Pseudoplatonica: Clitophon

So. Nuper mihi retulit quidam Clitophontem, Aristonymi filius, loquentem cum Lysia, Socratis quidem consuetudine vituperare, Thrasymachi vero laudare magnopere solitum.

So. Recently a certain man told me that Clitophon, son of Aristonymus, speaking with Lysias, was wont to disparage Socrates’ manner, but on the other hand to praise Thrasymachus greatly.

Cli. Quisquis ille, o Socrates, fuerit, haud recte narravit, quae de te cum Lysia sum locutus. Nam in quibusdam laudavi te, in quibusdam minime.

Cli. Whoever that man was, O Socrates, he has not rightly reported the things I spoke with Lysias about you. For in some respects I praised you, in others not at all.

Postquam vero aperte succenses mihi, quamquam dissimulas, te nihil curare, libentissime ego ipse tibi illa referam: praesertim cum soli simus: ne adeo te despici putes. Forte enim nunc non recte audisti: quodcirca infensior mihi redditus es, quam deceat. At si ipse mihi potestatem libere loquendi dederis, libentissime rem tibi narrabo.

But after you have openly shown yourself enraged toward me, although you feign not to care, I myself will most gladly recount those things to you: especially since we are alone; do not think therefore that I despise you. For perhaps you have not now heard rightly; on that account you have been made more hostile to me than is fitting. But if you yourself give me the authority to speak freely, I will most gladly tell you the matter.

So. At turpe nimium esset, si te, prodesse mihi volentem, non tolerem. Constat enim ubi intellexero, qua malus, qua bonus sim, deteriora declinaturum esse pro viribus, meliora prosecuturum.

So. But it would be far too shameful if I did not tolerate you, you wishing to be of service to me. For it is certain that when I shall have understood in what ways I am bad and in what ways good, you will, as far as your powers allow, turn away from the worse things and pursue the better.

Cli. Audi igitur. Equidem tecum versatus, saepenumero, Socrates, vehementer obstupui, dum te loquentem audirem, mihique visus es praeclarissime omnium dicere, quoties obiurgans homines, veluti e machina tragica deus, subito exclamares, 'Quoniam ruitis, homines?

Cli. Listen then. Indeed, Socrates, having often conversed with you, I was greatly astonished while I heard you speaking, and you seemed to me to speak most splendidly of all, whenever, reproving men, like a god from the tragic machine, you suddenly cried out, 'Why do you rush, men?'

Nescitis, quo feramini, neque opportunum quidquam agitis, qui omni studio pecuniis cumulandis incumbitis, filios autem, quibus eas relicturi estis, negligitis, neque, ut illis iuste uti sciant, eos iustitiae praeceptoribus commendatis, qui doceant iustitiam, si doceri potest, et si exercitatione ac consuetudine comparanda est, diligenter exerceant. Neque vos ipsos curastis umquam. Sed cum videatis, litteras, musicam et gymnasticam vos filiosque vestros ad sufficientiam consecutos, quam virtutis disciplinam perfectam existimatis, deinde nihilominus circa pecunias pravos esse, cur non praesentem educationem contemnitis?

You do not know whither you are being borne, nor do you do anything fitting, you who with all zeal apply yourselves to the accumulating of money, and yet neglect the sons to whom you will bequeath it, nor do you entrust them to preceptors of justice so that they may learn to use it rightly, who may teach justice, if it can be taught, and if it must be acquired by exercise and habit, may train them diligently. Nor have you ever taken care of yourselves. But since you see that you and your sons have attained a sufficiency in letters, music, and gymnastics, which you think the perfect discipline of virtue, and yet are still corrupt regarding money, why do you despise the education of the present?

Cur non quaeritis aliquos, qui vos ab hac in musica dissonantia liberent? Etenim propter hoc delictum socordimaque magis, quam propter pedis ad lyram dissonam motionem, et frater adversus fratrem, et civitas adversus civitatem, immoderata et discordi seditione suborta feruntur, et commisso proelio extrema patiuntur et inferunt. Vos autem dicitis, non propter ruditatem inscitiamque, sed sponte iniustos esse eos, qui sunt iniusti: rursusque asserere non dubitatis, iniustitiam turpem esse rem, Deoque odiosam.

Why do you not seek some men who will free you from this dissonance in music? For on account of this fault, and more from sloth than from a discordant movement of the foot to the lyre, brother rises against brother and city against city, they are borne into immoderate and discordant sedition, and with battle joined they suffer and inflict the utmost harms. But you say that those who are unjust are unjust not because of roughness and ignorance but of their own will; and again you do not hesitate to assert that injustice is a shameful thing, and odious to God.

Quam igitur, ob causam hoc tantum malum sponte quis eligit? Respondetis, hominem superatum voluptatibus id subire. Nonne superari, praeter voluntatem est, quandoquidem ex voluntate est superare?

For what, then, cause does anyone willingly choose this so great evil? You answer, that a man overcome by pleasures undergoes it. Is not being overcome beyond the will, when to overcome is from the will?

Quapropter iniuste agere, praeter voluntatem esse, omnino ratio convincit. Diligentiore itaque curam, quam solet, adhibere, et viros omnes privatim et publice civitates decet. Quoties ista, Socrates, audio te dicentem, mirum in modum delector ac laudo, idemque facio, cum ea, quae sequnntur, ausculto.

Wherefore that to act unjustly is beyond the will is altogether proven by reason. It therefore behoves to apply more diligent care than is usual, and it suits all men privately and states publicly. How often, Socrates, when I hear you saying these things I am marvelously delighted and I praise them, and I do likewise when I listen to those things which follow.

Addis enim eos, quicunque corpus quidem exercent, animum vero negligunt, quod natura subiectum est, colere; spernere vero, quod imperat. Item unicuique usum eius rei, qua uti nescit, relinquere. Illi vero, qui oculis, auribus, toto corpore nescit uti, praestare neque videre, neque audire, neque aliter uti corpore, quam uti.

For they add that whoever indeed trains the body but neglects the mind, which by nature is to be cultivated as a subject, reveres what is subject and scorns what commands. Likewise, to leave to each person the use of that thing which he does not know how to use. But those who know not how to use their eyes, their ears, and their whole body, are unable to do more than see or hear, nor to employ the body otherwise than to be employed.

Similiter in artibus. Quicunque enim lyra propria uti nescit, patet, ut ipse ais, quod neque alterius lyra scit uti: et qui aliena nescit uti, nescit et sua: eademque est de ceteris instrumentis et possesionibus ratio. Atque eo tandem praeclare tibi sermo procedit, ut inferas, qui nescit anima uti, praestare huic, ut otium agat anima, neque vivat, quam ut vivat, et sui iuris in agendo ipse sit.

Similarly in the arts. For whoever does not know how to use his own lyre, it is plain, as you yourself say, that he does not know how to use another’s lyre; and he who does not know how to use another’s, does not know his own: and the same reasoning holds for other instruments and possessions. And thus at last your discourse proceeds so remarkably that you infer that one who does not know how to use the soul should prefer for it that the soul keep otium, rather than live merely for living, and be its own master in action (sui iuris).

Quem si qua necessitas cogit vivere, melius huic esse, ut servus vitam ducat, quam liber. Est autem hoc, tanquam navis, ita cogitationis gubernacula committere alteri cuiquam, qui gubernatoriam humanae vitae adeptus sit disciplinam, quam saepe tu, Socrates, politicam vocas, eandemque iudiciariam et iustitiam. His ergo sermonibus, aliisque eiusmodi multis atque praeclaris, virtutem asserentibus posse doceri, suique ipsius inprimis suscipere curam iubentibus, numquam ferme adversatus sum, neque, ut arbitror, in posterum adversabor.

If any necessity compels a man to live, it is better for him that a slave should lead his life than a free man. And this is, as with a ship, to entrust the helm of one’s thought to some other person who has acquired the governing discipline of human life, which you often, Socrates, call the political, and the same judicial and just discipline. Therefore, by these speeches, and by many other such illustrious ones, asserting that virtue can be taught, and ordering that one should undertake the care of it especially for oneself, I have scarcely ever opposed, nor, as I judge, will I oppose in the future.

Perutiles enim ipsos existimo, plurimumque ad exhortationem valere, et ad homines quasi dormientes excitandos conducere. Adhibui itaque mentem, ut qui essem reliqua auditurus: percontatus sum non te primum, o Socrates, sed aequales tuos, vel contubernales, vel socios, vel quomodocumque aliter affectos tibi oportet dicere: horum, inquam, eos ante alios, qui primi apud te habentur, interrogavi, dummodo ita praefatus quaestionem exposui: O viri optimi, quo pacto, inquam, Socraticas ad virtutem hortationes accipere deinde debemus? An quasi solum hoc exstet, prodire vero ad opus, remque perficere, minime?

I deem them very useful indeed, and exceedingly effective for exhortation, and for awakening men as it were from sleep. I therefore applied my mind so that I might be one to hear the rest: I asked not you first, O Socrates, but your equals, or tent‑companions, or associates, or however else they ought to be called to you: of these, I say, those before the others who are reckoned first with you I questioned, provided I had thus prefaced the question: O best of men, in what manner, I ask, ought we then to receive Socratic exhortations toward virtue? Or is it as if this alone exists, and not to go forth to the work and to bring the matter to completion? By no means.

Atqui nostrum et hoc per omnem viatm erit officium, eos, qui nondum satis incitati sunt, provocare, atque ita semper invicem exhortari? An potius et Socratem, et nos ipsos, cum non negemus hoc ipsum agendum esse, sic inquirere decet: Quid posthac? Unde iustitiae studium incipiemus?

But surely it will be our duty in every way to challenge those who are not yet sufficiently stirred, and so always exhort one another? Or rather, is it fitting to inquire of both Socrates and ourselves, since we do not deny that this very thing must be done, thus: What next? From what source shall we begin the study (studium) of justice?

Si quis nos ad curandum corpus hortans, tanquam pueros, qui nequaquam advertunt, curam eius gymnasticam atque medicinam esse, obiurget, quod de tritico, et hordeo, et vitibus semper cogitemus, deque omnibus, quae corporis gratia quaerimus, artem vero et industriam, qua bonus corpors habitus fiat, nullam, inquiramus, cum tamen sit aliqua, forte illum rogaremus, quas artes circa cultum corporis esse dicat. Atque ille, ut arbitror, responderet, medicinam atque gymnasticam: eodem pacto nunc, quam artem circa animae virtutem versari censeamus, responderat, quisquis peritissimus horum sibi videtur. Respondit ergo ad haec, artem hanc, quam ex Socrate audivisti, nullam aliam, nisi iustitiam esse, scias.

If anyone, urging us to care for the body, should rebuke us like boys who do not heed at all, saying that its care is gymnastic and medical, because we are always thinking about wheat and barley and vines, and about all those things which we seek for the sake of the body, and truly inquire into no art and industry by which a good bodily condition is made, although there is some, perhaps we would ask him what arts he says surround the cultivation of the body. And he, I suppose, would answer, medicine and gymnastics; in the same way now, which art concerning the virtue of the soul we judge to be operative, whoever seems to himself most skilled in these would answer. He therefore replied to these matters that this art which you heard from Socrates is no other than justice, know this.

Tunc ego, non solum, inquam, mihi nomen adducas, sed ulterius sic exponas. Medicina porro ars quaedam dicitur, ab hac duo fiunt: nam et medici ex medicis efficiuntur, et sanitas reparatur. Alterum horum haud amplius dicimus sanitatem.

Then I, I say, not only have you bring me a name, but explain it further thus. Moreover medicine is said to be a certain art, from which two things result: for physicians are produced, and health is restored. We call one of these no more than health.

Ab architectura similiter duo fiunt, aedificium videlicet et archictectura: illud quidem opus, haec autem doctrina. Iustitiae quin etiam esto, iustos alios facere, quemadmodum superiores singulos artifices. Sed opus alterum, quod nobis vir iustus efficere potest, quid esse dicemus?

From architecture likewise two things arise, namely a building and architecture: the former indeed the opus, the latter the doctrina. Let it moreover belong to justice to make others just, just as superiors make individual artificers. But the other work, which a just man is able to effect for us, what shall we call it?

Declara. Respondit alius quidem, ut arbitror, conferens: alisu, decens: alius, conducibile: alius utile. At ergo respondens obieci, in singulis artibus eadem haec nomina esse: cumque recte quid fit, utilia, conducibilia, et alia huius generis illic fieri dicique.

Declare. Another, indeed, I think, answered, adding: “another — fitting; another — conducible; another — useful.” But in reply I objected that in the several arts these very names are used: and that, rightly speaking, what is done there is called utilia, conducibilia, and other things of that kind.

Illud vero artis cuiusque proprium, ad quod haec respiciunt, quemadmodum in arte fabrili quod bene, pulchre, decenter se habere dicitur, illuc tendit, ut ex lignea materia apte supellectilia fiant: quae quidem ars minime sunt, sed artis opus. Dicatur similiter et iustitiae ipsius opus. Hic quidam ex tuis familiaribus, Socrates, respondit, et bellissime quidem loqui visus est.

But that proper thing of each art, to which these qualities look, just as in the fabricatory art that which is said to comport itself well, beautifully, and becomingly, tends toward that end, namely that from wooden material suitable furnishings be made: which indeed are not the art itself, but the work of the art. Let the work of justice itself be spoken of similarly. A certain one of your household, Socrates, answered here, and he seemed indeed to speak very well.

Opus iustitiae proprium, inquit, quod nullius alterius facultatis est. Opus, amicitiam in civitatibus parere. Ille rursus interrogatus, amicitiam esse bonum quodddam asseruit, malum vero nunquam.

The proper work of justice, he said, which belongs to no other faculty. The work: to beget friendship in cities. He, when asked again, maintained that friendship is a certain good, but never an evil.

Cum vero interrogaretur de puerorum brutorumque benevolentiis, quas amicitias communiter appellamus, amicitias esse eas negavit, quippe cum saepius obsint, quam prosint: dixitque, illas falso amicitiae nuncupari: veram autem amicitiam esse procul dubio consensionem. Cum autem quaereretur, utrum assensionem illam vocaret, opinionis, an scientiae concursum, opinionem quidem contemsit, quia concursus opinionum multi inter homines ac noxii sunt: amicitiam vero bonam omnino opusque iustitiae esse concesserat. Quare idem dixit esse consensionem et scientiam, non opinionem.

But when he was asked about the benevolences of boys and of brutes, which we commonly call friendships, he denied that these are friendships, since they oftener hinder than help; and he said that those are falsely named friendship: true friendship, however, is without doubt consension or concord. When he was further asked whether he called that assent a concurrence of opinion or of knowledge, he scorned opinion, because a concurrence of opinions among many men is harmful; and he had conceded that a good friendship is entirely a work of justice. Therefore he said that the same thing was both consension and knowledge, not opinion.

Cum vero huc loquendo delati essemus, ambigui auditores adversus illum protinus inclamarunt, quod eodem sermo revolveretur: quoniam et medicina sit consensio quaedam, et artes reliquae, et circa quid versantur, declarare queant. At vero tua haec, quam dicis, iustitia, vel consensio, quo tendit ignorat, quodve opus sit, latet. Eadem abs te tandem quaesivi, Socrates: tu vero statim iustitiae opus esse dixisti, prodesse amicis, inimicos laedere.

But when we had been brought here speaking of this, some ambiguous hearers at once cried out against him, that the same speech was being turned over again: since medicine too is a kind of consensus, and the remaining arts, and the things about which they deal can be made clear. But truly this thing of yours, which you call justice, or consensus, to what it aims is unknown, and what work it is needed for is hidden. The same question I finally asked of you, Socrates: and you at once said that the work of justice is to be of benefit to friends, to harm enemies.

Deinde vero visus tibi est vir iustus numquam laedere quemquam, sed prodesse in omnibus unicuique. Haec non semel tantum, o Socrates, aut bis tentata sunt: sed cum diu supplex vos secutus fuerim, denique defessus sum, existimans, te ad inflammandos homines, ut studium virtutis capessant, ceteris enim eatenus tantum vales, ultra vero nihil, quod quidem in quavis arte contingere potest: seu in arte gubernatoria fieri potest, ut, qui gubernare nescit, excogitaverit aliquas eius artis laudes, quibus ad eam homines provocet, quasi dignissima sit: et in ceteris artibus eodem modo. Idem fortasse tibi quis tribuet, quasi nihilo magis iustitiam ipsam cognoscas, etsi praeclare eam laudas.

Then moreover it seemed to you that a just man never injures anyone, but benefits each person in all things. These things were not tried only once or twice, O Socrates, but when I had long followed you as a suppliant, at last I became weary, thinking that you aim to inflame men so that they seize a zeal for virtue; for you are of use to others only to this extent, but beyond that nothing, which indeed can happen in any art: whether in the art of steering it can happen that one who does not know how to steer may have contrived some praises of that art by which he provokes men to it, as if it were most worthy; and in the other arts in the same way. Someone perhaps will attribute the same to you, as if you knew justice itself no more, although you praise it most splendidly.

Ego autem non sic existimo, e duobus enim alterum inquam: aut nescire te arbitror, aut nolle mecum communicare. Quamobrem ad Thasymachum, ut opiner, me conferam, et alio, quocumque potero, speraveroque a dubitationibus liberari. Neque vero alio me conferrem, si velles ipse exhortationibus istis quandoque facere finem.

But I do not so suppose; for of the two I say the one: either I judge that you do not know, or that you are unwilling to communicate with me. Wherefore I will turn myself to Thasymachus, as I think, and to another, to whoever I can, and I will hope to be freed from doubts. Nor indeed would I turn to another, if you yourself were willing at any time to put an end to these exhortations.

Porro quemadmodum si me iam satis ad curam corporis, que gymnasticae est, incitasses, post exhortationem huiusmodi aperires mihi, qualis mei corporis esset affectio, et quali curatione indigeret: ita in praesentia facito. Pone, Clitophontem tibi concedere, ridiculum esse, ut in aliis rebus quis studium ponat; animam vero, cuius gratia in ceteris laboratur, negligat, et alia, quaecumque post haec sequuntur, et dicta modo sunt, retulisse me puta. Obsecro te, Socrates, ne aliter facias, ne, quemadmodum nunc, ita et posthac coram Lysiam ceterisque hominibus, partim quidem laudare te, partim vero vituperare necesse sit.

Furthermore, just as if you had already sufficiently incited me to the care of the body, which pertains to gymnastics, and after such exhortation you opened to me what condition my body was in and what kind of treatment it needed: so do now in the present. Suppose, granting you Clitophon, that it is ridiculous that one should place zeal in other matters while neglecting the soul, for whose sake one labors in the rest, and imagine that I have related the other things that follow and those which were just spoken. I beseech you, Socrates, do not act otherwise, lest, as now, so also henceforth before Lysias and other men, it be necessary to praise you in part and to blame you in part.

Ei namque, qui nondum ad virtutem sit provocatus, conferre te plurimum asseram: persuaso autem contar, impedimento esse te proponendum, quo minus ad virtutis finem perveniens, beatus efficiatur.

For to one who has not yet been roused to virtue, I should say that you contribute very much; but if I am persuaded to the contrary, I would set you forth as an impediment, by which, coming less to the goal of virtue, he may be prevented from being made blessed.