lex, quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus, verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus, ad quam non docti, sed facti, non instituti, sed imbuti sumus. Haec enim talia sunt, ut, quia referuntur eo quo debent referri, intellegamus non quaesitum esse numerum, sed secutum.

[165] In the pursuit of this concinnity we have learned that Gorgias was a principal; of which kind are those our lines in the Milonian: For, judges, this is a law not written, but born, which we did not learn, receive, read, but rather from nature herself we seized, we drank in, we pressed forth, according to which we have been not taught, but made, not instructed, but imbued. For these things are such that, because they are referred to where they ought to be referred, we understand that number was not sought, but followed.

[166] Quod fit item in contrariis referendis, ut illa sunt quibus non modo numerosa oratio sed etiam versus efficitur:

[166] Which likewise happens in the referring of contraries, as are those by which not only rhythmical oration but even verse is effected:

eam quam nihil accusas damnas

her whom you accuse of nothing you condemn

condemnas dixisset qui versum effugere vellet—,

one who wished to escape the verse would have said “you condemn”—,

bene quam meritam esse autumas [dicis]

you affirm that she has deserved well [you say]

male merere? Id quod scis prodest nihil;

to deserve ill? That which you know profits nothing;

id quod nescis obest?

does that which you do not know harm?

Versum efficit ipsa relatio contrariorum. Idem esset in oratione numerosum: Quod scis nihil prodest; quod nescis multum obest.

The very relation of contraries itself makes a verse. The same would be rhythmical in prose: What you know profits nothing; what you do not know harms much.

L. Semper haec, quae Graeci antitheta nominant, cum contrariis opponuntur contraria, numerum oratorium necessitate ipsa efficiunt etiam sine industria.

L. Always these things, which the Greeks call antitheta, when contraries are opposed to contraries, bring about the oratorical number by necessity itself even without industry.

[167] Hoc genere antiqui iam ante Isocratem delectabantur et maxime Gorgias, cuius in oratione plerumque efficit numerum ipsa concinnitas. Nos etiam in hoc genere frequentes, ut illa sunt in quarto accusationis: Conferte hanc pacem cum illo bello, huius praetoris adventum cum illius imperatoris victoria, huius cohortem impuram cum illius exercitu invicto, huius libidines cum illius continentia: ab illo qui cepit conditas, ab hoc qui constitutas accepit captas dicetis Syracusas.

[167] In this kind the ancients already before Isocrates took delight, and most of all Gorgias, in whose oration for the most part the very concinnity produces the number (rhythm). We too are frequent in this kind, as these are in the fourth of the accusation: Compare this peace with that war, the arrival of this praetor with the victory of that imperator, the impure cohort of this man with the unconquered army of that man, the lusts of this man with the continence of that man: from that one who took them when founded, from this one who received them when constituted, you will say Syracuse taken.

[168] Ergo et hi numeri sint cogniti et genus illud tertium explicetur quale sit, numerosae et aptae orationis. Quod qui non sentiunt, quas auris habeant aut quid in his hominis simile sit nescio. Meae quidem et perfecto completoque verborum ambitu gaudent et curta sentiunt nec amant redundantia.

[168] Therefore let these rhythms also be known, and let that third kind be explained, what it is: of rhythmical and apt oration. Those who do not perceive this—I know not what ears they have, or what in them is like to a human being. My own, for their part, both rejoice in a perfected and completed compass of words, and feel what is curtailed, nor do they love redundancies.

Quid dico meas? Contiones saepe exclamare vidi, cum apte verba cecidissent. Id enim exspectant aures, ut verbis conligetur sententia.

Why do I say mine? I have often seen public assemblies exclaim when the words had fallen aptly. For ears expect this: that the sentence be bound together by words.

"Non erat hoc apud antiquos." Et quidem nihil aliud fere non erat; nam et verba eligebant et sententias gravis et suavis reperiebant, sed eas aut vinciebant aut explebant parum.

"This was not among the ancients." And indeed scarcely anything else was lacking; for they both chose words and discovered thoughts, grave and sweet, but they either bound them or filled them out too little.

[169] "Hoc me ipsum delectat" inquiunt. Quid si antiquissima illa pictura paucorum colorum magis quam haec iam perfecta delectet, illa nobis sit credo repetenda, haec scilicet repudianda! Nominibus veterum gloriantur.

[169] "This very thing delights me," they say. What if that most ancient painting of few colors were to delight more than this one now perfected; that, I suppose, would have to be reverted to for us, and this, of course, would have to be repudiated! They glory in the names of the ancients.

Habet autem ut in aetatibus auctoritatem senectus, sic in exemplis antiquitas, quae quidem apud me ipsum valet plurimum. Nec ego id quod deest antiquitati flagito potius quam laudo quod est; praesertim cum [ea] maiora iudicem quae sunt quam illa quae desunt. Plus est enim in verbis et in sententiis boni, quibus illi excellunt, quam in conclusione sententiarum, quam non habent.

But as, in the ages of life, old age has authority, so in examples antiquity, which indeed prevails with me most of all. Nor do I demand from antiquity what it lacks rather than praise what it has; especially since I judge the things that are present to be greater than those that are absent. For there is more of the good in words and in sentences, wherein they excel, than in the conclusion of sentences, which they do not have.

LI. Post inventa conclusio est, qua credo usuros veteres illos fuisse, si iam nota atque usurpata res esset; qua inventa omnis usos magnos oratores videmus.

51. Afterwards the conclusion was invented, which I believe those ancients would have used, if the thing had already been known and employed; once it was invented, we see all the great orators using it.

[170] Sed habet nomen invidiam, cum in oratione iudiciali et forensi numerus [Latine, Graece rhythmos] inesse dicitur. Nimis enim insidiarum ad capiendas auris adhiberi videtur, si etiam in dicendo numeri ab oratore quaeruntur. Hoc freti isti et ipsi infracta et amputata loquuntur et eos vituperant qui apta et finita pronuntiant; si inanibus verbis levibusque sententiis, iure; sin probae res, lecta verba, quid est cur claudere aut insistere orationem malint quam cum sententia pariter excurrere?

[170] But the very name incurs odium, when in a judicial and forensic oration “number” [in Latin; in Greek, rhythmos] is said to be present. For it seems that too much ambush is being employed to capture the ears, if even in speaking numbers are sought by the orator. Trusting in this, those men themselves speak in a broken and amputated fashion, and they blame those who pronounce things fitted and finished; if with empty words and light sentences, they do so rightly; but if the matters are upright and the words chosen, what reason is there why they should prefer to close or to come to a stand in the oration rather than to run out together with the sentence (thought)?

Hic enim invidiosus numerus nihil adfert aliud nisi ut sit apte verbis comprehensa sententia; quod fit etiam ab antiquis, sed plerumque casu saepe natura; et quae valde laudantur apud illos, ea fere quia sunt conclusa laudantur.

For this invidious number brings nothing else than that the thought be aptly encompassed with words; which is done also by the ancients, but for the most part by chance, often by nature; and the things that are greatly praised among them are generally praised because they are concluded.

[171] Et apud Graecos quidem iam anni prope quadringenti sunt cum hoc probatur; nos nuper agnovimus. Ergo Ennio licuit vetera contemnenti dicere:

[171] And among the Greeks, indeed, now it is nearly 400 years that this has been approved; we have only lately recognized it. Therefore it was permitted to Ennius, contemning the old things, to say:

versibus, quos olim Fauni vatesque canebant,

in verses, which once the Fauns and vates sang,

mihi de antiquis eodem modo non licebit? Praesertim cum dicturus non sim ante hunc, ut ille, nec quae sequuntur: Nos ausi reserare;—legi enim audivique non nullos, quorum prope modum absolute concluderetur oratio. Quod qui non possunt, non est eis satis non contemni, laudari etiam volunt.

Will it not be permitted me to deal with the ancients in the same way? Especially since I am not going to say, before this man, as he did, nor the things that follow: “We have dared to unbar”;—for I have read and heard not a few, whose oration was concluded almost absolutely. Those who cannot do that, it is not enough for them not to be contemned; they also want to be lauded.

Ego autem illos ipsos laudo idque merito, quorum se isti imitatores esse dicunt, etsi in eis aliquid desidero, hos vero minime, qui nihil illorum nisi vitium sequuntur, cum a bonis absint longissime.

I, however, praise those very men—and deservedly—whom these fellows declare themselves to be imitators of, although I find something lacking in them; but these men, by no means, who follow nothing of those men except their vice, since they are farthest removed from the good.

[172] Quod si auris tam inhumanas tamque agrestis habent, ne doctissimorum quidem virorum eos movebit auctoritas? Omitto Isocratem discipulosque eius Ephorum et Naucratem, quamquam orationis faciendae et ornandae auctores locupletissimi summi ipsi oratores esse debebant. Sed quis omnium doctior, quis acutior, quis in rebus vel inveniendis vel iudicandis acrior Aristotele fuit?

[172] But if they have ears so inhuman and so rustic, will not even the authority of the most learned men move them? I omit Isocrates and his disciples Ephorus and Naucrates, although, as the most richly endowed authors of making and adorning oration, they themselves ought to have been supreme orators. But who of all was more learned, who more acute, who more keen in matters either discovering or judging than Aristotle?

Quis porro Isocrati est adversatus infensius? Is igitur versum in oratione vetat esse, numerum iubet. Eius auditor Theodectes in primis, ut Aristoteles saepe significat, politus scriptor atque artifex hoc idem et sentit et praecipit; Theophrastus vero eisdem de rebus etiam accuratius.

Who, moreover, has opposed Isocrates more hostilely? He therefore forbids a verse in an oration, and enjoins number. His auditor Theodectes, foremost among them, as Aristotle often signifies, a polished writer and craftsman, both holds this same and prescribes it; but Theophrastus on these same matters even more accurately.

Quis ergo istos ferat, qui hos auctores non probent? Nisi omnino haec esse ab eis praecepta nesciunt.

Who then would endure those who do not approve these authorities? Unless they altogether do not know that these are precepts set forth by them.

[173] Quod si ita est—nec vero aliter existimo—quid, ipsi suis sensibus non moventur? Nihilne eis inane videtur, nihil inconditum, nihil curtum, nihil claudicans, nihil redundans? In versu quidem theatra tota exclamant, si fuit una syllaba aut brevior aut longior; nec vero multitudo pedes novit nec ullos numeros tenet nec illud quod offendit aut curat aut in quo offendit intellegit; et tamen omnium longitudinum et brevitatum in sonis sicut acutarum graviumque vocum iudicium ipsa natura in auribus nostris conlocavit.

[173] But if this is so—and truly I do not deem otherwise—what? are they themselves not moved by their own senses? Does nothing seem to them empty, nothing unformed, nothing curtailed, nothing limping, nothing redundant? Indeed in verse whole theatres cry out, if a single syllable has been either shorter or longer; and yet the multitude does not know the feet nor hold any numbers (rhythms), nor either cares about that which offends or understands wherein it is offended; and nevertheless Nature herself has placed in our ears the judgment of all lengths and shortnesses in sounds, just as of acute and grave voices.

LII.

52.

[174] Visne igitur, Brute, totum hunc locum accuratius etiam explicemus quam illi ipsi, qui et haec et alia nobis tradiderunt, an his contenti esse quae ab illis dicta sunt possumus? Sed quid quaero velisne, cum litteris tuis eruditissime scriptis te id vel maxime velle perspexerim? Primum ergo origo, deinde causa, post natura, tum ad extremum usus ipse explicetur orationis aptae atque numerosae.

[174] Would you, then, Brutus, that we explicate this whole passage even more accurately than those very men who handed down to us both these things and others, or can we be content with what was said by them? But why do I ask whether you wish it, since from your letters, most learnedly written, I have clearly perceived that you most especially wish it? Therefore let the origin first, then the cause, afterward the nature, and finally the very use of apt and numerose (rhythmical) oration be explicated.

Nam qui Isocratem maxime mirantur, hoc in eius summis laudibus ferunt, quod verbis solutis numeros primum adiunxerit. Cum enim videret oratores cum severitate audiri, poetas autem cum voluptate, tum dicitur numeros secutus, quibus etiam in oratione uteretur, cum iucunditatis causa tum ut varietas occurreret satietati.

For those who most admire Isocrates report this among his highest praises: that he was the first to add numbers to prose. For when he saw that orators were listened to with severity, but poets with pleasure, then he is said to have followed numbers, which he would also employ in oration, both for the sake of pleasantness and so that variety might forestall satiety.

[175] Quod ab eis vere quadam ex parte, non totum dicitur. Nam neminem in eo genere scientius versatum Isocrate confitendum est, sed princeps inveniendi fuit Thrasymachus, cuius omnia nimis etiam exstant scripta numerose. Nam, ut paulo ante dixi, paria paribus adiuncta et similiter definita itemque contrariis relata contraria, quae sua sponte, etiam si id non agas, cadunt plerumque numerose, Gorgias primum invenit, sed eis est usus intemperatius.

[175] What is said by them is true in a certain respect, not in its entirety. For it must be confessed that no one was more skillfully practiced in that kind than Isocrates; but the first inventor was Thrasymachus, all of whose writings are extant composed with numbers (cadence), even excessively so. For, as I said a little before, equals joined to equals and similarly defined, and likewise contraries referred to contraries—things which of their own accord, even if you are not aiming at it, for the most part fall into numbers—Gorgias first discovered, but he used them somewhat too intemperately.

Id autem est genus, ut ante dictum est, ex tribus partibus conlocationis alterum.

That, however, is, as was said before, the second of the three parts of collocation.

[176] Horum uterque Isocratem aetate praecurrit, ut eos ille moderatione, non inventione vicerit. Est enim, ut in transferendis faciendisque verbis tranquillior sic in ipsis numeris sedatior. Gorgias autem avidior est generis eius et his festivitatibus sic enim ipse censet—insolentius abutitur; quas Isocrates tamen, cum audivisset adulescens in Thessalia senem iam Gorgiam, moderatius temperavit.

[176] Each of these two outstripped Isocrates in age, so that he surpassed them in moderation, not in invention. For he is—as in transferring and in making words more tranquil, so in the numbers themselves more sedate. But Gorgias is more avid of that genus and of these festivities so he himself judges—he abuses them more insolently; which festivities Isocrates, however, when as a young man he had heard in Thessaly Gorgias now an old man, more moderately tempered.

Quin etiam se ipse tantum quantum aetate procedebat—prope enim centum confecit annos—relaxabat a nimia necessitate numerorum, quod declarat in eo libro quem ad Philippum Macedonem scripsit, cum iam admodum esset senex; in quo dicit sese minus iam servire numeris quam solitus esset. Ita non modo superiores sed etiam se ipse correxerat.

Nay even, he relaxed himself from an excessive necessity of numbers in proportion as he advanced in age—for he completed nearly a hundred years—which he declares in that book which he wrote to Philip the Macedonian, when he was already very old; in which he says that he now serves the numbers less than he was accustomed. Thus he had corrected not only those before him but even himself.

LIII.

53.

[177] Quoniam igitur habemus aptae orationis eos principes auctoresque quos diximus et origo inventa est, causa quaeratur. Quae sic aperta est, ut mirer veteres non esse commotos, praesertim cum, ut fit, fortuito saepe aliquid concluse apteque dicerent. Quod cum animos hominum aurisque pepulisset, ut intellegi posset id quod casus effudisset cecidisse iucunde, notandum certe genus atque ipsi sibi imitandi fuerunt.

[177] Since therefore we have, for apt oration, those leaders and authors whom we have named, and the origin has been found, let the cause be sought. This is laid open thus, that I marvel the ancients were not moved, especially since, as happens, they often said something, fortuitously, in a concluded and apt way. When this had struck the minds and ears of men, so that it could be understood that what chance had poured forth had fallen pleasantly, surely the genre was to be noted, and they themselves had to be imitators of themselves.

Ipsae enim aures vel animus aurium nuntio naturalem quandam in se continet vocum omnium mensionem.

For the ears themselves, or the mind by the report of the ears, contains within itself a certain natural measure of all sounds.

[178] Itaque et longiora et breviora iudicat et perfecta ac moderata semper exspectat; mutila sentit quaedam et quasi decurtata, quibus tamquam debito fraudetur offenditur, productiora alia et quasi immoderatius excurrentia, quae magis etiam aspernantur aures; quod cum in plerisque tum in hoc genere nimium quod est offendit vehementius quam id quod videtur parum. Vt igitur poeticae versus inventus est terminatione aurium, observatione prudentium, sic in oratione animadversum est, multo illud quidem serius, sed eadem natura admonente, esse quosdam certos cursus conclusionesque verborum.

[178] And so it judges both the longer and the shorter, and always expects what is perfect and moderated; it senses certain things as mutilated and as if decurtated, and is offended at them as though it were defrauded of what is due; others as more protracted and as if running out more immoderately, which the ears even more disdain; and, as in most things, so in this kind, what is excessive offends more vehemently than what seems too little. Thus, just as the verse of poetry was discovered by the termination of the ears, by the observation of the prudent, so in oration it has been noticed—much indeed later, but with the same nature giving warning—that there are certain fixed courses and conclusions of words.

[179] Quoniam igitur causam quoque ostendimus, naturam nunc—id enim erat tertium—si placet explicemus; quae disputatio non huius instituti sermonis est, sed artis intimae. Quaeri enim potest, qui sit orationis numerus et ubi sit positus et natus ex quo, et is unusne sit an duo an plures quaque ratione componatur et ad quam rem et quando et quo loco et quem ad modum adhibitus aliquid voluptatis adferat.

[179] Since, therefore, we have also shown the cause, let us now—for that was the third—if it pleases, explicate the nature; this disputation does not belong to the plan of this discourse, but to the inmost matters of the art. For it can be asked what the number (rhythm) of speech is and where it is placed and from what it is born, and whether it is one or two or more, and by what method it is composed, and for what purpose and when and in what place, and in what manner, when applied, it brings some pleasure.

[180] Sed ut in plerisque rebus sic in hac duplex est considerandi via quarum altera est longior, brevior altera, eadem etiam planior.

[180] But as in very many matters, so in this, there is a twofold way of considering, of which one is longer, the other shorter—and the same also plainer.

LIV. Est autem longioris prima illa quaestio sitne omnino ulla numerosa oratio; quibusdam enim non videtur, quia nihil insit in ea certi ut in versibus, et quod ipsi, qui adfirment esse eos numeros, rationem cur sint non queant reddere. Deinde, si sit numerus in oratione, qualis sit aut quales, et e poeticisne numeris an ex alio genere quodam et, si e poeticis, quis eorum sit aut qui; namque aliis unus modo aliis plures aliis omnes idem videntur.

54. But of the longer method the first question is whether there is at all any rhythmical oration; for to some it does not seem so, because nothing certain is in it as in verses, and because they themselves, who affirm that those numbers exist, cannot render a rationale why they are. Then, if there is number in oration, of what sort it is or what sorts, and whether it be from poetic numbers or from some other kind, and, if from the poetic, which of them it is or which; for to some a single one only, to others several, to others all seem the same.

Deinde, quicumque sunt sive unus sive plures, communesne sint omni generi orationis—quoniam aliud genus est narrandi aliud persuadendi aliud docendi an dispares numeri cuique orationis generi accommodentur; si communes, qui sint; si dispares, quid intersit, et cur non aeque in oratione atque in versu numerus appareat.

Then, whatever they are, whether one or several, are they common to every kind of oration—since one kind is of narrating, another of persuading, another of teaching—or are disparate numbers accommodated to each kind of oration? If common, what they are; if disparate, what the difference is, and why number does not appear equally in oration as in verse.

[181] Deinde, quod dicitur in oratione numerosum, id utrum numero solum efficiatur, an etiam vel compositione quadam vel genere verborum; an sit suum cuiusque, ut numerus intervallis, compositio vocibus, genus ipsum verborum quasi quadam forma et lumine orationis appareat, sitque omnium fons compositio ex eaque et numerus efficiatur et ea quae dicuntur orationis quasi formae et lumina, quae, ut dixi, Graeci vocant schemata.

[181] Next, as to what is called “numbered” in oration, whether that is effected by number alone, or also by a certain composition or by the genus of words; or whether each has its own: number by intervals, composition by voices (sounds), the very genus of words appearing as a kind of form and illumination of speech; and whether the source of all is composition, and from it both number is produced and those things which are called the quasi forms and lights of oration, which, as I said, the Greeks call schemata.

[182] At non est unum nec idem quod voce iucundum est et quod moderatione absolutum et quod inluminatum genere verborum; quamquam id quidem finitimum est numero, quia per se plerumque perfectum est; compositio autem ab utroque differt, quae tota servit gravitati vocum aut suavitati. Haec igitur fere sunt in quibus rei natura quaerenda sit.

[182] But it is not one and the same, that which is pleasant by voice, and that which is made complete by moderation, and that which is illuminated by the genus of words; although that indeed is very near to number, because it is for the most part complete in itself; composition, however, differs from both, which wholly serves the gravity of the voices or suavity. These, therefore, are for the most part the things in which the nature of the matter must be sought.

LV.

55.

[183] Esse ergo in oratione numerum quendam non est difficile cognoscere. Iudicat enim sensus; in quo est iniquum quod accidit non agnoscere, si cur id accidat reperire nequeamus. Neque enim ipse versus ratione est cognitus, sed natura atque sensu, quem dimensa ratio docuit quid accideret.

[183] Therefore, that there is a certain number in oration is not difficult to recognize. For sense judges; and in this it is inequitable not to acknowledge what happens, if we cannot discover why it happens. For verse itself was not known by reason, but by nature and by sense, which reason, after measuring it out, has taught what would happen.

Ita notatio naturae et animadversio peperit artem. Sed in versibus res est apertior, quamquam etiam a modis quibusdam cantu remoto soluta esse videtur oratio maximeque id in optimo quoque eorum poetarum qui lyricoi a Graecis nominantur, quos cum cantu spoliaveris, nuda paene remanet oratio.

Thus the notation of nature and animadversion brought forth art. But in verses the matter is more apparent, although even, with certain measures—once the song is removed—speech seems to be loosened; and this especially in each of the best of those poets who are named lyricoi by the Greeks, whom, when you have stripped of song, the oration remains almost naked.

[184] Quorum similia sunt quaedam etiam apud nostros, velut illa in Thyeste:

[184] Of whom there are certain similar things even among our own, as those in the Thyestes:

quemnam te esse dicam? Qui tarda in senecta

whom am I to say you are? You who, tardy in senectitude

et quae sequuntur; quae, nisi cum tibicen accessit, orationis sunt solutae simillima. At comicorum senarii propter similitudinem sermonis sic saepe sunt abiecti, ut non numquam vix in eis numerus et versus intellegi possit. Quo est ad inveniendum difficilior in oratione numerus quam in versibus.

and what follows; which, unless when the pipe‑player has come in, are most similar to prose. But the senarii of the comic poets, because of their similarity to everyday speech, are so often cast off that sometimes scarcely the number and the verse can be understood in them. Wherefore it is more difficult to discover number (rhythm) in oration than in verses.

[185] Omnino duo sunt quae condiant orationem, verborum numerorumque iucunditas. In verbis inest quasi materia quaedam, in numero autem expolitio. Sed ut ceteris in rebus necessitatis inventa antiquiora sunt quam voluptatis.

[185] Altogether there are two things that season discourse: the pleasantness of words and of numbers. In words there is, as it were, a certain material; in number, however, a polish. But, as in other matters, the inventions of necessity are earlier than those of pleasure.

[186] [Itaque et Herodotus et eadem superiorque aetas numero caruit nisi quando temere ac fortuito, et scriptores perveteres de numero nihil omnino, de oratione praecepta multa nobis reliquerunt.]—Nam quod et facilius est et magis necessarium, id semper ante cognoscitur

[186] [And so both Herodotus and that same earlier age lacked number (rhythmic cadence) except when rashly and by chance, and the very ancient writers have left us nothing at all about number, but many precepts about oration.]—For that which is both easier and more necessary is always first learned.

LVI. ita translata aut facta aut coniuncta verba facile sunt cognita, quia sumebantur e consuetudine cotidianoque sermone. Numerus autem non domo depromebatur neque habebat aliquam necessitudinem aut cognationem cum oratione.

56. thus transferred or made or conjoined words are easily known, because they were taken from custom and everyday speech. The rhythm, however, was not fetched from home, nor did it have any necessity or cognation with oration.

Itaque serius aliquanto notatus et cognitus quasi quandam palaestram et extrema liniamenta orationi attulit.

Therefore, being somewhat later observed and recognized, it brought to oratory, as it were, a certain palaestra and the final lineaments.

[187] Quod si et angusta quaedam atque concisa et alia est dilatata et fusa oratio, necesse est id non litterarum accidere natura, sed intervallorum longorum et brevium varietate; quibus implicata atque permixta oratio quoniam tum stabilis est tum volubilis, necesse est eius modi vi naturam numeri contineri. Nam circuitus ille, quem saepe iam diximus, incitatior numero ipso fertur et labitur, quoad perveniat ad finem et insistat. Perspicuum est igitur numeris astrictam orationem esse debere, carere versibus.

[187] But if one kind of discourse is somewhat narrow and concise and another is dilated and diffuse, it must be that this happens not by the nature of letters, but by the variety of long and short intervals; and since discourse, entangled and mingled with these, is now stable, now rolling, it must be that by a force of such a kind the nature of rhythm (number) is contained. For that circuit, which we have often already mentioned, is borne on and glides the more swiftly by the very number, until it reaches an end and takes its stand. It is clear, therefore, that discourse ought to be constrained by numbers, while lacking verses.

[188] Sed hi numeri poeticine sint an ex alio genere quodam deinceps est videndum. Nullus est igitur numerus extra poeticos, propterea quod definita sunt genera numerorum. Nam omnis talis est, ut unus sit e tribus.

[188] But whether these numbers are poetic or of some other kind must next be examined. There is therefore no number outside the poetical ones, because the genera of numbers have been defined. For every such one is of such a sort that it is one of three.

Pes enim, qui adhibetur ad numeros, partitur in tria, ut necesse sit partem pedis aut aequalem esse alteri parti aut altero tanto aut sesqui esse maiorem. Ita fit aequalis dactylus, duplex iambus, sesquiplex paean; qui pedes in orationem non cadere qui possunt? Quibus ordine locatis quod efficitur numerosum sit necesse est.

For the foot, which is applied to numbers, is divided into three, so that it is necessary that a part of the foot be either equal to the other part, or twice as great, or greater by a sesqui (one-and-a-half). Thus there results the equal dactyl, the double iambus, the sesquiplex paeon; what feet are there that cannot fall into oration? With these set in order, it is necessary that what is produced be numerous (rhythmical).

[189] Sed quaeritur quo numero aut quibus potissimum sit utendum. Incidere vero omnis in orationem etiam ex hoc intellegi potest, quod versus saepe in oratione per imprudentiam dicimus. Est id vehementer vitiosum, sed non attendimus neque exaudimus nosmet ipsos; senarios vero et Hipponacteos effugere vix possumus; magnam enim partem ex iambis nostra constat oratio.

[189] But it is asked by what number, or which ones in particular, it ought to be used. That, in truth, all fall into oration can be understood also from this: that we often, through imprudence, utter a verse in oration. This is exceedingly faulty, but we do not attend nor overhear ourselves; the senarii, indeed, and the Hipponacteans we can scarcely escape; for a great part our oration consists of iambs.

Sed tamen eos versus facile agnoscit auditor; sunt enim usitatissimi; inculcamus autem per imprudentiam saepe etiam minus usitatos, sed tamen versus: vitiosum genus et longa animi provisione fugiendum.

And yet the hearer easily recognizes those verses; for they are most usual; we, however, through imprudence, often even force in the less usual ones—yet still verses: a faulty kind and to be avoided by long forethought of mind.

[190] Elegit ex multis Isocrati libris triginta fortasse versus Hieronymus Peripateticus in primis nobilis, plerosque senarios, sed etiam anapaestos; quo quid potest esse turpius? Etsi in legendo fecit malitiose; prima enim syllaba dempta ex primo verbo sententiae postremum ad verbum primam rursus syllabam adiunxit insequentis sententiae; ita factus est anapaestus is qui Aristophaneus nominatur; quod ne accidat observari nec potest nec necesse est. Sed tamen hic corrector in eo ipso loco quo reprehendit, ut a me animum adversum est studiose inquirente in eum, immittit imprudens ipse senarium.

[190] Out of the many books of Isocrates, Hieronymus the Peripatetic, very distinguished among the foremost, chose perhaps thirty verses, mostly senarii, but also anapaests; than which what could be more disgraceful? Although in reading he acted maliciously; for, with the first syllable removed from the first word of a sentence, he added the first syllable of the following sentence to the last word; thus an anapaest was made which is called “Aristophanean”; to prevent which from happening can neither be observed nor is it necessary. But nevertheless this corrector, in that very place where he finds fault—as my mind, set against him, was diligently inquiring into him—he himself unwittingly slips in a senarius.

Sit igitur hoc cognitum in solutis etiam verbis inesse numeros eosdemque esse oratorios qui sint poetici.

Let this, then, be known: that even in loosened (prose) words numbers are present, and that the same are oratorical as are poetical.

LVII.

57.

[191] Sequitur ergo ut qui maxime cadant in orationem aptam numeri videndum sit. Sunt enim qui iambicum putent, quod sit orationis simillimus, qua de causa fieri ut is potissimum propter similitudinem veritatis adhibeatur in fabulis, quod ille dactylicus numerus hexametrorum magniloquentiae sit accommodatior. Ephorus autem, levis ipse orator et profectus ex optima disciplina, paeana sequitur aut dactylum, fugit autem spondeum et trochaeum.

[191] It follows, then, that we must see which rhythms most fall into an apt oration. For there are those who think the iambic does, because it is most similar to speech; wherefore it comes about that this especially, on account of its likeness to truth, is employed in plays, whereas that dactylic rhythm of hexameters is more accommodative to magniloquence. Ephorus, however—a light orator himself and trained from the best discipline—follows the paean or the dactyl, but flees the spondee and the trochee.

Quod enim paean habebat tris brevis, dactylus autem duas, brevitate et celeritate syllabarum labi putat verba proclivius contraque accidere in spondeo et trochaeo; quorum quod alter e longis constet alter e brevibus, fieri alteram nimis incitatam alteram nimis tardam orationem, neutram temperatam.

For since the paean has three short syllables, but the dactyl two, he thinks that words slip along more readily by the brevity and celerity of the syllables; and the contrary happens in the spondee and the trochee, of which, because the one consists of long syllables and the other of short, the style becomes, in the one case, too impetuous, in the other, too slow—neither tempered.

[192] Sed et illi priores errant et Ephorus in culpa est. Nam et qui paeana praetereunt, non vident mollissimum a sese numerum eundemque amplissimum praeteriri. Quod longe Aristoteli videtur secus, qui iudicat heroum numerum grandiorem quam desideret soluta oratio, iambum autem nimis e vulgari esse sermone.

[192] But both those earlier ones err, and Ephorus is at fault. For those who pass over the paean do not see that by themselves the softest meter, and the same the most ample, is being passed over. Far otherwise does it seem to Aristotle, who judges the heroic meter to be grander than unbound speech (prose) requires, while the iamb is too much from common speech.

Ita neque humilem et abiectam orationem nec nimis altam et exaggeratam probat, plenam tamen eam vult esse gravitatis, ut eos qui audient ad maiorem admirationem possit traducere.

Thus he approves neither a humble and abject oration nor one too high and exaggerated; nevertheless he wants it to be full of gravity, so that it may be able to lead those who will hear to greater admiration.

[193] Trochaeum autem, qui est eodem spatio quo choreus, cordacem appellat, quia contractio et brevitas dignitatem non habeat. Ita paeana probat eoque ait uti omnis, sed ipsos non sentire cum utantur; esse autem tertium ac medium inter illos, et ita factos eos pedes esse, ut in eis singulis modus insit aut sesquiplex aut duplex aut par. Itaque illi de quibus ante dixi tantum modo commoditatis habuerunt rationem, nullam dignitatis.

[193] The trochee, moreover, which is of the same span as the choreus, he calls a cordax, because contraction and brevity do not have dignity. Thus he approves the paean and says that everyone uses it, but that they themselves do not perceive it when they use it; and that it is a third and a middle between those, and that the feet are so fashioned that in each of them there is a measure either sesquiplex or duplex or equal. Therefore those of whom I spoke before had regard only for convenience, none for dignity.

[194] Iambus enim et dactylus in versum cadunt maxime; itaque ut versum fugimus in oratione, sic hi sunt evitandi continuati pedes; aliud enim quiddam est oratio nec quicquam inimicius quam illa versibus; paean autem minime est aptus ad versum, quo libentius eum recepit oratio. Ephorus vero ne spondeum quidem, quem fugit, intellegit esse aequalem dactylo, quem probat. Syllabis enim metiendos pedes, non intervallis existimat; quod idem facit in trochaeo, qui temporibus et intervallis est par iambo, sed eo vitiosus in oratione, si ponatur extremus, quod verba melius in syllabas longiores cadunt.

[194] For the iamb and the dactyl fall most readily into verse; and so, just as we flee verse in oration, so these feet, when continuous, are to be avoided; for oration is something other, and nothing is more inimical to verse than it; but the paean is least apt for verse, wherefore oration has the more willingly received it. Ephorus, however, does not even understand that the spondee, which he avoids, is equal to the dactyl, which he approves. For he judges that feet ought to be measured by syllables, not by intervals; which same thing he does in the trochee, which is equal in times and intervals to the iamb, but is the more faulty in oration, if it be placed at the end, because words fall better upon longer syllables.

Atque haec, quae sunt apud Aristotelem, eadem a Theophrasto Theodecteque de paeane dicuntur.

And these things, which are found in Aristotle, are likewise said by Theophrastus and Theodectes about the paean.

[195] Ego autem sentio omnis in oratione esse quasi permixtos et confusos pedes, nec enim effugere possemus animadversionem, si semper isdem uteremur, quia nec numerosa esse, ut poema, neque extra numerum, ut sermo vulgi, esse debet oratio—alterum nimis est vinctum, ut de industria factum appareat, alterum nimis dissolutum, ut pervagatum ac vulgare videatur; ut ab altero non delectere, alterum oderis—;

[195] But I, for my part, sense that in oration all the feet are, as it were, commixed and confused; for we could not escape animadversion, if we always used the same ones, because oration ought neither to be “numerous,” like a poema, nor outside number, like the speech of the crowd—the one is too bound, so that it appears done on purpose, the other too dissolved, so that it seems hackneyed and vulgar; so that by the one you are not delighted, the other you hate—;

[196] sit igitur, ut supra dixi, permixta et temperata numeris nec dissoluta nec tota numerosa, paeane maxime, quoniam optimus auctor ita censet, sed reliquis etiam numeris, quos ille praeterit, temperata.

[196] Let it, therefore, as I said above, be commingled and tempered with numbers, neither dissolved nor wholly metrical, especially with the paean, since the best author so judges, but tempered also with the other numbers, which he passes over.

LVIII. Quos autem numeros cum quibus tamquam purpuram misceri oporteat nunc dicendum est atque etiam quibus orationis generibus sint quique accommodatissimi. Iambus enim frequentissimus est in eis quae demisso atque humili sermone dicuntur;

58. But now it must be said which numbers ought to be mixed with which, as if with purple, and also to which genera of oration they belong and to which they are most accommodated. For the iamb is most frequent in those things which are spoken in a lowered and humble style of speech;

[197] paean autem in amplioribus, in utroque dactylus. Itaque in varia et perpetua oratione hi sunt inter se miscendi et temperandi. Sic minime animadvertetur delectationis aucupium et quadrandae orationis industria; quae latebit eo magis, si et verborum et sententiarum ponderibus utemur.

[197] but the paeon in the more ample passages, and in both, the dactyl. Therefore in a various and perpetual oration these are to be mixed and tempered among themselves. Thus the hunting for delectation and the industry of making the oration four-square will be least noticed; which will lie hidden all the more, if we also employ the weights of words and of sentences.

Nam qui audiunt haec duo animadvertunt et iucunda sibi censent, verba dico, et sententias, eaque dum animis attentis admirantes excipiunt, fugit eos et praetervolat numerus; qui tamen si abesset, illa ipsa delectarent minus.

For those who listen notice these two and judge them pleasant to themselves—I mean the words and the sentences—and while, with attentive minds, they receive them admiringly, the rhythm escapes them and flits past; which, however, if it were absent, those very things would delight less.

[198] Nec vero is cursus est numerorum—orationis dico, nam est longe aliter in versibus—, nihil ut fiat extra modum; nam id quidem esset poema; sed omnis nec claudicans nec quasi fluctuans sed aequabiliter constanterque ingrediens numerosa habetur oratio. Atque id in dicendo numerosum putatur, non quod totum constat e numeris, sed quod ad numeros proxime accedit; quo etiam difficilius est oratione uti quam versibus, quod in illis certa quaedam et definita lex est, quam sequi sit necesse; in dicendo autem nihil est propositum, nisi ut ne immoderata aut angusta aut dissoluta aut fluens sit oratio. Itaque non sunt in ea tamquam tibicini percussionum modi, sed universa comprehensio et species orationis clausa et terminata est, quod voluptate aurium iudicatur.

[198] Nor indeed is the course of numbers—of prose I mean, for it is far otherwise in verses—such that nothing should be done outside the measure; for that would indeed be a poem; but speech is held to be “numerous” when it proceeds evenly and steadfastly, neither limping nor, as it were, fluctuating. And that in speaking is thought rhythmical, not because it consists wholly of numbers, but because it comes closest to numbers; whence it is even more difficult to employ prose than verses, because in the latter there is a certain and defined law which must needs be followed; whereas in speaking nothing is prescribed, except that the speech be not immoderate or cramped or dissolute or flowing. Therefore there are not in it, as for a pipe-player, modes of beats, but the entire comprehension and aspect of the speech is closed and bounded, which is judged by the pleasure of the ears.

LIX.

59.

[199] Solet autem quaeri totone in ambitu verborum numeri tenendi sint an in primis partibus atque in extremis; plerique enim censent cadere tantum numerose oportere terminarique sententiam. Est autem, ut id maxime deceat? non ut solum; ponendus est enim ille ambitus, non abiciendus.

[199] But the question is wont to be asked whether the numbers ought to be maintained in the whole ambit of the words, or in the first parts and in the last; for most judge that it is enough that the clause fall with number and that the sentence be brought to an end. Is it, however, that this is what is most fitting? Not that this alone; for that ambit is to be set, not cast aside.

Qua re cum aures extremum semper exspectent in eoque acquiescant, id vacare numero non oportet, sed ad hunc exitum iam a principio ferri debet verborum illa comprehensio et tota a capite ita fluere, ut ad extremum veniens ipsa consistat.

Wherefore, since the ears always expect the end and there acquiesce, that should not be void of number, but toward this exit that gathering of words ought from the beginning to be carried, and the whole from the head to flow thus, so that, coming to the end, it itself comes to a stand.

[200] Id autem bona disciplina exercitatis, qui et multa scripserint et quaecumque etiam sine scripto dicent similia scriptorum effecerint, non erit difficillimum. Ante enim circumscribitur mente sententia confestimque verba concurrunt, quae mens eadem, qua nihil est celerius, statim dimittit, ut suo quodque loco respondeant; quorum discriptus ordo alias alia terminatione concluditur. Atque omnia illa et prima et media verba spectare debent ad ultimum.

[200] But this will not be very difficult for those exercised by good discipline, who both have written many things and have made whatever they even say without writing similar to written compositions. For first the thought is circumscribed in the mind, and forthwith the words converge, which the same mind, than which nothing is swifter, immediately dispatches, so that each may correspond to its own place; whose distributed order is concluded now with one, now with another termination. And all those words, both the first and the middle, ought to look toward the last.

[201] Interdum enim cursus est in oratione incitatior, interdum moderata ingressio, ut iam a principio videndum sit quem ad modum velis venire ad extremum. Nec in numeris magis quam in reliquis ornamentis orationis, eadem cum faciamus quae poetae, effugimus tamen in oratione poematis similitudinem. Est enim in utroque et materia et tractatio: materia in verbis, tractatio in conlocatione verborum.

[201] For sometimes the course in oration is more impetuous, sometimes a moderated ingress, so that already from the beginning it must be seen in what manner you wish to come to the end. And we escape in oration the likeness of a poem not in numbers any more than in the remaining ornaments of oration, although we do the same things as the poets. For in both there is both matter and tractation: the matter in the words, the tractation in the collocation of words.

LX. Ternae autem sunt utriusque partes: verborum translatum, novum, priscum .- nam de propriis nihil hoc loco dicimus—; conlocationis autem eae quas diximus, compositio, concinnitas, numerus.

60. But there are three parts of each: of words, the transferred, the new, the ancient .- for about the proper we say nothing in this place—; and of collocation those which we have mentioned, composition, concinnity, number.

[202] Sed in utroque frequentiores sunt et liberiores poetae; nam et transferunt verba cum crebrius tum etiam audacius et priscis libentius utuntur et liberius novis. Quod idem fit in numeris, in quibus quasi necessitati parere coguntur. Sed tamen haec nec nimis esse diversa eque nullo modo coniuncta intellegi licet.

[202] But in both the poets are more frequent and freer; for they both transfer words more frequently and also more boldly, and they use ancient ones more willingly and new ones more freely. The same thing happens in the numbers, in which they are, as it were, compelled to obey necessity. Yet, nevertheless, one is permitted to understand that these things are neither too different nor altogether unconnected.

Ita fit ut non item in oratione ut in versu numerus exstet idque quod numerosum in oratione dicitur non semper numero fiat, sed non numquam aut concinnitate aut constructione verborum.

Thus it comes about that number does not exist in oratory in the same way as in verse, and that what is called “numerous” in oratory is not always produced by number, but sometimes by concinnity or by the construction of words.

[203] Ita si numerus orationis quaeritur qui sit, omnis est, sed alius alio melior atque aptior; si locus, in omni parte verborum; si unde ortus sit, ex aurium voluptate; si componendorum ratio, dicetur alio loco, quia pertinet ad usum, quae pars quarta et extrema nobis in dividendo fuit; si ad quam rem adhibeatur, ad delectationem; si quando, semper; si quo loco, in tota continuatione verborum; si quae res efficiat voluptatem, eadem quae in versibus, quorum modum notat ars, sed aures ipsae tacito eum sensu sine arte definiunt.

[203] Thus, if the number (rhythm) of oration is asked what it is, it is of every sort, yet one is better and more apt than another; if its place, in every part of the words; if whence it has arisen, from the pleasure of the ears; if the method of composing, it will be said in another place, because it pertains to use, which was for us the fourth and last part in our division; if to what purpose it is applied, to delectation; if when, always; if in what place, in the whole continuation of the words; if what thing produces the pleasure, the same as in verses, whose measure art notes, but the ears themselves by a silent sense without art define it.

LXI.

61.

[204] Satis multa de natura; sequitur usus, de quo est accuratius disputandum. In quo quaesitum est in totone circuitu illo orationis, quem Graeci periodon, nos tum ambitum, tum circuitum, tum comprehensionem aut continuationem aut circumscriptionem dicimus, an in principiis solum an in extremis an in utraque parte numerus tenendus sit; deinde cum aliud videatur esse numerus aliud numerosum, quid intersit.

[204] Enough has been said about nature; next comes use, about which there must be a more exact discussion. In this, the question has been raised whether in that whole circuit of discourse, which the Greeks call a period, and we now call sometimes an ambit, sometimes a circuit, sometimes a comprehension or a continuation or a circumscription, the number (i.e., rhythm) is to be maintained, or only at the beginnings, or at the endings, or at both parts; then, since “number” seems to be one thing and “numerous” (i.e., rhythmical) another, what the difference is.

[205] Tum autem in omnibusne numeris aequaliter particulas deceat incidere an facere alias breviores alias longiores, idque quando aut cur; quibusque partibus, pluribusne an singulis, imparibus an aequalibus, et quando aut istis aut illis sit utendum; quaeque inter se aptissime conlocentur et quo modo, an omnino nulla sit in eo genere distinctio; quodque ad rem maxime pertinet, qua ratione numerosa fiat oratio.

[205] Then, moreover, whether in all numbers alike it is fitting to cut the small parts, or to make some shorter and others longer—and when and why; and with what parts, with several or with single ones, unequal or equal, and when either these or those should be employed; and which are most fittingly set together among themselves and in what way, or whether there is absolutely no distinction in that kind; and, which most pertains to the matter, by what method an oration becomes numerous (i.e., rhythmical).

[206] Explicandum etiam est unde orta sit forma verborum dicendumque quantos circuitus facere deceat deque eorum particulis et tamquam incisionibus disserendum est quaerendumque utrum una species et longitudo sit earum anne plures et, si plures, quo loco aut quando quoque genere uti oporteat. Postremo totius generis utilitas explicanda est, quae quidem patet latius; non ad unam enim rem aliquam, sed ad pluris accommodatur.

[206] It must also be explained whence the form of words has arisen, and it must be said how many circuits it is fitting to make; and about their particles and, as it were, their incisions one must discourse; and one must inquire whether there is one species and length of them or several, and, if several, in what place or when and with what kind it is proper to use each. Finally, the utility of the whole genus must be explained, which indeed lies open more broadly; for it is accommodated not to one particular thing, but to several.

[207] Ac licet non ad singula respondentem de universo genere sic dicere, ut etiam singulis satis responsum esse videatur. Remotis igitur reliquis generibus unum selegimus hoc, quod in causis foroque versatur, de quo diceremus. Ergo in aliis, id est in historia et in eo quod appellamus epideiktikon placet omnia dici Isocrateo Theopompeoque more illa circumscriptione ambituque, ut tamquam in orbe inclusa currat oratio, quoad insistat in singulis perfectis absolutisque sententiis.

[207] And although it is permitted to speak about the whole genus, not answering to each particular, yet in such a way that even the particulars seem to have been sufficiently answered. Therefore, the remaining kinds having been removed, we have selected one—this which is engaged in causes and the forum—about which we would speak. Accordingly, in the others, that is, in history and in what we call the epideictic, it is pleasing that all things be said in the Isocratean and Theopompean manner, with that circumscription and ambit, so that the oration runs as if enclosed in an orb, until it take its stand upon individual sentences, finished and complete.

[208] Itaque postea quam est nata haec vel circumscriptio vel comprehensio vel continuatio vel ambitus, si ita licet dicere, nemo, qui aliquo esset in numero, scripsit orationem generis eius quod esset ad delectationem comparatum remotumque a iudiciis forensique certamine, quin redigeret omnis fere in quadrum numerumque sententias. Nam cum is est auditor qui non vereatur ne compositae orationis insidiis sua fides attemptetur, gratiam quoque habet oratori voluptati aurium servienti.

[208] And so, after there was born this either circumscription or comprehension or continuation or ambit, if it is permitted so to speak, no one who was of any account wrote an oration of that genus which was arranged for delectation and removed from judgments and forensic contest, without reducing nearly all his sentences into a squared form and number. For when the auditor is one who does not fear lest his trust be assailed by the ambushes of a composed speech, he also shows favor to the orator who serves the pleasure of the ears.

LXII.

62.

[209] Genus autem hoc orationis neque totum adsumendum est ad causas forensis neque omnino repudiandum, si enim semper utare, cum satietatem adfert tum quale sit etiam ab imperitis agnoscitur; detrahit praeterea actionis dolorem, aufert humanum sensum auditoris, tollit funditus veritatem et fidem. Sed quoniam adhibenda non numquam est, primum videndum est quo loco, deinde quam diu retinenda sit, tum quot modis commutanda.

[209] But this genus of oration is neither to be wholly taken up for forensic causes nor altogether repudiated; for if you use it always, while it brings satiety, its very character is recognized even by the unskilled; moreover, it detracts from the poignancy of the pleading, removes the hearer’s human feeling, and uproots truth and credibility from the foundations. But since it must sometimes be employed, first one must see in what place, then how long it should be retained, then in how many ways it should be altered.

[210] Adhibenda est igitur numerosa oratio, si aut laudandum est aliquid ornatius, ut nos in accusationis secundo de Siciliae laude diximus, ut in senatu de consulatu meo, aut exponenda narratio, quae plus dignitatis desiderat quam doloris, ut in quarto accusationis de Hennensi Cerere, de Segestana Diana, de Syracusarum situ diximus. Saepe etiam in amplificanda re concessu omnium funditur numerose et volubiliter oratio. Id nos fortasse non perfecimus, conati quidem saepissime sumus; quod plurimis locis perorationes nostrae voluisse nos atque animo contendisse declarant.

[210] Therefore a rhythmical oration is to be employed, if either something is to be praised more ornately, as we in the second of the accusation spoke in praise of Sicily, as in the Senate about my consulship, or a narration is to be set forth which demands more dignity than sorrow, as in the fourth of the accusation we spoke about the Ceres of Henna, the Diana of Segesta, the site of Syracuse. Often too, in amplifying the matter, by the concession of all the oration is poured forth rhythmically and volubly. This perhaps we have not perfected, indeed we have attempted it very often; which our perorations in very many places declare, that we have wished it and have striven with spirit.

Id autem tum valet cum is qui audit ab oratore iam obsessus est ac tenetur. Non enim id agit ut insidietur et observet, sed iam favet processumque vult dicendique vim admirans non anquirit quid reprehendat.

That, however, is effective then, when the one who listens has already been besieged by the orator and is held fast. For he is not acting so as to lie in wait and observe, but already he favors and wants the progress, and, admiring the power of speaking, does not inquire what he may reprehend.

[211] Haec autem forma retinenda non diu est, nec dico in peroratione, quam ipsam includit, sed in orationis reliquis partibus. Nam cum sis eis locis usus quibus ostendi licere, transferenda tota dictio est ad illa quae nescio cur, cum Graeci kommata et kola nominent, nos non recte incisa et membra dicamus. Neque enim esse possunt rebus ignotis nota nomina, sed cum verba aut suavitatis aut inopiae causa transferre soleamus, in omnibus hoc fit artibus, ut, cum id appellandum sit quod propter rerum ignorationem ipsarum nullum habuerit ante nomen, necessitas cogat aut novum facere verbum aut a simili mutuari.

[211] But this form is not to be retained for long, nor do I mean in the peroration, which it itself includes, but in the remaining parts of the oration. For when you have used those places by which I showed it to be permitted, the whole diction must be transferred to those things which—I know not why, since the Greeks name them kommata and kola—we do not rightly call incisions and members. For there cannot be known names for unknown things; but since we are accustomed to transfer words either for the sake of suavity or of poverty, in all the arts this happens: that, when something must be named which, on account of ignorance of the things themselves, has previously had no name, necessity compels either to make a new word or to borrow from something similar.

LXIII.

63.

[212] Quo autem pacto deceat incise membratimve dici iam videbimus; nunc quot modis mutentur comprehensiones conclusionesque dicendum est. Fluit omnino numerus a primo tum incitatius brevitate pedum, tum proceritate tardius. Cursum contentiones magis requirunt, eitiones rerum tarditatem.

[212] But in what manner it is fitting that one speak incisely or by members we shall presently see; now it must be said in how many ways the comprehensions and the conclusions are altered. Rhythm altogether flows from the outset, now more swiftly through the brevity of the feet, now more slowly through lengthiness. Contentions require a swifter course; expositions of matters, slowness.

Insistit autem ambitus modis pluribus, e quibus unum est secuta Asia maxime, qui dichoreus vocatur, cum duo extremi chorei sunt, id est e singulis longis et brevibus. Explanandum est enim, quod ab aliis eidem pedes aliis vocabulis nominantur.

Moreover, the ambit rests upon several modes, one of which Asia has most especially followed, which is called the dichoreus, since the two extremes are chorei, that is, each composed of a single long and a short. For it must be explained that the same feet are named by different terms by different people.

[213] Dichoreus non est ille quidem sua sponte vitiosus in clausulis, sed in orationis numero nihil est tam vitiosum quam si semper est idem. Cadit autem per se ille ipse praeclare, quo etiam satietas formidanda est magis. Me stante C. Carbo C. F. tribunus plebis in contione dixit his verbis: O Marce Druse, patrem appello—haec quidem duo binis pedibus incisim; dein membratim: Tu dicere solebas sacram esse rem publicam;—haec item membra ternis;

[213] The dichoreus is indeed not by its own nature faulty in clausulae, but in the rhythm of speech nothing is so faulty as when it is always the same. That very cadence, moreover, falls of itself quite splendidly, and for that very reason satiety is the more to be feared. With me standing by, Gaius Carbo, son of Gaius, tribune of the plebs, in an assembly said in these words: 'O Marcus Drusus, I call upon your father'—these two, to be sure, incisively, with two feet apiece; then by members: 'You used to say that the commonwealth is sacred'—these likewise members with three apiece;

[214] post ambitus: "Quicumque eam violavissent, ab omnibus esse ei poenas persolutas"—dichoreus; nihil enim ad rem, extrema illa longa sit an brevis; deinde: Patris dictum sapiens temeritas fili comprobavit—hoc dichoreo tantus clamor contionis excitatus est, ut admirabile esset. Quaero nonne id numerus effecerit? Verborum ordinem immuta, fac sic: "Comprobavit fili temeritas, iam nihil erit, etsi temeritas ex tribus brevibus et longa est, quem Aristoteles ut optimum probat, a quo dissentio."

[214] after the ambitus: "Whoever had violated it, that penalties had been paid to it by all"—dichoreus; for it is nothing to the matter whether that last one is long or short; then: The father's wise dictum the son's temerity has corroborated—at this dichoreus so great a clamor of the assembly was aroused that it was wonderful. I ask whether the number did not bring that about? Change the order of the words, make it thus: "Has corroborated the son's temerity, now it will be nothing, even if temerity is from three short syllables and one long, which Aristotle approves as best, with whom I disagree."

[215] "At eadem verba, eadem sententia." Animo istuc satis est, auribus non satis. Sed id crebrius fieri non oportet; primum enim numerus agnoscitur, deinde satiat, postea cognita facilitate contemnitur.

[215] "But the same words, the same thought." For the mind that is enough, for the ears not enough. But this ought not to be done too frequently; for first the rhythm is recognized, then it satiates, afterward, once its facility is known, it is contemned.

LXIV. Sed sunt clausulae plures, quae numerose et iucunde cadant. Nam et creticus, qui est e longa et brevi et longa, et eius aequalis paean, qui spatio par est, syllaba longior, quam commodissime putatur in solutam orationem inligari, cum sit duplex.

64. But there are several clausulae which fall rhythmically and pleasantly. For both the cretic, which is of a long and a short and a long, and its equal, the paean, which is equal in measure, longer by a syllable, is thought most suitably to be inwoven into prose, since it is twofold.

Nam aut e longa est et tribus brevibus, qui numerus in primo viget, iacet in extremo, aut e totidem brevibus et longa, [in] quem optime cadere censent veteres; ego non plane reicio, sed alios antepono.

For either it is of a long and three shorts, which rhythm flourishes at the beginning, lies at the end; or of as many shorts and a long, onto which the ancients judge it best to fall; I do not wholly reject it, but I set others before it.

[216] Ne spondeus quidem funditus est repudiandus, etsi, quod est e longis duabus, hebetior videtur et tardior; habet tamen stabilem quendam et non expertem dignitatis gradum, in incisionibus vero multo magis et in membris; paucitatem enim pedum gravitate sua et tarditate compensat. Sed hos cum in clausulis pedes nomino, non loquor de uno pede extremo: adiungo, quod minimum sit, proximum superiorem, saepe etiam tertium.

[216] Not even the spondee is to be utterly rejected, although, as it is of two longs, it seems duller and slower; yet it has a certain stable gait and not devoid of dignity, and, to a much greater degree, in incisions and in members; for it compensates for the paucity of feet by its weight and slowness. But when I name feet in clausulae, I am not speaking of the single ultimate foot: I add, at the least, the one immediately above it, and often even the third.

[217] Ne iambus quidem, qui est e brevi et longa, aut par choreo qui habet tris brevis trochaeus, sed spatio par, non syllabis, aut etiam dactylus, qui est e longa et duabus brevibus, si est proximus a postremo, parum volubiliter pervenit ad extremum, si est extremus choreus aut spondeus; numquam enim interest uter sit eorum in pede extremo. Sed idem hi tres pedes male concludunt, si quis eorum in extremo locatus est, nisi cum pro cretico postremus est dactylus; nihil enim interest dactylus sit extremus an creticus, quia postrema syllaba brevis an longa sit ne in versu quidem refert.

[217] Not even the iambus, which is of a short and a long, nor the trochaeus—equal to the choreus in span (three breves), equal in duration, not in syllables—or even the dactylus, which is of a long and two shorts, if it is next-to-last, comes with sufficient rolling fluency to the close, when the last is a choreus or a spondeus; for it never matters which of those two is in the final foot. But these same three feet make a poor close if any one of them is placed at the end, unless, in place of a creticus, the last is a dactylus; for it makes no difference whether the last be a dactylus or a creticus, since it does not matter, not even in verse, whether the last syllable is short or long.

[218] Qua re etiam paeana qui dixit aptiorem, in quo esset longa postrema, vidit parum, quoniam nihil ad rem est, postrema quam longa sit. Iam paean, quod pluris habeat syllabas quam tris, numerus a quibusdam, non pes habetur. Est quidem, ut inter omnis constat antiquos, Aristotelem, Theophrastum, Theodectem, Ephorum, unus aptissimus orationi vel orienti vel mediae; putant illi etiam cadenti, quo loco mihi videtur aptior creticus.

[218] Wherefore the one who said the paean is more fitting when the last syllable is long saw too little, since it is nothing to the matter how long the last is. Moreover, the paean, because it has more syllables than three, is held by some as a numerus, not a foot. It is indeed, as it is agreed among all the ancients—Aristotle, Theophrastus, Theodectes, Ephorus—the one most apt for oration either rising or in the middle; they think it also for falling, in which place to me the cretic seems more apt.

Dochmius autem e quinque syllabis, brevi, duabus longis, brevi, longa, ut est hoc: amicos tenes, quovis loco aptus est, dum semel ponatur: iteratus aut continuatus numerum apertum et nimis insignem facit.

But the dochmius, from five syllables—short, two long, short, long—as in this: “amicos tenes,” is apt in any place, provided it be set down once; repeated or continued, it makes the rhythm open and too conspicuous.

LXV.

65.

[219] His igitur tot commutationibus tamque variis si utemur, nec deprehendetur manifesto quid a nobis de industria fiat et occurretur satietati. Et quia non numero solum numerosa oratio sed et compositione fit et genere, quod ante dictum est, concinnitatis—compositione potest intellegi, cum ita structa verba sunt, ut numerus non quaesitus sed ipse secutus esse videatur, ut apud Crassum: Nam ubi libido dominatur, innocentiae leve praesidium est; ordo enim verborum efficit numerum sine ulla aperta oratoris industria—; itaque si quae veteres illi, Herodotum dico et Thucydidem totamque eam aetatem, apte numeroseque dixerunt, ea non numero quaesito, sed verborum conlocatione ceciderunt.

[219] Therefore, if we use so many and so various commutations, it will not be manifestly detected what is being done by us by design, and satiety will be forestalled. And because a numerous oration is fashioned not by number alone but also by composition and by the genus, of concinnity, as was said before—by composition can be understood this: when the words are so structured that the number seems not to have been sought but to have followed of itself, as in Crassus: For where lust rules, there is a light safeguard for innocence; for the order of the words effects number without any open industry of the orator—; therefore, if those ancients— I mean Herodotus and Thucydides and that whole age— spoke aptly and numerously, these things fell out not by a sought-for number, but by the collocation of the words.

[220] Formae vero quaedam sunt orationis, in quibus ea concinnitas est ut sequatur numerus necessario. Nam cum aut par pari refertur aut contrarium contrario opponitur aut quae similiter cadunt verba verbis comparantur, quidquid ita concluditur, plerumque fit ut numerose cadat, quo de genere cum exemplis supra diximus; ut haec quoque copia facultatem adferat non semper eodem modo desinendi. Nec tamen haec ita sunt arta et astricta, ut ea, cum velimus, laxare nequeamus.

[220] But there are certain forms of oration, in which there is such concinnity that the rhythm follows of necessity. For when either like is repaid with like, or the contrary is set against the contrary, or words that fall in like fashion are compared with words, whatever is concluded in this way, for the most part it comes about that it falls rhythmically—of which kind we have spoken above with examples—so that this abundance also may bring the faculty of not always ending in the same manner. Nor, however, are these things so tight and constrained that we cannot, when we wish, loosen them.

Multum interest utrum numerosa sit, id est similis numerorum, an plane e numeris constet oratio; alterum si fit, intolerabile vitium est, alterum nisi fit, dissipata et inculta et fluens est oratio.

There is much difference whether the oration be numerose—that is, like to numbers—or plainly consist of numbers; if the latter comes to pass, it is an intolerable fault; if the former does not, the oration is dissipated and uncultivated and flowing.

LXVI.

66.

[221] Sed quoniam non modo non frequenter verum etiam raro in veris causis aut forensibus circumscripte numeroseque dicendum est, sequi videtur, ut videamus quae sint illa quae supra dixi incisa, quae membra. Haec enim in veris causis maximam partem orationis obtinent. Constat enim ille ambitus et plena comprehensio e quattuor fere partibus, quae membra dicimus, ut et auris impleat et neque brevior sit quam satis sit neque longior.

[221] But since not only not frequently, but even rarely, in true causes or forensic ones must one speak in a circumscribed and numerose manner, it seems to follow that we should see what those are which I said above are “incisions” (incisa), and what “members” (membra) are. For these in true causes occupy the greatest part of the speech. For that compass and full period consists of about four parts, which we call members, so that it both fills the ear and is neither shorter than is sufficient nor longer.

Quamquam utrumque non numquam vel potius saepe accidit, ut aut citius insistendum sit aut longius procedendum, ne brevitas defrudasse auris videatur neve longitudo obtudisse. Sed habeo mediocritatis rationem; nec enim loquor de versu et est liberior aliquanto oratio.

Although both occur not infrequently, or rather often: that either one must halt sooner or proceed farther, lest brevity seem to have defrauded the ears and length to have blunted them. But I have a rule of moderation; for I am not speaking about verse, and oration is somewhat freer.

[222] [E quattuor igitur quasi hexametrorum instar versuum quod sit constat fere plena comprehensio.] His igitur singulis versibus quasi nodi apparent continuationis, quos in ambitu coniungimus. Sin membratim volumus dicere, insistimus atque, cum opus est, ab isto cursu invidioso facile nos et saepe diiungimus. Sed nihil tam debet esse numerosum quam hoc, quod minime apparet et valet plurimum.

[222] [Therefore a full comprehension (period) consists for the most part of four, as it were, verses in the likeness of hexameters.] In each of these single verses, then, there appear, as it were, knots of continuation, which we join together in the period. But if we wish to speak by members, we come to a halt and, when there is need, we easily and often disjoin ourselves from that invidious course. But nothing ought to be so rhythmical as this, which appears the least and yet has the greatest force.

Ex hoc genere illud est Crassi: "Missos faciant patronos; ipsi prodeant";—nisi intervallo dixisset "ipsi prodeant", sensisset profecto se fudisse senarium; omnino melius caderet prodeant ipsi; sed de genere nunc disputo;

Of this kind is that of Crassus: "Let them dismiss the patrons; let them themselves come forward";—unless he had said "let them themselves come forward" with an interval, he would surely have sensed that he had produced a senarius; altogether it would fall better as "let them come forward themselves"; but I am now disputing about the genus;

[223]—"cur clandestinis consiliis nos oppugnant? Cur de perfugis nostris copias comparant contra nos?" Prima sunt illa duo, quae kommata Graeci vocant, nos incisa dicimus; deinde tertium kolon illi, nos membrum; sequitur non longa—ex duobus enim versibus, id est membris, perfecta comprehensio est et in spondeos cadit; et Crassus quidem sic plerumque dicebat, idque ipse genus dicendi maxime probo.

[223]—"why do they assail us with clandestine counsels? Why do they assemble forces from our defectors against us?" Those first two are what the Greeks call kommata, we call incisa; then the third is a kolon for them, a membrum for us; there follows no long one—for from two verses, that is, membra, there is a complete comprehension, and it falls into spondees; and Crassus indeed for the most part spoke thus, and this kind of speaking I myself most approve.

LXVII. Sed quae incisim aut membratim efferuntur, ea vel aptissime cadere debent, ut est apud me: "Domus tibi deerat? At habebas.

67. But the things which are uttered in incisions or by members ought to fall most aptly, as there is with me: "Was a house lacking to you? Yet you had one."

Pecunia superabat? At egebas"; haec incise dicta sunt quattuor;

Did money abound? Yet you were in need"; these were said incise, four;

[224] at membratim quae sequuntur duo: "Incurristi amens in columnas, in alienos insanus insanisti". Deinde omnia tamquam crepidine quadam comprehensione longiore sustinentur: "Depressam, caecam, iacentem domum pluris quam te et quam fortunas tuas aestimasti". Dichoreo finitur. At spondeis proximum illud. Nam in his, quibus ut pugiunculis uti oportet, brevitas faciet ipsa liberiores pedes; saepe enim singulis utendum est, plerumque binis, et utrisque addi pedis potest, non fere ternis amplius.

[224] but piecemeal are the two that follow: "In madness you ran into the columns, crazed you raved against others." Then all is supported, as if by a kind of sandal-sole, by a somewhat longer comprehensio: "A house sunken, blind, prostrate you valued more highly than yourself and than your fortunes." It ends with a dichoreus. But that next one is closest to spondees. For in these, in which one ought to use, as it were, little daggers, brevity itself will make the feet freer; for one must often use single ones, more often pairs, and to both a foot can be added—generally not more than three.

[225] Incisim autem et membratim tractata oratio in veris causis plurimum valet, maximeque eis locis, cum aut arguas aut refellas, ut nos in Corneliana secunda: "O callidos homines, o rem excogitatam, o ingenia metuenda!" Membratim adhuc; deinde caesim: Diximus, rursus membratim: "Testis dare volumus". Extrema sequitur comprehensio, sed ex duobus membris, qua non potest esse brevior: "Quem, quaeso, nostrum fefellit ita vos esse facturos?"

[225] Moreover, a speech handled incisively and by members is of the greatest avail in real cases, and especially in those places when you either accuse or refute, as we did in the Second Cornelian: "O clever men, O contrived device, O talents to be feared!" Still by members; then with a cut: "We have spoken," again by members: "We wish to produce witnesses." A final comprehension follows, but from two members, than which it cannot be shorter: "Whom, I pray, of us did it deceive that you would be going to do thus?"

[226] Nec ullum genus est dicendi aut melius aut fortius quam binis aut ternis ferire verbis, non numquam singulis, paulo alias pluribus, inter quae variis clausulis interponit se raro numerosa comprehensio; quam perverse fugiens Hegesias, dum ille quoque imitari Lysiam vult alterum paene Demosthenem, saltat incidens particulas. Et is quidem non minus sententiis peccat quam verbis, ut non quaerat quem appellet ineptum qui illum cognoverit. Sed ego illa Crassi et nostra posui, ut qui vellet auribus ipsis quid numerosum etiam in minimis particulis orationis esset iudicaret.

[226] Nor is there any kind of speaking either better or stronger than to strike with words by twos or by threes, sometimes with singles, at other times with a few more, among which a rhythmical comprehension rarely inserts itself with various clausulae; which Hegesias perversely shuns, while he too wishes to imitate Lysias, almost a second Demosthenes—he dances, chopping into little particles. And he indeed sins no less in thoughts than in words, so that whoever has come to know him does not need to seek whom to call inept. But I set down those examples of Crassus and of myself, so that whoever wished might judge by the ears themselves what is numerose even in the smallest particles of oration.

Et quoniam plura de numerosa oratione diximus quam quisquam ante nos, nunc de eius generis utilitate dicemus.

And since we have said more about rhythmical oration than anyone before us, we shall now speak about the utility of that kind.

LXVIII.

68.

[227] Nihil enim est aliud, Brute, quod quidem tu minime omnium ignoras, pulchre et oratorie dicere nisi optimis sententiis verbisque lectissimis dicere. Et nec sententia ulla est quae fructum oratori ferat, nisi apte eita atque absolute, nec verborum lumen apparet nisi diligenter conlocatorum, et horum utrumque numerus inlustrat; numerus autem—saepe enim hoc testandum est—non modo non poetice vinctus verum etiam fugiens illum eique omnium dissimillimus; non quin idem sint numeri non modo oratorum et poetarum verum omnino loquentium, denique etiam sonantium omnium quae metiri auribus possumus, sed ordo pedum facit, ut id quod pronuntiatur aut orationis aut poematis simile videatur.

[227] For there is nothing else, Brutus—you least of all are unaware of this—to speak beautifully and oratorically than to speak with the best thoughts and the most carefully chosen words. And there is no thought that brings fruit to the orator unless it is aptly expressed and complete; nor does the light of words appear unless they are diligently set in place; and rhythm illuminates both of these. And rhythm—this must often be attested—is not only not bound poetically, but even shuns that and is of all things most dissimilar to it; not that the rhythms are other than the same for orators and poets, indeed for all who speak, and, finally, even for all sounding things which we can measure with our ears; but the order of feet makes what is delivered seem like either oration or poem.

[228] Hanc igitur, sive compositionem sive perfectionem sive numerum vocari placet, [et] adhibere necesse est, si ornate velis dicere, non solum, quod ait Aristoteles et Theophrastus, ne infinite feratur ut flumen oratio, quae non aut spiritu pronuntiantis aut interductu librari, sed numero coacta debet insistere, verum etiam quod multo maiorem habent apta vim quam soluta. Vt enim athletas nec multo secus gladiatores videmus nihil nec vitando facere caute nec petendo vehementer, in quo non motus hic habeat palaestram quandam, ut quicquid in his rebus fiat utiliter ad pugnam idem ad aspectum etiam sit venustum, sic orator nec plagam gravem facit, nisi petitio fuit apta, nec satis tecte declinat impetum, nisi etiam in cedendo quid deceat intellegit.

[228] This, therefore—whether it please you to call it composition or perfection or number—[and] it is necessary to employ, if you wish to speak ornately, not only, as Aristotle and Theophrastus say, lest the oration be borne on infinitely like a river (which ought to come to a halt, not by the breath of the pronouncer nor by the scribe’s pause, but, constrained by number, ought to stand fast), but also because things fitted have much greater force than things loosened. For just as we see athletes, and not much otherwise gladiators, do nothing either cautiously in avoiding or vehemently in attacking in which this movement does not have a kind of palestra-training, so that whatever in these matters is done usefully for the fight is at the same time also graceful to the sight, so the orator neither deals a weighty stroke unless the onset was apt, nor does he parry an assault with sufficient cover unless he also understands, in yielding, what is becoming.

[229] Itaque qualis eorum motus quos apalaistrous Graeci vocant, talis horum mihi videtur oratio qui non claudunt numeris sententias, tantumque abest ut quod ei qui hoc aut magistrorum inopia aut ingeni tarditate aut laboris fuga non sunt adsecuti solent dicere—enervetur oratio compositione verborum, ut aliter in ea nec impetus ullus nec vis esse possit.

[229] Therefore, such as is the movement of those whom the Greeks call apalaistrous, such does the speech of those seem to me who do not close their sentences with numbers; and it is so far from being the case—what those who have not attained this, either from poverty of teachers or from slowness of natural talent or from a flight from toil, are wont to say—that oration is enervated by the composition of words, that otherwise there can be in it neither any impetus nor any force.

LXIX. Sed magnam exercitationem res flagitat, ne quid eorum qui genus hoc secuti non tenuerunt simile faciamus, ne aut verba traiciamus aperte, quo melius aut cadat aut volvatur oratio;

69. But the matter demands great exercise, lest we do anything similar to the things of those who have pursued this kind but have not kept to it, lest we openly transpose words, so that the oration may either fall or roll the better;

[230] quod se L. Caelius Antipater in prooemio belli Punici nisi necessario facturum negat. O virum simplicem qui nos nihil celet, sapientem qui serviendum necessitati putet! Sed hic omnino rudis; nobis autem in scribendo atque in dicendo necessitatis excusatio non probatur; nihil est enim necesse et, si quid esset, id necesse tamen non erat confiteri.

[230] which L. Caelius Antipater, in the proem of the Punic War, says he will not do unless of necessity. O simple man who hides nothing from us, wise man who thinks that necessity must be served! But this one is altogether unpolished; for our part, in writing and in speaking, the excuse of necessity is not approved; for nothing is necessary, and if anything were, yet it was not necessary to confess it.

Et hic quidem, qui hanc a Laelio, ad quem scripsit, cui se purgat, veniam petit, et utitur ea traiectione verborum et nihilo tamen aptius explet concluditque sententias. Apud alios autem et Asiaticos maxime numero servientes inculcata reperias inania quaedam verba quasi complementa numerorum. Sunt etiam qui illo vitio, quod ab Hegesia maxime fluxit, infringendis concidendisque numeris in quoddam genus abiectum incidant versiculorum simillimum.

And this man indeed, who seeks this indulgence from Laelius—to whom he wrote, before whom he makes his purgation—uses that transposition of words, and yet he makes his sentences not a whit more apt in filling out and in concluding. Among others, and especially the Asiatics, who serve the number (rhythm), you may find certain empty words, hammered in as if complements of the numbers. There are even those who, by that vice which flowed most of all from Hegesias, by breaking and cutting to pieces the numbers, fall into a certain abject kind very similar to versicles.

[231] Tertium est, in quo fuerunt fratres illi Asiaticorum rhetorum principes Hierocles et Menecles minime mea sententia contemnendi. Etsi enim a forma veritatis et ab Atticorum regula absunt, tamen hoc vitium compensant vel facultate vel copia. Sed apud eos varietas non erat, quod omnia fere concludebantur uno modo.

[231] The third is that in which were those brothers, leaders of the Asiatic rhetors, Hierocles and Menecles, by no means, in my judgment, to be contemned. For although they are far from the form of truth and from the rule of the Attics, nevertheless they compensate this fault either by faculty or by copia. But with them there was no variety, because almost everything was concluded in one way.

Quae vitia qui fugerit, ut neque verbum ita traiciat ut id de industria factum intellegatur, neque inferciens verba quasi rimas expleat, nec minutos numeros sequens concidat delumbetque sententias, nec sine ulla commutatione in eodem semper versetur genere numerorum, is omnia fere vitia vitaverit. Nam de laudibus multa diximus, quibus sunt illa perspicue vitia contraria.

Whoever shall have fled these vices, so that he neither transposes a word in such a way that it is understood to have been done with deliberate design, nor, by inserting words, as if to fill up cracks, nor, following minute “numbers” (rhythms), cuts down and makes the sentences limp, nor, without any commutation, is always engaged in the same kind of numbers (rhythms), will have avoided almost all vices. For about praises we have said many things, to which those vices are plainly contrary.

LXX.

70.

[232] Quantum autem sit apte dicere, experiri licet, si aut compositi oratoris bene structam conlocationem dissolvas permutatione verborum;—corrumpatur enim tota res, ut [et] haec nostra in Corneliana et deinceps omnia: "Neque me divitiae movent, quibus omnis Africanos et Laelios multi venalicii mercatoresque superarunt": immuta paululum, ut sit multi superarunt mercatores venaliciique, perierit tota res; et quae sequuntur: "Neque vestis aut caelatum aurum et argentum, quo nostros veteres Marcellos Maximosque multi eunuchi e Syria Aegyptoque vicerunt"; verba permuta sic, ut sit "vicerunt eunuchi e Syria Aegyptoque": adde tertium: "Neque vero ornamenta ista villarum, quibus L. Paullum et L. Mummium, qui rebus his urbem Italiamque omnem referserunt, ab aliquo video perfacile Deliaco aut Syro potuisse superari"; fac ita: "potuisse superari ab aliquo Syro aut Deliaco";

[232] How important it is to speak aptly can be tested, if you dissolve the well-structured arrangement of a well-composed orator by a transposition of words;—for the whole thing is spoiled, as [and] this passage of ours in the Cornelian and thereafter all the rest: "Nor do riches move me, by which many slave-dealers and merchants have surpassed all the Africanos and Laelios": alter it a little, so that it is "many have surpassed merchants and slave-dealers," and the whole thing has perished; and the following: "Nor clothing or chased gold and silver, by which many eunuchs from Syria and Egypt have outdone our ancient Marcellos and Maximos"; change the words thus, so that it is "have outdone eunuchs from Syria and Egypt": add a third: "Nor indeed those ornaments of country-houses, by which I see that L. Paulus and L. Mummius, who with these things replenished the city and all Italy, could very easily have been surpassed by some Delian or Syrian"; make it thus: "could have been surpassed by some Syrian or Delian";

[233] videsne, ut ordine verborum paululum commutato, isdem tamen verbis stante sententia, ad nihilum omnia recidant, cum sint ex aptis dissoluta? Aut si alicuius inconditi arripias dissipatam aliquam sententiam eamque ordine verborum paululum commutato in quadrum redigas, efficiatur aptum illud, quod fuerit antea diffluens ac solutum. Age sume de Gracchi apud censores illud: "Abesse non potest quin eiusdem hominis sit probos improbare qui improbos probet"; quanto aptius, si ita dixisset: "Quin eiusdem hominis sit qui improbos probet probos improbare!"

[233] Do you see how, with the order of the words a little altered, the same words remaining and the sense standing, everything falls to nothing, when they have been dissolved out of apt arrangements? Or if you seize some dispersed sentence of some incondite writer and, with the order of the words slightly changed, bring it into square, that aptness is effected which before was diffuse and loose. Come, take that saying of Gracchus before the censors: "It cannot but be that it belongs to the same man—who approves the wicked—to disapprove the good"; how much more apt, if he had said it thus: "That it belongs to the same man who approves the wicked to disapprove the good!"

[234] Hoc modo dicere nemo umquam noluit nemoque potuit quin dixerit; qui autem aliter dixerunt, hoc adsequi non potuerunt. Ita facti sunt repente Attici; quasi vero Trallianus fuerit Demosthenes! Cuius non tam vibrarent fulmina illa, nisi numeris contorta ferrentur.

[234] To speak in this manner no one ever was unwilling, and no one could but speak; but those who spoke otherwise could not attain this. Thus they suddenly became Attic; as though in truth Demosthenes had been a Trallian! Whose thunderbolts would not so quiver, unless they were borne, twisted by rhythmic measures.

LXXI. Sed si quem magis delectant soluta, sequatur ea sane, modo sic ut, si quis Phidiae clipeum dissolverit, conlocationis universam speciem sustulerit, non singulorum operum venustatem; ut in Thucydide orbem modo orationis desidero, ornamenta comparent.

71. But if anyone is more delighted by the loose (unbound) style, let him by all means follow it, only thus: if someone should dissolve Phidias’s shield, he will have removed the entire aspect of the collocation, not the grace of the individual works; just so, in Thucydides I only miss the rounded period of the oration—the ornaments are comparable.

[235] Isti autem cum dissolvunt orationem, in qua nec res nec verbum ullum est nisi abiectum, non clipeum, sed, ut in proverbio est—etsi humilius dictum est [tamen simile est]—, scopas (ut ita dicam) mihi videntur dissolvere. Atque ut plane genus hoc, quod ego laudo, contempsisse videantur, aut scribant aliquid vel Isocrateo more vel quo Aeschines aut Demosthenes utitur, tum illos existimabo non desperatione reformidavisse genus hoc, sed iudicio refugisse; aut reperiam ipse eadem condicione qui uti velit, ut aut dicat aut scribat utra voles lingua eo genere quo illi volunt; facilius est enim apta dissolvere quam dissipata conectere.

[235] Those men, however, when they loosen a speech in which there is neither subject-matter nor any word except what is abject, are not unfastening a shield, but—as in the proverb, although the expression is humbler [yet it is similar]—they seem to me to be unbinding a broom, so to speak. And so that they may plainly seem to have contemned this kind which I praise, let them either write something in the Isocratean manner or in that which Aeschines or Demosthenes employs; then I shall judge that they have not shrunk from this style out of desperation, but have fled it by judgment; or else I myself will find, on the same condition, someone who is willing to use it, so that he may either speak or write, in whichever tongue you please, in the kind which they desire; for it is easier to dissolve things fitted together than to connect things dissipated.

[236] Res se autem sic habet, ut brevissime dicam quod sentio: composite et apte sine sententiis dicere insania est, sententiose autem sine verborum et ordine et modo infantia, sed eius modi tamen infantia, ut ea qui utantur non stulti homines haberi possint, etiam plerumque prudentes; quo qui est contentus utatur. Eloquens vero, qui non approbationes solum sed admirationes, clamores, plausus, si liceat, movere debet, omnibus oportet ita rebus excellat, ut ei turpe sit quicquam aut exspectari aut audiri libentius.

[236] The matter stands thus, to say most briefly what I think: to speak in a composed and apt manner without thoughts is insanity, but to speak sententiously without words and order and measure is infancy—yet an infancy of such a sort that those who use it can be held not foolish men, nay, for the most part prudent; let him who is content with that use it. The truly eloquent man, however, who ought to move not approvals only but admirations, clamors, applause—if it be permitted—must so excel in all things that it is a disgrace for him if anything is either looked for or listened to more gladly.

[237] Habes meum de oratore, Brute, iudicium; quod aut sequere, si probaveris, aut tuo stabis, si aliud quoddam est tuum. In quo neque pugnabo tecum neque hoc meum, de quo tanto opere hoc libro adseveravi, umquam adfirmabo esse verius quam tuum. Potest enim non solum aliud mihi ac tibi, sed mihimet ipsi aliud alias videri.

[237] You have my judgment about the orator, Brutus; which either follow, if you approve, or you will stand by your own, if yours is some other. In this matter I will neither fight with you, nor will I ever affirm that this view of mine, about which I have so greatly averred in this book, is truer than yours. For it is possible that not only one thing seem to me and another to you, but that even to myself at different times something else seem.

Nec in hac is modo re quae ad vulgi adsensum spectet et ad aurium voluptatem, quae duo sunt ad iudicandum levissima, sed ne in maximis quidem rebus quicquam adhuc inveni firmius, quod tenerem aut quo iudicium meum derigerem, quam id quodcumque mihi quam simillimum veri videretur, cum ipsum illud verum tamen in occulto lateret.

Nor in this matter only, which looks to the assent of the crowd and to the pleasure of the ears—two things most light for judging—but not even in the greatest matters have I thus far found anything more firm, which I might hold or by which I might direct my judgment, than whatever should seem to me as like as possible to the true, since that very truth itself, however, lies hidden in concealment.

[238] Tu autem velim, si tibi ea quae disputata sunt minus probabuntur, ut aut maius opus institutum putes quam effici potuerit, aut, dum tibi roganti voluerim obsequi, verecundia negandi scribendi me impudentiam suscepisse.

[238] But I would wish that, if the things that have been disputed prove less acceptable to you, you either think that a greater work was instituted than could have been effected, or that, while I wished to comply with you as you were asking, from the modesty of refusing I took upon myself the impudence of writing.