Albertano of Brescia: Liber consolationis et consilii

Quoniam multi sunt, qui in adversitatibus et tribulationibus taliter affliguntur et deprimuntur, quod, cum in se propter animi perturbationem nec consilium nec consolationem habeant neque ab aliis expectent, ita contristantur, ut de malo in pejus cadant: ideo tibi, filio meo Johanni, qui in arte cyrurgiæmedicando te exerces, et plerumque tales invenis, quædam tibi pro modulo meæ scientiæ scribere curavi, per quæ, dante Domino, poteris prædictis non solum in corporibus medelam tribuere, sed etiam circa prædicta consilium et consolationem impertiri atque juvamen. Legas itaque similitudinem infra scriptam, et auctoritates in hoc libronotatas attente ac studiosissime perlegas, et ita, divina favente grati, poteris tibi et aliis proficiendo ad prædicta leviter pervenire. Ecce similitudo.

Since there are many who in adversities and tribulations are so afflicted and depressed that, when in themselves, because of perturbation of mind, they have neither counsel nor consolation, nor do they expect them from others, they are thus saddened that they fall from bad into worse: therefore to you, my son John, who in the art of surgery exercise yourself by healing, and very often find such persons, certain things for you, according to the measure of my knowledge, I have taken care to write, through which, the Lord granting, you will be able to grant remedy to the aforesaid not only in bodies, but also concerning the aforesaid to impart counsel and consolation and aid. Read therefore the similitude written below, and most attentively and studiously read through the authorities noted in this book, and thus, with divine grace favoring, by profiting yourself and others you will be able to arrive more easily at the aforesaid. Behold the similitude.

Caput I.

Chapter 1.

Exemplum in persona Melibei.

Example in the person of Melibeus.

Quidam juvenis, Melibeus nomine, vir potens et dives, relinquens uxoremet filiam in domo, quas multum diligebat, clauso ostio domus, ivit spatiatum. Tres vero sui vicini et hostes antiqui hoc videntes, appositis scalis acper fenestras domus intrantes, uxorem Melibei, Prudentiam nomine, verberaveruntfortiter et, filiæ ejus plagis quinque appositis, videlicet in oculis, auribus, ore et naso ac manibus, illamque semivivam relinquentes, abierunt.

A certain youth, Melibeus by name, a man potent and rich, leaving his wife and daughter in the house, whom he greatly loved, with the door of the house shut, went out to stroll. But three of his neighbors and ancient enemies, seeing this, having set up ladders and entering through the windows of the house, beat Melibeus’s wife, Prudence by name, stoutly, and, five wounds having been applied to his daughter, namely in the eyes, ears, mouth and nose, and hands, and leaving her half-alive, they departed.

Melibeus vero post modum reversus, hoc videns coepit magno planctu flendocomas sibi dilaniare vestesque suas quasi more furiosi dilacerare. Uxor autem jam dicta, ut taceret, coepit illum instanter ammonere. Ille verosemper plus clamabat; at illa distulit aliquantulum recordata de verboOvidii, De Remedio Amoris, qui dixit:

Melibeus, however, having afterwards returned, seeing this began, with great lamentation and weeping, to tear his hair and to rend his garments, as if in the manner of a madman. But his wife, the aforesaid, began urgently to admonish him to be silent. He, however, kept crying out all the more; but she delayed a little, remembering the word of Ovid, The Remedy of Love, who said:

De consolatione.

On consolation.

Cum autem vir a fletu aliquantulum cessasset animumque ægrum implevisset, coepit illum Prudentia monere dicens:

But when the man had for a little ceased from weeping and had filled his ailing spirit, Prudence began to admonish him, saying:

Melibeus respondit: Quis posset in tanto dolore fletum et lacrimas cohibere, nam et Dominus noster, Jhesus Christus, de Lazaro amico suo "infremuitspiritu et lacrimatus est."

Melibeus responded: Who could in so great a grief restrain weeping and tears, for even our Lord, Jesus Christ, about Lazarus his friend, “groaned in spirit and wept.”

At Prudentia dixit: Temperatus fletus a tristi vel inter tristes nonest prohibitus, immo concessus secundum beatum Paulum, qui dixit in Epistolaad Romanos: "Gaudere cum gaudentibus et flere cum flentibus. " Et etiamTullius dixit: "Proprium est animi bene constituti, et lætari bonisrebus et dolere contrariis;" plorare autem ac multas lacrimas fundere, prohibitum est. Modus vero a Seneca inventus est servandus, qui dixit:"Nec sicci sint oculi tui, amisso amico, nec fluant: lacrimandum est, etnon plorandum.

But Prudence said: Temperate weeping by one who is sad or among the sad is not prohibited, rather it is conceded, according to blessed Paul, who said in the Epistle to the Romans: "Rejoice with those who rejoice and weep with those who weep." And Tully also said: "It is proper to a well-constituted mind both to be glad at good things and to grieve at contraries;" but to wail and to pour out many tears is prohibited. The measure indeed discovered by Seneca is to be observed, who said: "Let your eyes not be dry upon the loss of a friend, nor let them flow: one must weep, and not wail."

" Ante vero quam amicum amittas, repara ipsum, si commodepotes, nam ut idem ait: "Sanctius est amicum reparare quam flere. " Ad hocergo ut prudenter vivas, tristitiam hujus seculi ab animo tuo omnino repellas, ait enim Jhesus Sirac: "Multos enim occidit tristitia, nec est utilitasin illa. " Et alibi idem dixit: "Animus gaudens floridam vitam facit, spiritusvero tristis exsiccat ossa.

" But before you lose a friend, restore him, if you can conveniently, for, as the same man says: "It is holier to restore a friend than to weep." To this end, therefore, that you may live prudently, drive altogether from your mind the sadness of this age, for Jesus Sirach says: "For sadness has slain many, and there is no utility in it." And elsewhere the same said: "A rejoicing mind makes a florid life, but a sad spirit dries the bones.

" Et Salomon dixit: "Sicut tinea vestimentoet vermis ligno, ita tristitia nocet hominis cordi;" et iterum: "Non contristabitjustum quidquid ei acciderit, impii autem replebuntur malo. " Et Senecain Epistolis dixit: "Nihil est stultius quam famam captare tristitiæet lacrimas approbare;" "nihil enim sapienti viro accidere potest, quodeum contristet: stat rectus sub quolibet pondere, " sicut accidit in beatoJob, qui cum omnes filios suos omnemque substantiam suam amisisset, insuperet multas in corpore suo tribulationes sustineret, semper stetit rectus ac semper Domino gratias agens dicebat: "Dominus dedit, Dominus abstulit;quod Domino placuit factum est; sit nomen Domini benedictum" "ex hoc nuncet usque in seculum. " Non ergo debemus nimis dolere de filiis vel aliisrebus amissis, ex quo id quod accidit mutari non potest; sed potius debemusgaudere de habitis, quam dolere de amissis, unde quidam volens patrem demorte filii consolari sic ait: Noli flere quod bonum filium amisisti, sedpotius quod talem habuisti, gaude.

" And Solomon said: "Just as a moth to a garment and a worm to wood, so sadness harms the heart of a man;" and again: "A just man will not be saddened by whatever happens to him, but the impious will be filled with evil." And Seneca in the Epistles said: "Nothing is more foolish than to court the reputation of sadness and to approve tears;" "for nothing can befall a wise man that would sadden him: he stands upright under any burden," just as it happened in blessed Job, who, when he had lost all his sons and all his substance, and moreover was enduring many tribulations in his body, always stood upright and, always giving thanks to the Lord, used to say: "The Lord gave, the Lord took away; what pleased the Lord has been done; let the name of the Lord be blessed" "from this time now and unto the age." Therefore we ought not to grieve too much over sons or other things lost, since that which has happened cannot be changed; but rather we ought to rejoice over the things possessed, than to grieve over the things lost, whence someone, wishing to console a father for the death of his son, thus said: Do not weep that you lost a good son, but rather rejoice that you had such a one.

Et alibi idem Seneca ait: "Nulla res citius ad odium venit quam dolor; recens dolor libenter ad se consolationeminducit, inveteratus vero deridetur, nec immerito: aut enim simulatus estaut stultus." Et certe tristitiam hujus seculi a te ideo repellere debes, quia verum est, quod beatus Paulus in Epistola secunda ad Corinthios circamedium dixit: "Seculi autem tristitia mortem operatur. Quæ enim secundumDeum est, poenitentiam in salutem stabilem operatur;" et ideo eam a te nullomodo repellas, sed potius die noctuque studeas habere, quia postea "converteturin gaudium, " ut Dominus in Evangelio dixit. Unde Salomon ait: "Cor sapientiumest ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi lætitia.

And elsewhere the same Seneca says: "No thing comes more quickly into hatred than pain; fresh pain gladly brings consolation to itself, but when inveterate it is mocked, and not without cause: for it is either feigned or foolish." And certainly you ought for this reason to repel the sadness of this age from yourself, because it is true what blessed Paul said about the middle of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians: "But the sadness of the age works death. For that which is according to God works penitence unto stable salvation;" and therefore that you should by no means repel from yourself, but rather strive to have it day and night, because afterward "it will be converted into joy," as the Lord said in the Gospel. Whence Solomon says: "The heart of the wise is where sadness is, and the heart of fools where gladness."

" Et iterum: "Meliusest ire ad domum luctus quam ad domum convivii."

" And again: "It is better to go to the house of mourning than to the house of feasting."

Melibeus respondit: Omnia quæcunque dixisti vera sunt atque utilia;verumtamen animus turbatus me tantum impellit quod, quid facere debeam, ignoro.

Melibeus responded: All whatever things you have said are true and useful;nevertheless a perturbed spirit so impels me that I do not know what I ought to do.

At illa dixit: Convoca probatos ac fideles amicos, agnatos quoque etcognatos, et ab eis super prædictis diligenter consilium postula, et secundum illorum consilium te regas. Dixit enim Salomon: Omnia cum consiliofac, et non te poenitebit.

But she said: Convoke approved and faithful friends, agnates as well and cognates, and from them, concerning the aforesaid matters, diligently ask counsel, and govern yourself according to their counsel. For Solomon said: Do everything with counsel, and you will not repent.

Melibeus vero convocavit multitudinem hominum copiosam, inter quos fueruntmedici de cyrurgia et physici, senes quoque et juvenes, vicini vero multi, qui magis illum reverebantur timore, quam diligerent amore, et etiam quidam, qui de inimicis facti fuerant amici et qui in ejus gratiam redierant. Multietiam convenerunt illuc assentatores sive adulatores et etiam causidicisapientes. Quibus convocatis ille per ordinem narrans omnia, quæcunqueilli acciderant, et ab ipsis consilium postulans, magnam voluntatem devindicta in continenti facienda demonstravit.

Melibeus, however, convened a copious multitude of men, among whom there were chirurgeons and physicians, elders as well as youths, and indeed many neighbors, who revered him more from fear than they loved him from love, and also certain who from enemies had been made friends and who had returned into his favor. Many also gathered there—assentators or adulators—and also advocates learned in law. With these convened, he, relating in order all whatever had befallen him and asking counsel from them, displayed a great will for vengeance to be carried out immediately.

Tunc surrexit unus de medicis cyrurgiæ de consensu aliorum dearte sua et inter cetera dixit: Officium est medicorum atque ad illos semperspectat, omnibus prodesse ac nulli nocere. Plerumque enim accidit, ut, vulneribus in rixa utrinque factis, medici de arte sua utrique parti consulantac utrisque sollicite medelam adhibeant. Et ideo non expedit eis de guerravel vindicta consulere, nec inter aliquos partem capere, quare de vindictafacienda minime tibi consulimus.

Then one of the surgeons, with the consent of the others of his art, rose and, among other things, said: It is the office of physicians, and it always pertains to them, to profit all and to harm no one. For it very often happens that, when wounds have been made on both sides in a brawl, physicians, by their art, give counsel to both parties and carefully apply a remedy to each. And therefore it is not expedient for them to advise about war or vengeance, nor to take a side among any; wherefore we do not advise you at all to undertake vengeance.

Filiam vero tuam, inspectis diligenterillius vulneribus, sollicite ac provide, die noctuque procurabimus, et, dante Domino, licet gravissime sit vulnerata, ad bonam plenamque sanitatemperducemus.

Your daughter, indeed, with her wounds carefully inspected, we will care for solicitously and providently, by day and by night; and, God granting it, although she is most grievously wounded, we will lead her to good and complete health.

Post illum vero unus de medicis physicæ de consilio et voluntatealiorum consuluit quasi similia. Et post multa verba suum auxilium atqueconsilium circa medicinæ artem pro filia sua illi, pro se et aliis, repromisit. Circa vero guerram atque vindictam sic ait: Dicimus quia, sicutper physicam contraria contrariis curantur, ita et in guerra atque vindictaet in aliis rebus contraria contrariis curari consueverunt.

After him indeed one of the physicians of physic, by the counsel and will of the others, advised almost similar things. And after many words he re-promised his aid and counsel in the art of medicine for his daughter to him, on his own behalf and for the others. But concerning war and vengeance he spoke thus: We say that, just as by physic contraries are cured by contraries, so also in war and vengeance and in other matters contraries are accustomed to be cured by contraries.

Vicini vero et inimici quondam, qui modo in gratiam redierant, adulatoresquoque sive assentatores, omnes quasi lacrimantes et dolorem in facie deeo quod acciderat ostendentes, de vindicta in continenti facienda et guerraviriliter peragenda consuluerunt, multum commendantes dominum Melibeumejusque potentiam atque divitias, numerando etiam multitudinem agnatorumejus et cognatorum, affinium quoque et amicorum, adversarorium insuperejus potentiam vilipendendo corumque divitias verbis annihilando.

The neighbors, and once-enemies who just now had returned into favor, flatterers too or assenters, all as if weeping and showing grief in their face over what had happened, counseled that vengeance be done forthwith and that the war be carried through manfully, much commending lord Melibeus and his power and riches, enumerating also the multitude of his agnates and cognates, as well as of his affines and friends, and moreover belittling the power of his adversaries and annihilating their riches with words.

Deinde unus de sapientibus causidicus de voluntate aliorum surrexit, et inter cetera dixit: Negotium istud arduum est, ratione injuriæet maleficii noviter commissi, et quia multa graviora in futurum hac occasionepossent contingere. Arduum etiam est ratione vicinitatis et divitiarumac potentiæ utriusque partis et etiam multis aliis rationibus, quæde facili non possent excogitari, nec conveniens esset hic numerari. Quare, cum sollicite sit procedendum, consilimus tibi, quatenus personam tuamita custodias, quod neque dolus neque astutiæ desint tibi ad cavendum.

Then one of the wise men, an advocate, at the will of the others rose, and among the rest said: This business is arduous, by reason of the injury and the malefaction newly committed, and because many graver things in the future might, on this occasion, occur. It is arduous also by reason of the vicinity and the riches and power of both parties, and likewise for many other reasons, which could not easily be thought out, nor would it be fitting to enumerate here. Wherefore, since one must proceed solicitously, we counsel you that you so guard your person, that neither guile nor astuteness be lacking to you for taking precautions.

Insuper etiam domum tuam diligenter munias. De facto autem vindictæatque guerræ faciendæ dubium maximum videmus, quare, quid meliussit, adhuc judicare non possumus, unde spatium deliberandi causa postulamus;non enim subito vel celeriter est judicandum, "omnia enim subita probanturincauta, " et "in judicando criminosa est celeritas, " et "ad poenitendumproperat qui cito judicat, " quare dicit consuevit: Optimum judicem existimo, qui cito intelligit et tarde judicat; nam licet mora omnis odio sit, nontamen in judicando mora competens est reprobanda; scriptum est enim: "Moraomnis odio est, sed facit sapientem, " quare, si super prædictis deliberarevolumus, non est mirandum. "Deliberare enim utilia mora est tutissima;"dici enim vulgo consuevit: Melior est judex lentus, quam ad judicandumproperans, nam et ipse Deus, cum super muliere in adulterio deprehensajudicare vellet, scribendo in terra bis deliberavit.

Moreover, also fortify your house diligently. As to the fact, however, of vengeanceand war to be undertaken we see a very great doubt, wherefore what betteris, we cannot yet judge, whence for the sake of deliberating we ask a span;not indeed is it to be judged suddenly or swiftly, "for all sudden things are consideredincautious," and "in judging, speed is criminal," and "to repentancehastens he who judges quickly," wherefore it has been wont to be said: I reckon the best judge to be the one who understands quickly and judges slowly; for although every delay is hateful, neverthelessnot in judging is a fitting delay to be condemned; for it is written: "Everydelay is hateful, but it makes one wise," wherefore, if upon the aforesaid matters we deliberatewe wish, it is not to be wondered at. "For in deliberating useful things, delay is most safest;"it is commonly wont to be said: A slow judge is better than one hasteningto judge, for even God himself, when he wished to judge concerning the woman caughtin adultery, by writing on the earth deliberated twice.

Nos autem post deliberationem, dante Domino, super prædictis tibi utiliter consulemus.

We, however, after deliberation, the Lord granting, will counsel you to your advantage concerning the aforesaid.

Juvenes vero confisi de fortitudine ac viribus suis et etiam de multitudineillorum, qui videbantur amici, post multas laudes domini Melibei ac divitiarumet parentelæ illius et potentiæ, consuluerunt vindictam incontinenti faciendam et guerram potenti manu pertractandam, adversariorumpotentiam et divitias pro nihilo reputantes, reprehendendo etiam sapientesde inducia et deliberatione postulata, allegando etiam quod, sicut ferrumigne calefactum et candidatum semper melius quam frigidum laboratur, itaet injuria recens in continenti semper melius quam ex intervallo vindicatur. Tunc vero quasi omnes cum magno strepitu clamaverunt: Sic, sic, fiat, fiat.

The young men, indeed, confident in their fortitude and their own strengths, and also in the multitude of those who seemed friends, after many praises of lord Melibee and of his riches, his kindred, and his power, counseled that vengeance be made immediately and that war be undertaken with a mighty hand, reckoning the power and riches of the adversaries as nothing, and even reproaching the wise men for the truce and deliberation that had been requested, alleging also that, just as iron heated by fire and brought to a white heat is always worked better than when cold, so too a recent injury is always avenged better on the spot than after an interval. Then indeed almost all with a great din cried out: So, so, let it be done, let it be done.

Tunc denique unus de senioribus indicens manu silentium de consensuet voluntate aliorum senium dixit: Multi clamant sic, sic, qui vim verborum nesciunt et quod dicunt penitus ignorant. Vindicta certeet guerra, quæ oritur ex ea, tam largum habent introitum, ut initiumejus cuilibet pateat, finis vero illius cum magna difficultate et vix autnunquam reperitur. Multi in principio guerræ nondum nati sunt, quiante finem illius cum multo labore ac multis ærumpnis aut senescuntaut miserabiliter propter guerram vitam finiunt.

Then at last one of the elders, imposing silence with his hand, by the consensus and will of the other elders, said: Many cry so, so, who do not know the force of the words and utterly are ignorant of what they say. Vengeance, to be sure, and the war that arises from it, have so wide an entrance that its beginning lies open to anyone, but its end, with great difficulty, is scarcely or never found. Many, at the beginning of a war, are not yet born, who before its end either grow old with much toil and many hardships, or miserably, on account of the war, finish their life.

Quare non est subito necfestinanter procedendum; sed cum diligenti provisione et præparationeac deliberatione maxima sollicitaque cura omnia sunt peragenda. Cumquevellet dictum suum rationibus comprobare, fere omnes contra illum insultarecoeperunt dictumque suum frequenter interrumpere dicentes, ut verba suacum festinatione finiret, dictumque fuit illi: "Ubi non est auditus, noneffundas sermonem, et importune nolli extolli in sapientia tua, " importunaest enim narratio tua, quia tibi non præbetur auditus, et est quasimusicain luctu; ait enim Jhesus Sirac: "Musica in luctu importuna narratio. "Cum autem senior vidisset, sibi denegari audientiam, et cognosceret, quiainvito auditori nemo bene refert, dixit illis: Inconsulta temeritas nescitexpectare consilium, et iterum: "Consilium quippe mutare detractat improvidus;"nunc certe cognosco verum, quod dici consuevit: "Semper consilium tuncdeest, quando maxime opus est, " et ita quasi confusus senior resedit.

Wherefore one must not proceed suddenly nor hastily; but with diligent provision and preparation and with the greatest deliberation and solicitous care all things are to be carried through. And when he wished to corroborate his dictum by reasons, almost all began to insult against him and to interrupt his speech frequently, saying that he should finish his words with haste, and it was said to him: "Where there is no hearing, do not pour out your discourse, and do not be inopportunely exalted in your wisdom," for your narration is inopportune, because a hearing is not afforded to you, and it is as if music in mourning; for Jesus Sirach says: "Music in mourning—an inopportune narration." But when the elder saw that an audience was denied him, and understood that for an unwilling hearer no one reports well, he said to them: Unadvised temerity does not know how to wait for counsel, and again: "For the improvident shrinks from changing counsel;" now surely I recognize as true what is wont to be said: "Counsel is always lacking then, when it is most needed," and so, as if confounded, the elder sat down.

Sed et multi ad aures Melibei aliter consulebant secreto, quam palamdicere vellent, immo palam aliud monstrabant.

But also many to the ears of Meliboeus were counseling differently in secret than they wished to say openly; nay rather, openly they were demonstrating something else.

Tunc vero exsurgens Melibeus, facta inter eos more solito partita, cognovit, viginti partes illorum esse de partita vindictæ in continenti faciendæatque guerræ viriliter pertractandæ, unde consilium illorumlaudavit, insuper et firmavit.

Then indeed, rising up, Melibeus, the partition having been made between them in the customary manner, recognized that their twenty shares were from the allotment for vengeance to be carried out forthwith and for the war to be manfully prosecuted; whereupon he lauded their counsel, and moreover confirmed it.

Cumque Melibeus ad vindictam properaret, domina Prudentia, uxor ejusoccurrens ei, prius cognitis, quæ ordinata fuerant atque per consiliumjam dictum stabilita, dixit illi:

And when Melibeus was hastening to vengeance, Lady Prudence, his wife, meeting him, having first learned the things which had been ordained and established through the counsel already said, said to him:

Caput III.

Chapter 3.

De improperio mulierum.

On the reproach of women.

Qui respondens ait: Tuo consilio uti minime proposui multis rationibus. Primo, quia pro stulto ab omnibus reputarer, so pro tuo consilio vel sensumutarem quod est a tanta multitudine hominum stabilitum. Secunda ratione, quia mulieres malæ sunt, nullaque bona reperitur, Salomone testante, qui dixit: "Virum de mille unum reperi, mulierem ex omnibus non inveni.

He, responding, said: I have by no means purposed to use your counsel, for many reasons. First, because I would be reckoned by all as a fool, if, according to your counsel or opinion, I were to change what has been established by so great a multitude of men. For a second reason, because women are evil, and no good one is found, with Solomon bearing witness, who said: "I found one man out of a thousand; a woman among them all I did not find.

"Tertia ratione, quia si tuo sensu ac consilio me regerem, jam viderer tibisuper me dare primatum, et ita per hoc facerem te mihi contrariam, et potestatemtibi super me darem, quod esse minime debet; ait enim Jhesus Sirac: "Mulier, si primatum habeat, contraria est viro suo;" et Salomon dixit: "Auditepopuli et omnes gentes et rectores ecclesiæ: filio et mulieri etfratri et amico ne dederis potestatem super te in vita tua;" "melius estenim, ut filii tui in te respiciant, quam te respicere in manus filiorumtuorum. " Quarta vero ratione, quia, si uterer consilio tuo, quandoque oporteret, ut secretum haberetur, donec illud patefieri foret necessarium, quod ate fieri non valeret; scriptum est enim: "Garrulitas mulierum id solumnovit celare, quod nescit. " Quinta denique ratione propter philosophi verbum, qui dixit: "Malo in consilio feminæ vincunt viros.

"Third, because if I were to govern myself by your sense and counsel, I would already seem to you to be giving primacy over me, and thus by this I would make you contrary to me, and I would give power to you over me, which ought by no means to be; for Jesus Sirach says: "A woman, if she have primacy, is contrary to her husband;" and Solomon said: "Hear, peoples and all nations and the rulers of the Church: to a son and to a woman and to a brother and to a friend do not give power over yourself in your life;" "for it is better that your sons look to you than that you look into the hands of your sons. " The fourth reason indeed, because, if I used your counsel, sometimes it would be necessary that a secret be kept, until it should be necessary that it be laid open, which by you could not be done; for it is written: "The garrulity of women knows only to conceal that which it does not know. " The fifth and last reason, on account of the philosopher’s word, who said: "In evil counsel women conquer men.

Caput IV.

Chapter 4.

De excusatione mulierum.

On the excusation of women.

Tunc vero domina Prudentia, patienter et benigne auditis et cognitis, quæ a viro suo fuerant dicta, implorata prius respondendi licentia, dixit ei: Primæ rationi, quam pro te allegasti, potest responderi, quia "non est stultum cum re mutare consilium;" nam etiamsi prædictafacere promisisses, non tamen dicereris mentiri, si justa de causa ea mutares;scriptum est enim: Sapiens non mentitur, cum suum propositum mutat in melius;nec obstat quod dicis, tuum consilium a multitudine hominum fore stabililitum;veritas enim rerum atque utilitas semper a paucis sapientibus melius invenitur, quam per multitudinem clamosam discutiatur; "multitudo enim onerosa nihilhabet honesti."

Then indeed Lady Prudence, after patiently and benignly hearing and coming to know the things that had been said by her husband, with the license to respond first implored, said to him: To the first reason which you have alleged for yourself, it can be answered, because "it is not foolish to change counsel along with the matter;" for even if you had promised to do the aforesaid, you would not, however, be said to lie, if for a just cause you changed them;for it is written: "A wise man does not lie, when he changes his purpose into something better;"nor does it stand in the way that you say your counsel will be established by a multitude of men;for the truth of things and utility is always better found by a few wise men than that it be discussed by a clamorous multitude; "for a burdensome multitude has nothing of the honorable."

Secundæ autem rationi, qaa dixisti omnes mulieres tam malas esse, quod nulla bona reperitur, respondeo quod, salva reverentia tua, non deberesita generaliter despicere mulieres ac earum imprudentiam reprobare, namqui omnes despicit, omnibus displicet; et etiam Seneca, De Formula HonestæVitæ, dixit: "Nullius imprudentiam despicias; rari sermonis ipse, sed loquentium patiens auditor; severus non sævus, hilares nequeaspernans; sapientiæ cupidus et docilis; quæ scieris sine arrogantiapostulanti imperties; quæ nescieris sine occultatione ignorantiætibi benigne postula impertiri. " Infinitæ namque mulieres bonæsunt, quod potest divina ratione probari; nam si nulla bona mulier inveniretur, Jhesus Christus in muliere venire dedignatus fuisset, et carnem humanamde virgine non sumpsisset; nam et multas sanctas et bonas mulieres esse, nemo est qui ignoret. Et etiam Dominus noster, Jhesus Christus, propterbonitatem mulierum, post resurrectionem suam prius dignatus est se manifestaremulieribus quam viris, quia prius se ostendit Mariæ Magdalenæquam apostolis.

But to the second argument, that you said all women are so evil that no good one is found, I reply that, saving your reverence, you ought not thus generally to despise women and to reprove their imprudence; for he who despises all is displeasing to all; and even Seneca, On the Pattern of an Honest Life, said: “Despise no one’s imprudence; be yourself of rare speech, but a patient hearer of those who speak; severe, not savage; not spurning the cheerful; desirous of wisdom and docile; what you shall know, impart without arrogance to the one who asks; what you shall not know, without concealment of your ignorance kindly ask to have imparted to you.” For truly there are countless women who are good, which can be proved by divine reasoning; for if no good woman were found, Jesus Christ would have disdained to come in a woman, and would not have taken human flesh from a virgin; and that there are many holy and good women, there is no one who is unaware. And also our Lord, Jesus Christ, on account of the goodness of women, after his Resurrection deigned first to manifest himself to women rather than to men, because he first showed himself to Mary Magdalene before the apostles.

Nec obstat quod dixit Salomon: "Mulierem ex omnibus noninveni, " quia licet ille non invenerit, alii multi mulieres bonas invenerunt, vel forte Salomon intellexit de mulieribus in summa bonitate constitutis, de quibus nulla reperitur. Nemo enim est undique perfectus neque perfectebonus, nisi solus Deus, ut ipsemet in Evangelio dixit.

Nor does what Solomon said stand in the way: “I did not find a woman among them all,” because although he did not find one, many others have found good women; or perhaps Solomon understood it of women constituted in consummate goodness, of whom none is found. For no one is in every respect perfect nor perfectly good, except God alone, as he himself said in the Gospel.

Tertiam vero rationem, in qua dixisti, quod, si meo consilio vel sensute regeres, videreris mihi concedere primatum, et potestatem super te mihidare, puto frivolam, immo nullam; nam si omnibus, cum quibus consiliumhabemus, primatum ac dominium super nos concederemus, nullus vellet abalio consilium habere; liberum enim arbitrium habemus, consilium nobisdatum omittere vel servare.

Toward the third reason, in which you said that, if by my counsel or sense you should govern yourself, you would seem to me to concede primacy and to give power over you to me, I think it frivolous—nay, none at all; for if to all with whom we have counsel we were to concede primacy and dominion over us, no one would wish to have counsel from another; for we have free arbitrament, to omit or to keep the counsel given to us.

Quartam vero rationem, ubi dixisti: "Garrulitas mulierum id solum novitcelare, quod nescit, " similiter puto nullam, nec hic locum habere, namillud intelligitur de pessimis mulieribus garrulis et loquacibus, de quibusdici consuevit: Tria sunt, quæ expellunt hominem de domo, scilicetfumus et stillicidium et mala uxor; de quibus etiam Salomon dixit: "Meliusest habitare in terra deserta, quam cum muliere rixosa et iracunda. " Meautem non invenisti talem, immo frequenter expertus es meum secretissimumsilentium atque meam taciturnitatem.

But the fourth argument, where you said: "The garrulity of women knows only to conceal what it does not know, " likewise I think null, nor does it have place here; for that is understood of the worst women, garrulous and loquacious, of whom it is wont to be said: There are three things that drive a man out of his house, to wit smoke and stillicide and a bad wife; of whom also Solomon said: "It is better to dwell in a desert land than with a quarrelsome and irascible woman. " But you have not found me such; nay rather, you have frequently experienced my most secret silence and my taciturnity.

Quod autem quinto loco dixisti, videlicet: "Malo in consilio feminævincunt viros, " hic locum habere non potest, quia malum consilium facerenon vis; nam etsi malum consilium facere velles, et mulieres in hoc maloconsilio te vincerent consulendo tibi in bonum, non essent vituperandæ, sed potius laudandæ. Ait enim beatus Paulus in Epistola ad Romanos:"Noli vinci a malo, sed vince in bono malum. " Si autem diceres, quod mulieresmale consulerent viris volentibus capere bonum consilium, et in hoc vincerent:hoc imputandum esset viris qui domini sunt consilii, et possunt reprobaremalum consilium et eligere bonum; ait enim idem Paulus in Epistola primaad Thessalonicenses in fine: "Omnia probate: quod bonum est tenete. " Veldicas, illud locum habere, quando pravæ mulieres et pessimæconsulunt stultis viris.

But as to what you said in the fifth place, namely: "In evil counsel women conquer men, " this cannot have place here, because you do not wish to make evil counsel; for even if you wished to make evil counsel, and women in this evil counsel should prevail over you by counseling you toward the good, they ought not to be vituperated, but rather lauded. For blessed Paul says in the Epistle to the Romans: "Do not be conquered by evil, but conquer evil by good. " But if you were to say that women would counsel badly to men wishing to take good counsel, and in this they would prevail: this would have to be imputed to the men, who are lords of the counsel, and can reprobate bad counsel and choose the good; for the same Paul says at the end of the First Epistle to the Thessalonians: "Test all things: hold fast what is good. " Or you may say that that has place when depraved women, and very worst ones, counsel foolish men.

Hic autem non est sic.

Here, however, it is not so.

Caput V.

Chapter 5.

De laude mulierum.

On the praise of women.

Hijs ad excusationem mulierum auditis, audias et intelligas quinquealias rationes, quibus probari potest, mulieres esse bonas et maxime benignasconjuges, earumque consilium esse audiendum et, si bonum est, servandum. Primo, quiæ vulgo dici consuevit: Consilium feminile aut nimis vile. Nimiscarum intelligo: id est carissimum, ut non notetur per hoc superfluitas, sicut de amicis Dei dicitur: "Nimis honorati sunt amici tui, Deus.

With these things heard for the defense of women, hear and understand five other reasons, by which it can be proved that women are good and most benign wives, and that their counsel is to be listened to and, if it is good, to be kept. First, that which is commonly accustomed to be said: “A feminine counsel is either too cheap.” I understand it as very dear: that is, most dear, so that by this no superfluity be noted, just as of the friends of God it is said: “Exceedingly honored are your friends, O God.”

"Et certe, licet enim multæ mulieres pessimæ sint, quarum consiliumest vile, tamen in multis invenitur optimum consilium. Jacob enim per bonumconsilium matris suæ Rebeccæ adeptus est patris sui Ysaac benedictionemet super fratribus suis dominatum. Similiter et Judith per bonum suum consiliumliberavit civitatem, in qua morabatur, de manibus Holofernis, qui illamobsidendo destruere volebat.

"And certainly, although indeed many women are very wicked, whose counsel is vile, nevertheless in many is found the best counsel. For Jacob, through the good counsel of his mother Rebecca, obtained the benediction of his father Isaac and dominion over his brothers. Likewise Judith also, through her own good counsel, freed the city in which she was dwelling from the hands of Holofernes, who, by besieging it, wished to destroy it.

Similiter et Abigail per suum bonum consiliumvirum suum Nabal ab ira David regis liberavit, qui eum interficere volebat. Simili modo et Hester Judæos per suum bonum consilium simul cum Mardochæo, in regno Assueri regis, sublimavit. Et ita de infinitis bonis mulieribusearumque consiliis infinita possent reperiri exempla.

Likewise also Abigail, by her good counsel, delivered her husband Nabal from the wrath of King David, who wished to kill him. In like manner Esther, by her good counsel together with Mordecai, in the kingdom of King Ahasuerus, exalted the Jews. And thus, of countless good women and their counsels, countless examples could be found.

Secunda vero ratio, quare consilium bonarum mulierum est audiendum et, si bonum fuerit, servandum, comprobatur propter primum nomen a Deo mulieribusappositum; nam cum Deus fecisset hominem, dixit: "Faciamus ei adjutorium, "et sic extracta costa de corpore illius fecit Evam, et ita vocavit eamadjutorium, quia homines adjuvare illisque consulere debent. Et bene possunt vocarimulieres adjutiorum et sic per consequentiam consilium, nam sine auxilioet consilio mulierum mundus durare non valeret. Et certe malum auxiliumDeus homini dedisset, si ab eis consilium petere minime deberet, cum vixunum sine altero esse possit.

The second reason, indeed, why the counsel of good women is to be listened to and, if it be good, to be kept, is verified on account of the first name applied by God to women; for when God had made man, he said: “Let us make for him a help,” and thus, with a rib drawn out from his body, he made Eve, and so he called her Help, because women ought to help men and to counsel them. And women can well be called helps and thus, by consequence, counsel; for without the help and counsel of women the world would not be able to endure. And surely God would have given man a bad help, if he ought by no means to ask counsel from them, since scarcely the one can be without the other.

Tertia vero ratio ad hoc inducitur, quia mulier melier est auro et lapidepretioso et etiam ipso sensu, et ejus sensus acutior est et alios exsuperat, quare per versus dici consuevit:

The third reason indeed is introduced for this, because woman is better than gold and a precious stone and even than sense itself, and her sense is more acute and surpasses others, wherefore it has been accustomed to be said in verses:

Quintam denique rationem Cato pro mulieribus induxit dicens:

Finally, Cato introduced the fifth reason on behalf of women, saying:

Tunc Melibeus hoc audiens, exhilarata aliquantulum facie, dixit: "Favusmellis, verba composita: dulcedo animæ et sanitas ossium. " Per tuanamque bona et dulcia verba ac per experientiam præcedentem cognovite prudentem et fidelem mihi atque discretam; ideoque, mutato propositomeo, prudenter et cum consilio tuo me regere desidero.

Then Melibeus, hearing this, with his face somewhat cheered, said: "A honeycomb of honey, well-composed words: sweetness of the soul and health of the bones. " By your good and sweet words indeed, and by the preceding experience, I have come to know you to be prudent and faithful to me and discreet; and therefore, with my purpose changed, I desire to govern myself prudently and with your counsel.

At illa dixit: Si prudenter vis vivere, te prudentiam oportet habere.

But she said: If you wish to live prudently, it behooves you to have prudence.

Melibeus respondit: Bene habeo prudentiam, ex quo habeo te ipsam, quæhoc nomine vocaris.

Melibeus responded: I am well furnished with prudence, since I have you yourself, who are called by this very name.

At illa dixit: Non ego sum prudentia, sed sum prudentiæ verba.

But she said: I am not prudence, but I am the words of prudence.

Qui respondens dixit: Indica ergo mihi, quid sit prudentia et qualissit (VI), quot et quæ sint species prudentiæ (VII), quid siteffectus prudentiæ (VIII), et quomodo prudentia acquiratur (IX).

He, answering, said: Indicate therefore to me, what prudence is and of what sort it is (6), how many and which are the species of prudence (7), what is the effect of prudence (8), and how prudence is acquired (9).

Caput VI.

Chapter 6.

De prudentia.

On prudence.

Illa vero dixit ei: "Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum utrarumquediscretio" cum electione boni et fuga mali. Et certe prudentia expeditaest et infatigabilis, et superat cuncta. Ait enim Cassiodorus: "Superavitcuncta infatigabilis et expedita prudentia. "

She indeed said to him: "Prudence is the discretion of both good and bad things" with the choosing of the good and the flight of the bad. And certainly prudence is expeditious and indefatigable, and it surpasses all things. For Cassiodorus says: "Indefatigable and expeditious prudence has overcome all things. "

Caput VII.

Chapter 7.

Quot et quæ sint species prudentiæ.

How many and what the species of prudence are.

Species autem prudentia sunt sex, scilicet: Ratio, Intellectus, Providentia, Circumspectio, Cautio, Docilitas.

But the species of Prudence are six, namely: Reason, Intellect, Providence, Circumspection, Caution, Docility.

"Ratio est arbitra bonorum et malorum. " "Sequitur autem ratio naturam. Quid est ergo ratio: Naturæ imitatio.

"Reason is the arbiter of goods and evils. " "Reason, moreover, follows Nature. What, then, is reason: imitation of Nature.

" Diffinitur etiam sic: Ratioest vis discretiva boni et mali, liciti et illiciti, honesti et inhonesticum electione boni et fuga mali; inde etiam dicitur ratiocinatio, id estrationis inquisitio.

" It is also defined thus: Reason is the discriminative power of good and evil, of licit and illicit, of honest and dishonest, with the choosing of the good and the fleeing of the evil; thence also it is called ratiocination, that is, an inquisition of reason.

Intellectus est speculatio veri.

Intellect is the speculation of truth.

Providentia est præsens notio futurorum pertractans eventum.

Providence is a present notion of future things, thoroughly handling their outcome.

Circumspectio est contrariorum vitiorum cautela.

Circumspection is the caution against contrary vices.

Cautio est discernere a virtutibus vitia speciem virtutum præferentia.

Caution is to discern from the virtues the vices presenting the appearance of virtues.

Docilitas est virtus docendi imperitos.

Docility is the virtue of teaching the inexpert.

Caput VIII.

Chapter 8.

De effectu prudentiæ.

On the effect of prudence.

Effectus autem sive utilitas prudentiæ est beatitudo; nam quiprudens est beatus est, et ad beatam vitam sola sufficit prudentia. Aitenim Seneca in Epistolis: "Qui prudens est et temperans est; qui temperansest et constans est; qui constans est et imperturbatus est; qui imperturbatusest sine tristitia est; qui sine tristitia est beatus est: ergo prudensbeatus est, et prudentia ad beatam vitam satis est. " Qui ergo habet prudentiam, has habet utilitates, quia beatus est et prudens et constans et temperanset imperturbatus et sine tristitia, et habet etiam omnes utilitates, quæproveniunt ex speciebus prudentiæ, et multas alias, quas non oportethic enumerari.

The effect, or the utility, of prudence is beatitude; for whoever is prudent is blessed, and prudence alone suffices for the blessed life. For Seneca says in the Letters: "He who is prudent is also temperate; he who is temperate is also constant; he who is constant is also imperturbable; he who is imperturbable is without sadness; he who is without sadness is blessed: therefore the prudent man is blessed, and prudence is sufficient for the blessed life. " Therefore whoever has prudence has these utilities, because he is blessed and prudent and constant and temperate and imperturbable and without sadness; and he also has all the utilities that proceed from the species of prudence, and many others, which it is not fitting to enumerate here.

Caput IX.

Chapter 9.

Quomodo acquiratur prudentia.

How prudence may be acquired.

Acquiritur quippe prudentia et sapientia omnisque scientia doctrinabona et a bona doctore tradita et perseveranti studio.

Indeed, prudence and sapience, and every science, are acquired by good doctrine, handed down by a good teacher, and by persevering study.

A bono doctore tradita ideo dixi, quia bonos doctores medicosque, artifices quoque et magistros ac operarios, et in qualibet arte vel professioneperitiores semper eligere debes, eorumque consilium et auxilium, si opusfuerit, postulare. Nam sicut bonus doctor per bonam doctrinam præstabitgratiam, ita malus per malam doctrinam ducet in errorem ac destruet illam;et sicut bonus medicus curabiles infirmitates cito sanat, ita malus curabilesinfirmitates incurabiles tacit et per imperitiam suam post multos laboreset multas expensas multos necat. Sic etiam mali magistri, artifices etoperarii multa bona opera post multos labores multasque expensas devastantac imperite destruunt, quare de prædictis bonum mereatum non poterishabere; immo sanctius esset, illis, ut ab opere suo cessarent, bene solvere, quam eorum operam gratis et sine pretio habere.

Handed down by a good doctor I said for this reason: because good doctors and physicians, artificers also and masters and workmen, and in any art or profession the more experienced, you must always choose; and their counsel and aid, if there be need, you must ask. For just as a good doctor through good doctrine will bestow grace, so an evil one through evil doctrine will lead into error and will destroy it; and just as a good physician quickly heals curable infirmities, so an evil one makes curable infirmities incurable and, through his inexperience, after many labors and many expenses, kills many. So also evil masters, artificers, and workmen lay waste many good works after many labors and many expenses and unskilfully destroy them; wherefore from the aforesaid you will not be able to have a good earning; nay rather, it would be more holy to pay them well so that they might cease from their work, than to have their labor gratis and without price.

Verum, quia dixi, prudentiam et omnem scientiam acquiri etiam perseverantistudio, videndum est, quid sit studium, et quæ sint ad studiumutilia et necessaria.

But, since I have said that prudence and all knowledge are also acquired by perseverant study, it must be considered what study is, and what things are useful and necessary for study.

Caput X.

Chapter 10.

De studio et studioso, et quæ sint utilia et necessaria studentibus.

On study and the studious person, and what things are useful and necessary for students.

Itaque "studium est vehemens animi applicatio ad aliquam rem summa eumvoluntate."

Therefore "study is a vehement application of the mind to some matter with utmost volition."

Ad studium autem sunt utilia: in primis, doctrina, ut supra dixi, dequa doctrina, plenius scriptum est in libro De Forma Vitæin principio, quem ad Vincentium fratrem tuum direxi.

Now for study the following are useful: in the first place, doctrine, as I said above, about which doctrine it has been written more fully in the book De Forma Vitæat the beginning, which I directed to your brother Vincent.

Secundo, utile est adjuvare ingenium intentissima cura et acri usu etexercitatione; nam "exercitatio ingenium et naturam sæpe vincit, et usus omnium magistrorum præcepta superat."

Secondly, it is useful to aid the ingenuity by most intent care and by keen use andexercise; for "exercise often conquers ingenuity and nature, and use surpasses the precepts of all masters."

Tertio, utile est adjuvare usum per exercitium manuum, et ingenium cumcura; ait enim Cato:

Third, it is useful to assist practice through the exercise of the hands, and ingenuity with care; for Cato says:

De intentione dixit Seneca: "Acuit animum intentio, frangit remissio."

On intention Seneca said: "Intention sharpens the mind; remission (slackening) breaks it."

De jugi lectione dixit Cassiodorus: "Ægrescit profecto ingenium, nisi jugi lectione reparetur. " Reparare itaque debes ingenium jugi lectionecum humilitate et mansuetudine; scriptum est enim: "Bonus lector humilisese debet et mansuetus et a curis malis et voluptatum illecebris prorsusalienus, diligens et sedulus, ut ab omnibus libenter discat, et nunquamde scientia sua præsumat. Perversi dogmatis auctores quasi venenafugiat; diu rem pertractet, antequam judicet; discat non videri doctus, sed esse quærat; dicta sapientum intelligat, et intellecta diligat, et ea semper ante oculum vultus sui tenere studeat.

On continual reading Cassiodorus said: "The ingenuity indeed grows sick, unless it be repaired by continual reading. " Therefore you ought to repair the ingenuity by continual reading with humility and mansuetude; for it is written: "A good reader ought to be humble and meek and altogether alien from evil cares and the allurements of pleasures, diligent and sedulous, so that he may gladly learn from all, and never presume upon his own knowledge. Let him flee the authors of perverse dogma as if poisons; let him long deliberate the matter before he judges; let him learn not to seem learned, but to seek to be; let him understand the sayings of the wise, and love the things understood, and strive always to keep them before the eye of his countenance.

" Triplex ergo humilitasin studioso requiri debet: prima, ut "nullam scientiam nullamque scripturamvilem habest" vel reputet, quia quæcunque scripta sunt, ad nostramdoctrinam scripta sunt, juxta illud Senecæ: "Nullius imprudentiamdespicias" et cetera. "Secunda humilitas est, ut a nemine discere aliquatenuserubescat, " juxta "illud [Platonicum]: Malo enim aliena verecunde discere, quam mea impudenter ignorare. " "Tertia est, ut, cum scientiam quis adeptusfuerit, ceteros non contempnat, " juxta illud Senecæ: "Quæ scierissine arrogantia postulanti imperties; quæ nescieris sine occultationeignorantiæ tibi benigne postula impertiri.

" Therefore a triple humility ought to be required in the studious person: first, that he hold "no knowledge and no writing as vile" or reckon it so, because whatever things have been written have been written for our doctrine, according to that saying of Seneca: "Despise no one’s imprudence," and so forth. "The second humility is, that he not blush to learn from anyone at all," according to "that [Platonic]: For I prefer to learn another’s things modestly, rather than impudently to be ignorant of my own." "The third is, that, when someone has obtained knowledge, he not despise the others," according to that saying of Seneca: "What things you have known, impart to the one who asks without arrogance; what things you have not known, without concealment of ignorance kindly ask to have imparted to you.

" Et licet dixerim, nullamscripturam vilem habendam, non tamen in scripturas quasi inutilibus multumest studendum vel tempus amittendum; nam "providendum est lectori, ne instudiis inutilibus operam suam expendat, et ne in bono et utili propositoremaneat tepidus. Malum est enim bonum negligenter agere: pejus est invanum labores multos expendere. " Et certe non solum lectione, sed etiamscriptura reparari debet ingenium; scriptum est enim: "Nec tantum scriberedebemus, nec legere tantum: altera enim res vires constringit et exhaurit, altera solvit et diluit; invicent ergo hoc et illo commeandum est et alterumaltero temperandum."

" And although I have said that no writing is to be held cheap, nevertheless one must not be much engrossed in writings as if they were useless, nor lose time; for "it must be provided by the reader, lest he expend his effort on useless studies, and lest he remain tepid in a good and useful purpose. For it is an evil to do a good thing negligently; worse is it to spend many labors in vain." And certainly the wit/ingenuity ought to be repaired not only by reading, but also by writing; for it is written: "We ought not only to write, nor only to read: for the one constricts and exhausts the forces, the other loosens and dilutes; let there be, then, a going back and forth, now to this and now to that, and the one must be tempered by the other."

De ruminatione vero et frequenti et assidua commemoratione dixit Martialis:

Concerning rumination, indeed, and frequent and assiduous commemoration, Martial said:

Ad hoc Prudentia respondit: Licet non sis sapiens ad plenum, non tamenes stultus; non enim potest non sapere, qui se stultum intelligit; namsi stultus esses, alios stultos reputares. Dixit enim Salomon: "In viastultus ambulans, cum ipse stultus sit, omnes stultos reputat;" et alibi:"Via stulti recta st in oculis ejus. " Et etiam in proverbio dicitur:

To this Prudence replied: Although you may not be wise to the full, nevertheless you are not foolish; for he cannot fail to be wise who understands himself to be foolish; for if you were foolish, you would reckon others foolish. For Solomon said: "In the way a fool, as he walks—since he himself is a fool—reckons all men fools;" and elsewhere: "The way of the fool is straight in his eyes. " And also in the proverb it is said:

Caput XI.

Chapter 11.

De consilio.

On counsel.

Quia igitur meum consilium hbere desideras, primo videamus, quid sitconsilium (XI a), unde dicatur (XI b), quomodo componatur (XI c), a quibuspostulandum sit consilium (XI d Ò XVII) quorum consilium sit vitandum (XVIIIÒ XXV), quomodo sit examinandum (XXVI), quando et qualiter sit assumendum(XXVII), quando et qualiter sit retinendum (XXVIII), et quando sit mutandumconsilium vel promissum (XXIX).

Since therefore you desire to have my counsel, first let us see what counsel is (11 a), whence it is called (11 b), how it is composed (11 c), from whom counsel ought to be requested (11 d Ò 17), whose counsel ought to be avoided (18Ò 25), how it ought to be examined (26), when and in what manner it ought to be assumed (27), when and in what manner it ought to be retained (28), and when counsel or a promise ought to be changed (29).

a. Consilium est hominis intentio vel propositum, quod homini vel hominibusexhibetur vel tribuitur, bonum vel malum persuadendo, motu proprio, superaliquo faciendo vel omittendo. Dicitur etiam consilium, quod capitur cummultis. "Dicitur etiam consilium dari, licet nullum intervenerit verbum, quando sciens præsto opem in maleticio committendo, ut ecce ferramentacommodavi ad confringendum ostium, vel similia feci, " ut leges dicunt.

a. Counsel is a human’s intention or purpose, which is exhibited or bestowed upon a person or persons, by persuading to good or to evil, by one’s own motion, concerning something to be done or omitted. It is also called counsel, that which is undertaken with many. "It is also said that counsel is given, although no word has intervened, when, knowingly, one is at hand with aid in committing a malefaction, as, behold, I lent tools for breaking a door, or I did similar things," as the laws say.

b. Unde dicatur consilium. Dicitur autem consilium a consulo consulis, quod duas significationes habet, videlicet unam quærendi ab alioconsilium, et tunc habet constructionem ad accusativum: aliam vero dandiconsilium alteri, et tunc habet constructionem ad dativum; unde versus:

b. Whence counsel is said. Counsel, moreover, is said from consulo consulis (“I consult, you consult”), which has two significations: namely, one of seeking counsel from another, and then it has construction with the accusative; the other of giving counsel to another, and then it has construction with the dative; whence the verse:

d. A quibus sit consilium petendum. Nunc videamus, a quibus consiliumpetere debeas. Et certe tripliciter est petendum: primo, ab omnipotentiDomino; secundo, a te ipso; tertio vero, ab alio vel ab aliis.

d. From whom counsel should be sought. Now let us see, from whom you ought to counselseek. And certainly it is to be sought triply: first, from the omnipotentLord; second, from yourself; third indeed, from another or from others.

In Deo debesesse devotus et sapiens, in te ipso providus, in alio vel in aliis cautus, in examinando consilio discretus, in vitando rigidus, in assumendo doctus, in retinendo constans, in mutando lenis.

In God you ought to be devout and wise, in yourself provident, in another or in others cautious, in examining counsel discreet, rigid in avoiding, learned in taking up, constant in retaining, gentle in changing.

1. De consilio postulando a Deo. Quod consilium a Deo petere debeas, dicit beatus Jacobus in Epistola sua, circa principium ubi ait: "Si quisautem nostrum indiget sapientia, postulet a Deo, qui dat omnibus affluenter, et non improperat: et dabitur ei. " Consilium ergo et omnia, quæcunquefacis, in verbo aut in opere, in nomine Domini facere debes; ait enim beatusPaulus in Epistola ad Colossenses: "Omnia, quæcunque facitis, inverbo aut in opere, omnia in nomine Domini nostri Jhesu Christi faciatis, gratias agentes Deo et Patri;" nam ut idem Paulus dixit: "Omne datum optimumet omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum, apudquem non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio. " In petendo igiturconsilium a Domino devotus et sapiens esse debes, ut ei, qui dominus estconsilii, postules devote tantummodo "quod sit justum vel quod videaturhonestum;" et si hoc feceris, sine dubio quod volueris a Domino impetrabis.

1. On requesting counsel from God. That you ought to ask counsel from God, blessed James says in his Epistle, near the beginning where he says: "But if any one of us is in need of wisdom, let him ask of God, who gives to all abundantly, and does not reproach: and it will be given to him." Therefore counsel, and whatever things you do, in word or in work, you ought to do in the name of the Lord; for blessed Paul says in the Epistle to the Colossians: "Whatever things you do, in word or in work, do all in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, giving thanks to God and the Father;" for, as the same Paul said: "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no transmutation nor shadow of vicissitude." In asking therefore for counsel from the Lord you ought to be devout and wise, so that to Him, who is the lord of counsel, you may ask devoutly only "what is just or what seems honorable;" and if you do this, without doubt you will obtain from the Lord what you have willed.

Ait enim Dominus: "Omnia, quæcunque petieritis a Patre in nominemeo, dabit vobis. " Intelligo hoc, si justus fueris et juste postulaveris. Alioquin, si iniquissimum consilium feceris, super te devolvetur; ait enimJhesus Sirac: "Facienti iniquissimum consilium, super ipsum devolvetur, et non cognoscet unde veniat illi.

For the Lord says: "Whatever things you ask of the Father in my name, he will give you. " I understand this, if you have been just and have asked justly. Otherwise, if you have made a most iniquitous counsel, it will devolve upon you; for Jesus Sirach says: "To one doing a most iniquitous counsel, it will devolve upon him, and he will not know whence it comes to him.

" Si enim "in amicitia terrena lex talissancita est, ut nec rogemus res turpes nec faciamus rogati, " et "ab amicishonesta petamaus, et amicorum causa faciamus honesta, " multo fortius inDeo, qui est noster verus amicus et nostri animi custos, talia servaredebemus; nam si ea "facta, quæ pietatem et æstimationem etverecundiam nostram lædunt, et ut generaliter dicam, quæ contrabonos mores fiunt, nec nos facere posse credendum est, " ut leges dicunt, multo fortius Deus, adjutor omnium, talia facere dedignaretur, et supernos pro tali petitione iram suam induceret atque indignationem, quare etiamCato dixit:

" If indeed "in earthly friendship such a law has been sanctioned, that we neither ask for base things nor do them when asked," and "from friends we should ask for honest things, and for the sake of friends we should do honest things," much more strongly in God, who is our true friend and the guardian of our spirit, we ought to keep such things; for if those "deeds which wound our piety and our estimation and our modesty, and, to speak generally, which are done against good morals, are not even to be believed that we are able to do," as the laws say, much more strongly would God, the helper of all, disdain to do such things, and would bring upon us, for such a petition, his wrath and his indignation, wherefore even Cato said:

2. De consilio a se ipso petendo. A te ipso vero secundo loco peteredebes consilium et intra te requirere; et in hoc providus esse debes, uta te atque consiliariis tuis removeas illa tria, quæ maxime suntconsilio contraria, scilicet iram, voluptatem sive cupiditatem atque festinantiam.

2. On counsel to be sought from oneself. From yourself indeed, in the second place, you ought to seek counsel and to inquire within yourself; and in this you ought to be provident, that you remove from yourself and from your counselors those three things which are most contrary to counsel, namely anger, voluptuousness or cupidity, and hastiness.

Caput XII.

Chapter 12.

De ira vitanda in consiliis.

On anger to be avoided in counsels.

Primo itaque provideas, ne iratus vel ab irato consilium petas; et hocmultis rationibus: prima, quia iratus semper plus putat posse facere, quampossit, et ideo posse suum superat; scriptum est enim:

First, therefore, take care not, being angry, nor to seek counsel from an angry man; and this for many reasons: the first, because an angry man always thinks he can do more than he can, and therefore exceeds his own power; for it is written:

Et si de ira, irato et iracundo plenius scire volueris, legas in libro, DeForma Vitæ, ad Vincentium scripto, in titulo: De Amicitia IracundiHominis Vitanda.

And if you should wish to know more fully about anger, the irate man and the irascible man, read in the book, On the Form of Life, written to Vincent, under the title: On Avoiding the Friendship of an Irascible Man.

Caput XIII.

Chapter 13.

De cupiditate seu voluptate vitanda in consiliis.

On cupidity or pleasure to be avoided in counsels.

Providere etiam debes, ne cupiditas vel voluptas, consilium tuum impediendo, te vel consiliarios tuos in tantum hebetet, ut nimia voluptas sensum devincat;et hoc multis rationibus: prima, quia "cupiditas est radix omnium malorum, "ut beatus Paulus dixit in Epistola ad Timotheum.

You must also provide, lest cupidity or pleasure, by impeding your counsel, so dull you or your counselors, that excessive pleasure overcomes sense;and this for many reasons: first, because “cupidity is the root of all evils,” as blessed Paul said in the Epistle to Timothy.

Secunda vero ratione, quia voluptas omne animi lumen extinguit et omnemalum et vitium in se habet; nam dicit Tullius, De Senectute: "Nullamcapitaliorem pestem, quam voluptatem corporis hominibus a ntura datam, eujus voluptatis avidæ libidines et temere et effrenate ad potiendumincitantur. Hinc patriæ poditiones, hinc rerum publicarum eversiones, hinc cum hostibus clandestina colloquia nasci dicebat; nullum denique scelus, nullum malum facinus esse, ad quod suscipiendum non libido voluptatis impelleret;stupra vero et adulteria et omne malum flagitium nullis aliis illecebrisexcitari nisi voluptatis. Cumque homini sive natura sive quis deus nihilmente præstabilius dedisset, huic divino muneri ac dono nihil tamesse inimicum quam voluptatem.

Secondly indeed, for the reason that pleasure extinguishes every light of the soul and contains within itself every evil and vice; for Tullius, On Old Age, says: “No pest more capital than bodily pleasure has nature given to men, whose pleasure’s avid lusts are both rashly and unbridledly incited to obtain. Hence, he said, are born treasons against the fatherland, overthrows of commonwealths, clandestine colloquies with enemies; in fine, there is no crime, no evil deed, to the undertaking of which the lust of pleasure does not impel; indeed, defilements and adulteries and every flagitious wickedness are stirred by no other allurements than those of pleasure. And since to man, whether by nature or by any god, nothing more preeminent than the mind had been given, yet to this divine boon and gift nothing is so inimical as pleasure.”

Nec enim, libidine dominante, locum temperantiaesse, nec omnino in voluptatis regno virtutem posse consistere. " "Quocircanihil esse tam detestabile tamque pestiferum quam voluptatem, si quidamea, cum major esset, omne animi lumen extingueret. " Et certe voluptas itapessima est, ut nunquam oriatur, nisi præceserit dolor; ait enimPetrus Alfunsus: "Nulla quippe voluptas oritur, nisi dolor præcesserit, ut nemo unquam delectatur bibendo, nisi prius doluerit sitiendo; nemo delectaturin comestione, nisi dolor præcesserit in fame, aut etiam in requie, nisi prius doluerit ex labore, et sic in ceteris affectibus.

For neither, when libido is dominating, is there a place for temperance, nor at all in the kingdom of voluptuousness can virtue stand. " "Wherefore nothing is so detestable and so pestiferous as pleasure, since indeed, when it is greater, it would extinguish every light of the mind. " And certainly pleasure is so worst that it never arises unless pain has preceded; for Peter Alfonsus says: "No pleasure whatsoever arises unless pain has gone before, so that no one ever is delighted by drinking, unless first he has suffered by thirsting; no one is delighted in eating, unless pain has preceded in hunger, or even in rest, unless first he has suffered from labor, and so in the other affections."

" Et nota, quod in qualibet etiam minima voluptate periculum imminet; unde illud:Quicunque voluptuosus fuerit, vitio carere non poterit.

" And note that in any pleasure, even the very least, danger threatens; whence this: Whoever is voluptuous will not be able to be without vice.

Tertia vero ratione in consiliis et aliis rebus vitare ac removere debescupiditatem, quia parit peccatum et generat mortem. Ait enim beatus Jacobusin Epistola sua: "Unusquisque enim temptatur a concupiscentia sua abstractuset illectus; deinde cum concupiscentia conceperit, parit peccatum: peccatumcum consummatum fuerit, generat mortem. " Et certe in tantum est pessimacupiditas, ut "cupienti animo nihil satis festinetur;" quare dici consuevit:"Cupiditati tarda est celeritas."

By a third reasoning indeed, in counsels and other matters, cupidity ought to be avoided and removed, because it brings forth sin and generates death. For blessed James says in his Epistle: "For each one is tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and enticed; then when concupiscence has conceived, it brings forth sin: when sin has been consummated, it generates death. " And certainly cupidity is so exceedingly wicked, that "to a desiring mind nothing is hastened enough;" wherefore it is wont to be said: "To cupidity, speed is slow."

Quarta vero ratione vitanda est cupiditas et a consiliis penitus removenda, quia "omnes cupiditates portæ sunt inferni, per quas itur in mortem, ""quæ si aliter auferri non possent, ipsum cor evellendum esset."

By a fourth reason, indeed, cupidity is to be avoided and utterly removed from counsels, because "all cupidities are the gates of hell, through which one goes into death," ""which, if they could not otherwise be removed, the heart itself would have to be torn out."

Quinta vero ratione non solum in consiliis, sed etiam in omnibus actibustuis omnino cupiditatem expellere ac removere debes, quia "cupiditas nihilamat, nisi quod non licet;" quare Seneca dixit: "Ferocissima cupiditaspestis est, quæ solet egenos facere quos capit, quia finem quærendinon invenit. " "Altera enim cupiditas ex fine alterius nascitur. " Quareidem ait: "Fortior est qui cupiditatem vincit, quam qui hostem subicit."

By a fifth reason, not only in counsels, but also in all your acts you must altogether expel and remove cupidity, because "cupidity loves nothing, except what is not permitted;" wherefore Seneca said: "Most ferocious cupidity is a pestilence, which is wont to make needy those whom it seizes, because it finds no end of seeking. " "For another cupidity is born from the end of another. " Therefore the same says: "Stronger is he who conquers cupidity than he who subdues an enemy."

Sexta denique ratione "cupiditas omnino in omnibus negotiis omnibusqueactibus removenda est atque fugienda, et igne ac ferro succidenda, totoqueartificio separanda" propter infirmitatem vitandam maxime; nam si cupiditasfinem quærendi non invenerit, ut dictum est, illam merito fugeredebes. Scriptum est enim in Didascalo Hugonis, in titulo Quomodosit legenda divina Scriptura ad Correctionem Morum: "Noli sequi infinita;nam ubi finis non est, requies non esse potest; ubi pax non est, Deus habitarenon potest. In pace, inquit propheta, factus est locus ejus, et in Sionhabitatio ejus. "

By a sixth, finally, reason, "cupidity is altogether in all businesses and in all acts to be removed and fled, and to be cut down with fire and iron, and to be separated by every artifice" chiefly for infirmity to be avoided most of all; for if cupidity should not find an end of seeking, as has been said, you ought rightly to flee it. For it is written in Hugh’s Didascalicon, in the title How the Divine Scripture is to be Read for the Correction of Morals: "Do not follow things infinite; for where an end is not, rest cannot be; where peace is not, God cannot dwell. In peace, says the prophet, his place has been made, and in Zion his habitation."

Caput XIV.

Chapter 14.

De festinantia vitanda in consiliis.

On festination to be avoided in counsels.

Festinantiam denique in consiliis esse contrariam, cognoscas; ideoqueillam in consiliis a te procul abicias; sicut enim "in judicando criminosaest celeritas, " unde dici consuevit: Optimum judicem existimo, qui citointelligit et tarde judicat, et etiam: "Ad poenitendum properat qui citojudicat, " ita et de consiliis scriptum est: "De consiliis, quod diu tractaveris, id puta rectissimum. " Et etiam dici consuevit: "Velox consilium sequiturpoenitentia. " Non ergo consilium dare vel recipere debes subito et festinanter, sed cum deliberatione ac mora competenti; ait enim Seneca, De FormulaHonestæ Vitæ: "Nihil tibi subitum sit, sed totum ante prospicias;nam qui providus est, non dicit non putavi hoc fiere; quia non dubitat, sed expectat, non suspicatur, sed cavet.

Finally, know that hastiness in counsels is contrary; and therefore cast it far from you in counsels; for just as “in judging, swiftness is criminal,” whence it is wont to be said: I esteem the best judge who understands quickly and judges slowly, and also: “He hastens to repentance who judges quickly,” so too it is written about counsels: “In counsels, deem that the most correct which you have long handled.” And it is also wont to be said: “Swift counsel is followed by repentance.” Therefore you ought not to give or receive counsel suddenly and hastily, but with deliberation and with suitable delay; for Seneca says, On the Formula of an Honorable Life: “Let nothing be sudden for you, but foresee everything beforehand; for he who is provident does not say I did not think this would happen; because he does not doubt, but expects; he does not surmise, but is on guard.”

" Quare in talibus deliberatioet competens mora non est reprobanda, immo valde diligenda. Scriptum estenim: "Deliberare utilia, mora est tutissima;" et iterum: "Mora omnis odioest sed facit sapientem. "

" Therefore in such matters deliberation and a competent delay is not to be reprobated, rather to be greatly cherished. For it is written: "To deliberate upon useful things, delay is most safest;" and again: "Every delay is hateful, but it makes one wise. "

Caput XV.

Chapter 15.

De secreto non propalando nisi propter necessitatem et utilitatem.

On not divulging a secret except on account of necessity and utility.

Habita deliberatione ac diligenti provisione super removendis hijs, quæ sunt consilio contraria, videlicet ira, cupiditate seu voluptateac festinantia, provideas etiam, ut secretum tuum tibi habeas nec ab alioinde consilium petas, si per consilium, alienum non potes tuam conditionemfacere meliorem; ait enim Jhesus Sirac: "Amico et inimico noli enarraresensum tuum, et, si est tuum delictum, noli denudare. Audiet enim te, etrespiciet te, et quasi defendens peccatum tuum, subridebit te. " Et aliusdixit: "Quod secretum esse vis, nemini dicas. " Et alius dixit: Vix existimesab uno posse celari secretum.

Having taken deliberation and diligent provision about removing those things which are contrary to counsel, namely anger, cupidity or pleasure and hastiness, also provide that you keep your secret to yourself and do not from another seek counsel, if by an alien counsel you cannot make your condition better; for Jesus Sirach says: "To friend and to enemy do not recount your sense, and, if the offense is yours, do not lay it bare. For he will hear you, and will regard you, and as if defending your sin, he will smile at you. " And another said: "What you wish to be secret, tell to no one. " And another said: Hardly suppose that a secret can be hidden by one alone.

Et Petrus Alfunsus dixit: "Consilium velsecretum absconditum quasi in carcere suo tenet ligatum;" quare dixit:"Qui consilium suum in corde suo retinet, sui juris est melius eligere;"nam tutius est tacere, quam ut taceat alium rogare. Ait enim Seneca: "Sitibi ipsi non imperasti, ut taceres, quomodo ab alio silentium quæris?"Si autem per alienum consilium tuam conditionem credis facere meliorem, tunc delibera et intra te diligenter provide, cum quo vel quibus consiliumfacere debeas tuaque secreta aperire; ait enim Seneca: "Tu omnia cum amicodelibera, sed de ipso prius. " Et Petrus Alfunsus dixit: "Propter amicosnon probatos: provide tibi semel de inimicis, et millesies de amicis; quiaforsan amicus fiet inimicus, et sic levius poterit dampnum tuum perquirere.

And Peter Alfonsus said: "Counsel or a hidden secret keeps one bound as if in its own prison;" wherefore he said: "He who retains his counsel in his heart is more of his own right to choose better;" for it is safer to be silent than to ask another to be silent. For Seneca says: "If you have not commanded yourself to be silent, how do you seek silence from another?" But if through alien counsel you believe you can make your condition better, then deliberate and within yourself carefully provide with whom or with which persons you ought to take counsel and to open your secrets; for Seneca says: "Deliberate about all things with a friend, but about him first." And Peter Alfonsus said: "On account of unproved friends: take precautions once regarding enemies, and a thousand times regarding friends; because perhaps a friend will become an enemy, and thus he will be able to procure your damage more easily."

Caput XVI.

Chapter 16.

De non ostendenda voluntate in consiliis.

On not showing one's will in counsels.

Item provideas, ne voluntatem tuam super consilio petito consiliariisostendas; nam fere omnes homines assentatores sunt, vultumque petentisrespiciunt; et quod ei placere credunt, id libenter dicere conantur, etmagis, illius voluntatem respiciendo, illi applaudunt, quam quod ei displiceat, licet utile sit, dicere velint; et hæc est ratio, quare magnatesatque potentes, si per se nesciunt, consilium bonum vix aut nunquam caperepossunt; de quibus assentatoribus atque adulatoribus infra plenius tibidicam.

Likewise, see to it that you do not show your will to the counselors concerning the counsel sought; for almost all men are assentators, and they look to the countenance of the petitioner; and what they believe will please him, that they try gladly to say, and rather, by regarding his will, they applaud him, than wish to say what might displease him, although it be useful; and this is the reason why magnates and the potent, if they do not know for themselves, can scarcely or never take good counsel; about which assentators and adulators I shall speak to you more fully below.

In petendo itaque a te consilio primo provideas, ut quæ sunt contrariaconsilio a te et a consiliariis tuis removeas; secundo, ut secretum tuumtibi habeas, si tuam conditionem per alienum consilium meliorare non potes;tertio, ut de consiliariis intra te deliberes atque perpenses; quarto, ut de consilio petito voluntatem consiliariis non ostendas.

In seeking counsel, therefore, first see to it that you remove from yourself and from your counselors the things that are contrary to counsel; secondly, that you keep your secret to yourself, if you cannot ameliorate your condition by another’s counsel; thirdly, that you deliberate and weigh within yourself about the counselors; fourthly, that, concerning the counsel sought, you do not show your will to the counselors.

Caput XVII.

Chapter 17.

De consilio ab aliis petendo. ^Ð

On seeking counsel from others. ^Ð

Petito a te consilio atque intra te proviso, opportunum est quandoque, ut ab alio vel ab aliis consilium petas. Videndum est igitur a quibus consiliumpetere debeas.

With counsel having been sought from yourself and provided within yourself, it is sometimes opportune that you seek counsel from another or from others. It must therefore be seen from whom you ought to seek counsel.

In petendo itaque ab aliis consilio, hanc cautelam sollicite observes, ut bonos amicos a malis vel ab inimicis discernas. A bonis ergo amicis, et a sapientibus ac peritis, probatis et inventis fidelibus, et maximea senibus consilium postulanfum est.

Therefore, in seeking counsel from others, observe this caution solicitously, that you discern good friends from bad or from enemies. Therefore, from good friends, and from the wise and the experienced, the approved and those found faithful, and especially from elders, counsel must be asked.

De amicis ideo dixit, quia, ut ait Salomon, "unguento et variisodoribus delectatur cor, et bonis amici consiliis anima dulcoratur;" nihilenim "dulcius est quam habere amicum, cum quo tanquam cum te ipso loquaris. "Quare idem Salomon ait: "Amico fideli nulla est comparatio, nec est dignaponderatio auri vel argenti contra bonitatem fidei ejus;" et iterum: "Amicussi permanserit fixus, erit tibi quasi coæqualis, et in domesticistuis fiducialiter aget. " Et iterum ait: "Amicus fidelis, protectio fortis;qui autem invenit illum, invenit thesaurum.

Of friends he spoke for this reason, because, as Solomon says, "by unguent and various odors the heart is delighted, and by the good counsels of a friend the soul is sweetened;" for nothing "is sweeter than to have a friend with whom you may speak as with yourself." Wherefore the same Solomon says: "With a faithful friend there is no comparison, nor is there a worthy weighing of gold or silver against the goodness of his faith;" and again: "If a friend shall have remained steadfast, he will be to you as a coequal, and in your household affairs he will act with confidence." And again he says: "A faithful friend is a strong protection; and whoever finds him finds a treasure."

" Inde etiam dici consuevit:"Quale est sine anima corpus, talis est sine amicis homo;" nam "etsi eapermaneant, quæ dicuntur dona fortunæ, vita tamen inculta etdeserta ab amicis non potest esse jocunda."

" From this also it has been wont to be said:"As a body is without a soul, such is a man without friends;" for "even if those things remain which are called the gifts of Fortune, nevertheless a life uncultivated and deserted by friends cannot be jocund."

De sapientibus et peritis ideo dixi, quia verum est, quod diciconsuevit: "Sapiens contra omnes fert arma, dum cogitat. " Per sapientiamergo ac consilium suum tibi taliter consulent, quod, si eis credideris, inconsulte cadere non poteris. Scriptum est enim:

About the wise and the expert therefore I said, because it is true what is wont to be said: "The wise man bears arms against all while he thinks. " Therefore by their wisdom and their counsel they will counsel you in such a way that, if you believe them, you will not be able to fall inconsiderately. For it is written:

De probatis vero et inventis fidelibus ideo dixi, quiamulti dicuntur sapientes, qui malitiosi sunt et aliis per malitiam citoconsulerent male. Quare non est omnibus credendum, sed probatis tantumet fidelibus repertis; ait enim beatus Johannes in Epistola sua: "Karissimi, nolite omni credere spiritui, sed probate spiritus si ex Deo sint. " Etetiam Paulus in Epistola ad Thessalonicenses dixit: "Omnia probate: quodbonum est tenete.

About the proven indeed and the found faithful I said for this reason, that many are called wise who are malicious and would quickly advise others badly through malice. Wherefore one must not believe all, but only those proven and found faithful; for blessed John in his Epistle says: "Dearest, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits whether they are from God. " And also Paul in the Epistle to the Thessalonians said: "Test all things; hold fast to what is good."

Ab omni specie mala abstinete vos. " Et Sapiens ait: "Quicredit cito, levis est corde et minorabitur;" "facilitas enim animi adpartem stultitiæ vergit. " Et alius dixit: "Ne laudes amicum, donecprobaveris eum.

"Abstain from every evil appearance." And the Sage says: "He who believes quickly is light in heart and will be diminished;" "for the facility of the mind inclines toward the side of folly." And another said: "Do not praise a friend until you have proved him."

" Et Salomon dixit: "Si possides amicum, in temptationeposside;" "est enim amicus secundum sua tempora; in tempore autem temptationisvel tribulationis non permanebit. " Et quidam philosophus: "Cave tibi aconsilio illius, a quo consilium petis, ut sit tibi fidelis et probatus."

" And Solomon said: "If you possess a friend, possess him in temptation;" "for he is a friend according to his times; but in the time of temptation or tribulation he will not remain. " And a certain philosopher: "Beware for yourself of the counsel of the one from whom you ask counsel, that he may be to you faithful and proved."

De senibus denique ideo mentionem feci, quia, ut ait sanctusJob, "in antiquis est sapientia, et in longo tempore prudentia. " Nam etCassiodorus dixit: "Illi prudentiores semper sunt habiti, qui multorumhominum conversationibus probantur eruditi;" et iterum: "Cum multa trahisab antiquis, meruisti placere de propriis;" nam "senes ipsi consiliis sapientiamdiscunt. " Quare Martialis dixit:

Of the elders, finally, I have made mention for this reason, because, as holy Job says, "in the ancients is wisdom, and in long time prudence." For Cassiodorus also said: "Those men have always been held more prudent, who are proved learned by the conversations of many men;" and again: "When you draw many things from the ancients, you have deserved to please by your own things;" for "old men themselves learn wisdom by counsels." Wherefore Martial said:

A supra dictis itaque consilium postulando, talem adhibeas cautelam, ut primo ab uno vel a paucis consilium petatur; ait enim Salomon: "Multipacifici sint tibi, et consiliarius unus de mille. " Et non solum unum consiliumcum eis facias, sed etiam multa; ait enim idem Salomon: "Ubi non est gubernator, populus corruet: salus autem, ubi multa consilia. " Secundo, si opus fuerit, multos adhibeas consiliarios; nam dixit Salomon in Proverbiis: "Dissipanturcogitationes ubi non est consilium: ubi vero plures consiliarii sunt, confirmantur. "

Therefore, in requesting counsel from the aforesaid, apply such caution, that first counsel be sought from one or from a few; for Solomon says: "Let many be at peace with you, and one counselor out of a thousand." And not only make one counsel with them, but even many; for the same Solomon says: "Where there is no steersman, the people will fall; but salvation is where there are many counsels." Secondly, if there is need, bring in many counselors; for Solomon said in the Proverbs: "Thoughts are scattered where there is no counsel; but where there are more counselors, they are made firm."

Caput XVIII.

Chapter 18.

Quorum consilium sit vitandum.
De vitando consilio stultorum.

Whose counsel is to be avoided.
On avoiding the counsel of fools.

Viso et diligenter cognito, a quibus sit consilium postulandum, videamus, quorum consilium sit vitandum.

Having examined and diligently ascertained from whom counsel is to be requested, let us see whose counsel is to be avoided.

In primis itaque consilia stultorum penitus vitabis; stulti enim stultadiligunt et sua consilia ad stultitiam trahunt. Scriptum est enim: "Propriumest stultitia aliena vitia cernere, suorum autem oblivisci;" et Salomondixit: "Cor sapientis in dextera, et or stulti in sinistra ejus;" undealibi dixit: "In auribus insipientium ne loquaris, quia despicient doctrinameloquii tui;" et iterum: "Via stulti recta est in oculis ejus, sapiensautem audit consilia. " Quare idem dixit: "Si contuderis stultum in pilaquasi ptisanas feriente desuper pilo, non auferetur ab eo stultitia.

In the first place, therefore, you will utterly avoid the counsels of fools; for fools love folly and draw their own counsels toward foolishness. For it is written: "It is proper to folly to discern the vices of others, but to forget its own;" and Solomon said: "The heart of the wise is at his right hand, and the heart of the fool at his left;" whence elsewhere he said: "Do not speak in the ears of the unwise, because they will despise the doctrine of your discourse;" and again: "The way of the fool is straight in his own eyes, but the wise man hearkens to counsels." Wherefore the same said: "If you crush a fool in a mortar as groats, with a pestle smiting from above, his folly will not be taken away from him.

" Indeetiam ait: "Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur, siverideat, non inveniet requiem. "

" And furthermore he says: "A wise man, if he contends with a fool, whether he be irate, or whether he laugh, he will not find rest. "

Caput XIX.

Chapter 19.

De vitando consilio adulatorum.

On avoiding the counsel of flatterers.

Similiter vitandum est consilium adulatorum et simulatorum et assentatorum, non solum in adversis, sed etiam in secundissimis rebus. Ait enim Tullius:"Etiam in secundissimis rebus maxime utendum est consiliis amicorum, hijsquemajor etiam quam ante tribuenda est auctoritas. Iisdem temporibus cavendum, ne assentatoribus patefaciamus aures, ne adulari nos sinamus: in quo fallifacile est.

Similarly, the counsel of adulators and dissemblers and assentators must be avoided, not only in adverse circumstances, but even in the most favorable affairs. For Tully says: "Even in the most favorable circumstances, the counsels of friends must be used most of all, and to these an authority even greater than before must be assigned. In those same times we must beware lest we lay open our ears to assentators, lest we allow ourselves to be flattered: in which it is easy to be deceived.

Tales enim nos esse putamus, ut jure laudemur: ex quo nascunturinnumerabilia peccata, cum homines inflati opinionibus turpiter irridenturet in maximis versantur erroribus. " Unde sciendum est "nullam in amicitiapestem esse majorem quam adulationem, blanditiam, assentationem. " Sed "licetperniciosa sit assentatio, tamen nocere nemini potest, nisi ei, qui eamrecipit atque ea delectatur.

For we suppose ourselves to be such as to be praised by right: from this are born innumerable sins, when men, inflated with opinions, are shamefully derided and are engaged in the greatest errors. " Whence it must be known "that in friendship there is no plague greater than adulation, blandishment, assentation." But "although assentation is pernicious, nevertheless it can harm no one except him who receives it and takes delight in it."

Ita fit, ut is assentatoribus patefaciat auressuas maxime, qui sibi assentetur et se maxime ipse delectet. " Unde Catodixit:

Thus it comes about that he opens his ears most to flatterers, who assents to himself and most of all delights himself. " Whence Cato said:

Caput XX.

Chapter 20.

De vitando consilio illorum, qui sunt vel jam fuerunt inimici etpostea in gratiam redierunt.

On avoiding the counsel of those who are or already have been enemies and afterwards have returned into favor.

Item vitandum est illorum consilium, qui sunt vel jam fuerunt inimici, sed postea in gratiam redierunt. Scriptum est enim: "Nemo cum inimico tutein gratiam redit. " Quare Ysopus dixit:

Likewise, the counsel of those who are or already have been enemies, but afterwards have returned into favor, must be avoided. For it is written: "No one safely returns into favor with an enemy." Wherefore Aesop said:

Caput XXI.

Chapter 21.

De vitando consilio illorum, qui non amore, sed timore reverentiamostendunt.

On avoiding the counsel of those who show reverence not from love, but from fear.

Item vitandum est consilium illorum, qui non amore, sed timore tantumreverentiam ostendunt et dilectionem. Non enim sunt amici, sed odiosi inimici. Ait enim Tullius, De Officiis: "Omnium autem rerum nec quidquamest aptius ad opes tuendas et retinendas quam diligi, et nihil alieniusquam timeri.

Likewise, the counsel of those must be avoided who show reverence and love not from love, but only from fear. For they are not friends, but hateful enemies. For Tullius says, On Duties: "Of all things, indeed, nothing is more apt for guarding and retaining wealth than to be loved, and nothing more alien than to be feared.

Prælare enim homines, quem metuunt, oderunt; quem quisqueautem odit, periisse expetit. Multorum autem odiis nullas opes obsistereposse, etsi autea ignotum fuerat, modo autem est cognitum. " Non ergo credas, bonum amicum vel consiliarium per metum posse acquiri, nam, ut quidam philosophusdixit, nemo ei satis fidus est, quem metuit.

For indeed men hate the one whom they fear; and whomsoever each one hates, he seeks to have perished. Moreover, that no resources can stand against the hatreds of many—although formerly it was unknown—now, however, has been recognized. " Therefore do not believe that a good friend or counselor can be acquired through fear; for, as a certain philosopher said, no one is sufficiently fidus to him whom he fears.

Quare idem Tullius dixit:"Malus custos diuturnitatis est metus, contraque benivolentia fidelis velad perpetuitatem. " "Qui vero in libera civitate ita se instituunt, ut metuantur, hijs nihil potest esse dementius. " "Etenim qui se metui volunt: a quibusmetuuntur, eosdem ut metuant ipsi necesse est.

Wherefore the same Tullius said: "Fear is a bad custodian of long duration, and conversely benevolence is a faithful one even unto perpetuity." "But as for those who in a free commonwealth so discipline themselves that they are to be feared, for these men nothing can be more demented." "For indeed those who wish to be feared: by those whom they are feared, it is necessary that they themselves fear the same."

Caput XXII.

Chapter 22.

De vitando consilio ebriosorum.

On avoiding the counsel of drunkards.

Item vitandum est consilium ebriosorum, qui secretum consilium celarenon possunt. Ait enim Salomon: "Nullum secretum, ubi regnat ebrietas. "

Likewise the counsel of drunkards is to be avoided, who cannot conceal secret counsel. For Solomon says: "No secret, where ebriety reigns. "

Caput XXIII.

Chapter 23.

De vitando consilio illorum, qui secreto aliud consulunt, et palamaliud se velle ostendunt.

On avoiding the counsel of those who in secret consult one thing, and openly show that they wish another.

Item vitandum et suspectum habendum est illorum consilium, qui secretoaliud consulunt, et palam aliud se velle ostendunt. Ait enim Cassiodorus:"Læsionis genus est aliud occulte dicere, et aliud velle monstrare. "

Likewise, the counsel of those who in secret consult something else and openly show themselves to will something different is to be avoided and held suspect. For Cassiodorus says: "It is a kind of injury to say one thing occultly, and to demonstrate that one wills another."

Caput XXIV.

Chapter 24.

De consilio mali hominis vitando et suspecto habendo.

On the counsel of a wicked man to be avoided and held suspect.

Similiter vitandum est et suspectum habendum mali hominis consilium. Scriptum est enim: "Malus homo a se nunquam bonum consilium refert. "

Similarly the counsel of an evil man must be avoided and held suspect. For it is written: "A bad man never brings forth good counsel from himself. "

Caput XXV.

Chapter 25.

De vitando consilio juvenis et suspecto habendo.

On avoiding the counsel of a youth and holding it suspect.

Item vitandum est consilium juvenum vel saltim suspicandum. Juvenesenim maturum sensum non habent, et juvenilia diligunt et eis inhærent. Non enim potest in eis succus diuturnus haberi, qui nimis celeriter suntmaturitatem adepti.

Likewise, the counsel of youths is to be avoided, or at least to be suspected. For youths do not have mature sense, and they love juvenilia and adhere to them. For no enduring sap can be had in those who have too swiftly attained maturity.

Quare Salomon dixit: "Væ tibi, terra, cujus rexpuer est, et cujus principes mane comedunt. " Et Martialis tibi dixit:

Wherefore Solomon said: "Woe to you, land, whose king is a boy, and whose princes eat in the morning. " And Martial said to you:

De examinando consilio in genere.

On examining counsel in general.

Sequitur videre, quomodo examinandum sit onsilium. Et certe in examinandoconsilio ita debes esse discretus, ut inspicias principium et finem, et, quæ sint in examinatione consilii utilia et necessaria, diligenterprovideas.

It follows to see how counsel ought to be examined. And certainly, in examining counsel, you ought to be so discreet that you inspect the beginning and the end, and carefully provide for those things which in the examination of counsel are useful and necessary.

In examinatione consilii itaque primo abicias et a te atque consiliariispenitus removeas ea, quæ supra dixi esse contraria consilio, videlicetiram, voluptatem seu cupiditatem tque festinantiam.

Therefore, in the examination of counsel, first you should cast away and remove entirely from yourself and your counselors those things which I said above are contrary to counsel, namely ire, pleasure or cupidity, and haste.

Secundo vero ad principium negotii te referas, quia "uniuscujusque reipotissima pars est principium. " Et etiam in contractibus uniuscujusquecontractus initium spectandum est. Et etiam rationes, nisi a capite inspiciantur, intelligi non possunt, ut leges dicunt.

Secondly, indeed, you should refer yourself to the beginning of the business, because "the most potent part of each thing is the beginning. " And likewise, in contracts the inception of each contract is to be looked at. And also the reasons/accounts, unless they are inspected from the head, cannot be understood, as the laws say.

Initia igitur sive principia rerumdiligentissime circumspicienda sunt. Scriptum est enim:

Therefore the initia, or principia, of things are to be most diligently circumspected. For it is written:

In examinatione vero consilii et in aliis rebus, secundum Tullium hocconsiderabis, videlicet "quid in unaquaque re verum sincerumque sit, quidconsentaneum cuique rei sit, quid consequens, ex quibus quæque gignantur, quæ cujusque rei causa sit."

In the examination of counsel and in other matters, according to Tullius you will consider this, namely: “what in each thing is true and sincere, what is consentaneous to each thing, what is consequent, from which things each is generated, what the cause of each thing is.”

Quid verum sit, ideo inspicere debemus, quia "veritas semperest colenda, quæ sola Deo homines proximos facit, " cum ipse Deusveritas sit, ipso testante, qui ait: "Ego sum via et veritas et vita. "Quod autem adjecit Tullius sincerumque, hoc ideo ixit, quia sinceraet pura veritas spectanda est, mendacio doloso penitus fugato. Quare dixitCassiodorus: "Bonum est verum, si in eo nihil immisceatur adversum.

What is true, for that reason we ought to inspect, because "truth is always to be cultivated, which alone makes men nearest to God, " since God himself is truth, he himself bearing witness, who says: "I am the way and the truth and the life. " But what Tullius added, and sincere, he said this for this reason, because sincere and pure truth is to be aimed at, the deceitful lie utterly banished. Wherefore Cassiodorus said: "Good is the true, if nothing adverse is mixed into it.

" EtDominus dixit: "Diabolus est mendax et pater ejus. " Et Salomon dixit: "Potiusdiligendus est fur quam assiduus in mendacio."

" And the Lord said: "The Devil is a liar and the father of it." And Solomon said: "Rather, a thief is to be loved than one assiduous in mendacity."

Super eo vero quod adjecit consentaneum, statim in negotio tibiproposito inspicere debes, utrum negotium illud vel consilium consentaneumsit rationi, an non. Similiter inspicere debes, qui consentiant huic negotioet voluntati tuæ atque consilio, et qui contradicant et quales, utper hoc cognoscas, utrum negotium vel consilium perduci possit ad effectum, an minime. Similiter etiam inspicere ac providere debes, utrum voluntastua vel consilium consentiat possibilitati tuæ, an non.

Concerning that, indeed, which he added, consentaneous, you must at once, in the business proposed to you, examine whether that business or counsel be consentaneous to reason, or not. Similarly you must examine who consent to this business and to your will and counsel, and who contradict, and of what sort, so that through this you may know whether the business or counsel can be brought to effect, or by no means. Likewise also you must look into and provide whether your will or counsel consents to your possibility, or not.

Et in prædictisomnibus ita examinando provideas, ut appetitus tuus consentiat rationi, utilitati ac possibilitati.

And in all the aforesaid, by examining in such a way, provide that your appetite consents to reason, utility, and possibility.

Super tertio verbo, quod subicit Tullius, dicens quid consequens, sollicite provideas examinando, utrum ex consilio consequaris bonum anmalum, utrum odium an amorem, [utrum] timorem an gratiam, utrum jus aninjuriam, utrum pacem an guerram, utrum dampnum an utilitatem, et aliamulta, quæ circa consequentiam notari possunt, quæ hic commodeenumerari non valent. In quibus omnibus bonum eligendum est et utilitasassumenda, odio et timore, injuria et guerra, et aliis malis penitus omissisatque remotis.

Concerning the third word, which Tullius subjoins, saying what is consequent, you should carefully take care, by examining, whether from the counsel you will obtain a good or an evil, whether odium (hatred) or love, [whether] fear or favor, whether right or injury, whether peace or war, whether damage or utility, and many other things which can be noted regarding the consequence, which cannot conveniently be enumerated here. In all of which the good is to be chosen and utility to be assumed, with odium and fear, injury and war, and other evils altogether omitted and removed.

Super eo vero, quod quarto loco adjecit Tullius, videlicet ex quibusquæque gignantur, valde pensandum est, ut examines unumquodqueverbum consilii, an gignantur aliquid virtutis an vitii, an aliquid quodmerito debeat vitari, vel ex quo commoditas vel utilitas possit trahi.

Concerning, indeed, that which Tullius added in the fourth place, namely from which each thing is generated, it must be greatly weighed, that you examine each and every word of counsel, whether it engenders something of virtue or of vice, whether it be something that ought deservedly to be avoided, or from which advantage or utility can be drawn.

Super quinto denique verbo, ubi Tullius dixit quæ cujusquerei causa sit, diligenter provideas examinando causas rerum, easquesollicite requirendo. Ait enim Seneca: "Cujusque facti causam require et, cum initia inveneris, exitus cogitabis, " de quo initio et exitu satis tibisupra dixi. Causam igitur requiras, scilicet efficientem, materialem, formalematque finalem; item causam principalem atque accidentalem, quæ potestdici occasio potius quam causa; item causam proximam atque remotam.

On the fifth, finally, word, where Tullius said quæ cujusquerei causa sit, you should diligently take care by examining the causes of things, and by solicitously inquiring after them. For Seneca says: "Seek the cause of each deed, and, when you have found the beginnings, you will consider the outcomes," about which beginning and outcome I have said enough to you above. Therefore you should seek the cause, namely the efficient, material, formal, and final; likewise the principal cause and the accidental, which can be called an occasion rather than a cause; likewise the proximate cause and the remote.

Ad hoc ergo, ut consilium bene examines et negotia tua prudenter pertractes, "in futura prospectum intende et, quæ possint contingere, animo tuocuncta propone. " Et non solum in futura, sed etiam in præterita intenderedebes. Ait enim Seneca, De Formula Honestæ Vitæ: "Siprudens es, animus tuus tribus temporibus dispensetur: præsentiaordina, futura provide, præterita recordare; nam qui nihil de præteritocogitat, perdit vitam; qui nihil de futuro præmeditatur, in omniaincautus incidit.

To this end, therefore, that you may well examine counsel and handle your affairs prudently, "fix your outlook upon the future, and set before your mind all the things that may befall. " And you ought to direct it not only to the future, but also to the past. For Seneca says, in On the Formula of an Honest Life: "If you are prudent, let your mind be apportioned among three times: order the present, provide for the future, recall the past; for he who thinks nothing about the past loses life; he who premeditates nothing about the future falls heedless into everything.

Propone autem animo tuo et mala futura et bona, ut illasustinere possis, ista moderari. "

"But set before your mind both future evils and goods, so that you may be able to sustain those, to moderate these. "

Caput XXVII.

Chapter 27.

Quando consilium sit assumendum vel approbandum.

When counsel is to be assumed or approved.

Viso, quomodo examinandum sit consilium, videamus, quando sit assumendumet approbandum. Et certe assumendum et approbandum est consilium tunc demum, quando fuerit examinatum, et bonum ac utile fuerit visum. Et licet bonumvideatur consilium, non tamen statim illud sumere vel capere debes, seddiligenter inspicere, quomodo poteris perficere.

Having seen how counsel is to be examined, let us see when it is to be assumed and approved. And surely counsel is to be assumed and approved then at last, when it has been examined and has seemed good and useful. And although the counsel may appear good, nevertheless you ought not immediately to take or seize it, but diligently to inspect how you will be able to perfect it.

Ait enim Tullius: "Adrem gerendam qui accedit, caveat, ne id solummodo consideret, quam illares honesta sit, sed etiam ut habeat efficiendi facultatem. In quo ipsoconsiderandum est, ne aut temere desperet propter cupiditatem. In omnibusautem negotiis, prius quam aggrediare, adhibenda præparatio est diligens.

For Tullius says: "For conducting a matter, he who approaches should beware not to consider only how honorable that thing is, but also that he have the faculty of effecting it. In this very point it must be considered, lest he rashly despair on account of cupidity. But in all business, before you undertake it, diligent preparation must be applied."

"Considera ergo, ne nimis capias; nam in proverbio dicitur: Qui nimis capit, parum stringit. Inde etiam Cato dixit:

"Therefore consider, lest you seize too much; for in a proverb it is said: He who seizes too much, grips little. Hence also Cato said:

In omnibus denique prædictis ita per te et alios doctus sis, utsemper eligas bonum, veritatem, utilitatem, rationem atque justitiam, contrariispenitus omissis.

In all the aforesaid, finally, be so instructed by yourself and by others, that you always choose the good, the truth, the utility, reason, and justice, with the contraries utterly omitted.

Caput XXVIII.

Chapter 28.

Quando et qualiter consilium sit retinendum.

When and how counsel is to be retained.

Viso et cognito, quando et qualiter consilium sit capiendum sive assumendum, videamus, quando et qualiter consilium sit retinendum. Et certe consiliumest retinendum, quando per probationem et experientiam apparuit bonum acutile; nam, ut supra dixi, Paulus ait: "Omnia probate: quod bonum est tenete. "Et tunc magna constantia illud retinere debes; ait enim Cato:

With it seen and known, when and how counsel is to be taken or assumed, let us see when and how counsel is to be retained. And certainly counsel is to be retained, when through probation and experience it has appeared good and useful; for, as I said above, Paul says: "Prove all things: what is good, hold fast. " And then with great constancy you ought to retain it; for Cato says:

Caput XXIX.

Chapter 29.

Quando consilium vel promissum possit vel debeat mutari.

When counsel or a promise can or ought to be changed.

Nunc superest videre, quando consilium vel promissum mutari possit veldebeat. Et certe consilium mutari potest multis ex causis.

Now it remains to see when counsel or a promise may or ought to be changed. And certainly counsel can be changed for many causes.

Mutari namque potest cessante causa, vel etiam nova causa superveniente;nam "cessante causa debet cessare effectus, " et quæ de novo emergunt, novo indigent consilio, ut leges dicunt. Quare dici consuevit:

For indeed it can be changed with the cause ceasing, or also with a new cause supervening;for "with the cause ceasing the effect ought to cease, " and the things which newly emerge are in need of new counsel, as the laws say. Wherefore it is wont to be said:

Potest etiam et debet mutari consilium, si errore vel aliqua ex causamalum vel inutile fuerit captum, quod frequenter accidit; nam, ut ait Seneca, "sunt quædam, quæ non videntur bona esse, et sunt; et sunt, quæ videntur, et non sunt. " "Crebro quidem faciem mendacii veritasretinet; crebro mendacium specie veritatis occultatur. Nam sicut aliquandotristem faciem amicus, et blandam adulator ostendit: sic verisimile coloraturet, ut fallat vel subripiat, conatur. " Inde etiam Ovidius dixit:

It is also possible and it ought to be changed, the counsel, if by error or by some cause it has been taken in an evil or an inutile way, which happens frequently; for, as Seneca says, "there are certain things which do not seem to be good, and they are; and there are things which seem so, and are not." "Often indeed truth retains the face of mendacity; often a lie is hidden under the appearance of truth. For just as sometimes a friend shows a sad face, and a flatterer a smooth one: so the plausible colors itself, and strives to deceive or to steal upon one." From this also Ovid said:

Item mutandum est consilium, si turpe fuerit vel ex turpi causa; namsi ex prædictis causis etiam promissio facta esset, tamen effectumnon teneret, quia vel ipso jure nulla esset, vel exceptio contra eam daretur;generaliter enim novimus, "turpes stipulationes nullius esse momenti, "ut leges dicunt.

Likewise the counsel is to be changed, if it should be shameful or from a shameful cause; for even if a promise had been made from the aforesaid causes, nevertheless the effect would not hold, because either by the law itself it would be null, or an exception would be given against it; for generally we know that "shameful stipulations are of no moment," as the laws say.

Item mutandum est consilium, si ad peccatum pertineat, quia generaliterdici consuevit: "Nullum consilium est contra Dominum."

Likewise the counsel must be changed, if it pertains to sin, because it is generally accustomed to be said: "There is no counsel against the Lord."

Et quod dixi tibi de promissione turpi non servanda, intelligas etiamde promissione impossibili vel de ea, quæ commode servari non potest, vel de ea promissione, quæ magis nocet promissori, quam prosit ei, cui promittitur, vel, etiam del illa, quæ inutilis est vel contrariaei cui promissio facta est. Ait enim Tullius: "Nec promissa servanda sunt, quæ sunt hijs, quibus promiseris, inutilia: nec si tibi plus noceant, quam illi prosint, cui quid promiseris. " Unde supra dixi: Sapiens non mentitur, cum suum propositum mutat in melius.

And what I told you about a shameful (turpid) promise not being to be kept, understand likewise about an impossible promise, or about one which cannot commodiously be observed, or about that promise which is more noxious to the promissor than it is profitable to him to whom it is promised, or even about that which is useless or contrary to the one to whom the promise has been made. For Tullius says: “Nor are promises to be observed which are inutile to those to whom you have promised; nor if they hurt you more than they benefit him to whom you have promised something.” Whence I said above: A wise man does not lie, when he changes his purpose for the better.

Sicut enim "non videtur dejerare quiex concessa causa deserit jusjurandum, " ut lex dicit: hoc deniue servespro regula generali, quod per sapientes dici consuevit: "Malum est consilium, quod mutari non potest. " Quare hujusmodi juramenta, quæ dicunturpræcisa, videntur mala ideo quod in aliquibus sunt mutanda.

For just as "he does not seem to forswear himself who, for a conceded cause, abandons the oath, " as the law says: this, finally, keep as a general rule, which is wont to be said by the wise: "Evil is the counsel which cannot be changed. " Wherefore oaths of this kind, which are called præcisa, seem evil for this reason, that in some matters they must be changed.

Prædictis notatis ac diligenter cognitis Melibues respondit dicens:Huc usque, domina mea, sufficienter de consiliis et circa consilia in genereme docuisti. Vellem tamen ut, ad speciem descendendo, consilium super hocnegotio præsenti mihi datum mecum examinares, ita ut, utilitate provisaet cognita, quod melius fuerit eligamus.

With the aforesaid noted and diligently understood, Melibues answered, saying:Up to this point, my lady, you have sufficiently instructed me about counsels and concerning counsels in general. I would, however, that, by descending to the particular, you would examine with me the counsel given to me about this present business, so that, with the utility provided for and known, we may choose what will be better.

Prudentia dixit: Domine mi, rogo te ut, si forte aliquid dixero, quodtibi displiceat, ad animum non revoces, quia in tui honorem atque utilitatemhoc dicam sperans, quod patienter sustinebis; nam "qui corripit hominemmagis gratiam apud eum inveniet, quam qui per linguæ blandimentadecipit. " Scias igitur: consilium, quod dicis tibi datum, non potuit diciconsilium, sed, salva pace tua, fuit quædam arrengatio sive contionatioimprovida et indiscreta. Nam in multis capitulis errando malum consiliumcepisti.

Prudence said: My lord, I beg you that, if perchance I say something which displeases you, you not call it back to heart, because for your honor and utility I will say this, hoping that you will endure it patiently; for "he who reproves a man will find grace with him more than he who by blandishments of the tongue deceives." Know therefore: the counsel which you say was given to you could not be called counsel, but, saving your peace, it was a certain harangue or public contionation, improvident and indiscreet. For by erring in many heads you have taken up bad counsel.

Caput XXX.

Chapter 30.

De errore consilii.

On the error of counsel.

Primo enim errasti in congregatione consilii; nam primo debebas congregarepaucos consilii habendi cause et postea, si opus fuisset, multos: tu statima principio vocasti "multitudinem onerosam."

For at first you erred in the congregation of counsel; for at the outset you ought to gather a few for the sake of holding counsel, and afterwards, if there were need, many: you straightaway at the beginning summoned a “burdensome multitude.”

Secundo errasti quia, cum debuisses congregare bonos amicos ac sapientesac peritos, probatos ac fideles inventos et maxime senes, tu cum prædictiscongregasti quoslibet notos, etiam malos, juvenes ac stultos, adulatoresquoque et simulatores et assentatores, et illos etiam, qui non amore sedtimore tibi reverentiam ostendebant: quod minime facere debuisti.

Secondly you erred because, when you ought to have congregated good friends and wise and expert men, approved and faithful when found and especially elders, you with the aforesaid congregated just any acquaintances, even bad men, young and foolish, flatterers also and dissemblers and assenters, and even those who showed you reverence not from love but from fear: which you should by no means have done.

Tertio vero errasti, quia cum ira simul et voluptate seu cupiditateatque festinantia tu iratus consilium postulasti, non removendo prædictatria a te et a consiliariis tuis, quæ sunt contraria consilio.

Thirdly indeed you erred, because with ire together with pleasure or cupidity and hastiness, you, being angry, demanded counsel, not removing the aforesaid three from yourself and from your counselors, which are contrary to counsel.

Quarto vero errasti, quia, cum tuam voluntatem consiliariis ostendereminime debuisti, tu voluntatem tuam illis ostendendo, magnam affectionemde vindicta in continenti facienda eis demonstrasti; quare consiliarii, magis secuti tuam voluntatem quam tuam utilitatem, de vindicta in continentifacienda tibi consuluerunt.

Fourth indeed you erred, because, when you ought by no means to show your will to the counselors, you, by showing your will to them, displayed to them a great inclination for revenge to be done forthwith; wherefore the counselors, following your will rather than your utility, advised you concerning revenge to be carried out forthwith.

Quinto errasti, quia unico consilio contentus fuisti, cum in tam arduonegotio multa consilia sint necessaria.

Fifthly you erred, because you were content with a single counsel, since in so arduous a business many counsels are necessary.

Sexto errasti, quia non examinasti consilium.

Sixth, you erred, because you did not examine the counsel.

Septimo demum errasti quia, facta partita, non es secutus voluntatemet sensum sapientium et amicorum, sed potius voluntatem ac sensum multitudinisstultorum atque errantium. Si enim ad multitudinem, et non ad sensum respexeris, nunquam bonum consilium habere valebis; nam stultos semper invenies incentuplum, quam sapientes; et stulti stulta diligunt, et animum suum semperad stultitiam inclinant; sapientes vero pauci paucos inveniunt sapientes;quare in partitis, quæ in consiliis fieri consueverunt, semper succumbunt. Inde est, quod in partitis, quæ in consiliis civitatum fieri consueverunt, consilia semper malum sortiuntur effectum, so voluntatem multitudinis, et non paucorum sapientiam, sectantur.

Seventh and finally you erred because, once the division had been made, you did not follow the will and sense of the wise and of friends, but rather the will and sense of the multitude of fools and of those erring. For if you look to the multitude and not to sound sense, you will never be able to have good counsel; for you will always find fools in centuple more than the wise; and fools love foolish things, and always incline their spirit toward folly; whereas the wise, being few, find few who are wise; wherefore in divisions, which are wont to be made in councils, they always succumb. Hence it is that in divisions, which are wont to be made in the councils of cities, counsels always obtain an evil effect, if they follow the will of the multitude and not the wisdom of the few.

Melibeus respondit: Bene confiteor me errasse; verum quia supra mihidixisti, me licite consilium posse post examinationem, et etiam post captionemmutare, licet melius fuisset ab initio malum et indiscretum consilium noncapere, quam captum postea mutare, tamen post examinationem de novo faciendamad tuam voluntatem sum mutare paratus; "humanum enim est peccare, diabolicumvero perseverare."

Melibeus replied: Well I confess that I have erred; but because above you told me that I may lawfully be able to change the counsel after examination, and even after its adoption, although it would have been better from the beginning not to take up an evil and indiscreet counsel than, having taken it, to change it afterwards, nevertheless, after an examination to be made anew at your will, I am ready to change; “for it is human to sin, but diabolic to persevere.”

Tunc Prudentia respondit: Consilium, quod dicis factum, nullo jure infactumfieri potest. Ait enim lex: Factæ autem res nulla constitutione infactæfieri possunt. Verumtamen, quod factum ext, examinari potest et, erroredepulso, utilitas discerni atque assumi.

Then Prudence replied: The counsel which you say has been done cannot by any law be made un-done. For the law says: Things that have been done cannot by any constitution be made un-done. Nevertheless, what has been done can be examined and, the error driven away, the utility discerned and assumed.

Caput XXXI.

Chapter 31.

De examinatione consilii in specie.

On the examination of counsel in particular.

Examinemus itaque illud quale consilium, utilitatem dante Domino assumpturi. Ut igitur examinatio recte fieri valeat, a capite incipiendo, singula dispiciamus.

Let us, therefore, examine what sort of counsel that is, being about to assume it for utility, the Lord granting. In order, then, that the examination may be able to be done rightly, beginning from the head, let us scrutinize the particulars.

Consilium quippe medicorum de cyrurgia rectum et bonum fuit; nam "adillorum officium spectat omnibus prodesse et nulli nocere" et artem suamsollicite prosequi, ut sapienter dixerunt. Remunera ergo illos largissime, ut gaudenter atque sollicite artem suam prosequentes, tam suam quam filiætuæ faciendo utilitatem, illam velociter, dante Domino, ad sanitatem, perducant. Licet enim amici tui sint, nihilominus tamen sunt remunerandi.

Indeed, the counsel of the physicians concerning chirurgy was right and good; for “it pertains to their office to benefit all and to harm none,” and to pursue their art solicitously, as they wisely said. Therefore remunerate them most liberally, so that, gladly and solicitously prosecuting their art, accomplishing both their own benefit and that of your daughter, they may swiftly, the Lord granting, lead her to health. For although they are your friends, nonetheless they are to be remunerated.

Frequenter aneim accidit, ut medici aliique de artibus singulis præponantamicitiæ utilitatem pecuniariam et, ubi sentiunt lucrum, ibi magisprocurent. Et quod dixi de medicis cyrurgiæ, idem intelligo de consiliophysicorum, qui quasi eadem dixerunt. Volo tamen audire, qualiter intelligasverbum dubium, quod protulerunt, scilicet: contraria contrariis curantur.

Frequently indeed it happens, that physicians and others of the several arts prefer pecuniary utility to amity, and, where they sense gain, there they make greater provision. And what I said about the surgeons, I understand the same of the counsel of the physicians, who said, as it were, the same things. I wish, however, to hear how you understand the dubious word which they put forth, namely: contraries are cured by contraries.

Melibeus respondit: Intelligo contrarium, quod fecerunt mihi inimicimei, posse curari per aliud contrarium, quod eis facere volo; injuriamergo mihi factam per vindictam contra illos faciendam et injuriam, quameis faciam, curabo.

Melibeus responded: I understand the contrary, that the contrary which my enemies did to me can be cured by another contrary, which I wish to do to them; therefore I will cure the injury done to me by vengeance to be done against them, and by the injury which I shall do to them.

Prudentia dixit: Facile credunt homines quod volunt, et animum suumad suum desiderium velociter inclinant. Ego autem illud verbum non itaintelligo; nam malum non est contrarium malo, nec injuria injuriæ, nec vindicta vindictæ, sed sunt similia. Per vindictam namque velinjuriam non curatur injuria vel alia vindicta, immo augmentantur et crescunt.

Prudence said: Men easily believe what they want, and they quickly incline their mind to their desire. But I do not thus understand that word; for an evil is not contrary to an evil, nor an injury to an injury, nor a vengeance to a vengeance, but they are similar. For by vengeance or by injury an injury or another vengeance is not cured; rather they are augmented and grow.

Intelligo itaque, malum contrarium esse bono, pacem guerræ, concordiamdiscordiæ, frigidum calido; et ita infinita possent poni exempla. Secundum ergo dictum illud oportet contra discordiam opponere concordiam, et ontra guerram opponere pacem. Et etiam secundum beatum Paulum, qui dixitin Epistola ad Romanos: "Noli vinci a malo, sed vince in bono malum;" etiterum in eadem Epistola subicit: "Itaque quæ pacis sunt, sectemur;"et supra in eadem Epistola dixerat: "Nulli malum pro malo reddentes, providentesbona non tantum coram Deo, sed etiam coram omnibus hominibus; si fieripotest, quod ex vobis est, cum omnibus hominibus pacem habentes."

I understand, therefore, that evil is contrary to good, peace to war, concord to discord, the frigid to the hot; and thus infinitely many examples could be set forth. Therefore, according to that saying, one ought to set concord against discord, and to set peace against war. And also according to blessed Paul, who said in the Epistle to the Romans: "Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good;" and again in the same Epistle he adds: "Therefore the things of peace, let us pursue;" and above in the same Epistle he had said: "Rendering to no one evil for evil, providing good things not only before God but also before all human beings; if it can be done, as far as depends on you, having peace with all human beings."

Nunc accedamus ad examinationem et expositionem consilii, quod dederunttibi causidici spaientes ac senes, qui quasi eadem consuluerunt dicentes, ut personam tuam super omnia custodias, et domum tuam diligenter munias, allegantes etiam, non esse in talibus subito nec festinanter procedendum, sed cum diligenti provisione ac præparatione et deliberatione maximasollicitaque cura omnia esse peragenda. Et certe, cum istud consilium planumac rectum sit, et ab omnibus sapientibus valeat propter rationes sibi assignatasmerito comprobari, meo arbitrio in paucis indiget examinatione vel expositione. Quod enim dixerunt de tuæ personæ custodia bene notandum est.

Now let us approach the examination and exposition of the counsel which the wise advocates and elders gave you, who, as it were, advised the same things, saying that you should guard your person above all things, and diligently fortify your house, alleging also that in such matters one must not proceed suddenly nor hastily, but that all things are to be carried through with diligent provision and preparation and deliberation, with the greatest and most solicitous care. And assuredly, since that counsel is plain and right, and can deservedly be approved by all the wise on account of the reasons assigned to it, in my judgment it needs examination or exposition in a few points. For what they said concerning the custody of your person is well to be noted.

Caput XXXII.

Chapter 32.

De custodia personæ in guerra constitutæ.

On the custody of a person constituted in war.

Scire enim debes, quod qui guerram habet multipliciter se custodiredebet.

For you must know that whoever has war must guard himself in multiple ways.

In primis igitur custodiam a Deo postulare suppliciter ac devote debes, a quo est "omne datum optimum" et sine cujus auxilio nihil bene valet custodiri. Propheta hoc testante, qui ait: "Nisi Dominus custodierit civitatem, frustravigilat qui custodit eam."

In the first place, therefore, you ought humbly and devoutly to ask for guarding from God, from whom is “every best gift,” and without whose help nothing can be well kept. The Prophet bearing witness to this, who says: “Unless the Lord shall have guarded the city, he who guards it keeps watch in vain.”

Secundo custodiam tui committas probatis et notis ac fidelibus amicis, ab illis auxilium, si opus est, ad tui custodiam postulando. Ait enim Cato:

Secondly, entrust your protection to proven, well-known, and faithful friends, requesting from them, if need be, help for your protection. For Cato says:

Quarto custodias te sagaciter ab omnibus illis, quorum consilium tibidixi esse vitandum, supra in titulo: Quorum consilium sit vitandum.

Fourth, safeguard yourself sagaciously from all those whose counsel I told you is to be avoided, above in the title: Whose counsel is to be avoided.

Quinto vero ita de custodias, ut vilipendendo parvum inimicum custodiamtui non omittas. Sapiens enim in omnibus metuit, et maxime inimicos. UndeSalomon dixit: "Beatus homo, qui semper est pavidus; qui vero mentis estduræ, corruet in malum.

Fifth indeed guard yourself thus, that by vilipending a small enemy you do not omit the guardingofyourself. For the wise man fears in all things, and especially enemies. WhenceSalomon said: "Blessed the man who is always timorous; but he who ishard of mind will fall into evil.

" Timere ergo debes omnes insidias; dixitenim Seneca: "Qui omnes insidias timet, in nullas incidet;" et iterum idemait: "Semper metuendo sapiens vitat malum;" unde alibi idem dixit: "Noncito perit ruina, qui ruinam timet. " Et licet videatur tibi, te bene essetutum et in tuto loco, nihilominus tamen tibi cavere debes. Ait enim idemSeneca: "Caret periculo, qui etiam tutus cavet.

" Therefore you ought to fear all ambushes; for Seneca says: "He who fears all ambushes falls into none;" and again the same says: "By always fearing the wise man avoids evil;" whence elsewhere the same said: "He does not quickly perish by ruin, who fears ruin. " And although it may seem to you that you are well protected and in a safe place, nonetheless you must beware for yourself. For the same Seneca says: "He is free from danger, who, even safe, takes precautions.

" Et timere debes non solummagna, sed etiam modica et parva, et non solum magnos inimicos, sed etiamparvos. Scriptum est enim: "Inimicum, quamvis humilem, docti est metuere. "Inde etiam Ovidius, De Remedio Amoris, dixit:

" And you ought to fear not only great things, but also moderate and small things, and not only great enemies, but also small ones. For it is written: "To fear an enemy, although humble, is the mark of the learned. " Hence also Ovid, On the Remedy of Love, said:

Similiter illud, quod consuluerunt idem sapientes dicendo, ut domumtuam diligenter munias, examinatione et expositione indiget. Quare a tevolo audire, quomodo illud verbum intelligas.

Likewise that, which the same wise men counselled by saying that you should diligently fortify your house, needs examination and exposition. Wherefore I wish to hear from you how you understand that word.

Melibeus respondit: Credo, illos intellexisse, ut debeam munire domummeam turribus et aliis altis ædificiis, quarum vel quorum muniminetueri me valeam, et inimici timeant offensionis causa illic accedere.

Melibeus replied: I believe that they understood that I ought to fortify my house with towers and other lofty edifices, by whose—or by the muniments of which—I may be able to defend myself, and that enemies, for cause of offense, may fear to approach there.

Caput XXXIII.

CHAPTER 33.

De turribus.

On towers.

Prudentia respondit: Munitio turrium et aliorum altorum ædificiorumad superbiam plerumque pertinet, et timor et odium inde generatur, itaquod vicini amici propter timorem fiunt inimici, et omnia mala inde nascuntur, quæ occasione timoris notavi tibi supra in titulo: De vitandaconsilio illorum, qui non amore, sed timore reverentiam ostendum. QuareSalomon dixit: "Qui altam facit domum suam, quærit ruinam; et quievitat discere, incidet in mala. " Præterea turres cum magno laboreet infinitis expensis fiunt; et etiam cum factæ fuerint, nihil valent, nisi cum auxilio prudentium et fidelium amicorum et cum magnis expensisdefendantur. De qua superbia Jhesus Sirac dixit:

Prudence replied: The fortification of towers and of other high edifices for the most part pertains to superbia (pride), and from it fear and odium (hatred) are generated, so that neighbors and friends, on account of fear, become enemies, and all evils are born thence, which, on the occasion of fear, I noted to you above under the title: On avoiding the counsel of those who show reverence not from love but from fear. Wherefore Solomon said: "He who makes his house high seeks ruin; and he who avoids learning will fall into evils." Moreover, towers are made with great labor and infinite expenses; and even when they have been made, they avail nothing unless, with the help of prudent and faithful friends and with great expenses, they be defended. Concerning which superbia (pride) Jesus son of Sirach said:

Caput XXXIV.

Chapter 34.

De superbia.

On pride.

"Initium superbiæ hominis, apostatare a Deo; quoniam ab eo, quifecit illum recessit cor ejus; quoniam initium peccati omnis superbia. "Et iterum idem dixit: "Odibilis est coram Deo et hominibus superbia, etexecrabilis omnis iniquitas. " Et iterum idem ait: "Objurgatio et injuriæannullabunt substantiam; et domus, quæ nimis locuples est, annullabitursuperbia.

"The beginning of a man’s pride is to apostatize from God; for from Him who made him his heart has withdrawn; for the beginning of every sin is pride. "And again the same said: "Pride is odious before God and men, and execrable all iniquity. " And again the same says: "Objurgation and injuries will annul substance; and the house which is too opulent will be annulled by pride.

" Inde etiam Sapiens dixit: "Ubi fuerit superbia, ibi et contumelia:ubi autem humilitas, ibi et sapientia" simul cum gloria. Et iterum idemait: "Superbum sequiter humilitas, et humilem spiritum suscipiet gloria. "Et iterum idem ait: "Contritionem præcedit superbia; et ante ruinamexaltatur spiritus.

" Thence also the Wise Man said: "Where there shall have been pride, there also contumely:where however humility, there also sapience" together with glory. And again thesamesaid: "Humility follows the proud, and glory will receive a humble spirit. "And again the same said: "Pride precedes contrition; and before ruinthe spirit is exalted.

" Et etiam Job dixit: "Si ascenderit usque ad cælossuperbia, et caput ejus nubes tetigerit, quasi sterquilinium in fine perdetur. "Cum ergo tam detestabilis sit superbia, totque mala oriantur ex ea et infinitaalia, quæ notantur in libro De Forma Vitæ, in titulo:Deamicitia superbi vel perversi hominis vitanda; et etiam cum ex turribustot mala nascantur, meo arbitrio nunquam turres sunt faciendæ, nisitunc demum quando aliæ munitiones deficiunt vel non sufficiunt.

" And also Job said: "If he has ascended up to the heavens in pride, and his head has touched the clouds, he will be destroyed in the end like a dunghill." "Since therefore pride is so detestable, and so many evils arise from it, and infinite others, which are noted in the book On the Form of Life, in the title:On Avoiding the Friendship of a Proud or Perverse Man; and also since from towers so many evils are born, in my judgment towers are never to be made, except then at last when other fortifications fail or do not suffice.

At Melibeus respondens dixit: Quomodo domum meam aliter munire valeam?

But Melibeus, responding, said: How may I be able to fortify my house otherwise?

Prudentia respondit dicens:

Prudence responded, saying:

Caput XXXV.

Chapter 35.

De munitione.

On fortification.

Munitio multiplex est. Est enim munitio, quæ ad dilectionem pertinet, ut amor civium; et hæc inexpugnabilis est; de qua Tullius dixit:"Unum est inexpugnabile munimentum: amor civium."

Fortification is manifold. For there is a fortification which pertains to dilection, such as the love of the citizens; and this is impregnable; of which Tully said:"There is one impregnable muniment: the love of the citizens."

Est alia munitio, quæ roborat animam et corpus, videlicet virtus;et hæc similiter inexpugnabilis est; de qua Ysopus dixit:

There is another fortification, which strengthens the soul and the body, namely virtue;and this likewise is inexpugnable; about which Aesop said:

Sunt denique aliæ munitiones, quæ ad defensionem principaliterfiunt, licet ex hijs etiam offensiones fieri valeant, ut sunt sagittæet balistæ et alia arma, quibus omnibus munitionibus domum tuam etcorpus, quod est domus animæ tuæ, melius quam per turres potesmunire.

Finally, there are other fortifications, which are made principally for defense, although from these also offenses can be effected—such as arrows and ballistae and other arms—with all which fortifications you can better fortify your house, and the body, which is the house of your soul, than by means of towers.

Quod vero sapientes et senes in fine consuluerunt: In hoc negotio nonest subito nec festinanter procedendum; sed cum diligenti provisione acpræparatione et deliberatione sollicitaque cura omnia sunt peragenda:bene puto dictum ac sapienter. Ait enim Tullius: "In omnibus negotiis, prius quam aggrediare, adhibenda est præparatio diligens, " Ergo invindicta et in munitione facienda et in guerra et in bello et in omnibusnegotiis, ante ingressum vel aggressum, præparatio ac provisio necessariæsunt, si commode fieri possunt; nam, ut idem ait, longa præparatiobelli celerem victoriam facit. Et etiam Cassiodorus dixit: "Munitio quippetunc efficitur prævalida, si diuturna fuerit cogitatione roborata.

But as to what the wise men and elders resolved in the end: In this business one must not proceed suddenly nor hastily; but with diligent provision and preparation and deliberation and solicitous care all things are to be carried through: I think it well and wisely said. For Tullius says: "In all businesses, before you undertake, a diligent preparation must be applied, " Therefore in vengeance and in fortification to be made and in war and in battle and in all businesses, before ingress or aggression, preparation and provision are necessary, if they can be done commodiously; for, as the same man says, a long preparation of war makes a swift victory. And Cassiodorus also said: "A fortification, to be sure, is then rendered very powerful, if it has been strengthened by long cogitation.

Omnia subita probantur incauta, et male constructio loci tunc quæritur, quando jam pericula formidantur. " "Res ergo proeliorum bene disponitur, quoties in pace tractatur, " et "munitio semper tractanda in otio esset:quia tunc male quæritur, cum necessaria judicatur;" "omnia vero deliberatasunt robusta."

All things sudden are judged incautious, and the construction of the place is then sought badly, when dangers are already dreaded. " "Therefore the matter of battles is well arranged, as often as it is handled in peace," and "fortification ought always to be handled in leisure: because then it is sought badly, when it is judged necessary;" "but all things that have been deliberated are robust."

Nunc accedamus ad examinandum in specie consilium, quod dicis tibi datuma vicinis, timore dilectionem ostendentibus, et inimicis quondam, qui modoin gratiam tuam redierunt; et ab adulatoribus sive assentatoribus atqueab illis, qui secreto tibi ad aures aliter consuluerunt, quam palam verbisostenderent; et a juvenibus, qui tibi consuluerunt, vindictam in continentifaciendam et guerram viriliter et potenti manu peragendum. Et certe inhujusmodi consiliariis, ut supra tibi dixi, multum errasti, quia illosad consilium vocare minime debuisti; et, si bene recordaris, istud qualeconsilium quasi examinatum est supra in titulo: Quorum consilium sitvitandum et in sequentibus rubricis usque ad titulum: Quando consiliumsit assumendum. Verumtamen quia ibi in genere dicta sunt, descendamusad speciem, præfatum consilium examinantes.

Now let us come to examine in particular the counsel which you say was given to you by neighbors, showing affection out of fear, and by former enemies, who have now returned into your favor; and by flatterers or assenters, and by those who in secret advised into your ears otherwise than they showed openly in words; and by youths, who counseled you that vengeance should be carried out forthwith and that war should be prosecuted manfully and with a powerful hand. And certainly with counselors of this kind, as I said to you above, you erred greatly, since you ought by no means to have called them to counsel; and, if you recall well, this sort of counsel has, as it were, been examined above under the title: Whose counsel should be avoided and in the following rubrics up to the title: When counsel should be taken. Nevertheless, because there the things were said in general, let us descend to the particular, examining the aforesaid counsel.

Videamus itaque secundum Tullium in primis, quid in hac re verum sincerumquesit; secundo, quid consentaneum sit huic rei, quam facere vis, id est vindictæ;tertio, quid consequens; quarto, quid gignatur ex hac vindicta; quinto, quæ fuit causa injuriæ tibi illatæ, et quare Deus permisit, tibi hanc injuriam fieri.

Let us see, therefore, according to Tully, in the first place, what in this matter is true and sincere; second, what is consentaneous to this thing which you wish to do, that is, vengeance;third, what is consequent; fourth, what is generated from this vengeance; fifth, what was the cause of the injury inflicted upon you, and why God permitted this injury to be done to you.

Et certe, de veritate sincera hujus negotii non oportet multum inquirere, quia tu bene nosti, qui fuerunt illi et quot [et quales], qui hanc injuriamtibi intulerunt, et quando et quomodo, et qualem injuriam fecerunt.

And certainly, concerning the sincere truth of this affair, it is not necessary to inquire much, because you know well who they were and how many [and of what sort], who inflicted this injury upon you, and when and how, and what kind of injury they committed.

Examinemus ergo, quid consentaneum huic rei sit, id est, qui et quotet quales consentiant voluntati et consilio tuo, et qui et quot et qualesconsentiant cum inimicis et adversariis illi, quos supra nominavi, id estmulti juvenes et vicini, et agnati atque cognati, et illi, qui tibi consuluerunt, vindictam in continenti faciendam. Sed videamus et inquiramus, quis estu, et qui et quot et quales sint illi, quos dicis esse tuos amicos. Circatuam itaque personam notare potes et debes quod, licet magnus sis et diveset potens, solus tamen existis et permanes.

Let us examine therefore, what is consentaneous to this matter, that is, who and how manyand of what sort consent to your will and counsel, and who and how many and of what sortconsent with the enemies and adversaries of those whom I named above, that is many youths and neighbors, and agnates and cognates, and those who advised you that vengeance be done immediately. But let us see and inquire, who youare, and who and how many and of what sort those are whom you say are your friends. Aroundyour person, therefore, you can and ought to note that, although you are great and richand powerful, nevertheless you exist and remain alone.

Non enim habes filios masculos, neque fratres vel consanguineos germanos vel alios necessarios, quorumtimore inimici tui a destructione tuæ personæ cessarent; et, destructa persona, bene nosti, quod divitiarum multitudo dispergitur etnihil valet. Inimici vero tui sunt tres, et multos habent filios et germanoset alios necessarios, quorum si vindictam faciendo duos vel tres occideris, alii remanerent, qui personam tuam cito destruere valerent. Circa illosalios tuos amicos notare debes quod, licet multo plures sint quam inimicorumamici, tamen non sunt tales ut sui; nam sui sunt necessarii et propinqui, tui vero sunt remoti et longinqua parentela conjuncti.

For you have no male sons, nor brothers or consanguine german (full) brothers, nor other necessaries, at whose fear your enemies would desist from the destruction of your person; and, your person destroyed, you know well that a multitude of riches is scattered and avails nothing. But your enemies are three, and they have many sons and german brothers and other necessaries, of whom, if by taking vengeance you were to kill two or three, others would remain who could quickly destroy your person. Concerning those other friends of yours you ought to note that, although they are much more numerous than the friends of your enemies, nevertheless they are not such as theirs; for theirs are necessaries and near-kin, whereas yours are remote and joined by a far-distant parentage.

Ita circa illos, qui consentiunt tibi vel illis, et circa principales personas, illorumconditio valde melior est quam tua.

Thus, with respect to those who consent to you or to them, and with respect to the principal persons, the condition of those men is very much better than yours.

Secundo videamus super prædicto verbo consentaneum, utrumconsilium, quod recipisti, videlicet de vindicta facienda, consentaneumsit rationi, an non. Et certe non est consentaneum rationi, quia de jurevindicta nulli nisi judici jurisdictionem habenti permittitur, licet defensioin continenti permittatur quibusdam, si fiat cum moderamine inculpatætutelæ, ut leges dicunt.

Second, let us consider concerning the aforesaid word consentaneous, whether the counsel which you received, namely of taking vengeance, be consentaneous to reason, or not. And certainly it is not consentaneous to reason, because by law vengeance is permitted to no one except to a judge having jurisdiction, although defense on the spot is permitted to some, if it be done with the moderation of blameless self‑defense, as the laws say.

Caput XXXVI.

Chapter 36.

Quot modis dicatur quis posse.

In how many modes one is said to be able.

Tertio vero super eodem verbo consentaneum videamus, utrum voluntastua vel consilium consentiat possibilitati tuæ vel potentiætuæ, an non. Et certe posse sive possibilitas multis modis dicitur. Dicitur enim posse, quod commode fieri potest, et ita appellaturpossecommoditatis. Dicitur etiam quandoque posse, scilicetæquitatis, de quo posse dicitur, quod "ea facta, quæ pietatem, æstimationemet verecundiam nostram lædunt, et generaliter, quæ contra bonosmores fiunt, nec nos facere posse credendum est, " et hæc per legesprobantur.

Thirdly indeed, concerning the same word consentaneum, let us see whether your will or your counsel consents to your possibility or your power, or not. And certainly posse, or possibility, is said in many ways. For posse is said of that which can be done commodiously, and thus it is called possecommoditatis. Sometimes, too, posse is said, namely of equity (æquitatis), of which posse it is said that “those deeds which wound our piety, our estimation, and our modesty, and, generally, which are done against good morals, we must be believed not to be able to do”; and these are proved by the laws.

Et de hoc posse dicit Marcus in Evangelio suo de Christo:"Et non poterat ibi multas virtutes facere. " Et Apostolus in Epistola suasecunda ad Corinthios juxta finem dicit: "Non enim possumus aliquid adversusveritatem, sed pro veritate. " Aliter vero dicitur posse potestatis, unde Dominus in passione sua ad Petrum ait: "An putas, quia non possumrogare patrem meum, et exhibebit mihi plus quam duodecim legiones angelorum?"Aliter dicitur posse possibilitatis, de quo dixit Dominus ad Moisemin Exodo: "Non poteris videre faciem meam, non enim videbit me homo, etvivet.

And about this posse Mark in his Gospel says of Christ: "And he was not able there to do many mighty works." And the Apostle in his Second Epistle to the Corinthians near the end says: "For we are not able to do anything against the truth, but for the truth." Otherwise it is called a posse potestatis (“being-able of power”), whence the Lord in his Passion says to Peter: "Do you think that I cannot ask my Father, and he will furnish me with more than 12 legions of angels?" Otherwise it is called a posse possibilitatis (“being-able of possibility”), about which the Lord said to Moses in Exodus: "You will not be able to see my face; for man shall not see me and live."

" Aliter dicitur posse facultatis vel facilitatis veletiam probitatis de quo Dominus in Evangelio Matthæi dixit:"Potestis bibere calicem, quem ego bibiturus sum?" Aliter dicitur possegratiæ, de quo in libro Sapientiæ in persona Sapientiædicitur: "Et ut scivi, quoniam aliter non possum esse continens, nisi Deusdet" et cetera. Et Dominus in Evangelio dixit: "Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater mus traxerit illum. " Aliter vero ponitur in legibus posse, id est debere. Et etiam super hoc verbo posse hij versusdici consueverunt:

" Otherwise it is called the posse facultatis or facilitatis or even probitatis, about which the Lord said in the Gospel of Matthew: "Are you able to drink the cup that I am going to drink?" Otherwise it is called the possegratiæ, about which, in the Book of Wisdom, in the person of Wisdom, it is said: "And when I knew that otherwise I could not be continent unless God gives [it]," and so on. And the Lord said in the Gospel: "No one can come to me unless my Father draws him." Otherwise indeed in the laws posse is set, that is, debere. And also upon this word posse these verses are wont to be said:

Super hoc itaque verbo consentaneum tria breviter notabis, utprimo requiras, qui consentiant tuo proposito, et qui contradicant. Secundo, utrum propositum tuum rationi sit consentaneum, an non. Tertio, utrum consentaneumsit potentiæ tuæ sive possibilitati, an minime.

Upon this word consentaneous, therefore, you will briefly note three things: first, that you inquire who agree with your proposition and who contradict. Secondly, whether your proposition is consentaneous to reason or not. Thirdly, whether it is consentaneous to your potency or possibility, or not at all.

Et ista superho verbo consentaneum dicta sufficient.

And these things said above concerning the word consentaneum will suffice.

Sequitur videre examinationem super tertio verbo, ubi dixi consequens, super quo breviter notabis, quod ad vindictam, quam facere vis, consequensest alia vindicta, periculum et guerra; atque infinita dampna et incommodasuntsecutura.

It follows to see the examination upon the third word, where I said consequent, upon which you will briefly note that, with regard to the vengeance which you wish to carry out, there is consequent another vengeance, peril, and war; and infinite damages and inconveniences are going to follow.

Super quarto vero articulo, ubi dixi ex quibus quæque gignantur;scire debes, quod genita fuit tibi injuria ex odio inimicorum tuorum; etex vindicta gignitur alia rixa; ex rixa vero gignitur et oritur odium etguerra; ex guerra vero seditio et substantiæ consumptio, necessitaset bella atque innumerabilia mala gignuntur atque nascuntur.

But on the fourth article, where I said from which things each thing is begotten; you must know that an injury has been begotten against you from the hatred of your enemies; and from vengeance another quarrel is engendered; from a quarrel indeed hatred and war are engendered and arise; from war indeed sedition and consumption of substance, necessity and wars, and innumerable evils are engendered and are born.

Quinto videamus examinationem super illo verbo quæ eujusquerei causa sit.

Fifth, let us see the examination upon that word what may be the cause of each thing.

Caput XXXVII.

Chapter 37.

Super causa.

On the cause.

Causa igitur injuriæ tibi illatæ duplex fuit efficiens, scilicet remotissima et proxima. Remotissima causa efficiens fuit Deus, qui est causa efficiens omnium causarum, "per quem omnia fiunt, et sineipso factum est nihil, " ut in Evangelio dicitur. Causa vero efficiens proximafuerunt illi tres tui hostes, qui hoc maleficium commiserunt.

The cause, therefore, of the injury inflicted upon you was twofold in respect of the efficient cause, namely the most remote and the proximate. The most remote efficient cause was God, who is the efficient cause of all causes, “through whom all things come to be, and without him nothing was made,” as it is said in the Gospel. The proximate efficient cause, however, was those three enemies of yours, who committed this malefice.

Occasio veroillius causæ, quæ dicitur causa accidentalis, fuit odium, quodipsi habebant contra te, atque facta præcedentia. Causa materialisfuit illud maleficium plagæ et feritæ in filiam tuam factæ. Causa autem formalis fuit forma illius maleficii, quia cum hac forma fecerunt, id est, ascendendo per scalas et intrando per fenestras. Causa vero finalisillorum fuit circa illud maleficium, quia voluerunt filiam tuam interficerevell occidere et ad finem mortis perducere; nec per eos remansit.

The occasion, indeed, of that cause, which is called the accidental cause, was the hatred which they had against you, and the preceding deeds. The material cause was that malefice of the blows and wounds inflicted upon your daughter. The formal cause, however, was the form of that malefice, because they did it with this form, that is, by ascending by the stairs and entering through the windows. But the final cause of those men was with respect to that malefice, because they wished to slay or kill your daughter and to bring her to the end of death; nor did anything remain undone on their part.

Causamvero finalem remotam, id est, ad quem finem debeant pervenire, adhuc nonscire possumus, nisi forte per credulitatem vel præsumptionem. Crederenamque et præsumere possumus, quod ad malum finem inde pervenient;quia, ut supra dixi: "vix bono peraguntur exitu, quæ malo sunt inchoataprincipio."

But the remote final cause, that is, to what end they ought to arrive, we cannot yet know, unless perhaps through credulity or presumption. For indeed we can believe and presume that they will reach an evil end from this; because, as I said above: "things that are inchoated with a bad beginning are scarcely carried through to a good outcome."

Causam autem, quare Deus permisit tibi hanc injuriam fieri, similiternon possumus scire, nisi per credulitatem vel præsumptionem; namsicut "de occultis alieni cordis judicare stultum est, " ut dicit beatusProsper et etiam beatus Paulus in Epistola prima ad Corinthios, ita defactis Dei nullus judicare debet vel potest. Per credulitatem vel præsumptionemdico, quod in mundo "nihil agitur sine causa, nec mundus fortuitis casibusimplicatur, " ut Cassiodorus dixit. Credo itaque, quod Deus justus justaex causa hoc tibi contingere permisit.

But the cause why God permitted this injury to be done to you, likewise we cannot know, except through credulity or presumption; for just as “to judge about the hidden things of another’s heart is foolish,” as blessed Prosper says and also blessed Paul in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, so about the deeds of God no one ought or is able to judge. Through credulity or presumption I say that in the world “nothing is done without a cause, nor is the world entangled in fortuitous chances,” as Cassiodorus said. I believe, therefore, that a just God permitted this to befall you for a just cause.

Causa namque meo arbitrio fuit quod, nec Deum timendo nec hominem reverendo, secutus es nomen tuum. Componiturenim ex mel et bibens: inde dicitur Melibeus. Bibendoenim de melle atque hujus mundi dulcedine inebriatus es ita, quod dereliquistiDominum factorem tuum et, confisus in multitudine divitiarum tuarum prævaluistiin vanitate tua, et omnia quæcunque desideraverunt oculi tui, nonnegasti eis, tradens oblivioni scripturam, quæ dicit: "Nunquam bibesmel sine veneno, " et scripturam Ovidii dicentis:

Certainly the cause, in my judgment, was that, neither fearing God nor reverencing man, you followed your name. For it is composed from mel and bibens: hence one says Melibeus. For by drinking of honey and the sweetness of this world you have been made drunk, such that you abandoned the Lord your maker and, trusting in the multitude of your riches, you prevailed in your vanity, and you did not deny to your eyes whatever things they desired, consigning to oblivion the scripture which says: "You will never drink honey without poison," and the scripture of Ovid saying:

Melibeus respondit: Licet alia a te prolata vera sint vel verisimilia, non tamen credo, quod voluntas Dei fuerit, ut talia maleficia deberentcommitti. Deo enim placet ejusque voluntas est, ut homines bene faciant, nec talia maleficia committant, ut omnes fere scripturæ divinæclamant.

Melibeus responded: Although the other things brought forth by you are true or verisimilar, nevertheless I do not believe that it was the will of God that such malefactions oughtto be committed. For it pleases God, and it is his will, that men do good, nor commit such malefactions, as almost all the divine Scripturescry out.

At Prudentia respondit:

But Prudence answered:

Caput XXXVIII.

Chapter 38.

De quintuplici Dei voluntate.

On the Quintuple Will of God.

Quintuplex est Dei voluntas: alia enim est præceptiva, alia prohibitive, tertia permissiva, quarta consultiva, quinta completiva. Unde versus:

God’s will is fivefold: for one is preceptive, another prohibitive, the third permissive, the fourth consultive, the fifth completive. Whence the verse:

Melibeus respondit: In verbis planis et suavibus me semper videris inducere, ut a vindicta me debeam abstinere, monstrando pericula, quæ mihipossent evenire. Sed certe, nullus unquam vindictam faceret, si omnia, quæ possent ex ea contingere, cogitaret; et sic maleficia manerentinulta vel impunita, quod esse minime debet. Multa enim bona proveniuntex vindicta; nam malefactores occiduntur, et alii taliter deterrentur, quod de cetero similia facere non præsumant.

Melibeus responded: In plain and suave words you always seem to induce me to abstain from vengeance, by showing the dangers which could befall me. But certainly, no one would ever exact vengeance, if he considered all the things which could happen from it; and thus misdeeds would remain unavenged or unpunished, which ought by no means to be. For many goods proceed from vengeance; for malefactors are slain, and others are thus deterred, so that henceforth they do not presume to do similar things.

Sicut enim "multis minatur, qui uni facit injuriam, " ita multos a maleficio faciendo removet, multaquemaleficia prohibet, qui vindictam in malefactores potenter exercet.

For just as "he threatens many, who does injury to one, " so he removes many from doing malefice, and he prohibits many malefices, who potently exercises vengeance upon malefactors.

At Prudentia respondit:

But Prudence replied:

Caput XXXIX.

Chapter 39.

De officio judicis circa vindictam.

On the office of the judge concerning vengeance.

Quæ dixisti vera sunt, et locum habent in judicibus imperium veljurisdictionem habentibus; ad illos namque pertinet malefactores puniendovindictam exercere ac malos homines terrere. Ait enim Cassiodorus: "Excessustunc fiunt in formidine, cum creduntur judicibus displicere. " Plus etiamdico quod, sicut quilibet singulariter vindictam faciendo peccaret, itajudex vindictam omittendo non esset a peccato immunis.

What you have said is true, and has place in judges who have imperium or jurisdiction; for it pertains to them, by punishing malefactors, to exercise vindicta and to terrify evil men. For Cassiodorus says: “Excesses then come about in fear, when they are believed to displease the judges.” I even say more, that just as anyone individually would sin by making vindicta, so a judge, by omitting vindicta, would not be immune from sin.

Non ergo parceredebet judex malefactoribus; nam, ut ait Seneca, "bonis nocet, qui malisparcit. " Et alibi dixit: Judex, "qui dubitat ulcisci, multos improbos facit;"et iterum: Judex, "qui non corripit peccantem, peccare imperat. " Unde aliusdixit:

Therefore the judge ought not to spare malefactors; for, as Seneca says, "he harms the good who spares the wicked." And elsewhere he said: Judge, "he who hesitates to avenge makes many wicked;" and again: Judge, "he who does not correct the sinner, commands to sin." Whence another said:

At Melibeus dixit: Talis vindicta mihi displicet; nam de infamia velpecuniæ amissione parum curarent. Ego vero si emendam pro injuriamihi et filiæ meæ illata susciperem, sine dedecore ac vituperiode cetero vivere non valerem. Spreta itaque vindicta judiciali, fortunamvolo temptare atque, vindictam per me faciendo, fortunæ adhærere;quia firtuna usque nunc me fovit et, dante Domino, ad vindictam me adjuvabit.

But Meliboeus said: Such vengeance displeases me; for they would care little about infamy or the loss of money. But indeed, if I were to accept amends for the injury inflicted upon me and my daughter, I would not be able to live henceforth without disgrace and vituperation. Therefore, spurning judicial vengeance, I wish to tempt Fortune and, by taking vengeance by myself, to adhere to Fortune; because Fortune has fostered me up to now and, the Lord granting, will aid me unto vengeance.

Caput XL.

Chapter 40.

De fortuna.

On fortune.

Prudentia respondit: Meo consilio fortunam non temptabis nec, vindictamper te faciendo, illi adhærebis; et hoc dico multis rationibus. Primaratione, quia "male geritur, quidquid fortuna geritur fide, " ut Senecain Epistolis dixit. Secunda ratione, quia "fortuna vitrea est et, cum splendet, frangitur, " ut idem ait.

Prudence answered: By my counsel you will not tempt Fortune, nor, by making vengeance yourself, will you cleave to her; and I say this for many reasons. For the first reason, because “ill is managed, whatever is managed by Fortune on trust,” as Seneca said in the Epistolis. For the second reason, because “Fortune is glass, and, when she shines, she is broken,” as the same man says.

Tertia vero ratione, quia hoc faciendonaturam excederes atque omitteres, ut idem ait: Homines cum se fortunæpermittunt, naturam dediscunt. Quarta vero ratione, quia "fortuna, sicutmedicus imperitus, multos necat. " Quinta ratione, quia fortuna non adjuvat, sed "occupat adhærentem sibi.

The third reason indeed, because by doing this you would overstep and omit nature, as the same man says: Men, when they permit themselves to fortune, unlearn nature. The fourth reason indeed, because "fortune, like an unskilled physician, kills many. " The fifth reason, because fortune does not help, but "seizes the one adhering to herself.

" Non igitur fortunæ inhæreas, nec aliquo modo in illa confidas; non enim stabilis est vel perpetua. Scriptumest namque: In hoc mundo instabili nihil potest esse stabile. Et idem Senecadixit: "Nec vita nec fortuna perpetua est hominibus.

" Therefore do not adhere to fortune, nor in any way put your trust in her; for she is not stable or perpetual. For it has been written: In this unstable world nothing can be stable. And the same Seneca said: "Neither life nor fortune is perpetual for men.

" Cum ergo fortunasit lubrica, et invita detineri non possit, erras si credis, quod semperte fovebit, ideo quod hactenus te fovit: immo contrarium credere potes;nam si firtuna usque nunc te nimium fovit, te stultum fecit. Scriptum estnamque: "Fortuna quem nimium fovet, stultum facit. " Non ergo confidas instultitia a fortuna tibi collata; raro enim aut nunquam consuevit prodessestultitia.

" Since therefore fortune is slippery, and, being unwilling, cannot be detained, you err if you believe that it will always favor you, for the reason that thus far it has favored you: nay, you can believe the contrary;for if fortune up to now has favored you excessively, it has made you a fool. It is writtennamely: "Fortune, whom she favors too much, she makes a fool. " Do not therefore put confidence in the foolishness conferred on you by fortune; for rarely or never is foolishness accustomed to be of benefit.

Esto itaque sapiens, et vince fortunam virtute; ait enim Senecain Epistolis: "Sapiens vincit fortunam virtute. " Nec credas, fortunamte posse juvare; nam, ut idem ait, "errant qui dicunt, fortunam nobis tribuerealiquid boni vel mali. " Et hoc intelligas de illa, quam homines simplicesfortunam appellant; ait enim Boetius in libro secundo De Consolatione:Nihil enim est fortuna, nisi secundum opinionem vulgi.

Be wise, therefore, and conquer Fortune by virtue; for Seneca in the Epistolis says: "The wise man conquers Fortune by virtue." Nor should you believe that Fortune can help you; for, as the same says, "they err who say that Fortune attributes to us anything of good or of evil." And understand this about that which simple men call Fortune; for Boethius says in the second book of De Consolatione: For Fortune is nothing, except according to the opinion of the crowd.

Quare Cato dixit:

Wherefore Cato said:

Melibeus respondit: Si, tollerando injuriam, vindictam non fecero, inimicosmeos et alios homines ad novam injuriam mihi faciendam invitabo. Scriptumest enim: "Veterem patiendo injuriam, invitas novam. " Invitando itaquenovam injuriam, tot mihi undique fient injuriæ, quod eas non poteropati.

Melibeus responded: If, by tolerating injury, I shall not have taken vengeance, I shall invite my enemies and other men to do me a new injury. For it is written: "By suffering an old injury, you invite a new one." Therefore, by inviting a new injury, so many injuries will be done to me on all sides that I shall not be able to endure them.

Scriptum est enim: "Patiendo multa venient, quæ nequeas pati. "Talis ergo patientia pessima est, vindicta vero est optima.

For it is written: "By suffering, many things will come which you cannot suffer. "Such patience, therefore, is worst, but vengeance is best.

At Prudentia respondit: Prædictæ duæ auctoritateslocum habent in judicibus potius quam in aliis hominibus; nam si judicesmaleficia non vindicant, non solum novam injuriam invitant, sed etiam denovo peccare imperant et, si multa maleficia patiuntur fieri, venient quænon poterunt pati; quia malefactores tot mala committent, quæ tollerarinon poterunt: et ita ab officio expellentur. Tales itaque judices et potestatespotius eligant, maleficia et malefactores investigare, sollicite insequiatque punire, quam patiantur ab eis contempni et deici atque cum suo vituperioa dignitate et officio removeri. Et etiam si crederes, prædictasauctoritates etiam in aliis hominibus locum habere, non tamen in hoc casupatientia esset detestabilis, ut dicis.

But Prudence replied: The two aforesaid authorities have place in judges rather than in other men; for if judges do not vindicate misdeeds, they not only invite a new injury, but even command to sin anew, and, if they suffer many misdeeds to be done, there will come things which they will not be able to suffer; because malefactors will commit so many evils as cannot be tolerated: and thus they will be driven from their office. Therefore such judges and powers should rather choose to investigate misdeeds and malefactors, to pursue them solicitously and to punish them, than to allow themselves to be contemned and cast down by them, and, together with their reproach, to be removed from their dignity and office. And even if you were to believe that the aforesaid authorities have place also in other men, nevertheless in this case patience would not be detestable, as you say.

Bene namque per superiora cognovisti, tuam voluntatem circa vindictam non esse consentaneam rationi nec tuæpossibilitati. Nam ratio prohibet, vindictam ex intervallo fieri; et quodratione caret non potest esse diuturnum. Scriptum est enim: "Vis vinceretotum mundum, te subice rationi.

For indeed through the foregoing you have well come to know that your will concerning vengeance is not consonant with reason nor with your capability. For reason forbids that vengeance be carried out after an interval; and what lacks reason cannot be durable. For it is written: "Do you wish to conquer the whole world? Subject yourself to reason."

" Quare puto quod, si quis contra rationemfacit, merito et jure in omni negotio subcumbere debet. Possibilitas verotua non est, computatione facta, æqualis adversariorum tuorum potentiæsive possibilitati, ut supra notavimus, immo est valde minor, ita quodnon potes vindictam facere sine periculo ac destructione tuæ personæ. Quare in hoc casu non puto, patientiam esse pessimam, ut dixisti, sed valdeoptimam. Scriptum est namque:

" Wherefore I think that, if anyone acts against reason, he ought deservedly and by right to succumb in every affair. But your possibility, calculation having been made, is not equal to the power or possibility of your adversaries, as we have noted above; nay, it is very much lesser, so that you cannot exact vengeance without danger and the destruction of your person. Wherefore in this case I do not think patience to be worst, as you said, but very best. For it is written:

Caput XLI.

Chapter 41.

De contentionibus.

On contentions.

"Contendere cum superiori furiosum est vel periculosum, cum pari dubium, cum minore verecundum. " Puto itaque utile contentiones fugere; et qui nonpotest potentioribus resistere, procuret sollicite, ut eisdem valeat placere. Et non solum contendere vel violenter resistere potentioribus est furiosum, sed etiam irasci cum potenti est periculosum; ait enim Seneca: "Potentiirasci periculum est quærere. " Quare, si potentior aliquem læserit, tutius est illi læso potius pati, quam cum illo irasci; quod et Catovoluisse videtur, cum dixit:

"To contend with a superior is mad or dangerous, with an equal doubtful, with a lesser shameful. " I therefore think it useful to flee contentions; and he who cannot resist the more powerful should solicitously procure that he may be able to please those same. And not only is it mad to contend or to resist violently those more potent, but even to be angry with a potent man is dangerous; for Seneca says: "To be angry with a potent man is to seek peril. " Wherefore, if a more powerful man has injured someone, it is safer for the injured party rather to suffer than to be angry with him; which Cato also seems to have wished, when he said:

Caput XLII.

Chapter 42.

De patientia.

On patience.

Est enim patientia æquanimis tollerantia illatorum; vel "patientiaest virtus contumeliarum et omnis adversitatis impetus æquanimiterportans;" vel "patientia est remedium injuriarum, " ut in Moralium Dogmatecontinetur.

For patience is an equanimous toleration of things inflicted; or "patience is the virtue bearing with equanimity the impulses of contumely and of all adversity;" or "patience is the remedy of injuries, " as in the Moral Dogmais contained.

"Patientia itaque occultas habet divitias;" "patiens enim et fortisse ipsum felicem facit, " et "dolori eujusque remedium est patientia. " Etcerte a quibusdam dicitur, plus valere patientiam omnibus aliis virtutibus;unde versus:

"Patience therefore has occult riches;" "for the patient man and the man of fortitude makes himself happy, " and "for the pain of each the remedy is patience. " Etcerte by some it is said that patience is stronger than all other virtues;unde the verse:

Et nota quod, sicut patientia optima est, ita impatientia pessima est;nam, ut idem ait, "qui impatiens est, sustinebit dampnum; et cum rapuerit, aliud apponet. " Per impatientiam namque immiscet se quis quandoque reiad se non pertinenti, quod est culpa simul et stultitia; unde regula jurisdicit: "Culpa est immiscere se rei ad se non pertinenti. " Quare Salomonin Proverbiis dixit: "Sicut qui apprehendit auribus canem, sic qui transitet impatiens commiscetur alterius rixæ. " Quare idem ait: "Meliorest patiens viro forti, et qui dominatur animo suo, expugnatore urbium.

And note that, just as patience is best, so impatience is worst; for, as the same man says, "he who is impatient will sustain damage; and when he has snatched, he will add another. " For through impatience indeed someone sometimes mixes himself into a matter not pertaining to himself, which is both a fault and a stupidity; whence the rule of law says: "It is a fault to meddle with a matter not pertaining to oneself. " Wherefore Solomon in the Proverbs said: "Just as he who seizes a dog by the ears, so he who, passing by impatiently, becomes mixed up in another’s quarrel. " Wherefore the same says: "Better is the patient man than the strong man, and he who rules his spirit, than a conqueror of cities.

"Patientia namque perfectum opus habet, apostolo Jacobo hoc testante, quiait: "Omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, cum in temptationes variasincideritis, scientes quod probatio fidei nostræ patientiam operatur. Patientia autem perfectum opus habet, ut sitis perfecti et integri, innullo deficientes."

"For patience has a perfect work, the Apostle James bearing witness to this, because he says: "Esteem all joy, my brothers, when you have fallen into various temptations, knowing that the probation of our faith works patience. But let patience have a perfect work, that you may be perfect and integral, lacking in nothing."

At Melibeus dixit: Talem patientiam, quæ ad perfectionem pertineat, habere minime valeo; nam etsi periculum immineat, animus tamen meus sempervindictam facere satagit. Inimici namque mei cum magno excessu ac scelereprædicta hæc facientes omne periculum contempserunt. Si ergo, spreto periculo, cum aliquanto excessu vindictam fecero, non erit mirandumnec ad stultitiam reputandum, quia "nunquam periculum sine periculo vincitur;"et etiam a legibus permittitur vim vi repellere et fraudem fraude excludere.

But Melibeus said: Such patience, which pertains to perfection, I am by no means able to have; for even if peril is imminent, yet my spirit always strives to make vengeance. For my enemies, doing these aforesaid things with great excess and crime, have despised every peril. If, therefore, the peril being scorned, I shall have taken vengeance with some excess, it will not be a matter for wonder nor to be reckoned to stupidity, because "danger is never conquered without danger;" and also by the laws it is permitted to repel force by force and to exclude fraud by fraud.

Prudentia respondit: "Ratio bene adhibita, quid optimum sit, cernit:neglecta vero multis implicatur erroribus. " Si rationem itaque bene inspexeris, te male dixisse, aperte cognosces. Non enim periculum periculo in hoc casupoteris vincere, sed duplicare, si de prædictis volueris recordari.

Prudence replied: "Reason, when well applied, discerns what is optimum: neglected, however, it is entangled in many errors. " If, therefore, you examine reason well, you will plainly recognize that you have spoken ill. For you will not be able to conquer peril by peril in this case, but to double it, if you are willing to recall the aforesaid things.

Nam, licet inimici tui talia facientes graviter peccaverunt, tu vindictamcum excessu faciendo non esses a peccato immunis; ait enim Cassiodorus:"Nihil discrepat a peccante, qui se per excessum nititur vindicare. " Etlicet hostes tui scelus commiserint, tu eodem modo scelus committeres, si non te defendendo, sed noviter aggrediendo, contra juris ordinem vindictamfaceres: quod esse non debet; ait enim Seneca: "Nunquam scelus scelerevindicandum. " Quod autem dixisti, leges concedere vim vi repellere et fraudemfraude excludere, verum est, si in continenti defensio fiat cum moderamineinculpatæ tutela, et non ad vindictam.

For, although your enemies, doing such things, have sinned grievously, by making vengeance with excess you would not be immune from sin; for Cassiodorus says: "He differs in nothing from the sinner who strives to vindicate himself with excess." And although your foes have committed a crime, you would in the same way commit a crime, if, not defending yourself but attacking afresh, you were to make vengeance contrary to the order of law: which ought not to be; for Seneca says: "A crime is never to be avenged by a crime." But as to what you said, that the laws grant that force be repelled by force and fraud excluded by fraud, it is true, if the defense be made on the spot with the moderation of blameless protection, and not for vengeance.

Hic autem non vis facere addefensionem sive tutelam in continenti, sed ad vindictam et ex intervallo. Similiter non vis fraudem fraude excludere, sed de novo fraudem committere, quod est omnino contra juris rationem. Rationem ergo amplectaris, et abea nullo modo recedas.

Here, however, you do not wish to make a defense or tutelage immediately, but to exact vengeance and after an interval. Likewise, you do not wish to exclude fraud by fraud, but to commit fraud anew, which is wholly against the reason of law. Therefore embrace reason, and by no means depart from it.

Tunc Melibeus dixit: Licet adversarii mei potentiores me videantur rationepersonarum, ego tamen potentior sum illis ratione rerum; quia respectumei pauperes sunt; et, cum divitiæ atque "pecuniæ sint regimenomnium rerum, " multitudinem hominum mediante pecunia de facili potero habere, ita quod etiam ratione personarum illos potero superare et ad necessitatemet paupertatem ac mendicitatem et mortem illos perducere.

Then Melibeus said: Although my adversaries seem more powerful than me in respect of persons, I, however, am more powerful than them in respect of things; because with respect to me they are poor; and, since riches and "money are the regimen of all things, " I will be able with ease to have a multitude of men by the mediation of money, so that even in respect of persons I will be able to overcome them and to lead them to necessity and poverty and mendicancy and death.

Caput XLIII.

Chapter 43.

De paupertate et divitiis.

On poverty and riches.

Prudentia vero respondit: Quia in divitiis nimis confidere videris acpaupertatem despicere, ideo de paupertate et divitiis aliqua dicamus, perquæ destructionem divitiarum fugias, et paupertatem, quæ necessitatematque indigentiam inducat, omnino devites. Verum est, ut dixisti, pecuniamesse regimen omnium rerum; id est, ea mediante omnes res reguntur et gubernantur;et divitiæ et opes temporales, quantum in se, bonæ sunt, "quiaomnis creatura Dei bona;" nam sicut corpus sine anima vivere non potest, ita sine temporali substantia et opibus non potest durare. Victus enimet vestitus corpori ita sunt necessarii, quod sine opibus temporalibusvita in hominis corde diutius non potest manere. Per temporales namquedivitias faciunt homines magnas parentelas, magnosque honores acquirunt;unde Pamphilus dixit:

Prudence indeed responded: Because you seem to trust too much in riches and to despise poverty, therefore let us say some things about poverty and riches, by which you may flee the destruction of riches, and altogether avoid that poverty which brings in necessity and indigence. It is true, as you said, that money is the regimen of all things; that is, by its mediation all things are ruled and governed; and riches and temporal resources, in so far as they are in themselves, are good, “because every creature of God is good;” for just as the body cannot live without the soul, so without temporal substance and resources it cannot endure. For food and clothing are so necessary to the body that without temporal resources life cannot remain long in the heart of man. For through temporal riches men make great kinship-connections, and they acquire great honors; whence Pamphilus said:

Caput XLIV.

Chapter 44.

De necessitate.

On necessity.

Necessitas namque mater criminum dicitur. Quare Cassiodorus dixit: "Dummater criminum necessitas tollitur, peccandi ambitus aufertur. " "Necessitasenim moderata non diligit, " ut idem ait.

For Necessity is called the mother of crimes. Wherefore Cassiodorus said: "When the mother of crimes, Necessity, is taken away, the ambit of sinning is removed." "For Necessity does not love what is moderate," as the same man says.

Inde Petrus Alfunsus dixit: "Magnanecessitate cogitur etiam honestus vir latrinam adire, " et etiam ab inimicisauxilium postulare, quod est valde gravissimum. Unde idem ait: "Est unade adversitatibus hujus seculi gravioribus homini libero, quando necessitatecogitur, ut sibi subveniat, requirere inimicum;" et hoc ideo quia gravioresinsidias antiqui adversarii tunc subimus, quando ejus bona suscipimus. Et ita est pessima necessitas, ut hominem experiri omnia cogat cumque mendacemfaciat, ad res cunctas eum constringat, et ad mendicitatem atque indigentiamet excessus omnes perducat.

Thence Petrus Alfunsus said: “By great necessity even an honest man is compelled to go to the latrine,” and even to ask aid from enemies, which is very most grave. Whence the same man says: “There is one among the more grievous adversities of this age for a free man, when by necessity he is compelled, that he may succor himself, to seek the enemy;” and this for the reason that we then undergo graver ambushes of the ancient adversary, when we receive his benefits. And thus necessity is most wicked, in that it forces a man to try all things and, while it makes him a liar, constrains him with regard to all matters, and leads him into beggary and indigence and every excess.

Quare jura et proverbium clamant: "Necessitasnon habet legem. " Et Seneca dixit: "Necessitas egentem mendacem facit;"et iterum: "Necessitas ab homine quæ vult impetrat;" et iterum: ["Hominem]omnia experiri necessitas subigit. " Et Cassiodorus dixit: "Indigentiamjuste fugimus, quæ suadet excessus.

Wherefore the laws and the proverb cry out: "Necessity has no law. " And Seneca said: "Necessity makes the needy man a liar;"and again: "Necessity obtains from a man what it wants;"and again: ["A man] necessity compels to try all things. " And Cassiodorus said: "We justly flee indigence, which persuades to excesses.

" Et Salomon dixit: "Quinque sunt, quæ populum domant: licentia, luctus, fames, bellum, ad ultimum vulgiimperitia: ad res cunctas sola contringit necessitas. " Et iterum: "Meliusest mori, quam indigere. " Indigentia namque mendicitatem inducit, de quaInnocentius in libro de Contemptu Mundi ait:

" And Solomon said: "There are five things that tame the people: license, lamentation, famine, war, and at the last the common people’s inexperience; in all matters, necessity alone constrains." And again: "It is better to die than to be in need." For indigence indeed induces mendicancy, about which Innocent, in the book On the Contempt of the World, says:

Caput XLV.

Chapter 45.

De mendicitate.

On mendicancy.

"O miserabilis mendicantis conditio! Nam, si petit, pudore confunditur, et si non petit, egestate consumitur; sed ut mendicet, necessitate compellitur:indignatur, murmurat, imprecatur. " Quare Salomon in Proverbiis dixit: "Mendicitatemet divitias ne dederis mihi, " Domine!

"O wretched condition of the beggar! For, if he petitions, he is confounded by shame, and if he does not petition, he is consumed by indigence; but that he may beg, he is compelled by necessity:he is indignant, he murmurs, he imprecates. " Wherefore Solomon said in the Proverbs: "Give me neither beggary nor riches, " O Lord!

Opes itaque temporales, pecunia atquedivitiæ, per quas tot bona consequimur, totque mala fugamus, bonæsunt, si a bono homine possideantur. Respectu autem malorum hominum possidentiumillas, malæ dicuntur, quia nihil est homini bonum sine se bono. Licetenim per se bonæ sint, malis tamen hominibus malæ dicunturesse, quia illis causam malorum præstant; ait enim Seneca: "Divitiæsunt causa malorum, non quia faciant aliquid, sed quia facientes irritant.

Therefore temporal wealth, money and riches, through which we obtain so many goods and drive away so many evils, are good, if they be possessed by a good man. But with respect to wicked men possessing them, they are called evil, because nothing is good for a man without his being good himself. For although in themselves they are good, yet to evil men they are said to be evil, because they furnish to them a cause of evils; for Seneca says: "Riches are a cause of evils, not because they do anything, but because they irritate those who act."

"Unde quidam philosophus dixit: "Pecunia avaro supplicium est, profuso decus, parricidium proditori. " Utaris ergo divitiis, et eis abstineas moderateatque scienter et secundum virtutem. Ait enim Tullius: "Virtus est rebus, quas acquirimus, uti moderate atque scienter.

"Whence a certain philosopher said: "Money is a punishment to the avaricious man, an honor to the prodigal, a parricide to the traitor. " Therefore use riches, and from them refrain moderately and knowingly and according to virtue. For Tully says: "Virtue is to use the things which we acquire moderately and knowingly."

" Et Ovidius dixit:

" And Ovid said:

Hijs itaque notatis et diligenter inspectis circa divitias et paupertatematque indigentiam et necessitatem atque fortunam, non consulo tibi, utin divitiis nimis confidas, nec eas in guerra facienda consumas.

These things therefore having been noted and diligently inspected concerning riches and poverty and indigence and necessity and fortune, I do not advise you to confide too much in riches, nor to consume them in waging war.

Caput XLVI.

Chapter 46.

De malis guerræ.

On the evils of war.

Nullæ enim opes vel divitiæ sumptibus guerræ, meoarbitrio, sunt sufficientes; nam dixit quidam philosophus: Nemo in guerraconstitutus satis dives esse potest. Quantumcunque enim sit homo dives, oportet illum, si in guerra diu perseveraverit, aut divitias aut guerramperdere, aut forte utrumque simul et personam. Si enim pauper est, guerramnullo modo sustinere potest; si divitiis multum habundat, in sumptibusmulto magis habundabit. Nam sicut omnis, qui peccat, quanto major est, famosius crimen habet, secundum Martialem dicentem:

No resources or riches, for the expenses of war, in my judgment, are sufficient; for a certain philosopher said: No one stationed in war can be rich enough. However rich a man may be, it is necessary that he, if he has long persevered in war, either lose his riches or the war, or perhaps both at once and his person. For if he is poor, he can in no way sustain the war; if he abounds much in riches, he will abound much more in expenses. For just as everyone who sins, the greater he is, has a more notorious crime, according to Martial saying:

Caput XLVII.

CHAPTER 47.

De bello vitando.

On avoiding war.

Et etiam bellum, quod occasione guerræ fieri consueverit, multofortius est vitandum multis rationibus. Prima ratione, quia bella Deo displicent;unde Propheta dixit: "Dissipa gentes, quæ bella volunt."

And even war, which is wont to be undertaken on the occasion of a feud, must much more strongly be avoided for many reasons. As the first reason, because wars displease God;whence the Prophet said: "Scatter the nations who desire wars."

Secunda ratione, quia bella non solum homines singulariter, sed etiampopulum domare consueverunt, ut in prædicta auctoritate Salomonis:"Quinque sunt, quæ populum domant: licentia, luctus, fames, bellum"et cetera.

By a second reason, because wars have been accustomed to tame not only men singly, but also the people, as in the aforesaid authority of Solomon: "There are five things that tame the people: license, lamentation, famine, war," and the rest.

Tertia ratione, quia bellum valde timendum est; scriptum est enim: "Beatacivitas, quæ bellum in pace timet. " Et non solum timendum est bellum, sed nec etiam nominandum; scriptum est enim: "Si pacem diligis, belli nefeceris mentionem."

For a third reason, because war is to be greatly feared; for it is written: "Blessed is the city that fears war in peace. " And not only is war to be feared, but it is not even to be named; for it is written: "If you love peace, do not make mention of war."

Quarta ratione vitandum est bellum, quia "varius et dubius est bellieventus, " nec per multitudinem hominum nec alia ratione visibili potestesse certus; unde Judas Machabæus dixit: "Non in multitudine exercitusvictoria fit belli, sed de cælo est virtus. Facile enim est Deo amultis paucos liberare, et super multos paucis victoriam dare. " Et Daviddixit ad Philistæum, quem cum lapide fundæ interfecit: "Etnoverit universa ecclesia hæc, quia non in gladio nec in hasta salvatDominus: ipsius est enim bellum."

By a fourth reason war is to be avoided, because “the outcome of war is various and dubious,” nor can it be certain either through a multitude of men or by any other visible rationale; whence Judas Maccabaeus said: “Not in the multitude of an army is the victory of war made, but from heaven is the power. For it is easy for God to free the few from the many, and to give victory to the few over the many.” And David said to the Philistine, whom he slew with a stone from a sling: “And let all this Church know that not by the sword nor by the spear does the Lord save: for the battle is his.”

Quinta vero ratione vitandum est bellum, quia in eo maxime versaturpericulum, quod a sapientibus multum est fugiendum; ait enim Tullius: "Sedfugiendum etiam illud et curandum, ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa, quo nihil potest esse stultius; quapropter in adeundis periculis consuetudoimitanda est medicorum, qui leviter ægrotantes leviter curant, gravioribusautem morbis periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibere coguntur. Quarein tranquillo tempestatem adversam optare, dementis est, subvenire autemtempestati, id est necessitati, quovis modo, quavis ratione, sapientisest."

But by a fifth reason indeed war must be avoided, because in it the peril is chiefly engaged, which by the wise is much to be shunned; for Tully says: “But that also must be fled and cared for, that we not offer ourselves to perils without cause, than which nothing can be more foolish; wherefore in approaching perils the custom of physicians is to be imitated, who treat those lightly ailing lightly, but are compelled to apply perilous and two-edged treatments to more grievous diseases. Therefore, in a calm to desire an adverse tempest is the part of a madman; but to come to the aid of the tempest, that is, necessity, in whatever way, by whatever rationale, is the part of the wise.”

Sexta autem ratione bella vitanda sunt, quia in hijs mors ab omnibusmerito expectatur; nam "incertum est, quo loco mors te expectet: tu autemeam omni loco expectare potes et debes, " et maxime in bello. Infinitædenique sunt rationes, quibus bella et guerra vitanda sunt, quæ nonvalerent de facili cogitari; nec eas ad præsens notari oportet.

By a sixth reason, moreover, wars are to be avoided, because in these death is by everyone deservedly expected; for "it is uncertain in what place death awaits you: you, however, can and ought to expect it in every place, " and most of all in war. Infinite, finally, are the reasons by which wars and warfare are to be avoided, which could not easily be conceived; nor is it fitting to note them at present.

Tunc Melibeus dixit: Licet multas justas rationes sapienter induxeris, quibus vindictam et guerram ac bellum abhorrere videris, non tamen adhucmihi tribuisti consilium, quod in hoc negotio a te affectanter habere desidero.

Then Melibeus said: Although you have wisely brought forward many just reasons, by which you seem to abhor vengeance and guerra and war, yet you have not as yet granted me the counsel which in this matter I eagerly desire to have from you.

Caput XLVIII.

Chapter 48.

De guerra vitanda per reconciliationem.

On war to be avoided through reconciliation.

Prudentia respondit: Meum est consilium, ut per reconciliationem etconcordiam vincas discordiam et guerram; scriptum est enim: "Ibi semperest victoria, ubi est concordia. " Et ita habebis gaudium; et prædictamala fugiendo, tuæ res crescent et multiplicabuntur. Dixit namqueSalomon in Proverbiis: "Qui ineunt pacis consilia, sequitur eos gaudium.

Prudence answered: My counsel is that through reconciliation and concord you conquer discord and war; for it is written: "There is always victory where there is concord. " And thus you will have joy; and by fleeing the aforesaid evils, your affairs will grow and be multiplied. For Solomon said in the Proverbs: "Those who enter into counsels of peace, joy follows them.

"Et Seneca in Epistolis dixit: "Concordia parvæ res crescunt:discordia maximæ dilabuntur. " Et Tullius dixit: "Mea quidem sententiapaci, quæ nihil sit habitura insidiarum, semper est consulendum."

"And Seneca in the Epistles said: "By concord small things grow:discord the greatest melt away. " And Tullius said: "In my opinion, indeed, there must always be consultation for a peace which will have no snares."

At Melibeus dixit: Quomodo possum reconciliari meis inimicis? quia ipsiinitium discordiæ fecerunt, nec reconciliationem quærunt.

But Melibeus said: How can I be reconciled to my enemies? for they themselves made the beginning of discord, and they do not seek reconciliation.

Prudentia vero respondit: Si adversarii tui, te velle reconciliationem, crederent, cum magna devotione illam a te postularent. Audivi namque, quodde peccato atque stultitia sua valde dolent, et tuis mandatis in omnibuset per omnia cum juramento et juratoribus cupiunt obedire. Quare tutiuscredo, cum hoc honore de periculis et guerra exire, quam cum multis periculisdestructionem corporis et animæ ac rerum formidare.

Prudence, however, replied: If your adversaries believed that you wish reconciliation, they would with great devotion request it from you. For I have heard that they greatly grieve over their sin and foolishness, and that they desire to obey your mandates in all things and through all things, with an oath and with jurators. Wherefore I deem it safer to go out from dangers and war with this honor, than, amid many dangers, to dread the destruction of body and soul and of goods.

Plus etiam dicotibi quia, etsi adversarii tui non inciperent petere reconciliationem, nihilominus deberes tu illius reconciliationis facere inceptionem; scriptumest enim: "Semper ab aliis dissensio incipiat, te autem reconciliatio. "Nam et Propheta jussit, reconciliationem et pacem non solum ab aliis expectari, sed etiam inquiri et persequi; ait enim: "Diverte a malo et fac bonum, inquire pacem et persequere eam. " Et Apostolus in pistola ad Romanos dixit:"Nulli malum pro malo reddentes, providentes bona non tantum coram omnibushominibus; si fieri potest, quod ex vobis est, cum omnibus hominibus pacemhabentes.

Moreover I say to you also that, even if your adversaries did not begin to ask for reconciliation, nonetheless you ought to make the inception of that reconciliation yourself; for it is written: "Let dissension always begin from others, but from you, reconciliation. " For the Prophet also commanded that reconciliation and peace be not only expected from others, but also inquired and pursued; for he says: "Turn aside from evil and do good, seek peace and pursue it. " And the Apostle in the Epistle to the Romans said: "Rendering to no one evil for evil, providing good things not only before all human beings; if it can be done, as far as it is from you, having peace with all human beings.

" Et in Ysaia scriptum est: "Quam speciosi pedes evangelizantiumpacem. " Inquiras ergo pacem, et injuriæ obliviscaris; ait enim Senecain Epistolis: "Injuriæ oblivisci debemus, beneficii vero meminisse;"nam "injuriarum remedium est oblivio. " Unde Jhesus Sirac dixit: "Omnisinjuriæ proximi ne memineris, et nihil agas in operibus injuriæ."

" And in Isaiah it is written: "How beautiful are the feet of those evangelizing peace. " Therefore inquire after peace, and forget injuries; for Seneca in Epistles says: "We ought to forget injuries, but remember a benefit;" for "the remedy for injuries is oblivion. " Whence Jesus Sirach said: "Do not remember any injury of your neighbor, and do nothing in works of injury."

At Melibeus dixit: Injuriæ oblivisci non valeo, sed vellem utdiceres mihi, si in aliquo casu licet alieni guerram facere vel pugnare.

But Melibeus said: I am not able to forget injuries, but I would wish that you would tell me whether in any case it is permitted to wage another man’s war or to fight.

Prudentia respondit: Omnes homines semper guerram facere et pugnaretenentur cum peccatis et vitiis; nam scriptum est: "Non coronabitur quis, nisi legitime certaverit;" nam propter talem pugnam merentur omnes pugnantesvitam æternam et perpetuæ victoriæ coronam. Sed cum omnibushominibus pacem habere debes; unde scriptum est: "Cum hominibus pacem habeas, cum vitiis bellum."

Prudence answered: All men are always bound to make war and fight against sins and vices; for it is written: "No one will be crowned unless he has contended legitimately;" for on account of such a combat all who fight deserve eternal life and the crown of perpetual victory. But with all men you must have peace; whence it is written: "With men have peace, with vices war."

Melibeus dixit: Ego non loquor de pugna et bello contra vitia, sed depugna et bello contra homines committentes maleficia.

Melibeus said: I do not speak of battle and war against vices, but of battle and war against men committing malefactions.

Caput XLIX.

Chapter 49.

Casus, quibus licite pugnare possumus.

Cases, in which we can licitly fight.

Prudentia vero respondit: Octo sunt casus vel causæ, quibus licitepugnare possumus: pro fide conservanda et non violanda, pro justitia manutenenda, pro pace habenda, pro libertate conservanda, pro turpitudine vitanda, proviolentia repellenda, pro tutela sui corporis facienda et pro necessariacausa, de quibus singulariter dispiciamus.

But Prudence answered: There are eight cases or causes in which we may licitly fight: for faith to be conserved and not violated, for justice to be maintained, for peace to be had, for liberty to be conserved, for turpitude to be avoided, for violence to be repelled, for the protection of one’s own body to be effected, and for a necessary cause; concerning which let us consider individually.

Pro fide certe sunt bella suscipienda, et manu decertandum est. Namsicut fides nostrum scutum esse debet, sub quo omnes clauduntur virtutes, et cujus scuti adminiculo pugnare debemus, de qua dixit Apostolus in Epistolaad Ephesios circa finem: "Sumentes scutum fidei, in quo possitis omniatela nequissimi ignea extinguere, " et de qua etiam dictum est:

Surely for the faith wars are to be undertaken, and it must be battled hand to hand. For just as faith ought to be our shield, under which all the virtues are enclosed, and by the aid of which shield we ought to fight, about which the Apostle said in the Epistle to the Ephesians near the end: "Taking up the shield of faith, by which you may be able to quench all the fiery missiles of the most wicked one, " and about which it has also been said:

Similiter pro justitia pugnare debemus et usque ad mortem certare; aitenim Jhesus Sirac: "Pro justitia agonizare pro anima tua, et usque ad mortemcerta pro justitia, et Deus expugnabit pro te inimicos tuos."

Similarly we ought to fight for justice and to contend even unto death; for Jesus Sirach says: "For justice agonize for your soul, and contend even unto death for justice, and God will vanquish your enemies for you."

Pro pace vero habenda suscipienda sunt bella, et manu etiam decertandumest. Dixit enim Tullius: "Suscipienda quidem sunt bella ob eam causam, ut sine injuria in pace vivatur. " Et iterum idem ait: "Bellum ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax quæsita videatur."

But for peace indeed to be had, wars are to be undertaken, and it must even be fought out by hand. For Tullius said: "Wars indeed are to be undertaken for this reason, that one may live in peace without injury. " And again the same man says: "Let war be undertaken in such a way that nothing else than peace appears to have been sought."

Pro libertate vero conservanda et servitute indebita repellenda decertandumest usque ad mortem; ait enim Tullius: "Cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu est, et mors servituti turpitudinique anteponenda est. "Inde etiam Seneca dixit: "Occidi pulcrum est, si ignominiose servis. " Deservituteindebita ideo dixi, quia si debite et in veritate quis servus est, non debet curare; ait enim beatus Paulus in Epistola ad Corinthios: "Unusquisquein ea vocatione, in qua vocatus est, in ea permaneat.

But indeed, for liberty to be conserved and undue servitude to be repelled, it must be fought out even unto death; for Tullius says: "When time and necessity demand, it must be fought out by hand, and death is to be preferred to servitude and turpitude. " "Then Seneca also said: "To be slain is fair, if you serve ignominiously. " Ofundue servitude I said for this reason, because if someone is a slave duly and in truth, he ought not to care; for blessed Paul says in the Epistle to the Corinthians: "Let each remain in that calling in which he was called."

Servus vocatus es?non sit tibi curæ. " Et etiam beatus Petrus in Epistola sua primadixit: "Servi, subditi estote in omni timore dominis, non tantum boniset modestis, sed etiam discolis."

"Were you called as a servant?let it not be a care to you." And also blessed Peter in his first Epistle said: "Servants, be subject in all fear to masters, not only to the good and modest, but also to the wayward."

Pro turpitudine vero evitanda similiter decertandum est, et mors turpitudinianteponenda, ut supra dictum est in illa auctoritate: "Cum tempus" et cetera.

But for turpitude indeed to be avoided, one must likewise fight it out, and death is to be preferred to turpitude, as was said above in that authority: "When the time" and so forth.

Pro violentia vero repellenda pugnandum est ac manu decertandum; namper leges et decretales dicitur: "Vim vi repellere omnes leges omniaquejura permittunt;" et intelligo vim, non solum quando homines vulnerantur, sed etiam quando quis, quod deberi sibi putat, non per judicem reposcit, ut lex dicit.

For violence indeed to be repelled, it must be fought against and contended by hand; for by the laws and the decretals it is said: "To repel force by force all laws and all rights permit;" and I understand force, not only when men are wounded, but also when someone does not demand back through a judge what he thinks is owed to him, as the law says.

Pro tutela sui corporis similiter pugnandum est ac manu decertandum;ait enim lex: "Quod quis ob tutelam sui corporis facit, id recte videturfecisse;" nam adversus periculum naturalis ratio permittit se defendere. Et in tantum etiam defensio permittitur, ut etiam ante tempus violentiæoccurrere permittatur; melius est enim in tempore occurrere, quam postexitum vindicare, ut leges clamant. Et in tantum etiam tibi defensio permittitur, ut, si aliter periculum vitare non poteras, et hominem occidisti, per legeset jura nullo modo puniaris; nam et "si arietes et boves inter se commisissent, et agressor mortuus fuerit, altero se defendente, sine compositione jaceredebet, " ut lex dicit.

For the protection of one’s own body likewise one must fight and contend by hand; for the law says: “What someone does on account of the tutelage of his own body, that he seems to have done rightly;” for against peril natural reason permits one to defend himself. And defense is permitted to such an extent that one is permitted even to anticipate the time of violence; for it is better to meet it in time than to vindicate after the outcome, as the laws proclaim. And defense is permitted to you to such an extent that, if otherwise you could not avoid the peril, and you killed a man, by the laws and rights you are in no way to be punished; for even “if rams and oxen had come into conflict with one another, and the aggressor has died, the other defending himself, he ought to lie without composition,” as the law says.

Resistere namque injuriæ ac violentiætibi taliter permittitur, ut a quibusdam dicatur vitium et culpa non resistereinjuriæ, si fieri potest. Unde Tullius dixit: "Tam est in culpa quinon resistit injuriæ, si commode potest, quam si parentes aut amicosaut patriam relinquat. " Tutelam tamen tui corporis facere debes in continentiet cum moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ; ut si telo quis te percutarevult, tu etiam ante percussionem illum telo percutere poteris ad tutelamtantum, et non ad vindictam.

For to resist injury and violence it is thus permitted to you, that by some it is said to be a vice and a fault not to resist injury, if it can be done. Whence Tullius said: "So much in fault is he who does not resist injury, if he can conveniently, as if he were to abandon his parents or friends or his fatherland." Nevertheless you ought to make the protection of your body in continence and with the moderation of blameless defense; so that, if someone wishes to strike you with a weapon, you also, even before the blow, may strike him with a weapon for protection only, and not for vengeance.

Pro necessaria denique causa pugnandum est ac manu decertandum, putaquando bellum est indictum et denuntiatum; ait enim Tullius: "Intelligipotest, nullum bellum esse justum, nisi quod aut rebus petitis geratur, aut denuntiatum sit ante et indictum. " Inde etiam Cato dixit: "Pugna propatria."

For a necessary cause, finally, one must fight and contend hand-to-hand, for instance when war has been indicted and denounced; for Tullius says: "It can be understood that no war is just, unless it is either waged after the demanded things have been sought back, or has been previously denounced and indicted." Hence also Cato said: "Fight for the fatherland."

Et hæc, quæ dicta sunt de pugna et certamine manu faciendis, intelligas locum habere in quolibet homine non religioso. Religiosis autemperfectis, qui non noverunt movere arma, dictum est a Domino: "Mihi vindictam, et ego retribuam" et: "Si quis percusserit tibi maxillam, porrige et aliam;et si quis abstulerit tibi tunicam, da ei et pallium. " Tales namque religiosinon debent manu decertare, sed potius pati mortem, quam turpitudinem velaliquod peccatum mortale facere.

And these things, which have been said about fight and contest to be done by hand, understand to have place in any man not religious. Religiosis autemperfectis, who do not know to move arms, it has been said by the Lord: "Vengeance is mine, and I will repay" and: "If anyone shall strike you on the cheek, extend also the other;and if anyone shall take away your tunic, give to him also the cloak. " For such religiousinon ought not to contend by hand, but rather to suffer death than to do turpitude or velaliquod mortal sin.

Tunc Melibeus respondit: Bene a te audivi, quod pro pace habenda decertandumest manu atque pugnandum; quare volo cum prædictis meis adversariispugnare; et ita potero eum illis postea pacem habere.

Then Melibeus responded: Well have I heard from you that, for peace to be had, one must contend by hand and fight; wherefore I wish to fight with my aforesaid adversaries; and thus afterwards I shall be able to have peace with them.

At Prudentia quasi irato animo ac vultu mutato dixit:

But Prudence, as if with an irate spirit and with her countenance changed, said:

Tunc Melibeus dixit: Nolo, ut irato animo contra me aliquid dicas; sedsi quid stultum vel ineptum dixero vel decero, ad tuam voluntatem me corripias;non enim habebo pro malo, quidquid mihi dixeris quieto animo. Scripsitenim Salomon: "Qui corripit hominem, magis gratiam apud eum inveniet, quamqui per linguæ blandimenta decipit."

Then Melibeus said: I do not wish that you say anything against me with an irate spirit; butif I have said or shall declare anything foolish or inept, correct me according to your will; for I will not take it for an evil, whatever you may say to me with a quiet spirit. Forwrote indeed Solomon: "He who reproves a man will find more grace with him thanhe who deceives by blandishments of the tongue."

At Prudentia respondit: Non irascor contra te sine causa, sed potiuspro tua salute; nam, ut idem Salomon dixit: "Melior est ira risu, quiaper tristitiam vultus corrigitur animus delinquentis. " Consulo itaque tibi, ut te corrigas atque, me temptare verba pacis, permittas, et si id, quoddixi, bono animo facere volunt adversarii, illos ad tua præceptasuscipias.

But Prudence replied: I am not angry against you without cause, but rather for your salvation; for, as the same Solomon said: "Anger is better than laughter, because through the sadness of the countenance the mind of the delinquent is corrected." I therefore counsel you to correct yourself and to permit me to attempt words of peace; and if the adversaries are willing with good spirit to do that which I have said, you should receive them under your precepts.

Tunc Melibeus dixit: Ex quo tibi hoc placet, ac inde mihi consulis, quod tibi placet, facere non postponas.

Then Melibeus said: Since this pleases you, and thereupon you advise me, do not postpone to do what pleases you.

Tunc Prudentia, dilatione modica postulata, de voluntate viri, in ejustamen absentia, secreto illos adversarios suos ad se fecit vocari, in quorumpræsentia bona pacis et mala guerræ ac belli prædictomodo narrans, illos coepit hortari, ut de injuria sibi et domino Melibeoac filiæ ejus facta dolerent, ejusque domini præceptis cumjuramento ac juratoribus ac poena stare nullatenus differrent. Illi autemhæc audientes gavisi fuerunt gaudio magno; valdeque dulcedine verborummoti ac dolore cordis intrinsecus tacti cum fletu responderunt dicentes:Domina sapientissima, "tu prævenisti nos in benedictionibus dulcedinis. "Quod enim dixisti, nos prius dicere debebamus; initium namque discordiæa nostra processit stultitia; quare initium reconciliationis a nobis inciperedebebat.

Then Prudence, a modest delay having been requested, by the will of the man, yet in his absence, secretly had those her adversaries summoned to her; and in their presence, recounting in the aforesaid manner the goods of peace and the evils of war and battle, she began to exhort them, that they should be grieved for the injury done to herself and to lord Melibeus and to his daughter, and that they should in no way delay to stand to their lord’s precepts with oath and sureties and penalty. But they, hearing these things, rejoiced with great joy; and being strongly moved by the sweetness of her words and touched inwardly with pain of heart, they answered with weeping, saying: Most wise Lady, “you have anticipated us in the blessings of sweetness.” For what you have said, we ought to have said first; for the beginning of discord proceeded from our folly; wherefore the beginning of reconciliation ought to begin from us.

Verum, quia nesciebamus, prædicta tibi ac domino tuo placere, hæc vobis dicere nullatenus audebamus. Volentes igitur tuis consiliisacquiescere atque præceptis domini Melibei in omnibus et per omnia, sicut dixisti, libentissime obedire tuam benignitatem flexis genibus exoramus, ut quod verbis dixisti bonis sanctisque operibus inter nos et dominum Melibeumdebeas adimplere. Timemus tamen, ne, propter nostrum excessum ac peccatinostri improbitatem, dominus Melibeus iratus ad præceptum contranos properaret iniquum; quare tuum consilium super hijs devotissime postulamus.

Truly, because we did not know that the aforesaid things pleased you and your lord, we by no means dared to say these things to you. Wishing therefore to acquiesce in your counsels and to obey most gladly the precepts of lord Melibeus in all things and through all, just as you have said, we implore your benignity on bended knees, that what you have said in words you should fulfill by good and holy works between us and lord Melibeus. Yet we fear lest, on account of our excess and the depravity of our sin, lord Melibeus, angered, might hasten to an unjust precept against us; wherefore we most devotedly ask your counsel concerning these matters.

Prudentia respondit: Licet durum sit et omni rationi contrarium, quodquis in adversario vel inimico suo confidat, vel se in ejus potestate etarbritrio committat, ut supra in hoc libro, in titulo De vitando illorumconsilio, qui sunt vel jam fuerunt inimici, sed postea in gratiam redierunt, reperitur: tamen quia dominus Melibeus de prædictis mecum tractabit, nec meo consilio ad iniquum præceptum recurrere valebit, ideo consulovobis, ut de illo non diffidatis. Cognosco namque benignitatem et largitatemprædicti domini mei; non enim est iniquus nec pecuniæ cupidus, semper honorem affectans, iniquitatem atque pecuniam omnino contempnit. Alioquin nulli aliquo modo consulerem, ut sine causæ cognitione acpræcedenti tractatu arbitrium daret inimico suo vel super se potestatem.

Prudence replied: Although it is hard and contrary to all reason that someone should confide in his adversary or enemy, or commit himself to his power and arbitrement, as is found above in this book, under the title On avoiding the counsel of those who are or have already been enemies, but afterward returned into favor: nevertheless, since Lord Melibeus will treat of the aforesaid with me, nor will he be able, with my counsel, to resort to an iniquitous precept, therefore I advise you not to distrust him. For I know the benignity and largess of my aforesaid lord; for he is not iniquitous nor avaricious of money, ever aspiring to honor; he utterly contemns iniquity and money. Otherwise I would in no way advise anyone to grant, without knowledge of the cause and prior treatment, arbitrement to his enemy or power over himself.

Ait enim Salomon: "Audite populi et omnes gentes et rectores ecclesiæ:filio et mulieri, fratri et amico ne dederis potestatem super te in vitatua. " Si enim prohibuit, dari potestatem super se filio fratri et amico, multo fortius prohibuit cuilibet, ne alicui inimico super se potestatemconcedat. Prædictis auditis, illi tres adversarii unanimiter responderuntdicentes: Confisi de tua benignitate ac solita clementia, tuam et dominiMelibei voluntatem, dante Domino, adimplebimus.

For Solomon says: "Hear, peoples and all nations and rulers of the church: to a son and a woman, to a brother and a friend do not give power over you in your life." For if he forbade that power be given over oneself to a son, a brother, and a friend, much more strongly he forbade anyone to grant power over himself to any enemy. The aforesaid having been heard, those three adversaries unanimously answered, saying: Confident in your benignity and accustomed clemency, we will, the Lord granting, fulfill your will and the will of lord Melibee.

Quandocunque igitur tibiplacuerit, mittas pro nobis et omnibus vestris præceptis obedireerimus parati.

Whenever therefore it shall please you, send for us, and we will be ready to obey all your precepts.

Prudentia vero accedens ad virum eique narrans quæcunque cum illistractaverat, petiit ab eo, an prædicta illi placerent.

But Prudence, approaching the man and recounting to him whatever she had transacted with them, asked of him whether the aforesaid things pleased him.

Qui, cum audivisset illorum devotionem atque circa illorum excessumpoenitentiam et cordis contritionem atque peccati confessionem, responditdicens: Venia digni sunt, qui de peccato excusationem non faciunt, sedcum lacrimis et confessione ac cordis compunctione indulgentiam implorarenon cessant; ait enim Seneca: "Ubi est confessio, ibi est remissio;" innocentiæenim proxima est confessio. Et iterum: "Proximum ad innocentiam locum tenetverecundia peccati et confessio;" nam "peccatum extenuat, qui celeritercorrigit. " Hinc est, quod consilium per te mihi datum valde mihi est placidum, si hoc facere poterimus de amicorum voluntate atque consensu.

He, when he had heard their devotion and, concerning their transgression, penitence, and the contrition of heart and confession of sin, replied, saying: They are worthy of pardon who do not make an excuse for sin, but with tears and confession and compunction of heart do not cease to implore indulgence; for Seneca says: "Where there is confession, there is remission;" for confession is next to innocence. And again: "Shame for sin and confession hold the place nearest to innocence;" for "he attenuates the sin who quickly corrects it." Hence it is that the counsel given to me through you is very pleasing to me, if we can do this with the will and consent of our friends.

At Prudentia sereno vultu et hilari facie dixit: Recte respondisti, nam sicut cum amicorum nostrorum consilio atque auxilio vindictam facereproposueras, ita in concordia et reconciliatione corum consilium peterenon postponas. "Nihil enim tam naturale est, quam aliquid dissolvi eo genere, quo colligatum est, " ut lex dicit.

But Prudence, with a serene countenance and a cheerful face, said: You answered rightly, for just as with the counsel and aid of our friends you had proposed to exact vengeance, so in their concord and reconciliation do not postpone to seek their counsel. "For nothing is so natural as for something to be dissolved by the same kind by which it was bound, " as the law says.

Hijs itaque tractatis, in continenti convocaverunt amicos fideles, agnatosquoque atque cognatos probatos ac fideles inventos; eisque fere omnia, quæ supra scripta sunt, per ordinem narrantes, consilium, quod superprædictis facerent, diligenter postulaverunt. Amici vero hæcaudientes, post multam indagationem et prædictarum rerum diligentemexaminationem, consilium de reconciliatione, concordia et pace faciendalaudaverunt et unanimiter approbaverunt.

These things, therefore, having been handled, immediately they convoked faithful friends, and agnates as well as cognates, approved and found faithful; and to them, recounting in order nearly all the things which are written above, they diligently requested counsel as to what they should do concerning the aforesaid. But the friends, hearing these things, after much investigation and a diligent examination of the aforesaid matters, praised and unanimously approved the counsel of making reconciliation, concord, and peace.

Prudentia hijs auditis et diligenter cognitis ait: Semper audivi dici:quod bene potes facere, noli differre, ideoque consulo, ut statim fiat, quod post multas moras fieri deberet. Et sic de consensu omnium missi fueruntnuntii sapientes pro adversariis prædictis, qui illis dixerunt: ut, si placet illis, ad præfatam congregationem, causa compositionisatque concordiæ, nulla dilatione adhibita, cum juratoribus idoneisvenire non postponant. Qui benigne respondentes et gratias nuntiis agentes, rogaverunt eos, ut domino Melibeo ejusque congregationi referrent, se statimventuros, et eorum præceptis se fore in omnibus et per omnia obedireparatos.

Prudence, these things heard and diligently understood, said: I have always heard it said: what you can do well, do not defer; and therefore I advise that at once be done what after many delays ought to be done. And so, with the consent of all, wise messengers were sent to the aforesaid adversaries, who said to them: that, if it pleases them, to the aforesaid congregation, for the sake of composition and concord, with no delay applied, they should not postpone to come with suitable jurators. They, responding kindly and giving thanks to the messengers, asked them to report to lord Melibee and his congregation that they would come at once, and that to their precepts they would be ready to obey in all things and through and through.

Cum autem venire vellent, unus eorum dixit: Faciamus et nos congregationemmagnam, ut cum honore ad illos accedamus. Alius vero dixit: Hoc faciendo, mora factum nostrum cito impediret, nam

But when they wished to come, one of them said: Let us also make a great congregation, so that we may approach them with honor. But another said: By doing this, delay would quickly impede our deed, for

Tunc Melibeus surgens inter cetera dixit: Verum est, quod vos sine causajusta injuriam magnam mihi et dominæ meæ ac filiæ fecistisintrando violenter domum meam et talia faciendo, de quibus merito deberetispati mortem; unde volo a vobis audire, si vobis placet de prædictisvindictam meæ ac dominæ meæ Prudentiæ committerevoluntati.

Then Melibeus, rising, among other things said: It is true that you, without just cause, have done a great injury to me and to my lady and daughter by violently entering my house and by doing such things, for which you ought deservedly to suffer death; wherefore I wish to hear from you whether it pleases you, concerning the aforesaid, to commit the vengeance to the will of myself and of my lady Prudence.

Illi vero respondentes dixerunt: Domine, nos sumus indigni venire adcuriam tanti et talis domini; nam talia scelera commisimus de quibus mortedigni essemus; verumtamen confisi, non de nostra scientia vel potentia, sed potius de vestra solita clementia et benignitate huc venimus, et ecceparati sumus vestris parere mandatis et cum juramento ac juratoribus inomnibus et per omnia, flexis genibus fusisque lacrimis, obedire tam inpersonis quam in rebus. Et ita prostrati ad pedes Melibei et dominæPrudentiæ cadentes, cum summa devotione ab eis indulgentiam postulaverunt. Quos ipse Melibeus per mnus sublevans benigne ad sua mandata prædictomodo recepit hoc pacto, ut semel et sæpius posset contra illos præcipere, laudare ac pronuntiare.

But they, answering, said: Lord, we are unworthy to come to the curia of so great and such a lord; for we have committed such crimes of which we would be worthy of death; nevertheless, confident not in our own science or power, but rather in your accustomed clemency and benignity, we have come hither, and behold we are prepared to obey your mandates and, with oath and with jurors/sureties, in all things and through all things, with knees bent and tears poured out, to obey both as to our persons and as to our goods. And thus, prostrate, falling at the feet of Melibeus and Lady Prudence, with the highest devotion they asked from them indulgence. Whom Melibeus himself, kindly lifting up by the hand, received to his mandates in the aforesaid manner on this pact, that once and oftentimes he could command against them, praise, and pronounce (judgment).

Quibus etiam præcepit, ut hinc ad octavamante suam præsentiam illic se repræsentarent audituri suamvoluntatem atque præcepta; nam volebat cum medicis de convalescentiafiliæ suæ tractare, atque de præceptis illis faciendiscum magna deliberatione et diligenti provisione cogitare. Hijs taliterordinatis, omnes hinc inde cum lætitia et gaudio recesserunt.

He also commanded them that, a week hence, they should there present themselves before his presence to hear his will and precepts; for he wished to confer with the physicians about the convalescence of his daughter, and to consider, with great deliberation and diligent provision, about the carrying out of those precepts. These things being thus ordered, all on both sides withdrew with gladness and joy.

Post modum Melibeus, vocatis ad se medicis, de filiæ suæconvalescentia diligenter quæsivit. Cui dixerunt medici: Ecce filiatua quasi liberata est, nec de illius convalescntia te nullatenus dubitareoportet. Quos Melibeus copiose remuneravit, eosque rogavit, ut de filiæsuæ sanitate studiosissime procurarent.

Afterwards Melibeus, having called the physicians to himself, diligently inquired about his daughter’s convalescence. To him the physicians said: Behold, your daughter is as if delivered, and you ought in no way to doubt her recovery. Melibeus copiously remunerated them, and asked them to provide most studiously for his daughter’s health.

Quibus ita peractis, Prudentia, summo mane in remoto et secreto locosimul cum Melibeo existens, dixit ei: Domine, vellem a te audire cujusmodipræcepta placeat tibi nostris adversariis facere.

With these things thus accomplished, Prudence, very early in the morning, being together with Melibee in a remote and secret place, said to him: Lord, I would wish to hear from you what sort of precepts it pleases you to issue to our adversaries.

Qui dixit: Volo illos bonis omnibus spoliare illisque præcipere, ut ad partes ultramarinas se transferant, ulterius huc non reversuri.

He said: I wish to despoil them of all their goods and to command them to transfer themselves to the parts beyond the sea, never to return hither any further.

At illa dixit: Iniquum esset hoc præceptum, nec esset rationiconsentaneum. Quare, si hoc præceptum faceres, nunquam cum honorevivere valeres; nam, cum ultra modum dives existas, eorum pecunia nullatenusindiges, et de cupiditate merito posses reprehendi, quæ consuevit"radix omnium malorum" nuncupari.

But she said: This precept would be iniquitous, nor would it be consonant with reason. Wherefore, if you were to enact this precept, you would never be able to live with honor; for, since you are beyond measure rich, you in no way need their money, and for cupidity you could deservedly be reprehended, which is wont to be called “the root of all evils.”

Caput L.

Chapter 50.

De bona fama.

On good fame.

Nam melius esset tibi tantum de tuo amittere, quam sua turpiter recipere. Scriptum est enim: "Mallem perdidisse quam turpiter accepisse. " Unde diciconsuevit:

For it would be better for you to lose only of your own, than to receive your own back shamefully. For it is written: "I would prefer to have lost than to have accepted shamefully. " Whence it has been accustomed to be said:

Melibeus respondit: Non videntur mihi talia præcepta foe iniqua;nam talia scelera commiserunt, pro quibus poenam corporalem sustinendo moride jure deberent. Minus ergo punientur, si loco poenæ corporalis taliapatiantur; nam secundum jura quælibet poena corporalis durior estqualibet pecuniaria, ut leges clamant. Præterea cum Jhesus Siracdicat: "Regnum a gente in gentem transfertur propter injustitias, injuriaset contumelias:" non erit absonum, si pro injustitia, injuria et contumeliiscontra nos illatis de loco ad locum, amissa sua substantia, transferantur.

Melibeus replied: Such precepts do not seem to me therefore iniquitous; for they have committed such crimes, for which by law they ought to sustain the corporal penalty of death. They will therefore be punished less, if in place of a corporal penalty they suffer such things; for according to the laws any corporal penalty is harsher than any pecuniary one, as the laws proclaim. Moreover, since Jesus Sirach says: "The kingdom is transferred from nation to nation because of injustices, injuries, and contumelies," it will not be incongruous, if for the injustice, injury, and contumelies inflicted against us they are transferred from place to place, their substance lost.

Prudentia respondit: Jhesus Sirac loquitur de judicio divino, legesvero loquuntur de juris rigore; sed hic non debet tractari de judicio divinonec de juris rigore, sed potius de pacis et concordiæ benignitate. Quare consulo tibi, ut non taliter eos lædas, sed ab hoc malo præceptodesistas; dixit enim Constantinus imperator: Nam qui conatur perpetrarequod malum est, captivare utique studet bonitatem; cum ergo fuerit hoccertamine superatus, victoriam obtinet victus. In hoc itaque negotio tetaliter regas, ut in hac victoria per eos tibi concessa te vincas; et sicbis vincere poteris.

Prudence replied: Jesus Sirach speaks of divine judgment, but the laws speak of the rigor of right; yet here there ought to be no treatment of divine judgment nor of the rigor of law, but rather of the benignity of peace and concord. Wherefore I advise you not to injure them in such a manner, but to desist from this evil precept; for the emperor Constantine said: For he who endeavors to perpetrate what is evil does indeed strive to captivate goodness; and therefore, when he has been overcome in this contest, the vanquished obtains the victory. In this business, then, so govern yourself, that in this victory granted to you through them you may conquer yourself; and thus you will be able to conquer twice.

Ait enim Seneca: "Bis vincit qui se in victoria vincit;""is enim vinit assidue, qui novit omnia temperare. " Tempera itaque tuumanimum placabilitate atque clementia; nam Tullius dixit: "Nihil est laudabilius, nihil magno et præclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. "

For Seneca says: "He conquers twice who conquers himself in victory;""for he indeed conquers continually, who knows how to temper all things. " Therefore temper your mind with placability and clemency; for Tully said: "Nothing is more laudable, nothing more worthy of a great and illustrious man than placability and clemency. "

Caput LI.

Chapter 51.

De clementia et pietate et misericordia.

On clemency and piety and mercy.

Et alius dixit: "Perpetuo enim vincit, qui utitur clementia. " Plus etiamdico tibi, quia pietas et clementia non solum parvos vel mediocres ornantet sublimant, sed etiam magnos reges et principes decorant, eorumque imperiumcustodiunt et conservant. Quare beatus Paulus in Epistola prima ad Timotheum, dixit: "Pietas autem ad omnia utilis est, promissionem habens vitæ, quæ nunc est, et futuræ. " Et Cassiodorus dixit: "Pietas siquidemprincipum totum custodit imperium.

And another said: "For indeed he conquers perpetually, who employs clemency. " Moreover I also say to you, that piety and clemency not only adorn and exalt the small or the middling, but also decorate great kings and princes, and they guard and preserve their dominion. Wherefore Blessed Paul in the First Epistle to Timothy said: "But piety is useful for all things, having the promise of the life which now is, and of that which is to come. " And Cassiodorus said: "Indeed, the piety of princes guards the whole empire. "

" Et Salomon in Proverbiis dixit: "Misericordiaet veritas custodiunt regem; et roboratur clementia tronus ejus. " Et Constantinusimperator dixit: Omnium etenim se esse verum dominum comprobat, qui verumse servum pietatis demonstrat. Vere enim omnium adversantium poterimusesse victores, si a sola pietate vincamur.

" And Solomon in the Proverbs said: "Mercy and truth guard the king; and his throne is strengthened by clemency. " And the emperor Constantine said: For he proves himself to be the true lord of all, who demonstrates himself to be the true servant of piety. Truly indeed we shall be able to be victors over all adversaries, if we are conquered by piety alone.

Et Seneca, De Clementia Imperatoris, dixit: "Nullum clementia magis decet quam regem;" et iterum: "Iracundisimæet parvi corporis sunt apes, rex tamen earum sine aculeo est. " Exerceasergo circa hanc vindictam placabilitatem, clementiam et pietatem: alioquin, si vindictam cum iniquitate, prædictis omissis, exerceres, post famammalam de tali victoria multum doleres, tibique accideret quod Seneca dixit:"Male vincit, quem poenitet victoriæ;" melius est enim ignoscere, quam post victoriam poenitere. Quare consulo tibi, ut sensum Senecæsequaris, qui dixit: "Si forte inimicum tuum in potestate tua videris, vindictam putabis vindicare potuisse.

And Seneca, On the Clemency of the Emperor, said: "Clemency becomes no one more than a king;" and again: "Bees are most irascible and of small body, yet their king is without a sting. " Therefore, around this vengeance, exercise placability, clemency, and piety: otherwise, if you should exercise vengeance with iniquity, the aforesaid being omitted, afterward, after ill fame about such a victory, you would grieve much, and it would befall you what Seneca said:"He wins ill, who repents of victory;" for it is better to forgive than to repent after victory. Wherefore I advise you to follow Seneca’s sense, who said: "If perchance you should see your enemy in your power, you will reckon it vengeance to have been able to take vengeance.

Scito enim honestum et magnum vindictægenus, ignoscere. " Misericordiam itaque in hoc tuo judicio exerceas, utDeus in suo ultimo judicio tui misereatur ac tibi pareat: alioquin Deussine misericordia te puniret. Ait enim beatus Jacobus in Epistola sua:"Judicium enim sine misericordia fiet ei, qui non fecerit misericordiam."

Know indeed that the honorable and great kind of vengeance is to forgive. " Mercy therefore in this your judgment you should exercise, that God in his last judgment may have mercy on you and be favorable to you: otherwise God without mercy would punish you. For the blessed James in his Epistle says:"Judgment indeed without mercy will be for him who has not shown mercy."

Hijs auditis et diligenter cognitis, Melibeus dixit: "Unguente et variisodoribus delectatur cor, et bonis amici consiliis anima dulcoratur. " Hincest quod, propter dulcia et suavia tua consilia mutato meo proposito, tuamvolo sequi benignitatem, et in hoc negotio in omnibus et per omnia tuamfacere voluntatem.

Having heard these things and diligently come to know them, Melibeus said: " With unguent and various odors the heart is delighted, and by the good counsels of a friend the soul is sweetened. " Hence it is that, on account of your sweet and suave counsels, with my purpose changed, I wish to follow your benignity, and in this business in all things and through all things to do your will.

Adveniente itaque termino constituto, prædicti adversarii cumjuratoribus suis ad curiam domini Melibei accedentes, flexisque genibussuis fusisque lacrimis ad pedes dicti domini ac dominæ Prudentiæprostrati dixerunt: Ecce venimus huc parati in omnibus et per omnia vestrisobedire præceptis. Verumtamen, licet indigni, vestram exoramus dominationem, quatenus, erga nos non exercentes vindictam, sed potius placabilitatem, clementiam et pietatem, nobis subditis vestris donare dignemini indulgentiam. Eritis namque inde potentiores; scriptum est enim: "Multa ignoscendo potensfit potentior."

Therefore, with the appointed term arriving, the aforesaid adversaries, with their jurors, approaching the court of Lord Melibeus, and with their knees bent and their tears poured out, prostrated at the feet of the said lord and of Lady Prudence, said: Behold, we have come hither ready in all things and through all things to obey your precepts. Nevertheless, although unworthy, we implore your lordship that, not exercising vengeance toward us, but rather placability, clemency, and piety, you may deign to grant to us, your subjects, indulgence. For you will be the more powerful thereby; for it is written: "By forgiving much, the powerful becomes more powerful."

Tunc Melibeus de voluntate et consensu dominæ Prudentiædixit: Licet magna superbia in vobis contra nos præcesserit, majortamen humilitas est secuta, quæ, etsi minor esset, tamen omnibusmalis præponderare debet, cum plus debeat prodesse bonum quam noceremalum. Præterea, dulcia verba vestra mollesque responsiones nostrammitigaverunt iram et indignationem, secundum verbum Salamonis dicentis:"Verbum dulce multiplicat amicos et mitigat inimicos;" et iterum: "Mollisresponsio frangit iram: sermo quoque durus suscitat furorem;" et etiamsecundum auctoritatem illam: "Principium amicitiæ est bene loqui;male dicere vero est exordium inimicitiarum. " Insuper etiam vestra devotiocordisque contritio et poenitentia atque peccati confessio nos induxeruntad placabilitatem, clementiam et pietatem. Respicientes igitur ad vicinitatem, quia Ò ut ait Salomon Ò "melior est vicinus juxta quam frater procul, "et ad dictum Catonis dicentis:

Tunc Melibeus de voluntate et consensu dominæ Prudentiædixit: Although great superbia in you has gone before against us, yet greater humilitas has followed, which, even if it were lesser, nevertheless ought to outweigh all evils, since good ought to profit more than evil to harm. Moreover, your sweet words and soft responses have mitigated our ira and indignation, according to the word of Solomon saying: "A sweet word multiplies friends and mitigates enemies;" and again: "A soft answer breaks wrath; likewise a hard speech stirs up fury;" and also according to that auctoritas: "The beginning of friendship is to speak well; but to speak ill is indeed the exordium of enmities." Furthermore, your devotio and contrition of heart and penitence and confession of sin have led us to placability, clemency, and pietas. Looking therefore to neighborhood, because Ò as Solomon says Ò "a neighbor near is better than a brother far off," and to the saying of Cato saying:

Et ita utraque pars cum gaudio et lætitia recesserunt.

And so both parties departed with joy and gladness.

Explicit Liber consolationis et consilii, quem Albertanus, causidicusBrixiensis, de ora Sanctæ Agathæ, compilavit atque composuitsub anno domini M^oCC^oXL^oVI^o, in mensibus aprilis et maii.

Explicit Book of consolation and counsel, which Albertanus, advocateBrescian, from the parish of Saint Agatha, compiled and composedin the year of the Lord 1246, in the months of april and may.