Boethius de Dacia: DE SUMMO BONO

Cum in omni specie entis sit aliquod summum bonum possibile, et homo quaedam est species entis, oportet quod aliquod summum bonum sit homim possibile. Non dico summum bonum absolute, sed summum sibi, bona enim possibila homini finem habent nec procedunt in infinitum. Quid autem sit hoc summum bonum, quod est homini possibile, per rationem investigemus.

Since in every species of being there is some highest possible good, and man is a certain species of being, it follows that some highest good is possible for man. I do not say the highest good absolutely, but the highest for himself, for goods possible to man have an end and do not proceed to infinity. But what this highest good is, which is possible for man, let us investigate by reason.

Summum bonum quod est homini possibile debetur sibi secundum optimam suam virtutem. Non enim secundum animam vegetativam, quae plantarum est, nec secundum animam sensitivam quae bestiarum est, unde et delectationes sensibiles bestiarum sunt. Optima autem virtus hominis ratio et intellectus est; est enim summum regimen vitae humanae tam in speculando quam in operando.

The highest good that is possible for man is owed to him according to his best virtue. For not according to the vegetative soul, which belongs to plants, nor according to the sensitive soul which belongs to beasts, whence also are the sensible delights of beasts. But the best virtue of man is reason and intellect; for it is the supreme governance of human life both in speculating and in operating.

Ergo summum bonum quod est homini possibile debetur sibi secundum intellectum. Et idea dolere debent homines qui tantum delectationibus sensibilibus detinentur quod bona intellectualia omittunt, quia suum summum bonum numquam attingunt; tantum enim sunt dediti sensibus quod non quaerunt quod est bonum ipsius intellectus. Contra quos exclamat Philosophus dicens: “Vae vobis homines qui computati estis in numero bestiarum ei quod in vobis divinum est non intendentes!” Divinum autem in homine vocat intellectum; si enim in homine aliquid divinum est, dignum est quod hoc sit intellectus.

Therefore the highest good that is possible for man is due to him according to the intellect. And therefore men ought to grieve who are held only by sensible delights, in that they omit intellectual goods, because they never attain their highest good; for they are so devoted to the senses that they do not seek what is the good of the intellect itself. Against these the Philosopher cries out, saying: “Woe to you men who have been counted among the number of beasts, you who do not attend to that which is divine in you!” By the divine in man he means the intellect; for if anything in man is divine, it is fitting that this be the intellect.

Sicut enim quod in tota universitate entium optimum est hoc divinum est, ita et quod in homine optimum est hoc divinum vocamus.

For just as that which is best in the whole universe of beings is divine, so likewise that which is best in a man we call divine.

Praeterea, cum intellectus humani una sit potentia speculativa et alia practica, quod apparet ex hoc quod homo quorundam est speculativus quorum non est activus, ut aeternorum, et quorundam etiam est activus secundum regimen intellectus per quod operatur medium eligibile in omnibus actionibus humanis, ex hoc scimus has duas potentias intellectuales in genere esse in homine. Summum autem bonum quod est homini possibile secundum potentiam intellectus speculativam est cognitio veri et delectatio in eodem. Nam cognitio veri delectabilis est.

Moreover, since the human intellect is one power speculative and another practical, which is shown by this: that some men are speculative who are not active, as concerning eternal things, and some are also active according to the regimen of the intellect by which it operates an eligibile mean in all human actions, from this we know that these two intellectual powers in general are in man. The highest good, however, that is possible to man according to the power of the speculative intellect is the cognition of truth and delectation in the same. For the cognition of truth is delightful.

Intellectum enim delectat intellegentem, et quanto intellectum magis fuerit mirabile et magis nobile, et quanto intellectus comprehendens fuerit maioris virtutis in comprehendendo perfecte, tanto delectatio intellectualis est maior. Et qui gustavit talem delectationem spernit omnem minorem ut sensibilem, quae in veritate minor est et vilior. Et homo qui eam eligit propter eam vilior est, quam qui eligit primam.

For the intelligible delights the intellect, and the more wonderful and more noble the intelligible is, and the greater the virtue of the apprehending intellect in apprehending perfectly, the greater is the intellectual delectation. And he who has tasted such delectation scorns every lesser one, as the sensible, which in truth is lesser and more vile. And the man who chooses it for its own sake is more vile than he who chooses the former.

Unde ex hoc quod intellectum delectat intellegentem vult Philosophus in XI. Metaphysicae quod intellectus primus vitam habet voluptuosissimam. Cum enim intellectus primus sit maximae virtutis in intellegendo, intellegibile autem quod intellegit sit nobilissimum quia sui ipsius essentia—quid enim nobilus potest intellectus divinus intellegere quam sit essentia divina?—ideo habet vitam voluptuosissimam. Unde cum nullum maius bonum possit homini contingere per intellectum speculativum quam cognitio universitatis entium quae sunt a prima principia et per hoc primi principii, sicut possibile est, et delectatio in illa, tunc sequitur quod superius conclusum est, quod summum bonum, quod est homini possibile secundum intellectum speculativum, est cognitio veri in singulis et delectatio in eadem.

Wherefore from this — that the intellect delights the intelligible — the Philosopher says in 11. of the Metaphysics that the first intellect has a most voluptuous life. For since the first intellect is of the greatest power in understanding, and the intelligible which it understands is most noble because it is the essence of itself—what more noble thing can the divine intellect understand than that the divine essence is?—therefore it has a most voluptuous life. Whence, since no greater good can happen to a man by the speculative intellect than the cognition of the totality of beings which are from and, so far as possible, through the first principles, and the delectation in that, it then follows that what was concluded above follows, namely that the supreme good which is possible to man according to the speculative intellect is the cognition of truth in particulars and delectation in the same.

Item, summum bonum quod est homini possibile secundum intellectum practicum est operatio boni et delectatio in eadem. Quid enim maius bonum potest homini contingere secundum intellectum practicum quam operari medium eligibile in omnibus actionibus humanis et in illa delectari? Non enim est iustus nisi qui in operibus iustitiae delectatur.

Also, the highest good that is possible for a man according to practical intellect is the operation of the good and delight in the same. For what greater good can befall a man according to practical intellect than to work the mean chosen as fitting in all human actions and to delight in that? For he is not just except he who delights in the works of justice.

Et eadem modo intellegendum est de operibus aliarum virtutum moralium.

And the same in like manner is to be understood concerning the works of the other moral virtues.

Ex his quae dicta sunt manifeste concludi potest quod summum bonum quod est homini possibile est cognitio veri et operatio boni et delectatio in utroque.

From these things which have been said it can be plainly concluded that the highest good which is possible for man is the cognition of truth and the operation of the good and delight in both.

Et quia summum bonum quod est homini possibile est eius beatitudo, || sequitur quod cognitio veri et operatio boni et delectatio in utroque sit beatitudo humana. Propter hoc enim ars militaris ordinata est in civitate a legislatore, ut expulsis hostibus cives possint vacare virtutibus intellectualibus contemplantes verum et virtutibus moralibus operantes bonum et vivant vitam beatam; in his enim duobus consistit vita beata. Hoc enim est maius bonum quod homo a deo recipere potest et quod deus homini dare potest in hac vita.

And because the highest good that is possible for man is his beatitude, || it follows that the cognition of truth and the operation of good and delight in both is human beatitude. For for this reason the military art is ordained in the state by the legislator, so that, with enemies expelled, citizens may be able to devote themselves to the intellectual virtues, contemplating the True, and to the moral virtues, performing the good, and may live a blessed life; for in these two the blessed life consists. For this is the greater good which man can receive from God and which God can give to man in this life.

Et ille homo rationabiliter longam vitam desiderat, qui eam propter hoc desiderat, ut perfectiorem se reddat in hoc bono. Qui enim perfectior est in beatitudine, quam in hac vita homini possibile esse per rationem scirnus, ipso propinquior est beatitudini quam in vita futura per fidem expectamus. Et cum tantum bonum sit homini possibile, sicut jam dictum est, dignum est ut omnes actiones humanae in ipsum dirigantur, ut ipsum concludant.

And that man reasonably desires a long life who desires it for this reason, that he may make himself more perfect in this good. For whoever is more perfect in beatitude, insofar as by reason we know that such beatitude is possible for man in this life, is thereby nearer to beatitude than he who in the future life we await by faith. And since such a good is possible for man, as has already been said, it is fitting that all human actions be directed toward it, so as to attain it.

Sicut enim omnes actiones in loge aliqua rectae sunt et ut oportet, cum tendunt in finem legis, et meliores secundum quod fini legis propinquiores, actiones autem, quae adversantur fini legis, vel quae deminutae sunt—non perfectae secundum praecepta legis—vel etiam indifferentes—scilicet nec oppositae fini legis nec secundum praecepta legis— omnes tales actiones peccatum sunt in lege illa, secundum tamen magis et minus, ut patere potest ex dictis, sic est in homine, quia omnes intentiones et consilia, actiones et desideria hominis quae tendunt in hoc summum bonum, quod est homini possibile, quod iam dictum est, recta sunt et secundum quod oportet. Et cum homo sic operatur, naturaliter operatur, quia operatur propter summum bonum ad quod innatus est. Et cum operatur sic bene ordinatus est, quia tunc ordinatur ad optimum et ultimum suum finem.

For just as all actions in any law are straight and as they ought to be when they aim at the law’s end, and are better in proportion as they are nearer the law’s end, while actions that oppose the law’s end, or that are diminished—not perfect according to the precepts of the law—or even indifferent—namely neither opposed to the law’s end nor according to the precepts of the law—all such actions are sin in that law, albeit more or less, as can be seen from what has been said, so it is in man: for all intentions and counsels, actions and desires of a man that tend toward this highest good, which is possible for man, as has already been said, are right and as they ought to be. And when a man thus acts, he acts naturally, because he acts for the highest good to which he is innate. And when he thus acts well he is ordered, because then he is ordered to his best and ultimate end.

Omnes autem actiones hominis quae non ordinantur ad hoc bonum vel quae non sunt tales, per quas homo redditur fortior et magis diapositus ad operationes, quae ordinantur ad hoc bonum, peccatum sunt in homme. Unde homo felix nihil operatur nisi opera felicitatis vel opera per quae redditur fortior vel magis habilis ad opera felicitatis. Ideo felix sive dormiat sive vigilet sive comedat, felicitor vivit, dummodo illa facit, ut reddatur fortior ad opera felicitatis.

All the actions of a man that are not ordered toward this good, or that are not such as by which a man is rendered stronger and more disposed for the operations that are ordered toward this good, are sins in man. Hence a happy man works nothing except works of happiness, or works by which he is rendered stronger or more fit for the works of happiness. Therefore a happy man, whether he sleeps or watches or eats, lives more happily, provided that he does those things which make him stronger for the works of happiness.

Unde omnes actiones hominis, quae non diriguntur in hoc summum bonum hominis, quod iam dictum est, sive opponantur sibi, sive sint indifferentes, peccatum sunt in homine, secundum tamen magis et minus, ut patet ex se. Et omnium illarum actionum causa est inordinata concupiscentia, quae etiam est causa omnis mali in moribus. Inordinata etiam concupiscentia hominis ipsa est causa maxime impediens hominem a suo desiderate naturaliter. Cum enim omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant, paucissimi tamen hominum, de quo dolor est, studio sapientiae vacant inordinata concupiscentia eos a tanto bono impediente.

Wherefore all the actions of man which are not directed to this highest good of man, which has already been said, whether they oppose it, or are indifferent, are sin in man, yet according to more or less, as is evident in itself. And the cause of all those actions is disordered concupiscence, which also is the cause of all evil in morals. Disordered concupiscence of man itself is the chief cause hindering a man from his naturally desired good. For although all men naturally desire to know, very few of men, which is a matter of sorrow, apply themselves to the study of wisdom, concupiscence impeding them from so great a good.

Videmus enim quondam pigritiam vitae sequi, quosdam autem voluptates sensibiles detestabiles et quondam desiderium bonorum fortunae. Et ita omnes hominen hodie impedit inordinata concupiscentia a suo summo bono exceptis paucissimis honorandis viris; quos voco honorandos, quia contemnunt desiderium sensus et sequuntur delectationem et desiderium intellectus insudantes cognitioni veritatis rerum; quos etiam voce honorandem, quia vivunt secundum ordinem naturalem. Nam sicut omnes virtutes inferiores, quae sunt in homine, naturaliter sunt propter virtutem supremam—nutritiva enim est propter sensitivam, eo quod sensitiva perfectio est corporis cuiusdam animati, corpus autem animatum non potent esse sine nutrimento, nutritiva autem virtus est quae nutrimentum alterat et convertit, propter quod contingit quod nutritiva in homine sit propter sensitivam.

For we see that formerly sloth follows life, and sometimes sensual pleasures are detestable and sometimes the desire for goods of fortune. And thus inordinate concupiscence today hinders all men from their highest good, excepting a very few men worthy of honor; whom I call worthy of honor, because they contemn the desire of the senses and follow the delectation and desire of the intellect, laboring at the cognition of the truth of things; whom I also call worthy of honor, because they live according to the natural order. For just as all the lower virtues that are in man are naturally for the sake of the highest virtue—nutritive indeed is for the sensitive, because sensitive perfection is of a certain animated body, and an animated body cannot be without nourishment, the nutritive virtue is that which alters and converts nourishment—wherefore it happens that the nutritive in man is for the sake of the sensitive.

Sensitiva autem est propter intellectivam, eo quod intellecta in nobis sunt ex imaginatis, ideo difficilius illa intellegimus, quae secundum se esse imaginatum habere non possunt in nobis. Imaginatio autem non comprehendit nisi post sensum, cuius probatio est, quia omnis imaginans sensibiliter afficitur. Unde secundum Philosophum imaginatio sive phantasia est motus factus ex sensu secundum actum—sic operationes omnium virtutum inferiorum quae sunt in homine sunt propter operationes virtutis supremae, quae est intellectus.

The sensitive power, however, is for the sake of the intellectual, because intelligible things in us are from the imaginings; therefore we more difficultly understand those things which by themselves cannot be held as imagined in us. Imagination, however, grasps nothing except after sense, whose proof is that every one who imagines is sensibly affected. Whence, according to the Philosopher, imaginatio or phantasia is a motion made from sense according to act—so the operations of all the lower virtues which are in man are for the sake of the operations of the supreme virtue, which is the intellect.

Et inter operationes virtutis intellectivae, si aliqua est optima et perfectissima, omnes naturaliter sunt || propter illam. Et cum homo est in illa operatione, est in optimo statu qui est homini possibilis. Et isti sunt philosophi, qui ponunt vitam suam in studio sapientiae.

And among the operations of the intellective virtue, if any be best and most perfect, all are naturally for that || because of it. And when a man is in that operation, he is in the best state that is possible for a man. And these are the philosophers, who place their life in the study of wisdom.

Unde omnes virtutes quae sunt in philosopho operantur secundum ordinem naturalem: prior propter posteriorem et inferior propter superiorem et perfectiorem. Omnes autem alii homines qui vivunt secundum virtutes inferiores eligentes operationes enim et delectationes, quae sunt in illis operibus, innaturaliter ordinati sunt et peccant contra ordinem naturalem. Declinatio enim hominis ab ordine naturali peccatum est in homine, et quia philosophus ab hoc ordine non declinat, propter hoc contra ordinem naturalem non peccat.

Whence all the virtues that are in the philosopher operate according to the natural order:
the prior for the sake of the posterior and the inferior for the sake of the superior and more perfect. All
other men, however, who live according to inferior virtues—choosing indeed the operations and delights
that are in those works—are unnaturally ordered and sin against the natural order. For the declension of a man from the natural order
is sin in man, and because the philosopher does not decline from this order, for that reason he does not sin against the natural order.

Est etiam philosophus virtuosus moraliter loquendo propter tria. Unum est quod ipse cognoscit turpitudinem actionis, in qua consistit vitium, et nobilitatem actionis, in qua consistit virtus, ideo facilius potest eligere unum istorum et vitare reliquum et semper agere secundum rectam rationem, qui cum sic agit numquam peccat. Hoc autem non contingit ignoranti, nam ignorantem grave est recte agere.

There is also the virtuous philosopher, morally speaking, for three reasons. One is that he himself knows the turpitude of an action, in which the vice consists, and the nobility of an action, in which virtue consists; therefore he can more easily choose one of these and avoid the remainder, and always act according to right reason, — he who thus acts never sins. This, however, does not befall the ignorant, for it is hard for the ignorant to act rightly.

Secundum est quia qui gustavit delectationem maiorem spernit omnem delectationem minorem; philosophus autem gustavit delectationem intellectualem in speculando veritates entium, quae est maior quam delectatio sensus; ideo spernit delectationes sensibiles. Et plura peccata et vitia sunt in excessu delectationis sensibilis. Tertium est quia in intellegendo et speculando non est peccatum, in simpliciter enim bonis non est possibilis excessus et peccatum; actio autem philosophi est speculatio veritatis; ideo philosophus est facilius virtuosus quam alius.

Second, because one who has tasted a greater delectation scorns every lesser delectation; the philosopher, however, has tasted the intellectual delectation in speculating the truths of beings, which is greater than the delectation of the senses; therefore he scorns sensible delectations. And there are more sins and vices in the excess of sensible delectation. Third, because in understanding and speculating there is no sin — for in simple goods excess and sin are not possible; the action of the philosopher, however, is the speculation of truth; therefore the philosopher is more easily virtuous than another.

Ideo philosophus vivit sicut homo innatus est vivere et secundum ordinem naturalem, cum onmes virtutes in eo inferiores et actiones earum sint propter virtutes superiores et actiones earum, et omnes universaliter propter virtutem supremam et actionem ultimam, quae est speculatio veritatis et delectatio in illa, et praecipue veritatis primae; numquam enim satiatur appetitus sciendi, donec sciatur ens increatum. Quaestio enim de intellectu divino est naturaliter sciri desiderata ab omnibus hominibus, ut dicit Commentator. Desiderium enim cuiuslibet scibilis est aliquod desiderium primi scibilis, cuius probatio est quod quanto entia magis appropinquant primo scibili, tanto magis illa scire desideramus, et tanto magis in speculatione eorum debectamur.

Therefore the philosopher lives as a man is by nature to live and according to the natural order, since all the virtues in him are inferior and their actions are because of the superior virtues and their actions, and all universally for the supreme virtue and ultimate action, which is the contemplation of truth and the delectation in that, and especially of the first truth; for the appetite of knowing is never satisfied until the uncreated being is known. For the question about the divine intellect is by nature desired to be known by all men, as the Commentator says. For the desire of any knowable thing is some desire of the first knowable, whose proof is that the more beings approach the first knowable, the more we desire to know them, and the more we are carried away in the contemplation of them.

Ideo philosophus speculando entia causata, quae sunt in mundo, et naturas eorum et ordinem eorum ad invicem inducitur in speculationem altissimarum causarum rerum, quia cognitio effectuum est quaedam manuductio in cognitionem suae causae; et cognoscens causas superiores et naturas earum esse tales, quod necesse est eas habere aliam causam, inducitur in cognitionem primae causae. Et in speculando consistit delectatio et maior, cum intellegibilia sint nobiliora. Ideo philosophus ducit vitam valde voluptuosam.

Therefore the philosopher
by speculating on caused beings, which are in the world, and on their natures and their order one with another, is led into the speculation of the highest causes of things, because the cognition of effects is a certain manuduction into the cognition of their cause; and, knowing that higher causes and their natures are such as they must have another cause, he is led into the cognition
of the first cause. And in speculating there is delight, and a greater (delight), since intelligibles are nobler. Therefore the philosopher leads a very pleasurable life.

Philosophus etiam cognoscens et considerans quod necesse est hanc causam esse sibi ipsi causam essendi, hoc est aliam causam non habere; si enim in mundo nihil esset quod aliam causam non haberet, universaliter nihil esset.

The philosopher also, knowing and considering that it is necessary that this cause be to itself the cause of being, that is, to have no other cause; for if in the world there were nothing that did not have another cause, universally nothing would be.

Considerans etiam quod necesse est hanc causam esse aeternam et incommutabilem, semper uno modo se habentem, si enim ipsa non esset aeterna, universaliter nihil esset aeternum. Et iterum cum quaedam in mundo sint entia nova, et unum novum non potest esse causa sufficiens alterius novi, ut ex se patet, sequitur manifeste quod omnia nova quae sunt in mundo universaliter sunt ex causa aeterna. Et causa etiam est incommutabilis semper uno modo se habens, quia transmutatio non est possibilis nisi in rebus imperfectis, et si aliquod est ens perfectissimum in mundo, dignum est quod hoc sit prima causa.

Considering also that it is necessary that this cause be eternal and incommutable, always comporting itself in one manner; for if it itself were not eternal, universally nothing would be eternal. And again, since some things in the world are new beings, and one new thing cannot be a sufficient cause of another new thing, as is manifest in itself, it plainly follows that all new things which are in the world universally are from an eternal cause. And the cause is also incommutable, always comporting itself in one manner, because transmutation is not possible except in imperfect things, and if there is any most perfect being in the world, it is fitting that this be the first cause.

Considerans etiam quod necesse est totum ens mundi, quod est citra hanc primam causam, esse ex ipsa, et quod sicut haec prima causa est causa productionis entium, sic et ordinationis eorum ad in || vicem et conservationis eorum in esse, quorundam secundum suum numerum et sine omni transmutatione, sicut substantiarum separatarum, et quorundam secundum numerum suum, tamen cum transmutatione, sicut corporum caeli, et quorundam secundum suam speciem tantum, sicut sunt illa quae sub orbe sunt, sicut sunt infimus gradus entium.

Considering also that the whole being of the world, which is citra this first cause, is from it, and that just as this first cause is the cause of the production of beings, so likewise of their ordination in || turn and of their conservation in being, some according to their number and without any transmutation, like the separated substances, and some according to their number, yet with transmutation, like the bodies of the heavens, and some according to their species only, such as those which are under the orb, namely the lowest grades of beings.

Considerans etiam quod sicut omnia sunt ex hac prima causa, sic omnia ad ipsam ordinantur; nam ens illud in quo principium, a quo omnia, coniungitur fini, ad quem omnia, hoc est ens primum secundum philosophos et secundum sanctos deus benedictus. In hoc tamen ordine latitudo est, et entia, quae in hoc ordine primo principio magis sunt propinqua, sunt entia nobiliora et imagis perfecta. Quae autem sunt in hoc ordine magis remota a primo principio, me sunt entia magis deminuta et minus perfecta.

Considering also that just as all things are from this first cause, so all things are ordered to it; for that being in which the principle, from whom all things, is joined to the end, to whom all things, that is the first being according to the philosophers and according to the saints, blessed God. In this order, however, there is a latitude, and the entia which in this order are more near to the first principle are nobler entia and perfect in image. But those which in this order are more remote from the first principle are more diminished entia and less perfect.

Est enim hoc primum principium in hoc mundo sicut paterfamilias in domo et dux in exercitu et bonum commune in civitate. Et sicut exercitus est unus ab unitate ducis, et bonum exercitus per se est in duce, in aliis autem est secundum ordinem quem habent ad ducem, sic ex unitate humus primi principii est unitas huius mundi, et bonum huius mundi per se est in hoc primo principio, in aliis autem entibus mundi secundum participationem ab hoc primo principio et ordinem ad ipsum, ut nullum sit bonum in aliquo ente mundi, nisi sit ab hoc primo principio participatum. Philosophus haec omnia considerans inducitur in admirationem huius primi principii et in amorem eius, quia nos amamus illud a quo nobis bona proveniunt, et maxime id amamus a quo nobis maxima bona proveniunt.

For this first principle in this world is as the paterfamilias in a house and as a dux in an army and as the common good in a city. And just as an army is one from the unity of its leader, and the good of the army is in the leader per se, and in the others only according to the order they have toward the leader, so from the unity of the first principle is the unity of this world, and the good of this world is in that first principle per se, while in the other beings of the world it is by participation from that first principle and by order toward it; so that there is no good in any being of the world unless it be participated from this first principle. The Philosopher, considering all these things, is led into admiration of this first principle and into love of it, for we love that from which good things come to us, and especially we love that from which the greatest goods come to us.

Ideo philosophus cognoscens omnia sua bona sibi provenire ex hoc primo principio et sibi conservari, quantum conservantur, per hoc primum principium inducitur in maximum amorem huius primi principii et secundum rectam rationem naturae et secundum rationem rectam intellectualem. Et quia quilibet delectatur in illo quod amat et maxime delectatur in illo quod maxime amat, et philosophus maximum amorem habet primi principii, sicut declaratum est, sequitur quod philosophus in primo principio maxime delectatur et in contemplatione bonitatis suae. Et haec sola est recta delectatio.

Therefore the philosopher, knowing that all his goods come to him from this First Principle and are conserved for him by it, as far as they are conserved, through this First Principle is led into the greatest love of this First Principle both according to the right reason of nature and according to right intellectual reason. And because each one delights in that which he loves and delights most in that which he most loves, and the philosopher has the greatest love of the First Principle, as has been declared, it follows that the philosopher delights most in the First Principle and in the contemplation of his goodness. And this alone is true delectation.

Haec est vita philosophi, quam quicumque non habuerit non habet rectam vitam. Philosophum autem voco omnem hominem viventem secundum rectum ordinem naturae, et qui acquisivit optimum et ultimum finem vitae humanae. Primum autem principium, de quo sermo factus est, est deus gloriosus et sublimis, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum.

This is the life of the philosopher, which whoever has not had does not have the right life. By philosopher I mean every man living according to the right order of nature, and who has acquired the best and ultimate end of human life. The first principle, about which the discourse was made, is God, glorious and sublime, who is blessed for the ages of ages.

Amen.