Augustine: DE TRINITATE

[I 1] Aequalitatem patris et filii et spiritus sancti putant nonnulli ex hoc impediri quominus intellegatur, quia scriptum est: Christum dei uirtutem et dei sapientiam, ut ideo non uideatur aequalitas quia non est pater ipse uirtus et sapientia sed genitor uirtutis et sapientiae. Et reuera non mediocri intentione quaeri solet quomodo dicatur deus uirtutis et sapientiae pater. Ait enim apostolus: Christum dei uirtutem et dei sapientiam.

[1 1] Some think the equality of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is hindered from being understood by this, because it is written: “Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God,” so that equality does not therefore appear, since the Father himself is not Power and Wisdom but the begetter of Power and Wisdom. And indeed it is wont to be asked with no small earnestness how God is said to be Father of Power and Wisdom. For the Apostle says: “Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.”

Et hinc nonnulli nostri aduersus arrianos hoc modo ratiocinati sunt, eos dumtaxat qui prius se aduersus catholicam fidem extulerunt. Nam ipse Arius dixisse fertur: Si filius est, natus est. Si natus est, erat tempus quando non erat filius, non intellegens etiam natum esse deo sempiternum esse ut sit coaeternus patri filius, sicut splendor qui gignitur ab igne atque diffunditur coaeuus est illi, et esset coaeternus si esset ignis aeternus.

And hence some of our own have reasoned in this way against the Arians—namely only those who first set themselves up against the Catholic faith. For Arius himself is reported to have said: If he is Son, he is begotten. If he is begotten, there was a time when he was not Son; not understanding that even to be begotten of God is to be sempiternal, so that the Son may be coeternal with the Father, just as the splendor which is generated from fire and diffused is coaeval with it, and would be coeternal if the fire were eternal.

Vnde quidem posteriores arriani abiecerunt istam sententiam fassique sunt non ex tempore coepisse filium dei. Sed inter disputationes quas habebant nostri aduersus eos qui dicebant: Erat tempus quando non erat filius, hanc etiam nonnulli ratiocinationem inserebant: 'Si dei filius uirtus et sapientia dei est nec umquam deus sine uirtute et sapientia fuit, coaeternus est deo patri filius. Dicit autem apostolus: Christum dei uirtutem et dei sapientiam, et deum aliquando non habuisse uirtutem aut sapientiam dementis est dicere.

Whence indeed the later Arians cast away that opinion and have confessed that the Son of God did not begin from time. But among the disputations which our people had against those who were saying: 'There was a time when the Son was not,' some also inserted this line of ratiocination: 'If the Son of God is the power and wisdom of God, and God was never without power and wisdom, the Son is coeternal with God the Father. Moreover the apostle says: Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God, and to say that God at any time did not have power or wisdom is demented to say.

Non igitur erat tempus quando non erat filius.'

Therefore there was no time when the Son was not.'

[2] Quae ratiocinatio ad id cogit ut dicamus deum patrem non esse sapientem nisi habendo sapientiam quam genuit, non exsistendo per se pater ipsa sapientia. Deinde si ita est, filius quoque ipse sicut dicitur deus de deo, lumen de lumine, uidendum est utrum possit sapientia de sapientia dici si non est deus pater ipsa sapientia sed tantum genitor sapientiae. Quod si tenemus, cur non et magnitudinis suae et bonitatis, aeternitatis, omnipotentiae suae genitor sit ut non ipse sit sua magnitudo et sua bonitas et sua aeternitas et sua omnipotentia, sed ea magnitudine magnus sit quam genuit et ea bonitate bonus et ea aeternitate aeternus et ea omnipotentia omnipotens quae de illo nata est, sicut non ipse sua sapientia est sed ea sapientia sapiens est quae de illo nata est.

[2] Which ratiocination drives us to this, that we should say God the Father is not wise except by having the Wisdom which he begot, not by existing in himself as the Father the very Wisdom. Then, if it is so, as the Son himself is said to be God from God, Light from Light, it must be seen whether he can be said to be Wisdom from Wisdom, if God the Father is not himself Wisdom but only the begetter of Wisdom. But if we hold this, why is he not also the begetter of his own magnitude and goodness, eternity, his omnipotence, so that he is not himself his own magnitude and his own goodness and his own eternity and his own omnipotence, but is great by that magnitude which he begot, and good by that goodness, and eternal by that eternity, and omnipotent by that omnipotence which was born from him, just as he is not himself his own Wisdom but is wise by that Wisdom which was born from him.

Nam illud non est formidandum ne cogamur multos filios dei dicere paraeter adoptionem creaturae coaeternos patri si magnitudinis suae genitor est et bonitatis et aeternitatis et omnipotentiae. Huic enim calumniae facile respondetur sic non effici quia multa nominata sunt ut ille multorum filiorum coaeternorum sit pater quemadmodum non efficitur ut duorum sit cum dicitur: Christus dei uirtus et dei sapientia. Eadem quippe uirtus quae sapientia et eadem sapientia quae uirtus.

For this is not to be dreaded, that we should be compelled to say there are many sons of God—apart from the adoption of the creature—coeternal with the Father, if he is the begetter of his own magnitude and goodness and eternity and omnipotence. For to this calumny an easy reply is given: it does not thus come about, because many things have been named, that he should be the Father of many coeternal sons; just as it is not brought about that he is the Father of two when it is said: Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God. For the same power is what wisdom is, and the same wisdom is what power is.

Itane igitur etiam de ceteris ut eadem sit magnitudo quae uirtus et si qua alia uel supra commemorata sunt uel commemorari adhuc possunt?

So then, is it thus also concerning the rest: that magnitude is the same as virtue, and whatever other things either were commemorated above or can still be commemorated?

[II 3] Sed si non dicitur in se ipso nisi quod ad filium dicitur, id est pater uel genitor uel principium eius, si etiam gignens ei quod de se gignit consequenter principium est, quidquid autem aliud dicitur cum filio dicitur uel potius in filio, siue magnus ea magnitudine quam genuit, siue iustus ea iustitia quam genuit, siue bonus ea bonitate quam genuit, siue potens ea potentia uel uirtute quam genuit, siue sapiens ea sapientia quam genuit — magnitudo autem ipsa non dicitur pater sed magnitudinis generator; filius uero sicut in se ipso dicitur filius, quod non cum patre dicitur sed ad patrem, non sic et in se ipso magnus sed cum patre cuius ipse magnitudo est; sic et sapiens cum patre dicitur cuius ipse sapientia est, sicut ille sapiens cum filio quia ea sapientia sapiens est quam genuit — quidquid ergo ad se dicuntur, non dicitur alter sine altero, id est quidquid dicuntur quod substantia eorum ostendat ambo simul dicuntur.

[II 3] But if nothing is said of him in himself except what is said with reference to the Son, that is, father or begetter or his principle, if also, as begetting, he is consequently the principle for him of that which he begets from himself, but whatever else is said is said with the Son or rather in the Son, whether great by that magnitude which he begot, or just by that justice which he begot, or good by that goodness which he begot, or powerful by that power or virtue which he begot, or wise by that wisdom which he begot — but magnitude itself is not called father but the begetter of magnitude; the Son, however, just as he is said in himself to be Son, which is not said with the Father but toward the Father, is not thus in himself “great,” but with the Father, of whom he himself is the magnitude; so too he is said “wise” with the Father, of whom he himself is the wisdom, just as the Father is “wise” with the Son because by that wisdom which he begot he is wise — therefore, whatever they are said with respect to themselves, neither is said without the other, that is, whatever they are said which shows their substance, both are said together.

Si haec ita sunt, iam ergo nec deus est pater sine filio nec filius deus sine patre, sed ambo simul deus. Et quod dictum est: In principio erat uerbum, in patre erat uerbum intellegitur. Aut si in principio sic dictum est ac si diceretur 'ante omnia,' quod sequitur: Et uerbum erat apud deum, uerbum quidem solus filius accipitur non simul pater et filius tamquam ambo unum uerbum.

If these things are so, then now neither is the Father God without the Son nor the Son God without the Father, but both together are God. And that which has been said, "In the beginning was the Word," is understood as "the Word was in the Father." Or if "in the beginning" is thus said as if it were said "before all things," then what follows, "And the Word was with God," the Word indeed is taken as the Son alone, not the Father and the Son together, as though both were one Word.

Sic enim uerbum quomodo imago; non autem pater et filius simul ambo imago, sed filius solus imago patris quemadmodum et filius; non enim ambo simul filius. Quod uero adiungitur: Et uerbum erat apud deum, multum est ut sic intellegatur: uerbum, quod solus est filius, erat apud deum, quod non solus est pater sed pater et filius simul deus.

For thus the Word is as the Image; but not the Father and the Son together both an Image, rather the Son alone is the Image of the Father, just as he is also Son; for they are not both together Son. But as for what is subjoined: And the Word was with God, it is best understood thus: the Word, who alone is the Son, was with God, since not the Father alone is God, but the Father and the Son together are God.

Sed quid mirum si in duabus quibusdam rebus longe inter se diuersis potest hoc dici? Quod enim tam diuersum quam animus et corpus? Potest tamen dici animus erat apud hominem, id est in homine, cum animus non sit corpus, homo autem animus simul et corpus sit.

But what marvel if, in two certain things far diverse from one another, this can be said? For what is so diverse as mind and body? Yet it can be said: the mind was with the man, that is, in the man, since the mind is not body, but the man is mind and body together.

Vt etiam quod consequenter scriptum est: Et deus erat uerbum, sic intellegatur, uerbum quod non est pater deus erat simul cum patre. Itane ergo dicimus ut pater sit generator magnitudinis, hoc est generator uirtutis uel generator sapientiae suae, filius autem magnitudo, uirtus et sapientia; deus uero magnus, omnipotens, sapiens, ambo simul? Quomodo ergo deus de deo, lumen de lumine?

So that even what is written consequently, “And the Word was God,” be understood thus: the Word, which is not the Father, was God together with the Father. Do we then say this way, that the Father is the generator of magnitude, that is, the generator of his virtue (power) or the generator of his wisdom, but the Son is magnitude, virtue and wisdom; and that God is great, omnipotent, sapient, both together? How then “God from God, Light from Light”?

Non enim simul ambo deus de deo, sed solus filius de deo, scilicet patre; nec ambo simul lumen de lumine, sed solus filius de lumine patre. Nisi forte ad insinuandum et breuissime inculcandum quod coaeternum est patri filius ita dictum est deus de deo et lumen de lumine et si quid hoc modo dicitur, ac si diceretur, hoc quod non est filius sine patre de hoc quod non est pater sine filio, id est hoc lumen quod lumen non est sine patre de hoc lumine patre quod lumen non est sine filio, ut cum dicitur deus, quod non est filius sine patre, et de deo, quod non est pater sine filio, perfecte intellegatur quod non praecessit genitor illud quod genuit. Quod si ita est, hoc solum de eis dici non potest illud de illo quod simul ambo non sunt.

For not both together are God from God, but the Son alone is from God, namely the Father; nor are both together Light from Light, but the Son alone is from the Light, the Father. Unless perhaps, to insinuate and most briefly inculcate that the Son is coeternal with the Father, it has been said thus “God from God” and “Light from Light,” and whatever is said in this manner, as if it were being said: this—which is not Son without Father—from that—which is not Father without Son; that is, this Light, which is not Light without the Father, from that Light, the Father, which is not Light without the Son; so that, when “God” is said, what is not the Son without the Father, and “from God,” what is not the Father without the Son, it may be perfectly understood that the Begetter did not precede that which he begot. But if this is so, only this cannot be said of them: that “this is from that” in any case where both are not simultaneously that thing.

Sicut uerbum de uerbo dici non potest quia non simul ambo uerbum, sed solus filius; nec imago de imagine quia non simul ambo imago; nec filius de filio quia non simul ambo filius. Secundum quod dicitur: Ego et pater unum sumus. Vnum sumus enim dictum est; quod ille, hoc et ego secundum essentiam, non secundum relatiuum.

Just as “word from word” cannot be said, because they are not both at the same time “word,” but the Son alone; nor “image from image,” because they are not both at the same time “image”; nor “son from son,” because they are not both at the same time “son.” According to what is said: “I and the Father are one.” “We are one,” indeed, was said; what he is, this also am I according to essence, not according to relation.

[III 4] Et nescio utrum inueniatur in scripturis dictum 'unum sunt' quorum est diuersa natura. Si autem et aliqua plura eiusdem naturae sint et diuersa sentiant, non sunt unum in quantum diuersa sentiunt. Nam si iam unum essent ex eo quod homines erant, non diceret: Vt sint unum sicut et nos unum cum suos discipulos patri commendaret.

[3 4] And I do not know whether in the Scriptures the saying 'they are one' is found of those whose nature is diverse. But if there are also several of the same nature and they think differently, they are not one, insofar as they think differently. For if they were already one from the fact that they were human beings, he would not say: 'That they may be one, just as we are one,' when he was commending his disciples to the Father.

At uero Paulus et Apollo quia et ambo homines et idem sentiebant: Qui plantat, inquit, et qui regat unum sunt. Cum ergo sic dicitur unum ut non addatur quid unum et plura unum dicantur, eadem natura atque essentia non dissidens neque dissentiens significatur. Cum uero additur quid unum, potest aliquid significari ex pluribus unum factum quamuis diuersis natura.

But indeed Paul and Apollos, because both were men and thought the same: “He who plants,” he says, “and he who waters are one.” When, therefore, “one” is said in such a way that it is not added what is one, and several are said to be one, the same nature and essence, not discordant nor dissentient, is signified. But when it is added what is one, something made one out of several, although diverse by nature, can be signified.

Sicut anima et corpus non sunt utique unum (quid enim tam diuersum?), nisi addatur aut subintellegatur quid unum, id est unus homo aut unum animal. Inde apostolus: Qui adhaeret meretrici, inquit, unum corpus est. Non dixit 'unum sunt' aut 'unum est,' sed addidit corpus tamquam ex duobus diuersis masculino et feminino unum corpus adiunctione compositum.

Just as the soul and the body are assuredly not one (for what is so diverse?), unless there be added or understood what ‘one’ is, that is, one man or one animal. Thence the apostle: “He who adheres to a meretrix,” he says, “is one body.” He did not say ‘they are one’ or ‘it is one,’ but he added ‘body,’ as if from two diverse things, the masculine and the feminine, one body composed by adjunction.

Et: Qui adhaeret, inquit, domino unus spiritus est. Non dixit 'qui adhaeret domino unus est' aut 'unum sunt,' sed addidit spiritus. Diuersum enim natura spiritus hominis et spiritus dei, sed inhaerendo fit unus spiritus ex diuersis duobus, ita ut sine humano spiritu beatus sit dei spiritus atque perfectus, beatus autem hominis spiritus non nisi cum deo.

And: “He who adheres,” he says, “to the Lord is one spirit.” He did not say “he who adheres to the Lord is one” or “they are one,” but he added “spirit.” For different by nature are the spirit of man and the Spirit of God; but by adhering there is made one spirit from two diverse [spirits], such that without the human spirit the Spirit of God is blessed and perfect, while the spirit of man is blessed only with God.

Nec frustra, ut existimo, cum tanta in euangelio secundum Iohannem et totiens diceret dominus de ipsa unitate uel sua cum patre uel nostra inuicem nobiscum, nusquam dixit: 'Vt nos et ipsi unum' sed: Vt sint unum sicut et nos unum. Pater ergo et filius unum sunt utique secundum unitatem substantiae, et unus deus est et unus magnus et unus sapiens sicut tractatum est.

Nor in vain, as I reckon, since in the Gospel according to John, when the Lord spoke so greatly and so often about that very unity—either his with the Father or ours mutually with one another—nowhere did he say: 'That we and they are one' but: That they may be one just as we are one. Therefore the Father and the Son are assuredly one according to the unity of substance, and there is one God and one great and one wise, as has been treated.

[5] Vnde ergo maior pater? Si enim maior, magnitudine maior. Cum autem magnitudo eius filius sit, nec ille utique maior est eo qui se genuit, nec ille maior est ea magnitudine qua magnus est; ergo aequalis.

[5] Whence therefore is the father greater? For if greater, greater by magnitude. But since his magnitude is the son, neither, to be sure, is he greater than him whom he begot, nor is he greater than that magnitude by which he is great; therefore equal.

Nam unde aequalis si non eo quo est cui non est aliud esse et aliud magnum esse? Aut si aeternitate pater maior est, non est aequalis filius quacumque re. Vnde enim aequalis? Si magnitudine dixeris, non est par magnitudo quae minus aeterna est atque ita cetera.

For whence is he equal, if not by that by which he is, to him for whom it is not one thing to be and another to be great? Or if in eternity the Father is greater, the Son is not equal in any respect whatsoever. Whence, then, is he equal? If you say in magnitude, a magnitude that is less eternal is not on a par; and so with the rest.

An forte in uirtute aequalis est, in sapientia uero non est aequalis? Sed quomodo est aequalis uirtus quae minus sapit? An in sapientia aequalis est, in uirtute autem non est aequalis?

Or perhaps he is equal in power, but in wisdom indeed not equal? But how is that power equal which is less wise? Or is he equal in wisdom, but in power not equal?

Sed quomodo aequalis sapientia quae minus potens est? Restat itaque ut si in ulla re aequalis non est, non sit aequalis. At scriptura clamat: Non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis deo.

But how is sapience equal which is less potent? It remains, therefore, that if in any respect it is not equal, it is not equal. But scripture cries out: He did not deem it rapine to be equal to god.

Cogitur ergo quiuis aduersarius ueritatis qui modo tenetur auctoritate apostolica in qualibet uel una re aequalem deo filium confiteri. Eligat quam uoluerit. Hinc ei ostendetur in omnibus esse aequalem quae de substantia eius dicuntur.

Therefore any adversary of the truth who for the moment is held by apostolic authority is compelled to confess the Son equal to God in any—or even in a single—matter. Let him choose whichever he wishes. From this it will be shown to him that he is equal in all things which are said concerning his substance.

[IV 6] Si enim uirtutes quae sunt in animo humano, quamuis alio atque alio modo singulae intellegantur, nullo modo tamen separantur ab inuicem, ut quicumque fuerint aequales uerbi gratia in fortitudine, aequales sint et prudentia et iustitia et temperantia (si enim dixeris aequales esse istos fortitudine sed illum praestare prudentia, sequitur ut huius fortitudo minus prudens sit ac per hoc nec fortitudine aequales sunt quando est illius fortitudo prudentior, atque ita de ceteris uirtutibus inuenies si omnes eadem consideratione percurras; non enim de uiribus corporis agitur sed de animi fortitudine), quanto ergo magis in illa incommutabili aeternaque substantia incomparabiliter simpliciore quam est animus humanus haec ita se habent? Humano quippe animo non hoc est esse quod est fortem esse aut prudentem aut iustum aut temperantem; potest enim esse animus et nullam istarum habere uirtutem. Deo autem hoc est esse quod est potentem esse aut iustum esse aut sapientem esse et si quid de illa simplici multiplicitate uel multiplici simplicitate dixeris quo substantia eius significetur.

[4 6] If indeed the virtues that are in the human mind, although each is understood in one way and another, are in no way separated from one another, so that whoever may be equal, for example, in fortitude, are equal also in prudence and justice and temperance (for if you were to say that these are equal in fortitude but that that man excels in prudence, it follows that this man’s fortitude is less prudent, and through this they are not equal in fortitude, since that man’s fortitude is more prudent; and so you will find concerning the other virtues as well, if you run through them all with the same consideration; for it is not the powers of the body that are in question but the fortitude of the mind), how much more, then, in that unchangeable and eternal substance, incomparably more simple than the human mind, do these things stand thus? For to the human mind, to be is not the same as to be strong or prudent or just or temperate; for a mind can exist and have none of those virtues. But for God, to be is to be powerful or to be just or to be wise, and whatever else you might say from that simple multiplicity or multiple simplicity by which His substance is signified.

Quamobrem siue ita dicatur deus de deo ut et singulis hoc nomen conueniat, non tamen ut ambo simul duo dii, sed unus deus sit (ita enim sibi cohaerent quod etiam in distantibus diuersisque substantiis fieri apostolus testis est, nam et solus dominus spiritus est et solus hominis spiritus utique spiritus est, tamen si haereat domino unus spiritus est; quanto magis ibi ubi est omnino inseparabilis atque aeterna conexio ne absurde dici uideatur quasi filius amborum cum dicitur filius dei si id quod dicitur deus non nisi de ambobus simul dicitur), siue quidquid de deo dicitur quod substantiam eius indicet non nisi de ambobus simul, immo de ipsa simul trinitate dicitur; siue ergo hoc siue illud sit quod diligentius discutiendum est, nunc unde agitur satis est uidere nullo modo filium aequalem esse patri si in aliquo scilicet quod pertinet ad significandam eius substantiam inaequalis inuenitur sicut iam ostendimus. Apostolus autem dixit aequalem. In omnibus ergo aequalis est patri filius et est unius eiusdemque substantiae.

Wherefore, whether “God” be thus said of God so that this name fits each singly, yet not so that both together are two gods, but that there be one God (for thus do they cohere with one another, a thing which even in distant and diverse substances can come to be, as the Apostle is witness: for both the Lord alone is spirit, and the spirit of man alone is, to be sure, spirit; yet if he cleaves to the Lord, he is one spirit; how much more there, where the connection is altogether inseparable and eternal, lest it seem absurd to be said as though he were the Son of both when he is called the Son of God, if that which is called “God” is said of none but both together), or whether whatever is said of God that indicates his substance is said of none but both together—nay rather, of the Trinity itself together; whether therefore this or that be the case, which must be examined more diligently, for the matter now at hand it is enough to see that in no way is the Son equal to the Father, if in any respect, to wit, which pertains to the signifying of his substance, he is found unequal, as we have already shown. But the Apostle said “equal.” Therefore in all things the Son is equal to the Father and is of one and the same substance.

[V 7] Quapropter etiam spiritus sanctus in eadem unitate substantiae et aequalitate consistit. Siue enim sit unitas amborum siue sanctitas siue caritas, siue ideo unitas quia caritas et ideo caritas, quia sanctitas, manifestum est quod non aliquis duorum est quo uterque coniungitur, quo genitus a gignente diligatur generatoremque suum diligat, sintque non participatione sed essentia sua neque dono superioris alicuius sed suo proprio seruantes unitatem spiritus in uinculo pacis. Quod imitari per gratiam et ad deum et ad nos ipsos iubemur, in quibus duobus praeceptis tota lex pendet et prophetae.

[5 7] Wherefore the Holy Spirit also consists in the same unity of substance and equality. For whether he be the unity of both, or sanctity, or charity; or therefore unity because charity, and therefore charity because sanctity, it is manifest that it is not some one of the two by whom each is conjoined—by whom the Begotten is loved by the Begetter and loves his Generator—and that they keep, not by participation but by their own essence, nor by the gift of some superior but by his own proper [gift], the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. Which we are commanded by grace to imitate both toward God and toward our own selves; on which two precepts the whole Law and the Prophets hang.

Ita sunt illa tria deus unus, solus, magnus, sapiens, sanctus, beatus. Nos autem ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso beati quia ipsius munere inter nos unum; cum illo autem unus spiritus quia agglutinatur anima nostra post eum. Et nobis haerere deo bonum est quia perdet omnem qui fornicatur ab eo. Spiritus ergo sanctus commune aliquid est patris et filii, quidquid illud est, aut ipsa communio consubstantialis et coaeterna; quae si amicitia conuenienter dici potest, dicatur, sed aptius dicitur caritas; et haec quoque substantia quia deus substantia et deus caritas sicut scriptum est.

Thus those three are one God, alone, great, wise, holy, blessed. But we, from him and through him and in him, are blessed, because by his gift we are one among ourselves; but with him one spirit, because our soul is glued fast after him. And for us to cleave to God is good, because he will destroy everyone who fornicates away from him. Therefore the Holy Spirit is something common of the Father and the Son, whatever that is, or the very consubstantial and coeternal communion; which, if it can suitably be called friendship, let it be called so, but more aptly it is called charity; and this too is substance, because God is substance and God is charity, as it is written.

Sicut autem simul substantia cum patre et filio, ita simul magna et simul bona et simul sancta et quidquid aliud ad se dicitur quoniam non aliud est deo esse et aliud magnum esse uel bonum et cetera sicut supra ostendimus. Si enim minus magna est ibi caritas quam sapientia, minus quam est diligitur sapientia; aequalis est igitur ut quanta est sapientia tantum diligatur. Est autem sapientia aequalis patri sicut supra disputanuimus; aequalis est igitur etiam spiritus sanctus, et si aequalis in omnibus aequalis propter summam simplicitatem quae in illa substantia est.

As, moreover, it is together in substance with the Father and the Son, so it is together great and together good and together holy, and whatever else is said of itself, since it is not one thing for God to be and another to be great or good, and the rest, as we showed above. For if charity there is less great than wisdom, wisdom is loved less than it is; therefore it is equal, so that as great as wisdom is, so much it is loved. But wisdom is equal to the Father, as we have argued above; therefore the Holy Spirit also is equal, and if equal in all things, equal on account of the highest simplicity which is in that substance.

Et ideo non amplius quam tria sunt: unus diligens eum qui de illo est, et unus diligens eum de quo est, et ipsa dilectio. Quae si nihil est, quomodo deus dilectio est? Si non est substantia, quomodo deus substantia est?

And therefore there are no more than three: one loving him who is from him, and one loving him from whom he is, and the love itself. Which, if it is nothing, how is God love? If it is not substance, how is God substance?

[VI 8] Si autem quaeritur quomodo simplex et multiplex sit illa substantia, animaduertenda est primo creatura quare sit multiplex, nullo autem modo uere simplex. Et prius corpus uniuersum utique partibus constat ita ut sit ibi alia pars maior, alia minor, et maius sit uniuersum quam pars quaelibet aut quantalibet. Nam et caelum et terra partes sunt uniuersae mundanae molis, et sola terra uel solum caelum innumerabilibus partibus constat, et in tertia sui parte minor est quam in cetera et in dimidia minor quam in tota, et totum mundi corpus quod duabus plerumque partibus appelari solet, id est caelum et terra, utique maius est quam solum caelum aut sola terra.

[6 8] But if it is asked how that substance is simple and multiple, one must first take note, in the creature, why it is multiple, and in no way truly simple. And first, the universal body assuredly consists of parts, such that there is there one part greater, another lesser, and the universe is greater than any part whatsoever, of whatever size. For both heaven and earth are parts of the universal mundane mass, and the earth alone or the heaven alone consists of innumerable parts, and in a third part of itself it is less than in the rest, and in a half less than in the whole; and the whole body of the world, which for the most part is accustomed to be named by two parts, that is, heaven and earth, is assuredly greater than heaven alone or earth alone.

Et in unoquoque corpore aliud est magnitudo, aliud color, aliud figura. Potest enim et deminuta magnitudine manere idem color et eadem figura, et colore mutato manere eadem figura et eadem magnitudo, et figura eadem non manente tam magnum esse et eodem modo coloratum, et quaecumque alia simul dicuntur de corpore possunt et simul et plura sine ceteris commutari. Ac per hoc multiplex esse conuincitur natura corporis, simplex autem nullo modo.

And in each body one thing is magnitude, another color, another figure. For with the magnitude diminished the same color and the same figure can remain; and with the color changed the same figure and the same magnitude can remain; and though the same figure does not remain, it can be just as great and colored in the same manner; and whatever other things are said together of a body can be altered both together, and several without the rest. And through this the nature of body is proved to be manifold, but in no way simple.

Creatura quoque spiritalis sicut est animua est quidem in corporis comparatione simplicior; sine comparatione autem corporis multiplex est, etiam ipsa non simplex. Nam ideo simplicior est corpore quia non mole diffunditur per spatium loci sed in unoquoque corpore, et in toto tota est et in qualibet parte eius tota est; et ideo cum fit aliquid in quamuis exigua particula corporis quod sentiat anima, quamuis non fiat in toto corpore, illa tamen tota sentit quia totam non latet. Sed tamen etiam in anima cum aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem, aliud acutum, aliud memorem, aliud cupiditas, aliud timor, aliud laetitia, aliud tristitia; possintque et alia sine aliis et alia magis, alia minus, innumerabilia et innumerabiliter in animae natura inueniri; manifestum est non simplicem sed multiplicem esse naturam.

The spiritual creature, such as the soul is, is indeed, in comparison with body, simpler; without comparison, however, to body it is manifold, not even itself simple. For it is for this reason simpler than body, because it is not diffused by mass through the space of place, but in whatever body, it is whole in the whole and whole in any part of it; and therefore when something happens in however small a particle of the body which the soul senses, although it does not happen in the whole body, yet the whole of it senses it, because it is not hidden from the whole. But nevertheless, even in the soul, since one thing is a being that is skillful, another inert, another sharp, another mindful, another desire, another fear, another joy, another sadness; and since other things can be found without others, and some more, others less, innumerable things and in innumerable ways in the nature of the soul; it is manifest that the nature is not simple but multiple.

Nihil enim simplex mutabile est; omnis autem creatura mutabilis.

For nothing simple is mutable; but every creature is mutable.

[VII] Deus uero multipliciter quidem dicitur magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, uerus, et quidquid aliud non indigne dici uidetur; sed eadem magnitudo eius est quae sapientia (non enim mole magnus est sed uirtute), et eadem bonitas quae sapientia et magnitudo, et eadem ueritas quae illa omnia; et non est ibi aliud beatum esse et aliud magnum aut sapientem aut uerum aut bonum esse aut omnino ipsum esse.

[7] But God indeed is in many ways said to be great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatever else seems not unworthily to be said; but his magnitude is the same as his wisdom (for he is not great by mass but by virtue), and the same goodness as wisdom and magnitude, and the same truth as all those; and there it is not one thing to be blessed and another to be great or wise or true or good, or altogether to be itself.

[9] Nec quoniam trinitas est ideo triplex putandus est; alioquin minor erit pater solus aut filius solus quam simul pater et filius — quamquam non inuenitur quomodo dici possit aut pater solus aut filius solus cum semper atque inseparabiliter et ille cum filio sit et ille cum patre, non ut ambo sint pater aut ambo filius, sed quia semper in inuicem neuter solus. Quia uero dicimus et deum solum ipsam trinitatem, quamuis semper sit cum spiritibus et animabus sanctis, sed solum dicimus quod deus est quia non et illi cum illo deus sunt, ita solum patrem dicimus patrem non quia separatur a filio sed quia non simul ambo pater est.

[9] Nor, because it is a Trinity, is He therefore to be thought triple; otherwise the Father alone or the Son alone would be lesser than the Father and the Son together — although it cannot be found how one could say either “the Father alone” or “the Son alone,” since always and inseparably the Father is with the Son and the Son with the Father, not so that both are Father or both Son, but because always in one another neither is alone. But because we also say “God alone” of the Trinity itself, although He is always with holy spirits and souls, yet we say “alone” with respect to His being God, because those, though with Him, are not God along with Him; so we say “the Father alone” as Father, not because He is separated from the Son, but because not both together are Father.

[VIII] Cum itaque tantus est solus pater uel solus filius uel solus spiritus sanctus quantus est simul pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, nullo modo triplex dicendus est. Corpora quippe adiunctione sua crescunt. Quamuis enim qui adhaeret uxori suae unum corpus sit, maius tamen corpus fit quam si solius uiri esset aut solius uxoris.

[VIII] Since therefore the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, is as great as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together, in no way is he to be called triple. For bodies indeed increase by their adjunction. For although he who adheres to his wife is one body, nevertheless a greater body comes to be than if it were of the man alone or of the woman alone.

In rebus autem spiritalibus cum minor maiori adhaeret sicut creatura creatori, illa fit maior quam erat, non ille. In his enim quae non mole magna sunt hoc est maius esse quod est melius esse. Melior fit autem spiritus alicuius creaturae cum adhaeret creatori quam si non adhaereat, et ideo etiam maior quia melior.

But in spiritual matters, when the lesser adheres to the greater, as a creature to the Creator, that one becomes greater than it was, not the other. For in things which are not great by bulk, to be greater is to be better. Now the spirit of some creature becomes better when it adheres to the Creator than if it does not adhere, and therefore also greater because better.

Qui ergo adhaeret domino unus spiritus est, sed tamen dominus non ideo fit maior quamuis fiat ille qui domino adhaeret. In ipso igitur deo cum adhaeret aequali patri filius aequalis aut spiritus sanctus patri et filio aequalis, non fit maior deus quam singuli eorum quia non est quo crescat illa perfectio. Perfectus autem siue pater siue filius siue spiritus sanctus, et perfectus deus pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, et ideo trinitas potius quam triplex.

Therefore he who adheres to the Lord is one spirit; yet the Lord is not for that reason made greater, although he who adheres to the Lord does become so. In God Himself, therefore, when the equal Son adheres to the equal Father, or the Holy Spirit, equal to the Father and the Son, adheres, God is not made greater than each of them, because there is nothing by which that perfection could grow. Perfect, however, whether Father or Son or Holy Spirit; and perfect God is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; and therefore Trinity rather than triplex.

[IX 10] Et quoniam ostendimus quomodo possit dici solus pater quia non nisi ipse ibi pater, consideranda est illa sententia qua dicitur deum uerum solum non esse patre solum sed patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum. Si quis enim interroget pater solus utrum sit deus, quomodo respondebitur non esse nisi forte ita dicamus esse quidem patrem deum sed non eum esse solum deum, esse autem solum deum patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum? Sed quid agimus de illo testimonio domini?

[9 10] And since we have shown how “the Father alone” can be said, namely because none except he is there the Father, that sentence is to be considered by which it is said that the only true God is not the Father alone, but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For if someone should ask whether the Father alone is God, how will it be answered “no,” unless perhaps we speak thus: that the Father is indeed God, but that he is not the only God; rather, that the only God is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit? But what are we to do about that testimony of the Lord?

Patri enim dicebat et patrem nominauerat ad quem loquebatur cum ait: Haec est autem uita aeterna ut cognoscant te unum uerum deum. Quod quidem arriani sic solent accipere quasi non sit filius deus uerus. Quibus exclusis uidendum est an intellegere cogamur cum dictum est patri: Vt cognoscant te unum uerum deum, tamquam hoc insinuare uoluerit quia et solus pater deus uerus est ne non intellegeremus deum nisi ipsa tria simul, patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum.

For he was speaking to the Father and had named the Father to whom he was speaking when he said: But this is eternal life, that they may know you, the one true God. This indeed the Arians are accustomed to take as though the Son were not true God. With these excluded, we must see whether we are compelled to understand, when it was said to the Father: That they may know you, the one true God, as if he had wished to intimate this, that the Father also is the true God alone, lest we should understand “God” only as the three themselves together, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Num ergo ex domini testimonio et patrem unum uerum deum dicimus et filium unum uerum deum et spiritum sanctum unum uerum deum, et simul patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, id est simul ipsam trinitatem, non tres ueros deos sed unum uerum deum? An quoniam addidit et quem misisti Iesum Christum, subaudiendum est 'unum uerum deum'; et ordo uerborum est: 'ut te et quem misisti Iesum Christum cognoscant unum uerum deum'? Cur ergo tacuit de spiritu sanctu? An quoniam consequens est ut ubicumque nominatur unum tanta pace uni adhaerens ut per hanc utrumque unum sit, iam ex hoc intellegatur etiam ipsa pax quamuis non commemoretur?

Therefore, from the Lord’s testimony do we say both that the Father is one true God and that the Son is one true God and that the Holy Spirit is one true God, and that together the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, that is, together the Trinity itself, are not three true gods but one true God? Or, since he added ‘and Jesus Christ whom you sent,’ is ‘one true God’ to be understood; and is the order of the words: ‘that they may know you and Jesus Christ whom you sent one true God’? Why then did he keep silent about the Holy Spirit? Or, since it is consequent that wherever the One is named, the Peace itself—adhering to the One with such peace that through this both are one—should already from this be understood, even if it is not commemorated?

Nam et illo loco apostolus uidetur quasi praetermittere spiritum sanctum, et tamen ibi intellegitur ubi ait: Omnia uestra; uos autem Christi; Christus autem dei; et iterum: Caput mulieris uir; caput uiri Christus; caput autem Christi deus. Sed rursus si deus non nisi omnia simul tria, quomodo caput Christi deus, id est caput Christi trinitas, cum in trinitate sit Christus ut sit trinitas? An quod est pater cum filio caput est ei quod est solus filius?

For in that place too the apostle seems as it were to pass over the Holy Spirit, and yet he is understood there where he says: 'All things are yours; but you are Christ’s; but Christ is God’s'; and again: 'The head of the woman is the man; the head of the man is Christ; but the head of Christ is God.' But again, if God is nothing except all three together, how is God the head of Christ, that is, the Trinity the head of Christ, since Christ is in the Trinity so that there be a Trinity? Or is it that what the Father is together with the Son is head of that which is the Son alone?

Cum filio enim pater deus; solus autem filius Christus est maxime quia iam uerbum caro factum loquitur secundum quam humilitatem eius etiam maior est pater sicut dicit: Quoniam pater maior me est, ut hoc ipsum deum esse quod illi cum patre unum est caput sit hominis mediatoris quod ipse solus est. Si enim mentem recte dicimus principale hominis, id est tamquam caput humanae substantiae, cum ipse homo cum mente sit homo, cur non multo congruentius multoque magis uerbum cum patre quod simul deus est caput est Christi, quamuis Christus homo nisi cum uerbo quod caro factum est intellegi non possit? Sed hoc, ut iam diximus, aliquanto diligentius postea considerabimus.

For with the Son the Father is God; but the Son alone is Christ, especially because now the Word made flesh is speaking, according to which humility of his the Father is also greater, as he says: Because the Father is greater than I, so that this very being God—which is one with the Father—may be the head of the man the mediator, which he alone is. For if we rightly call the mind the principal part of the man, that is, as it were the head of the human substance, since the man himself together with the mind is a man, why is it not much more congruent and much more the case that the Word together with the Father, which together is God, is the head of Christ, although Christ as man cannot be understood except with the Word which was made flesh? But this, as we have already said, we shall consider somewhat more diligently later.

Nunc autem aequalitas trinitatis et una eademque substantia, quantum breuiter potuimus, demonstrata est ut, quoquo modo se habeat ista quaestio quam discutiendam acriore intentione distulimus, nihil impediat quominus fateamur summam aequalitatem patris et filii et spiritus sancti.

Now, however, the equality of the Trinity and the one and selfsame substance, so far as we were able briefly, has been demonstrated, so that, however that question stands—which we have deferred to be discussed with keener intention—nothing hinders our confessing the supreme equality of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

[X 11] Quidam cum uellet breuissime singularum in trinitate personarum insinuare propria: Aeternitas, inquit, in patre, species in imagine, usus in munere. Et quia non mediocris auctoritatis in tractatione scripturarum et assertione fidei uir exstitit, (Hilarius enim hoc in libris suis posuit), horum uerborum, id est patris et imaginis et muneris, aeternitatis et speciei et usus, abditam scrutatus intellegentiam quantum ualeo, non eum secutum arbitror in aeternitatis uocabulo nisi quod pater non habet patrem de quo sit, filius autem de patre est ut sit atque ut illi coaeternus sit. Imago enim si perfecte implet illud cuius imago est, ipsa coaequatur ei non illud imagini suae.

[10 11] A certain man, when he wished most briefly to insinuate the propria of each person in the Trinity: “Eternity,” he says, “in the father, species in the image, use in the gift.” And since he was a man of no mean authority in the handling of the Scriptures and the assertion of the faith (for Hilary set this down in his books), having scrutinized, as far as I am able, the hidden understanding of these words—that is, of father and image and gift, of eternity and species and use—I do not think I follow him in the vocable “eternity,” except in this sense: that the father does not have a father of whom he is, whereas the son is of the father, so that he may be, and so that he may be coeternal with him. For the image, if it perfectly fulfills that of which it is the image, is itself made coequal to it, not that to its own image.

In qua imagine speciem nominauit, credo, propter pulchritudinem ubi iam est tanta congruentia et prima aequalitas et prima similitudo nulla in re dissidens et nullo modo inaequalis et nulla ex parte dissimilis, sed ad identidem respondens ei cuius imago est; ubi est prima et summa uita cui non est aliud uiuere et aliud esse, sed idem et esse et uiuere, et primus ac summus intellectus cui non est aliud uiuere et aliud intellegere, sed id quod est intellegere, hoc uiuere, hoc esse est unum omnia tamquam uerbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid et ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis dei plena omnium rationum uiuentium incommutabilium, et omnes unum in ea sicut ipsa unum de uno cum quo unum. Ibi nouit omnia deus quae fecit per ipsam, et ideo cum decedant et succedant tempora, non decedit aliquid uel succedit scientiae dei. Non enim haec quae creata sunt ideo sciuntur a deo quia facta sunt, ac non potius ideo facta sunt uel mutabilia quia immutabiliter ab eo sciuntur.

In which image he named “species,” I believe, on account of beauty, where there is already so great a congruence and a primal equality and a primal similitude, dissenting in nothing and in no way unequal and in no part dissimilar, but answering again and again to that of which it is the image; where there is the first and highest life, for which to live is not one thing and to be another, but the same both to be and to live; and the first and highest intellect, for which to live is not one thing and to understand another, but that which it is to understand, this to live, this to be is one—the All as though a perfect word to which something is not lacking, and a certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all the living immutable reasons, and all are one in it, just as it itself is one from the One with whom it is one. There God knows all things which he made through it, and therefore, when times pass away and succeed each other, nothing passes away from or accrues to the knowledge of God. For these things which have been created are not therefore known by God because they have been made, but rather they have therefore been made or are mutable because they are immutably known by him.

Ille igitur ineffabilis quidam complexus patris et imaginis non est sine perfruitione, sine caritate, sine gaudio. Illa ergo dilectio, delectatio, felicitas uel beatitudo, si tamen aliqua humana uoce digne dicitur, usus ab illo appellatus est breuiter, et est in trinitate spiritus sanctus, non genitus sed genitoris genitique suauitas ingenti largitate atque ubertate perfundens omnes creaturas pro captu earum ut ordinem suum teneant et locis suis acquiescant.

Therefore that ineffable embrace of the Father and the Image is not without full fruition, without charity, without joy. That love, delectation, felicity or beatitude, if indeed it is worthily said by any human voice, was briefly called “use” by him, and in the Trinity is the Holy Spirit, not begotten but the suavity of the Begetter and the Begotten, with immense largess and abundance suffusing all creatures according to their capacity, so that they may hold their order and acquiesce in their places.

[12] Haec igitur omnia quae arte diuina facta sunt et unitatem quandam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem. Quidquid enim horum est et unum aliquid est sicut sunt naturae corporum ingeniaque animarum, et aliqua specie formatur sicut sunt figurae uel qualitates corporum ac doctrinae uel artes animarum, et ordinem aliquem petit aut tenet sicut sunt pondera uel conlocationes corporum atque amores aut delectationes animarum.

[12] Therefore all these things which have been made by divine art both show in themselves a certain unity and species and order. For whatever of these there is both is some one thing, as are the natures of bodies and the inborn dispositions of souls; and is formed by some species, as are the figures or qualities of bodies and the doctrines or arts of souls; and seeks or holds some order, as are the weights or placements of bodies and the loves or delights of souls.

Oportet igitur ut creatorem per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspicientes trinitatem intellegamus cuius in creatura quomodo dignum est apparet uestigium. In illa enim trinitate summa origo est rerum omnium et perfectissima pulchritudo et beatissima delectatio. Itaque illa tria et a se inuicem determinari uidentur et in se infinita sunt.

It is therefore meet that, beholding the Creator through the things that have been made, understood, we should understand the Trinity, whose vestige appears in the creature as is fitting. For in that Trinity there is the highest origin of all things, and the most perfect beauty, and the most blessed delectation. Accordingly, those three both seem to be determined from one another, and are infinite in themselves.

{Sed hic in rebus corporeis non tantum est una quantum tres simul, et plus aliquid sunt duae quam una res; ceterum in summa trinitate tantum est una quantum tres simul, nec plus aliquid sunt duae quam una, et in se infinita sunt.} Ita et singula sunt in singulis et omnia in singulis et singula in omnibus et omnia in omnibus et unum omnia. Qui uidet hoc uel ex parte uel per speculum in aenigmate gaudeat cognoscens deum et sicut deum honoret et gratias agat; qui autem non uidet tendat per pietatem ad uidendum, non per caecitatem ad calumniandum, quoniam unus est deus sed tamen trinitas. Nec confuse accipiendum est, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quem omnia; nec diis multis, sed ipsi gloria in saecula saeculorum.

{But here in corporeal things, the one is not as much as three together, and two are something more than one thing; but in the supreme trinity, the one is as much as three together, nor are two anything more than one, and they are infinite in themselves.} Thus both each is in each and all in each and each in all and all in all and the one [is] all things. Let him who sees this, either in part or through a mirror in an enigma, rejoice, recognizing god, and honor him as god and give thanks; but whoever does not see, let him stretch through piety toward seeing, not through blindness toward calumniating, since god is one, yet nevertheless trinity. Nor must it be taken confusedly: from whom are all things, through whom all things, into whom all things; nor to many gods, but to him be glory unto the ages of ages.

Amen.