Caesar: COMMENTARIORUM LIBRI III DE BELLO CIVILI

[1] Dictatore habente comitia Caesare consules creantur Iulius Caesar et P. Servilius: is enim erat annus, quo per leges ei consulem fieri liceret. His rebus confectis, cum fides tota Italia esset angustior neque creditae pecuniae solverentur, constituit, ut arbitri darentur; per eos fierent aestimationes possessionum et rerum, quanti quaeque earum ante bellum fuisset, atque eae creditoribus traderentur. Hoc et ad timorem novarum tabularum tollendum minuendumve, qui fere bella et civiles dissensiones sequi consuevit, et ad debitorum tuendam existimationem esse aptissimum existimavit.

[1] With Caesar, as dictator, holding the comitia, Julius Caesar and P. Servilius are created consuls; for that was the year in which by the laws it was permitted for him to be made consul. These things completed, since credit throughout all Italy was tighter and loaned monies were not being paid, he decreed that arbiters be appointed; through them valuations of possessions and goods should be made—how much each of them had been worth before the war—and that these be handed over to the creditors. He judged this to be most apt both for removing or diminishing the fear of new tablets (debt cancellation), which commonly is wont to follow wars and civil dissensions, and for protecting the reputation of debtors.

Itemque praetoribus tribunisque plebis rogationes ad populum ferentibus nonnullos ambitus Pompeia lege damnatos illis temporibus, quibus in urbe praesidia legionum Pompeius habuerat, quae iudicia aliis audientibus iudicibus, aliis sententiam ferentibus singulis diebus erant perfecta, in integrum restituit, qui se illi initio civilis belli obtulerant, si sua opera in bello uti vellet, proinde aestimans, ac si usus esset, quoniam sui fecissent potestatem. Statuerat enim prius hos iudicio populi debere restitui, quam suo beneficio videri receptos, ne aut ingratus in referenda gratia aut arrogans in praeripiendo populi beneficio videretur.

Likewise, to praetors and tribunes of the plebs bringing rogations to the people, he restored in integrum certain men convicted of ambitus by the Pompeian law in those times in which Pompeius had held garrisons of legions in the city—trials which had been completed, with some judges hearing and others delivering sentence, on single days—those who had offered themselves to him at the beginning of the civil war, if he should wish to use their services in the war, reckoning it just as if he had used them, since they had put themselves at his disposal. For he had determined that these ought first to be restored by the iudicium of the people, rather than to seem received by his own beneficium, lest he appear either ungrateful in returning gratitude or arrogant in preempting the people’s beneficium.

[2] His rebus et feriis Latinis comitiisque omnibus perficiendis XI dies tribuit dictaturaque se abdicat et ab urbe proficiscitur Brundisiumque pervenit. Eo legiones XII, equitatum omnem venire iusserat. Sed tantum navium repperit, ut anguste XV milia legionariorum militum, DC equites transportari possent.

[2] For these matters and for completing the Latin feriae and all the comitia he allotted 11 days, and he abdicates the dictatorship and sets out from the city and arrives at Brundisium. Thither he had ordered 12 legions and all the cavalry to come. But he found so few ships that only, and in cramped fashion, 15 thousand legionary soldiers and 600 horsemen could be transported.

Hoc unum Caesari ad celeritatem conficiendi belli defuit. Atque hae ipsae copiae hoc infrequentiores imponuntur, quod multi Gallicis tot bellis defecerant, longumque iter ex Hispania magnum numerum deminuerat, et gravis autumnus in Apulia circumque Brundisium ex saluberrimis Galliae et Hispaniae regionibus omnem exercitum valetudine temptaverat.

This one thing alone was lacking to Caesar for the celerity of completing the war. And these very forces are on this account embarked fewer in number, because many had fallen away in so many Gallic wars, and the long march from Spain had diminished a great number, and a severe autumn in Apulia and around Brundisium, coming from the most healthful regions of Gaul and Spain, had tried the whole army with ill-health.

[3] Pompeius annuum spatium ad comparandas copias nactus, quod vacuum a bello atque ab hoste otiosum fuerat, magnam ex Asia Cycladibusque insulis, Corcyra, Athenis, Ponto, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenice, Aegypto classem coegerat, magnam omnibus locis aedificandam curaverat; magnam imperatam Asiae, Syriae regibusque omnibus et dynastis et tetrarchis et liberis Achaiae populis pecuniam exegerat, magnam societates Carum provinciarum, quas ipse obtinebat, sibi numerare coegerat.

[3] Pompey, having obtained an annual period for preparing forces, which had been empty of war and at leisure from an enemy, had assembled a great fleet from Asia and the Cyclades islands, Corcyra, Athens, the Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, Egypt, had taken care that a great one be built in all places; he had exacted a great sum of money, imposed upon Asia, Syria, and upon all the kings and dynasts and tetrarchs and the free peoples of Achaia, had compelled the companies of those provinces, which he himself was holding, to pay a great amount to himself.

[4] Legiones effecerat civium Romanorum VIIII: V ex Italia, quas traduxerat; unam ex Cilicia veteranam, quam factam ex duabus gemellam appellabat; unam ex Creta et Macedonia ex veteranis militibus, qui dimissi a superioribus imperatoribus in his provinciis consederant; duas ex Asia, quas Lentulus consul conscribendas curaverat. Praeterea magnum numerum ex Thessalia, Boeotia, Achaia Epiroque supplementi nomine in legiones distribuerat: his Antonianos milites admiscuerat. Praeter has exspectabat cum Scipione ex Syria legiones II. Sagittarios Creta, Lacedaemone, ex Ponto atque Syria reliquisque civitatibus III milia numero habebat, funditorum cohortes sescenarias II, equitum VII milia.

[4] He had formed nine legions of Roman citizens: five from Italy, which he had brought across; one veteran from Cilicia, which, having been made from two, he called twin; one from Crete and Macedonia from veteran soldiers who, discharged by prior commanders, had settled in these provinces; two from Asia, which Lentulus, the consul, had taken care to enroll. Besides, a great number from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaea, and Epirus, under the name of reinforcement, he had distributed among the legions: to these he had admixed Antony’s soldiers. Apart from these he was awaiting with Scipio from Syria two legions. He had three thousand archers from Crete, Lacedaemon, from Pontus and Syria and the remaining cities, two six-hundred-strong cohorts of slingers, seven thousand cavalry.

Ex quibus DC Gallos Deiotarus adduxerat, D Ariobarzanes ex Cappadocia; ad eundem numerum Cotys ex Thracia dederat et Sadalam filium miserat; ex Macedonia CC erant, quibus Rhascypolis praeerat, excellenti virtute; D ex Gabinianis Alexandria, Gallos Germanosque, quos ibi A. Gabinius praesidii causa apud regem Ptolomaeum reliquerat, Pompeius filius eum classe adduxerat; DCCC ex servis suis pastorumque suorum numero coegerat; CCC Tarcondarius Castor et Domnilaus ex Gallograecia dederant (horum alter una venerat, alter filium miserat); CC ex Syria a Commageno Antiocho, cui magna Pompeius praemia tribuit, missi erant, in his plerique hippotoxotae. Huc Dardanos, Bessos partim mercenarios, partim imperio aut gratia comparatos, item Macedones, Thessalos ac reliquarum gentium et civitatum adiecerat atque eum, quem supra demonstravimus, numerum expleverat.

Of these, 600 Gauls Deiotarus had brought in, 500 Ariobarzanes from Cappadocia; to the same number Cotys from Thrace had given and had sent his son Sadalas; from Macedonia there were 200, over whom Rhascypolis, of outstanding valor, was in command; 500 from the Gabinian troops at Alexandria—Gauls and Germans, whom Aulus Gabinius had left there for the sake of a garrison with King Ptolemy—Pompey the son had brought by fleet; 800 from his own slaves and his shepherds he had gathered by number; 300 Tarcondarius Castor and Domnilaus had supplied from Gallo-Graecia (of these the one had come in person, the other had sent his son); 200 from Syria had been sent by the Commagenean Antiochus, to whom Pompey granted great rewards, among whom a good many were hippotoxotae (horse-archers). To these he had added Dardanians and Bessi, partly mercenaries, partly procured by command or favor, likewise Macedonians, Thessalians, and men of the remaining nations and cities, and he had filled up the number which we showed above.

[5] Frumenti vim maximam ex Thessalia, Asia, Aegypto, Creta, Cyrenis reliquisque regionibus comparaverat. Hiemare Dyrrachii, Apolloniae omnibusque oppidis maritimis constituerat, ut mare transire Caesarem prohiberet, eiusque rei causa omni ora maritima classem disposuerat. Praeerat Aegyptiis navibus Pompeius filius, Asiaticis D. Laelius et C. Triarius, Syriacis C. Cassius, Rhodiis C. Marcellus cum C. Coponio, Liburnicae atque Achaicae classi Scribonius Libo et M. Octavius.

[5] He had procured a very great quantity of grain from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and the remaining regions. He had determined to winter at Dyrrachium, at Apollonia, and in all the maritime towns, so as to prevent Caesar from crossing the sea, and for this purpose he had disposed a fleet along the whole seacoast. Pompey’s son was in command of the Egyptian ships; of the Asiatic, D. Laelius and C. Triarius; of the Syrian, C. Cassius; of the Rhodian, C. Marcellus with C. Coponius; of the Liburnian and Achaean fleet, Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius.

Toti tamen officio maritimo M. Bibulus praepositus cuncta administrabat; ad hunc summa imperii respiciebat.

Nevertheless, M. Bibulus, set over the entire maritime service, administered all things; to him the supreme command looked.

[6] Caesar, ut Brundisium venit, contionatus apud milites, quoniam prope ad finem laborum ac periculorum esset perventum, aequo animo mancipia atque impedimenta in Italia relinquerent, ipsi expediti naves conscenderent, quo maior numerus militum posset imponi, omniaque ex victoria et ex sua liberalitate sperarent, conclamantibus omnibus, imperaret, quod vellet, quodcumque imperavisset, se aequo animo esse facturos, II. Non. Ian. naves solvit.

[6] Caesar, when he came to Brundisium, having addressed the soldiers, since the end of labors and dangers was almost reached, [said that] they should with equanimity leave the slaves and the baggage in Italy, and that they themselves, unencumbered, should board the ships, in order that a greater number of soldiers could be put aboard, and that they should hope for everything from victory and from his liberality; with all shouting together that he should command what he wished—whatever he commanded, they would do with equanimity—on the 2nd day before the Nones of January he set sail.

Impositae, ut supra demonstratum est, legiones VII. Postridie terram attigit. Inter Cerauniorum saxa et alia loca periculosa quietam nactus stationem et portus omnes timens, quos teneri ab adversariis arbitrabatur, ad eum locum, qui appellabatur Palaeste, omnibus navibus ad unam incolumibus milites exposuit.

As has been demonstrated above, the 7 legions were put on board. On the next day he touched land. Between the Ceraunian rocks and other perilous places, having found a quiet station and fearing all the ports, which he supposed were held by the adversaries, he disembarked the soldiers at the place called Palaeste, with all the ships—every single one—unharmed.

[7] Erat Orici Lucretius Vespillo et Minucius Rufus cum Asiaticis navibus XVIII, quibus iussu D. Laelii praeerant, M. Bibulus cum navibus ex Corcyrae. Sed neque illi sibi confisi ex portu prodire sunt ausi, cum Caesar omnino XII naves longas praesidio duxisset, in quibus erant constratae IIII, neque Bibulus impeditis navibus dispersisque remigibus satis mature occurrit, quod prius ad continentem visus est Caesar, quam de eius adventu fama omnino in eas regiones perferretur.

[7] At Oricum were Lucretius Vespillo and Minucius Rufus with 18 Asiatic ships, over which, by the order of D. Laelius, they were in command, and M. Bibulus with ships from Corcyra. But neither did those men, relying on themselves, dare to go out from the port, since Caesar had brought as escort in all 12 long ships, among which there were 4 decked; nor did Bibulus, his ships impeded and his oarsmen scattered, come up in sufficiently timely fashion, because Caesar was sighted at the continent before news of his arrival was at all conveyed into those regions.

[8] Eitis militibus naves eadem nocte Brundisium a Caesare remittuntur, ut reliquae legiones equitatusque transportari possent. Huic officio praepositus erat Fufius Calenus legatus, qui celeritatem in transportandis legionibus adhiberet. Sed serius a terra provectae naves neque usae nocturna aura in redeundo offenderunt.

[8] With the soldiers put ashore, the ships that same night were sent back to Brundisium by Caesar, so that the remaining legions and the cavalry might be transported. To this duty the legate Fufius Calenus was appointed, to apply celerity in transporting the legions. But the ships, having put out from the land too late and not having used the night breeze, ran into difficulties on their return.

Bibulus enim Corcyrae certior factus de adventu Caesaris, sperans alicui se parti onustarum navium occurrere posse, inanibus occurrit et nactus circiter XXX in eas indiligentiae suae ac doloris iracundiam erupit omnesque incendit eodemque igne nautas dominosque navium interfecit, magnitudine poenae reliquos terreri sperans. Hoc confecto negotio a Sasonis ad Curici portum stationes litoraque omnia longe lateque classibus occupavit custodiisque diligentius dispositis ipse gravissima hieme in navibus excubans neque ullum laborem aut munus despiciens, neque subsidium exspectans si in Caesaris complexum venire posset . . .

For Bibulus, at Corcyra made more certain of Caesar’s advent, hoping that he could meet some part of the laden ships, met with empty ones, and, having gotten hold of about 30, he burst forth in the wrath of his own negligence and grief, and burned them all, and by the same fire killed the sailors and the owners of the ships, hoping that by the magnitude of the penalty the rest would be terrified. This business finished, from Sason to the harbor of Curici he occupied the stations and all the shores far and wide with fleets, and with guards more diligently arranged, he himself, keeping watch in the ships in the most severe winter, neither despising any toil or duty, nor awaiting succor if he could come into Caesar’s grasp . . .

[9] Discessu Liburnarum ex Illyrico M. Octavius cum eis, quas habebat, navibus Salonas pervenit. Ibi concitatis Dalmatis reliquisque barbaris Issam a Caesaris amicitia avertit; conventum Salonis cum neque pollicitationibus neque denuntiatione periculi permovere posset, oppidum oppugnare instituit. Est autem oppidum et loci natura et colle munitum.

[9] After the departure of the Liburnae from Illyricum, Marcus Octavius, with the ships which he had, arrived at Salona. There, with the Dalmatians and the other barbarians stirred up, he turned Issa away from Caesar’s amicitia; and since he could move the assembly at Salona neither by promises nor by a denuntiation of danger, he began to besiege the town. Now the town is fortified both by the nature of the place and by a hill.

Sed celeriter cives Romani ligneis effectis turribus his sese munierunt et, cum essent infirmi ad resistendum propter paucitatem hominum crebris confecti vulneribus, ad extremum auxilium descenderunt servosque omnes puberes liberaverunt et praesectis omnium mulierum crinibus tormenta effecerunt. Quorum cognita sententia Octavius quinis castris oppidum circumdedit atque uno tempore obsidione et oppugnationibus eos premere coepit. Illi omnia perpeti parati maxime a re frumentaria laborabant.

But quickly the Roman citizens, wooden towers having been constructed, fortified themselves with these; and, since they were infirm to resist because of the paucity of men, worn out by frequent wounds, they resorted to the ultimate remedy and liberated all their slaves of full age (pubescent), and, the hair of all the women having been cut off, they made engines of war. Their plan having been learned, Octavius surrounded the town with five camps and at one time began to press them by siege and by assaults. They, prepared to endure everything, were laboring most of all in the matter of the grain-supply.

Cui rei missis ad Caesarem legatis auxilium ab eo petebant; reliqua, ut poterant, incommoda per se sustinebant. Et longo interposito spatio cum diuturnitas oppugnationis neglegentiores Octavianos effecisset, nacti occasionem meridiani temporis discessu eorum pueris mulieribusque in muro dispositis, ne quid cotidianae consuetudinis desideraretur, ipsi manu facta cum eis, quos nuper liberaverant, in proxima Octavii castra irruperunt. His expugnatis eodem impetu altera sunt adorti, inde tertia et quarta et deinceps reliqua omnibusque eos castris expulerunt et magno numero interfecto reliquos atque ipsum Octavium in naves confugere coegerunt.

For this matter, having sent legates to Caesar, they sought assistance from him; the remaining inconveniences, as they were able, they endured by themselves. And after a long interval had been interposed, since the long duration of the assault had made Octavius’s men more negligent, seizing the opportunity of the midday hour, at their departure, with boys and women stationed on the wall so that nothing of the everyday routine should be missed, they themselves, a battle-party having been formed, together with those whom they had lately liberated, burst into Octavius’s nearest camp. This taken by storm, with the same impetus they assailed a second, then a third and a fourth, and thereafter the rest in succession, and drove them out of all the camps; and, a great number having been slain, they forced the survivors and Octavius himself to take refuge in the ships.

Hic fuit oppugnationis exitus. Iamque hiems appropinquabat, et tantis detrimentis acceptis Octavius desperata oppugnatione oppidi Dyrrachium sese ad Pompeium recepit.

This was the outcome of the assault. And now winter was approaching, and after such great losses had been sustained, Octavius, the assault on the town despaired of, withdrew to Pompey at Dyrrachium.

[10] Demonstravimus L. Vibullium Rufum, Pompei praefectum, bis in potestatem pervenisse Caesaris atque ab eo esse dimissum, semel ad Corfinium, iterum in Hispania. Hunc pro suis beneficiis Caesar idoneum iudicaverat, quem cum mandatis ad Cn. Pompeium mitteret, eundemque apud Cn. Pompeium auctoritatem habere intellegebat Erat autem haec summa mandatorum: debere utrumque pertinaciae finem facere et ab armis discedere neque amplius fortunam periclitari. Satis esse magna utrimque incommoda accepta, quae pro disciplina et praeceptis habere possent, ut reliquos casus timerent: illum Italia expulsum amissa Sicilia et Sardinia duabusque Hispaniis et cohortibus in Italia atque Hispania civium Romanorum centum atque XXX; se morte Curionis et detrimento Africani exercitus tanto militumque deditione ad Curictam.

[10] We have demonstrated that L. Vibullius Rufus, Pompey’s prefect, twice came into Caesar’s power and was dismissed by him—once at Corfinium, a second time in Spain. Caesar, on account of his own benefactions, judged him a suitable person to send with mandates to Cn. Pompey, and he understood that this same man had authority with Cn. Pompey. Now the sum of the mandates was this: that both ought to make an end of pertinacity and to depart from arms, and no longer to hazard fortune. That sufficiently great incommodities had been received on both sides, which they might hold as discipline and precepts, so that they should fear the remaining chances: that he (Pompey) had been driven from Italy, Sicily and Sardinia and the two Spains having been lost, and with cohorts in Italy and Spain of Roman citizens to the number of 130; that he (Caesar) had suffered the death of Curio and so great a detriment of the African army, and the surrender of soldiers at Curicta.

Proinde sibi ac rei publicae parcerent, cum, quantum in bello fortuna posset, iam ipsi incommodis suis satis essent documento. Hoc unum esse tempus de pace agendi, dum sibi uterque confideret et pares ambo viderentur; si vero alteri paulum modo tribuisset fortuna, non esse usurum condicionibus pacis eum, qui superior videretur, neque fore aequa parte contentum, qui se omnia habiturum confideret. Condiciones pacis, quoniam antea convenire non potuissent, Romae ab senatu et a populo peti debere.

Therefore they should spare themselves and the republic, since how much power fortune can have in war, they already by their own setbacks were sufficiently for a demonstration. This is the one time for negotiating about peace, while each trusts in himself and both seem on a par; but if fortune should have granted only a little to one side, the one who appeared superior would not make use of the conditions of peace, nor would he who was confident he would have everything be content with an equal share. The conditions of peace, since previously they could not be agreed upon, ought to be sought at Rome from the Senate and the People.

Interea et rei publicae et ipsis placere oportere, si uterque in contione statim iuravisset se triduo proximo exercitum dimissurum. Depositis armis auxiliisque, quibus nunc confiderent, necessario populi senatusque iudicio fore utrumque contentum. Haec quo facilius Pompeio probari possent, omnes suas terrestres ubique copias dimissurum . . .

Meanwhile it ought to be pleasing both to the Republic and to themselves, if each in the assembly should straightway have sworn that he would within the next three days dismiss his army. With arms and auxiliaries laid down, in which they now put confidence, each would of necessity be content with the judgment of the people and the senate. In order that these things might the more easily be approved by Pompey, he would dismiss all his land forces everywhere . . .

[11] Vibullius his expositis [Corcyrae] non minus necessarium esse existimavit de repentino adventu Caesaris Pompeium fieri certiorem, uti ad id consilium capere posset, antequam de mandatis agi inciperetur, atque ideo continuato nocte ac die itinere atque omnibus oppidis mutatis ad celeritatem iumentis ad Pompeium contendit, ut adesse Caesarem nuntiaret. Pompeius erat eo tempore in Candavia iterque ex Macedonia in hiberna Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque habebat. Sed re nova perturbatus maioribus itineribus Apolloniam petere coepit, ne Caesar orae maritimae civitates occuparet.

[11] Vibullius, after setting forth these things [Corcyra], judged it no less necessary that Pompey be made more certain about the sudden advent of Caesar, so that he might take counsel for it before there began to be action about the mandates; and therefore, with the journey continued night and day and the draft-animals exchanged in all the towns for speed, he hastened to Pompey, to announce that Caesar was at hand. Pompey at that time was in Candavia and had a route from Macedonia into winter quarters, to Apollonia and Dyrrachium. But disturbed by the new matter, he began to make for Apollonia by greater marches, lest Caesar seize the cities of the sea-coast.

At ille eitis militibus eodem die Oricum proficiscitur. Quo cum venisset, L. Torquatus, qui iussu Pompei oppido praeerat praesidiumque ibi Parthinorum habebat, conatus portis clausis oppidum defendere, cum Graecos murum ascendere atque arma capere iuberet, illi autem se contra imperium populi Romani pugnaturos esse negarent, oppidani autem etiam sua sponte Caesarem recipere conarentur, desperatis omnibus auxiliis portas aperuit et se atque oppidum Caesari dedidit incolumisque ab eo conservatus est.

But he, with his soldiers, on the same day sets out for Oricum. When he had come there, L. Torquatus, who by Pompey’s order was in command of the town and had there a garrison of the Parthini, attempted, with the gates shut, to defend the town; when he was ordering the Greeks to mount the wall and take up arms, they, however, said that they would not fight against the imperium of the Roman People, and the townsmen even of their own accord were trying to receive Caesar; with all aids despaired of, he opened the gates and surrendered himself and the town to Caesar, and he was preserved by him unscathed.

[12] Recepto Caesar Orico nulla interposita mora Apolloniam proficiscitur. Cuius adventu audito L. Staberius, qui ibi praeerat, aquam comportare in arcem atque eam munire obsidesque ab Apolloniatibus exigere coepit. Illi vero daturos se negare, neque portas consuli praeclusuros, neque sibi iudicium sumpturos contra atque omnis Italia populusque Romanus indicavisset.

[12] Having received Oricum, Caesar, with no delay interposed, sets out for Apollonia. Upon hearing of his arrival, L. Staberius, who was in command there, began to carry water into the citadel and to fortify it, and to exact hostages from the Apolloniates. But they asserted that they would not give them, and that they would neither shut the gates against the consul, nor assume judgment for themselves contrary to what all Italy and the Roman People had declared.

Quorum cognita voluntate clam profugit Apollonia Staberius. Illi ad Caesarem legatos mittunt oppidoque recipiunt. Hos sequuntur Bullidenses, Amantini et reliquae finitimae civitates totaque Epiros et legatis ad Caesarem missis, quae imperaret, facturos pollicentur.

With their will known, Staberius secretly fled from Apollonia. They send legates to Caesar and receive him into the town. These are followed by the Bullidenses, the Amantini, and the remaining neighboring civitates, and the whole of Epirus; and, legates having been sent to Caesar, they promise that they will do what he would command.

[13] At Pompeius cognitis his rebus, quae erant Orici atque Apolloniae gestae, Dyrrachio timens diurnis eo nocturnisque itineribus contendit. Simul Caesar appropinquare dicebatur, tantusque terror incidit eius exercitui, quod properans noctem diei coniunxerat neque iter intermiserat, ut paene omnes ex Epiro finitimisque regionibus signa relinquerent, complures arma proicerent ac fugae simile iter videretur. Sed cum prope Dyrrachium Pompeius constitisset castraque metari iussisset, perterrito etiam tum exercitu princeps Labienus procedit iuratque se eum non deserturum eundemque casum subiturum, quemcumque ei fortuna tribuisset.

[13] But Pompey, once these matters were known, which had been done at Oricum and Apollonia, fearing for Dyrrachium, hastened thither by day-and-night marches. At the same time Caesar was said to be approaching, and so great a terror fell upon his army—because, hurrying, he had joined night to day and had not interrupted the march—that nearly all from Epirus and the neighboring regions left their standards, many cast away their arms, and the march seemed like a flight. But when Pompey had taken up position near Dyrrachium and had ordered the camp to be marked out, with the army even then panic-stricken, the chief Labienus comes forward and swears that he will not desert him and that he will undergo the same lot, whatever fortune should allot to him.

Hoc idem reliqui iurant legati; tribuni militum centurionesque sequuntur, atque idem omnis exercitus iurat. Caesar praeoccupato itinere ad Dyrrachium finem properandi facit castraque ad flumen Apsum ponit in finibus Apolloniatium, ut bene meritae civitates tutae essent praesidio, ibique reliquarum ex Italia legionum adventum exspectare et sub pellibus hiemare constituit. Hoc idem Pompeius fecit et trans flumen Apsum positis castris eo copias omnes auxiliaque conduxit.

The remaining legates swear this same; the military tribunes and centurions follow, and the whole army likewise swears the same. Caesar, having pre-occupied the route to Dyrrachium, puts an end to his hastening and pitches camp by the river Apsus in the borders of the Apolloniates, so that the well-deserving cities might be safe by a garrison; and there he resolved to await the arrival of the remaining legions from Italy and to winter under canvas. Pompey did this same, and with his camp pitched across the river Apsus he assembled there all his forces and auxiliaries.

[14] Calenus legionibus equitibusque Brundisii in naves impositis, ut erat praeceptum a Caesare, quantum navium facultatem habebat, naves solvit paulumque a portu progressus litteras a Caesare accipit, quibus est certior factus portus litoraque omnia classibus adversariorum teneri. Quo cognito se in portum recipit navesque omnes revocat. Una ex his, quae perseveravit neque imperio Caleni obtemperavit, quod erat sine militibus privatoque consilio administrabatur, delata Oricum atque a Bibulo expugnata est; qui de servis liberisque omnibus ad impuberes supplicium sumit et ad unum interficit.

[14] Calenus, the legions and cavalry having been embarked at Brundisium onto the ships, as it had been prescribed by Caesar, set sail with as many ships as he had capacity of ships, and, having advanced a little from the harbor, receives letters from Caesar, by which he was made certain that the harbors and all the shores were held by the fleets of the adversaries. On learning this he withdraws into the harbor and recalls all the ships. One of these, which persisted and did not obey the command of Calenus, because it was without soldiers and was being managed by private counsel, was carried to Oricum and was taken by Bibulus; and he exacts punishment from all the slaves and the free, up to (i.e., sparing) the prepubescent, and puts to death every single one.

Ita exiguo tempore magnoque casu totius exercitus salus constitit.

Thus, in a brief time and by a great chance, the safety of the whole army was established.

[15] Bibulus, ut supra demonstratum est, erat cum classe ad Oricum et, sicuti mari portibusque Caesarem prohibebat, ita ipse omni terra earum regionum prohibebatur; praesidiis enim dispositis omnia litora a Caesare tenebantur, neque lignandi atque aquandi neque naves ad terram religandi potestas fiebat. Erat res in magna difficultate, summisque angustiis rerum necessariarum premebantur, adeo ut cogerentur sicuti reliquum commeatum ita ligna atque aquam Corcyra navibus onerariis supportare; atque etiam uno tempore accidit, ut difficilioribus usi tempestatibus ex pellibus, quibus erant tectae naves, nocturnum excipere rorem cogerentur; quas tamen difficultates patienter atque aequo animo ferebant neque sibi nudanda litora et relinquendos portus existimabant. Sed cum essent in quibus demonstravi angustiis, ac se Libo cum Bibulo coniunxisset, loquuntur ambo ex navibus cum M. Acilio et Statio Murco legatis; quorum alter oppidi muris, alter praesidiis terrestribus praeerat: velle se de maximis rebus cum Caesare loqui, si sibi eius rei facultas detur.

[15] Bibulus, as has been demonstrated above, was with the fleet at Oricum, and, just as he was prohibiting Caesar from the sea and the harbors, so he himself was prohibited from all the land of those regions; for with garrisons disposed, all the shores were held by Caesar, and no power was afforded either of wood-gathering and water-gathering or of mooring the ships to the land. The matter was in great difficulty, and they were pressed by the utmost straits of necessary things, to such a degree that they were compelled, just as the rest of the convoy-supply, so also to bring up wood and water from Corcyra by cargo (onerary) ships; and at one time it even befell that, having experienced more difficult weather, they were forced to catch the nocturnal dew from the hides with which the ships were covered; which difficulties, nevertheless, they bore patiently and with an even spirit, nor did they judge that the shores ought to be laid bare and the ports abandoned. But when they were in the straits which I have indicated, and Libo had joined himself with Bibulus, both speak from the ships with the legates M. Acilius and Statius Murcus; of whom the one was in charge of the town’s walls, the other of the land-based garrisons: that they wished to speak with Caesar concerning the greatest matters, if the opportunity for that matter should be granted to them.

Huc addunt pauca rei confirmandae causa, ut de compositione acturi viderentur. Interim postulant ut sint indutiae, atque ab eis impetrant. Magnum enim, quod afferebant, videbatur, et Caesarem id summe sciebant cupere, et profectum aliquid Vibulli mandatis existimabatur.

To this they add a few points for the sake of confirming the matter, so that they might seem about to act concerning a composition. Meanwhile they demand that there be a truce, and they obtain it from them. For what they were bringing forward seemed great, and they knew that Caesar supremely desired this, and some progress was thought to have been made in Vibullius’s mandates.

[16] Caesar eo tempore cum legione una profectus ad recipiendas ulteriores civitates et rem frumentariam expediendam, qua angusta utebatur,erat ad Buthrotum, oppidum oppositum Corcyrae. Ibi certior ab Acilio et Murco per litteras factus de postulatis Libonis et Bibuli legionem relinquit; ipse Oricum revertitur. Eo cum venisset, evocantur illi ad colloquium.

[16] At that time Caesar, having set out with one legion to recover the more remote cities and to expedite the grain-supply, in which he was straitened, was at Buthrotum, a town opposite Corcyra. There, informed by letters from Acilius and Murcus about the demands of Libo and Bibulus, he leaves the legion; he himself returns to Oricum. When he had come there, those men are summoned to a colloquy.

Prodit Libo atque excusat Bibulum, quod is iracundia summa erat inimicitiasque habebat etiam privatas cum Caesare ex aedilitate et praetura conceptas: ob eam causam colloquium vitasse, ne res maximae spei maximaeque utilitatis eius iracundia impedirentur. Suam summam esse ac fuisse semper voluntatem, ut componeretur atque ab armis discederetur, sed potestatem eius rei nullam habere, propterea quod de consilii sententia summam belli rerumque omnium Pompeio permiserint. Sed postulatis Caesaris cognitis missuros ad Pompeium, atque illum reliqua per se acturum hortantibus ipsis.

Libo comes forward and excuses Bibulus, because he was of the utmost irascibility and had even private enmities with Caesar, conceived from the aedileship and the praetorship: for that reason he had avoided the colloquy, lest matters of the greatest hope and of the greatest utility be impeded by his anger. That his own highest and always constant wish was that a composition be made and that there be a withdrawal from arms, but that he had no power in that matter, for the reason that, by the judgment of the council, they had entrusted the supreme command of the war and of all affairs to Pompey. But, once Caesar’s demands were learned, they would send to Pompey, and that he would conduct the remainder on his own, they themselves urging it.

Interea manerent indutiae, dum ab illo rediri posset, neve alter alteri noceret. Huc addit pauca de causa et de copiis auxiliisque suis.

Meanwhile let the armistice remain in force, until a return from him could be made, and that neither should injure the other. To this he adds a few points about the cause and about his forces and auxiliaries.

[17] Quibus rebus neque tum respondendum Caesar existimavit, neque nunc, ut memoriae prodantur, satis causae putamus. Postulabat Caesar, ut legatos sibi ad Pompeium sine periculo mittere liceret, idque ipsi fore reciperent aut acceptos per se ad eum perducerent. Quod ad indutias pertineret, sic belli rationem esse divisam, ut illi classe naves auxiliaque sua impedirent, ipse ut aqua terraque eos prohiberet.

[17] To these matters Caesar thought that no answer should be given then, nor do we now think there is sufficient cause to hand them down to memory. Caesar demanded that it be permitted him to send legates to Pompey without peril, and that they should themselves guarantee that this would be so, or, once received, should conduct them to him in their own persons. As to the truces, the method of war was divided thus: that they by their fleet should hinder his ships and his auxilia, while he by water and by land should prohibit them.

Si hoc sibi remitti vellent, remitterent ipsi de maritimis custodiis; si illud tenerent, se quoque id retenturum. Nihilo minus tamen agi posse de compositione, ut haec non remitterentur, neque hanc rem illi esse impedimento. Libo neque legatos Caesaris recipere neque periculum praestare eorum, sed totam rem ad Pompeium reicere: unum instare de indutiis vehementissimeque contendere.

If they wanted this to be remitted to them, let them themselves remit as to the maritime watches; if they held to that, he too would retain this. Nonetheless, a composition could still be pursued, such that these things not be remitted, nor was this matter an impediment to them. Libo neither received Caesar’s envoys nor guaranteed them against peril, but referred the whole matter to Pompey: he pressed one point, about a truce, and contended for it most vehemently.

Quem ubi Caesar intellexit praesentis periculi atque inopiae vitandae causa omnem orationem instituisse neque ullam spem aut condicionem pacis afferre, ad reliquam cogitationem belli sese recepit.

When Caesar understood that he had arranged his whole oration for the sake of avoiding the present peril and want, and was bringing forward no hope or condition of peace, he withdrew to the remaining cogitation of war.

[18] Bibulus multos dies terra prohibitus et graviore morbo ex frigore et labore implicitus, cum neque curari posset neque susceptum officium deserere vellet, vim morbi sustinere non potuit Eo mortuo ad neminem unum summa imperii redit, sed separatim suam quisque classem ad arbitrium suum administrabat. Vibullius sedato tumultu, quem repentinus adventus Caesaris concitaverat, ubi primum e re visum est, adhibito Libone et L. Lucceio et Theophane, quibuscum communicare de maximis rebus Pompeius consueverat, de mandatis Caesaris agere instituit. Quem ingressum in sermonem Pompeius interpellavit et loqui plura prohibuit.

[18] Bibulus, kept from land for many days and entangled in a rather severe sickness from cold and toil, since he could neither be cared for nor wished to desert the office he had undertaken, could not withstand the force of the disease. With him dead, the highest command returned to no single man, but each separately was administering his own fleet at his own discretion. Vibullius, the tumult calmed which the sudden arrival of Caesar had stirred up, as soon as it seemed for the advantage, Libo and L. Lucceius and Theophanes having been called in—men with whom Pompey was accustomed to communicate about the greatest matters—began to negotiate concerning Caesar’s mandates. Pompey interrupted him as he entered upon the discourse and forbade him to speak further.

"Quid mihi," inquit, "aut vita aut civitate opus est, quam beneficio Caesaris habere videbor? cuius rei opinio tolli non poterit, cum in Italiam, ex qua profectus sum, reductus existimabor bello periecto." Ab eis Caesar haec facta cognovit, qui sermoni interfuerunt; conatus tamen nihilo minus est aliis rationibus per colloquia de pace agere.

"What need have I," he says, "either of life or of citizenship, which I shall seem to have by Caesar’s benefaction? The opinion of this matter cannot be removed, since I shall be thought, when the war is finished, to have been brought back into Italy, from which I set out." From those who had taken part in the conversation Caesar learned these things; nevertheless he attempted none the less by other methods to negotiate about peace through conferences.

[19] Inter bina castra Pompei atque Caesaris unum flumen tantum intererat Apsus, crebraque inter se colloquia milites habebant, neque ullum interim telum per pactiones loquentium traiciebatur. Mittit P. Vatinium legatum ad ripam ipsam fluminis, qui ea, quae maxime ad pacem pertinere viderentur, ageret et crebro magna voce pronuntiaret, liceretne civibus ad cives de pace legatos mittere, quod etiam fugitivis ab saltu Pyrenaeo praedonibusque licuisset, praesertim eum id agerent, ne cives cum civibus armis decertarent? Multa suppliciter locutus est, ut de sua atque omnium salute debebat, silentioque ab utrisque militibus auditus.

[19] Between the two camps of Pompey and Caesar only a single river intervened, the Apsus, and the soldiers held frequent colloquies among themselves, and meanwhile, by the pactions of those conversing, no weapon at all was cast across. He sends P. Vatinius, legate, to the very bank of the river, to transact those matters which seemed most to pertain to peace and to proclaim repeatedly in a loud voice whether it were permitted for citizens to send envoys to citizens about peace—a thing which had been allowed even to fugitives from the Pyrenean pass and to pirates—especially since they were pursuing this very end: that citizens should not fight it out with citizens by arms. He spoke many things in a suppliant manner, as he ought concerning his own and everyone’s safety, and was heard in silence by the soldiers on both sides.

Responsum est ab altera parte Aulum Varronem profiteri se altera die ad colloquium venturum atque una visurum, quemadmodum tuto legati venire et quae vellent exponere possent; certumque ei rei tempus constituitur. Quo cum esset postero die ventum, magna utrimque multitudo convenit, magnaque erat exspectatio eius rei, atque omnium animi intenti esse ad pacem videbantur. Qua ex frequentia, Titus Labienus prodit, sed missa oratione de pace, loqui atque altercari cum Vatinio incipit.

It was responded by the other party that Aulus Varro professed that he would come to a colloquy on the next day and at the same time would see how the legates might come safely and set forth what they wished; and a fixed time was appointed for that matter. When, on the following day, there had been an arrival at that place, a great multitude assembled on both sides, and great was the expectation of that affair, and everyone’s minds seemed to be intent upon peace. From that concourse, Titus Labienus comes forth, but, the oration about peace set aside, he begins to speak and to altercate with Vatinius.

Quorum mediam orationem interrumpunt subito undique tela immissa; quae ille obtectus armis militum vitavit; vulnerantur tamen complures, in his Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtius, centuriones militesque nonnulli. Tum Labienus: "desinite ergo de compositione loqui; nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax esse nulla potest."

In the middle of whose speech missiles suddenly launched from every side interrupt; these he, screened by the soldiers’ arms, avoided; nevertheless several are wounded, among them Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtius, several centurions and soldiers. Then Labienus: "So cease, therefore, to speak about a composition; for for us no peace can exist unless Caesar’s head is brought back."

[20] Eisdem temporibus M. Caelius Rufus praetor causa debitorum suscepta initio magistratus tribunal suum iuxta C. Treboni, praetoris urbani, sellam collocavit et, si quis appellavisset de aestimatione et de solutionibus, quae per arbitrum fierent, ut Caesar praesens constituerat, fore auxilio pollicebatur. Sed fiebat aequitate decreti et humanitate Treboni, qui his temporibus clementer et moderate ius dicendum existimabat, ut reperiri non possent, a quibus initium appellandi nasceretur. Nam fortasse inopiam excusare et calamitatem aut propriam suam aut temporum queri et difficultates auctionandi proponere etiam mediocris est animi; integras vero tenere possessiones, qui se debere fateantur, cuius animi aut cuius impudentiae est?

[20] At the same time M. Caelius Rufus, praetor, having undertaken the cause of the debtors at the beginning of his magistracy, set his tribunal beside the chair of C. Trebonius, the urban praetor, and promised that, if anyone should appeal concerning the valuation and the payments which were being made through an arbiter, as Caesar in person had established, he would be of aid. But by the equity of the decree and the humanity of Trebonius—who at this time thought that the law ought to be administered gently and moderately—it came about that none could be found from whom a beginning of appealing might arise. For perhaps to plead poverty and to lament calamity, either one’s own or that of the times, and to set forth the difficulties of auctioning, is of even a middling spirit; but to hold one’s possessions intact, though they confess that they owe—of what sort of spirit, or of what shamelessness, is this?

Itaque, hoc qui postularet reperiebatur nemo. Atque ipsis, ad quorum commodum pertinebat, durior inventus est Caelius. Et ab hoc profectus initio, ne frustra ingressus turpem causam videretur, legem promulgavit, ut sexenni die sine usuris creditae pecuniae solvantur.

Accordingly, no one was found to demand this. And Caelius was discovered to be harsher even to those very persons to whose advantage it pertained. And, setting out from this beginning, lest he seem to have entered upon a base cause in vain, he promulgated a law, that moneys lent be paid, without usury, on the day of the six-year term.

[21] Cum resisteret Servilius consul reliquique magistratus, et minus opinione sua efficeret, ad hominum excitanda studia sublata priore lege duas promulgavit: unam, qua mercedes habitationum annuas conductoribus donavit, aliam tabularum novarum, impetuque multitudinis in C. Trebonium facto et nonnullis vulneratis eum de tribunali deturbavit. De quibus rebus Servilius consul ad senatum rettulit, senatusque Caelium ab re publica removendum censuit. Hoc decreto eum consul senatu prohibuit et contionari conantem de rostris deduxit.

[21] When the consul Servilius and the remaining magistrates offered resistance, and he achieved less than he had supposed, to rouse men’s enthusiasm he, the prior law having been set aside, promulgated two: one by which he gifted to the tenants the annual rents of dwellings, the other of “new tablets” (debt ledgers reset); and, a rush of the multitude having been made upon Gaius Trebonius and several being wounded, he drove him down from the tribunal. About these matters the consul Servilius reported to the senate, and the senate adjudged that Caelius must be removed from public business. By this decree the consul forbade him the senate and led him down from the rostra as he was attempting to address an assembly.

Ille ignominia et dolore permotus palam se proficisci ad Caesarem simulavit; clam nuntiis ad Milonem missis, qui Clodio interfecto eo nomine erat damnatus, atque eo in Italiam evocato, quod magnis muneribus datis gladiatoriae familiae reliquias habebat, sibi coniiunxit atque eum in Thurinum ad sollicitandos pastores praemisit. Ipse cum Casilinum venisset, unoque tempore signa eius militaria atque arma Capuae essent comprensa et familia Neapoli visa, quae proditionem oppidi appararet, patefactis consiliis exclusus Capua et periculum veritus, quod conventus arma ceperat atque eum hostis loco habendum existimabat, consilio destitit atque eo itinere sese avertit.

He, moved by ignominy and grief, openly pretended that he was setting out to Caesar; secretly, messengers having been sent to Milo—who, with Clodius slain, had been condemned on that charge—and he having been summoned into Italy, because by great gifts given he kept the remnants of a gladiatorial familia, he joined him to himself and sent him ahead to Thurii to solicit the shepherds. He himself, when he had come to Casilinum, and at the same time his military standards and arms had been seized at Capua and a band had been seen at Naples which was preparing the betrayal of the town, his plans being laid open, shut out from Capua and fearing peril, because the assembly had taken up arms and thought that he must be held in the position of an enemy, abandoned his plan and turned himself aside from that route.

[22] Interim Milo dimissis circum municipia litteris, se ea, quae faceret, iussu atque imperio facere Pompei, quae mandata ad se per Vibullium delata essent, quos ex acre alieno laborare arbitrabatur, sollicitabat. Apud quos cum proficere nihil posset, quibusdam solutis ergastulis Cosam in agro Thurino oppugnare coepit. Eo cum a Q. Pedio praetore cum legione . . . lapide ictus ex muro periit.

[22] Meanwhile, with letters sent out around the municipalities, Milo was declaring that the things he was doing he did by Pompey’s order and command, the mandates which had been conveyed to him through Vibullius; he was soliciting those whom he judged to be laboring under debt. Among whom, when he could accomplish nothing, with certain slave-prisons opened, he began to attack Cosa in the Thurian territory. There, when by the praetor Q. Pedius with a legion . . . struck by a stone from the wall, he perished.

Et Caelius profectus, ut dictitabat, ad Caesarem pervenit Thurios. Ubi cum quosdam eius municipii sollicitaret equitibusque Caesaris Gallis atque Hispanis, qui eo praesidii causa missi erant, pecuniam polliceretur, ab his est interfectus. Ita magnarum initia rerum, quae occupatione magistratuum et temporum sollicitam Italiam habebant, celerem et facilem exitum habuerunt.

And Caelius, having set out, as he kept saying, reached Caesar at Thurii. There, when he was soliciting certain men of that municipality and promising money to Caesar’s cavalry—Gauls and Spaniards who had been sent there for garrison-duty—he was killed by them. Thus the beginnings of great affairs, which by the occupation of the magistrates and of the times were keeping Italy anxious, had a swift and easy outcome.

[23] Libo profectus ab Orico cum classe, cui praeerat, navium L, Brundisium venit insulamque, quae contra portum Brundisinum est, occupavit, quod praestare arbitrabatur unum locum, qua necessarius nostris erat egressus, quam omnia litora ac portus custodia clausos teneri. Hic repentino adventu naves onerarias quasdam nactus incendit et unam frumento onustam abduxit magnumque nostris terrorem iniecit et noctu militibus ac sagittariis in terram eitis praesidium equitum deiecit et adeo loci opportunitate profecit, uti ad Pompeium litteras mitteret, naves reliquas, si vellet, subduci et refici iuberet: sua classe auxilia sese Caesaris prohibiturum.

[23] Libo, setting out from Oricum with the fleet, over which he presided, of 50 ships, came to Brundisium and occupied the island which is opposite the port of Brundisium, because he judged it preferable that a single place—where an exit was necessary for our men—be held, rather than that all the coasts and harbors be kept shut by a guard. Here, by his sudden advent, having come upon certain onerary (cargo) ships, he burned them and carried off one laden with grain, and he cast great terror upon our men; and by night, with soldiers and archers sent ashore, he dislodged the cavalry garrison; and he achieved so much by the opportunity of the place that he sent letters to Pompey, to the effect that he should order the remaining ships, if he wished, to be hauled up and refitted: that with his own fleet he would prohibit Caesar’s reinforcements.

[24] Erat eo tempore Antonius Brundisii; is virtute militum confisus scaphas navium magnarum circiter LX cratibus pluteisque contexit eoque milites delectos imposuit atque eas in litore pluribus locis separatim disposuit navesque triremes duas, quas Brundisii faciendas curaverat, per causam exercendorum remigum ad fauces portus prodire iussit. Has cum audacius progressas Libo vidisset, sperans intercipi posse, quadriremes V ad eas misit. Quae cum navibus nostris appropinquassent, nostri veterani in portum refugiebant: illi studio incitati incautius sequebantur.

[24] At that time Antony was at Brundisium; trusting in the valor of the soldiers, he covered the skiffs of the larger ships, about 60, with hurdles and mantlets, and he put chosen soldiers on them and stationed them separately in several places along the shore; and the two triremes which he had taken care to have built at Brundisium he ordered to go out to the jaws of the harbor under the pretext of exercising the oarsmen. When Libo saw these advancing rather boldly, hoping they could be intercepted, he sent 5 quadriremes against them. When these had approached our ships, our veterans were taking refuge back into the port; they, incited by zeal, were following too incautiously.

Iam ex omnibus partibus subito Antonianae scaphae signo dato se in hostes incitaverunt primoque impeto unam ex his quadriremibus cum remigibus defensoribusque suis ceperunt, reliquas turpiter refugere coegerunt. Ad hoc detrimentum accessit, ut equitibus per oram maritimam ab Antonio dispositis aquari prohiberentur. Qua necessitate et ignominia permotus Libo discessit a Brundisio obsessionemque nostrorum omisit.

Now from all sides, suddenly Antony’s skiffs, the signal having been given, rushed against the enemies, and at the first onset they captured one of these quadriremes with its rowers and defenders, and forced the rest to retreat disgracefully. To this loss there was added that, with cavalry posted by Antony along the seacoast, they were prevented from drawing water. Moved by this necessity and disgrace, Libo departed from Brundisium and relinquished the blockade of our men.

[25] Multi iam menses erant et hiems praecipitaverat, neque Brundisio naves legionesque ad Caesarem veniebant. Ac nonnullae eius rei praetermissae occasiones Caesari videbantur, quod certi saepe flaverant venti, quibus necessario committendum existimabat. Quantoque eius amplius processerat temporis, tanto erant alacriores ad custodias, qui classibus praeerant, maioremque fiduciam prohibendi habebant, et crebris Pompei litteris castigabantur, quoniam primo venientem Caesarem non prohibuissent, ut reliquos eius exercitus impedirent, duriusque cotidie tempus ad transportandum lenioribus ventis exspectabant.

[25] Many months already had passed and winter had plunged on, and from Brundisium neither ships nor legions were coming to Caesar. And several opportunities for that affair seemed to Caesar to have been let slip, because certain winds had often blown, to which he judged it was of necessity to commit himself. And the further that time had advanced, the more alacritous for guard were those who were in command of the fleets, and they had greater confidence of prohibiting, and they were being castigated by Pompey’s frequent letters, because they had not prohibited Caesar when he came at the first, in order that they might hinder the remainder of his forces; and day by day they were expecting a harsher season for transporting, and gentler winds.

Quibus rebus permotus Caesar Brundisium ad suos severius scripsit, nacti idoneum ventum ne occasionem navigandi dimitterent, sive ad litora Apolloniatium [sive ad Labeatium] cursum dirigere atque eo naves eicere possent. Haec a custodiis classium loca maxime vacabant, quod se longius a portibus committere non audebant.

Moved by these things, Caesar wrote more sternly to his men at Brundisium, that, having found a suitable wind, they should not let slip the occasion of navigating, and that they could either direct their course to the shores of the Apolloniates [or of the Labeates] and cast the ships ashore there. These places were especially free from the guards of the fleets, because they did not dare to commit themselves farther from the harbors.

[26] Illi adhibita audacia et virtute administrantibus M. Antonio et Fufio Caleno, multum ipsis militibus hortantibus neque ullum periculum pro salute Caesaris recusantibus nacti austrum naves solvunt atque altero die Apolloniam praetervehuntur. Qui cum essent ex continenti visi, Coponius, qui Dyrrachii classi Rhodiae praeerat, naves ex portu educit, et cum iam nostris remissiore vento appropinquasset, idem auster increbuit nostrisque praesidio fuit. Neque vero ille ob eam causam conatu desistebat, sed labore et perseverantia nautarum etiam vim tempestatis superari posse sperabat praetervectosque Dyrrachium magna vi venti nihilo secius sequebatur.

[26] They, audacity and virtue being applied, with Marcus Antonius and Fufius Calenus administering, and with much urging by the soldiers themselves, who refused no danger for Caesar’s safety, having found a south wind, cast off the ships and on the second day sail past Apollonia. And when they were seen from the mainland, Coponius, who at Dyrrachium was commanding the Rhodian fleet, leads the ships out of the port; and when he had now approached our men with the wind slackened, that same south wind increased and was a protection to our men. Nor indeed for that reason did he desist from the attempt, but he hoped that by the labor and perseverance of the sailors even the force of the storm could be overcome; and, though they had been borne past Dyrrachium by a great force of wind, nonetheless he kept following them.

Nostri usi fortunae beneficio tamen impetum classis timebant, si forte ventus remisisset. Nacti portum, qui appellatur Nymphaeum, ultra Lissum milia passuum III, eo naves introduxerunt (qui portus ab Africo tegebatur, ab austro non erat tutus) leviusque tempestatis quam classis periculum aestimaverunt. Quo simulatque introitum est, incredibili felicitate auster, qui per biduum flaverat, in Africum se vertit.

Our men, having used the beneficence of fortune, nevertheless were fearing the impetus of the fleet, if by chance the wind should slacken. Having found a harbor, which is called Nymphaeum, 3 miles beyond Lissus, they brought the ships into it (which harbor was sheltered from the Africus, but was not safe from the Auster) and they evaluated the danger of the tempest as lighter than that of the fleet. As soon as there was an entry into it, with incredible felicity the Auster, which had blown for two days, turned into the Africus.

[27] Hic subitam commutationem fortunae videre licuit. Qui modo sibi timuerant, hos tutissimus portus recipiebat; qui nostris navibus periculum intulerant, de suo timere cogebantur. Itaque tempore commutato tempestas et nostros texit et naves Rhodias afflixit, ita ut ad unam omnes, constratae numero XVI, eliderentur et naufragio interirent, et ex magno remigum propugnatorumque numero pars ad scopulos allisa interficeretur, pars ab nostris detraheretur; quos omnes conservatos Caesar domum dimisit.

[27] Here it was permitted to see a sudden commutation of fortune. Those who just now had feared for themselves, the safest harbor was receiving; those who had brought peril upon our ships were compelled to fear for their own. And so, with the weather changed, the tempest both covered our men and afflicted the Rhodian ships, with the result that, every last one, the decked vessels, to the number 16, were dashed to pieces and perished in shipwreck; and out of the great number of rowers and fighting-men, part, hurled against the crags, were slain, part were pulled off by our men; all of whom, preserved, Caesar sent home.

[28] Nostrae naves duae tardius cursu confecto in noctem coniectae, cum ignorarent, quem locum reliquae cepissent, contra Lissum in ancoris constiterunt. Has scaphis minoribusque navigiis compluribus immissis Otacilius Crassus, qui Lissi praeerat, expugnare parabat; simul de deditione eorum agebat et incolumitatem deditis pollicebatur. Harum altera navis CCXX e legione tironum sustulerat, altera ex veterana paulo minus CC. Hic cognosci licuit, quantum esset hominibus praesidii in animi firmitudine.

[28] Our two ships, the course completed more tardily and cast into the night, since they did not know what place the rest had taken, came to a stand at anchor over against Lissus. Against these, with skiffs and several smaller craft sent in, Otacilius Crassus, who was in command at Lissus, was preparing to storm them; at the same time he was negotiating about their surrender and was promising incolumity to those surrendering. Of these, one ship had taken up 220 from a legion of recruits, the other from a veteran [legion] a little less than 200. Here it could be learned how great a safeguard for men lies in firmness of spirit.

Tirones enim multitudine navium perterriti et salo nauseaque confecti iureiurando accepto, nihil eis nocituros hostes, se Otacilio dediderunt; qui omnes ad eum producti contra religionem iurisiurandi in eius conspectu crudelissime interficiuntur. At veteranae legionis milites, item conflictati et tempestatis et sentinae vitiis, neque ex pristina virtute remittendum aliquid putaverunt, et tractandis condicionibus et simulatione deditionis extracto primo noctis tempore gubernatorem in terram navem eicere cogunt, ipsi idoneum locum nacti reliquam noctis partem ibi confecerunt et luce prima missis ad eos ab Otacilio equitibus, qui eam partem orae maritimae asservabant, circiter CCCC, quique eos armati ex praesidio secuti sunt, se defenderunt et nonnullis eorum interfectis incolumes se ad nostros receperunt.

For the raw recruits, terrified by the multitude of ships and exhausted by the swell and by nausea, after an oath had been taken that the enemies would do them no harm, surrendered themselves to Otacilius; who, when they had all been brought before him, contrary to the religion of the oath, had them most cruelly slain in his sight. But the soldiers of the veteran legion, likewise harried both by the storm and by the faults of the bilge, neither thought that anything of their former virtue should be remitted; and, by protracting negotiations over terms and by a simulation of surrender, when the first part of the night had been drawn out, they forced the helmsman to drive the ship ashore; and having found a suitable place, they spent the rest of the night there, and at first light, when horsemen were sent against them by Otacilius—about 400—who were guarding that part of the seacoast, and when armed men who had followed them from the garrison arrived, they defended themselves, and, with several of them slain, they returned safe to our forces.

[29] Quo facto conventus civium Romanorum, qui Lissum obtinebant, quod oppidum eis antea Caesar attribuerat muniendumque curaverat, Antonium recepit omnibusque rebus iuvit. Otacilius sibi timens ex oppido fugit et ad Pompeium pervenit. Eitis omnibus copiis Antonius, quarum erat summa veteranarum trium legionum uniusque tironum et equitum DCCC, plerasque naves in Italiam remittit ad reliquos milites equitesque transportandos, pontones, quod est genus navium Gallicarum, Lissi relinquit, hoc consilio, ut si forte Pompeius vacuam existimans Italiam eo traiecisset exercitum, quae opinio erat edita in vulgus, aliquam Caesar ad insequendum facultatem haberet, nuntiosque ad eum celeriter mittit, quibus regionibus exercitum euisset et quid militum transvexisset.

[29] This having been done, the conventus of Roman citizens, who were holding Lissum— a town which Caesar had previously assigned to them and had taken care to fortify—received Antonius and aided him in all matters. Otacilius, fearing for himself, fled from the town and came to Pompeius. Antonius, with all his forces, whose total was three legions of veterans and one of recruits and 800 horse, sends most of the ships back into Italy to transport the remaining soldiers and cavalry, leaves pontoons (which is a kind of Gallic ships) at Lissum, with this plan: that if perhaps Pompeius, supposing Italy to be empty, had carried his army across thither—which opinion had been spread among the common people—Caesar might have some means for pursuing; and he quickly sends messengers to him, to report into what regions he had led his army and what number of soldiers he had transported across.

[30] Haec eodem fere tempore Caesar atque Pompeius cognoscunt. Nam praetervectas Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque naves viderant ipsi, ut iter secundum eas terra direxerant, sed quo essent eae delatae, primus diebus ignorabant. Cognitaque re diversa sibi ambo consilia capiunt: Caesar, ut quam primum se cum Antonio coniungeret; Pompeius, ut venientibus in itinere se opponeret, si imprudentes ex insidiis, adoriri posset,eodemque die uterque eorum ex castris stativis a flumine Apso exercitum educunt: Pompeius clam et noctu, Caesar palam atque interdiu.

[30] These things at nearly the same time Caesar and Pompey learn. For they themselves had seen the ships sailed past Apollonia and Dyrrachium, so that they had directed their route by land along them, but to where they had been borne, for the first days they were ignorant. And the matter having been learned, both take different counsels for themselves: Caesar, to join himself with Antony as soon as possible; Pompey, to oppose himself to them on the march as they were coming, if he might be able to attack them unawares from ambush; and on the same day each of them leads the army out from the standing camps from the river Apsus: Pompey secretly and by night, Caesar openly and by day.

Sed Caesari circuitu maiore iter erat longius, adverso flumine, ut vado transire posset; Pompeius, quia expedito itinere flumen ei transeundum non erat, magnis itineribus ad Antonium contendit atque eum ubi appropinquare cognovit, idoneum locum nactus ibi copias collocavit suosque omnes in castris continuit ignesque fieri prohibuit, quo occultior esset eius adventus. Haec ad Antonium statim per Graecos deferuntur. Ille missis ad Caesarem nuntiis unum diem sese castris tenuit; altero die ad eum pervenit Caesar.

But for Caesar, by a greater circuit, the march was longer, with the river adverse, so that he might be able to cross at a ford; Pompeius, because on an expeditious route he had no river to be crossed, pressed with great marches toward Antonius, and when he learned that he was approaching, having found a suitable place he stationed his forces there and kept all his men within the camp and forbade fires to be made, in order that his arrival might be more hidden. These things are immediately conveyed to Antonius through the Greeks. He, having sent messengers to Caesar, kept himself in camp for one day; on the next day Caesar came to him.

Cuius adventu cognito Pompeius, ne duobus circumcluderetur exercitibus, ex eo loco discedit omnibusque copiis ad Asparagium Dyrrachinorum pervenit atque ibi idoneo loco castra ponit.

Once his advent was known, Pompey, lest he be enclosed by two armies, departs from that place and with all his forces arrives at Asparagium of the Dyrrachians, and there in a suitable place pitches camp.

[31] His temporibus Scipio detrimentis quibusdam circa montem Amanum acceptis imperatorem se appellaverat. Quo facto civitatibus tyrannisque magnas imperaverat pecunias, item a publicanis suae provinciae debitam biennii pecuniam exegerat et ab eisdem insequentis anni mutuam praeceperat equitesque toti provinciae imperaverat. Quibus coactis, finitimis hostibus Parthis post se relictis, qui paulo ante M. Crassum imperatorem interfecerant et M. Bibulum in obsidione habuerant, legiones equitesque ex Syria deduxerat.

[31] At this time, after sustaining certain losses around Mount Amanus, Scipio had styled himself imperator. This having been done, he had levied great sums of money upon the cities and tyrants; likewise he had exacted from the publicans of his province the money owed for two years, and from these same had anticipated as a loan that of the following year, and he had levied cavalry upon the whole province. These things having been collected, leaving behind him the neighboring enemy, the Parthians—who a little before had slain the imperator M. Crassus and had kept M. Bibulus under siege—he had brought away the legions and the cavalry from Syria.

Summamque in sollicitudinem ac timorem Parthici belli provincia cum venisset, ac nonnullae militum voces cum audirentur, sese, contra hostem si ducerentur, ituros, contra civem et consulem arma non laturos, deductis Pergamum atque in locupletissimas urbes in hiberna legionibus maximas largitiones fecit et confirmandorum militum causa diripiendas his civitates dedit.

And when the province had fallen into the utmost anxiety and fear of the Parthian war, and when some voices of the soldiers were heard, saying that, if they were led against the enemy, they would go, but that against a citizen and a consul they would not carry arms, with the legions led down to Pergamum and into the most wealthy cities for winter-quarters, he made the greatest largesses and, for the sake of confirming the soldiers, he gave these cities over to be plundered by them.

[32] Interim acerbissime imperatae pecuniae tota provincia exigebantur. Multa praeterea generatim ad avaritiam excogitabantur. In capita singula servorum ac liberorum tributum imponebatur; columnaria, ostiaria, frumentum, milites, arma, remiges, tormenta, vecturae imperabantur; cuius modo rei nomen reperiri poterat, hoc satis esse ad cogendas pecunias videbatur.

[32] Meanwhile, the monies that had been commanded were being exacted most bitterly throughout the whole province. Many things besides, by categories, were contrived for avarice. A capitation was imposed per head upon slaves and free persons; column-taxes, door-taxes, grain, soldiers, arms, oarsmen, engines (artillery), and transport were requisitioned; if only the name of some item could be discovered, this seemed sufficient for the exaction of monies.

Non solum urbibus, sed paene vicis castellisque singulis cum imperio praeficiebantur. Qui horum quid acerbissime crudelissimeque fecerat, is et vir et civis optimus habebatur. Erat plena lictorum et imperiorum provincia, differta praefectis atque exactoribus: qui praeter imperatas pecunias suo etiam privato compendio serviebant; dictitabant enim se domo patriaque expulsos omnibus necessariis egere rebus, ut honesta praescriptione rem turpissimam tegerent.

Not only over the cities, but almost over each village and little fort, men were set in command. Whoever among these had done anything most harshly and most cruelly was held both the best man and the best citizen. The province was full of lictors and of commands, crammed with prefects and exactors: who, besides the monies that were imposed, also served their own private profit; for they kept saying that, driven from home and fatherland, they were in want of all necessary things, so that with an honorable pretext they might cloak a most disgraceful business.

Accedebant ad haec gravissimae usurae, quod in bello plerumque accidere consuevit universis imperatis pecuniis; quibus in rebus prolationem diei donationem esse dicebant. Itaque aes alienum provinciae eo biennio multiplicatum est. Neque minus ob eam causam civibus Romanis eius provinciae, sed in singulos conventus singulasque civitates certae pecuniae imperabantur, mutuasque illas ex senatusconsulto exigi dictitabant; publicanis, ut in Syria fecerant, insequentis anni vectigal promutuum.

To these were added very heavy usuries, which for the most part are accustomed to occur in war upon all the monies that were imposed; and in these matters they kept saying that a postponement of the day was a “donation.” And so the province’s indebtedness was multiplied in that two-year period. Nor on that account were the Roman citizens of that province burdened any less; rather, upon each assize and upon each city certain sums were imposed, and they kept saying that those were loans being exacted by a decree of the Senate; to the publicani (tax‑farmers), as they had done in Syria, the tax of the following year was made an advance‑loan.

[33] Praeterea Ephesi a fano Dianae depositas antiquitus pecunias Scipio tolli iubebat. Certaque eius rei die constituta cum in fanum ventum esset adhibitis compluribus ordinis senatorii, quos advocaverat Scipio, litterae ei redduntur a Pompeio, mare transisse cum legionibus Caesarem: properaret ad se cum exercitu venire omniaque posthaberet. His litteris acceptis quos advocaverat dimittit; ipse iter in Macedoniam parare incipit paucisque post diebus est profectus.

[33] Moreover, at Ephesus Scipio was ordering that monies long ago deposited from the fane of Diana be taken. And with a fixed day set for this matter, when they had come into the temple, several of the senatorial order being admitted, whom Scipio had summoned, letters are delivered to him from Pompey: that Caesar had crossed the sea with his legions; that he should hasten to come to him with his army and set everything else after. With these letters received, he dismisses those whom he had called; he himself begins to prepare a march into Macedonia, and after a few days set out.

Haec res Ephesiae pecuniae salutem attulit.

This event brought safety to the Ephesian funds.

[34] Caesar Antonii exercitu coniuncto deducta Orico legione, quam tuendae orae maritimae causa posuerat, temptandas sibi provincias longiusque procedendum existimabat et, cum ad eum ex Thessalia Aetoliaque legati venissent, qui praesidio misso pollicerentur earum gentium civitates imperata facturas, L. Cassium Longinum cum legione tironum, quae appellabatur XXVII, atque equitibus CC in Thessaliam, C. Calvisium Sabinum cum cohortibus V paucisque equitibus in Aetoliam misit; maxime eos, quod erant propinquae regiones, de re frumentaria ut providerent, hortatus est. Cn. Domitium Calvinum cum legionibus duabus, XI et XII, et equitibus D in Macedoniam proficisci iussit; cuius provinciae ab ea parte, quae libera appellabatur, Menedemus, princeps earum regionum, missus legatus omnium suorum excellens studium profitebatur.

[34] Caesar, after Antony’s army had been joined to him, and the legion withdrawn from Oricum—which he had stationed for the purpose of guarding the sea‑coast—judged that the provinces were to be tested and that he should advance farther; and when envoys had come to him from Thessaly and Aetolia, who, if a garrison were sent, promised that the cities of those nations would do what was commanded, he sent Lucius Cassius Longinus with a legion of recruits, which was called the 27th, and 200 horsemen into Thessaly, and Gaius Calvisius Sabinus with 5 cohorts and a few horsemen into Aetolia; he especially exhorted them, because the regions were neighboring, to provide for the grain‑supply. He ordered Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus to set out into Macedonia with two legions, the 11th and the 12th, and 500 horsemen; from that part of this province which was called “free,” Menedemus, a leading man of those regions, sent as envoy, was professing outstanding zeal on behalf of all his people.

[35] Ex his Calvisius primo adventu summa omnium Aetolorum receptus voluntate, praesidiis adversariorum Calydone et Naupacto eiectis, omni Aetolia potitus est. Cassius in Thessaliam cum legione pervenit. Hic cum essent factiones duae, varia voluntate civitatum utebatur: Hegesaretos, veteris homo potentiae, Pompeianis rebus studebat; Petraeus, summae nobilitatis adulescens, suis ac suorum opibus Caesarem enixe iuvabat.

[35] Of these, Calvisius at his first arrival was received with the highest good-will of all the Aetolians, and, the garrisons of the adversaries having been cast out from Calydon and Naupactus, he got possession of all Aetolia. Cassius came into Thessaly with the legion. Here, since there were two factions, he was dealing with a varied disposition of the communities: Hegesaretos, a man of ancient potency, was zealous for the Pompeian affairs; Petraeus, a youth of the highest nobility, with his own and his people’s resources was earnestly aiding Caesar.

[36] Eodemque tempore Domitius in Macedoniam venit; et cum ad eum frequentes civitatum legationes convenire coepissent, nuntiatum est adesse Scipionem cum legionibus, magna opinione et fama omnium; nam plerumque in novitate rem fama antecedit. Hic nullo in loco Macedoniae moratus magno impetu tetendit ad Domitium et, cum ab eo milia passuum XX afuisset, subito se ad Cassium Longinum in Thessaliam convertit. Hoc adeo celeriter fecit, ut simul adesse et venire nuntiaretur, et quo iter expeditius faceret, M. Favonium ad flumen Aliacmonem, quod Macedoniam a Thessalia dividit, cum cohortibus VIII praesidio impedimentis legionum reliquit castellumque ibi muniri iussit.

[36] And at the same time Domitius came into Macedonia; and when frequent embassies of the communities began to come together to him, it was reported that Scipio was present with the legions, with great opinion and fame among all; for most often, in the novelty of a matter, report precedes the thing. He, delaying in no place in Macedonia, made for Domitius with great impetuosity; and when he was 20 miles away from him, he suddenly turned himself toward Cassius Longinus in Thessaly. He did this so swiftly that it was announced at once that he was both present and coming, and, in order that he might make the march more expeditiously, he left M. Favonius at the river Aliacmon, which divides Macedonia from Thessaly, with 8 cohorts as a guard for the baggage of the legions, and he ordered a fort to be constructed there.

Eodem tempore equitatus regis Cotyis ad castra Cassii advolavit, qui circum Thessaliam esse consuerat. Tum timore perterritus Cassius cognito Scipionis adventu visisque equitibus, quos Scipionis esse arbitrabatur, ad montes se convertit, qui Thessaliam cingunt, atque ex his locis Ambraciam versus iter facere coepit. At Scipionem properantem sequi litterae sunt consecutae a M. Favonio, Domitium cum legionibus adesse neque se praesidium, ubi constitutus esset, sine auxilio Scipionis tenere posse.

At the same time the cavalry of King Cotys flew to Cassius’s camp, which had been accustomed to be around Thessaly. Then Cassius, thoroughly terrified with fear, once the advent of Scipio was known and upon seeing horsemen whom he supposed to be Scipio’s, turned toward the mountains that gird Thessaly, and from these places began to make a march toward Ambracia. But letters overtook Scipio, hastening to pursue, from M. Favonius, that Domitius was present with the legions and that he could not hold the garrison, where he had been posted, without Scipio’s aid.

Quibus litteris acceptis consilium Scipio iterque commutat; Cassium sequi desistit, Favonio auxilium ferre contendit. Itaque die ac nocte continuato itinere ad eum pervenit, tam opportuno tempore, ut simul Domitiani exercitus pulvis cerneretur, et primi antecursores Scipionis viderentur. Ita Cassio industria Domitii, Favonio Scipionis celeritas salutem attulit.

On receiving which letters Scipio changes plan and route; he ceases to follow Cassius, he hastens to bring aid to Favonius. And so, with a march continued day and night, he came to him at so opportune a time that at once the dust of the army of Domitius was discerned, and the first forerunners of Scipio were seen. Thus to Cassius the industry of Domitius, to Favonius the celerity of Scipio brought safety.

[37] Scipio biduum castris stativis moratus ad flumen, quod inter eum et Domitii castra fluebat, Aliacmonem, tertio die prima luce exercitum vado traducit et castris positis postero die mane copias ante frontem castrorum instruit. Domitius tum quoque sibi dubitandum non putavit, quin productis legionibus proelio decertaret. Sed cum esset inter bina castra campus circiter milium passuum II, Domitius castris Scipionis aciem suam subiecit; ille a vallo non discedere perseveravit.

[37] Scipio, having stayed for a two-day period in a stationary camp by the river, the Aliacmon, which flowed between him and the camp of Domitius, on the third day at first light led the army across by a ford; and, the camp having been pitched, on the following day in the morning he drew up his forces before the front of the camp. Domitius then also did not think he should hesitate, but, the legions having been brought out, to contend in battle. But since there was between the two camps a plain of about 2 miles, Domitius brought his battle-line up under Scipio’s camp; he, however, persevered in not departing from the rampart.

Ac tamen aegre retentis Domitianis militibus est factum, ne proelio contenderetur, et maxime, quod rivus difficilibus ripis subiectus castris Scipionis progressus nostrorum impediebat. Quorum studium alacritatemque pugnandi cum cognovisset Scipio, suspicatus fore, ut postero die aut invitus dimicare cogeretur aut magna cum infamia castris se contineret, qui magna exspectatione venisset, temere progressus turpem habuit exitum et noctu ne conclamatis quidem vasis flumen transit atque in eandem partem, ex qua venerat, redit ibique prope flumen edito natura loco castra posuit. Paucis diebus interpositis noctu insidias equitum collocavit, quo in loco superioribus fere diebus nostri pabulari consueverant; et cum cotidiana consuetudine Qu. Varus, praefectus equitum Domitii, venisset, subito illi ex insidiis consurrexerunt.

And yet with Domitius’s soldiers scarcely held back, it came to pass that battle was not joined, and chiefly because a stream with difficult banks, lying below Scipio’s camp, was impeding the advance of our men. When Scipio had learned their zeal and alacrity for fighting, suspecting that on the next day he would either be compelled to fight unwilling or, with great infamy, keep himself to his camp—he who had come with great expectation—rashly advancing he had a disgraceful outcome, and by night, without even the signal for the baggage being given, he crossed the river and returned to the same side from which he had come, and there near the river, on a spot elevated by nature, he pitched camp. After a few days had intervened he set a nocturnal ambuscade of cavalry at the place where for almost the previous days our men had been accustomed to forage; and when, in his everyday custom, Quintus Varus, prefect of cavalry of Domitius, had come, suddenly they sprang up from the ambush.

Sed nostri fortiter impetum eorum tulerunt, celeriterque ad suos quisque ordines rediit, atque ultro universi in hostes impetum fecerunt; ex his circiter LXXX interfectis, reliquis in fugam coniectis, duobus amissis in castra se receperunt.

But our men bravely bore their assault, and quickly each returned to his own ranks, and moreover, of their own accord, all together made an attack upon the enemy; with about 80 of them slain, the rest cast into flight, and with two lost, they withdrew into the camp.

[38] His rebus gestis Domitius, sperans Scipionem ad pugnam elici posse, simulavit sese angustiis rei frumentariae adductum castra movere, vasisque militari more conclamatis progressus milia passuum III loco idoneo et occulto omnem exercitum equitatumque collocavit. Scipio ad sequendum paratus equitum magnam partem ad explorandum iter Domitii et cognoscendum praemisit. Qui cum essent progressi, primaeque turmae insidias intravissent, ex fremitu equorum illata suspicione ad suos se recipere coeperunt, quique hos sequebantur celerem eorum receptum conspicati restiterunt.

[38] With these things done, Domitius, hoping that Scipio could be drawn out to battle, pretended that he, constrained by the straits of the grain-supply, was moving camp; and, the baggage called together after military custom, having advanced 3 miles, he stationed his whole army and cavalry in a suitable and concealed place. Scipio, prepared to pursue, sent ahead a great part of the cavalry to explore and ascertain Domitius’s route. When these had advanced and the first squadrons had entered the ambuscade, suspicion, brought on by the din of the horses, led them to begin to withdraw to their own; and those who were following them, catching sight of their swift retreat, halted.

Nostri, cognitis insidiis, ne frustra reliquos exspectarent, duas nacti turmas exceperunt (in his fuit M. Opimius, praefectus equitum), reliquos omnes aut interfecerunt aut captos ad Domitium deduxerunt.

Our men, the ambush having been recognized, lest they should expect the rest to no purpose, having come upon two squadrons, intercepted them (among these was M. Opimius, prefect of cavalry), and all the others they either killed or, captured, led to Domitius.

[39] Deductis orae maritimae praesidiis Caesar, ut supra demonstratum est, III cohortes Orici oppidi tuendi causa reliquit isdemque custodiam navium longarum tradidit, quas ex Italia traduxerat. Huic officio oppidoque Acilius Caninus legatus praeerat. Is naves nostras interiorem in portum post oppidum reduxit et ad terram deligavit faucibusque portus navem onerariam submersam obiecit et huic alteram coniunxit; super quam turrim effectam ad ipsum introitum portus opposuit et militibus complevit tuendamque ad omnes repentinos casus tradidit.

[39] Caesar, the garrisons of the maritime shore having been brought down, as has been shown above, left 3 cohorts for the purpose of guarding the town of Oricum, and to these same he entrusted the custody of the long ships, which he had brought across from Italy. Over this duty and the town the legate Acilius Caninus was in command. He led back our ships into the inner port behind the town and moored them to the land, and at the narrows of the harbor he set in the way a cargo-ship sunk and joined another to it; over this, a tower having been made, he placed it opposite the very entrance of the port and filled it with soldiers and assigned it to be guarded against all sudden contingencies.

[40] Quibus cognitis rebus Cn. Pompeius filius, qui classi Aegyptiae praeerat, ad Oricum venit submersamque navim remulco multisque contendens funibus adduxit atque alteram navem, quae erat ad custodiam ab Acilio posita, pluribus aggressus navibus, in quibus ad libram fecerat turres, ut ex superiore pugnans loco integrosque semper defatigatis submittens et reliquis partibus simul ex terra scalis et classe moenia oppidi temptans, uti adversariorum manus diduceret, labore et multitudine telorum nostros vicit, deiectisque defensoribus, qui omnes scaphis excepti refugerant, eam navem expugnavit, eodemque tempore ex altera parte molem tenuit naturalem obiectam, quae paene insulam oppidum effecerat, et IIII biremes subiectis scutulis impulsas vectibus in interiorem portum traduxit. Ita ex utraque parte naves longas aggressus, quae erant deligatae ad terram atque inanes, IIII ex his abduxit, reliquas incendit. Hoc confecto negotio D. Laelium ab Asiatica classe abductum reliquit, qui commeatus Bullide atque Amantia importari in oppidum prohibebat.

[40] When these things were known, Gnaeus Pompeius the son, who was commanding the Egyptian fleet, came to Oricum and, by tow and straining with many ropes, drew up the sunken ship, and, attacking with several ships the other vessel which had been placed for guard by Acilius, upon some of which he had made towers balanced true to the level, so that, fighting from a higher position and always sending in the fresh to relieve the wearied, and at the same time attempting the town-walls with ladders from the land and with the fleet as well, in order to draw apart the hands of the adversaries, by toil and a multitude of missiles he overcame our men; and, the defenders cast down—who all had been taken up in skiffs and had fled back—he stormed that ship; and at the same time on the other side he seized a natural mole thrown up opposite, which had made the town almost an island, and, with skid-boards placed beneath and the ships driven by levers, he brought 4 biremes into the inner harbor. Thus, attacking the long ships from either side, which had been moored to the land and were empty, he led away 4 of these, and burned the rest. This business having been completed, he left D. Laelius, drawn away from the Asiatic fleet, who was prohibiting that supplies from Bullis and Amantia be imported into the town.

Ipse Lissum profectus naves onerarias XXX a M. Antonio relictas intra portum aggressus omnes incendit; Lissum expugnare conatus defendentibus civibus Romanis, qui eius conventus erant, militibusque, quos praesidii causa miserat Caesar, triduum moratus paucis in oppugnatione amissis re infecta inde discessit.

He himself set out for Lissus and, attacking within the harbor the 30 cargo ships left by M. Antonius, burned them all; attempting to storm Lissus, with Roman citizens defending it—who were of that conventus (judicial district)—and with the soldiers whom Caesar had sent for the sake of a garrison, after a delay of three days, with few lost in the assault, the matter left undone, he departed from there.

[41] Caesar, postquam Pompeium ad Asparagium esse cognovit, eodem cum exercitu profectus expugnato in itinere oppido Parthinorum, in quo Pompeius praesidium habebat, tertio die ad Pompeium pervenit iuxtaque eum castra posuit et postridie eductis omnibus copiis acie instructa decernendi potestatem Pompeio fecit. Ubi illum suis locis se tenere animadvertit, reducto in castra exercitu aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit. Itaque postero die omnibus copiis magno circuitu difficili angustoque itinere Dyrrachium profectus est sperans Pompeium aut Dyrrachium compelli aut ab eo intercludi posse, quod omnem commeatum totiusque belli apparatum eo contulisset; ut accidit Pompeium enim primo ignorans eius consilium, quod diverso ab ea regione itinere profectum videbat, angustiis rei frumentariae compulsum discessisse existimabat; postea per exploratores certior factus postero die castra movit, breviore itinere se occurrere ei posse sperans.

[41] Caesar, after he learned that Pompey was at Asparagium, set out to the same place with his army; the town of the Parthini, in which Pompey had a garrison, having been taken by storm on the march, on the third day he came to Pompey and pitched camp next to him, and on the next day, with all his forces led out and the battle line drawn up, he gave Pompey the power of deciding. When he noticed that he was keeping to his own positions, with the army led back into camp he judged that another counsel should be adopted by himself. And so on the following day with all his forces, by a great circuit and by a difficult and narrow route, he set out for Dyrrachium, hoping that Pompey could either be compelled to Dyrrachium or be cut off from it, because he had transferred there all the supply and the apparatus of the whole war; as it turned out—for at first, ignorant of his plan, since he saw that he had set out by a route different from that region, he supposed that Pompey, forced by the straits of the grain-supply, had departed; afterwards, having been made more certain by scouts, on the following day he moved his camp, hoping that by a shorter route he could meet him.

Quod fore suspicatus Caesar militesque adhortatus, ut aequo animo laborem ferrent, parvam partem noctis itinere intermisso mane Dyrrachium venit, cum primum agmen Pompei procul cerneretur, atque ibi castra posuit.

Suspecting that this would be the case, Caesar, having encouraged the soldiers to bear the labor with an even mind, after intermitting the march for a small part of the night, came in the morning to Dyrrachium, when the foremost column of Pompey was seen from afar, and there he pitched camp.

[42] Pompeium interclusus Dyrrachio, ubi propositum tenere non potuit, secundo usus consilio edito loco, qui appellatur Petra aditumque habet navibus mediocrem atque eas a quibusdam protegit ventis, castra communit. Eo partem navium longarum convenire, frumentum commeatumque ab Asia atque omnibus regionibus, quas tenebat, comportari imperat. Caesar longius bellum ductum iri existimans et de Italicis commeatibus desperans, quod tanta diligentia omni litora a Pompeianis tenebantur, classesque ipsius, quas hieme in Sicilia, Gallia, Italia fecerat, morabantur, in Epirum rei frumentariae causa Q. Tillium et L. Canuleium legatum misit, quodque hae regiones aberant longius, locis certis horrea constituit vecturasque frumenti finitimis civitatibus descripsit.

[42] Pompey, shut out from Dyrrachium, when he could not hold to his plan, having recourse to a second counsel, on a raised place which is called Petra and has a middling access for ships and protects them from certain winds, fortifies a camp. To that place he orders part of the long ships to assemble, and grain and supplies to be brought from Asia and from all the regions which he held. Caesar, thinking that the war would be drawn out longer and despairing of Italian supplies, because with such diligence all the shores were held by the Pompeians, and his own fleets, which he had built in winter in Sicily, Gaul, and Italy, were delayed, sent Q. Tillius and L. Canuleius the legate into Epirus for the sake of the grain-supply, and because these regions were farther off he established granaries in fixed places and assessed the transport-services of grain upon the neighboring communities.

Item Lisso Parthinisque et omnibus castellis quod esset frumenti conquiri iussit. Id erat perexiguum cum ipsius agri natura, quod sunt loca aspera ac montuosa ac plerumque frumento utuntur importato, tum quod Pompeius haec providerat et superioribus diebus praedae loco Parthinos habuerat frumentumque omne conquisitum spoliatis effossisque eorum domibus per equites comportarat.

Likewise at Lissus and among the Parthini and in all the forts he ordered whatever grain there was to be collected. This was very scant, both because of the nature of the land itself—since the places are rough and mountainous and for the most part they use imported grain—and also because Pompey had foreseen these things and in the preceding days had treated the Parthini as booty, and had had all the grain that had been searched out transported by his horsemen, their houses having been plundered and dug up.

[43] Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar consilium capit ex loci natura. Erant enim circum castra Pompei permulti editi atque asperi colles. Hos primum praesidiis tenuit castellaque ibi communit.

[43] With these things learned, Caesar adopts a plan from the nature of the place. For around Pompey’s camp there were very many elevated and rugged hills. These he first holds with garrisons and fortifies redoubts there.

Inde, ut loci cuiusque natura ferebat, ex castello in castellum perducta munitione circumvallare Pompeium instituit, haec spectans, quod angusta re frumentaria utebatur quodque Pompeius multitudine equitum valebat, quo minore periculo undique frumentum commeatumque exercitui supportare posset, simul, uti pabulatione Pompeium prohiberet equitatumque eius ad rem gerendam inutilem efficeret, tertio, ut auctoritatem qua ille maxime apud exteras nationes niti videbatur, minueret, cum fama per orbem terrarum percrebuisset, illum a Caesare obsideri neque audere proelio dimicare.

Thence, as the nature of each place allowed, with a fortification carried from redoubt to redoubt he set about to circumvallate Pompey, having these aims in view: that he was in straitened circumstances as to grain and that Pompey was strong by a multitude of cavalry, whereby with less danger he might be able to bring up grain and convoy of supplies to the army from all sides; at the same time, that he might prohibit Pompey from foraging and render his cavalry useless for the prosecution of affairs; thirdly, that he might lessen the authority on which he seemed most to rely among foreign nations, since the report had spread through the whole world that he was being besieged by Caesar and did not dare to engage in battle.

[44] Pompeius neque a mari Dyrrachioque discedere volebat, quod omnem apparatum belli, tela, arma, tormenta ibi collocaverat frumentumque exercitui navibus supportabat, neque munitiones Caesaris prohibere poterat, nisi proelio decertare vellet; quod eo tempore statuerat non esse faciendum. Relinquebatur, ut extremam rationem belli sequens quam plurimos colles occuparet et quam latissimas regiones praesidiis teneret Caesarisque copias, quam maxime posset, distineret; idque accidit. Castellis enim XXIIII effectis XV milia passuum circuitu amplexus hoc spatio pabulabatur; multaque erant intra eum locum manu sata, quibus interim iumenta pasceret.

[44] Pompey neither wished to depart from the sea and from Dyrrachium, because he had placed there all the apparatus of war—missiles, arms, artillery—and was supplying grain for the army by ships, nor could he prevent Caesar’s fortifications unless he were willing to contend in a decisive battle; which at that time he had determined ought not to be done. It remained, therefore, that, following war’s last-resort tactic, he should seize as many hills as possible and hold by garrisons the broadest regions, and keep Caesar’s forces, as much as he could, distracted; and so it came about. For after 24 forts had been constructed, encompassing a circuit of 15 miles, he foraged within this space; and there were many fields within that area sown by hand, on which in the meantime he might feed the beasts of burden.

Atque ut nostri perpetua munitione providebant, ne quo loco erumperent Pompeiani ac nostros post tergum adorirentur, ita illi interiore spatio perpetuas munitiones efficiebant, ne quem locum nostri intrare atque ipsos a tergo circumvenire possent. Sed illi operibus vincebant, quod et numero militum praestabant et interiore spatio minorem circuitum habebant. Quaecumque erant loca Caesari capienda, etsi prohibere Pompeius totis copiis et dimicare non constituerat, tamen suis locis sagittarios funditoresque mittebat, quorum magnum habebat numerum, multique ex nostris vulnerabantur, magnusque incesserat timor sagittarum, atque omnes fere milites aut ex coactis aut ex centonibus aut ex coriis tunicas aut tegimenta fecerant, quibus tela vitarent.

And just as our men, by a perpetual fortification, took precautions that the Pompeians should not burst out at any point and attack our men from behind, so they, within the inner space, were making perpetual fortifications, that our men might not be able to enter any place and surround them from the rear. But they outdid us in works, because they both excelled in the number of soldiers and, by the inner space, had a smaller circuit. Whatever places were to be seized by Caesar, although Pompey had decided not to prevent them with all his forces nor to fight it out, nevertheless he sent to the particular spots archers and slingers, of whom he had a great number, and many of our men were being wounded, and a great fear of arrows had arisen, and almost all the soldiers had made tunics or coverings either from felted cloth or from patchwork quilts or from hides, with which to avoid the missiles.

[45] In occupandis praesidiis magna vi uterque nitebatur: Caesar, ut quam angustissime Pompeium contineret; Pompeius, ut quam plurimos colles quam maximo circuitu occuparet, crebraque ob eam causam proelia fiebant. In his cum legio Caesaris nona praesidium quoddam occupavisset et munire coepisset, huic loco propinquum et contrarium collem Pompeius occupavit nostrosque opere prohibere coepit et, cum una ex parte prope aequum aditum haberet, primum sagittariis funditoribusque circumiectis, postea levis armaturae magna multitudine missa tormentisque prolatis munitiones impediebat; neque erat facile nostris uno tempore propugnare et munire. Caesar, cum suos ex omnibus partibus vulnerari videret, recipere se iussit et loco excedere.

[45] In seizing strongholds each strove with great force: Caesar, to hem in Pompey as narrowly as possible; Pompey, to occupy as many hills as possible with the greatest circuit; and frequent battles took place for that reason. In these, when Caesar’s ninth legion had occupied a certain outpost and had begun to fortify it, Pompey seized a hill near to and opposite this spot and began to prevent our men from their work; and since from one side he had an almost level approach, first, after surrounding them with archers and slingers, afterward, having sent in a great multitude of light-armed troops and brought up engines, he was obstructing the fortifications; nor was it easy for our men at one and the same time to defend and to fortify. Caesar, when he saw his men being wounded from all parts, ordered them to withdraw and to leave the place.

Erat per declive receptus. Illi autem hoc acrius instabant neque regredi nostros patiebantur, quod timore adducti locum relinquere videbantur. Dicitur eo tempore glorians apud suos Pompeius dixisse: non recusare se, quin nullius usus imperator existimaretur, si sine maximo detrimento legiones Caesaris sese recepissent inde, quo temere essent progressae.

The retreat was down a slope. But they pressed on all the more sharply and did not allow our men to go back, because they seemed, driven by fear, to be abandoning the position. Pompey is said, boasting among his own at that time, to have said that he did not shrink from being reckoned a commander of no use, if Caesar’s legions should have withdrawn from there, whither they had rashly advanced, without very great loss.

[46] Caesar receptui suorum timens crates ad extremum tumulum contra hostem proferri et adversas locari, intra has mediocri latitudine fossam tectis militibus obduci iussit locumque in omnes partes quam maxime impediri. Ipse idoneis locis funditores instruxit, ut praesidio nostris se recipientibus essent. His rebus comparatis legionem reduci iussit.

[46] Fearing for the retreat of his men, Caesar ordered hurdles to be carried forward to the farthest knoll against the enemy and set facing them; within these he ordered a ditch of moderate width to be dug, with the soldiers under cover, and the place to be obstructed in all directions as much as possible. He arrayed slingers in suitable positions, that they might be a safeguard to our men as they withdrew. With these things prepared, he ordered the legion to be led back.

Pompeiani hoc insolentius atque audacius nostros premere et instare coeperunt cratesque pro munitione obiectas propulerunt, ut fossas transcenderent. Quod cum animadvertisset Caesar, veritus, ne non reducti, sed reiecti viderentur, maiusque detrimentum caperetur, a medio fere spatio suos per Antonium, qui ei legioni praeerat, cohortatus tuba signum dari atque in hostes impetum fieri iussit. Milites legionis VIIII subito conspirati pila coniecerunt et ex inferiore loco adversus clivum incitati cursu praecipites Pompeianos egerunt et terga vertere coegerunt; quibus ad recipiendum crates deiectae longuriique obiecti et institutae fossae magno impedimento fuerunt.

The Pompeians began to press our men more insolently and more audaciously and to insist, and they pushed forward the hurdles set in front as a fortification, so that they might cross the ditches. When Caesar noticed this, fearing lest they seem not withdrawn but driven back, and a greater detriment be sustained, from about the middle of the space he, through Antony, who was in command of that legion, after exhorting his men, ordered the signal to be given by the trumpet and an attack to be made against the enemy. The soldiers of the 9th legion, suddenly acting in concert, hurled their pila and, from the lower ground, urged on at a run up the slope, drove the Pompeians headlong and forced them to turn their backs; and, for their receiving themselves in retreat, the hurdles thrown down and the long poles cast in their way and the ditches they had established were a great impediment.

Nostri vero, qui satis habebant sine detrimento discedere, compluribus interfectis V omnino suorum amissis quietissime se receperunt pauloque citra eum locum aliis comprehensis collibus munitiones perfecerunt.

Our men indeed, who deemed it sufficient to depart without detriment, with several slain and with 5 of their own lost in all, withdrew most quietly, and, a little on this side of that place, with other hills seized, they completed the fortifications.

[47] Erat nova et inusitata belli ratio cum tot castellorum numero tantoque spatio et tantis munitionibus et toto obsidionis genere, tum etiam reliquis rebus. Nam quicumque alterum obsidere conati sunt, perculsos atque infirmos hostes adorti aut proelio superatos aut aliqua offensione permotos continuerunt, cum ipsi numero equitum militumque praestarent; causa autem obsidionis haec fere esse consuevit, ut frumento hostes prohiberent. At tum integras atque incolumes copias Caesar inferiore militum numero continebat, cum illi omnium rerum copia abundarent; cotidie enim magnus undique navium numerus conveniebat, quae commeatum supportarent, neque ullus flare ventus poterat, quin aliqua ex parte secundum cursum haberent.

[47] There was a new and unusual method of war, both in the number of so many forts, and in so great an extent and such great fortifications, and in the entire genre of siege, and likewise in the remaining particulars. For whenever people have attempted to besiege another, they have attacked enemies struck with fear and weakened, and kept them contained, either after being overcome in battle or stirred by some mishap, since they themselves excelled in the number of horse and foot; and the cause of a siege has generally been this: to prevent the enemy from grain. But at that time Caesar was holding in check intact and unhurt forces with an inferior number of soldiers, while they abounded in a supply of all things; for every day a great number of ships from all sides was assembling to bring up provisions, nor could any wind blow without their having in some respect a favorable course.

Ipse autem consumptis omnibus longe lateque frumentis summis erat in angustiis. Sed tamen haec singulari patientia milites ferebant. Recordabantur enim eadem se superiore anno in Hispania perpessos labore et patientia maximum bellum confecisse, meminerant ad Alesiam magnam se inopiam perpessos, multo etiam maiorem ad Avaricum, maximarum gentium victores discessisse.

He himself, however, with all the grain far and wide consumed, was in the utmost straits. Yet the soldiers bore these things with singular patience. For they recalled that, having endured the same things the previous year in Hispania, by labor and patience they had brought a very great war to completion; they remembered that at Alesia they had endured a great want, and an even much greater at Avaricum, and that they had departed victors over the greatest nations.

Non illi hordeum cum daretur, non legumina recusabant; pecus vero cuius rei summa erat ex Epiro copia, magno in honore habebant.

They did not refuse barley when it was given, nor legumes; but livestock, of which there was a very great abundance from Epirus, they held in high honor.

[48] Est autem genus radicis inventum ab eis, qui fuerant vacui ab operibus, quod appellatur chara, quod admixtum lacte multum inopiam levabat. Id ad similitudinem panis efficiebant. Eius erat magna copia.

[48] Moreover, a kind of root was discovered by those who had been free from tasks, which is called chara, which, admixed with milk, greatly alleviated want. They fashioned it in the similitude of bread. Of it there was a great abundance.

Ex hoc effectos panes, cum in colloquiis Pompeiani famem nostris obiectarent, vulgo in eos iaciebant, ut spem eorum minuerent.

From this, breads having been made, when in colloquies the Pompeians objected hunger to our men, they would commonly throw them at them, to diminish their hope.

[49] Iamque frumenta maturescere incipiebant, atque ipsa spes inopiam sustentabat, quod celeriter se habituros copiam confidebant; crebraeque voces militum in vigiliis colloquiisque audiebantur, prius se cortice ex arboribus victuros, quam Pompeium e manibus dimissuros. Libenter etiam ex perfugis cognoscebant equos eorum tolerari, reliqua vero iumenta interisse; uti autem ipsos valetudine non bona, cum angustiis loci et odore taetro ex multitudine cadaverum et cotidianis laboribus insuetos operum, tum aquae summa inopia affectos. Omnia enim flumina atque omnes rivos, qui ad mare pertinebant, Caesar aut averterat aut magnis operibus obstruxerat, atque ut erant loca montuosa et aspera, angustias vallium sublicis in terram demissis praesaepserat terramque aggesserat, ut aquam contineret.

[49] And now the grains were beginning to ripen, and hope itself was sustaining the want, because they trusted they would quickly have abundance; and frequent voices of the soldiers were heard in the watches and colloquies, that they would sooner live on bark from trees than let Pompey slip from their hands. They also gladly learned from deserters that their horses were being kept up, but that the remaining draft-animals had perished; and that they themselves, in not good health—what with the straits of the place and the foul odor from the multitude of corpses and the daily labors, being unaccustomed to such works—and further afflicted with the utmost scarcity of water. For Caesar had either diverted all the rivers and all the brooks which ran down to the sea or had blocked them by great works, and, as the places were mountainous and rough, he had fenced the narrows of the valleys by piles let down into the ground and had heaped up earth, to contain the water.

Itaque illi necessario loca sequi demissa ac palustria et puteos fodere cogebantur atque hunc laborem ad cotidiana opera addebant; qui tamen fontes a quibusdam praesidiis aberant longius et celeriter aestibus exarescebant. At Caesaris exercitus optima valetudine summaque aquae copia utebatur, tum commeatus omni genere praeter frumentum abundabat; quibus cotidie melius succedere tempus maioremque spem maturitate frumentorum proponi videbant.

Therefore they, of necessity, were compelled to follow low-lying and marshy places and to dig wells, and they added this labor to their daily tasks; yet those springs were at a greater distance from certain outposts and quickly dried up in the heats. But Caesar’s army enjoyed the best health and the greatest abundance of water, and provisions of every kind, except grain, were plentiful; by which they saw that day by day the time was succeeding better and that greater hope was being set forth by the maturity of the grains.

[50] In novo genere belli novae ab utrisque bellandi rationes reperiebantur. Illi, cum animadvertissent ex ignibus noctu cohortes nostras ad munitiones excubare, silentio aggressi universi intra multitudinem sagittas coniciebant et se confestim ad suos recipiebant. Quibus rebus nostri usu docti haec reperiebant remedia, ut alio loco ignes facerent . . .

[50] In a new kind of war, new methods of warring were being discovered by both sides. They, when they had noticed from the fires at night that our cohorts were keeping watch at the fortifications, having approached in silence, all together would hurl arrows into the multitude and immediately withdraw to their own. By which things our men, taught by use (experience), were discovering these remedies: that they should make fires in another place . . .

[51] Interim certior factus P. Sulla, quem discedens catris praefecerat Caesar, auxillo cohorti venit cum legionibus duabus; cuius adventu facile sunt repulsi Pompeiani. Neque vero conspectum aut impetum nostrorum tulerunt, primisque deiectis reliqui se verterunt et loco cesserunt. Sed insequentes nostros, ne longius prosequerentur, Sulla revocavit.

[51] Meanwhile, having been informed, Publius Sulla, whom, as he was departing, Caesar had put in charge of the camp, came with two legions to the cohort’s aid; at whose arrival the Pompeians were easily repulsed. Nor indeed did they endure the sight or the onset of our men, and, the foremost having been cast down, the rest wheeled about and yielded the position. But Sulla recalled our men in pursuit, lest they should follow farther.

At plerique existimant, si acrius insequi voluisset, bellum eo die potuisse finire. Cuius consilium reprehendendum non videtur. Aliae enim sunt legati partes atque imperatoris: alter omnia agere ad praescriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet.

But most think that, if he had wished to pursue more sharply, the war could have been finished that day. Yet his counsel does not seem to be reprehensible. For the parts of the legate and of the imperator are different: the one ought to do everything according to the prescript, the other ought freely to consult for the sum of affairs.

Sulla a Caesare in castris relictus liberatis suis hoc fuit contentus neque proelio decertare voluit, quae res tamen fortasse aliquem reciperet casum, ne imperatorias sibi partes sumpsisse videretur. Pompeianis magnam res ad receptum difficultatem afferebat. Nam ex iniquo progressi loco in summo constiterant; si per declive sese reciperent, nostros ex superiore insequentes loco verebantur; neque multum ad solis occasum temporis supererat; spe enim conficiendi negotii prope in noctem rem duxerant.

Sulla, left by Caesar in the camp, with his own men liberated, was content with this and did not wish to decide the matter by battle—a thing which, however, might perhaps have admitted some chance—lest he seem to have assumed imperial functions to himself. For the Pompeians the situation was bringing great difficulty for retreat. For, having advanced from an unequal position, they had taken their stand on the crest; if they should withdraw down the declivity, they feared our men pursuing from the higher ground; nor did much time remain until the setting of the sun; for in the hope of finishing the business they had prolonged the affair almost into the night.

Ita necessario atque ex tempore capto consilio Pompeius tumulum quendam occupavit, qui tantum aberat a nostro castello, ut telum tormento missum adigi non posset. Hoc consedit loco atque eum communivit omnesque ibi copias continuit.

Thus, with a plan taken of necessity and on the spur of the moment, Pompey occupied a certain mound, which was so far from our fort that a missile shot from a siege-engine could not be driven home to it. In this place he encamped and fortified it, and he kept all the forces there.

[52] Eodem tempore duobus praeterea locis pugnatum est: nam plura castella Pompeius pariter distinendae manus causa temptaverat, ne ex proximis praesidiis succurri posset. Uno loco Volcatius Tullus impetum legionis sustinuit cohortibus tribus atque eam loco depulit; altero Germani munitiones nostras egressi compluribus interfectis sese ad suos incolumes receperunt.

[52] At the same time fighting took place in two other places besides: for Pompey had at the same time attempted several forts for the sake of scattering the forces, so that succor could not be brought from the nearest garrisons. In one place Volcatius Tullus, with three cohorts, sustained the assault of a legion and drove it from its position; in another, the Germans, having sallied forth from our fortifications, with several slain, returned unscathed to their own.

[53] Ita uno die VI proeliis factis, tribus ad Dyrrachium, tribus ad munitiones, cum horum omnium ratio haberetur, ad duorum milium numero ex Pompeianis cecidisse reperiebamus, evocatos centurionesque complures (in eo fuit numero Valerius Flaccus, L. filius, eius, qui praetor Asiam obtinuerat); signaque sunt militaria sex relata. Nostri non amplius XX omnibus sunt proeliis desiderati. Sed in castello nemo fuit omnino militum, quin vulneraretur, quattuorque ex una cohorte centuriones oculos amiserunt.

[53] Thus, in one day, with 6 battles having been fought—three at Dyrrachium, three at the fortifications—when account was taken of all these, we found that to the number of two thousand of the Pompeians had fallen, the evocati and several centurions (among that number was Valerius Flaccus, son of Lucius—the latter being he who had held Asia as praetor); and 6 military standards were brought back. Of our men not more than 20 were lost in all the engagements. But in the fort there was not a single soldier at all who was not wounded, and four centurions from one cohort lost their eyes.

Et cum laboris sui periculique testimonium afferre vellent, milia sagittarum circiter XXX in castellum coniecta Caesari renumeraverunt, scutoque ad eum relato Scaevae centurionis inventa sunt in eo foramina CXX. Quem Caesar, ut erat de se meritus et de re publica, donatum milibus CC collaudatumque ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum se traducere pronuntiavit (eius enim opera castellum magna ex parte conservatum esse constabat) cohortemque postea duplici stipendio, frumento, veste, cibariis militaribusque donis amplissime donavit

And when they wished to bring testimony of their toil and peril, they counted out to Caesar about 30 thousand arrows cast into the fort, and, with the shield of the centurion Scaeva brought back to him, 120 holes were found in it. Caesar, as he had deserved of himself and of the commonwealth, declared him gifted with 200,000 sesterces and, highly commended, announced that he would transfer him from the eighth ranks to the primipilate (for it was agreed that by his effort the fort had in great part been preserved); and afterward he most bountifully endowed the cohort with double stipend, grain, clothing, rations, and military gifts.

[54] Pompeius noctu magnis additis munitionibus reliquis diebus turres exstruxit, et in altitudinem pedum XV effectis operibus vineis eam partem castrorum obtexit, et quinque intermissis diebus alteram noctem subnubilam nactus obstructis omnibus castrorum portis et ad impediendum obicibus obiectis tertia inita vigilia silentio exercitum eduxit et se in antiquas munitiones recepit.

[54] By night Pompey, great additions having been made to the fortifications, in the remaining days erected towers; and when the works had been brought to a height of 15 feet, he covered that part of the camp with vineae; and after an interval of five days, having gotten another somewhat-cloudy night, with all the gates of the camp obstructed and obstructions set to impede thrown up, with the third watch begun he led the army out in silence and withdrew into the old fortifications.

[55] Omnibus deinceps diebus Caesar exercitum in aciem aequum in locum produxit, si Pompeius proelio decertare vellet, ut paene castris Pompei legiones subiceret; tantumque a vallo eius prima acies aberat, uti ne telum tormento adigi posset. Pompeius autem, ut famam opinionemque hominum teneret, sic pro castris exercitum constituebat, ut tertia acies vallum contingeret, omnis quidem instructus exercitus telis ex vallo coniectis protegi posset.

[55] On all the following days Caesar led his army out into line of battle on level ground, if Pompey should wish to fight it out in a pitched battle, so that he almost brought Pompey’s legions under their very camp; and his front battle line was at such a distance from Pompey’s rampart that a missile could not be driven by an engine. Pompey, however, in order to hold the reputation and expectation of men, used to station his army in front of the camp in such a way that the third line touched the rampart, so that the whole army, drawn up for battle, could be protected by missiles cast from the rampart.

[56] Aetolia, Acarnania, Amphilochis per Cassium Longinum et Calvisium Sabinum, ut demonstravimus, receptis temptandam sibi Achaiam ac paulo longius progrediendum existimabat Caesar. Itaque eo Calenum misit eique Sabinum et Cassium cum cohortibus adiungit. Quorum cognito adventu Rutilius Lupus, qui Achaiam missus a Pompeio obtinebat, Isthmum praemunire instituit, ut Achaia Fufium prohiberet.

[56] Aetolia, Acarnania, and the Amphilochi having been recovered through Cassius Longinus and Calvisius Sabinus, as we have demonstrated, Caesar judged that Achaia was to be attempted by himself and that he should advance a little farther. And so he sent Calenus thither and to him he adjoins Sabinus and Cassius with cohorts. Their arrival having been learned, Rutilius Lupus, who, having been sent by Pompeius, was holding Achaia, began to pre-fortify the Isthmus, in order to keep Fufius out of Achaia.

Calenus Delphos, Thebas, Orchomenum voluntate ipsarum civitatium recepit, nonnullas urbes per vim expugnavit, reliquas civitates circummissis legationibus amicitia Caesari conciliare studebat. In his rebus fere erat Fufius occupatus.

Calenus received Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus by the will of the cities themselves; some towns he stormed by force; the remaining communities he was striving, with legations sent round, to conciliate in amity to Caesar. In these affairs Fufius was for the most part occupied.

[57] Haec cum in Achaia atque apud Dyrrachium gererentur, Scipionemque in Macedoniam venisse constaret, non oblitus pristini instituti Caesar mittit ad eum A. Clodium, suum atque illius familiarem, quem ab illo traditum initio et commendatum in suorum necessariorum numero habere instituerat. Huic dat litteras mandataque ad eum; quorum haec erat summa: sese omnia de pace expertum nihil adhuc effecisse: hoc arbitrari vitio factum eorum, quos esse auctores eius rei voluisset, quod sua mandata perferre non opportuno tempore ad Pompeium vererentur. Scipionem ea esse auctoritate, ut non solum libere quae probasset exponere, sed etiam ex magna parte compellere atque errantem regere posset; praeesse autem suo nomine exercitui, ut praeter auctoritatem vires quoque ad coercendum haberet.

[57] While these things were being transacted in Achaia and around Dyrrachium, and it was established that Scipio had come into Macedonia, Caesar, not forgetful of his former plan, sends to him A. Clodius, an intimate of his and of that man, whom, presented and commended by him at the beginning, he had resolved to hold among the number of his own intimates. To this man he gives letters and mandates for him; the sum of which was this: that he, having tried everything concerning peace, had as yet effected nothing; that he thought this had been done by the fault of those whom he had wished to be the authors of that matter, because they were afraid to carry his mandates to Pompey at an inopportune time. That Scipio was of such authority that he could not only set forth freely the things he had approved, but could even for the most part compel and direct one who was errant; and that he was in command of an army in his own name, so that, besides authority, he also had forces to coerce.

Quod si fecisset, quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperii uni omnes acceptam relaturos. Haec ad eum mandata Clodius refert ac primis diebus, ut videbatur, libenter auditus reliquis ad colloquium non admittitur, castigato Scipione a Favonio, ut postea confecto bello reperiebamus, infectaque re sese ad Caeaarem recepit.

If he did this, all would ascribe to one man the quiet of Italy, the peace of the provinces, the safety of the empire. Clodius reports these mandates to him, and in the first days, as it seemed, he was gladly heard; on the remaining days he is not admitted to a colloquy, Scipio having been castigated by Favonius, as afterward, with the war completed, we discovered; and, the matter unfinished, he returned to Caesar.

[58] Caesar, quo facilius equitatum Pompeianum ad Dyrrachium contineret et pabulatione prohiberet, aditus duos, quos esse angustos demonstravimus, magnis operibus praemunivit castellaque his locis posuit. Pompeius, ubi nihil profici equitatu cognovit, paucis intermissis diebus rursus eum navibus ad se intra munitiones recipit. Erat summa inopia pabuli, adeo ut foliis ex arboribus strictis et teneris harundinum radicibus contusis equos alerent (frumenta enim, quae fuerant intra munitiones sata, consumpserant); cogebantur Corcyra atque Acarnania longo interiecto navigationis spatio pabulum supportare, quodque erat eius rei minor copia, hordeo adaugere atque his rationibus equitatum tolerare.

[58] Caesar, in order the more easily to confine Pompey’s cavalry at Dyrrachium and to prohibit it from foraging, fortified in advance with great works the two approaches, which we have shown to be narrow, and he placed small forts in these places. Pompey, when he learned that nothing was being accomplished by the cavalry, after a few days had intervened, again received it by ships back to himself within the fortifications. There was an extreme lack of fodder, to such a degree that they fed the horses with leaves stripped from the trees and with the tender roots of reeds crushed (for they had consumed the grain-crops which had been sown within the fortifications); they were compelled from Corcyra and Acarnania, with a long interval of sailing interposed, to bring up fodder, and, because there was a smaller supply of that resource, to augment it with barley and by these methods to sustain the cavalry.

Sed postquam non modo hordeum pabulumque omnibus locis herbaeque desectae, sed etiam frons ex arboribus deficiebat, corruptis equis macie conandum sibi aliquid Pompeius de eruptione existimavit.

But after not only the barley and fodder in all places, and the grasses cut, but even the foliage from the trees was failing, the horses ruined by emaciation, Pompey judged that he must attempt something by way of a sortie.

[59] Erant apud Caesarem in equitum numero Allobroges duo fratres, Raucillus et Egus, Adbucilli filii, qui principatum in civitate multis annis obtinuerat, singulari virtute homines, quorum opera Caesar omnibus Gallicis bellis optima fortissimaque erat usus. His domi ob has causas amplissimos magistratus mandaverat atque eos extra ordinem in senatum legendos curaverat agrosque in Gallia ex hostibus captos praemiaque rei pecuniariae magna tribuerat locupletesque ex egentibus fecerat. Hi propter virtutem non solum apud Caesarem in honore erant, sed etiam apud exercitum cari habebantur; sed freti amicitia Caesaris et stulta ac barbara arrogantia elati despiciebant suos stipendiumque equitum fraudabant et praedam omnem domum avertebant.

[59] There were with Caesar in the number of the horsemen two Allobrogian brothers, Raucillus and Egus, sons of Adbucillus, who had held the principate in the civitas for many years, men of singular virtue, whose services Caesar had used as the best and bravest in all the Gallic wars. To these men at home on these accounts he had entrusted the most ample magistracies and had taken care that they be chosen into the senate out of order, and he had granted them fields in Gaul captured from the enemies and great pecuniary rewards, and had made them wealthy from needy. These men, on account of their virtue, were not only in honor with Caesar, but were also held dear by the army; but, relying on the friendship of Caesar and lifted up by foolish and barbaric arrogance, they despised their own men and defrauded the cavalry’s pay and diverted all the plunder homeward.

Quibus illi rebus permoti universi Caesarem adierunt palamque de eorum iniuriis sunt questi et ad cetera addiderunt falsum ab his equitum numerum deferri, quorum stipendium averterent.

Moved by these matters, they all together approached Caesar and openly complained about their injuries, and in addition to the rest they added that a false number of horsemen was being reported by them, whose pay they were diverting.

[60] Caesar neque tempus illud animadversionis esse existimans et multa virtuti eorum concedens rem totam distulit; illos secreto castigavit, quod quaestui equites haberent, monuitque, ut ex sua amicitia omnia exspectarent et ex praeteritis suis officiis reliqua sperarent. Magnam tamen haec res illis offensionem et contemptionem ad omnes attulit, idque ita esse cum ex aliorum obiectationibus tum etiam ex domestico iudicio atque animi conscientia intellegebant. Quo pudore adducti et fortasse non se liberari, sed in aliud tempus reservari arbitrati discedere a nobis et novam temptare fortunam novasque amicitias experiri constituerunt.

[60] Caesar, thinking that that was not a time for animadversion and conceding much to their virtue, deferred the whole matter; he chastised them in private, because they were having the cavalrymen for gain, and admonished them to expect everything from his friendship and to hope the remainder from his past services. Nevertheless this affair brought upon them great offense and contempt with everyone, and that this was so they understood both from the objections of others and also from their own domestic judgment and the conscience of their mind. Brought by this shame, and thinking perhaps that they were not being set free but reserved for another time, they resolved to depart from us and to try a new fortune and to test new friendships.

Et cum paucis collocuti clientibus suis, quibus tantum facinus committere audebant, primum conati sunt praefectum equitum C. Volusenum interficere, ut postea bello confecto cognitum est, ut cum munere aliquo perfugisse ad Pompeium viderentur; postquam id difficilius visum est neque facultas perficiendi dabatur, quam maximas potuerunt pecunias mutuati, proinde ac si suis satisfacere et fraudata restituere vellent, multis coemptis equis ad Pompeium transierunt cum eis, quos sui consilii participes habebant.

And after conferring with a few of their own clients, with whom alone they dared to entrust so great a crime, they first attempted to kill the prefect of horse, Gaius Volusenus, as afterward, when the war was finished, it became known, so that they might seem to have taken refuge with Pompey with some service rendered; after this seemed more difficult and no opportunity for accomplishing it was afforded, having borrowed as large sums of money as they could, just as if they wished to satisfy their creditors and to restore what they had defrauded, having bought many horses they crossed over to Pompey with those whom they held as participants in their plan.

[61] Quos Pompeius, quod erant honesto loco nati et instructi liberaliter magnoque comitatu et multis iumentis venerant virique fortes habebantur et in honore apud Caesarem fuerant, quodque novum et praeter consuetudinem acciderat, omnia sua praesidia circumduxit atque ostentavit. Nam ante id tempus nemo aut miles aut eques a Caesare ad Pompeium transierat, cum paene cotidie a Pompeio ad Caesarem perfugerent, vulgo vero universi in Epiro atque Aetolia conscripti milites earumque regionum omnium, quae a Caesare tenebantur. Sed hi cognitis omnibus rebus, seu quid in munitionibus perfectum non erat, seu quid a peritioribus rei militaris desiderari videbatur, temporibusque rerum et spatiis locorum, custodiarum varia diligentia animadversa, prout cuiusque eorum, qui negotiis praeerant, aut natura aut studium ferebat, haec ad Pompeium omnia detulerunt.

[61] Pompey, since they were born of honorable station and had come liberally equipped, with a great retinue and many beasts of burden, and were held to be brave men and had been in honor with Caesar, and because what had happened was new and beyond custom, led round and displayed all his garrisons. For before that time no soldier or horseman had passed over from Caesar to Pompey, whereas almost daily they were defecting from Pompey to Caesar—indeed, commonly, the enlisted soldiers in Epirus and Aetolia and of all those regions which were held by Caesar. But these men, having learned all matters—whether anything in the fortifications was not completed, or anything seemed to be lacking according to those more expert in the military art, and the timings of operations and the expanses of places, the varying diligence of the guards having been observed, according as the nature or zeal of each of those who were in charge of the operations inclined—reported all these things to Pompey.

[62] Quibus ille cognitis rebus eruptionisque iam ante capto consilio, ut demonstratum est, tegimenta galeis milites ex viminibus facere atque aggerem iubet comportare. His paratis rebus magnum numerum levis armaturae et sagittariorum aggeremque omnem noctu in scaphas et naves actuarias imponit et de media nocte cohortes LX ex maximis castris praesidiisque deductas ad eam partem munitionum ducit, quae pertinebant ad mare longissimeque a maximis castris Caesaris aberant. Eodem naves, quas demonstravimus, aggere et levis armaturae militibus completas, quasque ad Dyrrachium naves longas habebat, mittit et, quid a quoque fieri velit, praecipit.

[62] When these matters were known to him, and with the plan of an eruption (sortie) already previously adopted, as has been shown, he orders the soldiers to make coverings for their helmets out of osiers and to bring in agger (embankment) material. With these things prepared, he loads by night a great number of light-armed troops and archers, and all the agger, into skiffs and dispatch-boats, and at midnight leads 60 cohorts, withdrawn from the very large camps and garrisons, to that part of the fortifications which reached to the sea and was farthest from Caesar’s main camp. To the same place he sends the ships which we have pointed out, filled with agger and with light-armed soldiers, and also the long ships which he had at Dyrrachium, and he gives orders as to what he wishes each to do.

Ad eas munitiones Caesar Lentulum Marcellinum quaestorem cum legione VIIII positum habebat. Huic, quod valetudine minus commoda utebatur, Fulvium Postumum adiutorem submiserat.

At those fortifications Caesar had Lentulus Marcellinus, quaestor, posted with the 9th legion. To him, since he was in somewhat impaired health, he had supplied Fulvius Postumus as an assistant.

[63] Erat eo loco fossa pedum XV et vallum contra hostem in altitudinem pedum X, tantundemque eius valli agger in latitudinem patebat: ab eo intermisso spatio pedum DC alter conversus in contrariam partem erat vallus humiliore paulo munitione. Hoc enim superioribus diebus timens Caesar, ne navibus nostri circumvenirentur, duplicem eo loco fecerat vallum, ut, si ancipiti proelio dimicaretur, posset resisti. Sed operum magnitudo et continens omnium dierum labor, quod milium passuum in circuitu XVII munitiones erat complexus, perficiendi spatium non dabat.

[63] In that place there was a ditch of 15 feet and a rampart against the enemy to a height of 10 feet, and the embankment (agger) of that rampart extended just as much in width: at an intervening distance of 600 feet from it there was another rampart, turned in the opposite direction, with a fortification a little lower. For Caesar, fearing in the preceding days lest our men be surrounded by ships, had made a double rampart in that place, so that, if battle were fought on a two-fronted field, resistance might be made. But the greatness of the works and the continuous labor of all the days, because he had encompassed fortifications in a circuit of 17 miles, did not allow time for completion.

Itaque contra mare transversum vallum, qui has duas munitiones coniungeret, nondum perfecerat. Quae res nota erat Pompeio delata per Allobrogas perfugas, magnumque nostris attulerat incommodum. Nam ut ad mare duo cohortes nonae legionis excubuerant, accessere subito prima luce Pompeiani; simul navibus circumvecti milites in exteriorem vallum tela iaciebant, fossaeque aggere complebantur, et legionarii interioris munitionis defensores scalis admotis tormentis cuiusque generis telisque terrebant, magnaque multitudo sagittariorum ab utraque parte circumfundebatur.

Accordingly the crosswise rampart facing the sea, which should connect these two fortifications, he had not yet completed. This matter, having become known, had been reported to Pompey by Allobrogian deserters, and had brought our men great discommodium. For when by the sea two cohorts of the Ninth legion had kept watch, the Pompeians approached suddenly at first light; at the same time soldiers, having been carried around by ships, were hurling missiles at the outer rampart, and the ditch was being filled with an agger embankment; and, with ladders brought up, they were terrifying the legionary defenders of the inner fortification with engines of every kind and with missiles, and a great multitude of archers was being poured in on both sides.

Multum autem ab ictu lapidum, quod unum nostris erat telum, viminea tegimenta galeis imposita defendebant. Itaque cum omnibus rebus nostri premerentur atque aegre resisterent animadversum est vitium munitionis, quod supra demonstratum est, atque inter duos vallos, qua perfectum opus non erat, Pompeiani navibus eiti in aversos nostros impetum fecerunt atque ex utraque munitione deiectos terga vertere coegerunt

Moreover, from the blow of stones—since that was the one missile for our men—the wickerwork coverings placed upon the helmets afforded much defense. Therefore, when in all respects our men were pressed hard and scarcely held out, the defect of the fortification, which has been shown above, was noticed; and between the two ramparts, where the work had not been completed, the Pompeians, having been put ashore from the ships, made an attack upon our men from the rear, and forced those dislodged from each fortification to turn their backs.

[64] Hoc tumultu nuntiato Marcellinus cohortes subsidio nostris laborantibus submittit ex castris; quae fugientes conspicatae neque illos suo adventu confirmare potuerunt neque ipsae hostium impetum tulerunt. Itaque quodcumque addebatur subsidii, id corruptum timore fugientium terrorem et periculum augebat; hominum enim multitudine receptus impediebatur. In eo proelio cum gravi vulnere esset affectus aquilifer et a viribus deficeretur, conspicatus equites nostros, "hanc ego," inquit, "et vivus multos per annos magna diligentia defendi et nunc moriens eadem fide Caesari restituo.

[64] With this tumult announced, Marcellinus sends down from the camp cohorts for succor to our men laboring; and these, having caught sight of those fleeing, could neither by their arrival strengthen them nor did they themselves endure the enemy’s onset. And so whatever reinforcement was added, that, tainted by the fear of the fugitives, increased terror and danger; for the taking-in was hindered by the multitude of men. In that battle, when the eagle-bearer had been afflicted with a grave wound and was failing in strength, having caught sight of our horsemen, “this [eagle] I,” he said, “both while living for many years have defended with great diligence, and now, dying, I restore to Caesar with the same faith.

Nolite, obsecro, committere, quod ante in exercitu Caesaris non accidit, ut rei militaris dedecus admittatur, incolumemque ad eum deferte." Hoc casu aquila conservatur omnibus primae cohortis centurionibus interfectis praeter principem priorem.

"Do not, I beg, commit what has not previously happened in Caesar’s army, that a disgrace to the military art be admitted; and deliver it intact to him." By this occurrence the eagle was preserved, all the centurions of the first cohort having been slain except the princeps prior.

[65] Iamque Pompeiani magna caede nostrorum castris Marcellini appropinquabant non mediocri terrore illato reliquis cohortibus, et M. Antonius, qui proximum locum praesidiorum tenebat, ea re nuntiata cum cohortibus XII descendens ex loco superiore cernebatur. Cuius adventus Pompeianos compressit nostrosque firmavit, ut se ex maximo timore colligerent. Neque multo post Caesar significatione per castella fumo facta, ut erat superioris temporis consuetudo, deductis quibusdam cohortibus ex praesidiis eodem venit.

[65] And now, after a great slaughter of our men, the Pompeians were approaching the camp of Marcellinus, with no moderate terror brought upon the remaining cohorts; and M. Antonius, who held the nearest position of the garrisons, this matter having been reported, was seen descending from higher ground with 12 cohorts. His arrival pressed back the Pompeians and made our men firm, so that they gathered themselves from the greatest fear. And not long after Caesar, a signal made by smoke through the forts, as was the custom of earlier time, with certain cohorts drawn down from the garrisons, came to the same place.

Qui cognito detrimento eum animadvertisset Pompeium extra munitiones egressum, castra secundum mare munire, ut libere pabulari posset nec minus aditum navibus haberet, commutata ratione belli, quoniam propositum non tenuerat, castra iuxta Pompeium munire iussit.

He, once the detriment had been learned, had observed that Pompey had gone out beyond the fortifications and was fortifying a camp along the sea, so that he might forage freely and have no less access for ships; with the method of the war changed, since he had not kept to the proposed plan, he ordered a camp to be fortified next to Pompey.

[66] Qua perfecta munitione animadversum est a speculatoribus Caesaris, cohortes quasdam, quod instar legionis videretur, esse post silvam et in vetera castra duci. Castrorum sic situs erat. Superioribus diebus nona Caesaris legio, cum se obiecisset Pompeianis copiis atque opere, ut demonstravimus, circummuniret, castra eo loco posuit.

[66] With that fortification completed, it was noticed by Caesar’s scouts that certain cohorts—because it seemed of the size of a legion—were behind the wood and were being led into the old camp. The site of the camp was thus. In preceding days Caesar’s Ninth Legion, when it had thrown itself before the Pompeian forces and, by a work, as we have shown, was encircling itself with fortifications, pitched camp in that place.

Haec silvam quandam contingebant neque longius a mari passibus CCC aberant. Post mutato consilio quibusdam de causis Caesar paulo ultra eum locum castra transtulit, paucisque intermissis diebus eadem Pompeius occupaverat et, quod eo loco plures erat legiones habiturus, relicto interiore vallo maiorem adiecerat munitionem. Ita minora castra inclusa maioribus castelli atque arcis locum obtinebant.

These adjoined a certain wood and were no farther than 300 paces from the sea. Afterward, his plan changed for certain reasons, Caesar moved the camp a little beyond that place; and, when a few days had intervened, Pompey had occupied the same and, because in that place he was going to have more legions, leaving the inner rampart, had added a greater fortification. Thus the smaller camp, enclosed by the larger, held the place of a little fort and a citadel.

Item ab angulo castrorum sinistro munitionem ad flumen perduxerat circiter passus CCCC, quo liberius a periculo milites aquarentur. Sed is quoque mutato consilio quibusdam de causis, quas commemorari necesse non est, eo loco excesserat. Ita complures dies inania manserant castra; munitiones quidem omnes integrae erant.

Likewise from the left angle of the camp he had carried a fortification to the river for about 400 paces, in order that the soldiers might draw water more freely away from peril. But he too, his counsel having been changed for certain causes, which it is not necessary to commemorate, had withdrawn from that place. Thus for several days the camps had remained empty; the fortifications indeed were all intact.

[67] Eo signa legionis illata speculatores Caesari renuntiarunt. Hoc idem visum ex superioribus quibusdam castellis confirmaverunt. Is locus aberat a novis Pompei castris circiter passus quingentos.

[67] To that place, scouts reported back to Caesar that the standards of a legion had been brought. They confirmed this same thing as seen from certain higher fortlets. That place was about five hundred paces distant from Pompey’s new camp.

Hanc legionem sperans Caesar se opprimere posse et cupiens eius diei detrimentum sarcire, reliquit in opere cohortes duas, quae speciem munitionis praeberent; ipse diverso itinere quam potuit occultissime reliquas cohortes, numero XXXIII, in quibus erat legio nona multis amissis centurionibus deminutoque militum numero, ad legionem Pompei castraque minora duplici acie eduxit. Neque eum prima opinio fefellit. Nam et pervenit prius, quam Pompeius sentire posset, et tametsi erant munitiones castrorum magnae, tamen sinistro cornu, ubi erat ipse, celeriter aggressus Pompeianos ex vallo deturbavit.

Hoping that he could overwhelm that legion and desiring to make good the loss of that day, Caesar left two cohorts at work, to present the appearance of a fortification; he himself, by a different route as secretly as he could, led out the remaining cohorts, to the number of 33—in which was the ninth legion, with many centurions lost and the number of soldiers diminished—against Pompey’s legion and the smaller camp, in a double battle line. Nor did his first expectation deceive him. For he both arrived before Pompey could perceive it, and although the fortifications of the camp were great, nevertheless, on the left wing, where he himself was, having swiftly attacked, he dislodged the Pompeians from the rampart.

Erat obiectus portis ericius. Hic paulisper est pugnatum, cum irrumpere nostri conarentur, illi castra defenderent, fortissime T. Pulieone, cuius opera proditum exercitum C. Antoni demonstravimus, eo loco propugnante. Sed tamen nostri virtute vicerunt excisoque ericio primo in maiora castra, post etiam in castellum, quod erat inclusum maioribus castris, irruperunt, quo pulsa legio sese receperat, et nonnullos ibi repugnantes interfecerunt.

A “hedgehog” obstruction had been set before the gates. Here there was fighting for a little while, as our men tried to break in and they defended the camp, most bravely Titus Pulieo—by whose agency we have shown that the army of Gaius Antonius was betrayed—fighting as a defender in that place. But nevertheless our men prevailed by valor, and the hedgehog having been cut away, they first burst into the larger camp, and afterward even into the little fort which was enclosed within the larger camp, into which the routed legion had withdrawn itself, and there they slew several who resisted.

[68] Sed fortuna, quae plurimum potest cum in reliquis rebus tum praecipue in bello, parvis momentis magnas rerum commutationes efficit; ut tum accidit. Munitionem, quam pertinere a castris ad flumen supra demonstravimus, dextri Caesaris cornu cohortes ignorantia loci sunt secutae, cum portam quaererent castrorumque eam munitionem esse arbitrarentur. Quod cum esset animadversum coniunctam esse flumini, prorutis munitionibus defendente nullo transcenderunt, omnisque noster equitatus eas cohortes est secutus.

[68] But Fortune, which has the greatest power both in other matters and especially in war, by small moments brings about great changes of affairs; as then happened. The fortification which we have shown above to extend from the camp to the river, the cohorts of Caesar’s right wing, through ignorance of the place, followed, as they were seeking a gate and supposed that that fortification was of the camp. When it was noticed that it was joined to the river, the fortifications having been torn down, with no one defending, they crossed over, and all our cavalry followed those cohorts.

[69] Interim Pompeius hac satis longa interiecta mora et re nuntiata V legiones ab opere deductas subsidio suis duxit, eodemque tempore equitatus eius nostris equitibus appropinquabat, et acies instructa a nostris, qui castra occupaverant, cernebatur, omniaque sunt subito mutata. Legio Pompeiana celeris spe subsidii confirmata ab decumana porta resistere conabatur atque ultro in nostros impetum faciebat. Equitatus Caesaris, quod angusto itinere per aggeres ascendebat, receptui suo timens initium fugae faciebat.

[69] Meanwhile, with this quite long delay interposed and the matter reported, he led 5 legions, withdrawn from the work, as relief to his men; and at the same time his cavalry was approaching our cavalry, and a line of battle drawn up by our men, who had occupied the camp, was visible, and all things were suddenly changed. The Pompeian legion, strengthened by the swift hope of relief, was trying to make a stand from the Decuman Gate and even of its own accord was making an assault upon our men. Caesar’s cavalry, because it was ascending by a narrow route along the embankments, fearing for its own retreat, began flight.

Dextrum cornu, quod erat a sinistro seclusum, terrore equitum animadverso, ne intra munitionem opprimeretur, ea parte, quam proruerat, sese recipiebat, ac plerique ex his, ne in angustias inciderent, ex X pedum munitione se in fossas praecipitabant, primisque oppressis reliqui per horum corpora salutem sibi atque exitum pariebant. Sinistro cornu milites, cum ex vallo Pompeium adesse et suos fugere cernerent, veriti, ne angustiis intercluderentur, cum extra et intus hostem haberent, eodem, quo venerant, receptu sibi consulebant, omniaque erant tumultus, timoris, fugae plena, adeo ut, cum Caesar signa fugientium manu prenderet et consistere iuberet, alii admissis equis eodem cursu confugerent, alii metu etiam signa dimitterent, neque quisquam omnino consisteret.

The right wing, which had been secluded from the left, noticing the terror of the cavalry, lest it be overwhelmed within the fortification, was withdrawing by that part which it had torn down; and most of them, lest they fall into narrow straits, were pitching themselves from the 10‑foot fortification into the ditches, and, the foremost being crushed, the rest were procuring safety and an exit for themselves over these men’s bodies. On the left wing the soldiers, when from the rampart they perceived Pompey to be at hand and their own men to be fleeing, fearing that they would be shut in by the narrow places, since they had the enemy both outside and inside, were taking thought for themselves by the same retreat by which they had come, and all things were full of tumult, fear, and flight, to such a degree that, when Caesar grasped with his hand the standards of the fugitives and ordered them to halt, some, with their horses put to a gallop, fled off at the same pace, others from fear even let go the standards, and no one at all stood firm.

[70] His tantis malis haec subsidia succurrebant, quo minus omnis deleretur exercitus, quod Pompeius insidias timens, credo, quod haec praeter spem acciderant eius, qui paulo ante ex castris fugientes suos conspexerat, munitionibus appropinquare aliquamdiu non audebat, equitesque eius angustis spatiis atque his ab Caesaris militibus occupatis ad insequendum tardabantur. Ita parvae res magnum in utramque partem momentum habuerunt. Munitiones enim a castris ad flumen perductae expugnatis iam castris Pompei prope iam expeditam Caesaris victoriam interpellaverunt, eadem res celeritate insequentium tardata nostris salutem attulit.

[70] In the midst of such great evils, these reliefs came to the rescue, to the effect that the whole army was not obliterated: for Pompey, fearing ambushes, I believe, because these things had happened beyond his expectation—he who a little before had beheld his men fleeing from the camp—did not for some time dare to approach the fortifications; and his cavalry, in narrow spaces and these occupied by Caesar’s soldiers, were delayed in their pursuit. Thus small things had great momentum in both directions. For the fortifications drawn from the camp to the river, when Pompey’s camp had already been stormed, interrupted Caesar’s victory, now almost unencumbered; the same circumstance, the celerity of the pursuers being slowed, brought safety to our men.

[71] Duobus his unius diei proeliis Caesar desideravit milites DCCCCLX et notos equites Romanos Tuticanum Gallum, senatoris filium, C. Fleginatem Placentia, A. Granium Puteolis, M. Sacrativirum Capua, tribunos militum et centuriones XXXII; sed horum omnium pars magna in fossis munitionibusque et fluminis ripis oppressa suorum in terrore ac fuga sine ullo vulnere interiit; signaque sunt militaria amissa XXXII. Pompeius eo proelio imperator est appellatus. Hoc nomen obtinuit atque ita se postea salutari passus est, sed neque in litteris scribere est solitus, neque in fascibus insignia laureae praetulit.

[71] In these two battles of a single day Caesar lost 960 soldiers, and well-known Roman knights: Tuticanus Gallus, the son of a senator, G. Fleginas of Placentia, A. Granius of Puteoli, M. Sacrativirus of Capua, military tribunes, and 32 centurions; but a great part of all these, overwhelmed in the ditches and fortifications and on the banks of the river, perished without any wound, in the panic and flight of their own men; and 32 military standards were lost. Pompey in that battle was hailed imperator. He retained this name and thereafter allowed himself to be saluted thus, but he was not accustomed to write it in his letters, nor did he carry before his fasces the insignia of laurel.

At Labienus, cum ab eo impetravisset, ut sibi captivos tradi iuberet, omnes productos ostentationis, ut videbatur, causa, quo maior perfugae fides haberetur, commilitones appellans et magna verborum contumelia interrogans, solerentne veterani milites fugere, in omnium conspectu interfecit.

But Labienus, after he had obtained from him an order that the captives be handed over to himself, brought them all out—apparently for the sake of ostentation, so that greater credence might be given to the defector—and, addressing them as fellow-soldiers and with great verbal contumely asking whether veteran soldiers were accustomed to flee, killed them in the sight of all.

[72] His rebus tantum fiduciae ac spiritus Pompeianis accessit, ut non de ratione belli cogitarent, sed vicisse iam viderentur. Non illi paucitatem nostrorum militum, non iniquitatem loci atque angustias praeoccupatis castris et ancipitem terrorem intra extraque munitiones, non abscisum in duas partes exercitum, cum altera alteri auxilium ferre non posset, causae fuisse cogitabant. Non ad haec addebant non concursu acri facto, non proelio dimicatum, sibique ipsos multitudine atque angustiis maius attulisse detrimentum, quam ab hoste accepissent.

[72] By these events so much confidence and spirit accrued to the Pompeians that they did not think about the method of war, but seemed already to have won. They did not consider that the paucity of our soldiers, nor the unfavorableness of the terrain and the straits with the camps pre-occupied and the double-edged terror both within and outside the fortifications, nor the army cut into two parts, when one part could not bring aid to the other, had been the causes. Nor did they add to this that neither had a sharp charge been made, nor had a battle been fought, and that they themselves had brought upon themselves, by their multitude and by the narrowness, a greater detriment than they had received from the enemy.

Non denique communes belli casus recordabantur, quam parvulae saepe causae vel falsae suspicionis vel terroris repentini vel obiectae religionis magna detrimenta intulissent, quotiens vel ducis vitio vel culpa tribuni in exercitu esset offensum; sed, proinde ac si virtute vicissent, neque ulla commutatio rerum posset accidere, per orbem terrarum fama ac litteris victoriam eius diei concelebrabant.

Nor, finally, did they call to mind the common chances of war, how very small causes—whether of false suspicion, or sudden terror, or an alleged religious scruple—had often brought great detriments, how often offence had arisen in the army through the fault of a leader or the fault of a tribune; but, just as if they had conquered by valor, and as though no change of affairs could occur, throughout the orb of the earth by report and by letters they were celebrating the victory of that day.

[73] Caesar a superioribus consiliis depulsus omnem sibi commutandam belli rationem existimavit. Itaque uno tempore praesidiis omnibus deductis et oppugnatione dimissa coactoque in unum locum exercitu contionem apud milites habuit hortatusque est, ne ea, quae accidissent, graviter ferrent neve his rebus terrerentur multisque secundis proeliis unum adversum et id mediocre opponerent. Habendam fortunae gratiam, quod Italiam sine aliquo vulnere cepissent, quod duas Hispanias bellicosissimorum hominum peritissimis atque exercitatissimis ducibus pacavissent, quod finitimas frumentariasque provincias in potestatem redegissent; denique recordari debere, qua felicitate inter medias hostium classes oppletis non solum portibus, sed etiam litoribus omnes incolumes essent transportati.

[73] Caesar, driven off from his former counsels, judged that the whole plan of the war must be changed for himself. And so, at one and the same time, with all the garrisons withdrawn and the assault dismissed, and the army gathered into one place, he held an assembly among the soldiers and exhorted them not to take hard the things that had happened, nor to be terrified by these events, and to set against many favorable battles one adverse—and that a moderate one. Gratitude was to be had to Fortune, because they had seized Italy without any wound, because they had pacified the two Spains—of most warlike men—under the most skillful and most exercised commanders, because they had reduced the neighboring and grain-bearing provinces into their power; finally, they ought to recall with what happiness, in the very midst of the enemy fleets, with not only the harbors but even the shores filled, all had been transported safe and sound.

Si non omnia caderent secunda, fortunam esse industria sublevandam. Quod esset acceptum detrimenti, cuiusvis potius quam suae culpae debere tribui. Locum se aequum ad dimicandum dedisse, potitum esse hostium castris, expulisse ac superasse pugnantes.

If not all things fell out favorable, fortune was to be underpropped by industry. Whatever detriment had been incurred ought to be attributed to anyone’s fault rather than his own. He had given an even ground for fighting, had gotten possession of the enemies’ camp, had driven out and overcome those fighting.

Sed sive ipsorum perturbatio sive error aliquis sive etiam fortuna partam iam praesentemque victoriam interpellavisset, dandam omnibus operam, ut acceptum incommodum virtute sarciretur. Quod si esset factum, futurum, uti ad Gergoviam contigisset, ut detrimentum in bonum verteret, atque qui ante dimicare timuissent, ultro se proelio offerrent.

But whether their own perturbation or some error or even Fortune had interrupted a victory already acquired and present, effort must be given by all, that the setback received might be repaired by virtue. And if this were done, it would come to pass—as had happened at Gergovia—that the detriment would turn into a good, and those who previously had feared to contend would of their own accord offer themselves to battle.

[74] Hac habita contione nonnullos signiferos ignominia notavit ac loco movit. Exercitui quidem omni tantus incessit ex incommodo dolor tantumque studium infamiae sarciendae, ut nemo aut tribuni aut centurionis imperium desideraret, et sibi quisque etiam poenae loco graviores imponeret labores, simulque omnes arderent cupiditate pugnandi, cum superioris etiam ordinis nonnulli ratione permoti manendum eo loco et rem proelio committendam existimarent. Contra ea Caesar neque satis militibus perterritis confidebat spatiumque interponendum ad recreandos animos putabat, et relictis munitionibus magnopere rei frumentariae timebat.

[74] With this harangue having been held, he marked some standard-bearers with ignominy and removed them from their place. Upon the whole army, indeed, there came such grief from the setback and so great zeal for patching the infamy that no one waited for the command of a tribune or centurion, and each man imposed upon himself heavier labors even in the place of a penalty; and at the same time all burned with the desire of fighting, although several even of the higher order, moved by reason, judged that one should remain in that place and that the matter should be committed to battle. Against these things Caesar neither sufficiently trusted the soldiers, panic-stricken, and thought that an interval ought to be interposed for refreshing their spirits, and he greatly feared for the grain-supply if the fortifications were left.

[75] Itaque nulla interposita mora sauciorum modo et aegrorum habita ratione impedimenta omnia silentio prima nocte ex castris Apolloniam praemisit. Haec conquiescere ante iter confectum vetuit. His una legio missa praesidio est.

[75] Therefore, with no delay interposed, only consideration having been had for the wounded and the sick, he sent forward all the baggage in silence in the first watch of the night from the camp to Apollonia. He forbade these to rest before the march was completed. Along with them one legion was sent as a guard.

His explicitis rebus duas in castris legiones retinuit, reliquas de quarta vigilia compluribus portis eductas eodem itinere praemisit parvoque spatio intermisso, ut et militare institutum servaretur, et quam serissime eius profectio cognosceretur conclamari iussit statimque egressus et novissimum agmen consecutus celeriter ex conspectu castrorum discessit. Neque vero Pompeius cognito consilio eius moram ullam ad insequendum intulit; sed eodem spectans, si itinere impeditos perterritos deprehendere posset, exercitum e castris eduxit equitatumque praemisit ad novissimum agmen demorandum, neque consequi potuit, quod multum expedito itinere antecesserat Caesar. Sed cum ventum esset ad flumen Genusum, quod ripis erat impeditis, consecutus equitatus novissimos proelio detinebat.

With these matters completed, he retained two legions in the camp; the rest, brought out at several gates at the fourth watch, he sent ahead by the same route; and, a small interval interposed—both that the military institution might be observed and that his departure be learned as late as possible—he ordered the signal to be proclaimed; and immediately he went out, and, having overtaken the rearmost column, quickly withdrew from the sight of the camp. Nor indeed did Pompey, once his plan was known, put in any delay for pursuing; but aiming at the same thing, to see whether he could catch them impeded on the march and terrified, he led the army out of the camp and sent the cavalry ahead to delay the rearmost column; and he could not overtake them, because Caesar had gone far in advance by an unencumbered march. But when they came to the river Genusus, whose banks were obstructed, the cavalry, having overtaken them, was holding the rearmost engaged in battle.

Huic suos Caesar equites opposuit expeditosque antesignanos admiscuit CCCC; qui tantum profecerunt, ut equestri proelio commisso pellerent omnes compluresque interficerent ipsique incolumes se ad agmen reciperent.

Against these Caesar set his own horsemen and mixed in 400 light‑armed antesignani; who accomplished so much that, with a cavalry battle joined, they drove them all and killed many, and they themselves, unharmed, withdrew to the column.

[76] Confecto iusto itinere eius diei Caesar traductoque exercitu flumen Genusum veteribus suis in castris contra Asparagium consedit militesque omnes intra vallum continuit equitatumque per causam pabulandi emissum confestim decumana porta in castra se recipere iussit. Simili ratione Pompeius confecto eius diei itinere in suis veteribus castris ad Asparagium consedit. Eius milites, quod ab opere integris munitionibus vacabant, alii lignandi pabulandique causa longius progrediebantur, alii, quod subito consilium profectionis ceperant magna parte impedimentorum et sarcinarum relicta, ad haec repetenda invitati propinquitate superiorum castrorum, depositis in contubernio armis, vallum relinquebant.

[76] With the proper march of that day completed and the army led across the river Genusus, Caesar took position in his former camp opposite Asparagium and kept all the soldiers within the rampart, and he ordered the cavalry, sent out on the pretext of foraging, to withdraw at once into the camp by the decuman gate. By a similar method Pompey, the march of that day completed, took position in his own former camp by Asparagium. His soldiers, because they were free from work, the fortifications being intact, some advanced farther for the sake of wood-gathering and foraging; others, because they had suddenly adopted the plan of departure with a great part of their impediments and packs left behind, to retrieve these—enticed by the nearness of the former camp—after laying down their arms in the contubernium, were leaving the rampart.

Quibus ad sequendum impeditis Caesar, quod fore providerat, meridiano fere tempore signo profectionis dato exercitum educit duplicatoque eius diei itinere VIII milia passuum ex eo loco procedit; quod facere Pompeius discessu militum non potuit.

As they were hindered from following, Caesar—because he had foreseen that this would be—at almost midday, the signal for departure having been given, leads out the army, and, the march of that day being doubled, advances 8 miles from that place; which Pompey could not do owing to the departure of the soldiers.

[77] Postero die Caesar similiter praemissis prima nocte impedimentis de quarta vigilia ipse egreditur, ut, si qua esset imposita dimicandi necessitas, subitum casum expedito exercitu subiret. Hoc idem reliquis fecit diebus. Quibus rebus perfectum est, ut altissimis fluminibus atque impeditissimis itineribus nullum acciperet incommodum.

[77] On the next day Caesar, similarly, with the impediments (baggage-train) sent ahead in the first part of the night, himself goes out at the fourth watch, so that, if any necessity of fighting were imposed, he might meet the sudden contingency with an unencumbered army. He did the same on the remaining days. By these measures it was accomplished that, despite the very deep rivers and the most obstructed routes, he received no inconvenience.

Pompeius primi diei mora illata et reliquorum dierum frustra labore suscepto, cum se magnis itineribus extenderet et praegressos consequi cuperet, quarto die finem sequendi fecit atque aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit.

Pompey, a delay having been interposed on the first day and the labor of the remaining days undertaken in vain, since he was extending himself by great marches and desired to overtake those who had gone ahead, on the fourth day made an end of following and judged that another counsel had to be taken for himself.

[78] Caesari ad saucios deponendos, stipendium exercitui dandum, socios confirmandos, praesidium urbibus relinquendum necesse erat adire Apolloniam. Sed his rebus tantum temporis tribuit, quantum erat properanti necesse; timens Domitio, ne adventu Pompei praeoccuparetur, ad eum omni celeritate et studio incitatus ferebatur. Totius autem rei consilium his rationibus explicabat, ut, si Pompeius eodem contenderet, abductum illum a mari atque ab eis copiis, quas Dyrrachii comparaverat, abstractum pari condicione belli secum decertare cogeret; si in Italiam transiret, coniuncto exercitu cum Domitio per Illyricum Italiae subsidio proficisceretur; si Apolloniam Oricumque oppugnare et se omni maritima ora excludere conaretur, obsesso Scipione necessario illum suis auxilium ferre cogeret.

[78] It was necessary for Caesar to go to Apollonia for the purpose of setting down the wounded, giving the stipend to the army, confirming his allies, and leaving a garrison to the cities. But he allotted to these matters only as much time as was necessary for one in haste; fearing for Domitius, lest he be forestalled by Pompey’s arrival, he was borne toward him, spurred with all speed and zeal. Moreover, he was unfolding the plan of the whole affair on these considerations: that, if Pompey were to strive for the same place, he would compel him—drawn away from the sea and from those forces which he had assembled at Dyrrachium, and removed—to contend with him on an equal condition of war; if he were to cross into Italy, with the army conjoined with Domitius he would set out through Illyricum as a succor to Italy; if he should try to attack Apollonia or Oricum and to exclude him from the whole maritime shore, with Scipio besieged he would necessarily force him to bring aid to his own.

Itaque praemissis nuntiis ad Cn. Domitium Caesar ei scripsit et, quid fieri vellet, ostendit, praesidioque Apolloniae cohortibus IIII, Lissi I, III Orici relictis, quique erant ex vulneribus aegri depositis, per Epirum atque Athamaniam iter facere coepit. Pompeius quoque de Caesaris consilio coniectura iudicans ad Scipionem properandum sibi existimabat: si Caesar iter illo haberet, ut subsidium Scipioni ferret; si ab ora maritima Oricoque discedere nollet, quod legiones equitatumque ex Italia exspectaret, ipse ut omnibus copiis Domitium aggrederetur.

Therefore, with messengers sent ahead to Gnaeus Domitius, Caesar wrote to him and showed what he wished to be done, and, a garrison having been left—at Apollonia 4 cohorts, at Lissus 1, at Oricum 3—and those who were ailing from wounds left behind, he began to make a march through Epirus and Athamania. Pompey also, judging by conjecture about Caesar’s counsel, thought that he must hasten to Scipio: if Caesar should take a route thither, in order to bring subsidy to Scipio; if he were unwilling to depart from the maritime shore and from Oricum, because he was expecting legions and cavalry from Italy, he himself would attack Domitius with all his forces.

[79] His de causis uterque eorum celeritati studebat, et suis ut esset auxilio, et ad opprimendos adversarios ne occasioni temporis deesset. Sed Caesarem Apollonia a directo itinere averterat; Pompeius per Candaviam iter in Macedoniam expeditum habebat. Accessit etiam ex improviso aliud incommodum, quod Domitius, qui dies complures castris Scipionis castra collata habuisset, rei frumentariae causa ab eo discesserat et Heracliam, quae est subiecta Candaviae, iter fecerat, ut ipsa fortuna illum obicere Pompeio videretur.

[79] For these causes each of them was eager for celerity—both that he might be a help to his own, and lest he should fail the occasion of the time for oppressing his adversaries. But Apollonia had turned Caesar aside from the direct route; Pompey had an expedited route into Macedonia through Candavia. There was added also, unexpectedly, another inconvenience: that Domitius, who for several days had had his camp set opposite Scipio’s camp, had, for the sake of the grain-supply, withdrawn from him and made a march to Heraclea, which lies under Candavia, so that Fortune herself seemed to throw him in Pompey’s way.

Haec ad id tempus Caesar ignorabat. Simul a Pompeio litteris per omnes provincias civitatesque dimissis proelio ad Dyrrachium facto latius inflatiusque multo, quam res erat gesta, fama percrebuerat, pulsum fugere Caesarem paene omnibus copiis amissis; haec itinera infesta reddiderat, haec civitates nonnullas ab eius amicitia avertebat. Quibus accidit rebus, ut pluribus dimissi itineribus a Caesare ad Domitium et a Domitio ad Caesarem nulla ratione iter conficere possent.

These things up to that time Caesar did not know. At the same time, with letters sent out by Pompey through all the provinces and cities, after the battle at Dyrrachium had been fought, a report had spread more widely and much more inflated than the affair had been carried out, that Caesar, routed, was fleeing with almost all his forces lost; this had made the roads infested, this was turning some cities away from his friendship. From which things it befell that, though messengers were dispatched by several routes from Caesar to Domitius and from Domitius to Caesar, they were by no means able to complete the journey.

Sed Allobroges, Raucilli atque Egi familiares, quos perfugisse ad Pompeium demonstravimus, conspicati in itinere exploratores Domitii, seu pristina sua consuetudine, quod una in Gallia bella gesserant, seu gloria elati cuncta, ut erant acta, euerunt et Caesaris profectionem et adventum Pompei docuerunt. A quibus Domitius certior factus vix IIII horarum spatio antecedens hostium beneficio periculum vitavit et ad Aeginium, quod est oppidum obiectum Thessaliae, Caesari venienti occurrit.

But the Allobroges, retainers of Raucillus and Egius, whom we have shown to have fled to Pompey, having caught sight on the road of Domitius’s scouts, either by their former custom, since they had waged wars together in Gaul, or elated by glory, divulged everything as it had been done and made known Caesar’s departure and Pompey’s arrival. Being informed by them, Domitius, barely with a lead of 4 hours, by the benefit of the enemy, escaped the danger, and at Aeginium, which is a town set over against Thessaly, he met Caesar as he was coming.

[80] Coniuncto exercitu Caesar Gomphos pervenit, quod est oppidum primum Thessaliae venientibus ab Epiro; quae gens paucis ante mensibus ultro ad Caesarem legatos miserat, ut suis omnibus facultatibus uteretur, praesidiumque ab eo militum petierat. Sed eo fama iam praecurrerat, quam supra docuimus, de proelio Dyrrachino, quod multis auxerat partibus. Itaque Androsthenes, praetor Thessaliae, cum se victoriae Pompei comitem esse mallet quam socium Caesaris in rebus adversis, omnem ex agris multitudinem servorum ac liberorum in oppidum cogit portasque praecludit et ad Scipionem Pompeiumque nuntios mittit, ut sibi subsidio veniant: se confidere munitionibus oppidi, si celeriter succurratur; longinquam oppugnationem sustinere non posse.

[80] With the army joined, Caesar arrived at Gomphos, which is the first town of Thessaly for those coming from Epirus; a people who a few months before had of their own accord sent envoys to Caesar, that he might use all their resources, and had asked from him a garrison of soldiers. But to that place the rumor had already run ahead, which we have explained above, about the battle at Dyrrachium, which had in many parts greatly amplified the report. And so Androsthenes, praetor of Thessaly, since he preferred to be a companion of Pompey’s victory rather than a partner of Caesar in adverse affairs, musters into the town from the fields the whole multitude, slaves and free, shuts the gates, and sends messengers to Scipio and Pompey, that they may come to his succor: he is confident in the town’s fortifications, if help is brought quickly; a protracted siege he cannot sustain.

Scipio discessu exercituum ab Dyrrachio cognito Larisam legiones adduxerat; Pompeius nondum Thessaliae appropinquabat. Caesar castris munitis scalas musculosque ad repentinam oppugnationem fieri et crates parari iussit. Quibus rebus effectis cohortatus milites docuit, quantum usum haberet ad sublevandam omnium rerum inopiam potiri oppido pleno atque opulento, simul reliquis civitatibus huius urbis exemplo inferre terrorem et id fieri celeriter, priusquam auxilia concurrerent.

Scipio, the departure of the armies from Dyrrhachium having been learned, had led the legions to Larisa; Pompey was not yet approaching Thessaly. Caesar, with the camp fortified, ordered ladders and musculi for a sudden assault to be made, and hurdles to be prepared. When these things had been effected, after exhorting the soldiers he showed how great a use it would have, for relieving the scarcity of all things, to gain possession of a town full and opulent, and at the same time to bring terror upon the remaining cities by the example of this city—and that this be done swiftly, before reinforcements could converge.

Itaque usus singulari militum studio eodem, quo venerat, die post horam nonam oppidum altissimis moenibus oppugnare aggressus ante solis oocasum expugnavit et ad diripiendum militibus concessit statimque ab oppido castra movit et Metropolim venit, sic ut nuntios expugnati oppidi famamque antecederet.

And so, availing himself of the singular zeal of the soldiers, on the same day on which he had come, after the ninth hour, having set about to oppugn the town with its very lofty walls, he took it by storm before sunset and granted it to the soldiers for plundering; and at once he moved camp from the town and came to Metropolis, in such a way that he outstripped the messengers and the report of the captured town.

[81] Metropolitae primum eodem usi consilio isdem permoti rumoribus portas clauserunt murosque armatis compleverunt; sed postea casu civitatis Gomphensis cognito ex captivis, quos Caesar ad murum producendos curaverat, portas aperuerunt. Quibus diligentissime conservatis collata fortuna Metropolitum cum casu Gomphensium nulla Thessaliae fuit civitas praeter Larisaeos, qui magnis exercitibus Scipionis tenebantur, quin Caesari parerent atque imperata facerent. Ille idoneum locum in agris nactus, qua prope iam matura frumenta erant, ibi adventum exspectare Pompei eoque omnem belli rationem conferre constituit.

[81] The Metropolitans at first, employing the same plan and stirred by the same rumors, shut the gates and filled the walls with armed men; but afterwards, when the fall of the city of Gomphi was learned from the captives whom Caesar had taken care to have brought forward to the wall, they opened the gates. These being most carefully preserved, with the fortune of the Metropolitans compared to the fall of the Gomphians, there was no city of Thessaly, except the Larisaeans—who were held by Scipio’s great armies—that did not obey Caesar and do what was commanded. He, having found a suitable place in the fields, where the grain was by now nearly ripe, decided there to await Pompey’s arrival and to concentrate the entire plan of the war upon that point.

[82] Pompeius paucis post diebus in Thessaliam pervenit contionatusque apud cunctum exercitum suis agit gratias, Scipionis milites cohortatur, ut parta iam victoria praedae ac praemiorum velint esse participes, receptisque omnibus in una castra legionibus suum cum Scipione honorem partitur classicumque apud eum cani et alterum illi iubet praetorium tendi. Auctis copiis Pompei duobusque magnis exercitibus coniunctis pristina omnium confirmatur opinio, et spes victoriae augetur, adeo ut, quicquid intercederet temporis, id morari reditum in Italiam videretur, et si quando quid Pompeius tardius aut consideratius faceret, unius esse negotium diei, sed illum delectari imperio et consulares praetoriosque servorum habere numero dicerent. Iamque inter se palam de praemiis ac de sacerdotiis contendebant in annosque consulatum definiebant, alii domos bonaque eorum, qui in castris erant Caesaris, petebant; magnaque inter eos in consilio fuit controversia, oporteretne Lucili Hirri, quod is a Pompeio ad Parthos missus esset, proximis comitiis praetoriis absentis rationem haberi, cum eius necessarii fidem implorarent Pompei, praestaret, quod proficiscenti recepisset, ne per eius auctoritatem deceptus videretur, reliqui, in labore pari ac periculo ne unus omnes antecederet, recusarent.

[82] Pompey, after a few days, arrived in Thessaly, and having addressed an assembly before the whole army, he gives thanks to his own men; he exhorts Scipio’s soldiers that, victory now having been obtained, they should be willing to be participants in booty and rewards; and with all the legions received into one camp, he shares his honor with Scipio, and orders the trumpet-call to be sounded at his quarters and a second praetorium to be pitched for him. With Pompey’s forces augmented and the two great armies joined, the former opinion of all is confirmed, and the hope of victory is increased, to such a degree that whatever time intervened seemed to delay the return into Italy, and if ever Pompey did anything more slowly or more deliberately, they said it was a business of a single day, but that he took delight in command and counted consular and praetorian men in the number of slaves. And now they were openly contending among themselves about rewards and priesthoods, and were defining the consulship for years ahead; others were claiming the houses and goods of those who were in Caesar’s camp; and there was a great controversy among them in council whether for Lucilius Hirrus, because he had been sent by Pompey to the Parthians, account should be had of an absent candidate at the next praetorian elections, since his intimates were imploring Pompey’s good faith, that he should fulfill what he had promised upon his departure, lest by his authority he seem to have been deceived, while the rest refused, lest, with equal toil and danger, one man should outstrip all.

[83] Iam de sacerdotio Caesaris Domitius, Scipio Spintherque Lentulus cotidianis contentionibus ad gravissimas verborum contumelias palam descenderunt, cum Lentulus aetatis honorem ostentaret, Domitius urbanam gratiam dignitatemque iactaret, Scipio affinitate Pompei confideret. Postulavit etiam L. Afranium proditionis exercitus Acutius Rufus apud Pompeium, quod gestum in Hispania diceret. Et L. Domitius in consilio dixit placere sibi bello confecto ternas tabellas dari ad iudicandum eis, qui ordinis essent senatorii belloque una cum ipsis interfuissent, sententiasque de singulis ferrent, qui Romae remansissent quique intra praesidia Pompei fuissent neque operam in re militari praestitissent: unam fore tabellam, qui liberandos omni periculo censerent; alteram, qui capitis damnarent; tertiam, qui pecunia multarent.

[83] Already over Caesar’s priesthood, Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinther, through daily contentions, descended openly to the most grievous contumelies of words—Lentulus flaunting the honor of age, Domitius vaunting his urban favor and dignity, Scipio confiding in his affinity with Pompey. Acutius Rufus also demanded that Lucius Afranius be prosecuted for betrayal of the army before Pompey, on the ground that it had been done in Spain, as he said. And Lucius Domitius said in council that, the war finished, three ballots should be given for judging to those who were of senatorial order and had been present in the war together with themselves, and that they should cast votes concerning individuals—those who had remained at Rome and those who had been within Pompey’s garrisons and had not rendered service in the military matter: one ballot for those who deemed them to be freed from all peril; a second for those who condemned them to capital punishment; a third for those who mulcted them with money.

Postremo omnes aut de honoribus suis aut de praemiis pecuniae aut de persequendis inimicitiis agebant nec, quibus rationibus superare possent, sed, quemadmodum uti victoria deberent, cogitabant.

At last all were busy either about their own honors, or about monetary rewards, or about pursuing enmities, and they were not considering by what methods they might overcome, but in what manner they ought to make use of the victory.

[84] Re frumentaria praeparata confirmatisque militibus et satis longo spatio temporis a Dyrrachinis proeliis intermisso, quo satis perspectum habere militum animum videretur, temptandum Caesar existimavit, quidnam Pompeius propositi aut voluntatis ad dimicandum haberet. Itaque exercitum ex castris eduxit aciemque instruxit, primum suis locis pauloque a castris Pompei longius, continentibus vero diebus, ut progrederetur a castris suis collibusque Pompeianis aciem subiceret. Quae res in dies confirmatiorem eius exercitum efficiebat.

[84] With the grain-supply prepared and the soldiers strengthened, and with a sufficiently long span of time interposed from the Dyrrachian battles, so that he might seem to have had the soldiers’ spirit sufficiently observed, Caesar judged it should be tried what plan or will Pompey had for contending. And so he led the army out of camp and drew up the battle line, at first in his own positions and somewhat farther from Pompey’s camp; but on successive days, he would advance from his camp and bring his battle line up under the Pompeian hills. This was making his army more confirmed day by day.

Superius tamen institutum in equitibus, quod demonstravimus, servabat, ut, quoniam numero multis partibus esset inferior, adulescentes atque expeditos ex antesignanis electis ad pernicitatem armis inter equites proeliari iuberet, qui cotidiana consuetudine usum quoque eius generis proeliorum perciperent. His erat rebus effectum, ut equitum mille etiam apertioribus locis VII milium Pompeianorum impetum, cum adesset usus, sustinere auderent neque magnopere eorum multitudine terrerentur. Namque etiam per eos dies proelium secundum equestre fecit atque unum Allobrogem ex duobus, quos perfugisse ad Pornpeium supra docuimus, cum quibusdam interfecit.

However he kept the earlier instituted arrangement concerning the cavalry, which we have shown: namely that, since he was inferior in number by many parts, he would order young men and light-armed from the chosen antesignani, equipped for swiftness, to fight among the horsemen, who by daily consuetude might also acquire the use (experience) of that kind of engagements. By these measures it was brought about that a thousand cavalry, even in more open places, would dare, when occasion was present, to withstand the impetus of 7 thousand Pompeians, nor be greatly terrified by their multitude. For indeed during those days too he achieved a favorable equestrian battle, and he killed one Allobrogian out of the two whom we have shown above to have gone over as deserters to Pompey, along with certain others.

[85] Pompeius, qui castra in colle habebat, ad infimas radices montis aciem instruebat semper, ut videbatur, exspectans, si iniquis locis Caesar se subiceret. Caesar nulla ratione ad pugnam elici posse Pompeium existimans hanc sibi commodissimam belli rationem iudicavit, uti castra ex eo loco moveret semperque esset in itineribus, haec spectans, ut movendis castris pluribusque adeundis locis commodiore re frumentaria uteretur, simulque in itinere ut aliquam occasionem dimicandi nancisceretur et insolitum ad laborem Pompei exercitum cotidianis itineribus defatigaret. His constitutis rebus, signo iam profectionis dato tabernaculisque detensis animadversum est paulo ante extra cotidianam consuetudinem longius a vallo esse aciem Pompei progressam, ut non iniquo loco posse dimicari videretur.

[85] Pompey, who had his camp on a hill, would always draw up his line at the lowest foothills of the mountain, as it seemed, waiting to see whether Caesar would expose himself in unfavorable ground. Caesar, thinking that by no method could Pompey be enticed to battle, judged this the most commodious plan of war for himself: to move the camp from that place and always to be on the march, aiming at this—that by moving the camp and approaching more numerous places he might make use of a more commodious grain-supply—and at the same time that on the march he might obtain some occasion of fighting and wear down Pompey’s army, unaccustomed to labor, by daily marches. With these matters settled, when the signal for departure had already been given and the tents struck, it was noticed that a little before, beyond the daily custom, Pompey’s line had advanced farther from the rampart, so that it seemed one could fight not on disadvantageous ground.

Tum Caesar apud suos, cum iam esset agmen in portis, "differendum est" inquit, "iter in praesentia nobis et de proelio cogitandum, sicut semper depoposcimus; animo simus ad dimicandum parati: non facile occasionem postea reperiemus"; confestimque expeditas copias educit.

Then Caesar among his own, when the column was already at the gates, said, “the march must be deferred for the present and we must think about battle, just as we have always demanded; let us be prepared in spirit to fight: we shall not easily find an occasion afterward”; and immediately he leads out the unencumbered forces.

[86] Pompeius quoque, ut postea cognitum est, suorum omnium hortatu statuerat proelio decertare. Namque etiam in consilio superioribus diebus dixerat, priusquam concurrerent acies, fore uti exercitus Caesaris pelleretur. Id cum essent plerique admirati, "scio me," inquit, "paene incredibilem rem polliceri; sed rationem consilii mei accipite, quo firmiore animo in proelium prodeatis.

[86] Pompey also, as was learned afterward, at the urging of all his own had resolved to decide the issue by battle. For even in council on previous days he had said that, before the battle-lines should run together, it would come to pass that Caesar’s army would be driven back. When most were amazed at this, he said, "I know that I am promising a thing almost incredible; but receive the rationale of my counsel, that you may go forth into battle with a steadier spirit."

Persuasi equitibus nostris (idque mihi facturos confirmaverunt), ut, cum propius sit accessum, dextrum Caesaris cornu ab latere aperto aggrederentur et circumventa ab tergo acie prius perturbatum exercitum pellerent, quam a nobis telum in hostem iaceretur. Ita sine periculo legionum et paene sine vulnere bellum conficiemus. Id autem difficile non est, cum tantum equitatu valeamus." Simul denuntiavit, ut essent animo parati in posterum et, quoniam fieret dimicandi potestas, ut saepe rogitavissent, ne suam neu reliquorum opinionem fallerent.

I have persuaded our cavalry (and they have assured me that they will do this), that, when a closer approach has been made, they should attack Caesar’s right wing on its open flank and, the battle line having been surrounded from the rear, should drive the army, thrown into disorder, before any missile is hurled at the enemy by us. Thus without peril to the legions and almost without a wound we shall bring the war to a close. And this is not difficult, since we are so strong in cavalry." At the same time he gave notice that they should be prepared in spirit for the morrow and, since an opportunity of fighting was being afforded, as they had often asked, that they should disappoint neither his own expectation nor that of the rest.

[87] Hunc Labienus excepit et, cum Caesaris copias despiceret, Pompei consilium summis laudibus efferret, " noli," inquit, "existimare, Pompei, hunc esse exercitum, qui Galliam Germaniamque devicerit. Omnibus interfui proeliis neque temere incognitam rem pronuntio. Perexigua pars illius exercitus superest; magna pars deperiit, quod accidere tot proeliis fuit necesse, multos autumni pestilentia in Italia consumpsit, multi domum discesserunt, multi sunt relicti in continenti.

[87] Labienus answered him and, while he was looking down on Caesar’s forces and was exalting Pompey’s plan with the highest praises, " do not," he says, "suppose, Pompey, that this is the army which has conquered Gaul and Germany. I was present at all the battles, nor do I rashly pronounce on an unknown matter. A very scant part of that army survives; a great part has perished, which in so many battles was bound to happen; the pestilence of autumn in Italy has consumed many, many have departed home, many have been left behind on the continent.

An non audistis ex eis, qui per causam valetudinis remanserunt, cohortes esse Brundisi factas? Hae copiae, quas videtis, ex dilectibus horum annorum in citeriore Gallia sunt refectae, et plerique sunt ex coloniis Transpadanis. Ac tamen quod fuit roboris duobus proeliis Dyrrachinis interiit." Haec cum dixisset, iuravit se nisi victorem in castra non reversurum reliquosque, ut idem facerent, hortatus est.

"Or have you not heard from those who remained behind for reason of ill health that cohorts have been formed at Brundisium? These forces, which you see, have been replenished from the levies of these years in Cisalpine Gaul, and the greater part are from the Transpadane colonies. And yet whatever there was of strength perished in the two Dyrrhachian battles." When he had said this, he swore that he would not return to the camp unless as victor, and he urged the rest to do the same.

Hoc laudans Pompeius idem iuravit; nec vero ex reliquis fuit quisquam, qui iurare dubitaret. Haec cum facta sunt in consilio, magna spe et laetitia omnium discessum est; ac iam animo victoriam praecipiebant, quod de re tanta et a tam perito imperatore nihil frustra confirmari videbatur.

Praising this, Pompey swore the same; nor indeed was there anyone of the rest who hesitated to swear. When these things had been done in the council, they broke up with great hope and the joy of all; and now in their mind they were anticipating victory in advance, because about so great a matter, and by so experienced a commander, nothing seemed to be confirmed in vain.

[88] Caesar, cum Pompei castris appropinquasset, ad hunc modum aciem eius instructam animadvertit. Erant in sinistro cornu legiones duae traditae a Caesare initio dissensionis ex senatus conusulto; quarum una prima, altera tertia appellabatur. In eo loco ipse erat Pompeius.

[88] Caesar, when he had approached Pompey’s camp, observed his battle line drawn up in this manner. On the left wing were two legions handed over by Caesar at the beginning of the dissension by decree of the senate; of which one was called the First, the other the Third. In that place Pompey himself was.

Mediam aciem Scipio cum legionibus Syriacis tenebat. Ciliciensis legio coniuncta cum cohortibus Hispanis, quas traductas ab Afranio docuimus, in dextro cornu erant collocatae. Has firmissimas se habere Pompeius existimabat.

Scipio held the middle battle-line with the Syrian legions. The Cilician legion, joined with the Spanish cohorts, which we have shown were transferred by Afranius, were positioned on the right wing. Pompey supposed that he had these as the firmest.

Reliquas inter aciem mediam cornuaque interiecerat numeroque cohortes CX expleverat. Haec erant milia XLV, evocatorum circiter duo, quae ex beneficiariis superiorum exercituum ad eum convenerant; quae tot acie disperserat. Reliquas cohortes VII castris propinquisque castellis praesidio disposuerat.

He had interposed the remaining [cohorts] between the middle of the battle line and the wings, and had filled out the number to 110 cohorts. These were 45,000 men, with about two thousand evocati, who had come together to him from the beneficiarii of the former armies; all of whom he had dispersed throughout the battle line. The remaining seven cohorts he had assigned as garrison for the camp and the nearby forts.

Dextrum cornu eius rivus quidam impeditis ripis muniebat; quam ob causam cunctum equitatum, sagittarios funditoresque omnes sinistro cornu obiecerat.

A certain rivulet, with impeded banks, was fortifying his right wing; for which cause he had set the entire cavalry, and all the archers and slingers, on the left wing.

[89] Caesar superius institutum servans decimam legionem in dextro cornu, nonam in sinistro collocaverat, tametsi erat Dyrrachinis proeliis vehementer attenuata, et huic sic adiunxit octavam, ut paene unam ex duabus efficeret, atque alteram alteri praesidio esse iusserat. Cohortes in acie LXXX constitutas habebat, quae summa erat milium XXII; cohortes VII castris praesidio reliquerat. Sinistro cornu Antonium, dextro P. Sullam, media acie Cn. Domitium praeposuerat.

[89] Caesar, preserving his earlier institute, had placed the 10th legion on the right wing, the 9th on the left, although it had been vehemently attenuated in the battles at Dyrrachium; and to this he so adjoined the 8th that he made almost one out of the two, and he had ordered the one to be a protection to the other. He had 80 cohorts constituted in the battle line, which sum was 22 thousand; he had left 7 cohorts as a garrison for the camp. Over the left wing he had set Antony, over the right P. Sulla, over the center Cn. Domitius.

Ipse contra Pompeium constitit. Simul his rebus animadversis, quas demonstravimus, timens, ne a multitudine equitum dextrum cornu circumveniretur, celeriter ex tertia acie singulas cohortes detraxit atque ex his quartam instituit equitatuique opposuit et, quid fieri vellet, ostendit monuitque eius diei victoriam in earum cohortium virtute constare. Simul tertiae aciei totique exercitui imperavit, ne iniussu suo concurreret: se, cum id fieri vellet, vexillo signum daturum.

He himself took his stand opposite Pompey. At the same time, having observed these matters which we have demonstrated, fearing lest the right wing be surrounded by the multitude of cavalry, he quickly drew off single cohorts from the third battle-line and from these formed a fourth, and he set it opposite the cavalry, and he showed what he wished to be done and admonished that the victory of that day depended on the valor of those cohorts. At the same time he ordered the third line and the whole army not to charge without his command: that he, when he wished it to be done, would give the signal by the standard.

[90] Exercitum cum militari more ad pugnam cohortaretur suaque in eum perpetui temporis officia praedicaret, imprimis commemoravit: testibus se militibus uti posse, quanto studio pacem petisset; quae per Vatinium in colloquiis, quae per Aulum Clodium eum Scipione egisset, quibus modis ad Oricum cum Libone de mittendis legatis contendisset. Neque se umquam abuti militum sanguine neque rem publicam alterutro exercitu privare voluisse. Hac habita oratione ecentibus militibus et studio pugnae ardentibus tuba signum dedit.

[90] When, according to military custom, he was exhorting the army to battle and was proclaiming his services to it through all time, he especially recalled this: that he could use the soldiers as witnesses with what zeal he had sought peace; what he had transacted through Vatinius in conferences, what through Aulus Clodius with Scipio he had negotiated, in what ways at Oricum he had contended with Libo about sending envoys. He had never wished either to abuse the blood of the soldiers or to deprive the commonwealth of either army. With this speech delivered, and the soldiers crying out and burning with zeal for battle, he gave the signal by trumpet.

[91] Erat C. Crastinus evocatus in exercitu Caesaris, qui superiore anno apud eum primum pilum in legione X duxerat, vir singulari virtute. Hic signo dato, "sequimini me," inquit, "manipulares mei qui fuistis, et vestro imperatori quam constituistis operam date. Unum hoc proelium superest; quo confecto et ille suam dignitatem et nos nostram libertatem recuperabimus." Simul respiciens Caesarem, "faciam," inquit, "hodie, imperator, ut aut vivo mihi aut mortuo gratias agas." Haec cum dixisset, primus ex dextro cornu procucurrit, atque eum electi milites circiter CXX voluntarii eiusdem cohortis sunt prosecuti.

[91] There was Gaius Crastinus, an evocatus in Caesar’s army, who in the previous year had held the primus pilus in the 10th legion, a man of singular valor. When the signal was given, he said, "Follow me, you who were my manipulares, and render to your commander the service which you pledged. One battle remains; when it is finished, both he will recover his dignity and we our liberty." At the same time looking back at Caesar, he said, "Today, commander, I will so act that you will give thanks to me, whether living or dead." Having said these things, he was the first to run forward from the right wing, and about 120 chosen soldiers, volunteers of the same cohort, followed him.

[92] Inter duas acies tantum erat relictum spatii, ut satis esset ad concursum utriusque exercitus. Sed Pompeius suis praedixerat, ut Caesaris impetum exciperent neve se loco moverent aciemque eius distrahi paterentur; idque admonitu C. Triarii fecisse dicebatur, ut primus incursus visque militum infringeretur aciesque distenderetur, atque in suis ordinibus dispositi dispersos adorirentur; leviusque casura pila sperabat in loco retentis militibus, quam si ipsi immissis telis occurrissent, simul fore, ut duplicato cursu Caesaris milites exanimarentur et lassitudine conficerentur. Quod nobis quidem nulla ratione factum a Pompeio videtur, propterea quod est quaedam animi incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, quae studio pugnae incenditur; hanc non reprimere, sed augere imperatores debent; neque frustra antiquitus institutum est, ut signa undique concinerent clamoremque universi tollerent; quibus rebus et hostes terreri et suos incitari existimaverunt.

[92] Between the two battle-lines only so much space had been left as was sufficient for the clash of both armies. But Pompey had fore-instructed his men to receive Caesar’s impetus and not to move from their place and to allow his battle-line to be drawn out; and he was said to have done this at the admonition of Gaius Triarius, so that the first onrush and the force of the soldiers might be broken and the line stretched out, and, stationed in their own ranks, they might assail men scattered; and he hoped that the pila would fall more lightly upon soldiers held in place than if they themselves had met them with missiles sent in, and at the same time that, with their course doubled, Caesar’s soldiers would be out of breath and worn out with lassitude. Which indeed seems to us to have been done by Pompey with no rational calculation, because there is a certain incitation and alacrity of spirit naturally inborn in all, which is inflamed by zeal for fighting; this commanders ought not to repress, but to augment; nor was it established of old in vain that the signals should sound together from all sides and that all as one should raise a shout; by which things they judged both that the enemies were terrified and their own men incited.

[93] Sed nostri milites dato signo cum infestis pilis procucurrissent atque animum advertissent non concurri a Pompeianis, usu periti ac superioribus pugnis exercitati sua sponte cursum represserunt et ad medium fere spatium constiterunt, ne consumptis viribus appropinquarent, parvoque intermisso temporis spatio ac rursus renovato cursu pila miserunt celeriterque, ut erat praeceptum a Caesare, gladios strinxerunt. Neque vero Pompeiani huic rei defuerunt. Nam et tela missa exceperunt et impetum legionum tulerunt et ordines suos servarunt pilisque missis ad gladios redierunt.

[93] But our soldiers, the signal having been given, when they had run forward with javelins leveled and had noticed that there was no charging by the Pompeians, skilled by practice and trained by previous battles, of their own accord checked their course and came to a halt at about the middle of the interval, lest, with their strength consumed, they should approach; and, after a small space of time had been interposed, and their run renewed again, they hurled their javelins and quickly, as had been prescribed by Caesar, drew their swords. Nor indeed were the Pompeians lacking in this matter. For they both received the missiles sent, and withstood the impetus of the legions, and kept their ranks, and, their pila having been discharged, came to swords.

Eodem tempore equites ab sinistro Pompei cornu, ut erat imperatum, universi procucurrerunt, omnisque multitudo sagittariorum se profudit. Quorum impetum noster equitatus non tulit, sed paulatim loco motus cessit, equitesque Pompei hoc acrius instare et se turmatim explicare aciemque nostram a latere aperto circumire coeperunt. Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, quartae aciei, quam instituerat sex cohortium, dedit signum.

At the same time the horsemen from Pompey’s left wing, as had been commanded, all together dashed forward, and the whole multitude of archers poured out. Our cavalry did not endure their onrush, but little by little, moved from their position, gave ground; and Pompey’s horse pressed on the more keenly for this and began, squadron by squadron, to deploy themselves and to encircle our battle-line on the open flank. When Caesar noticed this, he gave the signal to the fourth line of battle, which he had established of six cohorts.

Illi celeriter procucurrerunt infestisque signis tanta vi in Pompei equites impetum fecerunt, ut eorum nemo consisteret, omnesque conversi non solum loco excederent, sed protinus incitati fuga montes altissimos peterent. Quibus submotis omnes sagittarii funditoresque destituti inermes sine praesidio interfecti sunt. Eodem impetu cohortes sinistrum cornu pugnantibus etiam tum ac resistentibus in acie Pompeianis circumierunt eosque a tergo sunt adorti.

They swiftly ran forward and, with hostile standards, made an attack upon Pompey’s horsemen with such force that not one of them stood fast, but all, turning about, not only withdrew from their position, but at once, spurred on by flight, made for the loftiest mountains. These having been driven off, all the archers and slingers, abandoned, unarmed, without protection, were slain. With the same impetus the cohorts went around the left wing, and, the Pompeians even then fighting and resisting in the battle-line, they encircled them and assailed them from the rear.

[94] Eodem tempore tertiam aciem Caesar, quae quieta fuerat et se ad id tempus loco tenuerat, procurrere iussit. Ita cum recentes atque integri defessis successissent, alii autem a tergo adorirentur, sustinere Pompeiani non potuerunt, atque universi terga verterunt. Neque vero Caesarem fefellit, quin ab eis cohortibus, quae contra equitatum in quarta acie collocatae essent, initium victoriae oriretur, ut ipse in cohortandis militibus pronuntiaverat.

[94] At the same time Caesar ordered the third battle-line, which had been quiet and had held its position up to that time, to run forward. Thus, when the fresh and intact had relieved the weary, and others moreover were attacking from the rear, the Pompeians could not sustain it, and all turned their backs. Nor indeed did it escape Caesar that from those cohorts, which had been stationed against the cavalry in the fourth line, the beginning of victory would arise, as he himself had proclaimed in exhorting the soldiers.

Ab his enim primum equitatus est pulsus, ab isdem factae caedes sagittariorum ac funditorum, ab isdem acies Pornpeiana a sinistra parte circumita atque initium fugae factum. Sed Pompeius, ut equitatum suum pulsum vidit atque eam partem, cui maxime confidebat, perterritam animadvertit, aliis quoque diffisus acie excessit protinusque se in castra equo contulit et eis centurionibus, quos in statione ad praetoriam portam posuerat, clare, ut milites exaudirent, "tuemini," inquit, "castra et defendite diligenter, si quid durius acciderit. Ego reliquas portas circumeo et castrorum praesidia confirmo." Haec cum dixisset, se in praetorium contulit summae rei diffidens et tamen eventum exspectans.

For by these, first, the cavalry was routed; by these same the slaughters of the archers and slingers were wrought; by these same the Pompeian battle line was outflanked on the left side and the beginning of flight was made. But Pompey, when he saw his cavalry driven back and observed that part, in which he had most confided, panic-stricken, distrusting the others also, withdrew from the line and straightway betook himself on horseback into the camp; and to those centurions whom he had stationed on guard at the praetorian gate, loudly, so that the soldiers might hear, he said, “Protect the camp and defend it diligently, if anything harsher should befall. I will go round the remaining gates and strengthen the garrisons of the camp.” When he had said these things, he betook himself into the praetorium, diffident of the main issue and yet awaiting the outcome.

[95] Caesar Pompeianis ex fuga intra vallum compulsis nullum spatium perterritis dari oportere existimans milites cohortatus est, ut beneficio fortunae uterentur castraque oppugnarent. Qui, etsi magno aestu fatigati (nam ad meridiem res erat perducta), tamen ad omnem laborem animo parati imperio paruerunt. Castra a cohortibus, quae ibi praesidio erant relictae, industrie defendebantur, multo etiam acrius a Thracibus barbarisque auxiliis.

[95] Caesar, thinking that, with the Pompeians driven in flight within the rampart, no interval ought to be given to the panic-stricken, exhorted the soldiers to make use of the benefit of Fortune and to assault the camp. They, although wearied by the great heat (for the affair had been prolonged to midday), yet, prepared in spirit for every toil, obeyed the command. The camp was being defended industriously by the cohorts which had been left there as a garrison, and much more fiercely by the Thracians and the barbarian auxiliaries.

Nam qui acie refugerant milites, et animo perterriti et lassitudine confecti, missis plerique armis signisque militaribus, magis de reliqua fuga quam de castrorum defensione cogitabant. Neque vero diutius, qui in vallo constiterant, multitudinem telorum sustinere potuerunt, sed confecti vulneribus locum reliquerunt, protinusque omnes ducibus usi centurionibus tribunisque militum in altissimos montes, qui ad castra pertinebant, confugerunt.

For the soldiers who had fled from the battle-line, both terrified in spirit and worn out with lassitude, most having let go their arms and military standards, were thinking more about further flight than about the defense of the camp. Nor indeed could those who had stood on the rampart sustain the multitude of missiles any longer, but, consumed by wounds, they left the position; and straightway all, making use of leaders in the centurions and the military tribunes, fled for refuge into the very lofty mountains which pertained to the camp.

[96] In castris Pompei videre licuit trichilas structas, magnum argenti pondus expositum, recentibus caespitibus tabernacula constrata, Lucii etiam Lentuli et nonnullorum tabernacula protecta edera, multaque praeterea, quae nimiam luxuriam et victoriae fiduciam designarent, ut facile existimari posset nihil eos de eventu eius diei timuisse, qui non necessarias conquirerent voluptates. At hi miserrimo ac patientissimo exercitui Caesaris luxuriam obiciebant, cui semper omnia ad necessarium usum defuissent. Pompeius, iam cum intra vallum nostri versarentur, equum nactus, detractis insignibus imperatoris, decumana porta se ex castris eiecit protinusque equo citato Larisam contendit.

[96] In Pompey’s camp it was possible to see arbors (trellises) set up, a great weight of silver displayed, tents carpeted with fresh sods, and the tents of Lucius Lentulus and of some others even covered with ivy, and many things besides that marked excessive luxury and a confidence of victory, so that it could easily be supposed that they, who were seeking out pleasures not necessary, feared nothing about the outcome of that day. Yet these men were hurling the charge of luxury at Caesar’s most wretched and most patient army, to which all things for necessary use had always been lacking. Pompey, when already our men were moving within the rampart, having obtained a horse, with the insignia of the imperator removed, flung himself out of the camp by the decuman gate and straightway, with his horse urged on, hastened to Larisa.

Neque ibi constitit, sed eadem celeritate, paucos suos ex fuga nactus, nocturno itinere non intermisso, comitatu equitum XXX ad mare pervenit navemque frumentariam conscendit, saepe, ut dicebatur, querens tantum se opinionem fefellisse, ut, a quo genere hominum victoriam sperasset, ab eo initio fugae facto paene proditus videretur.

Nor did he halt there, but with the same celerity, having come upon a few of his own from the rout, with the nocturnal march not intermitted, with an escort of 30 horsemen he reached the sea and boarded a grain-ship, often, as it was said, complaining that his opinion had so deceived him that, from the kind of men from whom he had hoped for victory, by that very group, with the beginning of flight made, he seemed almost betrayed.

[97] Caesar castris potitus a militibus contendit, ne in praeda occupati reliqui negotii gerendi facultatem dimitterent. Qua re impetrata montem opere circummunire instituit. Pompeiani, quod is mons erat sine aqua, diffisi ei loco relicto monte universi iugis eius Larisam versus se recipere coeperunt.

[97] Caesar, having gotten possession of the camp, urged the soldiers not to, being occupied in booty, let slip the opportunity of conducting the remaining business. This having been obtained, he instituted the encircling-fortification of the mountain with works. The Pompeians, because that mountain was without water, distrustful of that place, with the mountain abandoned, all together began to withdraw along its ridges in the direction of Larisa.

Qua re animadversa Caesar copias suas divisit partemque legionum in castris Pompei remanere iussit, partem in sua castra remisit, IIII secum legiones duxit commodioreque itinere Pompeianis occurrere coepit et progressus milia passuum VI aciem instruxit. Qua re animadversa Pompeiani in quodam monte constiterunt. Hunc montem flumen subluebat.

With this matter observed, Caesar divided his forces and ordered part of the legions to remain in Pompey’s camp, sent part back to his own camp, led 4 legions with him, and began by a more commodious route to encounter the Pompeians; and having advanced 6 miles he drew up his line of battle. This matter observed, the Pompeians halted on a certain hill. A river washed the foot of this hill.

Caesar milites cohortatus, etsi totius diei continenti labore erant confecti noxque iam suberat, tamen munitione flumen a monte seclusit, ne noctu aquari Pompeiani possent. Quo perfecto opere illi de deditione missis legatis agere coeperunt. Pauci ordinis senatorii, qui se cum eis coniunxerant, nocte fuga salutem petiverunt.

Caesar, having exhorted the soldiers—although they had been worn out by the continuous labor of the whole day and night was now close at hand—nevertheless by a fortification cut off the river from the mountain, so that the Pompeians could not draw water by night. With this work completed, they began to negotiate about surrender, envoys having been sent. A few of senatorial rank, who had joined themselves with them, sought safety by flight in the night.

[98] Caesar prima luce omnes eos, qui in monte consederant, ex superioribus locis in planiciem descendere atque arma proicere iussit. Quod ubi sine recusatione fecerunt passisque palmis proiecti ad terram flentes ab eo salutem petiverunt, consolatus consurgere iussit et pauca apud eos de lenitate sua locutus, quo minore essent timore, omnes conservavit militibusque suis commendavit, ne qui eorum violaretur, neu quid sui desiderarent. Hac adhibita diligentia ex castris sibi legiones alias occurrere et eas, quas secum duxerat, in vicem requiescere atque in castra reverti iussit eodemque die Larisam pervenit.

[98] At first light Caesar ordered all those who had settled on the mountain to descend from the higher places into the plain and to throw down their arms. When they did this without refusal, and with palms outstretched, cast down to the ground and weeping, they sought safety from him; having consoled them he ordered them to rise, and, having spoken a few words among them about his lenity, in order that they might be with less fear, he preserved them all and commended them to his soldiers, that none of them should be violated, nor that anything of their own should be missed. With this diligence applied, he ordered other legions to meet him from the camp, and those which he had led with him in their turn to rest and to return to the camp, and on the same day he arrived at Larisa.

[99] In eo proelio non amplius CC milites desideravit, sed centuriones, fortes viros, circiter XXX amisit. Interfectus est etiam fortissime pugnans Crastinus, cuius mentionem supra fecimus, gladio in os adversum coniecto. Neque id fuit falsum, quod ille in pugnam proficiscens dixerat.

[99] In that battle he lost no more than 200 soldiers, but he lost about 30 centurions, brave men. Crastinus, fighting most bravely, of whom we made mention above, was also slain, with a sword thrust straight into his face. Nor was that false which he had said when setting out to the battle.

Sic enim Caesar existimabat, eo proelio excellentissimam virtutem Crastini fuisse, optimeque eum de se meritum iudicabat. Ex Pompeiano exercitu circiter milia XV cecidisse videbantur, sed in deditionem venerunt amplius milia XXIIII (namque etiam cohortes, quae praesidio in castellis fuerant, sese Sullae dediderunt), multi praeterea in finitimas civitates refugerunt; signaque militaria ex proelio ad Caesarem sunt relata CLXXX et aquilae VIIII. L. Domitius ex castris in montem refugiens, cum vires eum lassitudine defecissent, ab equitibus est interfectus.

For thus Caesar thought: that in that battle the most excellent valor of Crastinus had been, and he judged that he had deserved very well of him. From Pompey’s army about 15 thousand seemed to have fallen, but more than 24 thousand came into surrender (for even the cohorts which had been on garrison-duty in the forts surrendered themselves to Sulla), and many besides fled back into the neighboring states; and 180 military standards and 9 eagles were brought back from the battle to Caesar. L. Domitius, fleeing from the camp to the mountain, when his strength failed him from weariness, was slain by the cavalry.

[100] Eodem tempore D. Laelius cum classe ad Brundisium venit eademque ratione, qua factum a Libone antea demonstravimus, insulam obiectam portui Brundisino tenuit. Similiter Vatinius, qui Brundisio praeerat, tectis instructisque scaphis elicuit naves Laelianas atque ex his longius productam unam quinqueremem et minores duas in angustiis portus cepit itemque per equites dispositos aqua prohibere classiarios instituit. Sed Laelius tempore anni commodiore usus ad navigandum onerariis navibus Corcyra Dyrrachioque aquam suis supportabat, neque a proposito deterrebatur neque ante proelium in Thessalia factum cognitum aut ignominia amissarum navium aut necessariarum rerum inopia ex portu insulaque expelli potuit.

[100] At the same time D. Laelius came with the fleet to Brundisium and, by the same method which we have shown was done by Libo before, held the island lying opposite the harbor of Brundisium. Similarly Vatinius, who was in command at Brundisium, with skiffs covered-in and equipped, lured out Laelius’s ships, and of these he seized, in the narrows of the harbor, one quinquereme that had been drawn out farther and two smaller vessels; likewise, by horsemen posted, he set about to keep the sailors of the fleet from water. But Laelius, making use of a more commodious season of the year for sailing, was conveying water to his men in transport ships from Corcyra and Dyrrachium, and he was neither deterred from his purpose nor, before the battle fought in Thessaly was known, could he be driven from the harbor and the island either by the ignominy of the lost ships or by a shortage of necessary supplies.

[101] Isdem fere temporibus C. Cassius cum classe Syrorum et Phoenicum et Cilicum in Siciliam venit, et cum esset Caesaris classis divisa in duas partes, dimidiae parti praeesset P. Sulpicius praetor ad Vibonem, dimidiae M. Pomponius ad Messanam, prius Cassius ad Messanam navibus advolavit, quam Pomponius de eius adventu cognosceret, perturbatumque eum nactus nullis custodiis neque ordinibus certis, magno vento et secundo completas onerarias naves taeda et pice et stupa reliquisque rebus, quae sunt ad incendia, in Pomponianam classem immisit atque omnes naves incendit XXXV, e quibus erant XX constratae. Tantusque eo facto timor incessit, ut, cum esset legio praesidio Messanae, vix oppidum defenderetur, et nisi eo ipso tempore quidam nuntii de Caesaris victoria per dispositos equites essent allati, existimabant plerique futurum fuisse, uti amitteretur. Sed opportunissime nuntiis allatis oppidum est defensum; Cassiusque ad Sulpicianam inde classem profectus est Vibonem, applicatisque nostris ad terram navibus pari atque antea ratione Cassius secundum nactus ventum onerarias naves praeparatas ad incendium immisit, et flamma ab utroque cornu comprensa naves sunt combustae quinque.

[101] At about the same time Gaius Cassius came into Sicily with a fleet of Syrians and Phoenicians and Cilicians; and since Caesar’s fleet had been divided into two parts, with Publius Sulpicius, praetor, commanding one half at Vibo and Marcus Pomponius the other half at Messana, Cassius swooped to Messana with his ships before Pomponius learned of his arrival, and finding him perturbed, with no guards and no fixed formations, with a great and favorable wind he sent into Pomponius’s fleet cargo-ships packed with torch-wood, pitch, tow, and the other things that are for incendium, and he burned all the ships, 35 in number, of which 20 were decked. And so great a fear set in at this deed that, although a legion was in garrison at Messana, the town was scarcely defended; and unless at that very time certain messages about Caesar’s victory had been brought by cavalry posted along the route, the majority thought it would have come about that it was lost. But with the messages most opportunely brought, the town was defended; and from there Cassius set out for the Sulpician fleet at Vibo, and with our ships brought alongside the land, by the same method as before, having gotten a favorable wind, Cassius sent in cargo-ships prepared for fire, and with the flame taking hold from both wings, five ships were consumed.

Cumque ignis magnitudine venti latius serperet, milites, qui ex veteribus legionibus erant relicti praesidio navibus ex numero aegrorum, ignominiam non tulerunt, sed sua sponte naves conscenderunt et a terra solverunt impetuque facto in Cassianam classem quinqueremes duas, in quarum altera erat Cassius, ceperunt; sed Cassius exceptus scapha refugit; praeterea duae sunt depressae triremes. Neque multo post de proelio facto in Thessalia cognitum est, ut ipsis Pompeianis fides fieret; nam ante id tempus fingi a legatis amicisque Caesaris arbitrabantur. Quibus rebus cognitis ex his locis Cassius cum classe discessit.

And since, by the magnitude of the wind, the fire was creeping more widely, the soldiers, who from the veteran legions had been left as a guard to the ships from the number of the sick, did not endure the ignominy, but of their own accord boarded the ships and cast off from land, and, an assault having been made, they captured two quinqueremes of Cassius’s fleet, in one of which Cassius was; but Cassius, taken up by a skiff, fled; besides this, two triremes were sunk. And not long after, it was learned about the battle fought in Thessaly, so that credence was given even by the Pompeians themselves; for before that time they supposed it was being fabricated by Caesar’s legates and friends. With these things known, Cassius departed from these places with the fleet.

[102] Caesar omnibus rebus relictis persequendum sibi Pompeium existimavit, quascumque in partes se ex fuga recepisset, ne rursus copias comparare alias et bellum renovare posset, et quantumcumque itineris equitatu efficere poterat, cotidie progrediebatur legionemque unam minoribus itineribus subsequi iussit. Erat edictum Pompei nomine Amphipoli propositum, uti omnes eius provinciae iuniores, Graeci civesque Romani, iurandi causa convenirent. Sed utrum avertendae suspicionis causa Pompeius proposuisset, ut quam diutissime longioris fugae consilium occultaret, an ut novis dilectibus, si nemo premeret, Macedoniam tenere conaretur, existimari non poterat.

[102] Caesar, with all other matters left aside, judged that Pompey must be pursued, into whatever parts he had withdrawn in flight, lest he be able again to assemble other forces and renew the war; and, as much distance as he could accomplish with the cavalry, he advanced daily, and he ordered one legion to follow by shorter marches. An edict was posted at Amphipolis in Pompey’s name, that all the younger men of that province, Greeks and Roman citizens, should gather for the purpose of swearing an oath. But whether Pompey had posted this for the sake of averting suspicion—so that he might conceal for as long as possible the plan of a longer flight—or whether, if no one pressed him, he was aiming by new levies to hold Macedonia, could not be determined.

Ipse ad ancoram unam noctem constitit et vocatis ad se Amphipoli hospitibus et pecunia ad necessarios sumptus corrogata, cognito Caesaris adventu, ex eo loco discessit et Mytilenas paucis diebus venit. Biduum tempestate retentus navibusque aliis additis actuariis in Ciliciam atque inde Cyprum pervenit. Ibi cognoscit consensu omnium Antiochensium civiumque Romanorum, qui illic negotiarentur, arma capta esse excludendi sui causa nuntiosque dimissos ad eos, qui se ex fuga in finitimas civitates recepisse dicerentur, ne Antiochiam adirent: id si fecissent, magno eorum capitis periculo futurum.

He himself stood at anchor for one night, and, having summoned to himself at Amphipolis his hosts and having scraped together money for the necessary expenses, upon learning of Caesar’s advent he departed from that place and in a few days came to Mytilene. Held back for two days by a tempest, and with other ships, swift transports (actuariae), added, he reached Cilicia and thence Cyprus. There he learns that, by the consensus of all the Antiochenes and of the Roman citizens who were negotiating there, arms had been taken up for the purpose of excluding him, and that messengers had been sent to those who were said to have betaken themselves from flight into the neighboring cities, that they should not go to Antioch: if they should do this, it would be with great peril to their lives.

Idem hoc L. Lentulo, qui superiore anno consul fuerat, et P. Lentulo consulari ac nonnullis aliis acciderat Rhodi; qui cum ex fuga Pompeium sequerentur atque in insulam venissent, oppido ac portu recepti non erant missisque ad eos nuntiis, ut ex his locis discederent contra voluntatem suam naves solverant. Iamque de Caesaris adventu fama ad civitates perferebatur.

The same had happened at Rhodes to L. Lentulus, who had been consul the previous year, and to P. Lentulus, a consular, and to several others; who, when they were following Pompey in flight and had come to the island, were not received into the town and the port, and, messengers having been sent to them that they should depart from these places, they loosed their ships against their will. And already the report of Caesar’s arrival was being carried to the cities.

[103] Quibus cognitis rebus Pompeius deposito adeundae Syriae consilio pecunia societatis sublata et a quibusdam privatis sumpta et aeris magno pondere ad militarem usum in naves imposito duobusque milibus hominum armatis, partim quos ex familiis societatum delegerat, partim a negotiatoribus coegerat, quosque ex suis quisque ad hanc rem idoneos existimabat, Pelusium pervenit. Ibi casu rex erat Ptolomaeus, puer aetate, magnis copiis cum sorore Cleopatra bellum gerens, quam paucis ante mensibus per suos propinquos atque amicos regno expulerat; castraque Cleopatrae non longo spatio ab eius castris distabant. Ad eum Pompeius misit, ut pro hospitio atque amicitia patris Alexandria reciperetur atque illius opibus in calamitate tegeretur.

[103] When these matters were learned, Pompey, having laid aside the plan of going to Syria, with the money of the company removed and funds taken from certain private persons, and with a great weight of bronze for military use loaded onto the ships, and two thousand men armed—partly those whom he had selected from the households of the companies, partly those he had gathered from the merchants, and those whom each man from his own deemed fit for this business—reached Pelusium. There by chance the king was Ptolemy, a boy in age, waging war with great forces against his sister Cleopatra, whom a few months before he had driven out from the kingdom through his own relatives and friends; and Cleopatra’s camp was not far from his camp. To him Pompey sent, that, on account of the hospitality and the friendship of his father, he might be received at Alexandria and be sheltered by his resources in his calamity.

Sed qui ab eo missi erant, confecto legationis officio liberius cum militibus regis colloqui coeperunt eosque hortari, ut suum officium Pompeio praestarent, neve eius fortunam despicerent. In hoc erant numero complures Pompei milites, quos ex eius exercitu acceptos in Syria Gabinius Alexandriam traduxerat belloque confecto apud Ptolomaeum, patrem pueri, reliquerat.

Sed qui ab eo missi erant, the business of their legation concluded, began to converse more freely with the king’s soldiers and to exhort them to render their duty to Pompey, and not to despise his fortune. In this number were several of Pompey’s soldiers, whom, taken from his army in Syria, Gabinius had led across to Alexandria, and, the war being finished, had left with Ptolemy, the boy’s father.

[104] His tum cognitis rebus amici regis, qui propter aetatem eius in procuratione erant regni, sive timore adducti, ut postea praedicabant, sollicitato exercitu regio ne Pompeius Alexandriam Aegyptumque occuparet, sive despecta eius fortuna, ut plerumque in calamitate ex amicis inimici exsistunt, his, qui erant ab eo missi, palam liberaliter responderunt eumque ad regem venire iusserunt; ipsi clam consilio inito Achillam, praefectum regium, singulari hominem audacia, et L. Septimium, tribunum militum, ad interficiendum Pompeium miserunt. Ab his liberaliter ipse appellatus et quadam notitia Septimii productus, quod bello praedonum apud eum ordinem duxerat, naviculam parvulam conscendit cum paucis suis: ibi ab Achilla et Septimio interficitur. Item L. Lentulus comprehenditur ab rege et in custodia necatur.

[104] These matters then being known, the friends of the king, who on account of his age were in the administration of the kingdom, whether led by fear, as they later proclaimed, having stirred up the royal army lest Pompey seize Alexandria and Egypt, or, his fortune being despised (as for the most part in calamity out of friends enemies arise), to those who had been sent by him they replied openly and liberally, and ordered him to come to the king; but they themselves, a plan having been formed in secret, sent Achillas, the royal prefect, a man of singular audacity, and L. Septimius, a tribune of soldiers, to put Pompey to death. By these he himself was addressed liberally, and, led on by a certain acquaintance with Septimius (because in the pirate war he had held a rank under him), he boarded a very small skiff with a few of his own: there he is slain by Achillas and Septimius. Likewise L. Lentulus is seized by the king and is killed in custody.

[105] Caesar, cum in Asiam venisset, reperiebat T. Ampium conatum esse pecunias tollere Epheso ex fano Dianae eiusque rei causa senatores omnes ex provincia evocasse, ut his testibus in summa pecuniae uteretur, sed interpellatum adventu Caesaris profugisse. Ita duobus temporibus Ephesiae pecuniae Caesar auxilium tulit. Item constabat Elide in templo Minervae repetitis atque enumeratis diebus, quo die proelium secundum Caesar fecisset, simulacrum Victoriae, quod ante ipsam Minervam collocatum esset et ante ad simulacrum Minervae spectavisset, ad valvas se templi limenque convertisse.

[105] Caesar, when he had come into Asia, found that T. Ampius had attempted to take monies at Ephesus from the shrine of Diana and, for the sake of this matter, had summoned all the senators from the province, so that he might use them as witnesses regarding the sum of money; but, being interrupted by Caesar’s arrival, he fled. Thus, on two occasions Caesar brought aid to the Ephesian funds. Likewise, it was established that at Elis in the temple of Minerva, when the days had been counted back and reckoned, on the very day on which Caesar fought a successful battle, the image of Victory, which had been placed before Minerva herself and had previously faced toward the image of Minerva, turned itself toward the doors and threshold of the temple.

Eodemque die Antiochiae in Syria bis tantus exercitus clamor et signorum sonus exauditus est, ut in muris armata civitas discurreret. Hoc idem Ptolomaide accidit. Pergami in occultis ac reconditis templi, quo praeter sacerdotes adire fas non est, quae Graeci adyta appellant, tympana sonuerunt.

And on that same day at Antioch in Syria a twice-as-great shouting of the army and a sound of the standards was heard, such that the city, under arms, ran to and fro upon the walls. This same thing happened at Ptolemais. At Pergamum, in the occult and recondite places of the temple, to which it is not permitted to approach except for the priests—places which the Greeks call adyta—the tympana resounded.

Item Trallibus in templo Victoriae, ubi Caesaris statuam consecraverant, palma per eos dies inter coagmenta lapidum ex pavimento exstitisse ostendebatur.

Likewise at Tralles, in the temple of Victory, where they had consecrated a statue of Caesar, it was shown that during those days a palm had sprung up from the pavement among the joints of the stones.

[106] Caesar paucos dies in Asia moratus, cum audisset Pompeium Cypri visum, coniectans eum in Aegyptum iter habere propter necessitudines regni reliquasque eius loci opportunitates cum legione una, quam se ex Thessalia sequi iusserat, et altera, quam ex Achaia a Q. Fufio legato evocaverat, equitibusque DCCC et navibus longis Rhodiis X et Asiaticis paucis Alexandriam pervenit. In his erant legionibus hominum milia tria CC; reliqui vulneribus ex proeliis et labore ac magnitudine itineris confecti consequi non potuerant. Sed Caesar confisus fama rerum gestarum infirmis auxiliis proficisci non dubitaverat, aeque omnem sibi locum tutum fore existimans.

[106] Caesar, having tarried a few days in Asia, when he had heard that Pompey had been seen at Cyprus, conjecturing that he was making his way into Egypt on account of the ties of the kingdom and the remaining opportunities of that place, with one legion, which he had ordered to follow him from Thessaly, and another, which he had summoned from Achaia by his legate Q. Fufius, and with 800 horsemen and with 10 Rhodian long ships and a few Asiatic ones, arrived at Alexandria. In these legions there were 3,200 men; the rest, worn out by wounds from the battles and by the toil and the magnitude of the march, had not been able to keep up. But Caesar, trusting in the fame of his achievements, had not hesitated to set out with weak auxiliaries, judging that every place would be equally safe for himself.

Alexandriae de Pompei morte cognoscit atque ibi primum e nave egrediens clamorem militum audit, quos rex in oppido praesidii causa reliquerat, et concursum ad se fieri videt, quod fasces anteferrentur. In hoc omnis multitudo maiestatem regiam minui praedicabat. Hoc sedato tumultu crebrae continuis diebus ex concursu multitudinis concitationes fiebant, compluresque milites huius urbis omnibus partibus interficiebantur.

At Alexandria he learns about the death of Pompey, and there, as he first disembarks from the ship, he hears the clamor of the soldiers whom the king had left in the town for the sake of a garrison, and he sees a concourse being made toward him, because the fasces were being carried before him. In this the whole multitude was proclaiming that the royal majesty was being diminished. Once this tumult was calmed, frequent agitations on successive days were arising from the concourse of the multitude, and numerous soldiers of this city were being slain in all quarters.

[107] Quibus rebus animadversis legiones sibi alias ex Asia adduci iussit, quas ex Pompeianis militibus confecerat. Ipse enim necessario etesiis tenebatur, qui navigantibus Alexandria flant adversissimi venti. Interim controversias regum ad populum Romanum et ad se, quod esset consul, pertinere existimans atque eo magis officio suo convenire, quod superiore consulatu cum patre Ptolomaeo et lege et senatusconsulto societas erat facta, ostendit sibi placere regem Ptolomaeum atque eius sororem Cleopatram exercitus, quos haberent, dimittere et de controversiis iure apud se potius quam inter se armis disceptare.

[107] Having observed these things, he ordered other legions to be brought to himself from Asia, which he had constituted from Pompeian soldiers. For he himself was necessarily held fast by the Etesian winds, which blow most adverse for those sailing to Alexandria. Meanwhile, thinking that the controversies of the kings pertained to the Roman People and to himself, inasmuch as he was consul, and that it the more befitted his office because in his previous consulship with Ptolemy the father, by law and by a senatus-consult, an alliance had been made, he indicated that it pleased him that King Ptolemy and his sister Cleopatra dismiss the armies which they had, and about their controversies plead their case in law before him rather than decide between themselves by arms.

[108] Erat in procuratione regni propter aetatem pueri nutricius eius, eunuchus nomine Pothinus. Is primum inter suos queri atque indignari coepit regem ad causam dicendam evocari; deinde adiutores quosdam consilii sui nactus ex regis amicis exercitum a Pelusio clam Alexandriam evocavit atque eundem Achillam, cuius supra meminimus, omnibus copiis praefecit. Hunc incitatum suis et regis inflatum pollicitationibus, quae fieri vellet, litteris nuntiisque edocuit.

[108] In the procuration of the kingdom, on account of the boy’s age, there was his nurse‑guardian, a eunuch named Pothinus. He first among his own began to complain and to be indignant that the king was summoned to plead his cause; then, having found certain helpers of his plan from among the king’s friends, he secretly summoned the army from Pelusium to Alexandria and set that same Achillas, of whom we have made mention above, over all the forces. This man, incited by his own and the king’s promises and puffed up, he instructed by letters and messengers as to what he wished to be done.

In testamento Ptolomaei patris heredes erant scripti ex duobus filiis maior et ex duabus filiabus ea, quae aetate antecedebat. Haec uti fierent, per omnes deos perque foedera, quae Romae fecisset, eodem testamento Ptolomaeus populum Romanum obtestabatur. Tabulae testamenti unae per legatos eius Romam erant allatae, ut in aerario ponerentur (hic cum propter publicas occupationes poni non potuissent, apud Pompeium sunt depositae), alterae eodem exemplo relictae atque obsignatae Alexandriae proferebantur.

In the testament of Ptolemy the father, there were written as heirs, of his two sons, the elder, and of his two daughters, the one who was prior in age. That these things might be done, through all the gods and through the foedera which he had made at Rome, in that same testament Ptolemy adjured the Roman people. One set of the testamentary tablets had been brought to Rome by his legates, to be placed in the Aerarium (since, on account of public occupations, they could not be placed there, they were deposited with Pompey); another set, of the same exemplar, left behind and sealed at Alexandria, was produced.

[109] De his rebus cum ageretur apud Caesarem, isque maxime vellet pro communi amico atque arbitro controversias regum componere, subito exercitus regius equitatusque omnis venire Alexandriam nuntiatur. Caesaris copiae nequaquam erant tantae, ut eis, extra oppidum si esset dimicandum, confideret. Relinquebatur, ut se suis locis oppido teneret consiliumque Achillae cognosceret.

[109] When these matters were being transacted before Caesar, and he most of all wished, as a mutual friend and arbiter, to compose the controversies of the kings, suddenly it is announced that the royal army and all the cavalry are coming to Alexandria. Caesar’s forces were by no means so great that he could put confidence in them, if there had to be a fight outside the town. It remained to keep himself to his own positions in the town and to learn Achillas’s plan.

Milites tamen omnes in armis esse iussit regemque hortatus est, ut ex suis necessariis, quos haberet maximae auctoritatis, legatos ad Achillam mitteret et, quid esset suae voluntatis, ostenderet. A quo missi Dioscorides et Serapion, qui ambo legati Romae fuerant magnamque apud patrem Ptolomaeum auctoritatem habuerant, ad Achillam pervenerunt. Quos ille, cum in conspectum eius venissent, priusquam audiret aut, cuius rei causa missi essent, cognosceret, corripi atque interfici iussit; quorum alter accepto vulnere occupatus per suos pro occiso sublatus, alter interfectus est.

He nevertheless ordered all the soldiers to be under arms and urged the king to send legates to Achillas from among his own intimates (necessarii) whom he held to be of the greatest authority, and to show what his will was. By him were sent Dioscorides and Serapion, who had both been legates at Rome and had possessed great authority with his father Ptolemy, and they came to Achillas. He, when they had come into his sight, before he heard them or learned for what matter they had been sent, ordered them to be seized and put to death; of the two, one, having received a wound, was quickly lifted up by his own men and carried off as though slain, the other was killed.

Quo facto regem ut in sua potestate haberet, Caesar efficit, magnam regium nomen apud suos auctoritatem habere existimans et ut potius privato paucorum et latronum quam regio consilio susceptum bellum videretur.

With this done, Caesar brings it about that he has the king in his own power, thinking that the royal name holds great authority among his own, and in order that the war might seem to have been undertaken by the private counsel of a few and of brigands rather than by royal counsel.

[110] Erant cum Achilla eae copiae, ut neque numero neque genere hominum neque usu rei militaris contemnendae viderentur. Milia enim XX in armis habebat. Haec constabant ex Gabinianis militibus qui iam in consuetudinem Alexandrinae vitae ac licentiae venerant et nomen disciplinamque populi Romani dedidicerant uxoresque duxerant, ex quibus plerique liberos habebant.

[110] There were with Achillas such forces that they seemed to be contemned neither in number, nor in the kind of men, nor in experience of the military art. For he had 20 thousand under arms. These consisted of the Gabinian soldiers, who had already come into the custom of Alexandrian life and license and had unlearned the name and discipline of the Roman people, and had taken wives, of whom most had children.

Huc accedebant collecti ex praedonibus latronibusque Syriae Ciliciaeque provinciae finitimarumque regionum. Multi praeterea capitis damnati exulesque convenerant; fugitivis omnibus nostris certus erat Alexandriae receptus certaque vitae condicio, ut dato nomine militum essent numero; quorum si quis a domino prehenderetur, consensu militum eripiebatur, qui vim suorum, quod in simili culpa versabantur, ipsi pro suo periculo defendebant. Hi regum amicos ad mortem deposcere, hi bona locupletum diripere, stipendii augendi causa regis domum obsidere, regno expellere alios, alios arcessere vetere quodam Alexandrini exercitus instituto consuerant.

To these there were added men collected from the pirates and brigands of the provinces of Syria and Cilicia and the neighboring regions. Many, moreover, condemned on a capital charge and exiles had convened; for all our fugitives there was a sure reception at Alexandria and a sure condition of life, such that, once their name was given, they were on the muster-roll of the soldiers; and if any of them were seized by his master, by the consensus of the soldiers he was snatched away—who defended with force their own, since they were involved in a similar guilt, for their own peril. These were wont to demand the friends of kings for death, to plunder the goods of the wealthy, to besiege the king’s house for the sake of augmenting the stipend, to expel some from the kingdom, to summon others, by a certain old institution of the Alexandrian army.

Erant praeterea equitum milia duo. Inveteraverant hi omnes compluribus Alexandriae bellis; Ptolomaeum patrem in regnum reduxerant, Bibuli filios duos interfecerant, bella cum Aegyptiis gesserant. Hunc usum rei militaris habebant.

There were, moreover, two thousand cavalry. These men had grown seasoned through several wars at Alexandria; they had restored Ptolemy the father to his kingdom, they had slain the two sons of Bibulus, they had waged wars with the Egyptians. This was the experience they had in military affairs.

[111] His copiis fidens Achillas paucitatemque militum Caesaris despiciens occupabat Alexandriam praeter eam oppidi partem, quam Caesar cum militibus tenebat, primo impetu domum eius irrumpere conatus; sed Caesar dispositis per vias cohortibus impetum eius sustinuit. Eodemque tempore pugnatum est ad portum, ac longe maximam ea res attulit dimicationem. Simul enim diductis copiis pluribus viis pugnabatur, et magna multitudine naves longas occupare hostes conabantur; quarum erant L auxilio missae ad Pompeium proelioque in Thessalia facto domum redierant, quadriremes omnes et quinqueremes aptae instructaeque omnibus rebus ad navigandum, praeter has XXII, quae praesidii causa Alexandriae esse consuerant, constratae omnes; quas si occupavissent, classe Caesari erepta portum ac mare totum in sua potestate haberent, commeatu auxiliisque Caesarem prohiberent.

[111] Trusting in these forces and despising the paucity of Caesar’s soldiers, Achillas was occupying Alexandria except that part of the town which Caesar was holding with the soldiers, and at the first onset tried to break into his house; but Caesar, with cohorts posted along the streets, withstood his attack. And at the same time there was fighting at the port, and by far that affair brought the greatest engagement. For simultaneously, with the forces drawn apart, there was fighting on several streets, and the enemy with a great multitude were trying to seize the long ships; of which 50 had been sent as aid to Pompey and, after the battle in Thessaly had been fought, had returned home, all quadriremes and quinqueremes, fitted out and equipped with everything for sailing, besides these 22, which were accustomed to be at Alexandria for the sake of garrison, all decked; which, if they had seized them, once the fleet had been snatched from Caesar, they would have had the port and the whole sea in their power, and would shut Caesar off from supplies and auxiliaries.

Itaque tanta est contentione actum, quanta agi debuit, cum illi celerem in ea re victoriam, hi salutem suam consistere viderent. Sed rem obtinuit Caesar omnesque eas naves et reliquas, quae erant in navalibus, incendit, quod tam late tueri parva manu non poterat, confestimque ad Pharum navibus milites euit.

Therefore it was conducted with as great a contention as it ought to have been, since those saw that a swift victory in that matter, these that their own safety, consisted. But Caesar prevailed in the matter and set fire to all those ships and the remaining ones which were in the dockyards, because he could not protect so widely with a small band, and immediately conveyed soldiers by ships to the Pharos.

[112] Pharus est in insula turris magna altitudine, mirificis operibus exstructae; quae nomen ab insula accepit. Haec insula obiecta Alexandriae portum efficit; sed a superioribus regibus in longitudinem passuum a DCCC in mare iactis molibus angusto itinere ut ponte cum oppido coniungitur. In hac sunt insula domicilia Aegyptiorum et vicus oppidi magnitudine; quaeque ibi naves imprudentia aut tempestate paulum suo cursu decesserunt, has more praedonum diripere consuerunt.

[112] The Pharos is, on an island, a tower of great altitude, constructed with wondrous works; which took its name from the island. This island, lying before Alexandria, makes a harbor; but by the former kings, with moles thrown into the sea to a length of 800 paces, it is connected with the town by a narrow path as by a bridge. On this island there are domiciles of Egyptians and a village of the magnitude of a town; and whatever ships there, through imprudence or tempest, have withdrawn a little from their course, these they have been accustomed to despoil in the manner of pirates.

Eis autem invitis, a quibus Pharus tenetur, non potest esse propter angustias navibus introitus in portum. Hoc tum veritus Caesar, hostibus in pugna occupatis, militibus eitis Pharum prehendit atque ibi praesidium posuit. Quibus est rebus effectum, uti tuto frumentum auxiliaque navibus ad eum supportari possent.

But with those who hold the Pharos unwilling, there cannot be an entrance into the harbor for ships on account of the narrows. This then fearing, Caesar, while the enemies were occupied in battle, disembarked soldiers, seized the Pharos, and placed a garrison there. By these measures it was effected that grain and auxiliaries could be safely brought up to him by ships.

Dimisit enim circum omnes propinquas provincias atque inde auxilia evocavit. Reliquis oppidi partibus sic est pugnatum, ut aequo proelio discederetur et neutri pellerentur (id efficiebant angustiae loci), paucisque utrimque interfectis Caesar loca maxime necessaria complexus noctu praemuniit. In eo tractu oppidi pars erat regiae exigua, in quam ipse habitandi causa initio erat inductus, et theatrum coniunctum domui quod arcis tenebat locum aditusque habebat ad portum et ad reliqua navalia.

For he sent out messengers round to all the neighboring provinces and from there summoned auxiliaries. In the remaining parts of the town the fighting was such that they broke off from an even engagement and neither side was driven back (the narrowness of the place brought this about), and with few slain on both sides Caesar, having occupied the positions most necessary, fortified them in advance by night. In that tract of the town there was a small part of the royal palace, into which he himself at the beginning had been conducted for the purpose of lodging, and a theater joined to the house, which held the place of a citadel and had access to the harbor and to the remaining dockyards.

Has munitiones insequentibus auxit diebus, ut pro muro obiectas haberet neu dimicare invitus cogeretur. Interim filia minor Ptolomaei regis vacuam possessionem regni sperans ad Achillam sese ex regia traiecit unaque bellum administrare coepit. Sed celeriter est inter eos de principatu controversia orta; quae res apud milites largitiones auxit; magnis enim iacturis sibi quisque eorum animos conciliabat.

He increased these fortifications in the following days, so that he might have them set before him as a wall and not be compelled to do battle unwillingly. Meanwhile the younger daughter of King Ptolemy, hoping for a vacant possession of the kingdom, crossed from the palace to Achillas and began to administer the war together with him. But a controversy about the principate quickly arose between them; this matter increased largesses among the soldiers; for by great outlays each of them was conciliating their minds to himself.

Haec dum apud hostes geruntur, Pothinus, nutricius pueri et procurator regni in parte Caesaris, cum ad Achillam nuntios mitteret hortareturque, ne negotio desisteret neve animo deficeret, indicatis deprehensisque internuntiis a Caesare est interfectus. Haec initia belli Alexandrini fuerunt.

While these things were being transacted among the enemy, Pothinus, the boy’s nurse-guardian and procurator of the kingdom on Caesar’s side, as he was sending messengers to Achillas and exhorting him not to desist from the business nor to lose heart, with the go-betweens revealed and apprehended, was put to death by Caesar. These were the beginnings of the Alexandrian War.