Cicero: PHILOSOPHIA

[1]CICERO FILIUS. Studeo, mi pater, Latine ex te audire ea quae mihi tu de ratione dicendi Graece tradidisti—si modo tibi est otium, et si vis. CICERO PATER. An est, mi Cicero, quod ego malim quam te quam doctissimum esse? Otium autem primum est summum, quoniam aliquando Roma exeundi potestas data est; deinde ista tua studia vel maximis occupationibus meis anteferrem libenter.

[1]CICERO THE SON. I am eager, my father, to hear from you in Latin the things which you have transmitted to me in Greek about the method of speaking—if only you have leisure, and if you wish. CICERO THE FATHER. Is there anything, my Cicero, that I would rather than that you be as learned as possible? As for leisure, it is at its highest, since at last the permission of departing from Rome has been given; then I would gladly set those studies of yours before even my greatest occupations.

[2]C.F. Visne igitur, ut tu me Graece soles ordine interrogare, sic ego te vicissim eisdem de rebus Latine interrogem? C.P. Sane, si placet. Sic enim et ego te meminisse intellegam quae accepisti et tu ordine audies quae requires.

[2]C.F. Do you wish, therefore, that, as you are wont to question me in order in Greek, so I in turn should question you in Latin about these same matters? C.P. Certainly, if you please. For thus both I shall understand that you remember what you have received, and you will hear in order what you require.

[3]C.F. Quot in partes distribuenda est omnis doctrina dicendi? C.P. In tres. C.F. Cedo quas?

[3]C.F. Into how many parts must the whole doctrine of speaking be distributed? C.P. Into 3. C.F. Come, which ones?

C.P. Primum in ipsam vim oratoris, deinde in orationem, tum in quaestionem. C.F. In quo est ipsa vis? C.P. In rebus et verbis.

C.P. First into the very force of the orator, then into the oration, then into the question. C.F. In what does the very force consist? C.P. In things and in words.

Sed et res et verba invenienda sunt et collocanda—proprie autem in rebus invenire, in verbis eloqui dicitur, collocare autem, etsi est commune, tamen ad inveniendum refertur. Vox, motus, vultus atque omnis actio eloquendi comes est, earumque rerum omnium custos est memoria.

But both matters and words must be invented and arranged—properly, however, in matters one is said to invent, in words to elocute; to arrange, however, although it is common to both, nevertheless is referred to invention. Voice, movement, countenance, and every action are attendants of elocution, and memory is the guardian of all these things.

[4]C.F. Quid? orationis quot sunt partes? C.P. Quattuor.

[4]C.F. What? How many parts are there of a speech? C.P. Four.

Earum duae valent ad rem docendam, narratio et confirmatio, ad impellendos animos duae, principium et peroratio. C.F. Quid? Quaestio quasnam habet partes?

Of these, two are effective for teaching the matter, narration and confirmation; for impelling minds, two, the beginning and the peroration. C.F. What? What parts does a question have?

C.P. Infinitam, quam consultationem appello, et definitam, quam causam nomino.

C.P. The indefinite, which I call a consultation, and the definite, which I name a cause.

[5]C.F. Quoniam igitur invenire primum est oratoris, quid quaeret? C.P. Ut inveniat quemadmodum fidem faciat eis quibus volet persuadere et quemadmodum motum eorum animis afferat. C.F. Quibus rebus fides fit?

[5]C.F. Since therefore invention is the orator’s first task, what will he seek? C.P. That he may find how he might establish credibility with those whom he wishes to persuade, and how he might bring emotion into their minds. C.F. By what means is credibility made?

C.P. Argumentis, quae ducuntur ex locis aut in re ipsa insitis aut assumptis. C.F. Quos vocas locos? C.P. Eos in quibus latent argumenta.

C.P. By arguments, which are drawn from places either implanted in the thing itself or assumed. C.F. What do you call “places”? C.P. Those in which arguments lie hidden.

C.F. Quid est argumentum? C.P. Probabile inventum ad faciendam fidem.

C.F. What is an argument? C.P. A probable discovery for producing credence.

[6]C.F. Quomodo igitur duo genera ista dividis? C.P. Quae sine arte putantur, ea remota appello, ut testimonia. C.F. Quid insita?

[6]C.F. How, then, do you divide those two kinds? C.P. Those which are thought to be without art, I call remote, such as testimonies. C.F. What of the inherent ones?

C.P. Quae inhaerent in ipsa re. C.F. Testimoniorum quae sunt genera? C.P. Divinum et humanum: divinum, ut oracula, ut auspicia, ut vaticinationes, ut responsa sacerdotum, haruspicum, coniectorum, humanum, quod spectatur ex auctoritate et ex voluntate et ex oratione aut libera aut expressa: in quo insunt scripta, pacta, promissa, iurata, quaesita.

C.P. Those which inhere in the thing itself. C.F. What are the kinds of testimonies? C.P. The divine and the human: the divine, as oracles, as auspices, as vaticinations, as the responses of priests, of haruspices, of conjectors; the human, which is regarded from authority and from will and from speech, either free or expressed: in which are included writings, pacts, promises, sworn statements, things elicited by inquiry.

[7]C.F. Quae sunt quae dicis insita? C.P. Quae infixa sunt rebus ipsis, [tum ex toto, tum ex partibus, tum ex notatione, tum ex eis rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur et ad id totum de quo disseritur; tum definitio adhibetur, tum partium enumeratio, tum notatio verbi; ex eis autem rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur alia coniugata appellantur [alia] ex genere, alia ex forma, alia ex similitudine, alia ex differentia, alia ex contrario, alia ex coniunctis, alia ex antecedentibus, alia ex consequentibus, alia ex repugnantibus, alia ex causis, alia ex effectis, alia ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum:] ut definitio, ut contrarium, ut ea quae sunt ipsi contrariove eius aut similia aut dissimilia aut consentanea aut dissentanea: ut ea quae sunt quasi coniuncta aut ea quae sunt quasi pugnantia inter se: ut earum rerum de quibus agitur causae, aut causarum eventus, id est, quae sunt effecta de causis: ut distributiones, ut genera partium generumve partes: ut primordia rerum et quasi praecurrentia, in quibus inest aliquid argumenti: ut rerum contentiones, quid maius, quid par, quid minus sit, in quibus aut naturae rerum aut facultates comparantur.

[7]C.F. What are the things that you call inherent? C.P. Those which are infixed in the things themselves, [both from the whole, and from the parts, and from notation, and from those things which are in some way affected toward that about which inquiry is made and toward that whole about which discussion is carried on; then a definition is applied, then an enumeration of parts, then a notation of the word; and from those things which are in some way affected toward that about which inquiry is made some are called conjugate, [others] from the genus, others from the form, others from similarity, others from difference, others from the contrary, others from conjoined things, others from antecedents, others from consequents, others from repugnant things, others from causes, others from effects, others from a comparison of greater or equal or lesser:] as definition, as the contrary, as those things which are either to the thing itself or to its contrary either similar or dissimilar or consentaneous or dissentient: as those things which are as it were conjoined, or those which are as it were at strife among themselves: as the causes of those matters which are being handled, or the outcomes of causes, that is, the things which are effected from causes: as distributions, as the genera of parts and the parts of genera: as the beginnings of things and, as it were, the things running before, in which there is something of argument: as the contestations of things—what is greater, what equal, what lesser—in which either the natures of things or their faculties are compared.

[8]C.F. Omnibusne igitur ex his locis argumenta sumemus? C.P. Immo vero scrutabimur et quaeremus ex omnibus: sed adhibebimus iudicium ut levia semper reiiciamus, nonnumquam etiam communia praetermittamus et non necessaria. C.F. Quoniam de fide respondisti, volo audire de motu.

[8]C.F. Shall we therefore take arguments from all these loci? C.P. Nay rather, we will scrutinize and seek from all; but we will apply judgment so that we always reject the trivial ones, and sometimes even pass over the commonplaces and the things not necessary. C.F. Since you have responded about credibility, I wish to hear about motion.

C.P. Loco quidem quaeris, sed planius quod vis explicabitur cum ad orationis ipsius quaestionumque rationem venero.

C.P. You ask in its proper place, but what you want will be more plainly explicated when I have come to the rationale of the oration itself and of the questions.

[9]C.F. Quid sequitur igitur? C.P. Cum inveneris, collocare: cuius in infinita quaestione ordo est idem fere quem exposui locorum; in definita autem adhibenda sunt illa etiam quae ad motus animorum pertinent. C.F. Quomodo igitur ista explicas?

[9]C.F. What follows then? C.P. When you have discovered, collocate: the order of which, in the indefinite question, is almost the same as that of the places I have set forth; but in the definite, those things too must be applied which pertain to the motions of the mind. C.F. How then do you explicate those?

C.P. Habeo communia praecepta fidem faciendi et commovendi. Quoniam fides est firma opinio, motus autem animi incitatio aut ad voluptatem aut ad molestiam aut ad metum aut ad cupiditatem (tot enim sunt motus genera, partes plures generum singulorum), omnem collocationem ad finem accommodo quaestionis. Nam est in proposito finis fides, in causa et fides et motus.

C.P. I have common precepts for creating belief and for stirring. Since belief (fides) is a firm opinion, while a motion of the mind is an incitement either toward pleasure or toward annoyance, or toward fear, or toward desire (for there are just so many genera of motions, and the parts of each genus are more numerous), I accommodate every arrangement to the end of the question. For in a general question the end is belief; in a case both belief and emotion.

Quare cum de causa dixero, in qua est propositum, de utroque dixero.

Wherefore, when I have spoken about the cause, in which the proposition is, I shall have spoken about both.

[10]C.F. Quid habes igitur de causa dicere? C.P. Auditorum eam genere distingui. Nam aut auscultator est modo qui audit aut disceptator, id est, rei sententiaeque moderator: ita ut aut delectetur aut statuat aliquid.

[10]C.F. What, then, have you to say about the case? C.P. That, as regards the hearers, it is distinguished by kind. For the one who hears is either merely a listener, or a disceptator—that is, a moderator of the matter and of the judgment—so that he either is delighted or determines something.

Statuit autem aut de praeteritis, ut iudex, aut de futuris, ut senatus. Sic tria sunt genera, iudicii, deliberationis, exornationis— quae quia in laudationes maxime confertur, proprium habet iam ex eo nomen.

Moreover, he decides either about past things, like a judge, or about future things, like the senate. Thus there are three kinds: of judgment, of deliberation, of exornation— which, because it is most of all applied to laudations, now has from that its own proper name.

[11]C.F. Quas res sibi proponet in istis tribus generibus orator? C.P. Delectationem in exornatione, in iudicio aut saevitiam aut clementiam iudicis, in suasione autem aut spem aut reformidationem deliberantis. C.F. Cur igitur exponis hoc loco genera controversiarum?

[11]C.F. What things will the orator set before himself in those three genera? C.P. Delectation in exornation, in judgment either the savagery or the clemency of the judge, but in suasion either the hope or the dread of the one deliberating. C.F. Why then do you set forth in this place the genera of controversies?

C.P. Ut rationem collocandi ad finem cuiusque accommodem.

C.P. So that I may accommodate the method of arranging to the end of each.

[12]C.F. Quonam tandem modo? C.P. Quia quibus in orationibus delectatio finis est varii sunt ordines collocandi. Nam aut temporum servantur gradus aut generum distributiones, aut a minoribus ad maiora ascendimus aut a maioribus ad minora delabimur: aut haec inaequabili varietate distinguimus, cum parva magnis, simplicia coniunctis, obscura dilucidis, laeta tristibus, incredibilia probabilibus inteximus, quae in exornationem cadunt omnia.

[12]C.F. In what way, then? C.P. Because in those orations in which delight is the end, the orders of arrangement are various. For either the gradations of times are observed, or the distributions of kinds, or we ascend from the lesser to the greater, or we slide down from the greater to the lesser: or we distinguish these by an unequal variety, when we interweave small with great, simple with conjoined, obscure with lucid, joyful with sad, the incredible with the probable—all of which fall under ornamentation.

[13]C.F. Quid? in deliberatione quid spectas? C.P. Principia vel non longa vel saepe nulla; sunt enim ad audiendum qui deliberant sua causa parati.

[13]C.F. What? In deliberation, what do you look to? C.P. Beginnings either not long, or often none; for those who deliberate are prepared to listen on their own account.

Nec multum sane saepe narrandum est; est enim narratio aut praeteritarum rerum aut praesentium, suasio autem futurarum. Quare ad fidem et ad motum adhibenda est omnis oratio.

Nor, to be sure, is it often necessary to narrate much; for narration is either of things past or of things present, while suasion is of things future. Wherefore every oration must be applied to credibility and to emotion.

[14]C.F. Quid? in iudiciis quae est collocatio? C.P. Non eadem accusatoris et rei, quod accusator rerum ordinem prosequitur et singula argumenta quasi hasta in manu collocata vehementer proponit, concludit acriter, confirmat tabulis, decretis, testimoniis, accuratiusque in singulis commoratur; perorationisque praeceptis, quae ad incitandos animos valent, et in reliqua oratione paullulum digrediens de cursu dicendi utitur et vehementius in perorando.

[14]C.F. What then? In trials what is the arrangement? C.P. Not the same for the accuser and for the defendant, because the accuser pursues the order of the matters and presents each argument vehemently, as if a spear placed in the hand; he concludes sharply, he confirms with tablets (records), decrees, testimonies, and he dwells more carefully on the individual points; and, following the precepts of peroration, which avail for inciting spirits, he makes use both of a slight digression from the course of speaking in the rest of the speech and of greater vehemence in perorating.

Est enim propositum ut iratum efficiat iudicem.

For the purpose is to render the judge irate.

[15]C.F. Quid faciendum est contra reo? C.P. Omnia longe secus. Sumenda principia ad benevolentiam conciliandam; narrationes aut amputandae quae laedunt, aut relinquendae si totae sunt molestae; firmamenta ad fidem posita aut per se diluenda aut obscuranda aut degressionibus obruenda; perorationes autem ad misericordiam conferendae.

[15]C.F. What is to be done, on the contrary, for the defendant? C.P. Everything far otherwise. The openings are to be adopted for conciliating goodwill; the narrations are either to be amputated which wound, or to be left off if as wholes they are troublesome; the supports set for credibility are either to be dissolved on their own, or obscured, or overwhelmed by digressions; but the perorations are to be directed toward mercy.

C.F. Semperne igitur ordinem collocandi quem volumus tenere possumus? C.P. Non sane; nam auditorum aures moderantur oratori prudenti et provido, et quod respuunt immutandum est.

C.F. Then can we always keep the order of arranging that we wish? C.P. Not indeed; for the ears of the hearers govern the prudent and provident orator, and what they reject must be changed.

[16]C.F. Expone deinceps quae ipsius orationis verborumque praecepta sint. C.P. Unum igitur genus est eloquendi sua sponte fusum, alterum conversum atque mutatum. Prima vis est in simplicibus verbis, in coniunctis secunda.

[16]C.F. Expound next what the precepts of the oration itself and of the words are. C.P. Therefore one kind of eloquence is poured forth of its own accord, another is turned and transformed. The primary force is in simple words, in conjoined ones the secondary.

Simplicia invenienda sunt, coniuncta collocanda. Et simplicia verba partim nativa sunt, partim reperta: nativa ea quae significata sunt sensu, reperta quae ex his facta sunt et novata aut similitudine aut imitatione aut inflexione aut adiunctione verborum.

Simple ones are to be found, conjoined ones to be collocated. And simple words are partly native, partly discovered: native are those which are signified by sense, discovered those which have been made from these and innovated either by similitude or by imitation or by inflection or by adjunction of words.

[17] Atque etiam est haec distinctio in verbis—altera natura, tractatione altera: natura, ut sint alia sonantiora, grandiora, leviora et quodammodo nitidiora, alia contra; tractatione autem, cum aut propria sumuntur rerum vocabula aut addita ad nomen aut nova aut prisca aut ab oratore modificata et inflexa quodammodo—qualia sunt ea quae transferuntur aut immutantur aut ea quibus tamquam abutimur aut ea quae obscuramus, quae incredibiliter tollimus quaeque mirabilius quam sermonis consuetudo patitur ornamus.

[17] And there is also this distinction in words—one by nature, another by handling: by nature, that some are more sonorous, grander, lighter, and in a certain way more nitid, others the reverse; by handling, however, when either the proper terms of things are taken, or additions are made to a name, or words are new or archaic, or are in some manner modified and inflected by the orator—such as those which are transferred, or altered, or those which we, as it were, abuse, or those which we obscure, which we astonishingly exalt, and which we adorn more marvelously than the custom of speech permits.

[18]C.F. Habeo de simplicibus verbis: nunc de coniunctione quaero. C.P. Numeri quidam sunt in coniunctione servandi, consecutioque verborum. Numeros aures ipsae metiuntur, ne aut non compleas verbis quod proposueris aut redundes; consecutio autem, ne generibus, numeris, temporibus, personis, casibus perturbetur oratio.

[18]C.F. I have what I need about simple words: now I ask about combination. C.P. Certain numbers are to be observed in combination, and the sequence of words. The ears themselves measure the numbers, lest you either not complete with words what you have proposed or overflow; the sequence, however, lest speech be disturbed in genders, numbers, tenses, persons, cases.

Nam ut in simplicibus verbis quod non est Latinum, sic in coniunctis quod non est consequens vituperandum est.

For just as, in simple words, that which is not Latin is to be censured, so, in conjoined ones, that which is not consequent is to be censured.

[19] Communia autem simplicium coniunctorumque sunt haec quinque quasi lumina, dilucidum, breve, probabile, illustre, suave. Dilucidum fit usitatis verbis propriis, dispositis aut circumscriptione conclusa aut intermissione aut concisione verborum. Obscurum autem aut longitudine aut contractione orationis aut ambiguitate aut inflexione atque immutatione verborum.

[19] Common to both simple and conjoined are these five, as it were, lights: clear, brief, probable, illustrious, suave. The clear is produced by usual proper words, disposed, or by a circumscription brought to a close, or by intermission, or by concision of words. The obscure, however, [arises] either from length or contraction of discourse, or from ambiguity, or from inflection and change of words.

Brevitas autem conficitur simplicibus verbis semel una quaque re dicenda, nulli rei nisi ut dilucide dicas serviendo. Probabile autem genus est orationis si non nimis est comptum atque expolitum, si est auctoritas et pondus in verbis, si sententiae vel graves vel aptae opinionibus hominum et moribus.

Brevity, moreover, is effected by simple words, each matter to be said once only, serving no concern except that you may speak lucidly. The probable kind of speech, moreover, is such if it is not overly adorned and polished, if there is authority and weight in the words, if the sentences are either grave or apt to the opinions of men and to their morals.

[20] Illustris autem oratio est si et verba gravitate delecta ponuntur et translata et superlata et ad nomen adiuncta et duplicata et idem significantia atque ab ipsa actione atque imitatione rerum non abhorrentia. Est enim haec pars orationis quae rem constituat paene ante oculos, is enim maxime sensus attingitur: sed ceteri tamen, et maxime mens ipsa moveri potest. Sed quae dicta sunt de oratione dilucida, cadunt in hanc illustrem omnia; est enim pluris aliquanto illustre quam illud dilucidum: altero fit ut intellegamus, altero vero ut videre videamur.

[20] Illustrious, moreover, is speech if both words chosen with gravity are set down, and transferred and superlated, and adjoined to the noun, and duplicated and signifying the same, and not abhorrent from the action itself and the imitation of things. For this is that part of speech which sets the thing almost before the eyes, for that sense is most of all touched; yet the others too, and most especially the mind itself, can be moved. But whatever has been said about lucid speech falls entirely into this illustrious kind; for the illustrious is somewhat more of worth than that lucid: by the one it comes about that we understand, by the other indeed that we seem to see.

[21] Suave autem genus erit dicendi primum elegantia et iucunditate verborum sonantium et lenium, deinde coniunctione quae neque asperos habeat concursus neque disiunctos atque hiantes et sit circumscripta non longo anfractu sed ad spiritum vocis apto habeatque similitudinem aequalitatemque verborum; tum ex contrariis sumpta verbis, crebra crebris, paria paribus respondeant: relataque ad idem verbum et geminata [atque duplicata] vel etiam saepius iterata ponantur, constructioque verborum tum coniunctionibus copuletur, tum dissolutionibus relaxetur.

[21] The suave kind of speaking will be, first, in the elegance and pleasantness of words that are sonant and smooth; then, in a conjunction that has neither harsh concourses nor disjoined and gaping parts, and is circumscribed not by a long circuit but suited to the breath of the voice, and that has a likeness and equality of words; then, with words taken from contraries, let frequent answer to frequent, equals to equals: and let things referred back to the same word and twinned [and duplicated], or even repeated more often, be set down; and let the construction of words now be coupled by conjunctions, now relaxed by dissolutions.

[22] Fit etiam suavis oratio cum aliquid aut invisum aut inauditum aut novum dicas. Delectat enim quidquid est admirabile, maximeque movet ea quae motum aliquem animi miscet oratio, quaeque significat oratoris ipsius amabiles mores: qui exprimuntur aut significando iudicio ipsius et animo humano ac liberali, aut inflexione sermonis cum aut augendi alterius aut minuendi sui causa alia dici ab oratore, alia existimari videntur, idque comitate fieri magis quam vanitate. Sed multa sunt suavitatis praecepta quae orationem aut magis obscuram aut minus probabilem faciant; itaque etiam hoc loco nobis est ipsis quid causa postulet iudicandum.

[22] A speech is also made pleasant when you say something either unseen or unheard or new. For whatever is admirable delights, and most of all those things move when the oration mingles some movement of the mind, and which signify the orator’s own amiable manners: which are expressed either by indicating his own judgment and a humane and liberal spirit, or by an inflection of discourse, when, for the sake of augmenting another or diminishing himself, some things seem to be said by the orator, other things to be thought—and this is done by comity rather than by vanity. But there are many precepts of suavity which make the oration either more obscure or less probable; and therefore in this place too it is for us ourselves to judge what the case requires.

[23]C.F. Reliquum est igitur ut dicas de conversa oratione atque mutata. C.P. Est itaque id genus totum situm in commutatione verborum: quae simplicibus in verbis ita tractatur ut aut ex verbo dilatetur aut in verbum contrahatur oratio—ex verbo cum aut proprium aut idem significans aut factum verbum in plura verba diducitur, ex oratione cum aut definitio ad unum verbum revocatur aut assumpta verba removentur aut circuitus diriguntur aut in coniunctione fit unum verbum ex duobus;

[23]C.F. The remainder, then, is that you speak about turned and altered speech. C.P. Therefore that whole genus is situated in the commutation of words: which, in simple words, is handled thus, that speech is either dilated from a word or contracted into a word— from a word, when either a proper word or one signifying the same thing or a made/derived word is drawn out into several words; from a discourse, when either a definition is recalled to a single word or the assumed words are removed or the roundabout circuits are straightened or, in conjunction, one word is made out of two;

[24] in coniunctis autem verbis triplex adhiberi potest commutatio, non verborum sed ordinis tantummodo, ut cum semel dictum sit directe sicut natura ipsa tulerit, invertatur ordo et idem quasi sursum versus retroque dicatur, deinde idem intercise atque permixte. Eloquendi autem exercitatio maxime in hoc toto convertendi genere versatur.

[24] but in conjoined words a triple commutation can be applied, not of the words but only of the order: namely, after it has once been said directly, just as nature itself has borne it, the order is inverted and the same thing is said as if turned upward and backward, and then the same thing is said cut-up and intermixed. Moreover, the exercise of eloquence is chiefly occupied with this whole kind of converting.

[25]C.F. Actio igitur sequitur, ut opinor. C.P. Est ita: quae quidem oratori et cum rerum et cum verborum momentis commutanda maxime est. Facit enim et dilucidam orationem et illustrem et probabilem et suavem non verbis sed varietate vocum, motu corporis, vultu, quae plurimum valebunt si cum orationis genere consentient eiusque vim ac varietatem subsequentur.

[25]C.F. Action therefore follows, as I suppose. C.P. It is so: which indeed must by the orator be most of all changed with the moments both of things and of words. For it makes the speech clear, illustrious, credible, and pleasant not by words but by a variety of voices, by movement of the body, by the countenance—things which will have the greatest force if they are in agreement with the kind of speech and follow its power and variety.

[26]C.F. Num quidnam de oratore ipso restat? C.P. Nihil sane praeter memoriam, quae est gemina litteraturae quodammodo et in dissimili genere persimilis. Nam ut illa constat ex notis litterarum et ex eo in quo imprimuntur illae notae, sic confectio memoriae tamquam cera locis utitur et in his imagines ut litteras collocat.

[26]C.F. Is there anything perhaps left about the orator himself? C.P. Nothing indeed except memory, which is a twin of literature in a certain manner, and in a dissimilar kind very similar. For as that consists of the notes of letters and of that in which those notes are imprinted, so the composition of memory uses places as if wax, and in these it sets images as letters.

[27]C.F. Quoniam igitur vis oratoris omnis exposita est, quid habes de orationis praeceptis dicere? C.P. Quattuor esse eius partes, quarum prima et postrema ad motum animi valet—is enim initiis est et perorationibus concitandus—, secunda, narratio, et tertia, confirmatio, fidem facit orationi. Sed amplificatio quamquam habet proprium locum, saepe etiam primum, postremum quidem fere semper, tamen reliquo in cursu orationis adhibenda est, maximeque cum aliquid aut confirmatum est aut reprehensum.

[27]C.F. Since therefore the whole force of the orator has been set forth, what have you to say about the precepts of the oration? C.P. That its parts are four, of which the first and the last avail for the motion of the mind—for it is in beginnings and in perorations that it must be stirred—, the second, narration, and the third, confirmation, give credence to the oration. But amplification, although it has its proper place, often even the first and indeed almost always the last, nevertheless is to be applied in the remaining course of the oration, and most especially when something has either been confirmed or reprehended.

Itaque ad fidem quoque vel plurimum valet; est enim amplificatio vehemens quaedam argumentatio, ut illa docendi causa sit, haec commovendi.

And so it also avails, indeed most of all, for credence; for amplification is a certain vehement kind of argumentation, the former being for the purpose of teaching, the latter for stirring [emotion].

[28]C.F. Perge igitur ordine quattuor istas mihi partes explicare. C.P. Faciam, et a principiis primum ordiar, quae quidem ducuntur aut ex personis aut ex rebus ipsis; sumuntur autem trium rerum gratia: ut amice, ut intellegenter, ut attente audiamur. Quorum primus locus est in personis nostris, disceptatorum, adversariorum; e quibus initia benevolentiae conciliandae comparantur aut meritis nostris efferendis aut dignitate aut aliquo genere virtutis, et maxime liberalitatis, officii, iustitiae, fidei, contrariisque rebus in adversarios conferendis, et cum eis qui disceptant aliqua coniunctionis aut causa aut spe significanda: et si in nos aliquod odium offensiove collocata sit, tollenda ea minuendave aut diluendo aut extenuando aut compensando aut deprecando.

[28]C.F. Proceed then to explain for me those four parts in order. C.P. I will do so, and I shall begin first from the beginnings, which indeed are derived either from persons or from the things themselves; they are taken, moreover, for the sake of three things: that we may be heard amicably, intelligently, attentively. Of which the first locus is in our persons, in those of the judges, and of the adversaries; from these the openings for conciliating benevolence are prepared either by extolling our merits or our dignity or some kind of virtue, and especially liberality, duty, justice, good faith, and by ascribing contrary things to the adversaries, and with those who adjudicate some conjunction either of cause or of hope should be indicated: and if some hatred or offense has been fixed upon us, it must be removed or diminished either by dispelling or by extenuating or by counterbalancing or by deprecating.

[29] Intellegenter autem ut audiamur et attente, a rebus ipsis ordiendum est. Sed facillime auditor discit et quid agatur intellegit si complectare a principio genus naturamque causae, si definias, si dividas, si neque prudentiam eius impedias confusione partium nec memoriam multitudine; quaeque mox de narratione dilucida dicentur, eadem etiam huc poterunt recte referri.

[29] And in order that we may be heard intelligently and attentively, one must begin from the things themselves. But the auditor most easily learns and understands what is being transacted if you embrace from the beginning the genus and nature of the cause, if you define, if you divide, if you impede neither his intelligence by a confusion of the parts nor his memory by a multitude; and the same points which will soon be said about a lucid narration can rightly be referred here also.

[30] Ut attente autem audiamur, trium rerum aliqua consequemur; nam aut magna quaedam proponemus aut necessaria aut coniuncta cum ipsis apud quos res agetur. Sit autem hoc etiam in praeceptis, ut si quando tempus ipsum aut res aut locus aut interventus alicuius aut interpellatio aut ab adversario dictum aliquod, et maxime in perorando, dederit occasionem nobis aliquam ut dicamus aliquid ad tempus apte, ne derelinquamus; et quae suo loco de amplificatione dicemus, multa ex his poterunt ad principiorum praecepta transferri.

[30] But that we may be heard attentively, we shall attain it by one of three means; for we will either propose something great, or something necessary, or something conjoined with the very persons before whom the matter will be conducted. Let this also be among the precepts: that if ever the time itself, or the matter, or the place, or someone’s intervention, or an interruption, or some remark by the adversary—especially in the peroration—should give us some occasion to say something aptly for the moment, we should not abandon it; and the things which in their own place we shall say about amplification, many of these can be transferred to the precepts for introductions.

[31]C.F. Quid? in narratione quae tandem conservanda sunt? C.P. Quoniam narratio est rerum explicatio et quaedam quasi sedes ac fundamentum constituendae fidei, ea sunt in ea servanda maxime quae etiam in reliquis fere dicendi partibus: quae partim sunt necessaria, partim assumpta ad ornandum.

[31]C.F. What then? In narration, what, pray, must be preserved? C.P. Since narration is an explication of matters and a certain, as it were, seat and foundation for the constituting of credibility, those things must be preserved in it especially which are also in almost the other parts of discourse: some of which are necessary, and some assumed for ornament.

Nam ut dilucide probabiliterque narremus, necessarium est, sed assumimus etiam suavitatem.

For to narrate lucidly and plausibly is necessary, but we also assume suavity.

[32] Ergo ad dilucide narrandum eadem illa superiora explicandi et illustrandi praecepta repetemus, in quibus est brevitas ea quae saepissime in narratione laudatur, de qua supra dictum est. Probabilis autem erit si personis, si temporibus, si locis ea quae narrabuntur consentient: si cuiusque facti et eventi causa ponetur: si testata dici videbuntur, si cum hominum auctoritate, si cum lege, cum more, cum religione coniuncta: si probitas narrantis significabitur, si antiquitas, si memoria, si orationis veritas, et vitae fides. Suavis autem narratio est quae habet admirationes, exspectationes, exitus inopinatos, interpositos motus animorum, colloquia personarum, dolores, iracundias, metus, laetitias, cupiditates.

[32] Therefore, for narrating clearly we will repeat those same earlier precepts of expounding and illustrating, among which is that brevity which is most often praised in narration, about which it was said above. But it will be plausible if the things to be narrated are consistent with the persons, with the times, with the places; if the cause of each deed and event is set forth; if they will seem to be said as attested, if conjoined with human authority, with law, with custom, with religion; if the probity of the narrator, antiquity, memory, the verity of the oration, and the trustworthiness of life are signified. A sweet narration, moreover, is that which has admirations, expectations, unexpected outcomes, interposed motions of minds, dialogues of persons, pains, angers, fears, joys, desires.

Sed iam ad reliqua pergamus.

But now let us proceed to the rest.

[33]C.F. Nempe ea sequuntur quae ad faciendam fidem pertinent. C.P. Ita est: quae quidem in confirmationem et reprehensionem dividuntur. Nam in confirmando nostra probare volumus, in reprehendendo redarguere contraria.

[33]C.F. Indeed, those things follow which pertain to producing belief. C.P. So it is: which indeed are divided into confirmation and reprehension (refutation). For in confirming we wish to prove our own claims; in reprehending, to refute the contrary.

Quoniam igitur omne quod in controversiam venit, id aut an sit necne aut quid sit aut quale sit quaeritur, in primo coniectura valet, in altero definitio, in tertio ratio.

Since, therefore, everything that comes into controversy is inquired either whether it is or not, or what it is, or of what quality it is, in the first conjecture prevails, in the second definition, in the third reason.

[34]C.F. Teneo istam distributionem: nunc coniecturae locos quaero. C.P. In verisimilibus et in propriis rerum notis posita est tota. Sed appellemus docendi gratia verisimile quod plerumque ita fiat, ut adolescentiam procliviorem esse ad libidinem; propriae autem notae argumentum quod numquam aliter fit certumque declarat, ut fumus ignem.

[34]C.F. I grasp that distribution: now I seek the loci of conjecture. C.P. The whole is placed in probabilities and in the proper notes of things. But for the sake of teaching let us call “probable” that which for the most part so happens, as that adolescence is more prone to lust; and by “proper note,” an argument which never happens otherwise and declares something certain, as smoke indicates fire.

Verisimilia reperiuntur ex partibus et quasi membris narrationis; ea sunt in personis, in locis, in temporibus, in factis, in eventis, in rerum ipsarum negotiorumque naturis.

Verisimilitudes are discovered from the parts and, as it were, the members of the narration; these are in persons, in places, in times, in deeds, in events, in the natures of the things themselves and of affairs.

[35] In personis naturae primum spectantur, valetudinis, figurae, virium, aetatis, marium, feminarum: atque haec quidem in corpore; animi autem aut quemadmodum affecti sint virtutibus, vitiis, artibus inertiis, aut quemadmodum commoti cupiditate, metu, voluptate, molestia. Atque haec quidem in natura spectantur. In fortuna genus, amicitiae, liberi, propinqui, affines, opes, honores, potestates, divitiae, libertas, et ea quae sunt eis contraria.

[35] In persons the natures are first inspected: of health, figure, strength, age, males, females; and these indeed in the body. But of the mind, either how they are affected by virtues, vices, arts, inertias, or how they are stirred by cupidity, fear, pleasure, trouble. And these indeed are considered under nature. Under fortune: stock, friendships, children, kin, in-laws, resources, honors, powers, riches, liberty, and the things which are contrary to them.

[36] In locis autem et illa naturalia, maritimi an remoti a mari, plani an montuosi, leves an asperi, salubres an pestilentes, opaci an aprici, et illa fortuita, culti an inculti, celebres an deserti, coaedificati an vasti, obscuri an rerum gestarum vestigiis nobilitati, consecrati an profani.

[36] In places, moreover, both the natural—maritime or removed from the sea, flat or mountainous, gentle or rough, salubrious or pestilential, shaded or sunny—and also the fortuitous—cultivated or uncultivated, celebrated or deserted, built‑up or waste, obscure or ennobled by the vestiges of deeds done, consecrated or profane.

[37] In temporibus autem praesentia [et] praeterita [et] futura cernuntur; in his ipsis vetusta, recentia, instantia, paullo post aut aliquando futura. Insunt etiam in temporibus illa quae temporis quasi naturam notant, ut [hiems, ver, aestas, auctumnus aut] anni tempora, ut mensis, ut dies, [ut] nox, hora, [tempestas] quae sunt naturalia: fortuita autem sacrificia, festi dies, nuptiae.

[37] In times, however, the present [and] the past [and] the future are discerned; within these themselves, the ancient, the recent, the immediate, those that will be a little later or sometime in the future. There are also in times those things which, as it were, mark the nature of time, such as [winter, spring, summer, autumn or] the seasons of the year, as the month, as the day, [as] the night, the hour, [weather], which are natural; but the fortuitous are sacrifices, feast days, weddings.

[38] Iam facta et eventus aut consilii sunt aut imprudentiae, quae est aut in casu aut in quadam animi permotione: casu cum aliter cecidit ac putatum sit, permotione cum aut oblivio aut error aut metus aut aliqua cupiditatis causa permovit. Est etiam in imprudentia necessitas ponenda. Rerum autem bonarum et malarum tria sunt genera, nam aut in animis aut in corporibus aut extra esse possunt.

[38] Now deeds and events are either of counsel or of imprudence, which is either in chance or in a certain perturbation of mind: by chance when it has fallen out otherwise than was supposed; by perturbation when either oblivion or error or fear or some cause of cupidity has moved one. Necessity too is to be set down under imprudence. Moreover, of things good and bad there are three genera, for they can exist either in minds or in bodies or outside.

Huius igitur materiae ad argumentum subiectae perlustrandae animo partes erunt omnes, et ad id quod agetur ex singulis coniectura capienda.

Therefore, of this material subjected to the argument, all the parts must be thoroughly surveyed by the mind, and, with a view to what will be handled, a conjecture must be taken from each.

[39] Est etiam genus argumentorum aliud quod ex facti vestigiis sumitur, ut telum, cruor, clamor editus, titubatio, permutatio coloris, oratio inconstans, tremor, ceterorum aliquid quod sensu percipi possit; etiamsi praeparatum aliquid, si communicatum cum aliquo, si postea visum, auditum, indicatum.

[39] There is also another genus of arguments which is taken from the vestiges of the deed, such as a weapon, gore, a clamor uttered, stumbling, change of color, inconstant speech, tremor, something among the rest that can be perceived by sense; even if something was prepared, if it was communicated with someone, if afterwards it was seen, heard, indicated.

[40] Verisimilia autem partim singula movent suo pondere, partim etiamsi videntur esse exigua per se, multum tamen cum sunt coacervata proficiunt. Atque in his verisimilibus insunt nonnumquam etiam certae rerum et propriae notae. Maximam autem facit fidem ad similitudinem veri primum exemplum, deinde introducta rei similitudo; fabula etiam nonnumquam, etsi est incredibilis, tamen homines commovet.

[40] Verisimilar things, moreover, partly each singly move by their own weight, and partly, even if they seem slight in themselves, nevertheless, when they are heaped together, they make much progress. And in these verisimilarities there are sometimes also certain and proper marks of things. But what creates the greatest credence toward the similitude of the true is, first, an example, then an introduced similitude of the matter; a fable too sometimes, even if it is incredible, nevertheless moves men.

[41]C.F. Quid? definitionis quae ratio est et quae via? C.P. Non dubium est id quidem quin definitio genere declaretur et proprietate quadam aut etiam communium frequentia ex quibus proprium quid sit eluceat.

[41]C.F. What about definition—what is the rationale and what the way? C.P. There is no doubt, indeed, that definition is declared by genus and by a certain property, or even by the frequency of common features, from which something proper may shine forth.

Sed quoniam de propriis oritur plerumque magna dissensio, definiendum est saepe ex contrariis, saepe etiam ex dissimilibus, saepe ex paribus. Quam ob rem descriptiones quoque sunt in hoc genere saepe aptae et enumeratio consequentium, in primisque commovet explicatio vocabuli ac nominis.

But since about proper attributes there very often arises great dissension, one must often define from contraries, often also from dissimilars, often from equals. Wherefore descriptions too are often apt in this kind, and the enumeration of consequents; and above all the explication of the word and of the name moves.

[42]C.F. Sunt exposita iam fere ea quae de facto quaeque de facti appellatione quaeruntur. Nempe igitur ea restant quae, cum factum constet et nomen, qualia sint vocatur in dubium. C.P. Est ita ut dicis.

[42]C.F. The things that are inquired concerning the fact and concerning the appellation of the fact have now for the most part been set forth. Accordingly, then, those remain which, when the fact and the name are established, are called into question as to what sort they are. C.P. It is as you say.

C.F. Quae sunt igitur in eo genere partes? C.P. Aut iure factum depellendi aut ulsciscendi doloris gratia, aut pietatis aut pudicitiae aut religionis aut patriae nomine, aut denique necessitate, inscitia, casu.

C.F. What then are the parts in that kind? C.P. Either it was done by right for the purpose of repelling, or for the sake of avenging a wrong; or in the name of piety, or chastity, or religion, or the fatherland; or finally by necessity, ignorance, or chance.

[43] Nam quae motu animi et perturbatione facta sine ratione sunt, ea defensionem contra crimen in legitimis iudiciis non habent, in liberis disceptationibus habere possunt. Hoc in genere, in quo quale sit quaeritur, [ex controversia] iure et recte necne actum sit quaeri solet: quorum disputatio ex locorum descriptione sumenda est.

[43] For those things which have been done by a motion of mind and by perturbation, without reason, have no defense against an accusation in legitimate courts; in free disputations they can have one. In this genus, in which the question is of what quality it is, it is usual to inquire [from the controversy] whether it was done by right and rightly or not; the disputation of which is to be taken from the description of the topics.

[44]C.F. Age sis ergo, quoniam in confirmationem et reprehensionem diviseras orationis fidem, et dictum de altero est, expone nunc de reprehendendo. C.P. Aut totum est negandum quod in argumentatione adversarius sumpserit, si fictum aut falsum esse possis docere, aut redarguenda ea quae pro verisimilibus sumpta sint: primum dubia sumpta esse pro certis, deinde etiam in perspicue falsis eadem posse dici, tum ex eis quae sumpserit non effici quod velit. Accidere autem oportet singula: sic universa frangentur.

[44]C.F. Come then, please, since you had divided the credence of the speech into confirmation and reprehension, and something has been said about the one, set forth now about reprehension. C.P. Either the whole is to be denied which the adversary has assumed in his argumentation, if you can demonstrate it to be feigned or false, or those things which have been taken as verisimilar are to be refuted: first, that doubtful things have been taken as certain; then also that the same points could be said in cases plainly false; then that from those things which he has assumed that which he desires is not effected. Each of these points ought to occur; thus the whole will be broken.

Commemoranda sunt etiam exempla quibus simili in disputatione creditum non sit, conquerenda conditio communis periculi si ingeniis hominum criminosorum sit exposita vita innocentium.

Examples too are to be commemorated in which in a similar disputation credit was not given, and the condition of the common peril is to be lamented, if the lives of the innocent are exposed to the ingenuity of criminal men.

[45]C.F. Quoniam unde inveniuntur quae ad fidem pertinent habeo, quemadmodum in dicendo singula tractentur exspecto. C.P. Argumentationem quaerere videris, quae est argumenti explicatio[: quae sumpta ex eis locis qui sunt expositi conficienda et distinguenda dilucide est]. C.F. Plane istuc ipsum desidero.

[45]C.F. Since I have where the things that pertain to credibility are found, I await how, in speaking, the individual points are to be handled. C.P. You seem to be seeking argumentation, which is the explication of the argument[: which, taken from those places that have been set out, must be put together and distinguished clearly]. C.F. Plainly, that very thing I desire.

[46]C.P. Est ergo (ut supra dictum est) explicatio argumenti argumentatio: sed ea conficitur cum sumpseris aut non dubia aut probabilia ex quibus id efficias quod aut dubium aut minus probabile per se videtur. Argumentandi autem duo sunt genera, quorum alterum ad fidem directo spectat, alterum se inflectit ad motum. Dirigitur cum proposuit aliquid quod probaret sumpsitque ea quibus niteretur, atque his confirmatis ad propositum se rettulit atque conclusit.

[46]C.P. Therefore (as said above) the explication of the argument is argumentation: but this is accomplished when you have taken either not-doubtful or probable things, from which you bring about that which in itself seems either doubtful or less probable. Moreover, there are two kinds of arguing, of which one looks directly to credence, the other bends itself toward emotion. It is direct when someone has proposed something to prove and has taken those things on which he would rely, and, these being confirmed, has referred back to the proposition and has concluded.

Illa autem altera argumentatio quasi retro et contra: prius sumit quae vult eaque confirmat, deinde id quod proponendum fuit permotis animis iacit ad extremum.

The other kind of argumentation, however, is as it were retro and contra: first it takes what it wants and confirms these, then it casts at the end, with minds stirred, that which was to be proposed.

[47] Est autem illa varietas in argumentando et non iniucunda distinctio, ut cum interrogamus nosmet ipsi aut percunctamur aut imploramus aut optamus—quae sunt cum aliis compluribus sententiarum ornamenta. Vitare autem similitudinem poterimus non semper a proposito ordientes, et si non omnia disputando confirmabimus, breviterque interdum quae erunt satis aperta ponemus quodque ex his efficietur, si id apertum sit, non habebimus necesse semper concludere.

[47] Moreover, there is that variety in arguing and a not unpleasing distinction, when we question ourselves or cross‑question or implore or wish—things which, along with many others, are ornaments of sentences. We shall be able to avoid similarity by not always beginning from the proposition; and if we do not confirm everything by disputation, we shall sometimes set forth briefly those matters which are sufficiently evident; and whatever is made out from these, if that is plain, we shall not have need always to conclude.

[48]C.F. Quid? illa quae sine arte appellantur, quae iamdudum assumpta dixisti, ecquonam modo artis indigent? C.P. Illa vero indigent, nec eo dicuntur sine arte quod ita sunt, sed quod ea non parit oratoris ars sed foris ad se delata tamen arte tractat, et maxime in testibus.

[48]C.F. What? those things which are called “without art,” which you said a while ago were assumed—by what manner do they need art? C.P. Those indeed do need it, nor are they for that reason called “without art” because they are so, but because the orator’s art does not produce them; yet, although brought to him from outside, he nevertheless treats them by art, and most of all in the case of witnesses.

[49] Nam et de toto genere testium quam id sit infirmum saepe dicendum est, et argumenta rerum esse propria, testimonia voluntatum, utendumque est exemplis quibus testibus creditum non sit; et de singulis testibus, si natura vani, si leves, si cum ignominia, si spe, si metu, si iracundia, si misericordia impulsi, si praemio, si gratia adducti; comparandique superiore cum auctoritate testium quibus tamen creditum non sit.

[49] For both it must often be said about the whole kind of witnesses how infirm that is, and that arguments are proper to facts, testimonies to wills; and examples must be employed in which witnesses were not credited; and about individual witnesses—if by nature vain, if frivolous, if under ignominy, if driven by hope, by fear, by anger, by mercy, if induced by reward, if by favor; and they are to be compared with the superior authority of witnesses to whom, nevertheless, credence was not given.

[50] Saepe etiam quaestionibus resistendum est, quod et dolorem fugientes multi in tormentis ementiti persaepe sint morique maluerint falsum fatendo quam infitiando dolere; multi etiam suam vitam neglexerint ut eos qui eis cariores quam ipsi sibi essent liberarent, alii autem aut natura corporis aut consuetudine dolendi aut metu supplicii ac mortis vim tormentorum pertulerint, alii ementiti sint in eos quos oderant. Atque haec exemplis firmanda sunt.

[50] Often, too, interrogations under torture must be resisted, because many, fleeing pain, have very often fabricated in torments and have preferred, by confessing a falsehood, to die rather than, by denying, to suffer pain; many also have neglected their own life so that they might free those who were more dear to them than they themselves were; others, however, have borne the force of the torments either by the nature of the body, or by a custom of suffering pain, or by fear of punishment and death; others have fabricated against those whom they hated. And these points must be strengthened by examples.

[51] Neque est obscurum, quin, quoniam in utramque partem sunt exempla et item ad coniecturam faciendam loci, in contrariis contraria sint sumenda. Atque etiam incurrit alia quaedam in testibus et in quaestionibus ratio; saepe enim ea quae dicta sunt si aut ambigue aut inconstanter aut incredibiliter dicta sunt aut etiam aliter ab alio dicta, subtiliter reprehenduntur.

[51] Nor is it obscure that, since there are examples on both sides and likewise topics for making conjecture, in contraries contrary points must be adopted. And furthermore, another kind of rationale presents itself in the matter of witnesses and in interrogations; for often the things that have been said, if they have been said either ambiguously or inconstantly or incredibly, or even differently by one person than by another, are subtly reprehended.

[52]C.F. Extrema tibi pars restat orationis, quae posita in perorando est, de qua sane velim audire. C.P. Facilior est explicatio perorationis. Nam est divisa in duas partes, amplificationem et enumerationem.

[52]C.F. The final part of the oration remains for you, which lies in the peroration, about which indeed I would like to hear. C.P. The explanation of the peroration is easier. For it is divided into two parts, amplification and enumeration.

Augendi autem et hic est proprius locus in perorando, et in cursu ipso orationis declinationes ad amplificandum dantur confirmata re aliqua aut reprehensa.

Moreover, here too there is a proper place for augmenting in the peroration, and in the very course of the oration turnings toward amplification are afforded when some matter has been confirmed or reprehended.

[53] Est igitur amplificatio gravior quaedam affirmatio quae motu animorum conciliet in dicendo fidem. Ea et verborum genere conficitur et rerum. Verba ponenda sunt quae vim habeant illustrandi nec ab usu sint abhorrentia, gravia, plena, sonantia, iuncta, facta, cognominata, non vulgata, superlata, in primisque translata; nec in singulis verbis sed in continentibus soluta, quae dicuntur sine coniunctione, ut plura videantur.

[53] Therefore amplification is a certain more weighty affirmation which, by a stirring of souls, conciliates credence in speaking. It is accomplished both by the kind of words and by the matters. Words must be set down which have the force of illustrating and are not abhorrent from usage—grave, full, sonorous, joined, fashioned, cognominated, not vulgar, uplifted, and especially translated; and not in single words, but in continuous ones loosened, which are spoken without conjunction, so that they may seem more numerous.

[54] Augent etiam relata verba, iterata, duplicata, et ea quae ascendunt gradatim ab humilioribus ad superiora; omninoque semper quasi naturalis et non explanata oratio, sed gravibus referta verbis, ad augendum accommodatior. Haec igitur in verbis, quibus actio vocis, vultus et gestus congruens et apta ad animos permovendos accommodanda est. Sed et in verbis et in actione causa erit tenenda et pro re agenda; nam haec quia videntur perabsurda cum graviora sunt quam causa fert, diligenter quid quemque deceat iudicandum est.

[54] Words too that are related, repeated, doubled, and those which ascend by degrees from humbler to higher, also augment; and in general a speech that is as if natural and not expounded, but stuffed with weighty words, is more accommodating to amplification. These things therefore are in words, to which the action of voice, face, and gesture, congruent and apt for stirring minds, must be accommodated. But both in words and in action the cause must be held and conducted according to the matter; for these seem very absurd when they are more weighty than the cause bears, and it must be judged carefully what is becoming for each.

[55] Rerum amplificatio sumitur eisdem ex locis omnibus quibus illa quae dicta sunt ad fidem; maximeque definitiones valent conglobatae et consequentium frequentatio et contrariarum et dissimilium et inter se pugnantium rerum conflictio, et causae, et ea quae sunt de causis orta, maximeque similitudines et exempla; fictae etiam personae, muta denique loquantur; omninoque ea sunt adhibenda, si causa patitur, quae magna habentur, quorum est duplex genus:

[55] Amplification of things is taken from all the same places as those by which the things that have been said are brought to credence; and especially definitions, when conglobated, have force, as does the frequentation of consequents, and the conflict of things contrary, dissimilar, and mutually contending; and causes, and the things that have arisen from causes; and most of all similitudes and examples; let even fictive persons speak, let mute things, finally, speak; and altogether those things are to be employed, if the cause allows, which are held great, of which there is a twofold kind:

[56] alia enim magna natura videntur, alia usu—natura, ut caelestia, ut divina, ut ea quorum obscurae causae, ut in terris mundoque admirabilia quae sunt, ex quibus similibusque, si attendas, ad augendum permulta suppetunt; usu, quae videntur hominibus aut prodesse aut obesse vehementius, quorum sunt genera ad amplificandum tria. Nam aut caritate moventur homines, ut deorum, ut patriae, ut parentum, aut amore, ut fratrum, ut coniugum, ut liberorum, ut familiarium, aut honestate, ut virtutum, maximeque earum quae ad communionem hominum et liberalitatem valent. Ex eis et cohortationes sumuntur ad ea retinenda, et in eos a quibus ea violata sunt odia incitantur et miseratio nascitur.

[56] for some things seem great by nature, others by use—by nature, such as the celestial, the divine, such as those whose causes are obscure, such as the things which on earth and in the world are admirable; from these and similar things, if you attend, very many resources are supplied for augmentation. By use, those which seem to men to benefit or to harm more vehemently, of which there are three kinds for amplifying. For men are moved either by charity, as toward the gods, the fatherland, parents; or by love, as toward brothers, spouses, children, familiars; or by honorableness, that is, by virtues, and most of all those which have force for the communion of men and for liberality. From these both exhortations are taken for the retaining of them, and hatreds are incited against those by whom they have been violated, and compassion is born.

[57] [Proprius locus est augendi in his rebus aut amissis aut amittendi periculo.] Nihil est enim tam miserabile quam ex beato miser, et hoc totum quidem moveat, si bona ex fortuna quis cadat, et a quorum caritate divellatur, quae amittat aut amiserit, in quibus malis sit futurusve sit exprimatur breviter—cito enim arescit lacrima, praesertim in alienis malis; nec quidquam in amplificatione nimis enucleandum est, minuta est enim omnis diligentia; hic autem locus grandia requirit.

[57] [A proper locus of amplifying lies in those things either lost or in the peril of being lost.] For nothing is so miserable as, from blessed, to be wretched; and let this whole matter indeed move: if someone should fall from the goods of fortune, and from whose love he is torn away, what he is losing or has lost, in what evils he is or will be—let it be expressed briefly—for a tear quickly dries, especially at others’ ills; nor must anything in amplification be too enucleated, for every punctilious diligence is minute; but this locus requires grand things.

[58] Illud iam est iudicii, quo quaque in causa genere utamur augendi. In illis enim causis quae ad delectationem exornantur ei loci tractandi sunt qui movere possunt exspectationem, admirationem, voluptatem; in cohortationibus autem bonorum ac malorum enumerationes et exempla valent plurimum. In iudiciis accusatori fere quae ad iracundiam, reo plerumque quae ad misericordiam pertinent; nonnumquam tamen accusator misericordiam movere debet et defensor iracundiam.

[58] This now is a matter of judgment, by what kind of genus we should employ amplification in each cause. For in those causes which are adorned for delectation, those topics are to be handled which can move expectation, admiration, pleasure; but in exhortations, enumerations of goods and evils and examples are most potent. In trials, for the accuser generally those things which pertain to irascibility, for the defendant for the most part those which pertain to mercy; sometimes, however, the accuser ought to move compassion and the defender anger.

[59] Enumeratio reliqua est, nonnumquam laudatori, suasori non saepe, accusatori saepius quam reo necessaria. Huius tempora duo sunt, si aut memoriae diffidas eorum apud quos agas vel intervallo temporis vel longitudine orationis, aut frequentatis firmamentis orationis et breviter expositis vim est habitura causa maiorem.

[59] Enumeration is the remaining topic, sometimes necessary to the laudator, not often to the suasor, more often to the accuser than to the defendant. Its occasions are two: either if you distrust the memory of those before whom you plead, whether because of the interval of time or the length of the oration; or if, the firmaments of the oration having been made frequent and set forth briefly, the cause is going to have greater force.

[60] Et reo rarius utendum est, quod ponenda sunt contraria, quorum dissolutio in brevitate lucebit, aculei pungent. Sed erit in enumeratione vitandum ne ostentatio memoriae suscepta videatur esse puerilis. Id effugiet qui non omnia minima repetet sed brevia singula attingens pondera rerum ipsa comprehendet.

[60] And the defendant should use it more rarely, because contraries must be set forth, whose dissolution will shine in brevity, and the barbs will sting. But in enumeration one must avoid that an ostentation of memory undertaken appear puerile. He will escape this who does not repeat every least thing, but, touching briefly on each single item, will comprehend the very weights of the matters.

[61]C.F. Quoniam et de ipso oratore et de oratione dixisti, expone eum mihi nunc quem ex tribus extremum proposuisti, quaestionis locum. C.P. Duo sunt, ut initio dixi, quaestionum genera, quorum alterum finitum temporibus et personis, causam appello, alterum infinitum nullis neque personis neque temporibus notatum propositum voco. Sed est consultatio quasi pars causae quaedam et controversiae: inest enim infinitum in definito, et ad illud tamen referuntur omnia.

[61]C.F. Since you have spoken both about the orator himself and about the oration, set out for me now that which you put forward as the last of the three, the locus of the question. C.P. There are two kinds of questions, as I said at the beginning, of which one, limited by times and persons, I call a cause; the other, unlimited, marked by neither persons nor times, I call a proposition. But deliberation is as it were a certain part of the cause and of controversy: for the infinite is present in the definite, and yet all things are referred to that.

[62] Quam ob rem prius de proposito dicamus, cuius genera sunt duo—cognitionis alterum; eius scientia est finis, ut verine sint sensus: alterum actionis, quod refertur ad efficiendum quid, ut si quaeratur quibus officiis amicitia colenda sit. Rursus superioris genera sunt tria: sit necne, quid sit, quale sit. Sit necne, ut ius in naturane sit an in more; quid autem sit, sitne ius id quod maiori parti sit utile; quale autem sit, iuste vivere sit necne utile.

[62] Wherefore let us first speak about the proposition, of which the genera are two—one of cognition; its end is knowledge, as whether the senses be true: the other of action, which is referred to the effecting of something, as if it be asked by what duties friendship should be cultivated. Again, of the former there are three genera: whether it be or not, what it is, of what sort it is. Whether it be or not, as whether right/law is in nature or in custom; what it is, as whether right/law is that which is useful to the greater part; and of what sort it is, as whether to live justly is useful or not.

[63] Actionis autem duo sunt genera—unum ad persequendum aliquid aut declinandum, ut quibus rebus adipisci gloriam possis aut quomodo invidia vitetur, alterum quod ad aliquod commodum usumque refertur, ut quemadmodum sit respublica administranda aut quemadmodum in paupertate vivendum.

[63] But of action there are two kinds—one for pursuing something or for declining it, as by what means you can acquire glory or how envy may be avoided; the other, which is referred to some advantage and use, as how the republic is to be administered or how one is to live in poverty.

[64] Rursus autem ex cognitionis consultatione, ubi sit necne sit aut fuerit futurumve sit quaeritur, unum genus est quaestionis, possitne aliquid effici? ut cum quaeritur, ecquisnam perfecte sapiens esse possit? alterum, quemadmodum quidque fiat, ut quonam pacto virtus pariatur, naturane an ratione an usu?

[64] Again, however, from the consultation of cognition, when it is inquired whether a thing is or is not, or has been or will be, there is one kind of question: can something be effected? as when it is asked, can anyone indeed be perfectly wise? The other is, how each thing comes to be, as: in what manner is virtue produced—by nature, or by reason, or by use/practice?

Cuius generis sunt omnes in quibus, ut in obscuris naturalibusque quaestionibus, causae rationesque rerum explicantur.

Of which kind are all those in which, as in obscure and natural questions, the causes and reasons of things are explicated.

[65] Illius autem generis in quo quid sit id de quo agitur quaeritur duo sunt genera, quorum in altero disputandum est, aliud an idem sit, ut pertinacia et perseverantia, in altero autem descriptio generis alicuius et quasi imago exprimenda est, ut qualis sit avarus aut quid sit superbia.

[65] But of that genus in which inquiry is made what the thing is that is being dealt with, there are two kinds: in the one, it must be disputed whether it is something other or the same, as pertinacity and perseverance; in the other, a description of some genus and, as it were, an image must be expressed, as what an avaricious man is like or what pride is.

[66] Tertio autem in genere, in quo quale sit quaeritur, aut de honestate aut de utilitate aut de aequitate dicendum est. De honestate sic, ut honestumne sit pro amico periculum aut invidiam subire; de utilitate autem sic, ut sitne utile in republica administranda versari; de aequitate vero sic, ut sitne aequum amicos cognatis anteferre. Atque in hoc eodem genere in quo quale sit quaeritur exoritur aliud quoddam disputandi genus.

[66] But in the third kind, in which what sort a thing is is asked, one must speak either about honesty, or about utility, or about equity. About honesty thus: whether it is honorable to undergo peril or envy for a friend; about utility thus: whether it is useful to be engaged in administering the republic; but about equity thus: whether it is equitable to prefer friends to kinsmen. And in this same kind, in which what sort a thing is is asked, there arises a certain other kind of disputation.

Non enim simpliciter solum quaeritur quid honestum sit, quid utile, quid aequum, sed etiam ex comparatione, quid honestius, quid utilius, quid aequius, atque etiam, quid honestissimum, quid utilissimum, quid aequissimum; cuius generis illa sunt quae praestantissima sit dignitas vitae. Atque ea quidem quae dixi cognitionis sunt omnia.

For not only is it asked simply what is honest, what is useful, what is equitable, but also by comparison, what is more honest, what more useful, what more equitable, and even, what is most honest, what most useful, what most equitable; to which genus belong those inquiries, as to what dignity of life is most preeminent. And indeed all the things which I have said are matters of cognition.

[67] Restant actionis, cuius alterum est praecipiendi genus quod ad rationem officii pertinet, ut quemadmodum colendi sint parentes, alterum autem ad sedandos animos et oratione sanandos, ut in consolandis maeroribus, ut in iracundia comprimenda aut in timore tollendo aut in cupiditate minuenda. Cui quidem generi contrarium est disputandi genus ad eosdem illos animi motus, quod in amplificanda oratione saepe faciendum est, vel gignendos vel concitandos. Atque haec fere est partitio consultationum.

[67] There remain those belonging to action, of which one is the preceptive genus, which pertains to the rationale of duty, as how parents are to be honored; the other, however, looks to soothing minds and healing them by oration, as in consoling griefs, in restraining anger, or in removing fear, or in diminishing desire. To this genus, indeed, there is opposed the genus of disputation directed to those same motions of the mind, which, in amplifying an oration, must often be done, either to generate them or to stir them up. And this is, for the most part, the partition of consultations.

[68]C.F. Cognovi: sed quae ratio sit in his inveniendi et disponendi requiro. C.P. Quid? tu aliamne censes et non eamdem quae est exposita, ut ex eisdem locis ad fidem et ad inveniendum ducantur omnia?

[68]C.F. I have understood: but I inquire what the method is in these for invention and disposition. C.P. What? Do you suppose another, and not the same that has been expounded, namely that from the same loci everything is led both to credibility and to invention?

Collocandi autem quae est exposita in aliis ratio, eadem huc transfertur. C.F. Cognita igitur omni distributione propositarum consultationum, causarum genera restant.

But the method of arranging which has been set forth in other places is transferred here as well. C.F. Therefore, with the entire distribution of the proposed consultations having been understood, the kinds of causes remain.

[69]C.P. Admodum; et earum quidem forma duplex est, quarum altera delectationem sectatur audientium, alterius ut obtineat, probet et efficiat quod agit, omnis est suscepta contentio. Itaque illud superius exornatio dicitur, quod cum latum genus esse potest saneque varium, unum ex eo delegimus, quod ad laudandos claros viros suscipimus et ad improbos vituperandos. Genus enim nullum est orationis quod aut uberius ad dicendum aut utilius civitatibus esse possit aut in quo magis orator in cognitione virtutum vitiorumque versetur.

[69]C.P. Very much so; and indeed their form is twofold, of which one pursues the delectation of the hearers, while in the other the whole contention is undertaken so that it may obtain, prove, and effect what it is doing. And so that former is called exornation; and since it can be a broad and indeed various genus, we have chosen one from it, which we undertake for praising illustrious men and for vituperating the wicked. For there is no kind of oration which can be either more copious for speaking or more useful to states, or in which the orator is more engaged in the cognition of virtues and vices.

Reliquum autem genus causarum aut in provisione posteri temporis aut in praeteriti disceptatione versatur, quorum alterum deliberationis est, alterum iudicii.

The remaining kind of causes is occupied either with provision for future time or with the disputation of the past, of which the one belongs to deliberation, the other to judgment.

[70] Ex qua partitione tria genera causarum exstiterunt, unum quod a meliori parte laudationis est appellatum, deliberationis alterum, tertium iudiciorum. Quam ob rem de primo primum, si placet, disputemus.C.F. Mihi vero placet.

[70] From this partition three kinds of causes have arisen: one which, from its better part, has been named of laudation, the second of deliberation, the third of judgments. Wherefore, about the first, first, if it pleases, let us discuss.C.F. It truly pleases me.

C.P. Ac laudandi vituperandique rationes, quae non ad bene dicendum solum sed etiam ad honeste vivendum valent, exponam breviter, atque a principiis exordiar et laudandi et vituperandi.

C.P. And the methods of laudation and vituperation, which are effective not only for well speaking but also for honorable living, I will briefly set forth, and I will begin from the principles both of praising and of blaming.

[71] Omnia enim sunt profecto laudanda quae coniuncta cum virtute sunt, et quae cum vitiis, vituperanda. Quam ob rem finis alterius est honestas, alterius turpitudo. Conficitur autem genus hoc dictionis narrandis exponendisque factis sine ullis argumentationibus, ad animi motus leniter tractandos magis quam ad fidem faciendam aut confirmandam accommodate.

[71] For assuredly all things are to be praised which are conjoined with virtue, and those which are with vices, to be vituperated. Wherefore the end of the one is honesty/honorableness, of the other turpitude. Moreover, this kind of diction is brought to completion by narrating and setting forth deeds without any argumentations, suited rather to the motions of the mind to be handled gently than to making or confirming credence.

Non enim dubia firmantur sed ea quae certa aut pro certis posita sunt augentur. Quam ob rem ex eis quae ante dicta sunt et narrandi et augendi praecepta repetentur.

For doubtful things are not strengthened, but those which are certain or have been posited as certain are augmented. Wherefore, from those things which have been said before, the precepts both of narrating and of augmenting will be repeated.

[72] Et quoniam in his causis omnis ratio fere ad voluptatem auditoris et ad delectationem refertur, utendum erit eis in oratione singulorum verborum insignibus quae habent plurimum suavitatis: id est ut factis verbis aut vetustis aut translatis frequenter utamur, et in ipsa constructione verborum ut paria paribus et similia similibus saepe referantur, ut contraria, ut geminata, ut circumscripta numerose, non ad similitudinem versuum, sed ad explendum aurium sensum, apto quodam quasi verborum modo.

[72] And since in these causes almost the whole method is referred to the pleasure of the auditor and to delectation, it will be necessary to use in the oration the insignia of individual words which have the very most suavity: that is, that we frequently employ coined words, or very old, or translated (i.e., transferred) ones; and in the very construction of the wording, that equals be matched to equals and similars to similars often, that there be contraries, that there be doubling, that things be circumscribed with number (rhythm), not in the likeness of verses, but to fill the sense of the ears, with a certain fitting, as it were, manner of words.

[73] Adhibendaque frequentius etiam illa ornamenta rerum sunt, sive quae admirabilia et nec opinata, sive significata monstris, prodigiis, oraculis, sive quae videbuntur ei de quo agimus accidisse divina atque fatalia. Omnis enim exspectatio eius qui audit et admiratio et improvisi exitus habent aliquam in audiendo voluptatem.

[73] And those ornaments of subject-matter too must be employed more frequently, whether such as are admirable and unlooked-for, or signified by monsters, prodigies, or oracles, or such as will seem to have befallen him about whom we are speaking as divine and fated. For every expectation of the hearer, and admiration, and unforeseen outcomes have some pleasure in the hearing.

[74] Sed quoniam tribus in generibus bona malave versantur, externis, corporis, animi, prima sunt externa, quae ducuntur a genere: quo breviter modiceque laudato aut si erit infame praetermisso, si humile, vel praeterito vel ad augendam eius quem laudes gloriam tracto; deinceps si res patietur de fortunis erit et facultatibus dicendum, postea de corporis bonis, in quibus quidem quae virtutem maxime significat facillime forma laudatur.

[74] But since good or ill is occupied in three kinds—external, of the body, of the mind—the first are the externals, which are drawn from lineage: which, praised briefly and moderately, or, if it be disgraceful, passed over; if lowly, either omitted or handled so as to augment the glory of him whom you praise; next, if the matter permit, one must speak of fortunes and faculties (resources), afterwards of the goods of the body, among which indeed that which most signifies virtue is most easily praised, the form (beauty).

[75] Deinde est ad facta veniendum, quorum collocatio triplex est: aut enim temporum servandus est ordo aut in primis recentissimum quodque dicendum aut multa et varia facta in propria virtutum genera sunt dirigenda. Sed hic locus virtutum atque vitiorum latissime patens ex multis et variis disputationibus nunc in quamdam angustam et brevem concludetur.

[75] Then one must come to the deeds, whose collocation is threefold: for either the order of times must be observed, or the most recent things must each be told first, or the many and various deeds must be directed into their proper genera of virtues. But this locus of virtues and vices, lying very widely open and drawn from many and various disputations, will now be concluded into a certain narrow and brief compass.

[76] Est igitur vis virtutis duplex; aut enim scientia cernitur virtus, aut actione. Nam quae prudentia, quae calliditas, quaeque gravissimo nomine sapientia appellatur, haec scientia pollet una; quae vero moderandis cupiditatibus regendisque animi motibus laudatur, eius est munus in agendo; cui temperantiae nomen est. Atque illa prudentia in suis rebus domestica, in publicis civilis appellari solet.

[76] Therefore the power of virtue is twofold; for virtue is discerned either by knowledge or by action. For that which is called prudence, shrewdness, and by the most weighty name wisdom, this prevails by knowledge alone; but that which is praised for moderating desires and governing the motions of the mind, its office is in acting; to which the name temperance belongs. And that prudence is wont to be called domestic in one’s own affairs, civil in public affairs.

[77] Temperantia autem in suas itidem res et in communes distributa est, duobusque modis in rebus commodis discernitur, et ea quae absunt non expetendo et ab eis quae in potestate sunt abstinendo. In rebus autem incommodis est itidem duplex; nam quae venientibus malis obstat fortitudo, quae quod iam adest tolerat et perfert patientia nominatur. Quae autem haec uno genere complectitur, magnitudo animi dicitur: cuius est liberalitas in usu pecuniae, simulque altitudo animi in capiendis incommodis et maxime iniuriis, et omne quod est eius generis, grave, sedatum [non turbulentum].

[77] Temperance, moreover, is likewise distributed into one’s own affairs and into common ones, and in advantageous matters it is discerned in two modes: both by not seeking the things that are absent and by abstaining from those which are in one’s power. But in disadvantageous matters it likewise has a twofold form; for that which stands in the way of incoming evils is Fortitude, while that which endures and bears what is already present is called Patience. And that which embraces these in a single kind is called Greatness of spirit (Magnanimity): whose is Liberality in the use of money, together with loftiness of spirit in taking on disadvantages and especially injuries, and everything that is of that kind, grave, sedate [not turbulent].

[78] In communione autem quae posita pars est, iustitia dicitur, eaque erga deos religio, erga parentes pietas, vulgo autem bonitas, creditis in rebus fides, in moderatione animadvertendi lenitas, amicitia in benevolentia nominatur. Atque hae quidem virtutes cernuntur in agendo. Sunt autem aliae quasi ministrae comitesque sapientiae, quarum altera quae sint in disputando vera atque falsa quibusque positis quid sequatur distinguit et iudicat, quae virtus omnis in ratione scientiaque disputandi sita est; altera autem oratoria.

[78] And the part which is set in common life is called justice, and this, toward the gods, is religion; toward parents, piety; commonly, goodness; in matters entrusted, faith; in the moderation of animadverting (censuring), lenity; friendship is named in benevolence. And these virtues indeed are discerned in acting. But there are others, as it were handmaids and companions of wisdom, of which the one distinguishes and judges, in disputation, what are true and false, and, certain things being posited, what follows—which virtue is wholly situated in the reason and science of disputing; the other is oratorical.

[79] Nihil enim est aliud eloquentia nisi copiose loquens sapientia, quae ex eodem hausta genere quo illa quae in disputando est, uberior est atque latior et ad motus animorum vulgique sensus accommodatior. Custos vero virtutum omnium dedecus fugiens laudemque maxime consequens verecundia est. Atque hi sunt fere quasi quidam habitus animi sic affecti et constituti ut sint singuli inter se proprio virtutis genere distincti: a quibus ut quaeque res gesta est, ita sit honesta necesse est summeque laudabilis.

[79] For eloquence is nothing else than wisdom speaking copiously, which, drawn from the same kind as that which is in disputation, is more abundant and broader and more accommodated to the motions of minds and to the perceptions of the common crowd. The guardian, indeed, of all the virtues—fleeing disgrace and most of all attaining praise—is modesty. And these are for the most part, as it were, certain habitus of the soul, so affected and constituted that each is distinguished from the others by its own proper genus of virtue: according to which, as each thing has been carried out, so it must be honorable and supremely laudable.

[80] Sunt autem alii quidam animi habitus ad virtutem quasi praeculti et praeparati rectis studiis et artibus, ut in suis rebus studia litterarum, ut numerorum ac sonorum, ut mensurae, ut siderum, ut equorum, ut venandi, ut armorum, in communibus propensiora studia in aliquo genere virtutis praecipue colendo aut divinis rebus deserviendo aut parentibus, amicis, hospitibus praecipue atque insigniter diligendis.

[80] There are, moreover, certain other dispositions of the mind, as it were pre‑cultivated and prepared for virtue by right studies and arts, as, in one’s own concerns, the studies of letters, of numbers and sounds, of measure, of the stars, of horses, of hunting, of arms; in common matters, more inclined pursuits by especially cultivating some kind of virtue, or by being devoted to divine things, or by loving parents, friends, and guests especially and notably.

[81] Atque haec quidem virtutum; vitiorum autem sunt genera contraria. Cernenda autem sunt diligenter, ne fallant ea nos vitia, quae virtutem videntur imitari. Nam et prudentiam malitia et temperantiam immanitas in voluptatibus aspernandis et magnitudinem animi superbia in nimis extollendis et despicientia in contemnendis honoribus et liberalitatem effusio et fortitudinem audacia imitatur et patientiam duritia immanis et iustitiam acerbitas et religionem superstitio et lenitatem mollitia animi et verecundiam timiditas et illam disputandi prudentiam concertatio captatioque verborum, et hanc oratoriam vim inanis quaedam profluentia loquendi.

[81] And these indeed are of the virtues; but of the vices there are contrary kinds. They must, however, be discerned diligently, lest those vices which seem to imitate virtue deceive us. For malice imitates prudence, and immanity in spurning pleasures imitates temperance, and pride in over-exalting oneself imitates magnanimity, and disdain in despising honors imitates it, and effusion imitates liberality, and audacity imitates fortitude, and a savage hardness imitates patience, and acerbity imitates justice, and superstition imitates religion, and lenity is imitated by softness of spirit, and modesty by timidity, and that prudence in disputing by wrangling and the catching at words, and this oratorical force by a certain empty profluency of speaking.

Studiis autem bonis similia videntur ea quae sunt in eodem genere nimia.

Moreover, to good pursuits, those things that are excessive in the same kind seem similar.

[82] Quam ob rem omnis vis laudandi vituperandique ex his sumetur virtutum vitiorumque partibus; sed in toto quasi contextu orationis haec erunt illustranda maxime, quemadmodum quisque generatus, quemadmodum educatus, quemadmodum institutus moratusque fuerit, et si quid cui magnum aut incredibile acciderit, maximeque si id divinitus accidisse potuerit videri; tum quod quisque senserit, dixerit, gesserit ad ea quae proposita sunt virtutum genera accommodabuntur, ex illisque eisdem inveniendi locis causae rerum et eventus et consequentia requirentur. Neque vero mors eorum quorum vita laudabitur silentio praeteriri debebit, si modo quid erit animadvertendum aut in ipso genere mortis aut in eis rebus quae post mortem erunt consecutae.

[82] Wherefore every force of praising and blaming will be taken from these parts of virtues and vices; but in the whole, as it were, context of the oration, these are to be most illustrated: in what way each was born, in what way brought up, in what way instructed and how he conducted himself; and if anything great or incredible befell anyone, and especially if that could seem to have happened by divine agency; then what each has thought, said, and done will be accommodated to those genera of virtues that have been set forth, and from those same places for invention the causes of things and the events and outcomes and the consequences will be sought. Nor indeed ought the death of those whose life will be praised to be passed over in silence, provided only that there is something to be noticed either in the very kind of death or in those things which after death have ensued.

[83]C.F. Accepi ista, didicique breviter non solum quemadmodum laudarem alterum sed etiam quemadmodum eniterer ut possem ipse iure laudari. Videamus igitur deinceps in sententia dicenda quam viam et quae praecepta teneamus. C.P. Est igitur in deliberando finis utilitas, ad quem omnia ita referuntur in consilio dando sententiaque dicenda ut illa prima sint suasori aut dissuasori videnda, quid aut possit fieri aut non possit et quid aut necesse sit aut non necesse.

[83]C.F. I have received those things, and I have learned briefly not only how I might praise another, but also how I might strive so that I myself could be praised with right. Let us then see next, in the opinion to be stated, what way and which precepts we should hold. C.P. Therefore, in deliberating the end is utility, to which all things are thus referred in giving counsel and in the opinion to be stated, that these should first be looked to by the persuader or the dissuader: what can be done or cannot be done, and what is necessary or not necessary.

Nam et si quid effici non potest, deliberatio tollitur quamvis utile sit, et si quid necesse est (necesse autem id est sine quo salvi liberive esse non possumus), id est reliquis et honestatibus in civili ratione et commodis anteponendum.

For even if something cannot be effected, deliberation is removed, although it be useful; and if something is necessary (necessary, moreover, is that without which we cannot be safe or free), that is to be set before the rest, both the “honorable” things in the civil rationale and the advantages.

[84] Cum autem quaeritur quid fieri possit, videndum etiam est quam facile possit; nam quae perdifficilia sunt perinde habenda saepe sunt ac si effici non possint. Et cum de necessitate attendemus, etsi aliquid non necessarium videbitur, videndum tamen erit quam sit magnum; quod enim permagnum est pro necessario saepe habetur.

[84] But when it is inquired what can be done, it must also be seen how easy it can be; for things that are exceedingly difficult are often to be regarded just as if they cannot be brought to effect. And when we attend to necessity, even if something will appear not necessary, it must still be seen how great it is; for what is very great is often held as necessary.

[85] Itaque cum constet hoc genus causarum ex suasione et dissuasione, suasori proponitur simplex ratio, si et utile est et fieri potest, fiat, dissuasori duplex, una, si non utile est, ne fiat, altera, si fieri non potest, ne suscipiatur. Sic suasori utrumque docendum est, dissuasori alterum infirmare sat est.

[85] Therefore, since this genus of causes consists of suasion and dissuasion, a simple rationale is proposed to the persuader: if it is both useful and can be done, let it be done; to the dissuader a double one: first, if it is not useful, let it not be done; second, if it cannot be done, let it not be undertaken. Thus the persuader must show both; for the dissuader it is enough to invalidate either one.

[86] Quare quoniam in his versatur omne consilium duobus, de utilitate ante dicamus, quae in discernendis bonis malisque versatur. Bonorum autem partim necessaria sunt, ut vita, pudicitia, libertas, partim non necessaria, ut liberi, coniuges, germani, parentes: quorum alia sunt per se expetenda, ut ea quae sita sunt in officiis atque virtutibus, alia quod aliquid commodi efficiunt, ut opes et copiae.

[86] Wherefore, since all deliberation is engaged in these two, let us speak first about utility, which is engaged in discerning goods and evils. Now of goods, some are necessary, as life, pudicity, liberty; some not necessary, as children, spouses, siblings, parents: of which some are to be sought for their own sake, such as those which are situated in duties and virtues; others because they bring about some advantage, such as wealth and resources.

[87] Eorum autem quae propter se expetuntur partim honestate ipsa, partim commoditate aliqua expetuntur: honestate ea quae proficiscuntur ab eis virtutibus de quibus paullo ante est dictum, quae sunt laudabilia ipsa per se: commoditate autem aliqua quae sunt in corporis aut in fortunae bonis expetenda, quorum alia sunt quasi cum honestate coniuncta, ut honos, ut gloria, alia diversa, ut vires, forma, valetudo, nobilitas, divitiae, clientelae.

[87] Of those things which are sought for their own sake, some are sought by honorableness itself, some by a certain convenience: by honorableness, those which proceed from those virtues about which a little before it was said, which are laudable in and of themselves; but by some convenience, those which are to be sought among the goods of the body or of fortune, of which some are, as it were, conjoined with honorableness, as honor, as glory, others are different, as strength, form (beauty), health, nobility, riches, clientele.

[88] Est etiam quaedam quasi materies subiecta honestati, quae maxime spectatur in amicitiis. Amicitiae autem caritate et amore cernuntur; nam cum deorum tum parentum patriaeque cultus eorumque hominum qui aut sapientia aut opibus excellunt ad caritatem referri solet, coniuges autem et liberi et fratres et alii quos usus familiaritasque coniunxit, quamquam etiam caritate ipsa, tamen amore maxime continentur. In his igitur rebus cum bona sint, facile est intellectu quae sint contraria.

[88] There is also a certain, as it were, material subject to honesty, which is beheld most of all in friendships. Friendships, moreover, are discerned by charity and love; for both the cult of the gods and of parents and of the fatherland, and the regard for those men who excel either in wisdom or in opulence, is wont to be referred to charity; but spouses and children and brothers and others whom use and familiarity have joined, although also by charity itself, yet are held together most of all by love. In these matters, therefore, since they are goods, it is easy to understand what things are contrary.

[89] Quodsi semper optima tenere possemus, haud sane, quoniam quidem ea perspicua sunt, consilio multum egeremus. Sed quia temporibus, quae vim habent maximam, persaepe evenit ut utilitas cum honestate certet, earumque rerum contentio plerumque deliberationes efficit ne aut opportuna propter dignitatem aut honesta propter utilitatem relinquantur, ad hanc difficultatem explicandam praecepta referamus.

[89] But if we could always hold to the best things, we would not, since these are indeed perspicuous, have much need of counsel. But because times, which have the greatest force, very often bring it about that utility contends with honesty (the honorable), and the contention of these things for the most part produces deliberations, lest either the opportune things be left aside on account of dignity or the honest things on account of utility, to the untying of this difficulty let us refer precepts.

[90] Et quoniam non ad veritatem solum sed etiam ad opiniones eorum qui audiunt accommodanda est oratio, hoc primum intellegamus, hominum duo esse genera, alterum indoctum et agreste, quod anteferat semper utilitatem honestati, alterum humanum et politum, quod rebus omnibus dignitatem anteponat. Itaque huic generi laus, honor, gloria, fides, iustitia, omnisque virtus, illi autem alteri quaestus emolumentum fructusque proponitur. Atque etiam voluptas, quae maxime est inimica virtuti bonique naturam fallaciter imitando adulterat, quam immanissimus quisque acerrime sequitur, neque solum honestis rebus sed etiam necessariis anteponit, in suadendo, cum ei generi hominum consilium des, saepe sane laudanda est.

[90] And since discourse must be accommodated not only to truth but also to the opinions of those who hear, let us first understand this: there are two kinds of human beings, one unlearned and rustic, which always prefers utility to the honorable, the other humane and polished, which in all things puts dignity first. And so to this latter kind praise, honor, glory, good faith, justice, and every virtue are proposed; but to that other, gain, emolument, and profit. And even pleasure, which is most inimical to virtue and, by deceitfully imitating the nature of the good, adulterates it, each most savage follows most keenly, and he puts it before not only honorable things but even necessary ones; in persuading, when you give counsel to that kind of men, it is often indeed to be commended.

[91] Et illud videndum, quanto magis homines mala fugiant quam sequantur bona. Nam neque honesta tam expetunt quam devitant turpia; quis enim honorem, quis gloriam, quis laudem, quis ullum decus tam umquam expetat quam ignominiam, infamiam, contumeliam, dedecus fugiat? quarum rerum dolor gravis est testis genus hominum ad honestatem natum, malo cultu pravisque opinionibus corruptum. Quare in cohortando atque suadendo propositum quidem nobis erit illud, ut doceamus qua via bona consequi malaque vitare possimus;

[91] And this must be observed, how much more men flee evils than follow goods. For they do not so much seek honorable things as they shun shameful ones; for who ever seeks honor, who glory, who praise, who any distinction, so greatly as he flees ignominy, infamy, contumely, disgrace? the grievous pain of which things is a witness that the race of humankind is born for honorableness, but is corrupted by bad cultivation and depraved opinions. Therefore, in exhorting and advising, our aim indeed will be this: that we teach by what way we can attain goods and avoid evils;

[92] sed apud homines bene institutos plurimum de laude et de honestate dicemus, maximeque ea virtutum genera tractabimus quae in communi hominum utilitate tuenda augendaque versantur. Sin apud indoctos imperitosque dicemus, fructus, emolumenta, voluptates vitationesque dolorum proferantur; addantur etiam contumeliae atque ignominiae; nemo enim est tam agrestis quem non, si ipsa minus honestas, contumelia tamen et dedecus magnopere moveat.

[92] but among men well instructed we shall say most about praise and about honorableness, and most especially we shall handle those kinds of virtues which are engaged in guarding and augmenting the common utility of men. But if we speak among the unlearned and inexpert, let profits, emoluments, pleasures, and the avoidances of pains be put forward; let contumelies and ignominies also be added; for there is no one so rustic that, if honorableness itself moves him less, nevertheless contumely and disgrace would not move him greatly.

[93] Quare quod ad utilitatem spectat ex eis quae dicta sunt reperietur: quod autem, possit effici necne, in quo etiam quam facile possit quamque expediat quaeri solet, maxime ex causis eis quae quamque rem efficiant est videndum. Causarum autem genera sunt plura; nam sunt aliae quae ipsae conficiunt, aliae quae vim aliquam ad conficiendum afferunt. Itaque illae superiores conficientes vocentur, hae reliquae ponantur in eo genere ut sine his confici non possit.

[93] Therefore, as regards utility, it will be found from the things that have been said; but as to whether it can be brought to effect or not—in which, too, it is usually asked how easily it can be done and how expedient it is—this must be considered chiefly from the causes which bring each thing to effect. Moreover, the kinds of causes are several; for some themselves complete the thing, others bring some force toward completing it. Accordingly, let the former be called efficient causes; let the remainder be placed in that class such that without them the thing cannot be completed.

[94] Conficiens autem causa alia est absoluta et perfecta per se, alia aliquid adiuvans et efficiendi socia quaedam: cuius generis vis varia est, et saepe aut maior aut minor, ut et illa quae maximam vim habet sola saepe causa dicatur. Sunt autem aliae causae quae aut propter principium aut propter exitum conficientes vocantur. Cum autem quaeritur quid sit optimum factu, aut utilitas aut spes efficiendi ad assentiendum impellit animos.

[94] Now, a producing cause is either absolute and perfect in itself, or else one that aids something and is a kind of associate in effecting; the force of this genus is variable, and often either greater or lesser, so that even that which has the greatest force is often said to be the sole cause. There are moreover other causes which are called producing either on account of the beginning or on account of the outcome. And when it is asked what is best to do, either utility or the hope of effecting impels minds to assent.

[95] Et quoniam de utilitate iam diximus, de efficiendi ratione dicamus. Quo toto in genere quibuscum et contra quos et quo tempore et quo loco quibus facultatibus armorum, pecuniae, sociorum, earumve rerum quae ad quamque rem efficiendam pertinent possimus uti requirendum est. Neque solum ea sunt quae nobis suppetunt sed etiam illa quae adversantur videnda; et si ex contentione procliviora erunt nostra, non solum effici posse quae suademus erit persuadendum sed curandum etiam ut illa facilia, proclivia, iucunda videantur.

[95] And since we have now spoken about utility, let us speak about the method of effecting. In this whole kind, it must be inquired with whom and against whom, and at what time and in what place, and with what resources in arms, money, allies, and the other things which pertain to bringing each matter to effect, we can make use. Nor must only those things which are at our disposal be considered, but also those which oppose; and if, by comparison, our side is more favorable, one must persuade not only that the things we recommend can be effected, but also take care that they seem easy, inclined, and agreeable.

Dissuadentibus autem aut utilitas labefactanda est aut efficiendi difficultates efferendae, neque aliis ex praeceptis sed eisdem ex suasionis locis.

But when dissuading, either the utility must be undermined or the difficulties of accomplishing must be brought forth, and this not by other precepts but from the same topics of suasion.

[96] Uterque vero ad augendum habeat exemplorum aut recentium quo notiora sint aut veterum quo plus auctoritatis habeant, copiam; maximeque sit in hoc genere meditatus, ut possit vel utilia ac necessaria saepe honestis vel haec illis anteferre. Ad commovendos autem animos maxime proficient, si incitandi erunt, huiusmodi sententiae quae aut ad explendas cupiditates aut ad odium satiandum aut ad ulciscendas iniurias pertinebunt; sin autem reprimendi, de incerto statu fortunae dubiisque eventis rerum futurarum et retinendis suis fortunis si erunt secundae, sin autem adversae, de periculo commonendi. Atque hi quidem sunt perorationis loci.

[96] But each side, for amplification, should have a supply of examples, either recent, so that they may be more well-known, or ancient, so that they may have more authority; and let him be especially practiced in this kind, so that he can either often set the useful and necessary before the honorable, or prefer these to those. To move the feelings, moreover, if they must be incited, sentiments of this sort will be most effective: those that pertain either to satisfying desires, or to satiating hatred, or to avenging injuries; but if they must be restrained, then [speak] about the uncertain state of Fortune and the doubtful outcomes of future affairs, and about retaining their own advantages if they will be favorable—if, however, adverse, to be warned about the danger. And these, indeed, are the topics of the peroration.

[97] Principia autem in sententiis dicendis brevia esse debent; non enim supplex ut ad iudicem venit orator sed hortator atque auctor. Quare proponere qua mente dicat, quid velit, quibus de rebus dicturus sit debet, hortarique ad se breviter dicentem audiendum. Tota autem oratio simplex et gravis et sententiis debet ornatior esse quam verbis.

[97] The principles, moreover, in pronouncing sentences ought to be brief; for the orator comes not as a suppliant to the judge but as an exhorter and author. Therefore he ought to set forth with what mind he speaks, what he wants, about what matters he is going to speak, and to exhort that he, speaking briefly, be heard. And the whole oration ought to be simple and weighty, and more adorned with sentences than with words.

[98]C.F. Cognovi iam laudationis et suasionis locos: nunc quae iudiciis accommodata sint exspecto, idque nobis genus restare unum puto. C.P. Recte intellegis. Atque eius quidem generis finis est aequitas, quae non simpliciter spectatur sed ex comparatione nonnumquam, ut cum de verissimo accusatore disputatur aut cum hereditatis sine lege aut sine testamento petitur possessio, in quibus causis quid aequius aequissimumve sit quaeritur; quas ad causas facultas petitur argumentationum ex eis de quibus mox dicetur aequitatis locis.

[98]C.F. I have now come to know the places of laudation and of suasion: now I await those which are accommodated to trials, and I think that that one kind is left to us. C.P. You understand rightly. And the end of that kind is equity, which is not looked at simply but sometimes from comparison, as when it is disputed about the very truest accuser, or when possession of an inheritance is sought without statute or without testament, in which cases what is more equitable or most equitable is inquired; for which causes the faculty of argumentations is sought from those topics of equity about which it will soon be spoken.

[99] Atque etiam ante iudicium de constituendo ipso iudicio solet esse contentio, cum aut sitne actio illi qui agit aut iamne sit aut num iam esse desierit aut illane lege hisne verbis sit actio quaeritur. Quae etiamsi ante quam res in iudicium venit aut concertata aut diiudicata aut confecta non sunt, tamen in ipsis iudiciis permagnum saepe habent pondus cum ita dicitur: plus petisti; sero petisti; non fuit tua petitio; non a me, non hac lege, non his verbis, non hoc iudicio.

[99] And even before the judgment there is often contention about the constituting of the judgment itself, when it is inquired whether there be an action for the one who prosecutes, or whether it already exists, or whether perhaps it has already ceased to exist, or whether there is an action by that law, in these words. And even if these matters—before the case comes into judgment—have not been contested, or adjudicated, or concluded, nevertheless in the trials themselves they often have very great weight, when it is said thus: you have asked for more; you have asked too late; your petition was not yours; not against me; not by this law; not in these words; not in this court.

[100] Quarum causarum genus est positum in iure civili quod est in privatarum rerum lege aut more positum; cuius scientia neglecta ab oratoribus plerisque nobis ad dicendum necessaria videtur. Quare de constituendis actionibus, de accipiendis subeundisque iudiciis, de excipienda iniquitate actionis, de comparanda aequitate, quod ea fere generis eius sunt ut quamquam in ipsum iudicium saepe delabantur tamen ante iudicium tractanda videantur, paullulum ea separo a iudiciis tempore magis agendi quam dissimilitudine generis. Nam omnia quae de iure civili aut de aequo et bono disceptantur cadunt in eam formam in qua quale quid sit ambigitur, de qua dicturi sumus; quae in aequitate et iure maxime consistit.

[100] The kind of these causes is set in civil law, which is set in the statute or custom of private matters; the knowledge of which, neglected by most orators, seems to us necessary for speaking. Therefore, about instituting actions, about accepting and undergoing trials, about taking exception to the iniquity of an action, about procuring equity—since these are for the most part of such a kind that, although they often glide into the trial itself, nevertheless they seem to be handled before the trial—I separate them a little from trials, more by the time of pleading than by dissimilarity of kind. For all matters that are disputed concerning civil law or about what is equitable and good fall into that form in which it is in doubt what sort a thing is, about which we are going to speak; which chiefly consists in equity and law.

[101] In omnibus igitur causis tres sunt gradus ex quibus unus aliquis capiendus est, si plures non queas, ad resistendum. Nam aut ita constituendum est ut id quod obiicitur factum neges, aut illud quod factum fateare neges eam vim habere atque id esse quod adversarius criminetur, aut si neque de facto neque de facti appellatione ambigi potest, id quod arguere neges tale esse quale ille dicat et rectum esse quod feceris concedendumve defendas.

[101] Therefore in all causes there are three grades, one of which must be seized, if you cannot take more, for resisting. For either the case must be so constituted that you deny that what is objected was done; or, though you confess the deed was done, you deny that it has that force and that it is what the adversary criminates; or, if there can be no dispute either about the fact or about the appellation of the fact, you deny that what he argues is of such a kind as he says, and you defend that what you have done is right and ought to be conceded.

[102] Ita primus ille status et quasi conflictio cum adversario coniectura quadam, secundus autem definitione atque descriptione aut informatione verbi, tertius aequi et veri et recti et humani ad ignoscendum disputatione tractandus est. Et quoniam semper is qui defendit non solum resistat oportet aliquo statu aut infitiando aut definiendo aut aequitate opponenda sed etiam rationem subiiciat recusationis suae, primus ille status rationem habet iniqui criminis, ipsam negationem infitiationemque facti; secundus quod non sit in re quod ab adversario ponatur in verbo; tertius quod id recte factum esse defendat quod sine ulla nominis controversia factum fatetur.

[102] Thus the first status, and as it were a conflict with the adversary, must be handled by a certain conjecture; the second by definition and description or by the informing/formation of the word; the third by disputation concerning the equitable, the true, the right, and the humane, with a view to forgiving. And since he who defends must always not only resist by some status—either by denying, or by defining, or by opposing equity—but also submit the rationale of his recusation, that first status has as its rationale the iniquity of the charge, namely the very negation and infitiation (denial) of the fact; the second, that what is set by the adversary in the word is not in the thing; the third, that he defends that what he admits to have been done, without any controversy of the name, was done rightly.

[103] Deinde uni cuique rationi opponendum est ab accusatore id quod si non esset in accusatione, causa omnino esse non posset. Itaque ea quae sic referuntur continentia causarum vocentur: quamquam non ea magis quae contra rationem defensionis afferuntur quam ipsae defensionis rationes continent causas. Sed distinguendi gratia rationem appellamus eam quae affertur ab reo ad recusandum depellendi criminis causa, quae nisi esset, quod defenderet non haberet: firmamentum autem quod contra ad labefactandam rationem refertur, sine quo accusatio stare non potest.

[103] Then to each and every rationale there must be opposed by the accuser that which, if it were not in the accusation, the case could not exist at all. And so let those things which are thus adduced be called the contents of cases: although no more do the things that are brought against the rationale of the defense than the rationales of the defense themselves contain the cases. But for the sake of distinguishing, we call “reason” that which is brought by the defendant for recusation, for the purpose of driving off the charge—without which he would have nothing to defend; but “support” that which, on the contrary, is brought to undermine the reason, without which the accusation cannot stand.

[104] Ex rationis autem et firmamenti conflictione et quasi concursu quaestio exoritur quaedam quam disceptationem voco: in qua quid veniat in iudicium et de quo disceptetur quaeri solet. Nam prima adversariorum contentio diffusam habet quaestionem; ut in coniectura, ceperitne pecunias Decius; in definitione, minueritne maiestatem Norbanus; in aequitate, iurene occiderit Opimius Gracchum. Haec, quae primam contentionem habent ex arguendo et resistendo, lata, ut dixi, et fusa sunt; rationum et firmamentorum contentio adducit in angustum disceptationem.

[104] From the confliction of the reason and the support, and, as it were, their concourse, there arises a certain question which I call disceptation: in which it is usually asked what comes into judgment and about what there is to be discepted. For the first contention of adversaries has a diffuse question; as in conjecture, whether Decius took monies; in definition, whether Norbanus diminished the majesty; in equity, whether Opimius killed Gracchus by right. These things, which have their first contention from arguing and resisting, are, as I said, broad and spread out; the contention of reasons and supports draws the disceptation into a narrow compass.

Ea in coniectura nulla est; nemo enim eius quod negat factum rationem aut potest aut debet aut solet reddere. Itaque in his causis eadem et prima quaestio, et disceptatio est extrema.

There is none of this in conjecture; for no one either can, ought, or is wont to render a reason for that which he denies to have been done. And thus in these cases the first question and the ultimate disceptation are the same.

[105] In illis autem ubi ita dicitur: 'Non minuit maiestatem quod egit de Caepione turbulentius; populi enim Romani dolor iustus vim illam excitavit, non tribuni actio; maiestas autem, quoniam est magnitudo quaedam, populi Romani in eius potestate ac iure retinendo aucta est potius quam diminuta,' et ubi ita refertur: 'Maiestas est in imperii atque in nominis populi Romani dignitate, quam minuit is qui per vim multitudinis rem ad seditionem vocavit,' exsistit illa disceptatio, minueritne maiestatem qui voluntate populi Romani rem gratam et aequam per vim egerit.

[105] But in those cases where it is said thus: 'He did not diminish the majesty by having acted somewhat more turbulently concerning Caepio; for the just grief of the Roman people aroused that force, not the tribune’s action; and majesty, since it is a certain magnitude, of the Roman people, by retaining its power and right, was increased rather than diminished,' and where it is reported thus: 'Majesty is in the dignity of the empire and of the name of the Roman people, which is diminished by him who, by the force of a multitude, called the matter to sedition,' there arises that disceptation, whether he diminished the majesty who, by the will of the Roman people, carried through by force a matter pleasing and equitable.

[106] In eis autem causis ubi aliquid recte factum aut concedendum esse defenditur, cum est facti subiecta ratio, sicut ab Opimio: 'Iure feci, salutis omnium et conservandae reipublicae causa,' relatumque est ab Decio: 'Ne sceleratissimum quidem civem sine iudicio iure ullo necare potuisti,' oritur illa disceptatio: potueritne recte salutis reipublicae causa civem eversorem civitatis indemnatum necare. Ita disceptationes eae quae in his controversiis oriuntur quae sunt certis personis et temporibus notatae fiunt rursus infinitae detractis et temporibus et personis, et rursum ad consultationis formam rationemque revocantur.

[106] But in those cases where it is maintained that something was done rightly or ought to be conceded, when the rationale of the deed is put forward, as by Opimius: 'I acted by right, for the safety of all and for preserving the Republic,' and it is reported by Decius: 'Not even the most criminal citizen could you kill without trial under any right,' that disputation arises: whether one could rightly, for the safety of the Republic, kill an uncondemned citizen, an overthrower of the state. Thus the disputations which arise in these controversies that are marked by certain persons and times become again infinite with the times and the persons removed, and are again called back to the form and rationale of consultation.

[107] Sed in gravissimis firmamentis etiam illa ponenda sunt, si qua ex scripto legis aut testamenti aut verborum ipsius iudicii aut alicuius stipulationis aut cautionis opponuntur defensioni contraria. Ac ne hoc quidem genus in eas causas incurrit quae coniectura continentur; quod enim factum negatur, id argui non potest scripto. Ne in definitionem quidem venit genere scripti ipsius; nam etiamsi verbum aliquod de scripto definiendum est quam vim habeat, ut cum ex testamentis quid sit penus aut cum ex lege praedii quaeritur quae sint ruta caesa, non scripti genus sed verbi interpretatio controversiam parit.

[107] But among the most weighty supports there are also to be placed those, if any, which are set against the defense from the writing of a law or of a testament, or from the very wording of the action, or from some stipulation or bond (cautio). And not even this kind falls into those cases which are contained under conjecture; for what is denied to have been done cannot be argued by a writing. Nor does it come into definition by the kind of the writing itself; for even if some word from the writing must be defined as to what force it has—just as, from wills, what “penus” is, or, from a statute concerning a praedium, what things are “ruta caesa”—it is not the kind of the writing but the interpretation of the word that begets the controversy.

[108] Cum autem aut plura significantur scripto propter verbi aut verborum ambiguitatem, ut liceat ei qui contra dicat eo trahere significationem scripti quo expediat ac velit, aut, si ambigue scriptum non sit, vel a verbis voluntatem et sententiam scriptoris abducere vel alio se eadem de re contrarie scripto defendere, tum disceptatio ex scripti contentione exsistit, ut in ambiguis disceptetur quid maxime significetur, in scripti sententiaeque contentione, utrum potius sequatur iudex, in contrariis scriptis, utrum magis sit comprobandum.

[108] When, however, multiple things are signified by the writing because of the ambiguity of a word or of words, so that it is permitted for the one who speaks against to draw the signification of the writing toward what is expedient and what he wishes; or, if it is not written ambiguously, either to wrench from the words the will and intention of the writer, or to defend himself by another writing set down to the contrary on the same matter—then a disputation arises from a contention over the writing: namely, that in ambiguities it be disputed what is chiefly signified; in the contention between the writing and the intention, which the judge ought rather to follow; and, where writings are contrary, which ought more to be approved.

[109] Disceptatio autem cum est constituta, propositum esse debet oratori quo omnes argumentationes repetitae ex inveniendi locis coniiciantur. Quod quamquam satis est ei qui videt quid in quoque loco lateat quique illos locos tamquam thesauros aliquos argumentorum notatos habet, tamen ea quae sunt certarum causarum propria tangemus.

[109] Moreover, when the disputation has been constituted, there ought to be a plan set before the orator by which all the arguments, recalled from the places of invention (loci), may be brought to bear. And although this is sufficient for one who sees what lies hidden in each locus and who has those loci marked as certain treasuries of arguments, nevertheless we shall touch upon those things which are proper to certain kinds of cases.

[110] In coniectura igitur, cum est in infitiando reus, accusatori haec duo prima sunt—sed accusatorem pro omni actore et petitore appello: possunt enim etiam sine accusatione in causis haec eadem controversiarum genera versari—sed haec duo sunt ei prima, causa et eventus. Causam appello rationem efficiendi, eventum id quod est effectum. Atque ipsa quidem partitio causarum paullo ante in suasionis locis distributa est.

[110] In conjecture, therefore, when the defendant is in denial, these two are primary for the accuser—but I call “accuser” every actor and petitioner: for even without an accusation these same kinds of controversies can be handled in cases—but these two are for him primary, the cause and the event. I call “cause” the rationale of effecting, “event” that which has been effected. And the partition of causes itself indeed was a little before distributed under the topics of suasion.

[111] Quae enim in consilio capiendo futuri temporis praecipiebantur, quam ob rem aut utilitatem viderentur habitura aut efficiendi facultatem, eadem qui de facto argumentabitur colligere debebit, quam ob rem et utilia illi quem arguet fuisse et ab eo effici potuisse demonstret. Utilitatis coniectura movetur si illud quod arguitur aut spe bonorum aut malorum metu fecisse dicitur, quod eo fit acrius quo illa in utroque genere maiora ponuntur.

[111] For the very points which, in the taking of counsel for future time, were being prescribed—on account of what reason they seemed likely either to have utility or to have the faculty of effecting—those same points the one who will argue about a deed ought to gather, so that he may demonstrate for what reason both that they were advantageous to the man whom he will accuse and that they could have been effected by him. The conjecture of utility is moved if that which is alleged is said to have been done either by hope of goods or by fear of evils; and this becomes the sharper the greater those are set in either kind.

[112] Spectant etiam ad causam facti motus animorum, si ira recens, si odium vetus, si ulciscendi studium, si iniuriae dolor, si honoris, si gloriae, si imperii, si pecuniae cupiditas, si periculi timor, si aes alienum, si angustiae rei familiaris: si audax, si levis, si crudelis, si impotens, si incautus, si insipiens, si amans, si commota mente, si vinolentus, si cum spe efficiendi, si cum opinione celandi aut si patefactum esset depellendi criminis, vel perrumpendi periculi, vel in longinquum tempus differendi: aut si iudicii poena levior quam facti praemium: aut si facinoris voluptas maior quam damnationis dolor.

[112] Motions of mind, too, bear upon the cause of the deed, if there is fresh ire, if old odium, if zeal for avenging, if the pain of an injury, if desire of honor, of glory, of imperium, if cupidity for money, if fear of peril, if debt, if the straits of household means: if he is audacious, if flighty, if cruel, if unbridled, if incautious, if unwise, if in love, if with a mind agitated, if wine-sodden, if with hope of accomplishing it, if with the belief of concealing it, or if, should it be laid open, of driving off the charge, or of breaking through the danger, or of deferring it to a far-distant time: or if the penalty of the judgment is lighter than the reward of the act: or if the pleasure of the crime is greater than the pain of condemnation.

[113] His fere rebus facti suspicio confirmatur, cum et voluntatis in reo causae reperiuntur et facultas. In voluntate autem utilitas ex adeptione alicuius commodi vitationeque alicuius incommodi quaeritur, ut aut spes aut metus impulisse videatur, aut aliquis repentinus animi motus, qui etiam citius in fraudem quam ratio utilitatis impellit. Quam ob rem sint haec dicta de causis.

[113] By nearly these considerations the suspicion of the fact is confirmed, when both causes of will in the defendant and the faculty are discovered. In the will, moreover, utility is sought from the acquisition of some commodity and the avoidance of some incommodity, so that either hope or fear may seem to have impelled, or some sudden movement of mind, which impels into fraud even more quickly than a reckoning of utility. Wherefore let these things have been said about the causes.

[114]C.F. Teneo, et quaero qui sint illi eventus quos ex causis effici dixisti. C.P. Consequentia quaedam signa praeteriti et quasi impressa facti vestigia: quae quidem vel maxime suspicionem movent et quasi tacita sunt criminum testimonia, atque hoc quidem graviora quod causae communiter videntur insimulare et arguere omnes posse quorum modo interfuerit aliquid: haec proprie attingunt eos ipsos qui arguuntur, ut telum, ut vestigium, ut cruor, ut deprehensum aliquid, quod ablatum ereptumve videatur, ut responsum inconstanter, ut haesitatum, ut titubatum, ut cum aliquo visus ex quo suspicio oriatur, ut eo ipso in loco visus in quo facinus, ut pallor, ut tremor, ut scriptum aut obsignatum aut depositum quippiam. Haec enim et talia sunt quae aut in re ipsa aut etiam ante quam factum est aut postea suspiciosum crimen efficiant.

[114]C.F. I grasp it, and I ask what those outcomes are which you said are effected from causes. C.P. Certain consequent signs of what is past, and, as it were, imprinted vestiges of the deed: these indeed most of all move suspicion and are, as it were, silent testimonies of crimes—and all the weightier for this, that causes seem in common to calumniate and to be able to accuse all in whose case there was in any way some involvement; but these touch properly those persons themselves who are accused—such as a weapon, such as a footprint/vestige, such as gore, such as something detected which seems to have been taken away or snatched, such as an inconstant answer, such as hesitation, such as stumbling, such as being seen with someone whence suspicion may arise, such as being seen in that very place in which the crime [was done], such as pallor, such as trembling, such as something written or sealed or deposited. For these and the like are the things which either in the matter itself, or even before it has been done, or afterward, make the crime suspicious.

[115] Quae si non erunt, tamen causis ipsis et efficiendi facultatibus niti oportebit, adiuncta illa disputatione communi, non fuisse illum tam amentem ut indicia facti aut effugere aut occultare non posset, ut ita apertus esset, ut locum crimini relinqueret. Communis ille contra locus, audaciam temeritati, non prudentiae esse coniunctam.

[115] If these should not be present, nevertheless one ought to rely upon the causes themselves and the faculties of effectuating, with that common line of argument added: that he was not so demented that he could not either evade or conceal the indications of the deed, that he was not so open as to leave room for a charge. The contrary commonplace is this: audacity is joined to temerity, not to prudence.

[116] Sequitur autem ille locus ad augendum, non esse exspectandum dum fateatur, argumentis peccata convinci; et hic etiam exempla ponentur.

[116] There follows, moreover, that locus for augmenting: that it is not to be waited for until he confesses—crimes are to be convicted by arguments; and here examples too will be set forth.

[117] Atque haec quidem de argumentis. Sin autem erit etiam testium facultas, primum genus erit ipsum laudandum, dicendumque ne argumentis teneretur reus ipsum sua cautione effecisse, testes effugere non potuisse; deinde singuli laudentur [quae autem essent laudabilia dictum est]; deinde etiam argumento firmo, quia tamen saepe falsum est, posse recte non credi, viro bono et firmo sine vitio iudicis non posse non credi; atque etiam, si obscuri testes erunt aut tenues, dicendum erit non esse ex fortuna fidem ponderandam, aut eos esse cuiusque locupletissimos testes qui id de quo agatur facillime scire possint. Sin quaestiones habitae aut postulatio ut habeantur causam adiuvabunt, confirmandum genus primum quaestionum erit, dicendum de vi doloris, de opinione maiorum, qui eam rem totam nisi probassent certe repudiassent;

[117] And so much for arguments. But if there will also be the resource of witnesses, first the kind itself must be praised, and it must be said that, lest he be held by arguments, the defendant has by his own precaution brought it about that witnesses could not be evaded; then let the individuals be praised [what things, moreover, would be praiseworthy has been said]; then also by a firm argument, because nevertheless it is often false, it can rightly not be believed; but a good and steadfast man, unless there is a fault in the judge, cannot not be believed; and likewise, if the witnesses are obscure or of low condition, it will have to be said that credibility is not to be weighed by fortune, or that the most “opulent” witnesses for anyone are those who can most easily know that about which the case is being conducted. But if examinations (quaestiones) have been held, or a demand that they be held will aid the case, the kind of questionings must first be confirmed, and one must speak about the force of pain, about the opinion of the ancestors, who, unless they had approved that whole matter, surely would have repudiated it;

[118] de institutis Atheniensium, Rhodiorum, doctissimorum hominum, apud quos etiam (id quod acerbissimum est) liberi civesque torquentur; de nostrorum etiam prudentissimorum hominum institutis, qui cum de servis in dominos quaeri noluissent, de incestu tamen, et coniuratione quae facta me consule est, quaerendum putaverunt. Irridenda etiam disputatio est qua solent uti ad infirmandas quaestiones et meditata puerilisque dicenda. Tum facienda fides diligenter esse et sine cupiditate quaesitum, dictaque quaestionis argumentis et coniectura ponderanda.

[118] about the institutions of the Athenians and the Rhodians, most learned men, among whom even (which is most acerbic) the free and citizens are tortured; about the institutions too of our own most prudent men, who, although they were unwilling that inquiry be made of slaves against their masters, nevertheless thought that there should be inquiry concerning incest, and concerning the conspiracy which was made when I was consul. Also to be ridiculed is the disputation which they are accustomed to use for weakening the examinations, and their rehearsed and boyish talking points are to be set forth. Then credibility must be created that the inquiry was conducted diligently and without cupidity, and the statements of the examination must be weighed by arguments and conjecture.

Atque haec accusationis fere membra sunt.

And these are, for the most part, the parts of the accusation.

[119] Defensionis autem primum infirmatio causarum: aut non fuisse, aut non tantas, aut non sibi soli, aut commodius potuisse idem consequi, aut non eis se esse moribus, non ea vita, aut nullos animi motus aut non tam impotentes fuisse. Facultatum autem infirmatione utetur si aut vires aut animum aut copias aut opes abfuisse demonstrabit, aut alienum tempus aut locum non idoneum, aut multos arbitros quorum crederet nemini: aut non se tam ineptum ut id susciperet quod occultare non posset, neque tam amentem ut poenas ac iudicia contemneret.

[119] But of the defense the first is the infirmation of the motives: either that they did not exist, or were not so great, or were not peculiar to himself alone, or that he could more conveniently have attained the same outcome, or that he is not of such morals, not of such a life, or that there were no motions of mind, or not so ungovernable. But he will use the infirmation of means if he shows that either the forces or the spirit or the resources or the wealth were lacking, or that the time was alien to the purpose or the place not suitable, or that there were many arbiters of whom he would believe none; or that he is not so inept as to undertake that which he could not conceal, nor so demented as to scorn penalties and judgments.

[120] Consequentia autem diluet exponendo non esse illa certa indicia facti quae etiam nullo admisso consequi possent, consistetque in singulis, et ea aut eorum quae ipse facta esse dicit propria esse defendet potius quam criminis, aut si sibi cum accusatore communia essent, pro periculo potius quam contra salutem valere debere; testiumque et quaestionum genus universum et quod poterit in singulis ex reprehensionis locis de quibus ante dictum est refellet.

[120] As for the consequents, he will dilute them by explaining that those are not certain indicia of the deed which could also ensue even with no offense having been committed, and he will dwell upon the individual points, and will defend that they are proper to the things which he himself says were done rather than to the crime; or, if they are common to himself and the accuser, they ought to prevail in favor of danger rather than to tell against his safety; and the whole class of witnesses and of interrogations, and, in the individual items, whatever he can, he will refute from the loci of reprehension of which it was said before.

[121] Harum causarum principia suspiciosa ad acerbitatem ab accusatore ponentur, denuntiabiturque insidiarum commune periculum, excitabunturque animi ut attendant. Ab reo autem querela conflati criminis collectarumque suspicionum et accusatoris insidiae et item commune periculum proferetur, animique ad misericordiam allicientur et modice benevolentia iudicum colligetur. Narratio autem accusatoris erit quasi membratim gesti negotii suspiciosa explicatio, sparsis omnibus argumentis, obscuratis defensionibus; defensori aut praeteritis aut obscuratis suspicionum argumentis rerum ipsarum eventus erunt casusque narrandi.

[121] The beginnings of these causes will be set forth by the accuser as suspicious unto acerbity, and the common peril of ambushes will be denounced, and minds will be stirred up to attend. By the defendant, however, a complaint will be put forward of a concocted charge and of collected suspicions, and of the accuser’s ambushes, and likewise the common peril; and minds will be enticed to compassion, and the goodwill of the judges will be gathered moderately. The accuser’s narration will be a, as it were, piece-by-piece suspicious explication of the business transacted, with all the arguments scattered, the defenses obscured; for the defender, with the arguments of suspicions either passed over or obscured, it will be the outcomes of the things themselves and the contingencies that must be narrated.

[122] In confirmandis autem nostris argumentationibus infirmandisque contrariis saepe erunt accusatori motus animorum incitandi, reo mitigandi. Atque haec quidem utrique maxime in peroratione facienda— alteri frequentatione argumentorum et coacervatione universa, alteri, si plane causam redarguendo explicarit, enumeratione ut quidque diluerit et miseratione ad extremum.

[122] In confirming our own argumentations and infirming the contrary, the motions of minds will often have to be incited by the accuser, mitigated by the defendant. And these things, indeed, for both sides are to be done most of all in the peroration— for the one, by the frequentation of arguments and by a coacervation taken as a whole; for the other, if he has plainly unfolded the case by refuting it, by an enumeration of how he has diluted each point, and by miseration at the end.

[123]C.F. Scire mihi iam videor quemadmodum coniectura tractanda sit. Nunc de definitione audiamus. C.P. Communia dantur in isto genere accusatori defensorique praecepta.

[123]C.F. I now seem to know how conjecture is to be handled. Now let us hear about definition. C.P. Common precepts are given in this kind to the accuser and to the defender.

Uter enim definiendo describendoque verbo magis ad sensum iudicis opinionemque penetrarit, et uter ad communem verbi vim et ad eam praeceptionem quam incohatam habebunt in animis ei qui audient magis et propius accesserit, is vincat necesse est.

For whichever, by defining and describing the word, shall have penetrated more to the judge’s sense and opinion, and whichever shall have approached more closely to the common force of the word and to that preconception which those who will hear will have begun to have in their minds, that one must win.

[124] Non enim argumentando hoc genus tractatur sed tamquam explicando excutiendoque verbo, ut si in reo pecunia absoluto rursusque revocato praevaricationem accusator esse definiat omnem iudicii corruptelam ab reo, defensor autem non omnem sed tantummodo accusatoris corruptelam ab reo: sit ergo haec contentio prima verborum, in qua, etiamsi propius accedat ad consuetudinem mentemque sermonis defensoris definitio, tamen accusator sententia legis nititur;

[124] For this kind is not handled by arguing but, as it were, by unfolding and shaking out the word, as if, when a defendant has been acquitted by money and then recalled, the accuser should define prevarication to be every corruption of the trial by the defendant, but the defender not every, but only the accuser’s corruption by the defendant: let this, then, be the first contention of words, in which, even if the defender’s definition comes nearer to the usage and the mind of speech, nevertheless the accuser relies on the wording of the law;

[125] negat enim probari oportere eos qui leges scripserint ratum habere iudicium si totum corruptum sit, si unus accusator corruptus sit non rescindere: nititur aequitate, ut utilitate scribenda lex sit, quaeque tum complecteretur in iudiciis corruptis ea verbo uno praevaricationis comprehendisse dicitur.

[125] for he denies that it ought to be approved that those who have written the laws intended to hold the judgment ratified if it be wholly corrupted, but not to rescind it if a single accuser be corrupted: he relies on equity, namely that a law should be written with utility in view, and that then whatever it would encompass in corrupted judgments it is said to have comprehended in the single word prevarication.

[126] Defensor autem testabitur consuetudinem sermonis, verbique vim ex contrario reperiet, quasi ex vero accusatore, cui contrarium est nomen praevaricatoris; ex consequentibus, quod ea littera de accusatore solet dari iudici; ex nomine ipso, quod significat eum qui in contrariis causis quasi vare esse positus videatur. Sed huic tamen ipsi confugiendum est ad aequitatis locos, ad rerum iudicatarum auctoritatem, ad finem aliquem periculi; communeque sit hoc praeceptum, ut cum uterque definierit quam maxime potuerit ad communem sensum vimque verbi, tum similibus exemplisque eorum qui ita locuti sunt suam definitionem sententiamque confirmet.

[126] The defender, however, will bear witness to the usage of speech, and will find the force of the word from its contrary, as if from the true accuser, to whom the contrary is the name prevaricator; from consequents, that that letter is accustomed to be given by the judge concerning the accuser; from the name itself, which signifies one who in opposing causes seems to be set, as it were, varus (knock‑kneed). But even this very party must take refuge in the topics of equity, in the authority of res judicata, in some limit of peril; and let this be the common precept, that when each has defined, as far as he can, the force of the word according to common sense, then by like instances and examples of those who have so spoken he should confirm his definition and opinion.

[127] Atque accusatori in hoc genere causarum locus ille communis, minime esse concedendum ut is qui de re confiteatur verbi se interpretatione defendat; defensor autem et ea quam proposui aequitate nitatur et ea cum secum faciat non re sed depravatione verbi se urgeri queratur. Quo in genere percensere poterit plerosque inveniendi locos; nam et similibus utetur et contrariis et consequentibus quamquam uterque, tamen reus, nisi plane erit absurda causa, frequentius.

[127] And for the accuser in this genus of cases there is that commonplace: that it must by no means be conceded that one who confesses as to the matter should defend himself by an interpretation of the word; but the defender should rely both on that equity which I have proposed, and, since those points are on his side, complain that he is being pressed not by the thing itself but by a depravity of the word. In this genus he will be able to run through most of the topics of invention; for he will use similars and contraries and consequents—although both sides do this, nevertheless the defendant, unless the case is plainly absurd, more frequently.

[128] Amplificandi autem causa, quae aut cum degredientur a causa dici volent aut cum perorabunt, haec vel ad odium vel ad misericordiam vel omnino ad animos iudicum movendos ex eis quae sunt ante posita sumentur, si modo rerum magnitudo hominumve aut invidia aut dignitas postulabit.

[128] And for the purpose of amplification, the things which they will wish to say either when they step aside from the case or when they perorate shall be taken, whether to incite hatred or pity, or generally to move the minds of the judges, from those matters that have been set forth before, provided only that the magnitude of the affairs or of the persons, or ill-will or dignity, shall require it.

[129]C.F. Habeo ista; nunc ea quae cum quale sit quippiam disceptatur quaeri ex utraque parte deceat velim audire. C.P. Confitentur in isto genere qui arguuntur se id fecisse ipsum in quo reprehenduntur, sed quoniam iure se fecisse dicunt, iuris est omnis ratio nobis explicanda. Quod dividitur in duas partes primas, naturam atque legem, et utriusque generis vis in divinum et humanum ius est distributa, quorum aequitatis est unum, alterum religionis.

[129]C.F. I have those; now I would like to hear what it is fitting should be inquired on both sides when it is disputed of what sort something is. C.P. In this kind, those who are accused confess that they did the very thing for which they are reprehended; but since they say they did it by right, the whole rationale of ius must be explained by us. This is divided into two primary parts, nature and law; and the force of each kind is distributed into divine and human ius, of which the one is of equity, the other of religion.

[130] Aequitatis autem vis est duplex, cuius altera directa et veri et iusti et ut dicitur aequi et boni ratione defenditur, altera ad vicissitudinem referendae gratiae pertinet, quod in beneficio gratia, in iniuria ultio nominatur. Atque haec communia sunt naturae atque legis, sed propria legis et ea quae scripta sunt et ea quae sine litteris aut gentium iure aut maiorum more retinentur. Scriptorum autem privatum aliud est, publicum aliud: publicum lex, senatusconsultum, foedus, privatum tabulae, pactum conventum, stipulatio.

[130] But the force of equity is twofold: one part is direct and is defended by the reason of the true and the just and, as it is said, the equitable and the good; the other pertains to the reciprocation of returning grace/favor, which in a benefit is called grace/favor, in an injury vengeance. And these are common to nature and to law; but proper to law are both the things which are written and the things which without letters are maintained either by the law of nations or by the custom of the ancestors. Of written things, moreover, the private is one thing, the public another: public are a statute, a senate-decree, a treaty; private are tablets (deeds), a pact, a convention, a stipulation.

Quae autem scripta non sunt, ea aut consuetudine aut conventis hominum et quasi consensu obtinentur, atque etiam hoc in primis, ut nostros mores legesque tueamur quodammodo naturali iure praescriptum est.

But the things which are not written obtain either by custom or by the conventions of men and, as it were, by consensus; and even this, among the foremost, that we guard our own customs and laws, is in a certain manner prescribed by natural law.

[131] Et quoniam breviter aperti fontes sunt quasi quidam aequitatis, meditata nobis ad hoc causarum genus esse debebunt ea quae dicenda erunt in orationibus de natura, de legibus, de more maiorum, de propulsanda iniuria, de ulciscenda, de omni parte iuris. Si imprudenter aut necessitate aut casu quippiam fecerit quod non concederetur eis qui sua sponte et voluntate fecissent, ad eius facti deprecationem ignoscendi petenda venia est quae sumetur ex plerisque locis aequitatis. Expositum est ut potui brevissime de omni controversiarum genere—nisi praeterea tu quid requiris.

[131] And since the fountains of equity have been briefly laid open, as it were certain ones, the points that will have to be said in orations about nature, about laws, about the mores of the ancestors, about repelling an injury, about avenging it, about every part of law, ought to have been meditated by us for this genus of cases. If someone has done something imprudently or from necessity or by chance, which would not be conceded to those who had done it of their own accord and will, then for the deprecation of that deed a pardon of forgiving must be sought, which will be taken from many loci of equity. I have set forth as briefly as I could about every kind of controversies—unless, besides this, you require anything further.

[132]C.F. Illud equidem quod iam unum restare video, quale sit cum disceptatio versatur in scriptis. C.P. Recte intellegis; eo enim exposito munus promissi omne confecero. Sunt igitur ambigui duobus adversariis praecepta communia.

[132]C.F. As for that one thing which I now see remains—what it is like when the disputation revolves in writings. C.P. You understand rightly; for with that set forth, I shall have completed the whole duty of my promise. Therefore, the precepts for ambiguity are common to both adversaries.

Uterque enim hanc significationem qua utetur ipse dignam scriptoris prudentia esse defendet: uterque id quod adversarius ex ambigue scripto intellegendum esse dicet aut absurdum aut inutile aut iniquum aut turpe esse defendet aut etiam discrepare cum ceteris scriptis vel aliorum vel maxime si poterit eiusdem; quamque defendet ipse eam rem et sententiam quemvis prudentem et iustum hominem si ad integrum daretur scripturum fuisse, sed planius;

For each, indeed, will defend that the signification which he himself employs is worthy of the writer’s prudence; each will defend that what the adversary says ought to be understood from the ambiguous writing is either absurd, or useless, or iniquitous, or shameful, or even discrepant with the other writings, whether of others or—most of all, if he can—of the same (author); and he will defend that the thing and the sense which he himself upholds any prudent and just man, if it were given afresh, would have written, only more plainly;

[133] eamque sententiam quam significari posse dicet nihil habere aut captionis aut vitii, contrariam autem si probarint, fore ut multa vitia, stulta, iniqua, contraria consequantur. Cum autem aliud scriptor sensisse videtur et aliud scripsisse, qui scripto nitetur, eum re exposita recitatione uti oportebit, deinde instare adversario, iterare, renovare, interrogare num aut scriptum neget aut contra factum infitietur; post iudicem ad vim scripti vocet.

[133] and he will say that the meaning which he will claim can be signified has nothing either of captiousness or of fault, but that, if they approve the contrary, it will result that many vices—foolish, iniquitous, contradictory—follow. And when the writer seems to have meant one thing and to have written another, he who relies on the writing ought, the matter having been set forth, to employ a recitation, then to press the adversary, to repeat, to renew, to ask whether he either denies the writing or denies the contrary fact; afterward let him call the judge to the force of the written text.

[134] Hac confirmatione usus amplificet rem lege laudanda audaciamque confutet eius qui, cum palam contra fecerit idque fateatur, adsit tamen factumque defendat. Deinde infirmet defensionem: cum adversarius aliud voluisse, [aliud sensisse] scriptorem, aliud scripsisse dicat, non esse ferendum a quoquam potius latoris sensum quam a lege explicari: cur ita scripserit si ita non senserit? cur, cum ea quae plane scripta sint neglexerit, quae nusquam scripta sint proferat?

[134] Using this confirmation, let him amplify the matter, the law being laudable, and confute the audacity of the man who, though he has openly acted contrary and admits it, nevertheless appears and defends the deed. Then let him enfeeble the defense: when the adversary says that the writer willed one thing, [thought another], and wrote another, it is not to be borne by anyone that the sense of the proposer should rather be expounded than the law: why did he write thus if he did not so think? why, when he has neglected those things that are plainly written, does he bring forth things that are written nowhere?

cur prudentissimos in scribendo viros summae stultitiae putet esse damnandos? quid impedierit scriptorem quo minus exciperet illud quod adversarius tamquam si exceptum esset ita dicit se secutum?

why should he think that the most prudent men in writing are to be condemned for utmost stupidity? what prevented the writer from excepting that which the adversary says he followed as though it had been excepted?

[135] Utetur exemplis eis quibus idem scriptor aut, si id non poterit, quibus alii quod excipiendum putarint exceperint. Quaerenda etiam ratio est, si qua poterit inveniri, quare non sit exceptum; aut iniqua lex aut inutilis futura dicetur, aut alia causa obtemperandi, alia abrogandi: dissentire adversarii vocem atque legis. Deinde amplificandi causa de conservandis legibus, de periculo rerum publicarum atque privatarum cum aliis locis, tum in perorando maxime graviter erit vehementerque dicendum.

[135] He will use examples in which the same writer has excepted, or, if he cannot do that, those in which others have excepted what they judged ought to be excepted. A reason too must be sought, if any can be found, why it has not been excepted: either the law will be said to be iniquitous or likely to be useless, or that one cause exists for obedience and another for abrogation—the adversary’s voice and the law’s are in dissent. Then, for the sake of amplification, it must be said, about the conserving of laws and about the peril of public and private affairs, both from other commonplaces and most of all in the peroration, with great gravity and vehemence.

[136] Ille autem qui se sententia legis voluntateque defendet, in consilio atque in mente scriptoris, non in verbis ac litteris vim legis positam esse defendet, quodque nihil exceperit in lege laudabit, ne diverticula peccatis darentur atque ut ex facto cuiusque iudex legis mentem interpretaretur. Deinde erit utendum exemplis in quibus omnis aequitas perturbetur si verbis legum ac non sententiis pareatur.

[136] He, however, who defends himself by the sentence and the will of the law, will maintain that the force of the law is placed in the counsel and in the mind of the writer, not in the words and letters, and he will commend that nothing has been excepted in the law, lest bypaths be given to sins and so that from the deed of each the judge may interpret the mind of the law. Then examples must be used in which all equity is disturbed if obedience is paid to the words of the laws and not to their senses.

[137] Deinde genus eiusmodi calliditatis et calumniae retrahatur in odium iudicis cum quadam invidiosa querela. Et si incidet imprudentiae causa quae non ad delictum sed ad casum necessitatemve pertineat, quod genus paullo ante attigimus, erit eisdem aequitatis sententiis contra acerbitatem verborum deprecandum. Sin scripta inter se dissentient, tanta series artis est et sic inter se sunt pleraque connexa et apta, ut quae paullo ante praecepta dedimus ambigui quaeque proxime sententiae et scripti, eadem ad hoc genus causae tertium transferantur.

[137] Then let a kind of such cunning and calumny be drawn back into the judge’s hatred with a certain invidious complaint. And if there occurs a case of imprudence which pertains not to a delinquency but to accident or necessity, a kind which we touched a little before, one must with the same sentences of equity deprecate the acerbity of the words. But if the written texts dissent among themselves, such is the sequence of the art and most things are so interconnected and apt among themselves, that the precepts which a little before we gave about ambiguity and those nearest to sense and to script are to be transferred likewise to this third kind of cause.

[138] Nam quibus locis in ambiguo defendimus eam significationem quae nos adiuvat, eisdem in contrariis legibus nostra lex defendenda est. Deinde est efficiendum ut alterius scripti sententiam, alterius verba defendamus. Ita quae modo de scripto sententiaque praecepta sunt, eadem huc omnia transferemus.

[138] For in those situations where, in ambiguity, we defend that signification which helps us, in those same cases, in contrary laws, our own law must be defended. Then it must be brought about that we defend the sense of one writing and the words of the other. Thus the precepts which just now were given concerning the writing and the sentence, we will transfer all these same things hither.

[139] Expositae sunt tibi omnes oratoriae partitiones, quae quidem e media illa nostra Academia effloruerunt; neque sine ea aut inveniri aut intellegi aut tractari possunt; nam et partiri ipsum et definire et ambigui partitiones dividere et argumentorum locos nosse et argumentationem ipsam concludere, et videre quae sumenda in argumentando sint quidque ex eis quae sumpta sunt efficiatur, et vera a falsis, verisimilia ab incredibilibus diiudicare et distinguere aut male sumpta aut male conclusa reprehendere, et eadem vel anguste disserere, ut dialectici qui appellantur, vel, ut oratorem decet, late exprimere illius exercitationis et subtiliter disputandi et copiose dicendi artis est.

[139] All the oratorical partitions have been set out for you, which indeed have effloresced from the very midst of that Academy of ours; nor without it can they either be found, understood, or handled; for both the very act of partitioning and of defining, and of dividing the partitions of ambiguity, and of knowing the loci of arguments and of concluding the argumentation itself, and of seeing what ought to be taken up in arguing and what is effected from those things that have been taken up, and of adjudging and distinguishing the true from the false, the verisimilar from the incredible, and of reprehending things ill-taken or ill-concluded, and of discoursing upon these same things either narrowly, as the so‑called dialecticians, or, as befits an orator, expressing them broadly—this belongs to that training and to the art of disputing subtly and of speaking copiously.

[140] De bonis vero rebus et malis, aequis, iniquis, utilibus, inutilibus, honestis, turpibus quam potest habere orator sine illis maximarum rerum artibus facultatem aut copiam? Quare haec tibi sint, mi Cicero, quae exposui, quasi indicia fontium illorum: ad quos si nobis eisdem ducibus aliisve perveneris, tum et haec ipsa melius et multo maiora alia cognosces.C.F. Ego vero, ac magno quidem studio, mi pater; multisque ex tuis praeclarissimis muneribus nullum maius exspecto.

[140] But concerning good things and bad, equitable and inequitable, useful and useless, honorable and shameful—what capacity or abundance can an orator have without those arts of the greatest matters? Wherefore let these things, my Cicero, which I have set forth, be to you as indications of those sources: if, with the same guides or with others, you come to them, then you will learn both these very things better and many others far greater.C.F. I indeed, and with great zeal, my father; and among your most distinguished gifts I expect none greater.