Justinian: DIGESTA

2.2.0. That whatever of law anyone has established against another, he himself should make use of the same law.
Dig. 2.3.0. If anyone has not obeyed the one pronouncing the law.

Dig. 2.4.0. De in ius vocando.
Dig.

Dig. 2.4.0. On calling into court.
Dig.

2.5.0. Si quis in ius vocatus non ierit sive quis eum vocaverit, quem ex edicto non debuerit.
Dig. 2.6.0. In ius vocati ut eant aut satis vel cautum dent.

2.5.0. If anyone, having been called into court, does not go, or if someone has summoned a person whom he ought not to have, according to the edict.
Dig. 2.6.0. Those summoned into court: that they go, or give surety or a guarantee.

Dig. 2.7.0. Ne quis eum qui in ius vocabitur vi eximat.
Dig.

Dig. 2.7.0. Let no one remove by force him who will be summoned into court.
Dig.

2.8.0. Qui satisdare cogantur vel iurato promittant vel suae promissioni committantur.
Dig. 2.9.0. Si ex noxali causa agatur, quemadmodum caveatur.

2.8.0. Those who are compelled to give surety either are to promise by oath or be committed to their own promise.
Dig. 2.9.0. If action is brought from a noxal cause, how security is to be taken.

Dig. 2.10.0. De eo per quem factum erit quominus quis in iudicio sistat.
Dig.

Dig. 2.10.0. Concerning the person through whom it has been brought about that someone does not appear in court.
Dig.

2.11.0. Si quis cautionibus in iudicio sistendi causa factis non obtemperaverit.
Dig. 2.12.0. De feriis et dilationibus et diversis temporibus.

2.11.0. If anyone has not complied with sureties made for the purpose of appearing in court.
Dig. 2.12.0. On holidays and adjournments and various times.

Dig. 2.13.0. De edendo.
Dig.

Dig. 2.13.0. On the Production of Documents.
Dig.

2.14.0. De pactis.
Dig. 2.15.0. De transactionibus.

2.14.0. On pacts.
Digest 2.15.0. On settlements.

Dig. 2.1.0. De iurisdictione.

Dig. 2.1.0. On jurisdiction.

Dig. 2.1.1

Digest 2.1.1

Ulpianus 1 reg.

Ulpian, Rules, book 1.

Ius dicentis officium latissimum est: nam et bonorum possessionem dare potest et in possessionem mittere, pupillis non habentibus tutores constituere, iudices litigantibus dare.

The duty of the law-pronouncer is very broad: for he can both grant possession of the goods (estate) and send into possession, constitute tutors for wards not having guardians, and give judges to litigants.

Dig. 2.1.2

Digest 2.1.2

Iavolenus 6 ex cass.

Javolenus 6 from Cassius.

Cui iurisdictio data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus iurisdictio explicari non potuit.

To the one to whom jurisdiction has been given, those things also seem to have been conceded, without which the jurisdiction could not have been exercised.

Dig. 2.1.3

Digest 2.1.3

Ulpianus 2 de off. quaest.

Ulpian, book 2, On the Office of the Quaestor

Imperium aut merum aut mixtum est. merum est imperium habere gladii potestatem ad animadvertendum facinorosos homines, quod etiam potestas appellatur. mixtum est imperium, cui etiam iurisdictio inest, quod in danda bonorum possessione consistit.

Imperium is either mere or mixed. mere imperium is to have the power of the sword for punishing malefactors, which is also
called "potestas." mixed imperium is that to which jurisdiction also belongs, which consists in granting "bonorum possessio."

iurisdictio est etiam iudicis dandi licentia.

Jurisdiction is also the license to appoint a judge.

Dig. 2.1.4

Digest 2.1.4

Ulpianus 1 ad ed.

Ulpian, 1 on the edict

Iubere caveri praetoria stipulatione et in possessionem mittere imperii magis est quam iurisdictionis.

To order that security be taken by a praetorian stipulation and to put into possession is more a matter of imperium than of jurisdiction.

Dig. 2.1.5

Digest 2.1.5

Iulianus 1 Dig.

Julianus 1 Digest.

More maiorum ita comparatum est, ut is demum iurisdictionem mandare possit, qui eam suo iure, non alieno beneficio habet:

By the custom of the ancestors it has been so arranged, that only he can delegate jurisdiction who holds it by his own right, not by another’s benefit:

Dig. 2.1.6

Digest 2.1.6

Paulus 2 ad ed.

Paulus, book 2 on the Edict.

Et quia nec principaliter ei iurisdictio data est nec ipsa lex defert, sed confirmat mandatam iurisdictionem. ideoque si is, qui mandavit iurisdictionem, decesserit, antequam res ab eo, cui mandata est iurisdictio, geri coeperit, solvi mandatum labeo ait, sicut in reliquis causis.

And because jurisdiction has been given to him neither principally, nor does the law itself defer it, but confirms the mandated jurisdiction. And therefore, if he who mandated
the jurisdiction has died before the matter has begun to be conducted by him to whom the jurisdiction was mandated, Labeo says the mandate is dissolved, just as in the other cases.

Dig. 2.1.7pr.

Digest 2.1.7, preface.

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 3 on the Edict.

Si quis id, quod iurisdictionis perpetuae causa, non quod prout res incidit, in albo vel in charta vel in alia materia propositum erit, dolo malo corruperit: datur in eum quingentorum aureorum iudicium, quod populare est.

If anyone, with malicious deceit, should corrupt that which, for the sake of perpetual jurisdiction (not that which, as the matter arises), will have been posted on the album or on paper or on some other material: an action of five hundred aurei is granted against him, which is a popular action.

Dig. 2.1.7.1

Digest 2.1.7.1

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, 3 on the edict.

Servi quoque et filii familias verbis edicti continentur: sed et utrumque sexum praetor complexus est.

Slaves too and sons of the household are contained within the words of the edict; but the praetor has also encompassed both sexes.

Dig. 2.1.7.2

Digest 2.1.7.2

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian 3 on the edict.

Quod si dum proponitur vel ante propositionem quis corruperit, edicti quidem verba cessabunt, pomponius autem ait sententiam edicti porrigendam esse ad haec.

But if, while it is being proposed or before the proposition, someone has corrupted it, the words of the edict indeed will cease; pomponius, however, says that the sense of the edict is to be extended to these.

Dig. 2.1.7.3

Digest 2.1.7.3

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 3 on the Edict.

In servos autem, si non defenduntur a dominis, et eos qui inopia laborant corpus torquendum est.

But as for slaves, if they are not defended by their masters, and those who labor under indigence, the body is to be subjected to torture.

Dig. 2.1.7.4

Digest 2.1.7.4

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 3 on the Edict.

Doli mali autem ideo in verbis edicti fit mentio, quod, si per imperitiam vel rusticitatem vel ab ipso praetore iussus vel casu aliquis fecerit, non tenetur.

But mention of malicious fraud is made in the words of the edict for this reason: that, if someone has done it through inexperience or rusticity, or because he was ordered by the praetor himself, or by chance,
he is not held liable.

Dig. 2.1.7.5

Digest 2.1.7.5

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, 3 On the Edict.

Hoc vero edicto tenetur et qui tollit, quamvis non corruperit: item et qui suis manibus facit et qui alii mandat. sed si alius sine dolo malo fecit, alius dolo malo mandavit, qui mandavit tenebitur: si uterque dolo malo fecerit, ambo tenebuntur: nam et si plures fecerint vel corruperint vel mandaverint, omnes tenebuntur:

By this edict he too is held who removes it, although he has not corrupted it: likewise both he who does it with his own hands and he who commands another. But if one did it without malicious intent, and another with malicious intent ordered it, he who ordered will be held: if both acted with malicious intent, both will be held: for even if several have done it or corrupted it or
have ordered it, all will be held.

Dig. 2.1.8

Digest 2.1.8

Gaius 1 ad ed.

Gaius, Book 1, On the Edict.

Adeo quidem, ut non sufficiat unum eorum poenam luere.

To such an extent, indeed, that it does not suffice for one of them to pay the penalty.

Dig. 2.1.9

Digest 2.1.9

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the edict.

Si familia alicuius album corruperit, non similiter hic edicitur ut in furto, ne in reliquos actio detur, si tantum dominus, cum defendere voluit, unius nomine praestiterit, quantum liber praestaret: fortasse quia hic et contempta maiestas praetoris vindicatur et plura facta intelleguntur: quemadmodum cum plures servi iniuriam fecerunt vel damnum dederunt, quia plura facta sunt, non ut in furto unum. octavenus hic quoque domino succurrendum ait: sed hoc potest dici, si dolo malo curaverint, ut ab alio album corrumperetur, quia tunc unum consilium sit, non plura facta. idem pomponius libro decimo notat.

If the household of someone has corrupted the album, it is not here edicted in the same way as in theft, that an action not be given against the others, if only the master, when he wished to defend, has paid, in the name of one, as much as a free man would pay: perhaps because here both the contemned majesty of the praetor is vindicated and multiple acts are understood: just as when several slaves have committed an injury or have given damage, because multiple acts have been done, not, as in theft, one. Octavenus also says here that the master should be succored: but this can be said if they, with malicious intent, took care that the album be corrupted by another, because then there is one plan, not multiple acts. The same Pomponius notes this in Book 10.

Dig. 2.1.10

Digest 2.1.10

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, 3 On the Edict.

Qui iurisdictioni praeest, neque sibi ius dicere debet neque uxori vel liberis suis neque libertis vel ceteris, quos secum habet.

He who presides over jurisdiction ought neither to declare the law for himself, nor for his wife or his children, nor for his freedmen or the others whom he has with him.

Dig. 2.1.11pr.

Digest 2.1.11, beginning.

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 1 on the Provincial Edict

Si idem cum eodem pluribus actionibus agat, quarum singularum quantitas intra iurisdictionem iudicantis sit, coacervatio vero omnium excedat modum iurisdictionis eius: apud eum agi posse sabino cassio proculo placuit: quae sententia rescripto imperatoris antonini confirmata est.

If the same person proceeds against the same person by several actions, each of which in its single amount is within the jurisdiction of the judge, but the accumulation of all exceeds the measure of his jurisdiction: it pleased Sabinus, Cassius, and Proculus that proceedings can be had before him; which opinion was confirmed by a rescript of Emperor Antoninus.

Dig. 2.1.11.1

Digest 2.1.11.1

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 1 on the Provincial Edict.

Sed et si mutuae sunt actiones et alter minorem quantitatem, alter maiorem petat, apud eundem iudicem agendum est ei qui quantitatem minorem petit, ne in potestate calumniosa adversarii mei sit, an apud eum litigare possim.

But also, if the actions are mutual and one seeks a smaller quantity, the other a greater, it must be proceeded before the same judge by the one who seeks the smaller quantity, lest it be in the calumnious power of my adversary whether I can litigate before that judge.

Dig. 2.1.11.2

Digest 2.1.11.2

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 1 on the Provincial Edict

Si una actio communis sit plurium personarum, veluti familiae erciscundae ^ herciscundae^, communi dividundo, finium regundorum, utrum singulae partes spectandae sunt circa iurisdictionem eius qui cognoscit, quod ofilio et proculo placet, quia unusquisque de parte sua litigat: an potius tota res, quia et tota res in iudicium venit et vel uni adiudicari potest, quod cassio et pegaso placet: et sane eorum sententia probabilis est.

If one common action belongs to several persons, for example familiae erciscundae ^ herciscundae^, communi dividundo, finium regundorum, whether
the individual shares are to be considered for the jurisdiction of the one who hears the case—which pleases Ofilius and Proculus, since each litigates about his own share—or
rather the whole matter, since the whole matter likewise comes into judgment and can even be adjudicated to a single person—which pleases Cassius and Pegasus; and indeed their opinion is the more probable
is.

Dig. 2.1.12

Digest 2.1.12

Ulpianus 18 ad ed.

Ulpian, 18 on the edict.

Magistratibus municipalibus supplicium a servo sumere non licet, modica autem castigatio eis non est deneganda.

It is not permitted for municipal magistrates to exact punishment from a slave, but a moderate castigation is not to be denied them.

Dig. 2.1.13pr.

Digest 2.1.13pr.

Ulpianus 51 ad sab.

Ulpian, 51, on Sabinus.

Eum qui iudicare iubet magistratum esse oportet.

The one who commands to judge must be a magistrate.

Dig. 2.1.13.1

Digest 2.1.13.1

Ulpianus 51 ad sab.

Ulpian 51 on sab.

Magistratus autem vel is qui in potestate aliqua sit, ut puta proconsul vel praetor vel alii qui provincias regunt, iudicare iubere eo die, quo privati futuri essent, non possunt.

Magistrates, however, or one who is in some authority—such as a proconsul or a praetor or others who govern provinces—cannot order a trial to be held on the day on which they are to become private persons.

Dig. 2.1.14

Digest 2.1.14

Ulpianus 39 ad ed.

Ulpian, 39, on the Edict.

Est receptum eoque iure utimur, ut si quis maior vel aequalis subiciat se iurisdictioni alterius, possit ei et adversus eum ius dici.

It is settled, and we employ that law, that if anyone greater or equal subjects himself to another’s jurisdiction, law may be declared both in his favor and against him.

Dig. 2.1.15

Digest 2.1.15

Ulpianus 2 de omn. trib.

Ulpian Book 2 On All Tribunals

Si per errorem alius pro alio praetor fuerit aditus, nihil valebit quod actum est. nec enim ferendus est qui dicat consensisse eos in praesidem, cum, ut iulianus scribit, non consentiant qui errent: quid enim tam contrarium consensui est quam error, qui imperitiam detegit?

If by error someone has approached one praetor in place of another, nothing that has been done will be valid. Nor indeed is he to be endured who says that they consented to the presiding judge, since, as Julian writes, those who err do not consent: for what is so contrary to consent as error, which reveals ignorance?

Dig. 2.1.16

Digest 2.1.16

Ulpianus 3 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, book 3 On all tribunals

Solet praetor iurisdictionem mandare: et aut omnem mandat aut speciem unam: et is cui mandata iurisdictio est fungetur vice eius qui mandavit, non sua.

The praetor is wont to delegate jurisdiction: and he either delegates the whole or a single species: and he to whom jurisdiction has been delegated will function in the stead of the one who delegated, not in his own right.

Dig. 2.1.17

Digest 2.1.17

Ulpianus 1 opin.

Ulpian, Opinions 1.

Praetor sicut universam iurisdictionem mandare alii potest, ita et in personas certas vel de una specie potest, maxime cum iustam causam susceptae ante magistratum advocationis alterius partis habuerat.

The praetor, just as he can entrust the entire jurisdiction to another, so too he can do so with respect to certain persons or of a single kind, especially when he had a just cause—namely that, before holding the magistracy, he had undertaken the advocacy of the other party.

Dig. 2.1.18

Digest 2.1.18

Africanus 7 quaest.

Africanus 7 Questions.

Si convenerit, ut alius praetor, quam cuius iurisdictio esset, ius diceret et priusquam adiretur mutata voluntas fuerit, procul dubio nemo compelletur eiusmodi conventioni stare.

If it has been agreed that a praetor other than the one whose jurisdiction it was should pronounce the law, and before he was approached the will has been changed, beyond doubt no one is compelled to stand by a convention of that kind.

Dig. 2.1.19pr.

Digest 2.1.19, preface.

Ulpianus 6 fideic.

Ulpian, 6, Fideicommissa.

Cum quaedam puella apud competentem iudicem litem susceperat, deinde condemnata erat, posteaque ad viri matrimonium alii iurisdictioni subiecti pervenerat, quaerebatur, an prioris iudicis sententia exsequi possit. dixi posse, quia ante fuerat sententia dicta: sed et si post susceptam cognitionem ante sententiam hoc eveniet, idem putarem, sententiaque a priore iudice recte fertur. quod generaliter et in omnibus huiuscemodi casibus observandum est.

When a certain girl had undertaken a lawsuit before a competent judge, and then had been condemned, and afterwards had come into a husband’s marriage, the husband being subject to another jurisdiction, the question was raised whether the prior judge’s sentence could be executed. I said it can, because the sentence had been pronounced before: but even if, after cognizance has been assumed and before sentence, this should occur, I would think the same, and the sentence is rightly delivered by the prior judge. This, generally, is to be observed in all cases of this kind.

Dig. 2.1.19.1

Digest 2.1.19.1

Ulpianus 6 fideic.

Ulpian, On Fideicommissa, Book 6.

Quotiens de quantitate ad iurisdictionem pertinente quaeritur, semper quantum petatur quaerendum est, non quantum debeatur.

Whenever inquiry is made about the quantity pertaining to jurisdiction, it is always how much is claimed that must be asked, not how much is owed.

Dig. 2.1.20

Digest 2.1.20

Paulus 1 ad ed.

Paulus, book 1 on the Edict.

Extra territorium ius dicenti impune non paretur. idem est, et si supra iurisdictionem suam velit ius dicere.

Outside his territory, one declaring the law may be disobeyed with impunity. The same is so if he wishes to declare the law beyond his jurisdiction.

Dig. 2.2.0. Quod quisque iuris in alterum statuerit, ut ipse eodem iure utatur.

Digest 2.2.0. Whatever each has established of right against another, let him himself use the same right.

Dig. 2.2.1pr.

Digest 2.2.1pr.

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, 3 on the edict.

Hoc edictum summam habet aequitatem, et sine cuiusquam indignatione iusta: quis enim aspernabitur idem ius sibi dici, quod ipse aliis dixit vel dici effecit?

This edict has the highest equity, and without anyone’s just indignation: for who will disdain to have the same law declared for himself that he himself has declared for others
or has caused to be declared?

Dig. 2.2.1.1

Digest 2.2.1.1

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, 3 on the Edict.

"qui magistratum potestatemve habebit, si quid in aliquem novi iuris statuerit, ipse quandoque adversario postulante eodem iure uti debet. si quis apud eum, qui magistratum potestatemque habebit, aliquid novi iuris optinuerit, quandoque postea adversario eius postulante eodem iure adversus eum decernetur": scilicet ut quod ipse quis in alterius persona aequum esse credidisset, id in ipsius quoque persona valere patiatur.

"whoever shall hold a magistracy or power, if he shall have established anything of novel law against someone, he himself, whenever upon the adversary petitioning, ought to make use of the same law. if
anyone before him who shall hold a magistracy and power shall have obtained something of novel law, whenever thereafter upon his adversary petitioning, by the same
law it shall be decreed against him": namely, that what someone himself had believed to be equitable in the person of another, he should allow to be valid in his own person as well.

Dig. 2.2.1.2

Digest 2.2.1.2

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 3 on the Edict.

Haec autem verba: "quod statuerit qui iurisdictioni praeest" cum effectu accipimus, non verbo tenus: et ideo si, cum vellet statuere, prohibitus sit nec effectum decretum habuit, cessat edictum. nam statuit verbum rem perfectam significat et consummatam iniuriam, non coeptam. et ideo si inter eos quis dixerit ius, inter quos iurisdictionem non habuit, quoniam pro nullo hoc habetur nec est ulla sententia, cessare edictum putamus: quid enim offuit conatus, cum iniuria nullum habuerit effectum?

These words: "what he who presides over the jurisdiction shall have decreed" we take with effect, not merely verbally: and therefore if, when he wished to decree, he was prohibited and the decree had no effect, the edict ceases. For the word statuit signifies a perfected matter and a consummated injury, not a begun one. And therefore if someone has pronounced the law between those over whom he did not have jurisdiction, since this is held as nothing and there is no judgment, we think the edict ceases: for what has the attempt availed, since the injury has had no effect?

Dig. 2.2.2

Digest 2.2.2

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paul, Book 3 on the Edict.

Hoc edicto dolus debet ius dicentis puniri: nam si adsessoris imprudentia ius aliter dictum sit quam oportuit, non debet hoc magistratui officere, sed ipsi adsessori.

By this edict the deceit of the one declaring the law ought to be punished: for if through the assessor’s imprudence the law has been declared otherwise than it ought, this ought not to prejudice the magistrate, but the assessor himself.

Dig. 2.2.3pr.

Digest 2.2.3, preface.

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, 3 On the Edict.

Si quis iniquum ius adversus aliquem impetravit, eo iure utatur ita demum, si per postulationem eius hoc venerit: ceterum si ipso non postulante, non coercetur. sed si impetravit, sive usus est iure aliquo, sive impetravit ut uteretur licet usus non sit, hoc edicto puniatur.

If anyone has obtained an inequitable law against someone, let him use that law only then, if this has come about through that person’s postulation; otherwise, if he himself did not postulate, he is not coerced. But if he has obtained it, whether he has used some right under it, or he has obtained it so that he might use it although he has not used it, let him be punished by this edict.

Dig. 2.2.3.1

Digest 2.2.3.1

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 3 on the Edict.

Si procurator meus postulavit, quaeritur, quis eodem iure utatur: et putat pomponius me solum, utique si hoc ei specialiter mandavi vel ratum habui. si tamen tutor vel curator furiosi postulaverit vel adulescentis, ipse hoc edicto coercetur. item adversus procuratorem id observandum est, si in rem suam fuerit datus.

If my procurator has petitioned, the question arises who may avail himself of the same right: and Pomponius thinks me alone, certainly if I specially mandated this to him or ratified it. if, however, the tutor or curator of a madman or of an adolescent has petitioned, he himself is restrained by this edict. likewise this is to be observed against a procurator, if he has been appointed in rem suam.

Dig. 2.2.3.2

Digest 2.2.3.2

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, 3 on the Edict.

Haec poena adversus omnem statuitur, qui in edictum incidit, non solum eo postulante qui ab eo laesus est, sed omni, qui quandoque experitur.

This penalty is established against anyone who falls under the edict, not only upon petition by the one who has been injured by him, but at the instance of anyone who at any time brings an action.

Dig. 2.2.3.3

Digest 2.2.3.3

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, 3 On the Edict.

Si is pro quo spopondisti impetraverit, ne aliquis debitor ipsius adversus eum exceptione utatur, deinde tu in negotio, in quo spopondisti, velis exceptione uti: nec te nec ipsum oportet hoc impetrare, etsi interdum patiaris iniuriam, si solvendo debitor non sit. sed si tu incidisti in edictum, reus quidem utetur exceptione, tu non utaris: nec poena tua ad reum promittendi pertinebit: et ideo mandati actionem non habebis.

If the one for whom you have promised has procured that no debtor of his use an exception against him, and then you, in the transaction in which you have promised, wish to use an exception: neither you nor he ought to procure this, even if you sometimes suffer a wrong, if the debtor is not solvent. But if you have fallen under the edict, the defendant will indeed use the exception; you should not use it: nor will your penalty pertain to the promissor as defendant: and therefore you will not have an action of mandate.

Dig. 2.2.3.4

Digest 2.2.3.4

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, 3 on the Edict.

Si filius meus in magistratu in hoc edictum incidit, an in his actionibus, quas ex persona eius intendo, hoc edicto locus sit? et non puto, ne mea condicio deterior fiat.

If my son, while in magistracy, falls under this edict, is there room for this edict in those actions which I bring from his person? And I do not think so, lest my condition become worse.

Dig. 2.2.3.5

Digest 2.2.3.5

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian 3 on the Edict.

Quod autem ait praetor, ut is eodem iure utatur, an etiam ad heredem haec poena transmittatur? et scribit iulianus non solum ipsi denegari actionem, sed etiam heredi eius.

But as for what the praetor says, that he is to make use of the same right, is this penalty transmitted also to the heir? And Julian writes that not only is the action denied to him himself, but also to his heir.

Dig. 2.2.3.6

Digest 2.2.3.6

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 3 on the Edict.

Illud quoque non sine ratione scribit non solum in his actionibus pati eum poenam edicti, quas tunc habuit cum incideret in edictum, verum si quae postea ei adquirentur.

He also writes, not without reason, that he is to suffer the penalty of the edict not only in those actions which he then had when he came under the edict, but also if any should afterwards be acquired to him.

Dig. 2.2.3.7

Digest 2.2.3.7

Ulpianus 3 ad ed.

Ulpian, 3 on the Edict.

Ex hac causa solutum repeti non posse iulianus putat: superesse enim naturalem causam, quae inhibet repetitionem.

From this cause Julian thinks that what has been paid cannot be reclaimed: for a natural cause remains, which inhibits repetition.

Dig. 2.2.4

Digest 2.2.4

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, Book 1, on the Provincial Edict.

Illud eleganter praetor excipit: "praeterquam si quis eorum contra eum fecerit, qui ipse eorum quid fecisset": et recte, ne scilicet vel magistratus, dum studet hoc edictum defendere, vel litigator, dum vult beneficio huius edicti uti, ipse in poenam ipsius edicti committat.

That point the praetor elegantly excepts: "except that if any of them has acted against one who himself had done something against them": and rightly, namely lest either a magistrate, while he is eager to defend this edict, or a litigant, while he wishes to use the benefit of this edict, himself commit into the penalty of this edict.

Dig. 2.3.0. I quis ius dicenti non obtemperaverit.

Dig. 2.3.0. If anyone does not obey the one administering justice.

Dig. 2.3.1pr.

Digest 2.3.1, pr.

Ulpianus 1 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 1 on the Edict.

Omnibus magistratibus, non tamen duumviris, secundum ius potestatis suae concessum est iurisdictionem suam defendere poenali iudicio.

To all magistrates, though not to the duumvirs, it has been granted, according to the right of their authority, to defend their jurisdiction by a penal judgment.

Dig. 2.3.1.1

Digest 2.3.1.1

Ulpianus 1 ad ed.

Ulpian 1 on the edict.

Is videtur ius dicenti non obtemperasse, qui quod extremum in iurisdictione est non fecit: veluti si quis rem mobilem vindicari a se passus non est, sed duci eam vel ferri passus est: ceterum si et sequentia recusavit, tunc non obtemperasse videtur.

He is deemed not to have obeyed the one declaring the law, who did not do what is the ultimate within the jurisdiction: for example, if someone did not allow a movable thing to be vindicated from him, but allowed it to be led away or carried; however, if he also refused the subsequent steps, then he is deemed not to have obeyed.

Dig. 2.3.1.2

Digest 2.3.1.2

Ulpianus 1 ad ed.

Ulpian, 1 on the Edict.

Si procurator tuus vel tutor vel curator ius dicenti non obtemperavit, ipse punitur, non dominus vel pupillus.

If your procurator or tutor or curator did not obey the one declaring the law, he himself is punished, not the master or the ward.

Dig. 2.3.1.3

Digest 2.3.1.3

Ulpianus 1 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 1 on the Edict.

Non solum autem reum, qui non obtemperavit, hoc edicto teneri labeo ait, verum etiam petitorem.

But Labeo says that not only the defendant, who did not obey, is held by this edict, but also the plaintiff.

Dig. 2.3.1.4

Digest 2.3.1.4

Ulpianus 1 ad ed.

Ulpian, 1 On the Edict.

Hoc iudicium non ad id quod interest, sed quanti ea res est concluditur: et cum meram poenam contineat, neque post annum neque in heredem datur.

This action is not assessed by that which is of interest, but by how much that thing is worth; and since it contains a mere penalty, it is given neither after a year nor against an heir.

Dig. 2.4.0. De in ius vocando.

Digest 2.4.0. On summoning into court.

Dig. 2.4.1

Digest 2.4.1

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paulus 4 on the Edict.

In ius vocare est iuris experiundi causa vocare.

To call into court is to call for the purpose of trying the right.

Dig. 2.4.2

Digest 2.4.2

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the Edict.

In ius vocari non oportet neque consulem neque praefectum neque praetorem neque proconsulem neque ceteros magistratus, qui imperium habent, qui et coercere aliquem possunt et iubere in carcerem duci: nec pontificem dum sacra facit: nec eos qui propter loci religionem inde se movere non possunt: sed nec eum qui equo publico in causa publica transvehatur. praeterea in ius vocari non debet qui uxorem ducat aut eam quae nubat: nec iudicem dum de re cognoscat: nec eum dum quis apud praetorem causam agit: neque funus ducentem familiare iustave mortuo facientem:

One ought not to be called into court neither the consul nor the prefect nor the praetor nor the proconsul nor the other magistrates who have imperium, who also can coerce someone and order him to be led into prison: nor the pontiff while he performs sacred rites: nor those who, on account of the religion of the place, cannot move themselves from there: but not even him who is being conveyed on the public horse on public business. Moreover, one ought not to be called into court who is taking a wife or she who is marrying: nor a judge while he takes cognizance of the matter: nor one while someone pleads a cause before the praetor: nor one leading a funeral, performing for a deceased person a familial or just funeral:

Dig. 2.4.3

Digest 2.4.3

Callistratus 1 cogn.

Callistratus, Book 1, On Cognitions.

Vel qui cadaver prosequuntur, quod etiam videtur ex rescripto divorum fratrum comprobatum esse:

Or those who accompany a cadaver, which also seems to have been confirmed by a rescript of the deified brothers:

Dig. 2.4.4pr.

Digest 2.4.4, beginning.

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 5 on the Edict.

Quique litigandi causa necesse habet in iure vel certo loco sisti: nec furiosos vel infantes.

And whoever, for the sake of litigating, has necessity to be made to appear in court or at a certain place: not the insane nor infants.

Dig. 2.4.4.1

Digest 2.4.4.1

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, On the Edict, book 5.

Praetor ait: "parentem, patronum patronam, liberos parentes patroni patronae in ius sine permissu meo ne quis vocet".

The praetor says: "Let no one summon into court a parent, a patron, a patroness, or the children or parents of a patron or patroness, without my permission."

Dig. 2.4.4.2

Digest 2.4.4.2

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, On the Edict, book 5.

Parentem hic utriusque sexus accipe: sed an in infinitum, quaeritur. quidam parentem usque ad tritavum appellari aiunt, superiores maiores dici: hoc veteres existimasse pomponius refert: sed gaius cassius omnes in infinitum parentes dicit, quod et honestius est et merito optinuit.

Here take “parent” of either sex; but whether without limit, is asked. Some say that “parent” is so called up to the tritavus (great-great-great-great-grandfather), those higher up being called “elders” (maiores) to be called: Pomponius reports that the ancients judged this; but Gaius Cassius says all are “parents” without limit, which both is more honorable and has deservedly prevailed.

Dig. 2.4.4.3

Digest 2.4.4.3

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the Edict.

Parentes etiam eos accipi labeo existimat, qui in servitute susceperunt: nec tamen, ut severus dicebat, ad solos iustos liberos: sed et si volgo quaesitus sit filius, matrem in ius non vocabit,

labeo thinks that those too are to be taken as parents who have had children while in servitude: and yet not, as severus used to say, only with respect to legitimate children: but even if the son has been begotten promiscuously, he will not summon the mother into court,

Dig. 2.4.5

Digest 2.4.5

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paulus, On the Edict, 4.

Quia semper certa est, etiam si volgo conceperit: pater vero is est, quem nuptiae demonstrant.

Because the mother is always certain, even if she has conceived promiscuously: but the father is he whom the nuptials demonstrate.

Dig. 2.4.6

Digest 2.4.6

Paulus 1 sent.

Paul 1 sent.

Parentes naturales in ius vocare nemo potest: una est enim omnibus parentibus servanda reverentia.

No one can call natural parents into court: for one reverence is to be observed toward all parents.

Dig. 2.4.7

Digest 2.4.7

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paulus, 4 on the Edict.

Patris adoptivi parentes impune vocabit, quoniam hi eius parentes non sunt, cum his tantum cognatus fiat quibus et adgnatus.

He may with impunity summon the parents of his adoptive father, since these are not his parents, inasmuch as he becomes cognate only with those to whom he is also agnate.

Dig. 2.4.8pr.

Digest 2.4.8pr.

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 5 on the Edict.

Adoptivum patrem, quamdiu in potestate est, in ius vocare non potest iure magis potestatis quam praecepto praetoris, nisi sit filius qui castrense habuit peculium: tunc enim causa cognita permittetur. sed naturalem parentem ne quidem dum est in adoptiva familia in ius vocari.

An adoptive father, so long as he (the son) is in potestas, cannot be called into court, more by the law of power than by the praetor’s precept, unless he be a son who
has had a castrense peculium: for then, the cause having been inquired into, it will be permitted. But a natural parent is not even, while he is in an adoptive family, to be called into court.

Dig. 2.4.8.1

Digest 2.4.8.1

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 5 on the Edict.

"patronum", inquit, "patronam". patroni hic accipiendi sunt, qui ex servitute manumiserunt: vel si collusionem detexit: vel si qui praeiudicio pronuntietur esse libertus cum alioquin non fuerit, aut si iuravi eum libertum meum esse: quemadmodum per contrarium pro patrono non habebor, si contra me iudicatum est aut si me deferente iuraverit se libertum non esse.

"patron," he says, "patroness." Patrons here are to be understood as those who have manumitted from servitude: or if he has exposed collusion: or if someone by a preliminary judgment is pronounced to be a freedman although otherwise he was not, or if I have sworn that he is my freedman: just as, on the contrary, I shall not be held as a patron, if it has been adjudged against me or if, at my instance, he has sworn that he is not a freedman.

Dig. 2.4.8.2

Digest 2.4.8.2

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 On the Edict.

Sed si ad iusiurandum adegi, ne uxorem ducat, ne nubat, impune in ius vocabor. et celsus quidem ait in tali liberto ius ad filium meum me vivo non transire: sed iulianus contra scribit. plerique iuliani sententiam probant.

But if I have driven him to an oath, that he not take a wife, that he not marry, I shall be summoned into court with impunity. And Celsus indeed says that, in such a freedman, the right does not pass to my son while I live; but Julian writes the contrary. The majority approve Julian’s opinion.

secundum quod eveniet, ut patronus quidem in ius vocetur, filius quasi innocens non vocetur.

according as it will ensue, so that the patron indeed is summoned into court, the son as if innocent is not summoned.

Dig. 2.4.9

Digest 2.4.9

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paulus, 4, On the Edict.

Is quoque, qui ex causa fideicommissi manumittit, non debet in ius vocari, quamvis ut manumittat, in ius vocetur.

He too, who manumits by reason of a fideicommissum, ought not to be called into court, although he is called into court so that he may manumit.

Dig. 2.4.10pr.

Digest 2.4.10, proem.

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 5, On the Edict.

Sed si hac lege emi ut manumittam, et ex constitutione divi marci venit ad libertatem: cum sim patronus, in ius vocari non potero. sed si suis nummis emi et fidem fregi, pro patrono non habebor.

But if I bought on this condition, that I manumit, and by the constitution of the deified Marcus he comes to freedom: since I am the patron, I cannot be called into court. But if I bought with his own moneys and broke faith, I shall not be held as patron.

Dig. 2.4.10.1

Digest 2.4.10.1

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 5 on the Edict.

Prostituta contra legem venditionis venditorem habebit patronum, si hac lege venierat, ut si prostituta esset, fieret libera. at si venditor, qui manus iniectionem excepit, ipse prostituit, quoniam et haec pervenit ad libertatem, sub illo quidem, qui vendidit, libertatem consequitur, sed honorem haberi ei aequum non est, ut et Marcellus libro sexto digestorum existimat.

A woman prostituted contrary to the law of the sale will have the seller as patron, if she had been sold under this law, that, if she were prostituted, she would become free. But if the seller, who
excepted manus iniectio, himself prostituted her, since she too attains to freedom, under that man indeed, who sold, she obtains freedom; but
it is not equitable that honor be had for him, as Marcellus also judges in the sixth book of the Digests.

Dig. 2.4.10.2

Digest 2.4.10.2

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5, on the Edict.

Patronum autem accipimus etiam si capite minutus sit: vel si libertus capite minutus, dum adrogetur per obreptionem. cum enim hoc ipso, quo adrogatur, celat condicionem, non id actum videtur ut fieret ingenuus.

We take him as patron even if he has undergone capitis diminution; or if the freedman has undergone capitis diminution, provided that he is adrogated by obreption. For since by this very act,
by which he is adrogated, he conceals his status, it does not seem that the act was done in order that he become freeborn.

Dig. 2.4.10.3

Digest 2.4.10.3

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the Edict.

Sed si ius anulorum accepit, puto eum reverentiam patrono exhibere debere, quamvis omnia ingenuitatis munia habet. aliud si natalibus sit restitutus: : nam princeps ingenuum facit.

But if he has received the right of the rings, I think he ought to exhibit reverence to his patron, although he has all the incidents of freeborn status. it is otherwise if he has been to his birthrights
restored: : for the emperor makes him freeborn.

Dig. 2.4.10.4

Digest 2.4.10.4

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the Edict.

Qui manumittitur a corpore aliquo vel collegio vel civitate, singulos in ius vocabit: nam non est illorum libertus. sed rei publicae honorem habere debet et si adversus rem publicam vel universitatem velit experiri, veniam edicti petere debet, quamvis actorem eorum constitutum in ius sit vocaturus.

One who is manumitted by some corpus or collegium or civitas will summon individuals into court; for he is not their freedman. But he ought to show honor to the res publica
and if he wishes to proceed against the res publica or the universitas, he ought to seek leave of the edict, although he is going to summon into court their appointed actor
into court.

Dig. 2.4.10.5

Digest 2.4.10.5

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 On the Edict.

Liberos parentesque patroni patronaeque utriusque sexus accipere debemus.

We ought to understand as included the children and the parents, of either sex, of the patron or the patroness.

Dig. 2.4.10.6

Digest 2.4.10.6

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 5 on the Edict.

Sed si per poenam deportationis ad peregrinitatem redactus sit patronus, putat pomponius eum amisisse honorem. sed si fuerit restitutus, erit ei etiam huius edicti commodum salvum.

But if through the punishment of deportation the patron has been reduced to peregrinity, Pomponius thinks that he has lost the honor. but if he has been restored,
the benefit of this edict will also remain intact for him.

Dig. 2.4.10.7

Digest 2.4.10.7

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 On the Edict.

Parentes patroni etiam adoptivi excipiuntur: sed tamdiu quamdiu adoptio durat.

The parents of a patron, even an adoptive one, are excepted: but only so long as the adoption endures.

Dig. 2.4.10.8

Digest 2.4.10.8

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian 5 on the Edict.

Si filius meus in adoptionem datus sit, vocari a liberto meo in ius non poterit: sed nec nepos in adoptiva familia susceptus. sed si filius meus emancipatus adoptaverit filium, hic nepos in ius vocari poterit: nam mihi alienus est.

If my son should be given into adoption, he will not be able to be called into court by my freedman; nor will a grandson taken up in the adoptive family. but if my son, once emancipated, shall have adopted a son, this grandson will be able to be called into court: for he is alien to me.

Dig. 2.4.10.9

Digest 2.4.10.9

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 5 on the Edict.

Liberos autem secundum cassium, ut in parentibus, et ultra trinepotem accipimus.

As for descendants, moreover, following Cassius, as with parents, we accept them—even beyond the great-great-great-grandchild.

Dig. 2.4.10.10

Digest 2.4.10.10

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the edict.

Si liberta ex patrono fuerit enixa, mutuo se ipsa et filius eius in ius non vocabunt.

If a freedwoman has borne a child by her patron, she herself and her son will not mutually summon one another into court.

Dig. 2.4.10.11

Digest 2.4.10.11

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 5 On the Edict.

Sin autem liberi patroni capitis accusaverunt libertum paternum vel in servitutem petierunt, nullus eis honor debetur.

But if, however, the patron’s children have accused their father’s freedman on a capital charge, or have sought to claim him into slavery, no honor is owed to them.

Dig. 2.4.10.12

Digest 2.4.10.12

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 On the Edict.

Praetor ait: "in ius nisi permissu meo ne quis vocet". permissurus enim est, si famosa actio non sit vel pudorem non suggilat, qua patronus convenitur vel parentes. et totum hoc causa cognita debet facere: nam interdum etiam ex causa famosa, ut pedius putat, permittere debet patronum in ius vocari a liberto: si eum gravissima iniuria adfecit, flagellis forte cecidit.

The praetor says: “let no one summon into court unless with my permission.” For he will grant permission if it is not a defamatory (famosa) action or does not outrage modesty (pudor), by which the patron or parents are proceeded against. And he ought to do all this after the cause has been examined: for sometimes even in a defamatory cause, as Pedius thinks, he ought to permit the patron to be called into court by a freedman—if he has afflicted him with a most serious injury, for instance has beaten him with whips.

Dig. 2.4.10.13

Digest 2.4.10.13

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the Edict.

Semper autem hunc honorem patrono habendum, etsi quasi tutor vel curator vel defensor vel actor interveniat patronus. sed si patroni tutor vel curator interveniat, impune posse eos in ius vocari pomponius scribit et verius est.

However, this honor must always be maintained for the patron, even if the patron intervenes as, so to speak, a tutor or curator or defender or agent. but if the patron’s tutor or curator intervenes, Pomponius writes that they can be called into court with impunity, and this is more correct.

Dig. 2.4.11

Digest 2.4.11

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 4 on the Edict.

Quamvis non adiciat praetor causa cognita se poenale iudicium daturum, tamen labeo ait moderandam iurisdictionem: veluti si paeniteat libertum et actionem remittat: vel si patronus vocatus non venerit: aut si non invitus vocatus sit, licet edicti verba non patiantur.

Although the praetor does not add that, the case having been inquired into, he will grant a penal judgment, nevertheless Labeo says the jurisdiction must be moderated: for instance, if the freedman repent and remit the action; or if the patron, when summoned, has not come; or if he has been summoned not unwillingly, although the words of the edict do not allow it.

Dig. 2.4.12

Digest 2.4.12

Ulpianus 57 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 57 on the Edict.

Si libertus in ius vocaverit contra praetoris edictum filium patroni sui, quem ipse patronus in potestate habet: probandum est absente patre subveniendum esse filio qui in potestate est et ei poenalem in factum actionem, id est quinquaginta aureorum, adversus libertum competere.

If a freedman, contrary to the praetor’s edict, has summoned into court his patron’s son, whom the patron himself has under his power: it must be held that, with the father absent, aid is to be afforded to the son who is under power, and that a penal action in factum—namely, for 50 aurei—lies for him against the freedman.

Dig. 2.4.13

Digest 2.4.13

Modestinus 10 pand.

Modestinus 10 Pandects.

Generaliter eas personas, quibus reverentia praestanda est, sine iussu praetoris in ius vocare non possumus.

Generally, those persons to whom reverence is to be shown we cannot call into court without the praetor’s order.

Dig. 2.4.14

Digest 2.4.14

Papinianus 1 resp.

Papinian, 1 Responses.

Libertus a patrono reus constitutus, qui se defendere paratus pro tribunali praesidem provinciae frequenter interpellat, patronum accusatorem in ius non videtur vocare.

A freedman, made defendant by his patron, who, prepared to defend himself, before the tribunal frequently interpellates the governor of the province, the patron
as accuser does not seem to call into court.

Dig. 2.4.15

Digest 2.4.15

Paulus 1 quaest.

Paulus, Questions 1.

Libertus adversus patronum dedit libellum non dissimulato se libertum esse eius: an si ad desiderium eius rescribatur, etiam edicti poena remissa esse videtur? respondi non puto ad hunc casum edictum praetoris pertinere. neque enim qui libellum principi vel praesidi dat, in ius vocare patronum videtur.

A freedman gave a libellus against his patron, not dissimulating that he was his freedman: or, if a rescript is issued according to his desire, does even the penalty of the edict seem to have been remitted? I answered: I do not think the praetor’s edict pertains to this case. For he who gives a libellus to the Princeps or the governor does not seem to call his patron into court.

Dig. 2.4.16

Digest 2.4.16

Paulus 2 resp.

Paulus, Responses, book 2.

Quaesitum est, an tutor pupilli nomine patronam suam sine permissu praetoris vocare possit. respondi eum, de quo quaeritur, pupilli nomine etiam in ius vocare patronam suam potuisse sine permissu praetoris.

It was inquired whether a tutor, in the name of the ward, could summon his patroness without the permission of the praetor. I answered that the one about whom inquiry is made, in the name of the ward,
could even summon his patroness into court without the permission of the praetor.

Dig. 2.4.17

Digest 2.4.17

Paulus 1 sent.

Paulus, Sentences 1.

Eum, pro quo quis apud officium cavit, exhibere cogitur. item eum qui apud acta exhibiturum se esse quem promisit, etsi officio non caveat, ad exhibendum tamen cogitur.

The one who has given security before the office is compelled to exhibit the person on whose behalf he did so. likewise, the one who, in the records, has declared that he will exhibit the person whom he promised, even if he has not given security before the office,
is nevertheless compelled to exhibit (him).

Dig. 2.4.18

Digest 2.4.18

Gaius 1 ad l. xii tab.

Gaius 1 on the Law of the 12 Tables.

Plerique putaverunt nullum de domo sua in ius vocari licere, quia domus tutissimum cuique refugium atque receptaculum sit, eumque qui inde in ius vocaret vim inferre videri.

Most people thought that it is not permitted for anyone to be called into court from his own house, because a house is for each person the safest refuge and receptacle, and that he who from there would summon into court is deemed to be employing force.

Dig. 2.4.19

Digest 2.4.19

Paulus 1 ad ed.

Paul, Book 1, on the edict.

Satisque poenae subire eum, si non defendatur et latitet, certum est, quod mittitur adversarius in possessionem bonorum eius. sed si aditum ad se praestet aut ex publico conspiciatur, recte in ius vocari eum iulianus ait.

And it is certain that he undergoes punishment enough, if he is not defended and lies hidden, because the adversary is sent into possession of his goods. But if he affords access to himself or is seen in public, Julian says that he is rightly called into court.

Dig. 2.4.20

Digest 2.4.20

Gaius 1 ad l. xii tab.

Gaius 1 on the Law of the 12 Tables

Sed etiam ab ianua et balineo et theatro nemo dubitat in ius vocari licere.

But also from the door and the bath and the theatre, no one doubts that it is permitted to be called into court.

Dig. 2.4.21

Digest 2.4.21

Paulus 1 ad ed.

Paulus, On the Edict, book 1.

Sed etsi is qui domi est interdum vocari in ius potest, tamen de domo sua nemo extrahi debet.

But although he who is at home can sometimes be called into court, nevertheless no one ought to be dragged out of his own house.

Dig. 2.4.22pr.

Digest 2.4.22pr.

Gaius 1 ad l. xii tab.

Gaius 1 on the Law of the 12 Tables.

Neque impuberes puellas, quae alieno iuri subiectae essent, in ius vocare permissum est.

Nor was it permitted to summon into court underage girls who were subject to another’s legal power.

Dig. 2.4.22.1

Digest 2.4.22.1

Gaius 1 ad l. xii tab.

Gaius, Book 1, on the Law of the 12 Tables.

Qui in ius vocatus est, duobus casibus dimittendus est: si quis eius personam defendet, et si, dum in ius venitur, de re transactum fuerit.

He who has been called into court is to be dismissed in two cases: if someone will defend his person, and if, while one is coming into court, the matter has been settled.

Dig. 2.4.23

Digest 2.4.23

Marcianus 3 inst.

Marcianus, Institutes 3.

Communis libertus licet plurium sit, debet a praetore petere, ut ei liceat vel quendam ex patronis in ius vocare, ne in poenam incidat ex edicto praetoris.

A common freedman, although he be of several, ought to petition the praetor that it be permitted to him to summon even one of the patrons into court, lest he incur the penalty under the praetor’s edict.

Dig. 2.4.24

Digest 2.4.24

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5, on the Edict.

In eum, qui adversus ea fecerit, quinquaginta aureorum iudicium datur: quod nec heredi nec in heredem nec ultra annum datur.

Against one who has acted contrary to these provisions, a suit of fifty aurei is given; which is given neither to an heir nor against an heir, nor beyond a year.

Dig. 2.4.25

Digest 2.4.25

Modestinus 1 de poen.

Modestinus, book 1 on penalties.

Si sine venia edicti impetrata libertus patronum in ius vocaverit, ex querella patroni vel supradictam poenam, id est quinquaginta aureos dat vel a praefecto urbi quasi inofficiosus castigatur, si inopia dinoscitur laborare.

If, without leave of the edict obtained, a freedman summons his patron into court, then upon the patron’s complaint he either pays the aforesaid penalty—that is, fifty aurei—or he is chastised by the Prefect of the City as undutiful, if he is found to be laboring under poverty.

Dig. 2.5.0. Si quis in ius vocatus non ierit sive quis eum vocaverit, quem ex edicto non debuerit.

Dig. 2.5.0. If anyone, when called into court, does not go, or if anyone summons someone whom he ought not under the edict.

Dig. 2.5.1

Digest 2.5.1

Ulpianus 1 ad ed.

Ulpian, 1 on the Edict.

Si quis in ius vocatus fideiussorem dederit in iudicio sistendi causa non suppositum iurisdictioni illius, ad quem vocatur, pro non dato fideiussor habetur, nisi suo privilegio specialiter renuntiaverit.

If anyone, summoned into court, has given a surety for the purpose of appearing in court, one not subjected to the jurisdiction of him to whom he is summoned, the surety is held as not given, unless he has specially renounced his own privilege.

Dig. 2.5.2pr.

Digest 2.5.2pr.

Paulus 1 ad ed.

Paul 1 on the edict.

Ex quacumque causa ad praetorem vel alios, qui iurisdictioni praesunt, in ius vocatus venire debet, ut hoc ipsum sciatur, an iurisdictio eius sit.

From whatever cause, to the praetor or to others who preside over jurisdiction, being summoned into court, he must come, in order that this very point may be ascertained, whether the jurisdiction
is his.

Dig. 2.5.2.1

Digest 2.5.2.1

Paulus 1 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 1 on the Edict.

Si quis in ius vocatus non ierit, ex causa a competenti iudice multa pro iurisdictione iudicis damnabitur: rusticitati enim hominis parcendum erit: item si nihil intersit actoris eo tempore in ius adversarium venisse, remittit praetor poenam, puta quia feriatus dies fuit.

If anyone, having been called into court, does not go, he will be condemned, for cause, by a competent judge to a mulct according to the judge’s jurisdiction: for the man’s rusticity is to be spared:
likewise, if it makes no difference to the plaintiff that at that time the adversary has come into court, the praetor remits the penalty, for instance because it was a holiday.

Dig. 2.5.3

Digest 2.5.3

Ulpianus 47 ad sab.

Ulpian, 47 on Sabinus.

Cum quis in iudicio sisti promiserit neque adiecerit poenam, si status non esset: incerti cum eo agendum esse in id quod interest verissimum est, et ita celsus quoque scribit.

When someone has promised to appear in court and has not added a penalty, if he should not appear: it is most true that he must be proceeded against by an action for an uncertain sum, to the extent of what is of interest, and thus Celsus also writes.

Dig. 2.6.0. In ius vocati ut eant aut satis vel cautum dent.

Digest 2.6.0. Those summoned into court are to go, or give surety or a guarantee.

Dig. 2.6.1

Digest 2.6.1

Paulus 1 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 1 on the Edict.

Edicto cavetur, ut fideiussor iudicio sistendi causa datus pro rei qualitate locuples detur exceptis necessariis personis: ibi enim qualemcumque accipi iubet: veluti pro parente patrono,

By the edict it is provided that a fideiussor (surety), given for the purpose of appearing in court, be solvent according to the quality of the matter, necessary persons being excepted: for there it orders that one of whatever kind be accepted; for example, for a parent, for a patron,

Dig. 2.6.2

Digest 2.6.2

Callistratus 1 ad ed. monit.

Callistratus 1 on the monitory edict.

Item pro patrona liberisve suis vel uxore nuruve. tunc enim qualiscumque fideiussor accipi iubetur: et in eum, qui non acceperit, cum sciret eam necessitudinem personarum, quinquaginta aureorum iudicium competit,

Likewise, on behalf of a patroness, or of one’s own children or wife or daughter-in-law. For then any sort of surety is ordered to be accepted: and against him who has not accepted, when he knew that relationship of the persons,
an action for fifty aurei lies,

Dig. 2.6.3

Digest 2.6.3

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paul 4 on the edict.

Quoniam pro locuplete accipitur fideiussor in necessariis personis.

Since a surety is accepted as solvent for necessary persons.

Dig. 2.6.4

Digest 2.6.4

Ulpianus 48 ad ed.

Ulpian, 48 on the Edict.

Qui duos homines in iudicio sisti promisit, si alterum exhibet, alterum non, ex promissione non videtur eos stetisse, cum alter eorum non sit exhibitus.

He who promised that two men be made to appear in court—if he produces one and not the other—they are not considered, under the promise, to have appeared, since one of them has not been exhibited.

Dig. 2.7.0. Ne quis eum qui in ius vocabitur vi eximat.

Digest 2.7.0. Let no one remove by force him who will be summoned to court.

Dig. 2.7.1pr.

Digest 2.7.1, beginning.

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 5 on the edict.

Hoc edictum praetor proposuit, ut metu poenae compesceret eos, qui in ius vocatos vi eripiunt.

The praetor published this edict, so that by fear of punishment he might restrain those who snatch away by force persons summoned to court.

Dig. 2.7.1.1

Digest 2.7.1.1

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 5 on the Edict.

Denique pomponius scribit servi quoque nomine noxale iudicium reddendum, nisi sciente domino id fecit: tunc enim sine noxae deditione iudicium suscipiet.

Finally, Pomponius writes that a noxal judgment is to be rendered also in the name of a slave, unless he did it with the master aware: for then the judgment will be undertaken without a noxal surrender.

Dig. 2.7.1.2

Digest 2.7.1.2

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the edict.

Ofilius putat locum hoc edicto non esse, si persona, quae in ius vocari non potuit, exempta est, veluti parens et patronus ceteraeque personae: quae sententia mihi videtur verior. et sane si deliquit qui vocat, non deliquit qui exemit.

Ofilius thinks that there is no place for this edict, if a person who could not be summoned into court has been exempted, such as a parent and a patron and the other persons: which opinion seems to me the truer. And indeed, if the one who summons has done wrong, the one who exempts has not done wrong.

Dig. 2.7.2pr.

Digest 2.7.2, opening paragraph.

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paulus 4 on the Edict.

Nam cum uterque contra edictum faciat, et libertus qui patronum vocat, et is qui patronum vi eximat: deteriore tamen loco libertus est, qui in simili delicto petitoris partes sustinet.

For since each acts against the edict, both the freedman who summons his patron, and the one who by force takes the patron away; nevertheless the freedman is in the worse position, who in a similar delict sustains the parts of the petitioner.

Dig. 2.7.2.1

Digest 2.7.2.1

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paulus, in the fourth book on the Edict.

Eadem aequitas est in eo, qui alio quam quo debuerat in ius vocabatur: sed et fortius dicendum est non videri vi eximi eum, cui sit ius ibi non conveniri.

The same equity holds in the case of one who was summoned into court in a place other than that in which he ought to have been; but it must be said even more strongly that he does not seem to be exempted by force, who has the right not to be convened there.

Dig. 2.7.3pr.

Digest 2.7.3, preface.

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the edict.

Quod si servum quis exemit in ius vocatum, pedius putat cessare edictum, quoniam non fuit persona, quae in ius vocari potuit. quid ergo? ad exhibendum erit agendum.

But if someone removed a slave who had been summoned into court, pedius thinks the edict ceases, since there was not a person who could be summoned into court. What then? An action to exhibit will have to be brought.

Dig. 2.7.3.1

Digest 2.7.3.1

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the Edict.

Si quis ad pedaneum iudicem vocatum quem eximat, poena eius edicti cessabit.

If anyone removes a person who has been summoned before an inferior judge, the penalty of that edict will cease.

Dig. 2.7.3.2

Digest 2.7.3.2

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 5 on the Edict.

Quod praetor praecepit "vi eximat": vi an et dolo malo? sufficit vi, quamvis dolus malus cesset.

As to what the praetor has prescribed, "let him remove it by force": is it on account of force, or also of malicious fraud (dolus malus)? Force suffices, even though malicious fraud is absent.

Dig. 2.7.4pr.

Digest 2.7.4, preface.

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paul, On the Edict, book 4.

Sed eximendi verbum generale est, ut pomponius ait. eripere enim est de manibus auferre per raptum: eximere quoquo modo auferre. ut puta si quis non rapuerit quem, sed moram fecerit quo minus in ius veniret, ut actionis dies exiret vel res tempore amitteretur: videbitur exemisse, quamvis corpus non exemerit.

But the word “eximere” is a general term, as Pomponius says. for “to snatch away” (eripere) is to take from the hands by rapine; “to remove” (eximere) is to take away in whatever way. for instance
if someone has not snatched someone, but has caused a delay whereby he did not come into court, so that the day for the action expired or the matter was lost by lapse of time, he will be seen to have “removed,”
although he has not removed the body (corpus).

sed et si eo loco retinuerit, non abduxit, his verbis tenetur.

but also, if he has retained him in that place, even though he did not lead him away, he is bound by these words.

Dig. 2.7.4.1

Digest 2.7.4.1

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paulus, 4 On the Edict.

Item si quis eum, qui per calumniam vocabatur, exemerit: constat eum hoc edicto teneri.

Likewise, if anyone removes him who was being summoned on account of calumny, it is established that he is bound by this edict.

Dig. 2.7.4.2

Digest 2.7.4.2

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paulus, 4, On the Edict.

Praetor ait "neve faciat dolo malo, quo magis eximeretur": nam potest sine dolo malo id fieri, veluti cum iusta causa est exemptionis.

The praetor says, "and let him not do it with malicious fraud, whereby he would be more exempted": for it can be done without malicious fraud, as when there is a just cause of exemption.

Dig. 2.7.5pr.

Digest 2.7.5pr.

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the Edict.

Si per alium quis exemerit, hac clausula tenetur, sive praesens fuit sive absens.

If anyone has removed through another, he is held by this clause, whether he was present or absent.

Dig. 2.7.5.1

Digest 2.7.5.1

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 5 on the Edict.

In eum autem, qui vi exemit, in factum iudicium datur: quo non id continetur quod in veritate est, sed quanti ea res est ab actore aestimata, de qua controversia est. hoc enim additum est, ut appareat etiam si calumniator quis sit, tamen hanc poenam eum persequi.

But against him who removed it by force, an action on the facts is given: in which there is not contained that which is in truth, but how much that thing is, as assessed by the plaintiff, de which there is controversy. For this has been added, so that it may appear that, even if someone is a calumniator, nevertheless he is pursuing this penalty.

Dig. 2.7.5.2

Digest 2.7.5.2

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 5 on the Edict.

Docere autem debet quis per hanc exemptionem factum quo minus in ius produceretur. ceterum si nihilo minus productus est, cessat poena: quoniam verba cum effectu sunt accipienda.

But one ought to show that by this exemption there was a ground preventing him from being brought into court. However, if nonetheless he has been produced, the penalty ceases:
since words are to be taken with effect.

Dig. 2.7.5.3

Digest 2.7.5.3

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the Edict.

Hoc iudicium in factum est: et si plures deliquerint in singulos dabitur, et nihilo minus manet qui exemptus est obligatus:

This is an action in factum: and if several have committed the delict, it will be given against each individually, and nonetheless he who has been exempted remains obligated:

Dig. 2.7.5.4

Digest 2.7.5.4

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the Edict.

Heredibus autem ita dabitur, si eorum intersit: neque autem in heredem neque post annum dabitur.

To heirs, however, it will be granted thus, if it be to their interest; nor, however, will it be granted against an heir nor after a year.

Dig. 2.7.6

Digest 2.7.6

Ulpianus 35 ad ed.

Ulpian, 35 on the Edict.

Is qui debitorem vi exemit, si solverit, reum non liberat, quia poenam suam solvit.

He who has removed the debtor by force, if he pays, does not free the defendant, because he pays his own penalty.

Dig. 2.8.0. Qui satisdare cogantur vel iurato promittant vel suae promissioni committantur.

Dig. 2.8.0. Those who are compelled to furnish surety, let them either promise by sworn oath or be committed to their own promise.

Dig. 2.8.1

Digest 2.8.1

Gaius 5 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, 5, on the Provincial Edict.

Satisdatio eodem modo appellata est quo satisfactio. nam ut satisfacere dicimur ei, cuius desiderium implemus, ita satisdare dicimur adversario nostro, qui pro eo, quod a nobis petiit, ita cavit, ut eum hoc nomine securum faciamus datis fideiussoribus.

Satisdation has been called by the same name as satisfaction. For just as we are said to satisfy him whose desire we fulfill, so we are said to give satisdation to our adversary, who, with respect to that which he has sought from us, has so taken caution that we make him secure under this head by giving sureties.

Dig. 2.8.2pr.

Digest 2.8.2 preface.

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the edict.

Fideiussor in iudicio sistendi causa locuples videtur dari non tantum ex facultatibus, sed etiam ex conveniendi facilitate.

A surety, for the purpose of producing in court, is deemed sufficient not only on the basis of his faculties, but also on the facility of convening him.

Dig. 2.8.2.1

Digest 2.8.2.1

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 5 on the Edict.

Si quis his personis, quae agere non potuerunt, fideiussorem iudicio sistendi causa dederit, frustra erit datio.

If anyone should give a surety for those persons who were unable to bring an action, for the purpose of ensuring their appearance in court, the giving will be in vain.

Dig. 2.8.2.2

Digest 2.8.2.2

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 5 on the Edict.

Praetor ait: "si quis parentem, patronum patronam, liberos aut parentes patroni patronae, liberosve suos eumve quem in potestate habebit, vel uxorem, vel nurum in iudicium vocabit: qualiscumque fideiussor iudicio sistendi causa accipiatur."

The praetor says: "If anyone shall summon into court a parent, a patron or patroness, the children or parents of a patron or patroness, or his own children or someone whom he will have in his power, or his wife, or his daughter-in-law: let a surety of whatever kind be accepted for the purpose of appearing in the action."

Dig. 2.8.2.3

Digest 2.8.2.3

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, On the Edict, book 5.

Quod ait praetor "liberosve suos", accipiemus et ex feminino sexu descendentes liberos. parentique dabimus hoc beneficium non solum sui iuris, sed etiam si in potestate sit alicuius: hoc enim pomponius scribit. et filius fideiussor pro patre fieri potest, etiam si in alterius potestate sit.

As the praetor says "or his children," we will also understand as children those descending from the female sex. And we will grant this beneficium to the parent not only when he is sui iuris, but also if he is in someone’s power: for Pomponius writes this. And a son can become fideiussor (surety) for his father, even if he is in another’s power.

nurum etiam pronurum et deinceps accipere debemus.

we ought also to accept the daughter-in-law, the granddaughter-in-law, and so on in succession.

Dig. 2.8.2.4

Digest 2.8.2.4

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, 5 on the Edict.

Quod ait praetor "qualiscumque fideiussor accipiatur": hoc quantum ad facultates, id est etiam non locuples.

What the praetor says, "let a surety of whatever sort be accepted": this is with respect to means, that is, even if not solvent.

Dig. 2.8.2.5

Digest 2.8.2.5

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 5 on the Edict.

In fideiussorem, qui aliquem iudicio sisti promiserit, tanti quanti ea res erit actionem dat praetor. quod utrum veritatem contineat an vero quantitatem, videamus. et melius est ut in veram quantitatem fideiussor teneatur, nisi pro certa quantitate accessit.

In respect to a surety who has promised that someone will be made to appear in court, the praetor gives an action for as much as that matter will be worth. As to whether this contains the truth or rather the quantity, let us see. And it is better that the surety be held to the true quantity, unless he acceded for a fixed quantity.

Dig. 2.8.3

Digest 2.8.3

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, 1 on the Provincial Edict

Sive in duplum est actio sive tripli aut quadrupli, tanti eundem fideiussorem omnimodo teneri dicimus, quia tanti res esse intellegitur.

Whether the action is for double or for triple or quadruple, we say that the same surety is in every way held for that amount, because the thing is understood to be worth that much.

Dig. 2.8.4

Digest 2.8.4

Paulus 4 ad ed.

Paul, 4 on the Edict.

Si decesserit qui fideiussorem dederit iudicio sistendi causa, non debebit praetor iubere exhibere eum. quod si ignorans iusserit exhiberi vel post decretum eius ante diem exhibitionis decesserit, deneganda erit actio. si autem post diem exhibitionis decesserit aut amiserit civitatem, utiliter agi potest.

If he who has given a fideiussor (surety) for the purpose of appearing in the suit has died, the praetor ought not to order him to be produced. but if, being unaware, he has ordered him to be produced, or
after his decree he has died before the day of production, the action must be denied. if, however, he has died after the day of production or has lost citizenship,
an actio utilis (useful action) can be brought.

Dig. 2.8.5pr.

Digest 2.8.5, preface.

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, Book 1, on the Provincial Edict

Si vero pro condemnato fideiusserit et condemnatus decesserit aut civitatem romanam amiserit, recte nihilo minus cum fideiussore eius agetur.

If, however, someone has stood as surety (fideiussor) for a condemned man, and the condemned has died or has lost Roman citizenship, none the less an action will properly be brought against his surety.

Dig. 2.8.5.1

Digest 2.8.5.1

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, 1, on the provincial edict

Qui pro rei qualitate evidentissime locupletem vel, si dubitetur, adprobatum fideiussorem iudicio sistendi causa non acceperit: iniuriarum actio adversus eum esse potest, quia sane non quaelibet iniuria est duci in ius eum, qui satis idoneum fideiussorem det. sed et ipse fideiussor, qui non sit acceptus, tamquam de iniuria sibi facta queri poterit.

He who, in proportion to the quality of the matter, has not accepted, for the purpose of securing appearance at trial, a most evidently solvent or, if there be doubt, an approved fidejussor: an action for injuries can be against him, for indeed it is by no means a slight injury to be led into court when one provides a sufficiently suitable fidejussor. but even the fidejussor himself, if he is not accepted, will be able to complain as though an injury had been done to him.

Dig. 2.8.6

Digest 2.8.6

Paulus 12 ad ed.

Paul, 12 on the Edict.

Quotiens vitiose cautum vel satisdatum est, non videtur cautum.

Whenever security has been defectively provided or surety has been defectively furnished, it is not deemed to have been provided.

Dig. 2.8.7pr.

Digest 2.8.7, beginning.

Ulpianus 14 ad ed.

Ulpian, 14 on the Edict.

Si fideiussor non negetur idoneus, sed dicatur habere fori praescriptionem et metuat petitor, ne iure fori utatur: videndum quid iuris sit. et divus pius ( ut et pomponius libro epistularum refert et Marcellus libro tertio digestorum et papinianus libro tertio quaestionum) cornelio proculo rescripsit merito petitorem recusare talem fideiussorem: sed si alias caveri non possit, praedicendum ei non usurum eum privilegio, si conveniatur.

If a surety is not denied to be suitable, but is said to have a forum prescription and the claimant fears lest he use the right of the forum: we must see what the law is. And
the deified Pius (as both Pomponius relates in the Book of Letters, and Marcellus in the third book of the Digests, and Papinian in the third book of Questions) wrote in rescript to Cornelius
Proculus that the claimant rightly refuses such a surety; but if it cannot otherwise be secured, it must be declared by him that he will not use the privilege if
he is sued.

Dig. 2.8.7.1

Digest 2.8.7.1

Ulpianus 14 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 14 on the Edict.

Si necessaria satisdatio fuerit et non facile possit reus ibi eam praestare, ubi convenitur: potest audiri, si in alia eiusdem provinciae civitate satisdationem praestare paratus sit. si autem satisdatio voluntaria est, non in alium locum remittitur: neque enim meretur qui ipse sibi necessitatem satisdationis imposuit.

If a necessary satisdation is required and the defendant cannot easily furnish it there where he is sued: he can be heard, if he is prepared to furnish the satisdation in another city of the same province
to furnish the satisdation. but if the satisdation is voluntary, it is not remitted to another place: for he does not deserve it who has himself
imposed the necessity of satisdation.

Dig. 2.8.7.2

Digest 2.8.7.2

Ulpianus 14 ad ed.

Ulpian, 14, on the Edict.

Si satisdatum pro re mobili non sit et persona suspecta sit, ex qua satis desideratur: apud officium deponi debebit si hoc iudici sederit, donec vel satisdatio detur vel lis finem accipiat.

If surety has not been given for a movable thing and the person from whom surety is demanded is suspect, it ought to be deposited with the office, if this has seemed good to the judge, until either surety is furnished or the lawsuit comes to an end.

Dig. 2.8.8pr.

Digest 2.8.8, preface.

Paulus 14 ad ed.

Paulus, 14 on the Edict.

De die ponenda in stipulatione solet inter litigatores convenire. si non conveniat, pedius putat in potestate stipulatoris esse moderato spatio: de hoc a iudice statuendum ^ statuendo^.

On the day to be set in a stipulation it is customary for agreement to be made between the litigants. if there is no agreement, Pedius thinks it is in the power of the stipulator within a moderate interval: about this, to be determined by the judge ^ in determining^.

Dig. 2.8.8.1

Digest 2.8.8.1

Paulus 14 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 14 on the Edict.

Qui mulierem adhibet ad satisdandum, non videtur cavere: sed nec miles nec minor viginti quinque annis probandi sunt: nisi hae personae in rem suam fideiubeant, ut pro suo procuratore. quidam etiam, si a marito fundus dotalis petatur, in rem suam fideiussuram mulierem.

He who employs a woman to give security is not considered to provide caution; and neither a soldier nor one under twenty-five years are to be approved—unless these persons furnish a fideiussory guarantee in their own interest (in rem suam), as for their own procurator. Some also hold that, if a dotal estate (fundus dotalis) is claimed from the husband, the woman will stand surety in her own interest (in rem suam).

Dig. 2.8.8.2

Digest 2.8.8.2

Paulus 14 ad ed.

Paulus, book 14, on the edict.

Si servus inveniatur, qui antequam iudicium accipiatur fideiussit iudicatum solvi: succurrendum est actori, ut ex integro caveatur. minori quoque viginti quinque annis succurrendum est, fortasse et mulieri propter imperitiam.

If a slave is found who, before the action is accepted, has stood as surety that the adjudged sum be paid: succor must be given to the plaintiff, so that security be furnished anew. Succor must also be given to a minor,
under 25 years, perhaps even to a woman on account of inexperience.

Dig. 2.8.8.3

Digest 2.8.8.3

Paulus 14 ad ed.

Paulus, 14 on the Edict.

Si fideiussor iudicatum solvi stipulatori heres extiterit aut stipulator fideiussori, ex integro cavendum erit.

If the surety (fideiussor) for iudicatum solvi has become heir to the stipulator, or the stipulator to the fideiussor, security shall be provided anew in full.

Dig. 2.8.8.4

Digest 2.8.8.4

Paulus 14 ad ed.

Paulus 14 on the edict.

Tutor et curator, ut rem salvam fore pupillo caveant, mittendi sunt in municipium, quia necessaria est satisdatio: item de re restituenda domino proprietatis, cuius usus fructus datus est: item legatarius, ut caveat evicta hereditate legata reddi, et quod amplius per legem falcidiam ceperit: heres quoque ut legatorum satisdet audiendus est, ut in municipium mittatur. plane si misso iam legatario in possessionem, cum per heredem staret quominus caveret, heres postulet uti de possessione decedat paratumque se dicat in municipio cavere: impetrare non debebit. diversum, si sine culpa aut dolo heredis missus sit in possessionem.

The tutor and the curator, in order that they may give security that the property will be safe for the ward, must be sent to the municipality, because surety is necessary: likewise in regard to the thing to be restored to the owner of the property, whose usufruct has been granted: likewise the legatee, that he give security that, if the inheritance be evicted, the legacies will be returned, and for what more beyond the Falcidian law
he has taken: the heir too, so that he may give surety for the legacies, must be heard, that he may be sent to the municipality. Clearly, if, the legatee having already been sent into possession, when it was by
the heir that he could not give security, the heir should request that he depart from possession and say that he is prepared to give security in the municipality: he ought not to obtain it. The opposite, if without fault or fraud of the heir he has been sent into possession.

Dig. 2.8.8.5

Digest 2.8.8.5

Paulus 14 ad ed.

Paulus, book 14 on the Edict.

Iubetur iurare de calumnia, ne quis vexandi magis adversarii causa, forsitan cum romae possit satisdare, in municipium evocet: sed quibusdam hoc iusiurandum de calumnia remittitur, velut parentibus et patronis. sic autem iurare debet qui in municipium remittitur "romae se satisdare non posse et ibi posse, quo postulat remitti, idque se non calumniae causa facere": nam sic non est compellendus iurare "alibi se quam eo loco satisdare non posse", quia si romae non potest, pluribus autem locis possit, cogitur peierare.

He is ordered to swear concerning calumny, lest anyone, for the purpose of vexing his adversary rather, perhaps when he is able to provide surety at Rome, should summon him to a municipium: but for certain persons this oath concerning calumny is remitted, as for parents and patrons. Thus, however, he who is remitted to a municipium ought to swear “that he cannot provide surety at Rome and can do so there, to which place he asks to be remitted, and that he does not do this for the sake of calumny”: for thus he is not compelled to swear “that he cannot provide surety anywhere other than in that place,” because if he cannot at Rome, but could in several other places, he is forced to perjure himself.

Dig. 2.8.8.6

Digest 2.8.8.6

Paulus 14 ad ed.

Paulus, 14, on the Edict.

Hoc autem tunc impetrabitur, cum iusta causa esse videbitur. quid enim si, cum erat in municipio, noluit cavere? hoc casu non debet impetrare, cum per eum steterit, quominus ibi, ubi ire desiderat, satisdaret.

This, however, will be obtained then, when a just cause shall seem to exist. For what if, when he was in the municipal town, he was unwilling to give security? In this case he ought not to obtain it, since it was by his own doing that he failed to provide surety there, where he desires to go.

Dig. 2.8.9

Digest 2.8.9

Gaius 5 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 5 on the provincial edict.

Arbitro ad fideiussores probandos constituto, si in alterutram partem iniquum arbitrium videatur, perinde ab ed atque ab iudicibus appellare licet.

With an arbiter appointed to approve fidejussors, if the award appears inequitable to either side, it is permitted to appeal from him just as from judges to do so is allowed.

Dig. 2.8.10

Digest 2.8.10

Paulus 75 ad ed.

Paulus 75 on the Edict.

Si ab arbitro probati sunt fideiussores, pro locupletibus habendi sunt, cum potuerit querella ad competentem iudicem deferri, qui ex causa improbat ab arbitro probatos, alias improbatos probat: multoque magis, si sua voluntate accepit fideiussores, contentus his esse debet. quod si medio tempore calamitas fideiussoribus insignis vel magna inopia accidit, causa cognita ex integro satisdandum erit.

If fideiussors have been approved by an arbitrator, they are to be held as solvent, since a complaint can be carried to the competent judge, who for cause
disapproves those approved by the arbitrator, and on the other hand approves those disapproved: and much more so, if he has of his own will accepted fideiussors, he ought to be content with these. But
if in the meantime a notable calamity or great indigence befalls the fideiussors, the cause having been examined, security shall be furnished anew.

Dig. 2.8.11

Digest 2.8.11

Ulpianus 75 ad ed.

Ulpian, 75 on the Edict.

Iulianus ait, si antequam ^ ante, quam^ mandarem tibi ut fundum peteres, satis acceperis petiturus fundum et postea mandatu meo agere institueris, fideiussores teneri.

Julian says, if before I had given you a mandate to claim the farm, you received security, being about to claim the farm, and afterwards, on my mandate, you set about to bring the action, the sureties are liable.

Dig. 2.8.12

Digest 2.8.12

Ulpianus 77 ad ed.

Ulpian, 77 on the Edict.

Inter omnes convenit heredem sub condicione, pendente condicione possidentem hereditatem, substituto cavere debere de hereditate, et, si defecerit condicio, adeuntem hereditatem substitutum et petere hereditatem posse et, si optinuerit, committi stipulationem. et plerumque ipse praetor et ante condicionem existentem et ante diem petitionis venientem ex causa iubere solet stipulationem interponi.

Among all it is agreed that an heir under a condition, who, while the condition is pending, possesses the inheritance, ought to give security to the substitute concerning the inheritance; and, if
the condition fails, the substitute, on entering upon the inheritance, both can seek the inheritance and, if he prevails, the stipulation is incurred. And for the most part
the praetor himself is accustomed, for cause, to order that a stipulation be interposed both before the condition exists and before the day of the petition arrives.

Dig. 2.8.13

Digest 2.8.13

Paulus 75 ad ed.

Paul 75 on the edict.

Sed et si plures substituti sint, singulis cavendum est.

But also, if several substitutes have been appointed, security must be given to each individually.

Dig. 2.8.14

Digest 2.8.14

Paulus 2 resp.

Paul, Responses 2.

Filius familias defendit absentem patrem: quaero an iudicatum solvi satisdare debeat. paulus respondit eum qui absentem defendit, etiam si filius vel pater sit, satisdare petituro ex forma edicti debere.

the son of the household defends an absent father: I ask whether he ought to give surety for payment of the judgment. paul answered that he who defends an absent person, even if
he be a son or a father, ought to give surety to the claimant according to the form of the edict.

Dig. 2.8.15pr.

Digest 2.8.15pr.

Macer 1 de appellat.

Macer 1 On Appeals.

Sciendum est possessores immobilium rerum satisdare non compelli.

It should be known that possessors of immovable property are not compelled to give security.

Dig. 2.8.15.1

Digest 2.8.15.1

Macer 1 de appellat.

Macer, Book 1, on appeals.

Possessor autem is accipiendus est, qui in agro vel civitate rem soli possidet aut ex asse aut pro parte. sed et qui vectigalem, id est emphyteuticum agrum possidet, possessor intellegitur. item qui solam proprietatem habet, possessor intellegendus est.

But a possessor is to be understood as one who, in the field or in the city, possesses a thing of the soil (an immovable), either for the whole or for a part. And he who possesses vectigalian, that is, emphyteutic land, is understood to be a possessor. Likewise, he who has the bare ownership alone is to be understood as a possessor.

eum vero, qui tantum usum fructum habet, possessorem non esse ulpianus scripsit.

but Ulpian wrote that he who has only a usufruct is not a possessor.

Dig. 2.8.15.2

Digest 2.8.15.2

Macer 1 de appellat.

Macer 1 on appeals.

Creditor, qui pignus accepit, possessor non est, tametsi possessionem habeat aut sibi traditam aut precario debitori concessam.

A creditor who has received a pledge is not a possessor, although he may have possession either delivered to himself or granted to the debtor by precarium (precariously).

Dig. 2.8.15.3

Digest 2.8.15.3

Macer 1 de appellat.

Macer 1 on appeals.

Si fundus in dotem datus sit, tam uxor quam maritus propter possessionem eius fundi possessores intelleguntur.

If an estate has been given in dowry, both the wife and the husband are understood to be possessors on account of the possession of that estate.

Dig. 2.8.15.4

Macer 1 de appellat.

Macer 1 on appeals.

Diversa causa est eius, qui fundi petitionem personalem habet.

A different case is that of one who has a personal petition for the estate.

Dig. 2.8.15.5

Digest 2.8.15.5

Macer 1 de appellat.

Macer, Book 1, on Appeals.

Tutores, sive pupilli eorum sive ipsi possideant, possessorum loco habentur: sed et si unus ex tutoribus possessor fuit, idem dicendum erit.

Tutors, whether their pupils possess or they themselves do, are held as possessors; and likewise, if one of the tutors was the possessor, the same must be said.

Dig. 2.8.15.6

Digest 2.8.15.6

Macer 1 de appellat.

Macer, book 1 on appeals.

Si fundum, quem possidebam, a me petieris, deinde cum secundum te esset iudicatum, appellaverim: an possessor eiusdem fundi sim? et recte dicetur possessorem me esse, quia nihilominus possideo, nec ad rem pertinet, quod evinci mihi ea possessio possit.

If you should bring an action against me for the farm which I was possessing, then, when it has been adjudged in your favor, I have appealed: am I the possessor of that same farm? and it will rightly be said that I am the possessor, because I nonetheless possess; nor does it pertain to the matter that that possession can be evicted from me.

Dig. 2.8.15.7

Digest 2.8.15.7

Macer 1 de appellat.

Macer 1 on appeals.

Possessor autem quis nec ne fuerit, tempus cautionis spectandum est: nam sicuti ei, qui post cautionem possessionem vendidit, nihil obest, ita nec prodest ei, qui post cautionem possidere coepit.

However, whether one has been a possessor or not, the time of the caution must be regarded: for just as to him who, after the caution, sold the possession, it does no harm, so neither does it benefit him who began to possess after the caution.

Dig. 2.8.16

Digest 2.8.16

Paulus 6 ad ed.

Paul, 6 on the Edict.

Qui iurato promisit iudicio sisti, non videtur peierasse, si ex concessa causa hoc deseruerit.

He who by oath promised to appear for judgment is not deemed to have perjured himself, if he has abandoned this for a conceded cause.

Dig. 2.9.0. Si ex noxali causa agatur, quemadmodum caveatur.

Dig. 2.9.0. If action is brought from a noxal cause, in what manner security should be given.

Dig. 2.9.1pr.

Digest 2.9.1, preface.

Ulpianus 7 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 7 on the Edict.

Si quis eum, de quo noxalis actio est, iudicio sisti promisit, praetor ait in eadem causa eum exhibere, in qua tunc est, donec iudicium accipiatur.

If anyone has promised that the person about whom a noxal action lies will be made to appear in the action, the praetor says that he must produce him in the same condition in which he then is, until the trial is taken up.

Dig. 2.9.1.1

Digest 2.9.1.1

Ulpianus 7 ad ed.

Ulpian 7 on the Edict.

"in eadem causa" quid sit, videamus: et puto verius eum videri in eadem causa sistere, qui ad experiendum non facit ius actoris deterius. si desinat servus esse promissoris vel actio amissa sit, non videri in eadem causa statum labeo ait: vel si qui pari loco erat in litigando, coepit esse in duriore, vel loco vel persona mutata: itaque si quis ei qui in foro promissoris conveniri non potest venditus aut potentiori datus sit, magis esse putat, ut non videatur in eadem causa sisti. sed et si noxae deditus sit, ofilius non putat in eadem causa sisti, cum noxae deditione ceteris noxalem actionem peremi putat.

"what "in the same condition" is, let us see: and I think it truer that he appears to stand in the same condition who, for proceeding to trial, does not make the plaintiff’s right worse. if he should cease to be the promisor’s slave, or the action be lost, Labeo says he does not appear to have stood in the same condition: or if someone who was in an equal position for litigating has begun to be in a harsher one, either because the place or the person has been changed: and so, if someone has been sold to one who cannot be convened in the promisor’s forum, or has been delivered to a more powerful person, he thinks all the more that he is not seen to be made to stand in the same condition. but also if he has been surrendered for noxal liability, Ofilius does not think he is made to stand in the same condition, since by noxal surrender he thinks the noxal action to be extinguished as to the others.

Dig. 2.9.2pr.

Digest 2.9.2pr.

Paulus 6 ad ed.

Paulus 6 on the Edict.

Sed alio iure utimur. nam ex praecedentibus causis non liberatur noxae deditus: perinde enim noxa caput sequitur, ac si venisset.

But we use a different law. For from the foregoing causes the noxally surrendered person is not freed: for the noxa follows the person, just as if he had come.

Dig. 2.9.2.1

Digest 2.9.2.1

Paulus 6 ad ed.

Paul, Book 6 on the Edict.

Si absens sit servus, pro quo noxalis actio alicui competit: si quidem dominus non negat in sua potestate esse, compellendum putat vindius vel iudicio eum sisti promittere vel iudicium accipere, aut, si nolit defendere, cauturum, cum primum potuerit, se exhibiturum: sin vero falso neget in sua potestate esse, suscepturum iudicium sine noxae deditione. idque iulianus scribit et si dolo fecerit, quominus in eius esset potestate. sed si servus praesens est, dominus abest nec quisquam servum defendit, ducendus erit iussu praetoris: sed causa cognita domino postea dabitur defensio, ut pomponius et vindius scribunt, ne ei absentia sua noceat: ergo et actori actio restituenda est, perempta eo quod ductus servus in bonis eius esse coepit.

If the slave be absent, on whose account a noxal action is competent to someone: if indeed the master does not deny that he is in his power, Vindius thinks he should be compelled either to promise to have him appear in court or to accept the action, or, if he is unwilling to defend, to give security that he will produce him as soon as he can; but if he falsely denies that he is in his power, he must undertake the action without noxal surrender. And Julianus writes that this holds also if he has by fraud brought it about that he was not in his power. But if the slave is present, the master is absent, and no one defends the slave, he shall be led away by order of the praetor; but, the case having been inquired into, defense will afterward be given to the master, as Pomponius and Vindius write, lest his absence harm him: therefore the action must also be restored to the plaintiff, it having been extinguished because, the slave having been led away, he began to be among his goods.

Dig. 2.9.3

Digest 2.9.3

Ulpianus 7 ad ed.

Ulpian, 7 on the Edict.

Si cum usufructuario noxali iudicio agetur isque servum non defenderit, denegatur ei per praetorem usus fructus persecutio.

If a noxal action is brought against a usufructuary and he does not defend the slave, the pursuit of the usufruct is denied to him by the praetor.

Dig. 2.9.4

Digest 2.9.4

Gaius 6 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, 6 on the provincial edict.

Si cum uno ex dominis noxalis agetur, an pro parte socii satisdare deberet? sabinus ait non debere: quia quodammodo totum suum hominem defenderet, cui in solidum defendendi necessitas esset, nec auditur, si pro parte paratus sit defendere.

If a noxal action is brought against one of the owners, should he have to give surety for the partner’s share? Sabinus says he ought not: because in a certain way he is defending his slave as a whole, for whom there is a necessity of defending in solidum, nor is he heard if he is prepared to defend only for his share.

Dig. 2.9.5

Digest 2.9.5

Ulpianus 47 ad sab.

Ulpian, 47 on Sabinus.

Si servum in eadem causa sistere quidam promiserit et liber factus sistatur: si de ipso controversia est capitalium actionum iniuriarumque nomine, non recte sistitur: quia aliter de servo supplicium et verberibus de iniuria satisfit, aliter de libero vindicta sumitur vel condemnatio pecuniaria. quod autem ad ceteras noxales causas pertinet, etiam in meliorem causam videtur pervenisse.

If someone has promised to produce a slave in the same case and, after being made free, he is produced: if the controversy is about him under the head of capital actions and of injuries, he is not rightly produced; because, in one way, in the case of a slave, satisfaction for injury is made by punishment and beatings, in another way, for a free man, vengeance is taken or a pecuniary condemnation. But as concerns the other noxal causes, he even seems to have come into a better condition.

Dig. 2.9.6

Digest 2.9.6

Paulus 11 ad sab.

Paulus, 11 on Sabinus.

Sed si statu liberum sisti promissum sit, in eadem causa sisti videtur, quamvis liber sistatur, quod implicitus ei casus libertatis fuerit.

But if it has been promised that a statuliber be presented, he is considered to be presented in the same position, although he is presented as a free man, because the contingency of liberty was implicit for him.

Dig. 2.10.0. De eo per quem factum erit quominus quis in iudicio sistat.

Dig. 2.10.0. On the one through whose act it will come about that someone does not appear in court.

Dig. 2.10.1pr.

Digest 2.10.1, beginning.

Ulpianus 7 ad ed.

Ulpian, On the Edict, book 7.

Aequissimum putavit praetor dolum eius coercere, qui impedit aliquem iudicio sisti.

The praetor thought it most equitable to restrain the fraud of one who hinders someone from being brought to appear in court.

Dig. 2.10.1.1

Digest 2.10.1.1

Ulpianus 7 ad ed.

Ulpian, On the Edict, book 7.

Fecisse autem dolo malo non tantum is putatur, qui suis manibus vel per suos retinuerit ^ retinuit^, verum qui alios quoque rogavit ut eum detinerent vel abducerent, ne iudicio sistat, sive scientes sive ignorantes quid esset quod comminisceretur.

Moreover, a person is considered to have acted with malicious fraud not only if he by his own hands or through his own people has detained him ^ detained^, but also if he has asked others as well to detain him or carry him off, so that he not appear in court, whether they were aware or unaware what it was that he was contriving.

Dig. 2.10.1.2

Digest 2.10.1.2

Ulpianus 7 ad ed.

Ulpian 7 on the Edict.

Dolum autem malum sic accipimus, ut si quis venienti ad iudicium aliquid pronuntiaverit triste, propter quod is necesse habuerit ad iudicium non venire, teneatur ex hoc edicto: quamvis quidam putent sibi eum imputare, qui credulus fuit.

We take “malicious fraud” thus: if someone has announced something dire to a person coming to court, on account of which that person was obliged not to come to court, he is held liable under this edict; although some think that he must impute it to himself, who was credulous.

Dig. 2.10.1.3

Digest 2.10.1.3

Ulpianus 7 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 7 on the Edict.

Si reus dolo actoris non steterit, non habebit reus adversus eum actionem ex hoc edicto, cum contentus esse possit exceptione, si ex stipulatu conveniatur de poena, quod ad iudicium non venerit. aliter atque si ab alio sit impeditus: nam actionem propositam adversus eum exercebit.

If the defendant has not appeared through the plaintiff’s fraud, the defendant will not have an action against him under this edict, since he can be content with an exception, if he is sued ex stipulatu for the penalty, because he did not come to the trial. aliter than if he were impeded by someone else: for he will exercise the action proposed against him.

Dig. 2.10.1.4

Digest 2.10.1.4

Ulpianus 7 ad ed.

Ulpian, 7 on the Edict.

Si plures dolo fecerint, omnes tenentur: sed si unus praestitit poenam, ceteri liberantur, cum nihil intersit.

If several have acted with fraud, all are liable: but if one has satisfied the penalty, the others are released, since it makes no difference.

Dig. 2.10.1.5

Digest 2.10.1.5

Ulpianus 7 ad ed.

Ulpian, 7, on the edict.

Servi nomine ex hac causa noxali iudicio agendum omnes consentiunt.

All agree that, on this ground, a noxal suit must be brought in the slave’s name.

Dig. 2.10.1.6

Digest 2.10.1.6

Ulpianus 7 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 7 on the Edict.

Et heredi datur, sed non ultra annum. adversus heredem autem hactenus puto dandam actionem, ut ex dolo defuncti heres non lucretur.

And it is given to the heir, but not beyond a year. against the heir, however, I think the action is to be granted only to this extent: that the heir not be enriched by the deceit of the deceased.

Dig. 2.10.2

Digest 2.10.2

Paulus 6 ad ed.

Paulus, book 6 on the Edict.

Si actoris servus domino sciente et cum possit non prohibente dolo fecerit, quo minus in iudicio sistam, ofilius dandam mihi exceptionem adversus dominum ait, ne ex dolo servi dominus lucretur. si vero sine voluntate domini servus hoc fecerit, sabinus noxale iudicium dandum ait nec factum servi domino obesse debere nisi hactenus, ut ipso careat: quando ipse nihil deliquit.

If the plaintiff’s slave, with the master knowing and, though able, not forbidding, has acted by fraud so as to prevent me from appearing in court, Ofilius says that an exception ought to be given to me against the master, lest the master profit from the slave’s fraud. if, however, the slave did this without the master’s will, Sabinus says a noxal action should be given,
and that the act of the slave ought not to prejudice the master except to this extent, that he be deprived of the slave himself; since he himself has committed no delinquency.

Dig. 2.10.3pr.

Digest 2.10.3, beginning.

Iulianus 2 Dig.

Julian, Digest 2

Ex hoc edicto adversus eum, qui dolo fecit, quo minus quis in iudicium vocatus sistat, in factum actio competit quanti actoris interfuit eum sisti. in quo iudicio deducitur si quid amiserit actor ob eam rem: veluti si reus tempore dominium rei interim sibi adquirat aut actione liberatus fuerit.

From this edict an action on the fact lies against him who by dolus has done something whereby one summoned into court is prevented from appearing, for as much as it was in the plaintiff’s interest that he be produced. in which action there is deducted whatever the plaintiff has lost on that account: for example, if in the meantime the defendant by lapse of time acquires ownership of the thing for himself, or has been released from the action.

Dig. 2.10.3.1

Digest 2.10.3.1

Iulianus 2 Dig.

Julian, Digest 2.

Plane si is, qui dolo fecerit, quo minus in iudicio sistatur, solvendo non fuerit, aequum erit adversus ipsum reum restitutoriam actionem competere, ne propter dolum alienum reus lucrum faciat et actor damno adficiatur.

Plainly, if the person who by fraud has brought it about that the defendant not be made to appear in court is not solvent, it will be equitable that a restitutory action lie against the defendant himself, lest on account of another’s fraud the defendant make gain and the plaintiff be affected by loss.

Dig. 2.10.3.2

Digest 2.10.3.2

Iulianus 2 Dig.

Julian, Digest 2.

Si et stipulator dolo titii et promissor dolo maevi impeditus fuerit, quo minus in iudicio sistatur: uterque adversus eum, cuius dolo impeditus fuerit, actione in factum experietur.

If both the stipulator is hindered by the fraud of titius and the promisor by the fraud of maevius, from being set in court: each of them will bring an in factum action against him by whose fraud he was hindered.

Dig. 2.10.3.3

Digest 2.10.3.3

Iulianus 2 Dig.

Julianus, Digest 2.

Si et stipulator dolo promissoris et promissor dolo stipulatoris impeditus fuerit quo minus ad iudicium veniret: neutri eorum praetor succurrere debebit, ab utraque parte dolo compensando.

If both the stipulator is hindered by the promissor’s fraud and the promissor by the stipulator’s fraud from coming to judgment: the praetor ought to aid neither of them, offsetting the fraud on both sides.

Dig. 2.10.3.4

Digest 2.10.3.4

Iulianus 2 Dig.

Julianus 2 Dig.

Si a fideiussore quinquaginta stipulatus fuero, si in iudicium reus non venerit, petiturus a reo centum, et dolo malo sempronii factum fuerit, ne in iudicium reus veniat: centum a sempronio consequar. tanti enim mea interfuisse videtur, quia, si venisset in iudicium, actio mihi centum adversus reum vel adversus heredem eius competebat, licet fideiussor minorem summam mihi promiserit.

If I should have stipulated 50 from a surety, if the defendant should not come into court, being about to claim 100 from the defendant, and it should have been brought about by the malicious fraud of Sempronius that the defendant not come into court: I shall obtain 100 from Sempronius. For it seems that my interest amounted to so much, because, if he had come into court, an action for 100 would have lain for me against the defendant or against his heir, although the surety promised me a smaller sum.

Dig. 2.11.0. Si quis cautionibus in iudicio sistendi causa factis non obtemperaverit.

Dig. 2.11.0. If anyone has not complied with securities made for the purpose of appearing in court.

Dig. 2.11.1

Digest 2.11.1

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, Book 1, on the Provincial Edict

Vicena milia passum in singulos dies dinumerari praetor iubet praeter eum diem, quo cautum promittitur, et in quem sistere in iudicium oportet. nam sane talis itineris dinumeratio neutri litigatorum onerosa est.

The praetor orders twenty thousand paces (twenty miles) to be counted for each single day, except for the day on which surety is promised, and for the day on which one ought to appear in court. For indeed such a reckoning of the journey is burdensome to neither of the litigants.

Dig. 2.11.2pr.

Digest 2.11.2, beginning.

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 to the edict

Non exigimus reum iudicio sisti, si negotium, propter quod iudicio sisti promisit, fuerit transactum: sed hoc ita, si prius id negotium transactum sit, quam sisti oporteret. ceterum si postea transactum est, exceptio doli opponi debet: quis enim de poena promissa laborat post negotium transactum? cum etiam transacti negotii exceptionem putaverit quis nocere, quasi etiam de poena transactum sit, nisi contrarium specialiter partibus placuerit.

We do not require the defendant to appear in court, if the business on account of which he promised to appear has been transacted: but this is so, if that business was transacted before he ought to have appeared. otherwise, if it was transacted afterward, the exception of fraud ought to be opposed: for who presses for a promised penalty after the business has been transacted? since one would even think the exception of a transacted business to have effect, as if it had also been transacted concerning the penalty, unless the contrary has been specially agreed by the parties.

Dig. 2.11.2.1

Digest 2.11.2.1

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 on the Edict.

Si quis municipalis muneris causa sine suo dolo malo impeditus in iudicio secundum suam promissionem non stetit, aequissimum est tribui ei exceptionem.

If anyone, by reason of municipal duty, was impeded, without his own fraud or malice, from standing in court according to his promise, it is most equitable that an exception be granted to him.

Dig. 2.11.2.2

Digest 2.11.2.2

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 On the Edict.

Simili modo et si ad testimonium desideratus ad iudicium occurrere non potuit, erit ei subveniendum.

In a similar manner, even if one desired for testimony was not able to appear at the trial, aid must be given to him.

Dig. 2.11.2.3

Digest 2.11.2.3

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 74 on the Edict.

Si quis iudicio se sisti promiserit et valetudine vel tempestate vel vi fluminis prohibitus se sistere non possit, exceptione adiuvatur, nec immerito. cum enim in tali promissione praesentia opus sit, quemadmodum potuit se sistere qui adversa valetudine impeditus est? et ideo etiam lex duodecim tabularum, si iudex vel alteruter ex litigatoribus morbo sontico impediatur, iubet diem iudicii esse diffisum.

If anyone has promised to present himself for trial and, prevented by ill-health or by a storm or by the force of a river, is not able to present himself, he is aided by an exception, and not without merit. For since in such a promise presence is requisite, how could he present himself who is hindered by adverse health? And therefore even the Law of the Twelve Tables, if the judge or either one of the litigants is impeded by a morbus sonticus (grave disease), orders the day of the trial to be deferred.

Dig. 2.11.2.4

Digest 2.11.2.4

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 on the edict.

Si non propter valetudinem mulier non steterit iudicio, sed quod gravida erat, exceptionem ei dandam labeo ait: si tamen post partum decubuerit, probandum erit quasi valetudine impeditam.

If a woman did not appear in court not on account of ill-health, but because she was pregnant, Labeo says an exception should be granted to her: if, however, after childbirth she took to her bed,
it will have to be proved as though she were impeded by ill-health.

Dig. 2.11.2.5

Digest 2.11.2.5

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 on the Edict.

Idem est et si quis furere coeperit: nam qui furore impeditur, valetudine impeditur.

It is the same also if someone has begun to be mad: for he who is impeded by madness is impeded by ill-health.

Dig. 2.11.2.6

Digest 2.11.2.6

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 On the Edict.

Quod diximus succurri etiam ei, qui tempestate aut vi fluminis prohibitus non venit, tempestatem sic intellegere debemus, sive maritima sive terrestris sit. tempestatem intellegere debemus talem, quae impedimento sit itineri vel navigationi.

What we have said is that succor is afforded even to him who did not come because he was prevented by a tempest or by the force of a river; we ought thus to understand “tempest,” whether it be maritime or terrestrial.
we ought to understand a “tempest” as one that is an impediment to a journey or to navigation.

Dig. 2.11.2.7

Digest 2.11.2.7

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 On the Edict.

Vis fluminis etiam sine tempestate accipienda est: vim fluminis intellegimus, et si magnitudo eius impedimento sit sive pons solutus sit vel navigium non stet.

The force of the river is to be accepted even without a tempest: by “force of the river” we understand also if its magnitude be an impediment, or if a bridge be loosened, or a vessel does not stand.

Dig. 2.11.2.8

Digest 2.11.2.8

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 On the Edict.

Si quis tamen cum posset non incidere in tempestatem vel in fluminis vim, si ante profectus esset vel tempore oportuno navigasset, ipse se artaverit: numquid exceptio ei minime prosit? quod quidem causa cognita erit statuendum. nam neque sic artandus sit, ut possit ei dici, cur non multo ante profectus est quam dies promissionis veniret: neque iterum permittendum ei, si quid sit quod ei imputetur, causari tempestatem vel vim fluminis.

If, however, someone—when he could have avoided falling into a tempest or into the force of a river, had he set out earlier or sailed at an opportune time—has himself hemmed himself in: would the exception not benefit him at all? This, indeed, must be determined with the case known. For he should not be pressed thus far that it could be said to him, why did he not set out much earlier than the day of the promise would come; nor, in turn, should it be permitted to him, if there is anything that can be imputed to him, to allege a tempest or the force of the river.

quid enim si quis, cum romae esset ipso tempore promissionis sistendi, nulla necessitate urguente voluptatis causa in municipium profectus sit? nonne indignus est, cui haec exceptio patrocinetur? aut quid si tempestas quidem in mari fuit, terra autem iste potuit venire: vel flumen circumire?

For what if someone, when he was at Rome at the very time for appearing upon the promise, with no necessity pressing, set out to a municipium for the sake of pleasure? Is he not unworthy that this exception should plead in his patronage? Or what if indeed there was a storm at sea, but he could have come by land, or gone around the river?

aeque dicendum non semper ei exceptionem prodesse: nisi angustiae non patiebatur terra iter metiri vel circumire. cum tamen vel flumen sic abundasset, ut implesset omnem locum, in quo sisti oportuit, vel aliqua fortuita calamitas eundem locum evertit vel praesentiam venienti periculosam fecit, ex bono et aequo et hic exceptio ei accommodanda est.

equally it must be said that the exception does not always profit him: unless straits did not permit the route by land to be measured out or to go around.
when, however, either the river had so overflowed that it filled every place where it was proper to make appearance, or some fortuitous calamity overturned that same place or made presence dangerous for one coming, on grounds of the good and the equitable here too the exception is to be accommodated to him.

Dig. 2.11.2.9

Digest 2.11.2.9

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 On the Edict.

Simili modo exceptio datur ei, qui cum ad iudicium venire volebat, a magistratu retentus est, et retentus sine dolo malo ipsius: nam si ipse hoc affectavit vel causam praestitit, non ei proderit exceptio: sed ipsius quidem dolus ei oberit, ceterorum non oberit, qui dolo fecerunt ut retineretur. sed si privatus eum detinuerit, nullo modo ei proderit haec exceptio,

In a similar way an exception is given to him who, when he wanted to come to the judgment, was retained by the magistrate, and retained without his own bad-faith deceit: for if he himself aimed at this or furnished a pretext, the exception will not benefit him: but indeed his own fraud will harm him; the fraud of others, who by deceit brought it about that he was retained, will not harm him. But if a private person has detained him, in no way will this exception benefit him,

Dig. 2.11.3

Digest 2.11.3

Paulus 69 ad ed.

Paul 69 on the edict.

Sed actio ei datur adversus eum qui detinuit in id quod eius interest.

But an action is given to him against the one who detained it, to the extent of his interest.

Dig. 2.11.4pr.

Digest 2.11.4, preface.

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 On the Edict.

Sed et si quis rei capitalis ante condemnatus iudicio sistere se non potuit, merito huic ignoscitur: rei capitalis condemnatum accipere debemus, qui morte exiliove coercitus est. dixerit aliquis, quo ergo haec exceptio damnato? sed respondebitur fideiussoribus eius esse necessariam: aut si forte in exilium salva civitate abiit, ubi defensori eius exceptio ista proderit.

But also, if someone already condemned on a capital charge was not able to present himself for the hearing, he is deservedly pardoned: we ought to take as “condemned on a capital charge” one who has been punished by death or by exile. Someone may say, to what end, then, is this exception for one condemned? But it will be answered that it is necessary for his sureties; or if perchance he went into exile with his citizenship preserved, in which case this exception will benefit his defender.

Dig. 2.11.4.1

Digest 2.11.4.1

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 on the Edict.

Illud sciendum est eum, qui idcirco non stetit, quia capitis reus factus est, in ea causa esse, ut exceptione uti non possit: damnato enim datur. plane si vinculis vel custodia militari impeditus ideo non stetit, in ea erit causa, ut exceptione utatur.

It must be known that one who therefore did not appear because he has become a defendant on a capital charge is in such a case that he cannot use the exception: for it is granted to one who has been condemned.
plainly, if he did not appear for this reason, that he was impeded by chains or by military custody, he will be in such a case that he may use the exception.

Dig. 2.11.4.2

Digest 2.11.4.2

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian 74 on the edict.

Praeterea si funere quis domestico impeditus non venit, debet ei exceptio dari.

Moreover, if someone, impeded by a household funeral, did not come, an exception ought to be granted to him.

Dig. 2.11.4.3

Digest 2.11.4.3

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 on the Edict.

Item si quis in servitute hostium fuerit ac per hoc in iudicium non stetit, debet exceptione adiuvari.

Likewise, if someone has been in the servitude of the enemy and for this reason did not stand in judgment, he ought to be aided by an exception.

Dig. 2.11.4.4

Digest 2.11.4.4

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 on the Edict.

Quaesitum est an possit conveniri, ne ulla exceptio in promissione deserta iudicio sistendi causa facta obiciatur: et ait atilicinus conventionem istam non valere. sed ego puto conventionem istam ita valere, si specialiter causae exceptionum expressae sint, quibus a promissore sponte renuntiatum est.

It has been asked whether it can be covenanted that no exception be objected on account of a promise defaulted, a promise made for the sake of appearing in court; and Atilicinus says that that covenant is not valid. But I think that such a covenant is valid in this way, if the causes of the exceptions are specifically expressed, which the promisor has voluntarily renounced.

Dig. 2.11.4.5

Digest 2.11.4.5

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, 74 On the Edict.

Item quaeritur, si quis, cum iudicio sistendi causa satisdare non deberet, satisdato promiserit, an fideiussoribus eius exceptio detur. puto interesse, utrum per errorem satisdato promissum est an ex conventione: si per errorem, dandam fideiussoribus exceptionem: si ex conventione, minime dandam. nam et iulianus scribit, si iudicio sistendi causa pluris quam statutum est per ignorantiam promissum fuerit, exceptionem dari debere: si autem ex conventione tantae summae promissio facta sit, exceptionem pacti conventi replicatione infirmandam iulianus ait.

Likewise it is asked, if someone, when he ought not to give security for the purpose of appearing in court, nevertheless, after security was furnished, has promised, whether a defense (exceptio) is afforded to his sureties (fideiussors). I think it makes a difference whether the promise upon giving security was made through error or by agreement (conventio): if through error, an exception ought to be given to the sureties; if by agreement, by no means should it be given. For Julian also writes that, if for the purpose of appearing in court more than what has been fixed was promised through ignorance, an exception ought to be granted; but if by agreement a promise for so great a sum was made, Julian says that the exception of a concluded pact (exceptio pacti conventi) is to be weakened by a replication.

Dig. 2.11.5pr.

Digest 2.11.5pr.

Paulus 69 ad ed.

Paulus, On the Edict, 69.

Si duo rei stipulandi sint et uni debitor iudicio se sisti cum poena promiserit, alter autem impedierit: ita demum exceptio adversus alterum danda est, si socii sint: ne prosit ei dolus propter societatem.

If there are two co‑stipulators, and to one the debtor has promised to present himself in the action with a penalty, but the other has impeded it: only then is an exception to be granted against the other, if they are partners: lest his fraud profit him by reason of the partnership.

Dig. 2.11.5.1

Digest 2.11.5.1

Paulus 69 ad ed.

Paulus, 69, on the Edict.

Item si duo rei promittendi sint et unus ad iudicium non venerit contempta sua promissione iudicio sistendi causa facta, actor autem ab altero rem petat, ab altero poenam desertionis: petendo poenam exceptione summovebitur.

Likewise, if two are defendants on a promise, and one has not come to court, his own promise—made for the purpose of appearing at the trial—having been contemned, while the plaintiff from the one
seeks the thing, and from the other the penalty of desertion: by seeking the penalty he will be removed by an exception.

Dig. 2.11.5.2

Digest 2.11.5.2

Paulus 69 ad ed.

Paulus 69 on the Edict.

Aeque si a patre facta fuerit promissio iudicio sistendi gratia ex filii contractu, deinde de re actor egerit cum filio, exceptione summovebitur, si cum patre ex eius promissione agat. et contra idem erit, si filius promiserit et actor egerit cum patre de peculio.

Likewise, if a promise has been made by the father, for the sake of appearing in the action, on account of the son’s contract, then if the plaintiff has proceeded with the son concerning the matter, he will be removed by an exception, if he proceeds against the father on the basis of that promise. And conversely, the same will be the case if the son has promised and the plaintiff proceeds against the father in respect of the peculium.

Dig. 2.11.6

Digest 2.11.6

Gaius 1 ad l. xii tab.

Gaius 1 on the Law of the 12 Tables

Si is qui fideiussorem dedit ideo non steterit, quod rei publicae causa afuit: iniquum est fideiussorem ob alium necessitate sistendi obligatum esse, cum ipsi liberum esset non sistere.

If he who gave a surety did not appear for this reason, that he was absent on public business: it is inequitable that the surety, on account of another, be obligated by the necessity of appearing, since he himself was free not to appear.

Dig. 2.11.7

Digest 2.11.7

Paulus 69 ad ed.

Paulus, book 69 on the edict.

Si quis servum in iudicio sisti promiserit vel alium qui in aliena potestate est, isdem exceptionibus utitur, quibus si pro libero vel patre familias fideiussit, praeterquam si rei publicae causa abesse diceretur servus: nam servus rei publicae causa abesse non potest. praeter hanc autem exceptionem ceterae, quia communes sunt, tam in libero homine quam in servo locum habent.

If someone shall have promised that a slave be produced in court, or another who is under another’s power, he uses the same exceptions as if he had stood surety for a free person or a pater
familias, except if it were said that the slave was absent on account of the republic: for a slave cannot be absent on account of the republic. Apart from this
exception, however, the rest, since they are common, have place both in a free person and in a slave.

Dig. 2.11.8

Digest 2.11.8

Gaius 29 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 29 on the provincial edict.

Et si post tres aut quinque pluresve dies, quam iudicio sisti se reus promisit, secum agendi potestatem fecerit nec actoris ius ex mora deterius factum sit, consequens est dici defendi eum debere per exceptionem.

And if, after three or five or more days from the time when the defendant promised to present himself for the trial, he has afforded the power to proceed against himself and the plaintiff’s right has not been made worse by the delay, it is consequent to say that he ought to be defended by an exception.

Dig. 2.11.9pr.

Digest 2.11.9, beginning.

Ulpianus 77 ad ed.

Ulpian, 77 On the Edict.

Si servus iudicio se sisti promittat, non committitur stipulatio neque in eum neque in fideiussores eius.

If a slave should promise that he will present himself in court, the stipulation is not incurred, neither against him nor against his sureties.

Dig. 2.11.9.1

Digest 2.11.9.1

Ulpianus 77 ad ed.

Ulpian 77 on the edict.

Si plurium servorum nomine iudicio sistendi causa una stipulatione promittatur, poenam quidem integram committi, licet unus status non sit, labeo ait, quia verum sit omnes statos non esse: verum si pro rata unius offeratur poena, exceptione doli usurum eum, qui ex hac stipulatione convenitur.

If, in the name of several slaves, for the purpose of producing them in court, it is promised by one stipulation, Labeo says that the full penalty is indeed incurred, even if one has not been produced,
because it is true that not all have been produced: but if a penalty pro rata for one is tendered, the one who is sued on this stipulation will make use of the exception of fraud.

Dig. 2.11.10pr.

Digest 2.11.10, preface.

Paulus 1 ad plaut.

Paulus 1 on Plautius.

Si eum iudicio sisti promisero, qui iam tempore liberatus esse dicebatur, quia iam actione forte non tenebatur: actio in me danda est, ut vel exhibeam eum vel defendam, ut veritas inquiratur.

If I have promised that he be made to appear in court, who was already said to have been released by lapse of time, because he was perhaps no longer held by an action: an action is to be granted against me, so that I either exhibit him or defend him, in order that the truth may be inquired into.

Dig. 2.11.10.1

Digest 2.11.10.1

Paulus 1 ad plaut.

Paulus, 1 on Plautius.

Homo sisti promissus ante diem dolo promissoris periit: certo iure utimur non ante poenam peti posse, quam dies venerit: tota enim stipulatio in diem collata videtur.

A man promised to be made to appear died before the day through the promisor’s fraud: we employ a settled law that the penalty cannot be sought before the day has come: for the whole
stipulation is considered deferred to the day.

Dig. 2.11.10.2

Digest 2.11.10.2

Paulus 1 ad plaut.

Paulus, Book 1, on Plautius.

Qui iniuriarum acturus est, stipulatus erat ante litem contestatam ut adversarius suus iudicio sistat: commissa stipulatione mortuus est. non competere heredi eius ex stipulatu actionem placuit, quia tales stipulationes propter rem ipsam darentur, iniuriarum autem actio heredi non competit. quamvis enim haec stipulatio iudicio sistendi causa facta ad heredem transeat, tamen in hac causa danda non est: nam et defunctus si vellet omissa iniuriarum actione ex stipulatu agere, non permitteretur ei. idem dicendum esse et si is, cum quo iniuriarum agere volebam, stipulatione tali commissa decesserit: nam non competit mihi adversus heredem eius ex stipulatu actio, et hoc iulianus scribit.

He who was going to bring an action for injuries had stipulated, before the suit was joined, that his adversary should appear for trial: the stipulation having been committed (forfeited), he died. it was decided that an action ex stipulatu does not belong to his heir, because such stipulations are given for the very matter itself, but an action for injuries does not belong to the heir. for although this stipulation, made for the sake of appearing for trial, passes to the heir, nevertheless in this case it is not to be granted: for even the deceased, if he had wished, with the action for injuries omitted, to sue ex stipulatu, it would not have been permitted to him. the same is to be said also if the one against whom I wished to bring an action for injuries, after such a stipulation has been committed, has died: for an action ex stipulatu does not belong to me against his heir, and Julian writes this.

secundum quod et si fideiussores dati erant, minime dabitur in eos actio mortuo reo. idem pomponius, si non post longum tempus decesserit: quia si ad iudicium venisset, litem cum eo contestari actor potuisset.

accordingly, even if sureties had been furnished, no action at all will be granted against them after the defendant has died. the same, says Pomponius, if he did not die after a long time: because if he had come to the trial, the plaintiff could have joined issue with him.

Dig. 2.11.11

Digest 2.11.11

Ulpianus 47 ad sab.

Ulpian, Book 47 on Sabinus.

Si quis quendam in iudicio sisti promiserit ^ promisit^, in eadem causa eum debet sistere. in eadem autem causa sistere hoc est ita sistere, ut actori persecutio loco deteriori non sit, quamvis exactio rei possit esse difficilior. licet enim difficilior exactio sit, tamen dicendum est videri in eadem causa eum stetisse: nam et si novum aes alienum contraxisset vel pecuniam perdidisset, videtur tamen in eadem causa stetisse: ergo et qui alii iudicatus sistitur, in eadem causa stare videtur.

If someone has promised ^ he promised ^ to cause a certain person to be set in judgment, he must set him in the same condition. Now to set him in the same condition is to set him in such a way that the plaintiff’s pursuit is not in a worse position, although exaction of the thing may be more difficult. For although the exaction is more difficult, nevertheless it must be said that he is seen to have stood in the same condition: for even if he had contracted a new debt or had lost money, nevertheless he is seen to have stood in the same condition: therefore even he who, adjudged to another, is set forth, is seen to stand in the same condition.

Dig. 2.11.12pr.

Digest 2.11.12, preface.

Paulus 11 ad sab.

Paulus 11 on Sabinus.

Qui autem novo privilegio utitur, non videtur in eadem causa sisti.

However, he who makes use of a new privilege is not considered to be placed in the same case.

Dig. 2.11.12.1

Digest 2.11.12.1

Paulus 11 ad sab.

Paulus 11 on Sabinus.

Illud tenendum est, quod aestimationem eius quod intersit agentis ad illud tempus referendum est, quo sisti debuit, non ad id, quo agitur, quamvis desierit eius interesse.

This must be maintained: that the estimation of the plaintiff’s interest is to be referred to the time at which he ought to have been made to appear, not to that at which the case is being litigated, although his interest has ceased.

Dig. 2.11.13

Digest 2.11.13

Iulianus 55 Dig.

Julian 55 Digest.

Quotiens servus iudicio sistendi causa ut ipse litigaturus vel ab alio stipulatur vel ipse promittit: nec commititur stipulatio nec fideiussores tenentur, quia servus conveniri vel convenire non potest.

Whenever a slave, for the purpose of appearing in court, as he himself is about to litigate, either stipulates from another or himself promises: neither does the stipulation come into being nor are the fidejussors bound, because a slave cannot be sued or sue.

Dig. 2.11.14

Digest 2.11.14

Nerva 2 membr.

Nerva, book 2 of the Notebooks.

Si procurator ita stipulatus est, ut sistat dumtaxat eum quem stipularetur, non etiam poenam si status non esset stipularetur: propemodum nullius momenti est ea stipulatio, quia procuratoris, quod ad ipsius utilitatem pertinet, nihil interest sisti. sed cum alienum negotium in stipulando egerit, potest defendi non procuratoris, sed eius cuius negotium gesserit utilitatem in ea re spectandam esse: ut quantum domini litis interfuit sisti, tantum ex ea stipulatione non stato reo procuratori debeatur. eadem et fortius adhuc dici possunt, si procurator ita stipulatus esset "quanti ea res erit": ut hanc conceptionem verborum non ad ipsius, sed ad domini utilitatem relatam interpretemur.

If a procurator has so stipulated that he will produce only him whom he was stipulating for, and did not also stipulate a penalty if he should not be produced: almost
of no moment is that stipulation, because, so far as it pertains to the procurator’s own utility, it is of no interest that there be a production. But since in stipulating he has transacted another’s business, it can be defended that not the procurator’s, but the utility of him whose business he has managed ought to be regarded in this matter: so that as much as it was of interest to the dominus litis to have a production, so much, from that stipulation, with the defendant not produced, is owed to the procurator. The same things, and more strongly still, can be said if the procurator had so stipulated “for how much that matter will be,” so that we interpret this formulation of words as referred not to his own, but to the master’s utility.

Dig. 2.11.15

Digest 2.11.15

Papinianus 2 quaest.

Papinianus, Questions, Book 2.

Si tutor iudicio sisti promiserit et stipulationi non obtemperaverit, et interea pupillus adoleverit aut mortem obierit aut etiam abstentus sit hereditate: denegabitur ex stipulatu actio. nam et ipsius rei, quae petebatur, si tutor iudicatus fuerit et eorum quid acciderit, non esse dandam in eum actionem iudicati probatum est.

If a tutor (guardian) has promised to appear in court and has not complied with the stipulation, and meanwhile the ward has come of age or has met death or also has abstained from the inheritance: the action ex stipulatu will be denied. For also as to the very thing that was being sought, if the tutor has been adjudged and any of those events has occurred, it has been established that an action on the judgment (actio iudicati) is not to be given against him.

Dig. 2.12.0. De feriis et dilationibus et diversis temporibus.

Dig. 2.12.0. On holidays and adjournments and diverse times.

Dig. 2.12.1pr.

Digest 2.12.1, preface.

Ulpianus 4 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 4 On All Tribunals.

Ne quis messium vindemiarumque tempore adversarium cogat ad iudicium venire, oratione divi marci exprimitur, quia occupati circa rem rusticam in forum compellendi non sunt.

That no one, in the time of harvests and vintages, compel an adversary to come to judgment is expressed in an oration of the deified Marcus,
because, occupied about rustic business, they are not to be compelled into the forum.

Dig. 2.12.1.1

Digest 2.12.1.1

Ulpianus 4 de omn. trib.

Ulpian 4 on all tribunals.

Sed si praetor aut per ignorantiam vel socordiam evocare eos perseveraverit hique sponte venerint: si quidem sententiam dixerit praesentibus illis et sponte litigantibus, sententia valebit, tametsi non recte fecerit qui eos evocaverit: sin vero, cum abesse perseveraverint, sententiam protulerit etiam absentibus illis, consequens erit dicere sententiam nullius esse momenti ( neque enim praetoris factum iuri derogare oportet): et citra appellationem igitur sententia infirmabitur.

But if the praetor, either through ignorance or sloth, has persisted in summoning them and they have come of their own accord: if indeed he has pronounced sentence with those men present and voluntarily litigating, the sentence will be valid, although he who summoned them did not act rightly: but if, when they have persisted in being absent, he has delivered sentence even with them absent, it will be consequent to say that the sentence is of no effect (for the praetor’s act ought not to derogate from the law): and therefore the sentence will be invalidated even without an appeal.

Dig. 2.12.1.2

Digest 2.12.1.2

Ulpianus 4 de omn. trib.

Ulpian 4 On All Tribunals.

Sed excipiuntur certae causae, ex quibus cogi poterimus et per id temporis, cum messes vindemiaeque sunt, ad praetorem venire: scilicet si res tempore peritura sit, hoc est si dilatio actionem sit peremptura. sane quotiens res urguet, cogendi quidem sumus ad praetorem venire, verum ad hoc tantum cogi aequum est ut lis contestetur, et ita ipsis verbis orationis exprimitur: denique alterutro recusante post litem contestatam litigare dilationem oratio concessit.

But certain causes are excepted, by reason of which we can be compelled even during that time when the harvests and vintages are, to come to the praetor: namely, if the thing is going to perish with time, that is, if delay is going to extinguish the action. Indeed, whenever the matter presses, we are certainly to be compelled to come to the praetor; but it is equitable to be compelled only to this, that the suit be contested (issue be joined), and thus it is expressed in the very words of the oration: finally, if either party refuses, after issue has been joined the oration granted a postponement for litigating.

Dig. 2.12.2

Digest 2.12.2

Ulpianus 5 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 5 on the Edict.

Eadem oratione divus marcus in senatu recitata effecit de aliis speciebus praetorem adiri etiam diebus feriaticis: ut puta ut tutores aut curatores dentur: ut offici admoneantur cessantes: excusationes allegentur: alimenta constituantur: aetates probentur: ventris nomine in possessionem mittatur, vel rei servandae causa, vel legatorum fideive commissorum, vel damni infecti: item de testamentis exhibendis: ut curator detur bonorum eius, cui an heres exstaturus sit incertum est: aut de alendis liberis parentibus patronis: aut de adeunda suspecta hereditate: aut ut aspectu atrox iniuria aestimetur: vel fideicommissaria libertas praestanda.

By the same oration, recited in the senate, the deified Marcus effected that, in other categories, the praetor might be approached even on holy days: for example, that tutors or curators be given: that those remiss in duty be admonished: that excuses be alleged: that aliments be established: that ages be proven: that, in the name of the womb, one be sent in to possession, either for the sake of preserving the thing, or of legacies and fideicommissa, or of damage not yet done: likewise concerning wills to be exhibited: that a curator be given for the goods of him for whom it is uncertain whether an heir will be forthcoming: or concerning the support of children, parents, patrons: or concerning entering upon a suspect inheritance: or that an injury atrocious in appearance be assessed: or that fideicommissary freedom be furnished.

Dig. 2.12.3pr.

Digest 2.12.3, preface.

Ulpianus 2 ad ed.

Ulpian, On the Edict, book 2.

Solet etiam messis vindemiarumque tempore ius dici de rebus quae tempore vel morte periturae sunt. morte: veluti furti: damni iniuriae: iniuriarum atrocium: qui de incendio ruina naufragio rate nave expugnata rapuisse dicuntur: et si quae similes sunt. item si res tempore periturae sunt aut actionis dies exiturus est.

It is also customary, at the time of harvest and of the vintage, for judgment to be given concerning matters which are going to perish by time or by death. By death: for example, actions of theft; of wrongful damage (damnum iniuria); of atrocious outrages (iniuriae atroces); those who are said to have plundered from a fire, a ruin, a shipwreck, or from a raft or ship taken by assault; and any that are similar. Likewise, if things are going to perish with time, or the day for the action is about to expire.

Dig. 2.12.3.1

Digest 2.12.3.1

Ulpianus 2 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 2 on the edict.

Liberalia quoque iudicia omni tempore finiuntur.

Freedom suits also are concluded at any time.

Dig. 2.12.3.2

Digest 2.12.3.2

Ulpianus 2 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 2 on the Edict.

Item in eum, qui quid nundinarum nomine adversus communem utilitatem acceperit, omni tempore ius dicitur.

Likewise, against one who has received anything under the name of the market-days, in opposition to the common utility, an action is said to lie at all times.

Dig. 2.12.4

Digest 2.12.4

Paulus 1 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 1 on the Edict.

Praesides provinciarum ex consuetudine cuiusque loci solent messis vindemiarumque causa tempus statuere.

The governors of the provinces, in accordance with the custom of each locality, are accustomed to fix a time for the harvest and for the vintage.

Dig. 2.12.5

Digest 2.12.5

Ulpianus 62 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 62 on the Edict.

Pridie kalendas ianuarias magistratus neque ius dicere, sed nec sui potestatem facere consuerunt.

On the day before the Kalends of January, magistrates are accustomed neither to pronounce judgment, nor even to make their own power available.

Dig. 2.12.6

Digest 2.12.6

Ulpianus 77 ad ed.

Ulpian, 77 on the edict.

Si feriatis diebus fuerit iudicatum, lege cautum est, ne his diebus iudicium sit nisi ex voluntate partium, et quod aliter adversus ea iudicatum erit ne quis iudicatum facere neve solvere debeat, neve quis ad quem de ea re in ius aditum erit iudicatum facere cogat.

If judgment has been rendered on festival days, it is provided by law that on these days there shall be no proceeding unless by the will of the parties, and that if otherwise a judgment shall have been given contrary to these provisions, no one ought to satisfy the judgment nor to pay, nor should anyone, to whom concerning that matter resort into court shall have been made, compel the judgment to be satisfied.

Dig. 2.12.7

Digest 2.12.7

Ulpianus 1 de off. cons.

Ulpian, 1, on the office of the consul.

Oratione quidem divi marci amplius quam semel non esse dandam instrumentorum dilationem expressum est: sed utilitatis litigantium gratia causa cognita et iterum dilatio tam ex eadem quam ex alia provincia secundum moderamen locorum impertiri solet, et maxime si aliquid inopinatum emergat. illud videndum, si defunctus acceperit aliquam dilationem propter instrumenta, an successori quoque eius dari debeat, an vero, quia iam data est, amplius dari non possit? et magis est, ut et hic causa cognita dari debeat.

In the oration of the deified Marcus it has been expressly set forth that a postponement on account of instruments (documents) is not to be given more than once: but for the utility of the litigants, after the case has been examined, even a second postponement is wont to be imparted, whether from the same or from another province, according to the moderation of the localities, and especially if something unforeseen emerges. It must be considered whether, if a deceased person had received any postponement on account of the instruments, it ought to be given also to his successor, or rather, because it has already been given, it cannot be given further? And the more correct view is that here too, after the case has been examined, it ought to be given.

Dig. 2.12.8

Digest 2.12.8

Paulus 13 ad sab.

Paulus 13 to Sabinus.

More romano dies a media nocte incipit et sequentis noctis media parte finitur. itaque quidquid in his viginti quattuor horis, id est duabus dimidiatis noctibus et luce media, actum est, perinde est, quasi quavis hora lucis actum esset.

By Roman custom the day begins at midnight and ends at the middle part of the following night. and so whatever in these twenty-four hours, that is, in two
halved nights and the middle light, has been done, it is the same as if it had been done at any hour of daylight.

Dig. 2.12.9

Digest 2.12.9

Ulpianus 7 de off. procons.

Ulpian, 7, On the Office of the Proconsul

Divus traianus minicio natali rescripsit ferias a forensibus tantum negotiis dare vacationem, ea autem, quae ad disciplinam militarem pertinet, etiam feriatis diebus peragenda: inter quae custodiarum quoque cognitionem esse.

The deified Trajan wrote back to Minicius Natalis that holidays grant vacation from forensic business only, but that those things which pertain to military discipline are to be carried out even on holidays: among which is also the hearing concerning the guards.

Dig. 2.12.10

Digest 2.12.10

Paulus 5 sent.

Paulus, Sentences 5.

In pecuniariis causis omnibus dilatio singulis causis plus semel tribui non potest: in capitalibus autem reo tres dilationes, accusatori duae dari possunt: sed utrumque causa cognita.

In all pecuniary causes, a delay cannot be granted more than once for each individual case: in capital causes, however, three delays can be given to the defendant, two to the accuser: but in either case after the cause has been examined.

Dig. 2.13.0. De edendo.

Digest 2.13.0. On producing.

Dig. 2.13.1pr.

Digest 2.13.1, preface.

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian 4 on the Edict.

Qua quisque actione agere volet, eam edere debet: nam aequissimum videtur eum qui acturus est edere actionem, ut proinde sciat reus, utrum cedere an contendere ultra debeat, et, si contendendum putat, veniat instructus ad agendum cognita actione qua conveniatur.

By whatever action each person wishes to sue, he ought to set it forth: for it seems most equitable that he who is going to bring an action should publish the action, so that the defendant may thereby know whether he ought
to yield or to contend further, and, if he thinks there must be contention, he may come equipped for litigating, with the action by which he is convened known.

Dig. 2.13.1.1

Digest 2.13.1.1

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the Edict.

Edere est etiam copiam describendi facere: vel in libello complecti et dare: vel dictare. eum quoque edere labeo ait, qui producat adversarium suum ad album et demonstret quod dictaturus est vel id dicendo, quo uti velit.

To publish is also to make an opportunity for copying: or to include it in a little book and deliver it: or to dictate. Labeo says that he also publishes who brings his adversary to the album and demonstrates what he is going to dictate, or by saying that by which he wishes to proceed.

Dig. 2.13.1.2

Digest 2.13.1.2

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 4 on the edict.

Editiones sine die et consule fieri debent, ne quid excogitetur edito die et consule et praelato die fiat. diem autem et consulem excepit praetor quo instrumentum conscriptum est, non in quem solutio concepta est: nam dies solutionis sicuti summa pars est stipulationis. rationes tamen cum die et consule edi debent, quoniam accepta et data non alias possunt apparere, nisi dies et consul fuerit editus.

Editions ought to be made without the day and the consul, lest anything be contrived by entering a day and consul and it be done with an antedated day. But the praetor excepted the day and the consul on which the instrument was written, not the one for which payment has been stipulated: for the day of payment, like the sum, is a part of the stipulation. Nevertheless accounts ought to be produced with the day and the consul, since receipts and disbursements cannot otherwise appear, unless the day and the consul have been set out.

Dig. 2.13.1.3

Digest 2.13.1.3

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Edenda sunt omnia, quae quis apud iudicem editurus est: non tamen ut et instrumenta, quibus quis usurus non est, compellatur edere.

Everything must be produced which someone is going to produce before the judge; yet not so as to compel him to produce even the instruments (documents) which he is not going to use.

Dig. 2.13.1.4

Digest 2.13.1.4

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 On the Edict.

Edere non videtur qui stipulationem totam non edidit.

One is not considered to have set forth who has not set forth the entire stipulation.

Dig. 2.13.1.5

Digest 2.13.1.5

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Eis, qui ob aetatem vel rusticitatem vel ob sexum lapsi non ediderunt vel alia ex iusta causa, subvenietur.

Aid will be afforded to those who, on account of age or rusticity or on account of sex, having lapsed, did not produce, or for another just cause.

Dig. 2.13.2

Digest 2.13.2

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the edict.

Si legatum petatur, non iubet praetor verba testamenti edere: ideo fortasse, quia heredes solent habere exemplum testamenti.

If a legacy is sought, the praetor does not order the words of the testament to be produced; perhaps for this reason, because heirs are accustomed to have an exemplar of the testament.

Dig. 2.13.3

Digest 2.13.3

Mauricius 2 de poen.

Maurice 2 on penance.

Senatus censuit, ne quisquam eorum, a quibus quid fisco petetur, alia instrumenta delatori cogatur edere, quam quae ad eam causam pertinerent, ex qua se deferre professus est.

The Senate decreed that none of those from whom anything will be claimed for the fiscus be compelled to produce to the delator other written instruments than those which pertain to that cause in respect of which he has professed to lay information.

Dig. 2.13.4pr.

Digest 2.13.4pr.

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the Edict.

Praetor ait: "argentariae mensae exercitores rationem, quae ad se pertinet, edent adiecto die et consule".

The praetor says: "The operators of the banking table shall produce the account which pertains to themselves, with the day and the consul appended."

Dig. 2.13.4.1

Digest 2.13.4.1

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Huius edicti ratio aequissima est: nam cum singulorum rationes argentarii conficiant, aequum fuit id quod mei causa confecit meum quodammodo instrumentum mihi edi.

The rationale of this edict is most equitable: for since bankers draw up the accounts of individuals, it was equitable that what he compiled on my account be issued to me as, in a certain manner, my instrument.

Dig. 2.13.4.2

Digest 2.13.4.2

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Sed et filius familias continetur his verbis, ut vel ipse cogatur edere: an et pater, quaeritur. labeo scribit patrem non cogendum, nisi sciente eo argentaria exercetur: sed recte sabinus respondit tunc id admittendum, cum patri quaestum refert.

But also a son under paternal power is contained by these words, so that even he himself may be compelled to produce: whether the father also, is the question. labeo writes that the father is not to be compelled, unless with his knowledge the banking business is conducted: but rightly sabinus replied that this is to be admitted then, when it brings profit to the father.

Dig. 2.13.4.3

Digest 2.13.4.3

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the Edict.

Sed si servus argentariam faciat ( potest enim), si quidem voluntate domini fecerit, compellendum dominum edere ac perinde in eum dandum est iudicium, ac si ipse fecisset. sed si inscio domino fecit, satis esse dominum iurare eas se rationes non habere: si servus peculiarem faciat argentariam, dominus de peculio vel de in rem verso tenetur: sed si dominus habet rationes nec edit, in solidum tenetur.

But if a slave conducts a banking business ( he can), then, if he did it with the master’s will, the master must be compelled to produce the accounts, and judgment must be given against him just as if he had done it himself. But if he did it with the master unaware, it is enough for the master to swear that he does not have those accounts: if the slave conducts a banking business as a peculium,
the master is liable de peculio or for what has been turned to his use ( de in rem verso): but if the master has the accounts and does not produce them, he is liable for the whole ( in solidum).

Dig. 2.13.4.4

Digest 2.13.4.4

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the Edict.

Etiam is qui desit ^ desiit^ argentariam facere, ad editionem compellitur.

Even he who has ceased to conduct banking is compelled to make disclosure.

Dig. 2.13.4.5

Digest 2.13.4.5

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Sed ibi quis compellitur edere, ubi argentariam exercuit, et hoc est constitutum. quod si instrumentum argentariae in alia provincia habeat, in alia administraverit, ibi puto cogendum edere, ubi argentariam exercuit: hoc enim primum deliquit, quod alio instrumentum transtulit. quod si in alio loco argentariam exercet, alibi autem ad editionem compelletur, minime hoc facere cogitur: nisi descriptum velis ubi de ea re agitur eum tibi dare, tuis videlicet sumptibus:

But there one is compelled to produce where he has exercised banking, and this is established. But if he has the instruments of the banking in another province, in another he has administered it, there I think he must be compelled to produce, where he exercised the banking: for this was his first delinquency, that he transferred the instruments elsewhere. But if in another place he practices banking, but is compelled to the production elsewhere, he is by no means forced to do this: unless you wish him to give you a transcript where the matter is being litigated, to give it to you, namely at your expense:

Dig. 2.13.5

Digest 2.13.5

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, 3 on the Edict.

Spatiumque ad perferendas eas tribuendum est.

And a period must be granted for bringing them.

Dig. 2.13.6pr.

Digest 2.13.6 preface.

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 4 on the Edict.

Si quis ex argentariis, ut plerique eorum, in villa habeat instrumentum vel in horreo: aut ad locum te perducet aut descriptas rationes dabit.

If any one of the bankers, as most of them, has the instruments (records) in a country-house or in a warehouse: either he will conduct you to the place or he will give you the accounts written out.

Dig. 2.13.6.1

Digest 2.13.6.1

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Cogentur et successores argentarii edere rationes. quod si plures sunt heredes et unus habeat, solus ad editionem compelletur: sed si omnes habeant et unus ediderit, omnes ad editionem compellendi sunt. quid enim si humilis et deploratus unus edidit, ut dubitare quis merito de fide editionis possit?

They too—the successors of a banker—are compelled to produce the accounts. But if there are several heirs and one has them, he alone will be compelled to produce; but if all have them and one has produced, all are to be compelled to produce. For what if a single man, humble and bankrupt, has produced them, so that someone might rightly doubt the good faith of the production?

ut igitur comparari rationes possint, etiam ceteri edere debent aut certe unius editioni subscribere. hoc idem erit et si plures fuerint argentarii, a quibus editio desideratur. nam et si plures tutores tutelam administraverunt simul, aut omnes edere debent aut unius editioni subscribere.

Accordingly, so that the accounts may be compared, the others also ought to produce them, or at least subscribe to the production by one. The same will apply even if there have been several bankers from whom production is demanded. For likewise, if several tutors have administered the tutelage together, either all ought to produce, or subscribe to the production by one.

Dig. 2.13.6.2

Digest 2.13.6.2

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict

Exigitur autem ab adversario argentarii iusiurandum non calumniae causa postulare edi sibi: ne forte vel supervacuas rationes vel quas habet edi sibi postulet vexandi argentarii causa.

Moreover, it is required of the adversary of the banker to swear that he is not demanding that there be produced to him for the sake of calumny; lest perhaps either superfluous accounts, or those which he already has,
he should demand to be produced to him for the purpose of vexing the banker.

Dig. 2.13.6.3

Digest 2.13.6.3

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 On the Edict.

Rationem autem esse labeo ait ultro citro dandi accipiendi, credendi, obligandi solvendi sui causa negotiationem: nec ullam rationem nuda dumtaxat solutione debiti incipere. nec si pignus acceperit aut mandatum, compellendum edere: hoc enim extra rationem esse. sed et quod solvi constituit, argentarius edere debet: nam et hoc ex argentaria venit.

An account, moreover, Labeo says, is a negotiation, a course of dealing of giving and receiving to and fro, of lending, obligating, and paying, undertaken for its own sake: nor does any account begin merely with the bare
payment of a debt. Nor, if he has received a pledge or a mandate, is he to be compelled to render it: for this is outside the account. But also what
he has determined to be paid, the banker ought to render: for this too comes from the banking business.

Dig. 2.13.6.4

Digest 2.13.6.4

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Ex hoc edicto in id quod interfuit actio competit:

From this edict an action lies for the amount of the interest:

Dig. 2.13.6.5

Digest 2.13.6.5

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the Edict.

Unde apparet ita demum tenere hoc edictum, si ad eum pertineat. pertinere autem videtur ad me ratio, si modo eam tractaveris me mandante. sed si procurator meus absente me mandaverit, an mihi edenda sit, quasi ad me pertineat?

Whence it appears that this edict holds only then, if it pertains to him. However, the matter seems to pertain to me, provided that you have handled it at my mandate. But if my procurator, I being absent, has given a mandate, is it to be produced to me, as though it pertained to me?

et magis est ut edatur. procuratori quoque meo edendam rationem, quam mecum habet, non dubito, quasi ad eum pertineat: et cauturum de rato, si mandatum ei non sit.

and the stronger view is that it should be produced. I do not doubt that the account which he has with me ought also to be produced to my procurator, as though it pertained to him; and that he must provide security de rato (for ratification), if no mandate has been given to him.

Dig. 2.13.6.6

Digest 2.13.6.6

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the Edict.

Si initium tabularum habet diem, in quibus titii ratio scripta est, postmodum mea sine die et consule, etiam mihi edendus est dies et consul: communis enim omnis rationis est praepositio diei et consulis.

If the beginning of the ledgers has a date, in which Titius’s account is written, but afterward my own is without a day and consul, the day and the consul must be entered for me as well:
for the placing at the head of the day and the consul is common to every account.

Dig. 2.13.6.7

Digest 2.13.6.7

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Edi autem est vel dictare vel tradere libellum vel codicem proferre.

To publish, however, is either to dictate, or to hand over a libel, or to bring forth a codex.

Dig. 2.13.6.8

Digest 2.13.6.8

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian 4 On the Edict.

Praetor ait: "argentario eive, qui iterum edi postulabit, causa cognita edi iubebo".

The Praetor says: "To a banker or to whoever will demand that it be published again, after the cause has been examined I will order it to be published".

Dig. 2.13.6.9

Digest 2.13.6.9

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Prohibet argentario edi illa ratione, quod etiam ipse instructus esse potest instrumento suae professionis: et absurdum est, cum ipse in ea sit causa, ut edere debeat, ipsum petere ut edatur ei. an nec heredi argentarii edi ratio debeat, videndum: et si quidem instrumentum argentariae ad eum pervenit, non debet ei edi, si minus, edenda est ex causa. nam et ipsi argentario ex causa ratio edenda est: si naufragio vel ruina vel incendio vel alio simili casu rationes perdidisse probet aut in longinquo habere, veluti trans mare.

He forbids an account to be produced to a banker for this reason, that he too can be furnished with the instrument of his profession: and it is absurd, since he himself is in the position that he ought to produce, that he should himself demand that it be produced to him. Whether an account ought not even to be produced to the heir of a banker must be considered: and if indeed the instrument of the banking-business has come to him, it ought not to be produced to him; if not, it must be produced for cause. For even to the banker himself an account must be produced for cause: if he proves that by shipwreck or collapse or fire or some other similar casualty he has lost the accounts, or that he has them at a distance, as across the sea.

Dig. 2.13.6.10

Digest 2.13.6.10

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 On the Edict.

Nec iterum postulanti edi praetor iubet, nisi ex causa:

Nor does the praetor order it to be produced again to a petitioner, unless for cause:

Dig. 2.13.7pr.

Digest 2.13.7 pr.

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Veluti si peregre habere quod primum editum est doceat: vel minus plene editum: vel eas rationes, quas casu maiore, non vero neglegentia perdiderit. nam si eo casu amisit, cui ignosci debeat, ex integro edi iubebit.

Just as, for example, if he shows that he has abroad what was first issued; or that it was issued less fully; or that he has lost those accounts by a greater casualty, not indeed by negligence. For if he lost it by such a mishap as ought to be pardoned, he will order it to be issued anew in full.

Dig. 2.13.7.1

Digest 2.13.7.1

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, book 3 on the Edict.

Haec vox iterum duas res significat: alteram, qua demonstraretur tempus secundum, quod graeci deuteron dicunt: alteram, quae ad insequentia quoque tempora pertinet, quae graece dicitur palin , quod ita accipitur "quotiens opus erit". nam potest fieri ut bis editam sibi rationem quis perdiderit: ut verbum iterum pro saepius accipiatur.

This word iterum signifies two things: one, by which a second time is indicated, which the Greeks call deuteron; the other, which pertains also to subsequent times, which in Greek is called palin , which is taken thus: "as often as there will be need." For it can happen that someone has lost an account rendered to him twice; so that the word iterum is taken for "more often."

Dig. 2.13.8pr.

Digest 2.13.8 pr.

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the edict.

Ubi exigitur argentarius rationes edere, tunc punitur, cum dolo malo non exhibet: sed culpam non praestabit nisi dolo proximam. dolo malo autem non edidit et qui malitiose edidit et qui in totum non edidit.

Where a banker is required to produce accounts, then he is punished when he fails to produce them with fraudulent intent; but he will not be liable for fault unless it is proximate to fraud. Moreover, one has not produced by fraudulent intent both who has produced maliciously and who has not produced at all.

Dig. 2.13.8.1

Digest 2.13.8.1

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 4 on the edict.

Is autem, qui in hoc edictum incidit, id praestat, quod interfuit mea rationes edi, cum decerneretur a praetore, non quod hodie interest: et ideo licet interesse desiit vel minoris vel pluris interesse coepit, locum actio non habebit neque augmentum neque deminutionem.

But he who falls under this edict renders that which it was of interest to me that my accounts be produced when it was decreed by the praetor, not what is of interest today: and therefore although the interest has ceased or has begun to be of less or of more, the action will have no place, neither for augmentation nor for diminution.

Dig. 2.13.9pr.

Digest 2.13.9 pr.

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Quaedam sunt personae, quas rationes nobis edere oportet nec tamen a praetore per hoc edictum compelluntur. veluti cum procurator res rationesve nostras administravit, non cogitur a praetore per metum in factum actionis rationes edere: scilicet quia id consequi possumus per mandati actionem. et cum dolo malo socius negotia gessit, praetor per hanc clausulam non intervenit: est enim pro socio actio.

There are certain persons from whom it is proper that we obtain accounts to be rendered to us, and yet they are not compelled by the praetor through this edict. For instance, when a procurator has administered our affairs or our accounts, he is not forced by the praetor, by the fear of the in factum action, to render accounts: plainly because we can achieve that through the action on mandate. And when a partner has conducted the business with dolus malus, the praetor does not intervene by this clause: for there is the pro socio action.

sed nec tutorem cogit praetor pupillo edere rationes: sed iudicio tutelae solet cogi edere.

but nor does the praetor compel the tutor to render accounts to the ward: rather, by the action of guardianship he is usually compelled to render them.

Dig. 2.13.9.1

Digest 2.13.9.1

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Nihil interest, si successores aut pater aut dominus argentarii eiusdem fuerunt professionis: quia cum in locum et in ius succedant argentarii, partibus eius fungi debent. is autem, cui argentarius rationes suas legavit, non videbitur contineri, quia iuris successor his verbis significatur: non magis, quam si ei vivus eas donasset. sed nec heres tenebitur, cum nec possideat nec dolo malo fecerit: sed si ei, antequam eas legatario traderet, renuntiatum fuerit, ne ante eas tradat, tenebitur quasi dolo fecerit: item antequam eas tradat, tenebitur.

It makes no difference if the successors—whether the banker’s father or master—were of the same profession: because, since they succeed into the place and into the right of the banker, they ought to perform his functions. But the one to whom the banker has bequeathed his accounts will not be seen to be included, because by these words a successor in law is signified: no more than if he had given them to him while alive. But neither will the heir be liable, since he neither possesses nor has acted with fraud: but if, before he delivered them to the legatee, it had been notified to him not to deliver them beforehand, he will be liable as though he had acted with fraud: likewise, if he delivers them beforehand, he will be liable.

quod si nihil dolo fecerit, causa cognita legatarius cogendus est edere.

but if he has done nothing by fraud, once the case has been inquired into, the legatee must be compelled to produce the accounts.

Dig. 2.13.9.2

Digest 2.13.9.2

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the Edict.

Nummularios quoque non esse iniquum cogi rationes edere pomponius scribit: quia et hi nummularii sicut argentarii rationes conficiunt, quia et accipiunt pecuniam et erogant per partes, quarum probatio scriptura codicibusque eorum maxime continetur: et frequentissime ad fidem eorum decurritur.

Pomponius writes that it is not inequitable that money-changers also be compelled to render accounts: because these money-changers, like the bankers, prepare accounts, since they both receive money and disburse it by items, the proof of which is chiefly contained in writing and in their ledgers: and very frequently recourse is had to their credit.

Dig. 2.13.9.3

Digest 2.13.9.3

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, book 3 on the Edict.

Ceterum omnibus postulantibus et iurantibus non calumniae causa petere rationes, quae ad se pertineant, edi iubet.

Moreover, he orders that, for all who demand and swear that they seek the accounts not for the sake of calumny, the accounts which pertain to them be produced.

Dig. 2.13.9.4

Digest 2.13.9.4

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paul, book 3 on the Edict.

Ad nos enim pertinet non tantum cum ipsi contraximus vel successimus ei qui contraxit, sed etiam si is qui in nostra potestate est contraxit.

For it pertains to us not only when we ourselves have contracted or have succeeded to him who contracted, but also if he who is in our power has contracted.

Dig. 2.13.10pr.

Digest 2.13.10pr.

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, 1, on the Provincial Edict.

Argentarius rationes edere iubetur: nec interest cum ipso argentario controversia sit an cum alio.

The banker is ordered to produce the accounts: nor does it matter whether the controversy is with the banker himself or with another.

Dig. 2.13.10.1

Digest 2.13.10.1

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 1 on the provincial edict

Ideo autem argentarios tantum neque alios ullos absimiles eis edere rationes cogit, quia officium eorum atque ministerium publicam habet causam et haec principalis eorum opera est, ut actus sui rationes diligenter conficiant.

Therefore, however, it compels only bankers, and no others unlike them, to render accounts, because their office and ministry has a public cause, and this is their principal work: that they diligently compile the accounts of their transactions.

Dig. 2.13.10.2

Digest 2.13.10.2

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, Book 1 on the provincial edict.

Edi autem ratio ita intellegitur, si a capite edatur, nam ratio nisi a capite inspiciatur, intellegi non potest: scilicet ut non totum cuique codicem rationum totasque membranas inspiciendi describendique potestas fiat, sed ut ea sola pars rationum, quae ad instruendum aliquem pertineat, inspiciatur et describatur.

But the production of an account is understood thus, if it is issued from the head; for an account cannot be understood unless it is inspected from the head: namely, that there not be granted to anyone the power of inspecting and transcribing the whole codex of accounts and all the membranes (parchment sheets), but that only that part of the accounts which pertains to preparing a case against someone, be inspected and transcribed.

Dig. 2.13.10.3

Digest 2.13.10.3

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 1 on the provincial edict

Cum autem in id actio competit, quanti agentis intersit editas sibi rationes esse: eveniet, ut, sive quis condemnatus sit sive quod petierit non optinuerit eo, quod non habuerit rationes ex quibus causam suam tueri possit, id ipsum, quod ita perdiderit, hac actione consequatur. sed an hoc procedat videamus: nam si apud hunc iudicem, qui inter eum et argentarium iudicat, potest probare se illo iudicio, quo victus est, vincere potuisse, poterat et tunc probare: et si non probavit aut probantem iudex non curavit, de se ipso aut de iudice queri debet. sed non ita est.

When, however, the action lies for that amount, namely how much it is of concern to the plaintiff to have accounts rendered to him: it will result that, whether someone has been condemned or has not
obtained what he sought, because he did not have accounts by which he could defend his cause, by this action he recovers that very thing which he has thus lost. But let us see
whether this goes through: for if before this judge, who judges between him and the banker, he can prove that in that proceeding in which he was defeated he could have
won, he could also then have proved it; and if he did not prove it, or the judge did not heed him while proving, he ought to complain of himself or of the judge. But it is not so.

fieri enim potest, ut nunc, rationes vel ipso edente vel alio modo nanctus, aut aliis instrumentis vel testibus, quibus illo tempore aliqua ex causa uti non potuit, possit probare potuisse se vincere. sic enim et de cautione subrepta aut corrupta competit condictio et damni iniuriae actio: quia quod ante non potuimus intercepta cautione probare et ob id amisimus, hoc nunc aliis instrumentis aut testibus, quibus tum uti non potuimus, probare possumus.

for it can happen that now, having obtained the accounts either by that very person producing them or in some other way, or by other instruments or witnesses, which at that time for some reason he could not use, he is able to prove that he could have won. For thus too, regarding a bond surreptitiously taken or corrupted, a condiction lies and an action for wrongful damage: because what earlier we were not able to prove, the bond having been intercepted, and on that account we lost, this now we are able to prove by other instruments or witnesses, which then we were not able to use.

Dig. 2.13.11

Digest 2.13.11

Modestinus 3 reg.

Modestinus, Rules, book 3.

Exempla instrumentorum etiam sine subscriptione edentis edi posse receptum est.

It is established that exemplars of instruments can be issued even without the subscription of the issuer.

Dig. 2.13.12

Digest 2.13.12

Callistratus 1 ed. monit.

Callistratus, Book 1, On the Edict, Monitions.

Feminae remotae videntur ab officio argentarii, cum ea opera virilis sit.

Women seem removed from the office of the banker, since that work is virile.

Dig. 2.13.13

Digest 2.13.13

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Haec actio neque post annum neque in heredem nisi ex suo facto dabitur. heredi autem dabitur.

This action will be granted neither after a year nor against an heir, unless by reason of his own act. however, it will be granted to the heir.

Dig. 2.14.0. De pactis.

Digest 2.14.0. On pacts.

Dig. 2.14.1pr.

Digest 2.14.1pr.

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian 4 on the edict.

Huius edicti aequitas naturalis est. quid enim tam congruum fidei humanae, quam ea quae inter eos placuerunt servare?

The equity of this edict is natural. for what indeed is so congruent to human good faith as to observe those things that have been agreed upon between them?

Dig. 2.14.1.1

Digest 2.14.1.1

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 On the Edict.

Pactum autem a pactione dicitur ( inde etiam pacis nomen appellatum est)

Pact, moreover, is said to derive from paction ( whence also the name of peace has been appellated)

Dig. 2.14.1.2

Digest 2.14.1.2

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, On the Edict, book 4

Et est pactio duorum pluriumve in idem placitum et consensus.

And a pact is the agreement of two or more to the same thing agreed upon, and consensus.

Dig. 2.14.1.3

Digest 2.14.1.3

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Conventionis verbum generale est ad omnia pertinens, de quibus negotii contrahendi transigendique causa consentiunt qui inter se agunt: nam sicuti convenire dicuntur qui ex diversis locis in unum locum colliguntur et veniunt, ita et qui ex diversis animi motibus in unum consentiunt, id est in unam sententiam decurrunt. adeo autem conventionis nomen generale est, ut eleganter dicat pedius nullum esse contractum, nullam obligationem, quae non habeat in se conventionem, sive re sive verbis fiat: nam et stipulatio, quae verbis fit, nisi habeat consensum, nulla est.

Convention is a general word pertaining to all things about which, for the sake of contracting and settling a business, those who deal among themselves agree: for
just as those are said to convene who from diverse places gather and come into one place, so too those who from diverse motions of mind consent into one,
that is, run into one opinion. And so general, moreover, is the name “convention” that Pedius says elegantly that there is no contract, no obligation, which does not have within itself a convention, whether it be effected by the thing (re) or by words: for even a stipulation, which is made by words, unless it have consent, is null.

Dig. 2.14.1.4

Digest 2.14.1.4

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Sed conventionum pleraeque in aliud nomen transeunt: veluti in emptionem, in locationem, in pignus vel in stipulationem.

But most conventions pass into another appellation: for example into purchase, into lease, into pledge, or into stipulation.

Dig. 2.14.2pr.

Digest 2.14.2, at the beginning.

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Labeo ait convenire posse vel re: vel per epistulam vel per nuntium inter absentes quoque posse. sed etiam tacite consensu convenire intellegitur.

Labeo says that one can come to an agreement either by the thing: or by epistle or by messenger, and that it can be between absentees as well. But it is understood that agreement is also made tacitly by consent.

Dig. 2.14.2.1

Digest 2.14.2.1

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the Edict.

Et ideo si debitori meo reddiderim cautionem, videtur inter nos convenisse ne peterem, profuturamque ei conventionis exceptionem placuit.

And therefore, if I have returned the bond to my debtor, it seems to have been agreed between us that I should not sue, and it has been decided that the defense of the agreement will benefit him.

Dig. 2.14.3

Digest 2.14.3

Modestinus 3 reg.

Modestinus, Rules, Book 3.

Postquam pignus vero debitori reddatur, si pecunia soluta non fuerit, debitum peti posse dubium non est, nisi specialiter contrarium actum esse probetur.

After the pledge has in fact been returned to the debtor, if the money has not been paid, there is no doubt that the debt can be demanded, unless it is proven that the contrary was expressly agreed.

Dig. 2.14.4pr.

Digest 2.14.4pr.

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paul, book 3 on the Edict.

Item quia conventiones etiam tacite valent, placet in urbanis habitationibus locandis invecta illata pignori esse locatori, etiamsi nihil nominatim convenerit.

Likewise, since conventions also are valid tacitly, it is held that, in the letting of urban habitations, goods brought in and brought onto the premises are in pledge to the lessor, even if nothing
has been expressly agreed.

Dig. 2.14.4.1

Digest 2.14.4.1

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Secundum haec et mutus pacisci potest.

In accordance with these, even a mute can make a pact.

Dig. 2.14.4.2

Digest 2.14.4.2

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book 3.

Huius rei argumentum etiam stipulatio dotis causa facta est: nam ante nuptias male petitur, quasi si hoc expressum fuisset, et nuptiis non secutis ipso iure evanescit stipulatio. idem iuliano placet.

An argument of this matter is also a stipulation made for the sake of a dowry: for before the nuptials it is improperly demanded, as though this had been expressly stipulated, and, the nuptials not ensuing, the stipulation lapses by operation of law. The same pleases Julian.

Dig. 2.14.4.3

Digest 2.14.4.3

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, 3 on the Edict.

Ex facto etiam consultus, cum convenisset, ut donec usurae solverentur sors non peteretur, et stipulatio pure concepta fuisset, condicionem inesse stipulationi, atque si hoc expressum fuisset.

Also, when consulted on the basis of the facts, since it had been agreed that, until the interest was paid, the principal was not to be demanded, and the stipulation had been conceived purely, a condition was present in the stipulation, just as if this had been expressed.

Dig. 2.14.5

Digest 2.14.5

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the Edict.

Conventionum autem tres sunt species. aut enim ex publica causa fiunt aut ex privata: privata aut legitima aut iuris gentium. publica conventio est, quae fit per pacem, quotiens inter se duces belli quaedam paciscuntur.

But there are three species of conventions. For they are made either on a public ground or on a private one: private [conventions are] either legitimate or of the law of nations. A public convention is that which is made by peace, whenever the leaders of war enter into certain pacts between themselves.

Dig. 2.14.6

Digest 2.14.6

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, book 3 on the Edict.

Legitima conventio est quae lege aliqua confirmatur. et ideo interdum ex pacto actio nascitur vel tollitur, quotiens lege vel senatus consulto adiuvatur.

A legitimate agreement is that which is confirmed by some law. and therefore sometimes from a pact an action arises or is taken away, whenever it is aided by a law or a senatorial decree.

Dig. 2.14.7pr.

Digest 2.14.7, preface.

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian 4 on the Edict.

Iuris gentium conventiones quaedam actiones pariunt, quaedam exceptiones.

Certain conventions of the law of nations beget actions; certain, exceptions.

Dig. 2.14.7.1

Digest 2.14.7.1

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 4 on the Edict.

Quae pariunt actiones, in suo nomine non stant, sed transeunt in proprium nomen contractus: ut emptio venditio, locatio conductio, societas, commodatum, depositum et ceteri similes contractus.

Those which give rise to actions do not stand in their own name, but pass into the proper name of the contract: such as purchase and sale, letting and hiring, partnership,
loan for use, deposit, and other similar contracts.

Dig. 2.14.7.2

Digest 2.14.7.2

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 On the Edict.

Sed et si in alium contractum res non transeat, subsit tamen causa, eleganter aristo celso respondit esse obligationem. ut puta dedi tibi rem ut mihi aliam dares, dedi ut aliquid facias: hoc sunallagma esse et hinc nasci civilem obligationem. et ideo puto recte iulianum a mauriciano reprehensum in hoc: dedi tibi stichum, ut pamphilum manumittas: manumisisti: evictus est stichus.

But also, even if the thing does not pass into another contract, yet if a causa underlies, Aristo elegantly answered Celsus that there is an obligation. For example, I gave you a thing so that
you might give me another; I gave so that you might do something: this is a synallagma, and from this a civil obligation arises. And therefore I think Julian was rightly reproved by Mauricianus in this: I gave you Stichus, that you might manumit Pamphilus; you have manumitted; Stichus was evicted.

iulianus scribit in factum actionem a praetore dandam: ille ait civilem incerti actionem, id est praescriptis verbis sufficere: esse enim contractum, quod aristo sunallagma dicit, unde haec nascitur actio.

julianus writes that an action in factum is to be given by the praetor: he says that a civil action incerti, that is, by prescribed words, suffices: for there is a contract, which aristo calls a synallagma, whence this action arises.

Dig. 2.14.7.3

Digest 2.14.7.3

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Si ob maleficium ne fiat promissum sit, nulla est obligatio ex hac conventione.

If, for a malefaction not to be done, a promise has been made, there is no obligation from this agreement.

Dig. 2.14.7.4

Digest 2.14.7.4

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the edict.

Sed cum nulla subest causa, propter conventionem hic constat non posse constitui obligationem: igitur nuda pactio obligationem non parit, sed parit exceptionem.

But when no cause underlies, it is established here that an obligation cannot be constituted on account of the agreement: therefore a bare pact does not beget an obligation, but begets an exception.

Dig. 2.14.7.5

Digest 2.14.7.5

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the Edict.

Quin immo interdum format ipsam actionem, ut in bonae fidei iudiciis: solemus enim dicere pacta conventa inesse bonae fidei iudiciis. sed hoc sic accipiendum est, ut si quidem ex continenti pacta subsecuta sunt, etiam ex parte actoris insint: si ex intervallo, non inerunt, nec valebunt, si agat, ne ex pacto actio nascatur. ut puta post divortium convenit, ne tempore statuto dilationis dos reddatur, sed statim: hoc non valebit, ne ex pacto actio nascatur: idem Marcellus scribit.

Nay rather, at times he even shapes the action itself, as in good‑faith judgments: for we are accustomed to say that pacts agreed are inherent in good‑faith judgments. But this is to be taken thus, that if indeed the pacts followed immediately from the same transaction, they are included even on the plaintiff’s side; if after an interval, they will not be included, nor will they be effective, if he brings an action, lest an action arise from a pact. For instance, after a divorce it is agreed that the dowry not be returned at the time fixed for delay, but at once: this will not be valid, lest an action arise from the pact: the same Marcellus writes.

et si in tutelae actione convenit, ut maiores quam statutae sunt usurae praestentur, locum non habebit, ne ex pacto nascatur actio: ea enim pacta insunt, quae legem contractui dant, id est quae in ingressu contractus facta sunt. idem responsum scio a papiniano, et si post emptionem ex intervallo aliquid extra naturam contractus conveniat, ob hanc causam agi ex empto non posse propter eandem regulam, ne ex pacto actio nascatur. quod et in omnibus bonae fidei iudiciis erit dicendum.

and even if in a guardianship action it is agreed that usuries (rates of interest) greater than the statutory ones be provided, it will have no place,
lest an action arise from the pact: for those pacts are understood to be included which give a law to the contract, that is, which were made at the ingress of the contract. I know the same responsum from Papinian, that even if after a purchase, after an interval, something outside the nature of the contract is agreed, for this cause it is not possible to sue on purchase (ex empto) by reason of the same rule, lest an action arise from a pact.
and this must be said also in all good‑faith judgments.

sed ex parte rei locum habebit pactum, quia solent et ea pacta, quae postea interponuntur, parere exceptiones.

but on the defendant’s part the pact will
have place, because even those pacts which are afterwards interposed are wont to produce exceptions.

Dig. 2.14.7.6

Digest 2.14.7.6

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the edict

Adeo autem bonae fidei iudiciis exceptiones postea factae, quae ex eodem sunt contractu, insunt, ut constet in emptione ceterisque bonae fidei iudiciis re nondum secuta posse abiri ab emptione. si igitur in totum potest, cur non et pars eius pactione mutari potest? et haec ita pomponius libro sexto ad edictum scribit.

Moreover, in actions of good faith, exceptions later made, which are from the same contract, are so included that it is established in a purchase and in the other actions of good faith, before performance has yet ensued, one can withdraw from the purchase. if therefore this can be done in whole, why cannot even a part of it be changed by pact? and thus Pomponius writes these things in the sixth book on the Edict.

quod cum est, etiam ex parte agentis pactio locum habet, ut et ad actionem proficiat nondum re secuta, eadem ratione. nam si potest tota res tolli, cur non et reformari? ut quodammodo quasi renovatus contractus videatur.

Since this is so, a pact likewise has place even on the plaintiff’s part, so that, by the same reasoning, it may also advance to an action, the matter not yet having ensued. For if the whole thing can be taken away, why not also re-formed? so that in a certain manner the contract may seem as if renewed.

quod non insuptiliter dici potest. unde illud aeque non reprobo, quod pomponius libris lectionum probat, posse in parte recedi pacto ab emptione, quasi repetita partis emptione. sed cum duo heredes emptori exstiterunt, venditor cum altero pactus est, ut ab emptione recederetur: ait iulianus valere pactionem et dissolvi pro parte emptionem: quoniam et ex alio contractu paciscendo alter ex heredibus adquirere sibi potuit exceptionem.

which can be said not without subtlety. Whence I likewise do not disapprove that which Pomponius in the Books of Readings approves, that it is possible in part to withdraw by pact from the purchase, as if the purchase of the part were repeated. But when two heirs succeeded to the buyer, the seller made a pact with one of them that there should be a withdrawal from the purchase: Julianus says the pact is valid and that the purchase is dissolved as to the part; since also from another contract, by making a pact, one of the heirs could acquire for himself an exception.

utrumque itaque recte placet, et quod iulianus et quod pomponius.

Accordingly, both are rightly approved: both that of Julian and that of Pomponius.

Dig. 2.14.7.7

Digest 2.14.7.7

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 4 on the Edict.

Ait praetor: "pacta conventa, quae neque dolo malo, neque adversus leges plebis scita senatus consulta decreta edicta principum, neque quo fraus cui eorum fiat facta erunt, servabo."

The praetor says: "I will uphold the agreed pacts, which will have been made neither by malicious deceit, nor against the laws, plebiscites, senatorial decrees, and the decrees and edicts of the princes, nor whereby fraud would be done to any of them."

Dig. 2.14.7.8

Digest 2.14.7.8

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Pactorum quaedam in rem sunt, quaedam in personam. in rem sunt, quotiens generaliter paciscor ne petam: in personam, quotiens ne a persona petam, id est ne a lucio titio petam. utrum autem in rem an in personam pactum factum est, non minus ex verbis quam ex mente convenientium aestimandum est: plerumque enim, ut pedius ait, persona pacto inseritur, non ut personale pactum fiat, sed ut demonstretur, cum quo pactum factum est.

Certain pacts are in rem, certain in personam. In rem they are, whenever I generally make a pact not to sue; in personam, whenever I make a pact not to sue the
person, that is, not to sue Lucius Titius. Whether, however, a pact has been made in rem or in personam is to be assessed no less from the words than from the intention of the parties agreeing; for most often, as Pedius says, a person is inserted into the pact, not so that a personal pact be made, but to show with whom the pact has been made.

Dig. 2.14.7.9

Digest 2.14.7.9

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 4 on the edict.

Dolo malo ait praetor pactum se non servaturum. dolus malus fit calliditate et fallacia: et ut ait pedius, dolo malo pactum fit, quotiens circumscribendi alterius causa aliud agitur et aliud agi simulatur.

Because of malicious fraud the praetor says he will not have a pact observed. Malicious fraud arises from cunning and deceit; and, as Pedius says, a pact is made by malicious fraud whenever,
for the purpose of overreaching another, one thing is transacted and another is simulated to be transacted.

Dig. 2.14.7.10

Digest 2.14.7.10

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the Edict.

Sed si fraudandi causa pactum factum dicatur, nihil praetor adicit: sed eleganter labeo ait hoc aut iniquum esse, aut supervacuum. iniquum, si quod semel remisit creditor debitori suo bona fide, iterum hoc conetur destruere: supervacuum, si deceptus hoc fecerit, inest enim dolo et fraus.

But if it is said that a pact was made for the purpose of defrauding, the praetor adds nothing: but elegantly labeo says that this is either iniquitous or superfluous. Iniquitous, if what the creditor once remitted to his debtor in bona fide he again attempts to destroy: superfluous, if he did this being deceived, for dolus and fraud are inherent.

Dig. 2.14.7.11

Digest 2.14.7.11

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Sive autem ab initio dolo malo pactum factum est sive post pactum dolo malo aliquid factum est, nocebit exceptio propter haec verba edicti "neque fiat".

But whether from the beginning the pact was made by malicious fraud, or after the pact something was done by malicious fraud, the exception will be harmful on account of these words of the edict, "nor shall it be done".

Dig. 2.14.7.12

Digest 2.14.7.12

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 On the Edict.

Quod fere novissima parte pactorum ita solet inseri "rogavit titius, spopondit maevius", haec verba non tantum pactionis loco accipiuntur, sed etiam stipulationis: ideoque ex stipulatu nascitur actio, nisi contrarium specialiter adprobetur, quod non animo stipulantium hoc factum est, sed tantum paciscentium.

That which is commonly inserted thus in the very last part of agreements, “Titius asked, Maevius promised,” these words are taken not only in the place of a paction, but also of a stipulation: and therefore an action ex stipulatu arises, unless the contrary is specifically proven, namely that this was done not with the intention to stipulate, but only of those making a paction.

Dig. 2.14.7.13

Digest 2.14.7.13

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 On the Edict.

Si paciscar, ne pro iudicati vel incensarum aedium agatur, hoc pactum valet.

If I make a pact that suit shall not be brought either on a judgment or for burned houses, this pact is valid.

Dig. 2.14.7.14

Digest 2.14.7.14

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, On the Edict, book 4.

Si paciscar, ne operis novi nuntiationem exsequar, quidam putant non valere pactionem, quasi in ea re praetoris imperium versetur: labeo autem distinguit, ut si ex re familiari operis novi nuntiatio sit facta, liceat pacisci, si de re publica, non liceat: quae distinctio vera est. et in ceteris igitur omnibus ad edictum praetoris pertinentibus, quae non ad publicam laesionem, sed ad rem familiarem respiciunt, pacisci licet: nam et de furto pacisci lex permittit.

If I make a pact not to prosecute the notification of new work, some think the pact is not valid, as though in that matter the praetor’s imperium were involved: but Labeo
distinguishes, that if the notification of new work has been made from a family/estate matter, it is permitted to make a pact; if from a public matter, it is not permitted: which distinction is true. And in
all other things therefore pertaining to the praetor’s edict, which look not to public injury but to a family/estate matter, it is permitted to make a pact:
for the law even permits making a pact about theft.

Dig. 2.14.7.15

Digest 2.14.7.15

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the Edict.

Sed et si quis paciscatur, ne depositi agat, secundum pomponium valet pactum. item si quis pactus sit, ut ex causa depositi omne periculum praestet, pomponius ait pactionem valere nec quasi contra iuris formam factam non esse servandam.

But also, if anyone should make a pact that he not bring an action of deposit, according to Pomponius the pact is valid. Likewise, if someone has bargained that, on the ground of deposit, all peril
he should make good, Pomponius says the pact is valid, nor, as if made contrary to the form of the law, is it not to be observed.

Dig. 2.14.7.16

Digest 2.14.7.16

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, On the Edict, 4.

Et generaliter quotiens pactum a iure communi remotum est, servari hoc non oportet: nec legari, nec iusiurandum de hoc adactum ne quis agat servandum Marcellus libro secundo digestorum scribit: et si stipulatio sit interposita de his, pro quibus pacisci non licet, servanda non est, sed omnimodo rescindenda.

And generally, whenever a pact has been removed from the common law, this is not to be observed: nor is it to be bequeathed, nor—on this point, that no one should bring an action—is an oath exacted to be observed, Marcellus writes in the second book of the Digests; and if a stipulation has been interposed concerning those things for which it is not permitted to make a pact, it is not to be observed, but in every way to be rescinded.

Dig. 2.14.7.17

Digest 2.14.7.17

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the edict.

Si ante aditam hereditatem paciscatur quis cum creditoribus ut minus solvatur, pactum valiturum est.

If, before the inheritance has been entered upon, someone makes a pact with the creditors that less be paid, the pact will be valid.

Dig. 2.14.7.18

Digest 2.14.7.18

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 On the Edict.

Sed si servus sit, qui paciscitur, priusquam libertatem et hereditatem apiscatur, quia sub condicione heres scriptus fuerat, non profuturum pactum vindius scribit: Marcellus autem libro octavo decimo digestorum et suum heredem et servum necessarium pure scriptos, paciscentes priusquam se immisceant putat recte pacisci, quod verum est. idem et in extraneo herede: qui si mandatu creditorum adierit, etiam mandati putat eum habere actionem. sed si quis, ut supra rettulimus, in servitute pactus est, negat Marcellus, quoniam non solet ei proficere, si quid in servitute egit, post libertatem: quod in pacti exceptione admittendum est.

But if it is a slave who makes the pact, before he obtains freedom and the inheritance, because he had been instituted heir under a condition, Vindius writes that the pact will not be of benefit. Marcellus, however, in the eighteenth book of the Digests, thinks that both his own heir (suus heres) and a necessary slave (servus necessarius), instituted purely, making a pact before they intermeddle, make a proper pact—which is true. The same also in the case of an external heir; who, if he has entered on the inheritance by the mandate of the creditors, he thinks has even an action of mandate. But if someone, as we reported above, made a pact in slavery, Marcellus denies it, since what he did in slavery is not wont to profit him after freedom: which is to be admitted in the exception of pact (exceptio pacti).

sed an vel doli ei prosit exceptio, quaeritur. Marcellus in similibus speciebus licet antea dubitavit, tamen admisit: ut puta filius familias heres institutus pactus est cum creditoribus et emancipatus adiit hereditatem: et dicit doli eum posse uti exceptione. idem probat, et si filius vivo patre cum creditoribus paternis pactus sit: nam et hic doli exceptionem profuturam.

but whether even the exception of fraud may profit him is asked. Marcellus, in similar cases, although he formerly doubted, nevertheless admitted it: for instance, a filius familias appointed heir made a pact with the creditors, and, when emancipated, entered upon the inheritance; and he says that he can use the exception of fraud. He likewise approves it even if the son, while his father is alive, has made a pact with the father’s creditors; for here too the exception of fraud will be advantageous.

immo et in servo doli exceptio non est respuenda.

nay rather, even in the case of a slave, the exception of fraud is not to be rejected.

Dig. 2.14.7.19

Digest 2.14.7.19

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Hodie tamen ita demum pactio huiusmodi creditoribus obest, si convenerint in unum et communi consensu declaraverint, quota parte debiti contenti sint: si vero dissentiant, tunc praetoris partes necessariae sunt, qui decreto suo sequetur maioris partis voluntatem.

Today, however, a pact of this kind is prejudicial to the creditors only thus, if they have come together as one and by common consensus have declared with what share of the debt
they are content: but if they dissent, then the praetor’s role is necessary, who by his decree will follow the will of the majority.

Dig. 2.14.8

Digest 2.14.8

Papinianus 10 resp.

Papinian, Responses 10.

Maiorem esse partem pro modo debiti, non pro numero personarum placuit. quod si aequales sint in cumulo debiti, tunc plurium numerus creditorum praeferendus est. in numero autem pari creditorum auctoritatem eius sequetur praetor, qui dignitate inter eos praecellit.

It has been decided that the greater share is according to the measure of the debt, not according to the number of persons. But if they are equal in the aggregate of the debt, then the number of more creditors is to be preferred. And when the number of creditors is equal, the praetor will follow the authority of him who excels among them in dignity.

sin autem omnia undique in unam aequalitatem concurrant, humanior sententia a praetore eligenda est. hoc enim ex divi marci rescripto colligi potest.

but if, however all things on every side concur into one equality, the more humane opinion is to be chosen by the praetor. For this can be gathered from the rescript of the deified Marcus.

Dig. 2.14.9pr.

Digest 2.14.9pr.

Paulus 62 ad ed.

Paulus, book 62, On the Edict.

Si plures sint qui eandem actionem habent, unius loco habentur. ut puta plures sunt rei stipulandi vel plures argentarii, quorum nomina simul facta sunt: unius loco numerabuntur, quia unum debitum est. et cum tutores pupilli creditoris plures convenissent, unius loco numerantur, quia unius pupilli nomine convenerant.

If there are several who have the same action, they are held in the place of one. For instance, there are several stipulators or several bankers, whose entries were made at the same time: they will be numbered in the place of one, because there is one debt. And when several tutors of a pupil who is a creditor had brought suit, they are numbered in the place of one, because they had proceeded in the name of one pupil.

nec non et unus tutor plurium pupillorum nomine unum debitum praetendentium si convenerit, placuit unius loco esse. nam difficile est, ut unus homo duorum vicem sustineat. nam nec is, qui plures actiones habet, adversus eum, qui unam actionem habet, plurium personarum loco accipitur.

and likewise also if one tutor, in the name of several pupils who are asserting one debt, has brought suit,
it has been decided that he is in the place of one. For it is difficult for one man to sustain the place of two. For neither is he who has several actions, as against him who has one action,
received as in the place of several persons.

Dig. 2.14.9.1

Digest 2.14.9.1

Paulus 62 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 62, on the Edict.

Cumulum debiti et ad plures summas referemus, si uni forte minutae summae centum aureorum debeantur, alii vero una summa aureorum quinquaginta: nam in hunc casum spectabimus summas plures, quia illae excedunt in unam summam coadunatae.

We will refer the cumulus of the debt also to several sums, if to one person perchance minute sums amounting to one hundred aurei are owed, but to another one single sum of fifty aurei: for in this case we will look to the several sums, because those, coadunated into one sum, exceed.

Dig. 2.14.9.2

Digest 2.14.9.2

Paulus 62 ad ed.

Paulus, 62 on the Edict.

Summae autem applicare debemus etiam usuras.

Moreover, we ought also to apply interest to the sum.

Dig. 2.14.10pr.

Digest 2.14.10, proem.

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the Edict.

Rescriptum autem divi marci sic loquitur, quasi omnes creditores debeant convenire. quid ergo si quidam absentes sint ? num exemplum praesentium absentes sequi debeant ? sed an et privilegiariis absentibus haec pactio noceat, eleganter tractatur: si modo valet pactio et contra absentes. et repeto ante formam a divo marco datam divum pium rescripsisse fiscum quoque in his casibus, in quibus hypothecas non habet, et ceteros privilegiarios exemplum creditorum sequi oportere.

However, the rescript of the deified Marcus speaks thus, as if all creditors ought to convene. What then if certain are absent ? Should the absent follow the example of those present ? But whether this pact also harms privileged parties who are absent is elegantly handled: provided that the pact is valid even against the absent. And I recall that, before the form given by the deified Marcus, the deified Pius had rescripted that the Fisc too, in those cases in which it does not have hypothecs, and the other privileged parties, ought to follow the example of the creditors.

haec enim omnia in his creditoribus, qui hypothecas non habent, conservanda sunt.

for all these things are to be preserved in the case of those creditors who do not have hypothecs.

Dig. 2.14.10.1

Digest 2.14.10.1

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 On the Edict.

Si pacto subiecta sit poenae stipulatio, quaeritur, utrum pacti exceptio locum habeat an ex stipulatu actio. sabinus putat, quod est verius, utraque via uti posse prout elegerit qui stipulatus est: si tamen ex causa pacti exceptione utatur, aequum erit accepto eum stipulationem ferre.

If a stipulation for a penalty is made subject to a pact, the question is whether the exception of the pact has place or the action ex stipulatu. sabinus thinks, which is truer, that either route can be used, as the stipulator chooses; however, if he uses the exception by reason of the pact, it will be fair that he enter the stipulation as accepted.

Dig. 2.14.10.2

Digest 2.14.10.2

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Plerumque solemus dicere doli exceptionem subsidium esse pacti exceptionis: quosdam denique, qui exceptione pacti uti non possunt, doli exceptione usuros et iulianus scribit et alii plerique consentiunt. ut puta si procurator meus paciscatur, exceptio doli mihi proderit, ut trebatio videtur, qui putat, sicuti pactum procuratoris mihi nocet, ita et prodesse,

We generally are wont to say that the exception of fraud is a subsidiary aid of the exception of pact: indeed, both Julian writes and most others agree that certain persons who cannot make use of the exception of pact will make use of the exception of fraud. For instance, if my procurator were to conclude a pact, the exception of fraud will be of use to me, as it seems to Trebatius, who thinks that, just as the procurator’s pact harms me, so also it profits,

Dig. 2.14.11

Digest 2.14.11

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, 3 on the edict.

Quia et solvi ei potest.

Because it can also be paid to him.

Dig. 2.14.12

Digest 2.14.12

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Nam et nocere constat, sive ei mandavi ut pacisceretur, sive omnium rerum mearum procurator fuit: ut et puteolanus libro primo adsessoriorum scribit: cum placuit eum etiam rem in iudicium deducere.

For it is likewise settled that it has prejudicial effect, whether I gave him a mandate to make a pact, or he was the procurator of all my affairs; as Puteolanus also writes in the first book of his Assessorials: since it has been decided that he too may bring the matter into judgment.

Dig. 2.14.13pr.

Digest 2.14.13pr.

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Sed si tantum ad actionem procurator factus sit, conventio facta domino non nocet, quia nec solvi ei possit.

But if the procurator has been appointed only for the action, a convention made with the principal does not harm, because payment cannot be made to him either (i.e., to the procurator).

Dig. 2.14.13.1

Digest 2.14.13.1

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the Edict.

Sed si in rem suam datus sit procurator, loco domini habetur: et ideo servandum erit pactum conventum.

But if a procurator has been appointed for his own account, he is held in the place of the owner; and therefore the agreed pact will have to be observed.

Dig. 2.14.14

Digest 2.14.14

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the edict.

Item magistri societatium pactum et prodesse et obesse constat.

Likewise, it is established that the pact of the master of partnerships both benefits and prejudices.

Dig. 2.14.15

Digest 2.14.15

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Tutoris quoque, ut scribit iulianus, pactum pupillo prodest.

The tutor’s pact also, as iulianus writes, benefits the pupil.

Dig. 2.14.16pr.

Digest 2.14.16, beginning.

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 4 on the edict.

Si cum emptore hereditatis pactum sit factum et venditor hereditatis petat, doli exceptio nocet. nam ex quo rescriptum est a divo pio utiles actiones emptori hereditatis dandas, merito adversus venditorem hereditatis exceptione doli debitor hereditarius uti potest.

If a pact has been made with the purchaser of an inheritance and the seller of the inheritance sues, the exceptio of fraud avails. For since it has been rescripted by the deified Pius that utile actions are to be granted to the purchaser of an inheritance, rightly the hereditary debtor can employ the exceptio of fraud against the seller of the inheritance.

Dig. 2.14.16.1

Digest 2.14.16.1

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Sed et si inter dominum rei venditae et emptorem convenisset, ut homo qui emptus erat redderetur, ei qui pro domino rem vendidit petenti pretium doli exceptio nocebit.

But also, if it had been agreed between the owner of the thing sold and the purchaser that the slave who had been bought be returned, the exception of fraud will prejudice him who, on behalf of the owner, sold the thing and is demanding the price.

Dig. 2.14.17pr.

Digest 2.14.17 pr.

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Si tibi decem dem et paciscar, ut viginti mihi debeantur, non nascitur obligatio ultra decem: re enim non potest obligatio contrahi, nisi quatenus datum sit.

If I give you ten and make a pact that twenty be owed to me, no obligation arises beyond ten: for by the thing (i.e., by delivery) an obligation cannot be contracted except insofar as it has been given.

Dig. 2.14.17.1

Digest 2.14.17.1

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 On the Edict.

Quaedam actiones per pactum ipso iure tolluntur: ut iniuriarum, item furti.

Certain actions are, by pact, extinguished by operation of law: such as for insults, and likewise for theft.

Dig. 2.14.17.2

Digest 2.14.17.2

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paul, Book 3 on the Edict.

De pignore iure honorario nascitur ex pacto actio: tollitur autem per exceptionem, quotiens paciscor ne petam.

On pledge, by the honorary law an action is born from a pact; but it is taken away by an exception, whenever I make a pact not to sue.

Dig. 2.14.17.3

Digest 2.14.17.3

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the Edict.

Si quis paciscatur, ne a se petatur, sed ut ab herede petatur, heredi exceptio non proderit.

If someone makes a pact that a claim is not to be brought against himself, but that it be brought against the heir, the exception will not benefit the heir.

Dig. 2.14.17.4

Digest 2.14.17.4

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the Edict.

Si pactus sim, ne a me neve a titio petatur, non proderit titio, etiamsi heres extiterit, quia ex post facto id confirmari non potest. hoc iulianus scribit in patre, qui pactus erat, ne a se neve a filia peteretur, cum filia patri heres extitisset.

If I have made a pact that suit not be brought from me nor from Titius, it will not benefit Titius, even if he has become heir, because that cannot be confirmed by an ex post facto event. this Julian
writes in the case of a father, who had made a pact that suit not be brought from himself nor from his daughter, when the daughter had become heir to the father.

Dig. 2.14.17.5

Digest 2.14.17.5

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Pactum conventum cum venditore factum si in rem constituatur, secundum plurium sententiam et emptori prodest, et hoc iure nos uti pomponius scribit: secundum sabini autem sententiam etiam si in personam conceptum est, et in emptorem valet: qui hoc esse existimat et si per donationem successio facta sit.

If a pact agreed with the vendor is constituted in rem, then according to the opinion of the majority it also profits the purchaser, and pomponius writes that we make use of this law; but according to the opinion of sabinus, even if it is conceived in personam, it is likewise valid with respect to the purchaser; he considers this to be so even if succession has taken place through a donation.

Dig. 2.14.17.6

Digest 2.14.17.6

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, on the Edict, book 3.

Cum possessor alienae hereditatis pactus est, heredi, si evicerit, neque nocere neque prodesse plerique putant.

When the possessor of another’s inheritance has entered into a pact, most think that, for the heir, if he prevails, it neither harms nor benefits.

Dig. 2.14.17.7

Digest 2.14.17.7

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, On the Edict, 3.

Filius servusve si paciscantur, ne a patre dominove petatur,

If a son or a slave should enter into a pact that it not be demanded from the father or the master,

Dig. 2.14.18

Digest 2.14.18

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 1 on the provincial edict

Sive de eo paciscantur, quod cum ipsis, sive de eo, quod cum patre dominove contractum est,

Whether they conclude a pact concerning that which is with them, or concerning that which has been contracted with the father or the master,

Dig. 2.14.19pr.

Digest 2.14.19pr.

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Adquirent exceptionem. idem est et in his, qui bona fide serviunt.

They will acquire an exception. the same is also in those who serve in good faith.

Dig. 2.14.19.1

Digest 2.14.19.1

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the edict.

Item si filius familias pactus fuerit ne a se petatur, proderit ei, et patri quoque, si de peculio conveniatur.

Likewise, if a son of the household has entered into a pact that no claim be sought from him, it will profit him, and the father as well, if he is sued with respect to the peculium.

Dig. 2.14.20

Digest 2.14.20

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, Book 1 on the Provincial Edict

Vel de in rem verso, vel si quasi defensor filii, si hoc maluerit conveniatur,

Either on the ground of in rem versum, or, if he prefers this, let him be convened as if the son's defender,

Dig. 2.14.21pr.

Digest 2.14.21pr.

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the Edict.

Et heredi patris vivo filio: post mortem vero filii nec patri nec heredi eius, quia personale pactum est.

And to the father’s heir, while the son is alive; but after the son’s death, neither to the father nor to his heir, because it is a personal pact.

Dig. 2.14.21.1

Digest 2.14.21.1

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, On the Edict, 3.

Quod si servus, ne a se peteretur, pactus fuerit, nihil valebit pactum: de doli exceptione videamus. et si in rem paciscatur, proderit domino et heredi eius pacti conventi exceptio: quod si in personam pactum conceptum est, tunc domino doli superest exceptio.

But if a slave, so that it might not be demanded from himself, has made a pact, the pact will be of no force: let us consider the exception of fraud. And if he bargains in rem, the exception of the concluded pact will benefit the master and his heir; but if the pact is framed in personam, then for the master there remains the exception of fraud.

Dig. 2.14.21.2

Digest 2.14.21.2

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, 3 on the Edict.

Nos autem his, qui in nostra potestate sunt, paciscendo prodesse non possumus: sed nobis id profuturum, si nomine eorum conveniamur, proculus ait: quod ita recte dicitur, si in paciscendo id actum sit. ceterum si paciscar, ne a titio petas, deinde actionem adversus me nomine eius instituas, non est danda pacti conventi exceptio: nam quod ipsi inutile est, nec defensori competit. iulianus quoque scribit, si pater pactus sit, ne a se neve a filio petatur, magis est ut pacti exceptio filio familias danda non sit, sed doli prosit.

We, however, cannot by entering into a pact benefit those who are in our power; but Proculus says that this will be of advantage to us, if we are convened in their name, which is rightly said thus, if this was transacted in the making of the pact. However, if I make a pact that you not seek from Titius, and then you institute an action against me in his name, the exception of a pact concluded is not to be granted: for what is useless to him himself likewise does not belong to his defender. Julian also writes that, if a father has made a pact that suit be brought neither against himself nor against his son, it is rather the case that the exception of pact is not to be given to the filius familias, but that the plea of fraud should avail.

Dig. 2.14.21.3

Digest 2.14.21.3

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, On the Edict, book 3.

Filia familias pacisci potest, ne de dote agat, cum sui iuris esse coeperit.

A daughter of the household can stipulate, not to bring an action concerning the dowry, when she has begun to be sui juris.

Dig. 2.14.21.4

Digest 2.14.21.4

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Item filius familias de eo, quod sub condicione legatum est, recte paciscetur.

Likewise, a son under paternal power will lawfully make a pact concerning that which has been bequeathed under a condition.

Dig. 2.14.21.5

Digest 2.14.21.5

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, book 3, on the edict.

In his, qui eiusdem pecuniae exactionem habent in solidum, vel qui eiusdem pecuniae debitores sunt, quatenus alii quoque prosit vel noceat pacti exceptio, quaeritur. et in rem pacta omnibus prosunt, quorum obligationem dissolutam esse eius qui paciscebatur interfuit. itaque debitoris conventio fideiussoribus proficiet,

In the case of those who have the exaction of the same money in solidum, or who are debtors of the same money, it is asked to what extent the exception of the pact may also benefit or harm others. And pacts in rem benefit all those to whom it was of concern that the obligation of him who was making the pact be dissolved. And so the debtor’s agreement will benefit the sureties,

Dig. 2.14.22

Digest 2.14.22

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 4 on the Edict.

Nisi hoc actum est, ut dumtaxat a reo non petatur, a fideiussore petatur: tunc enim fideiussor exceptione non utetur.

Unless this was agreed, that it be demanded not from the defendant but only from the surety: for then the surety will not use the exception.

Dig. 2.14.23pr.

Digest 2.14.23pr.

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the edict.

Fideiussoris autem conventio nihil proderit reo, quia nihil eius interest a debitore pecuniam non peti. immo nec confideiussoribus proderit.

But the guarantor’s agreement will profit the defendant nothing, because it is of no concern to him that money not be sought from the debtor. Indeed, nor will it profit the co-guarantors.

Dig. 2.14.23.1

Digest 2.14.23.1

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, 3 On the Edict.

Neque enim quoquo modo cuiusque interest, cum alii conventio facta prodest, sed tunc demum, cum per eum, cui exceptio datur, principaliter ei qui pactus est proficiat: sicut in reo promittendi et his qui pro reo obligati sunt.

Nor indeed is it in just any way anyone’s concern, merely because a convention made is of advantage to another, but then and only then, when through the person to whom the exception is given, it principally profits the one who has made the pact: just as in the promissor and those who are obligated for the debtor.

Dig. 2.14.24

Digest 2.14.24

Paulus 3 ad plaut.

Paulus 3 on Plautius.

Sed si fideiussor in rem suam spopondit, hoc casu fideiussor pro reo accipiendus est et pactum cum eo factum cum reo factum esse videtur.

But if the surety has promised to his own account, in this case the surety is to be taken as in place of the debtor, and a pact made with him is considered to have been made with the debtor.

Dig. 2.14.25pr.

Digest 2.14.25 pr.

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, 3 on the edict.

Idem in duobus reis promittendi et duobus argentariis sociis.

The same [applies] in the case of two co-obligors (promisors) and two bankers who are partners.

Dig. 2.14.25.1

Digest 2.14.25.1

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, 3 on the Edict.

Personale pactum ad alium non pertinere, quemadmodum nec ad heredem, labeo ait.

Labeo says that a personal pact does not pertain to another, just as it does not pertain to an heir.

Dig. 2.14.25.2

Digest 2.14.25.2

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, book 3 on the Edict.

Sed quamvis fideiussoris pactum reo non prosit, plerumque tamen doli exceptionem reo profuturam iulianus scribit,

But although the surety’s pact does not profit the defendant, nevertheless julian writes that, for the most part, the exception of fraud will profit the defendant,

Dig. 2.14.26

Digest 2.14.26

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 4 on the edict.

Videlicet si hoc actum sit, ne a reo quoque petatur. idem et in confideiussoribus est.

Namely, if this has been stipulated, that it not be sought from the principal debtor as well. the same applies also to co-sureties.

Dig. 2.14.27pr.

Digest 2.14.27, beginning.

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Si unus ex argentariis sociis cum debitore pactus sit, an etiam alteri noceat exceptio? neratius atilicinus proculus, nec si in rem pactus sit, alteri nocere: tantum enim constitutum, ut solidum alter petere possit. idem labeo: nam nec novare alium posse, quamvis ei recte solvatur: sic enim et his, qui in nostra potestate sunt, recte solvi quod crediderint, licet novare non possint.

If one of the argentarii (bankers) partners has made a pact with the debtor, does the exception also harm the other? neratius atilicinus proculus, not even if he has pacted in rem, [say that it does] harm the other; for only this has been constituted, that the other may demand the solidum (the whole). the same labeo: for neither can one novate another, although payment is rightly made to him; thus also for those who are in our power, what they have credited is rightly paid, although they cannot novate.

quod est verum. idemque in duobus reis stipulandi dicendum est.

which is true. And the same must be said in the case of two joint stipulators.

Dig. 2.14.27.1

Digest 2.14.27.1

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, 3 on the Edict.

Si cum reo ad certum tempus pactio facta sit, ultra neque reo neque fideiussori prodest. quod si sine persona sua reus pepigerit, ne a fideiussore petatur, nihil id prodesse fideiussori quidam putant, quamquam id rei intersit: quia ea demum competere ei debeat exceptio, quae et reo. ego didici prodesse fideiussori exceptionem: non sic enim illi per liberam personam adquiri, quam ipsi, qui pactus sit, consuli videmur: quo iure utimur.

If a pact with the defendant has been made for a fixed time, beyond that neither the defendant nor the surety is benefited. But if the defendant has bargained, without reference to his own person, that suit not be brought against the surety, some think that this benefits the surety not at all, although it concerns the defendant’s interest: because only that exception ought to be available to him which is also available to the defendant. I have learned that the exception does benefit the surety: for we do not seem in this way to be acquiring it for him through an independent person, but to be consulting the very one who made the pact: and this is the law we use.

Dig. 2.14.27.2

Digest 2.14.27.2

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Pactus, ne peteret, postea convenit ut peteret: prius pactum per posterius elidetur, non quidem ipso iure, sicut tollitur stipulatio per stipulationem, si hoc actum est, quia in stipulationibus ius continetur, in pactis factum versatur: et ideo replicatione exceptio elidetur. eadem ratione contingit, ne fideiussoribus prius pactum prosit. sed si pactum conventum tale fuit, quod actionem quoque tolleret, velut iniuriarum, non poterit, postea paciscendo ut agere possit, agere: quia et prima actio sublata est et posterius pactum ad actionem parandam inefficax est: non enim ex pacto iniuriarum actio nascitur, sed ex contumelia.

Having made a pact that he should not sue, it was later agreed that he should sue: the prior pact will be struck out by the later, not indeed by the law itself, as a stipulation is removed by a stipulation, if this was transacted, because in stipulations law is contained, in pacts the matter turns upon fact: and therefore by a replication the exception will be struck out. By the same reasoning it happens that the prior pact does not benefit the sureties. But if the pactum conventum was such as also to take away the action, for example the action for injuries, he will not be able, by later making a pact that he may bring suit, to bring suit: because both the first action has been removed and the later pact is ineffectual for procuring an action: for the action for injuries is not born from a pact, but from contumely.

idem dicemus et in bonae fidei contractibus, si pactum conventum totam obligationem sustulerit, veluti empti: non enim ex novo pacto prior obligatio resuscitatur, sed proficiet pactum ad novum contractum. quod si non ut totum contractum tolleret, pactum conventum intercessit, sed ut imminueret, posterius pactum potest renovare primum contractum. quod et in specie dotis actionis procedere potest.

we will say the same also in good‑faith contracts, if an agreed pact has removed the whole obligation, for instance in the contract of sale (empti): for the prior obligation is not resuscitated by a new pact, but the pact will profit toward a new contract. but if an agreed pact intervened not so as to take away the whole contract, but to diminish it, a later pact can renew the first contract. and this can also proceed in the specific case of the action for dowry.

puta pactam mulierem, ut praesenti die dos redderetur, deinde pacisci, ut tempore ei legibus dato dos reddatur: incipiet dos redire ad ius suum. nec dicendum est deteriorem condicionem dotis fieri per pactum: quotiens enim ad ius, quod lex naturae eius tribuit, de dote actio redit, non fit causa dotis deterior, sed formae suae redditur. haec et scaevolae nostro placuerunt.

suppose a woman has made a pact that the dowry be returned on the present day, and then to make a pact that the dowry be returned at the time given to her by the laws: the dowry will begin to return to its own right. Nor must it be said that the condition of the dowry becomes worse through a pact: for whenever the action concerning the dowry returns to the right which the law of its nature bestows upon it, the case of the dowry does not become worse, but is restored to its own form. These views too pleased our Scaevola.

Dig. 2.14.27.3

Digest 2.14.27.3

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Illud nulla pactione effici potest, ne dolus praestetur: quamvis si quis paciscatur ne depositi agat, vi ipsa id pactus videatur, ne de dolo agat: quod pactum proderit.

That cannot be effected by any pact, that liability for fraud be excluded; although if someone stipulates not to bring the action of deposit, by that very force he seems to have stipulated not to sue on account of fraud: which pact will avail.

Dig. 2.14.27.4

Digest 2.14.27.4

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the edict

Pacta, quae turpem causam continent, non sunt observanda: veluti si paciscar ne furti agam vel iniuriarum, si feceris: expedit enim timere furti vel iniuriarum poenam: sed post admissa haec pacisci possumus. item ne experiar interdicto unde vi, quatenus publicam causam contingit, pacisci non possumus. et in summa, si pactum conventum a re privata remotum sit, non est servandum: ante omnia enim animadvertendum est, ne conventio in alia re facta aut cum alia persona in alia re aliave persona noceat.

Pacts that contain a base cause are not to be observed: for example, if I make a pact that I will not bring an action of theft or of injuries, should you commit it; for it is expedient to fear the penalty of theft or of injuries: but after these have been committed we can make a pact. Likewise, that I not proceed by the interdict “unde vi,” insofar as it touches a public cause,
we cannot make a pact. And in sum, if the pact agreed upon is removed from a private matter, it is not to be kept: for before all it must be observed
that a convention made in another matter or with another person not be harmful in another matter or to another person.

Dig. 2.14.27.5

Digest 2.14.27.5

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paul, Book 3, On the Edict.

Si cum decem mihi deberes, pepigero, ne a te viginti petam: in decem prodesse tibi pacti conventi vel doli exceptionem placet. item si cum viginti deberes, pepigerim, ne decem petam: efficeretur per exceptionem mihi opponendam, ut tantum reliqua decem exigere debeam.

If, when you owed me ten, I have bargained that I not demand twenty from you: as to the ten, it is held that the exception of pactum conventum or of dolus benefits you. likewise, if, when you owed twenty, I have bargained that I not demand ten: it would be brought about, through an exception to be set up against me, that I should be bound to exact only the remaining ten.

Dig. 2.14.27.6

Digest 2.14.27.6

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Sed si stipulatus decem aut stichum de decem pactus sim et petam stichum aut decem: exceptionem pacti conventi in totum obstaturam: nam ut solutione et petitione et acceptilatione unius rei tota obligatio solveretur, ita pacto quoque convento de una re non petenda interposito totam obligationem summoveri. sed si id actum inter nos sit, ne decem mihi, sed stichus praestetur: possum efficaciter de sticho agere, nulla exceptione opponenda. idem est et si de sticho non petendo convenerit.

But if I have stipulated for ten or for Stichus, or if I have made a pact about ten, and I seek Stichus or ten: the exception of a pactum conventum will bar the matter in its entirety; for just as by payment, by demand, and by acceptilation of one item the whole obligation is discharged, so also, with an agreed pact interposed not to sue for one item, the whole obligation is removed. But if it has been transacted between us that not ten be rendered to me, but Stichus be furnished: I can effectively bring an action for Stichus, no exception being able to be set up. The same holds also if it has been agreed not to sue for Stichus.

Dig. 2.14.27.7

Digest 2.14.27.7

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Sed si generaliter mihi hominem debeas et paciscar, ne stichum petam: stichum quidem petendo pacti exceptio mihi opponetur, alium autem hominem si petam, recte agam.

But if you owe me a slave in general and I make a pact that I will not claim Stichus: by claiming Stichus indeed the exception of the pact will be opposed to me, but if I claim another slave, I shall proceed rightly.

Dig. 2.14.27.8

Digest 2.14.27.8

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the Edict.

Item si pactus, ne hereditatem peterem, singulas res ut heres petam: ex eo, quod pactum erit, pacti conventi exceptio aptanda erit, quemadmodum si convenerit ne fundum peterem et usum fructum petam, aut ne navem aedificiumve peterem et dissolutis his singulas res petam: nisi specialiter aliud actum est.

Likewise, if I have pacted that I not seek the inheritance, and yet, as heir, I seek individual things: from that which has been pacted, the exception of the pact concluded must be applied, just as if it has been agreed that I not seek the estate and I seek the usufruct, or that I not seek the ship or the building and, these having been dismantled, I seek individual things: unless something else has been specially transacted.

Dig. 2.14.27.9

Digest 2.14.27.9

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paul, 3 on the Edict.

Si acceptilatio inutilis fuit, tacita pactione id actum videtur, ne peteretur.

If the acceptilation was ineffective, it is deemed that, by a tacit pact, it was arranged that it not be demanded.

Dig. 2.14.27.10

Digest 2.14.27.10

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 3 on the Edict.

Servus hereditarius heredi post adituro nominatim pacisci non potest, quia nondum is dominus sit: sed si in rem pactum conventum factum sit, heredi adquiri potest.

A hereditary slave cannot expressly bargain by name with an heir who is going to enter upon the inheritance later, because he is not yet his master; but if an in rem pact and convention has been made, it can be acquired for the heir.

Dig. 2.14.28pr.

Digest 2.14.28pr.

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, Book 1, on the provincial edict

Contra iuris civilis regulas pacta conventa rata non habentur: veluti si pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate pactus sit ne a debitore suo peteret, aut ne intra certum tempus veluti quinquennium peteret: nam nec solvi ei sine tutoris auctoritate potest. ex diverso autem si pupillus paciscatur, ne quod debeat a se peteretur, ratum habetur pactum conventum: quia meliorem condicionem suam facere ei etiam sine tutoris auctoritate concessum est.

Contrary to the rules of civil law, concluded pacts are not held to be ratified: for instance, if a ward, without the authority of his tutor, has bargained that he would not sue his debtor, or
that he would not sue within a fixed time, for instance five years: for neither can payment be made to him without the authority of his tutor. Conversely, however, if a ward makes a pact,
that nothing which he owes be demanded from himself, the concluded pact is held to be ratified: because it is granted to him, even without the tutor’s authority,
to make his condition better.

Dig. 2.14.28.1

Digest 2.14.28.1

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 1 on the provincial edict

Si curator furiosi aut prodigi pactus sit, ne a furioso aut prodigo peteretur, longe utile est curatoris recipi pactiones: sed non contra.

If the curator of a madman or of a spendthrift has stipulated that suit not be brought against the madman or the spendthrift, it is by far useful that the curator’s pactions be received; but not conversely.

Dig. 2.14.28.2

Digest 2.14.28.2

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, book 1, on the Provincial Edict.

Si filius aut servus pactus sit, ne ipse peteret, inutile est pactum. si vero in rem pacti sunt, id est ne ea pecunia peteretur, ita pactio eorum rata habenda erit adversus patrem dominumve, si liberam peculii administrationem habeant et ea res, de qua pacti sint, peculiaris sit. quod et ipsum non est expeditum: nam cum verum est, quod iuliano placet, etiamsi maxime quis administrationem peculii habeat concessam, donandi ius eum non habere: sequitur ut, si donandi causa de non petenda pecunia pactus sit, non debeat ratum haberi pactum conventum.

If a son or a slave has made a pact that he himself would not bring suit, the pact is ineffectual. But if they have contracted in rem, that is, that that money be not sought, thus their agreement is to be held ratified against the father or the master, if they have free administration of the peculium and the matter about which they have agreed is of the peculium. Which even itself is not clear: for since it is true, as pleases Julian, that even if one has in the highest degree the administration of the peculium conceded, he does not have the right of donating, it follows that, if for the sake of donating he has made a pact about not seeking the money, the pact and agreement ought not to be held ratified.

quod si pro eo ut ita pacisceretur aliquid, in quo non minus vel etiam amplius esset, consecutus fuerit, rata habenda est pactio.

but if, in consideration that he should so make the pact, he has obtained something in which there is no less, or even more, the pact is to be held valid.

Dig. 2.14.29

Digest 2.14.29

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, 4 on the Edict.

Sin autem dominicam pecuniam crediderit, quod credendi tempore pactus est valere celsus ait.

But if, however, he has lent the master’s money, Celsus says that what he stipulated at the time of the lending is to be valid.

Dig. 2.14.30pr.

Digest 2.14.30pr.

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 1 on the Provincial Edict.

In persona tamen filii familias videndum est, ne aliquando, et si pactus sit ne ageret, valeat pactio: quia ^ puis^ aliquando filius familias habet actionem, veluti iniuriarum. sed cum propter iniuriam filio factam habeat et pater actionem, quin pactio filii nocitura non sit patri agere volenti, dubitari non oportet.

In the case of a filius familias, however, it must be considered whether sometimes, even if he has agreed not to bring an action, the pact is valid: because ^ puis^ sometimes a filius familias has an action,
for example for injuries. But since, on account of an injury done to the son, the father also has an action, there should be no doubt that the son’s pact will not be harmful to a father who wishes to sue,
to bring an action.

Dig. 2.14.30.1

Digest 2.14.30.1

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, Book 1 on the Provincial Edict

Qui pecuniam a servo stipulatus est, quam sibi titius debebat, si a titio petat, an exceptione pacti conventi summoveri et possit et debeat, quia pactus videatur, ne a titio petat, quaesitum est. iulianus ita summovendum putat, si stipulatori in dominum istius servi de peculio actio danda est, id est si iustam causam intercedendi servus habuit, quia forte tantandem pecuniam titio debuit: quod si quasi fideiussor intervenit, ex qua causa in peculium actio non daretur, non esse inhibendum creditorem, quo minus a titio petat: aeque nullo modo prohiberi eum debere, si eum servum liberum esse credidisset.

He who stipulated money from a slave, which Titius owed to him, if he seeks it from Titius, the question has been raised whether he both can and ought to be removed by the exception of pactum conventum, because he appears to have bargained not to seek it from Titius. Julianus thinks he should be so removed, if an actio de peculio is to be given to the stipulator against the master of that slave, that is, if the slave had a just cause for interceding, because perhaps he owed Titius the same amount of money: but if he intervened as, so to speak, a fideiussor, from which ground an action against the peculium would not be granted, the creditor is not to be inhibited from seeking it from Titius: likewise he ought in no way to be prohibited, if he had believed that that slave was free.

Dig. 2.14.30.2

Digest 2.14.30.2

Gaius 1 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, 1, On the Provincial Edict.

Si sub condicione stipulatus fuerim a te quod titius mihi pure deberet: an deficiente condicione si a titio petam, exceptione pacti conventi et possim et debeam summoveri? et magis est exceptionem non esse opponendam.

If I have stipulated from you under a condition that Titius should owe me purely (unconditionally): upon the condition failing, if I sue Titius, can and should I be removed by the exception of a concluded pact (pactum conventum)? And the better view is that the exception is not to be opposed.

Dig. 2.14.31

Digest 2.14.31

Ulpianus 1 ad ed. aedil. curul.

Ulpian, Book 1 on the Edict of the Curule Aediles.

Pacisci contra edictum aedilium omnimodo licet, sive in ipso negotio venditionis gerendo convenisset sive postea.

To make a pact contrary to the edict of the aediles is in every way permitted, whether it was agreed upon in the very business of conducting the sale or afterwards.

Dig. 2.14.32

Digest 2.14.32

Paulus 3 ad plaut.

Paul, Book 3 on Plautius.

Quod dictum est, si cum reo pactum sit, ut non petatur, fideiussori quoque competere exceptionem: propter rei personam placuit, ne mandati iudicio conveniatur. igitur si mandati actio nulla sit, forte si donandi animo fideiusserit, dicendum est non prodesse exceptionem fideiussori.

What has been said—that if a pact has been made with the defendant that it not be demanded, the exception is available to the surety as well—has been approved on account of the person of the principal debtor, so that he not be sued by an action of mandate.
Therefore, if there is no action of mandate, for instance if he became surety with the intention of making a gift, it must be said that the exception does not benefit the surety.

Dig. 2.14.33

Digest 2.14.33

Celsus 1 Dig.

Celsus, Digest 1.

Avus neptis nomine, quam ex filio habebat, dotem promisit et pactus est, ne a se neve a filio suo dos peteretur. si a coherede filii dos petatur, ipse quidem exceptione conventionis tuendus non erit, filius vero exceptione conventionis recte utetur. quippe heredi consuli concessum est nec quicquam obstat uni tantum ex heredibus providere si heres factus sit, ceteris autem non consuli.

Grandfather, in the name of a granddaughter whom he had from his son, promised a dowry and stipulated that the dowry not be sought from himself nor from his son. If the dowry is sought by a co-heir of the son, he himself indeed will not be protected by the exception of the convention, but the son will rightly make use of the exception of the convention. For it has been conceded to provide for the heir, and nothing stands in the way of providing for only one among the heirs, if he has become heir, but not of providing for the others.

Dig. 2.14.34

Digest 2.14.34

Modestinus 5 reg.

Modestinus 5 Rules.

Ius adgnationis non posse pacto repudiari, non magis quam ut quis dicat nolle suum esse, iuliani sententia est.

It is Julian’s opinion that the right of agnation cannot be repudiated by a pact, any more than someone could declare that he does not wish to have a suus-heir.

Dig. 2.14.35

Digest 2.14.35

Modestinus 2 resp.

Modestinus, Responses 2.

Tres fratres titius et maevius et seia communem hereditatem inter se diviserunt instrumentis interpositis, quibus divisisse maternam hereditatem dixerunt nihilque sibi commune remansisse caverunt. sed postea duo de fratribus, id est maevius et seia, qui absentes erant tempore mortis matris suae, cognoverunt pecuniam auream a fratre suo esse substractam, cuius nulla mentio instrumento divisionis continebatur. quaero an post pactum divisionis de subrepta pecunia fratribus adversus fratrem competit actio.

Three siblings, titius and maevius and seia, divided the common inheritance among themselves, instruments having been interposed, in which they declared that they had divided the maternal inheritance and stipulated that nothing remained in common to themselves. But afterward two of the siblings, that is, maevius and seia, who had been absent at the time of their mother’s death, learned that gold money had been withdrawn by their brother, of which no mention was contained in the instrument of division. I ask whether, after the pact of division, an action lies for the siblings against the brother concerning the subrepted money.

modestinus respondit, si agentibus ob portionem eius, quod subreptum a titio dicitur, generalis pacti conventi exceptio his, qui fraudem a titio commissam ignorantes transegerunt, obiciatur, de dolo utiliter replicari posse.

Modestinus answered that, if, to persons bringing an action for the portion of that which is said to have been surreptitiously taken by Titius, the exception of a general pactum conventum is raised against them—these being persons who, ignorant of the fraud committed by Titius, had entered into a settlement—a replication based on dolus can be usefully made.

Dig. 2.14.36

Digest 2.14.36

Proculus 5 epist.

Proculus, Epistles 5.

Si cum fundum meum possides, convenisset mihi tecum, ut eius possessionem attio traderes: vindicantem eum fundum a te non aliter me conventionis exceptione excludi debere, quam si aut iam tradidisses, aut si tua causa id inter nos convenisset et per te non staret quo minus traderes.

If, while you are in possession of my farm, it had been agreed between me and you that you would hand over its possession: I, when vindicating that farm from you, ought not to be excluded by the exception of the agreement otherwise than if either you had already delivered, or if that had been agreed between us for your sake and it was not through you that delivery failed to be made.

Dig. 2.14.37

Digest 2.14.37

Papirius 2 de const.

Papirius 2 on constitutions.

Imperatores antoninus et verus rescripserunt debitori rei publicae a curatore permitti pecunias non posse et, cum philippensibus remissae essent, revocandas.

The emperors Antoninus and Verus issued a rescript that moneys cannot be permitted by a curator to a debtor of the commonwealth, and that, when they had been remitted to the Philippenses, they are to be recalled.

Dig. 2.14.38

Digest 2.14.38

Papinianus 2 quaest.

Papinian, Questions 2.

Ius publicum privatorum pactis mutari non potest.

Public law cannot be changed by the pacts of private persons.

Dig. 2.14.39

Digest 2.14.39

Papinianus 5 quaest.

Papinian, Questions 5.

Veteribus placet pactionem obscuram vel ambiguam venditori et qui locavit nocere, in quorum fuit potestate legem apertius conscribere.

It pleases the Ancients that an obscure or ambiguous pact harms the vendor and the lessor, in whose power it was to draft the clause more openly.

Dig. 2.14.40pr.

Digest 2.14.40, preface.

Papinianus 1 resp.

Papinian, Responses 1.

Tale pactum "profiteor te non teneri" non in personam dirigitur, sed cum generale sit, locum inter heredes quoque litigantes habebit.

Such a pact, "I declare you not to be bound," is not directed in personam, but since it is general, it will also have effect among heirs who are litigating.

Dig. 2.14.40.1

Digest 2.14.40.1

Papinianus 1 resp.

Papinian, Responses, book 1.

Qui provocavit, pactus est intra diem certum pecunia, qua transegerat, non soluta iudicatis se satisfacturum: iudex appellationis nullo alio de principali causa discusso iustam conventionem velut confessi sequetur.

He who has appealed, having stipulated that, if within a fixed day the money by which he had transacted a settlement were not paid, he would satisfy the judgment‑creditors: the judge of the appeal, with no other matter of the
principal cause discussed, will follow the just convention as though [he were] confessed.

Dig. 2.14.40.2

Digest 2.14.40.2

Papinianus 1 resp.

Papinianus, Responses 1.

Post divisionem bonorum et aeris alieni singuli creditores a singulis heredibus non interpositis delegationibus in solidum, ut convenerat, usuras acceptaverunt: actiones, quas adversus omnes pro partibus habent, impediendae non erunt, si non singuli pro fide rei gestae totum debitum singulis offerant.

After the division of the goods and of the debt, each creditor, from each heir, with no delegations interposed, accepted interest for the whole, as had been agreed:
the actions which they have against all for their shares are not to be impeded, if each does not, in the good faith of the transaction, offer the entire debt to each.

Dig. 2.14.40.3

Digest 2.14.40.3

Papinianus 1 resp.

Papinian, Responses, 1.

Pater, qui dotem promisit, pactus est, ut post mortem suam in matrimonio sine liberis defuncta filia portio dotis apud heredem suum fratrem remaneret. ea conventio liberis a socero postea susceptis et heredibus testamento relictis per exceptionem doli proderit, cum inter contrahentes id actum sit, ut heredibus consulatur et illo tempore, quo pater alios filios non habuit, in fratrem suum iudicium supremum contulisse videatur.

A father, who promised a dowry, stipulated that, after his death, if his daughter should die in marriage without children, a portion of the dowry should remain with his heir, her brother.
This convention will profit, by the exceptio doli, against children later begotten by the father-in-law and heirs left by testament, since between the contracting parties it was transacted that the heirs be consulted, and at that time, when the father had no other sons, he appears to have conferred the supreme judgment upon his brother.

Dig. 2.14.41

Digest 2.14.41

Papinianus 11 resp.

Papinian, Responses, 11.

"intra illum diem debiti partem mihi si solveris, acceptum tibi residuum feram et te liberabo." licet actionem non habet, pacti tamen exceptionem competere debitori constitit.

"within that day, if you pay me a part of the debt, I will carry the remainder as accepted to your credit and will release you." Although he has no action, nevertheless it is settled that an exception of pact lies for the debtor.

Dig. 2.14.42

Digest 2.14.42

Papinianus 17 resp.

Papinian, Responses, 17.

Inter debitorem et creditorem convenerat, ut creditor onus tributi praedii pignerati non adgnosceret, sed eius solvendi necessitas debitorem spectaret. talem conventionem quantum ad fisci rationem non esse servandam respondi: pactis etenim privatorum formam iuris fiscalis convelli non placuit.

Between the debtor and the creditor it had been agreed that the creditor should not acknowledge the burden of the tax of the pledged estate, but that the necessity of paying it should pertain to the debtor. I replied that such an agreement, so far as the fisc’s reckoning is concerned, is not to be observed: for by the pacts of private persons it has not been approved that the form of fiscal law be shaken.

Dig. 2.14.43

Digest 2.14.43

Paulus 5 quaest.

Paulus, Questions 5.

In emptionibus scimus, quid praestare debitor debeat quidque ex contrario emptor: quod si in contrahendo aliquid exceptum fuerit, id servari debebit.

In purchases we know what the debtor ought to render, and conversely what the buyer [ought]; but if, in contracting, anything has been excepted, that must be observed.

Dig. 2.14.44

Digest 2.14.44

Scaevola 5 resp.

Scaevola, Responses 5.

Cum in eo esset pupillus, ut ab hereditate patris abstineretur, tutor cum plerisque creditoribus decidit, ut certam portionem acciperent: idem curatores cum aliis fecerunt. quaero, an et tutor idemque creditor patris eandem portionem retinere debeat. respondi eum tutorem, qui ceteros ad portionem vocaret, eadem parte contentum esse debere.

When the ward was in such a position that he should abstain from his father's inheritance, the tutor settled with most of the creditors that they should receive a fixed portion: the same the curators did with the others. I ask whether also the tutor, who is likewise a creditor of the father, ought to retain the same portion. I answered that that tutor, who called the others to a portion, ought to be content with the same share.

Dig. 2.14.45

Digest 2.14.45

Hermogenianus 2 iuris epit.

Hermogenianus, book 2 of the Epitome of Law.

Divisionis placitum nisi traditione vel stipulatione sumat effectum, ad actionem, ut nudum pactum, nulli prodesse poterit.

Unless an agreement of division takes effect by delivery or by stipulation, it will, for purposes of an action, be of use to no one, like a nude pact.

Dig. 2.14.46

Digest 2.14.46

Tryphonus 2 disp.

Tryphonus, Disputations 2.

Pactum inter heredem et legatarium factum, ne ab eo satis accipiatur, cum in semestribus relata est constitutio divi marci servari in hoc quoque defuncti voluntatem, validum esse constat. nec a legatario remissa heredi satisdatio per pactionem ex paenitentia revocari debet, cum liceat sui iuris persecutionem aut spem futurae perceptionis deteriorem constituere.

An agreement made between an heir and a legatee, that no security be taken from him, since in the Semestria it has been recorded that the constitution of the deified Marcus is to be observed—namely, that in this matter as well the will of the deceased be observed—is understood to be valid.
Nor should the security remitted by the legatee to the heir be revoked by pact out of repentance, since
it is permitted to make the prosecution of one’s own right, or the hope of future receipt, worse.

Dig. 2.14.47pr.

Digest 2.14.47, beginning.

Scaevola 1 Dig.

Scaevola, Digest 1.

Emptor praedii viginti caverat se soluturum et stipulanti spoponderat: postea venditor cavit sibi convenisse, ut contentus esset tredecim et ut ea intra praefinita tempora acciperet: debitor ad eorum solutionem conventus pactus est, si ea soluta intra praefinitum tempus non essent, ut ex prima cautione ab eo petitio esset. quaesitum est an, cum posteriore pacto satisfactum non sit, omne debitum ex prima cautione peti potest. respondi secundum ea, quae proponerentur, posse.

The purchaser of the estate had given security that he would pay twenty and had promised to the stipulator: thereafter the seller gave security that it had been agreed with him that he would be content with thirteen and
that he would receive them within pre-fixed times: the debtor, when sued for the payment of these, made a pact that, if these were not paid within the pre-fixed time, there should be a claim against him under the first security. It was asked whether, since satisfaction was not rendered to the later pact, the whole debt can be sought under the first security. I responded that, according to the matters set forth, it can.

Dig. 2.14.47.1

Digest 2.14.47.1

Scaevola 1 Dig.

Scaevola 1 Digest.

Lucius titius gaium seium mensularium, cum quo rationem implicitam habebat propter accepta et data, debitorem sibi constituit et ab eo epistulam accepit in haec verba: "ex ratione mensae, quam mecum habuisti, in hunc diem ex contractibus plurimis remanserunt apud me ad mensam meam trecenta octaginta sex et usurae quae competierint. summam aureorum, quam apud me tacitam habes, refundam tibi. si quod instrumentum a te emissum, id est scriptum, cuiuscumque summae ex quacumque causa apud me remansit, vanum et pro cancellato habebitur." quaesitum est, cum lucius titius ante hoc chirographum seio nummulario mandaverat, uti patrono eius trecenta redderet, an propter illa verba epistulae, quibus omnes cautiones ex quocumque contractu vanae et pro cancellato ut haberentur cautum est, neque ipse neque filii eius eo nomine conveniri possunt.

Lucius Titius constituted Gaius Seius, a money‑changer, with whom he had an entangled account on account of receipts and disbursements, as his debtor, and received from him a letter in these words: "From the account of the counting‑table which you had with me, up to this day from very many contracts there have remained with me at my table 386 and the interest which shall be due. The sum of gold‑pieces which you have with me tacitly I will refund to you. If any instrument issued by you, that is, writing, of whatever sum from whatever cause, has remained with me, it shall be void and regarded as canceled." It was asked, since before this chirograph Lucius Titius had instructed Seius the money‑changer to pay 300 to his patron, whether, by reason of those words of the letter, whereby it was provided that all securities from whatever contract should be void and held as canceled, neither he himself nor his sons can be sued under that head.

respondi, si tantum ratio accepti atque expensi esset computata, ceteras obligationes manere in sua causa.

I answered that, if only the account of receipts and expenditures had been computed, the other obligations remain on their own basis.

Dig. 2.14.48

Digest 2.14.48

Gaius 3 ad l. xii tab.

Gaius 3 on the Law of the 12 Tables.

In traditionibus rerum quodcumque pactum sit, id valere manifestissimum est.

In transfers of things, whatever pact has been made, that is most manifestly valid.

Dig. 2.14.49

Digest 2.14.49

Ulpianus 36 ad sab.

Ulpian 36 on Sabinus.

Si quis crediderit pecuniam et pactus sit ut, quatenus facere possit debitor, eatenus agat: an pactum valeat? et magis est hoc pactum valere. nec enim improbum est, si quis hactenus desideret conveniri, quatenus facultates patiuntur.

If someone has lent money and has agreed that, insofar as the debtor is able to perform, to that extent he shall act: does the pact hold? and the better view is that this pact is valid.
For it is not improper if someone should wish to be sued only to this extent, insofar as his resources permit.

Dig. 2.14.50

Digest 2.14.50

Ulpianus 42 ad sab.

Ulpian, 42 on Sabinus.

Non impossibile puto in contractibus depositi, commodati et locati et ceteris similibus hoc pactum: "ne facias furem vel fugitivum servum meum", hoc est: ne sollicites ut fur fiat, ut fugitivus fiat: ne ita neglegas servum, ut fur efficiatur. sicut enim servi corrupti actio locum habet, ita potest etiam haec pactio locum habere, quae ad non corrumpendos servos pertinet.

I do not think it impossible, in the contracts of deposit, commodatum, and locatio and other similar ones, to have this pact: "do not make my slave a thief or a fugitive," that is: do not solicit him so that he become a thief, so that he become a fugitive; do not be so negligent with the slave that he be made a thief. For just as the action for a corrupted slave has its place, so this pact too can have its place, which pertains to not corrupting slaves.

Dig. 2.14.51pr.

Digest 2.14.51pr.

Ulpianus 26 ad ed.

Ulpian, 26 on the Edict.

Si cum te ex causa legati debere pacisci debitori tuo existimas, pactus sit ne ab eo peteres: neque iure ipso liberatur debitor neque petentem summovebit exceptione conventionis, ut celsus libro vicensimo scribit.

If, while you suppose that you owe by reason of a legacy, you make a pact with your debtor, and he has bargained that you not seek from him: neither is the debtor freed by the law itself nor will he remove the petitioner with the exception of agreement, as Celsus writes in Book 20.

Dig. 2.14.51.1

Digest 2.14.51.1

Ulpianus 26 ad ed.

Ulpian, 26 on the edict.

Idem eodem loco scribit, si debitorem tuum iussisti solvere titio, cui legatum falso debere existimas, et debitor pactus sit cum titio suo debitor constituto: neque tibi adversus tuum debitorem neque ipsi adversus suum actionem peremptam.

The same writer in the same place writes: if you have ordered your debtor to pay Titius, whom you suppose to be falsely owed a legacy, and the debtor has made a pact with Titius, with his own debtor having been constituted: the action is not extinguished either for you against your debtor or for him against his own.

Dig. 2.14.52pr.

Digest 2.14.52, beginning.

Ulpianus 1 opin.

Ulpian, Opinions, book 1.

Epistula, qua quis coheredem sibi aliquem esse cavit, petitionem nullam adversus possessores rerum hereditariarum dabit.

A letter, by which someone has secured for himself that another be co‑heir, will furnish no claim against the possessors of the hereditary assets.

Dig. 2.14.52.1

Digest 2.14.52.1

Ulpianus 1 opin.

Ulpian, Opinions 1.

Si inter debitorem et eum, qui fundum pigneratum a creditore quasi debitoris negotium gereret emerit, placuit ut habita compensatione fructuum solutoque, quod reliquum deberetur, fundus debitori restitueretur: etiam heres pacto, quod defunctus fecit, fidem praestare debet.

If, between the debtor and the person who purchased from the creditor the pledged fundus, as though he were conducting the debtor’s business, it was agreed that, account taken of the set-off of the fruits and, upon payment of what remained owed, the fundus should be restored to the debtor, the heir too must honor the pact which the deceased made.

Dig. 2.14.52.2

Digest 2.14.52.2

Ulpianus 1 opin.

Ulpian, Opinions, 1.

Pactum, ut si quas summas propter tributiones praedii pignori nexi factas creditor solvisset, a debitore reciperet, et ut tributa eiusdem praedii debitor penderet, iustum ideoque servandum est.

A pact, that if the creditor had paid any sums on account of the tributes of an estate bound in pledge, he should recover them from the debtor, and that the debtor should pay the tributes of the same estate, is just and therefore to be observed.

Dig. 2.14.52.3

Digest 2.14.52.3

Ulpianus 1 opin.

Ulpian, Opinions, Book 1.

De inofficioso patris testamento acturis, ut eis certa quantitas, quoad viveret heres, praestaretur, pactus est: produci ad perpetuam praestationem id pactum postulabatur: rescriptum est neque iure ullo neque aequitate tale desiderium admitti.

Concerning those about to bring an action on account of an undutiful (inofficious) testament of their father, it was agreed that a fixed amount should be furnished to them so long as the heir lived; it was requested that this pact be extended to perpetual performance: it was rescripted that such a desire is admitted by no law nor by equity.

Dig. 2.14.53

Digest 2.14.53

Ulpianus 4 opin.

Ulpian, Opinions, Book 4.

Sumptus quidem prorogare litiganti honestum est: pacisci autem, ut non quantitas eo nomine expensa cum usuris licitis restituatur, sed pars dimidia eius, quod ex ea lite datum erit, non licet.

It is indeed honorable to advance the expenses to a litigant; but to make a bargain that not the amount expended under that title be restored with lawful interest, but part
a half of that which will be paid out from that suit, is not permitted.

Dig. 2.14.54

Digest 2.14.54

Scaevola not. ad iul. 22 Dig.

Scaevola, notes on Julian, Digest 22.

Si pactus sim, ne stichum, qui mihi debebatur, petam: non intellegitur mora mihi fieri mortuoque sticho puto non teneri reum, qui ante pactum moram non fecerat.

If I have made a pact not to demand Stichus, who was owed to me: it is not considered that delay (mora) is incurred toward me, and, Stichus having died, I think the defendant is not held liable, since he had not caused delay before the pact.

Dig. 2.14.55

Digest 2.14.55

Iulianus 35 Dig.

Julian, Digest 35.

Si debitor sit fructuarius et paciscatur servus, in quo usum fructum habet, ne ab eo petatur: paciscendo meliorem condicionem eius facit. item si creditor esset fructuarius et pactus esset, ne peteret, servus autem fructuarius pacisceretur, ut peteret: beneficio pacti, quod servus interposuisset, utiliter ad petitionem admittetur.

If the debtor is a usufructuary and he makes an agreement with the slave, over whom he has a usufruct, that it not be demanded from him: by making the pact he makes his condition better. likewise
if the creditor were a usufructuary and had agreed not to demand, but the usufructuary’s slave should make an agreement that he should demand: by the benefit of the pact which the slave had interposed, the creditor will be effectively admitted to the action.
interposed, he will be effectively admitted to the petition.

Dig. 2.14.56

Digest 2.14.56

Iulianus 6 ad minic.

Julian, Book 6 on Minicius.

Si convenerit, ne dominus a colono quid peteret, et iusta causa conventionis fuerit: nihilo minus colonus a domino petere potest.

If it has been agreed that the owner should not demand anything from the colonus, and there has been a just cause for the agreement: nonetheless the colonus can demand from the owner.

Dig. 2.14.57pr.

Digest 2.14.57, at the beginning.

Florus 8 inst.

Florus, Institutes 8.

Qui in futurum usuras a debitore acceperat, tacite pactus videtur, ne intra id tempus sortem petat.

He who had received interest for the future from the debtor is deemed to have tacitly stipulated not to demand the principal within that time.

Dig. 2.14.57.1

Digest 2.14.57.1

Florus 8 inst.

Florus, Institutes 8.

Si ex altera parte in rem, ex altera in personam pactum conceptum fuerit, veluti ne ego petam vel ne a te petatur: heres meus ab omnibus vobis petitionem habebit et ab herede tuo omnes petere poterimus.

If on one side the pact has been conceived in rem, on the other in personam, for example, that I not sue or that it not be sued from you: my heir will have a claim against all of you, and from your heir we shall be able to demand everything.

Dig. 2.14.58

Digest 2.14.58

Nerva 3 membr.

Nerva, book 3 of the Membranae.

Ab emptione venditione, locatione conductione ceterisque similibus obligationibus quin integris omnibus consensu eorum, qui inter se obligati sint, recedi possit, dubium non est. aristoni hoc amplius videbatur, si ea, quae me ex empto praestare tibi oporteret, praestitissem et cum tu mihi pretium deberes, convenisset mihi tecum, ut rursus praestitis mihi a te in re vendita omnibus, quae ego tibi praestitissem, pretium mihi non dares tuque mihi ea praestitisses: pretium te debere desinere, quia bonae fidei, ad quam omnia haec rediguntur, interpretatio hanc quoque conventionem admittit. nec quicquam interest, utrum integris omnibus, in quae obligati essemus, conveniret, ut ab eo negotio discederetur, an in integrum restitutis his, quae ego tibi praestitissem, consentiremus, ne quid tu mihi eo nomine praestares.

From purchase and sale, letting and hiring, and other similar obligations, that one can withdraw, all things being intact, by the consent of those who are bound to one another, is not in doubt. To Aristo this further seemed right: if I had performed those things which I ought to render to you under the purchase, and when you would owe me the price, it had been agreed between me and you that, upon all things in the thing sold which I had rendered to you being in turn rendered to me by you, you should not pay me the price and you had rendered those things to me: you cease to owe the price, because the interpretation of good faith, to which all these matters are referred, admits this convention also. Nor does it make any difference whether, with all things intact in which we had been obligated, it were agreed that we should depart from that transaction, or, these things which I had rendered to you having been restored in integrum, we should consent that you render nothing to me under that head.

illud plane conventione, quae pertinet ad resolvendum id quod actum est, perfici non potest, ut tu quod iam ego tibi praestiti contra praestare mihi cogaris: quia eo modo non tam hoc agitur, ut a pristino negotio discedamus, quam ut novae quaedam obligationes inter nos constituantur.

That, plainly, cannot be effected by a convention which pertains to resolving that which has been transacted, namely that you be compelled to perform in return to me what I have already performed to you: because in that way the point is not so much that we depart from the former transaction as that certain new obligations are constituted between us.

Dig. 2.14.59

Digest 2.14.59

Paulus 3 reg.

Paulus, book 3 of the Rules.

Per quos adquiri nobis stipulatione potest, per eosdem etiam pactis conventis meliorem condicionem nostram fieri posse placet.

Through those by whom acquisition can be made to us by stipulation, through those same persons it is held that by pacts and conventions our condition also can be made better.

Dig. 2.14.60

Digest 2.14.60

Papirius 8 const.

Papirius, 8 constitutions.

Imperator antoninus avidio cassio rescrpisit, si creditores parati sint partem ex bonis licet ab extraneo consequi, rationem habendam prius necessariarum personarum, si idoneae sint.

Emperor Antoninus wrote in a rescript to Avidius Cassius that, if the creditors are prepared to obtain a portion out of the goods even from an extraneous person, consideration should first be had for the necessary persons, if they are suitable.

Dig. 2.14.61

Digest 2.14.61

Pomponius 9 ad sab.

Pomponius 9 to Sabinus.

Nemo paciscendo efficere potest, ne sibi locum suum dedicare liceat aut ne sibi in suo sepelire mortuum liceat aut ne vicino invito praedium alienet.

No one can, by making a pact, effect that it not be permitted for him to dedicate his own place, or that it not be permitted for him to bury a corpse on his own, or that he not, the neighbor being unwilling, alienate a holding.

Dig. 2.14.62

Digest 2.14.62

Furius 1 ad ed.

Furius, Book 1, on the edict.

Si reus, postquam pactus sit a se non peti pecuniam ideoque coepit id pactum fideiussori quoque prodesse, pactus sit ut a se peti liceat: an utilitas prioris pacti sublata sit fideiussori, quaesitum est. sed verius est semel adquisitam fideiussori pacti exceptionem ulterius ei invito extorqueri non posse.

If the defendant, after having made a pact that money not be sought from himself and therefore that pact began to benefit the surety as well, then makes a pact that it be permitted to seek it from himself: the question has been raised whether the advantage of the prior pact is taken away from the surety. But the truer view is that the exception of the pact, once acquired by the surety, cannot thereafter be wrested from him against his will.

Dig. 2.15.0. De transactionibus.

Digest 2.15.0. On settlements.

Dig. 2.15.1

Digest 2.15.1

Ulpianus 40 ad ed.

Ulpian, 40 on the Edict

Qui transigit, quasi de re dubia et lite incerta neque finita transigit. qui vero paciscitur, donationis causa rem certam et indubitatam liberalitate remittit.

He who transacts, as if about a doubtful matter and a lawsuit uncertain and not finished, transacts. but he who makes a pact, for the cause of donation, by liberality remits a certain and indubitable thing.

Dig. 2.15.2

Digest 2.15.2

Ulpianus 74 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 74 on the Edict.

Transactum accipere quis potest non solum, si aquiliana stipulatio fuerit subiecta, sed et si pactum conventum fuerit factum.

One can accept a settlement not only if an Aquilian stipulation has been subjoined, but also if a pact agreed upon has been made.

Dig. 2.15.3pr.

Digest 2.15.3pr.

Scaevola 1 Dig.

Imperatores antoninus et verus ita rescripserunt: "privatis pactionibus non dubium est non laedi ius ceterorum. quare transactione, quae inter heredem et matrem defuncti facta est, neque testamentum rescissum videri posse neque manumissis vel legatariis actiones suae ademptae. quare quidquid ex testamento petunt, scriptum heredem convenire debent: qui in transactione hereditatis aut cavit sibi pro oneribus hereditatis, aut si non cavit, non debet neglegentiam suam ad alienam iniuriam referre."

The emperors antoninus and verus gave this rescript: "by private pactions it is not doubtful that the right of the others is not injured. wherefore, by the transaction which was made between the heir and the mother of the deceased, neither can the testament be seen to have been rescinded nor have the actions of the manumitted or the legatees been taken away. wherefore, whatever they seek from the testament, they ought to convene the instituted heir: who in the transaction of the inheritance either provided security for himself with respect to the burdens of the inheritance, or, if he did not provide security, ought not to refer his own negligence to another’s injury."

Dig. 2.15.3.1

Digest 2.15.3.1

Scaevola 1 Dig.

Scaevola, Digest 1

Cum transactio propter fideicommissum facta esset et postea codicilli reperti sunt: quaero, an quanto minus ex transactione consecuta mater defuncti fuerit quam pro parte sua est, id ex fideicommissi causa consequi debeat. respondit debere.

When a transaction on account of a fideicommiss had been made and afterwards codicils were found: I ask whether, to the extent that the mother of the deceased has obtained less from the transaction than is due for her share, she ought to obtain that by reason of the fideicommiss. He responded that she ought.

Dig. 2.15.3.2

Digest 2.15.3.2

Scaevola 1 Dig.

Scaevola 1 Digest.

Debitor, cuius pignus creditor distraxit, cum maevio, qui se legitimum creditoris heredem esse iactabat, minimo transegit: postea testamento prolato septicium heredem esse apparuit. quaesitum est, si agat pigneraticia debitor cum septicio, an is uti possit exceptione transactionis factae cum maevio, qui heres eo tempore non fuerit: possitque septicius pecuniam, quae maevio ut heredi a debitore numerata est, condictione repetere, quasi sub praetextu hereditatis acceptam. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur non posse, quia neque cum eo ipse transegit nec negotium septicii maevius gerens accepit.

The debtor, whose pledge the creditor sold, made a very small settlement with maevio, who was vaunting that he was the lawful heir of the creditor: afterward, with the will produced, it appeared that septicius was the heir. The question was raised, if the debtor brings a pignoratitious action against septicius, whether he can use the defense of a settlement made with maevio, who at that time had not been heir: and whether septicius can recover by a condiction the money which was paid by the debtor to maevio as heir, as if received under the pretext of heirship. He replied that, on the facts proposed, he could not, because he himself neither settled with him, nor did maevio, acting as manager of septicius’s business, receive it.

Dig. 2.15.4

Digest 2.15.4

Ulpianus 46 ad sab.

Ulpian, book 46 on Sabinus.

Aquiliana stipulatio omnimodo omnes praecedentes obligationes novat et peremit ipsaque peremitur per acceptilationem: et hoc iure utimur. ideoque etiam legata sub condicione relicta in stipulationem aquilianam deducuntur.

The Aquilian stipulation in every way novates and extinguishes all prior obligations, and it itself is extinguished by acceptilation; and we use this law. And therefore even legacies left under a condition are brought into the Aquilian stipulation.

Dig. 2.15.5

Digest 2.15.5

Papinianus 1 def.

Papinian, Definitions 1.

Cum aquiliana stipulatio interponitur, quae ex consensu redditur, lites, de quibus non est cogitatum, in suo statu retinentur. liberalitatem enim captiosam interpretatio prudentium fregit.

When an Aquilian stipulation is interposed, which is rendered by consent, suits about which no thought has been given are retained in their own status. liberality indeed a captious one has been broken by the interpretation of the prudent.

Dig. 2.15.6

Digest 2.15.6

Gaius 17 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, 17, on the provincial edict.

De his controversiis, quae ex testamento proficiscuntur, neque transigi neque exquiri veritas aliter potest quam inspectis cognitisque verbis testamenti.

Concerning those controversies which proceed from a testament, neither can they be settled nor can the truth be sought out otherwise than after the words have been inspected and ascertained of the testament.

Dig. 2.15.7pr.

Digest 2.15.7, preface.

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian, Disputations, 7.

Et post rem iudicatam transactio valet, si vel appellatio intercesserit vel appellare potueris.

And after res judicata, a settlement (transaction) is valid, if either an appeal has intervened or you could have appealed.

Dig. 2.15.7.1

Digest 2.15.7.1

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian, Disputations 7.

Si fideiussor conventus et condemnatus fuisset, mox reus transegisset cum eo, cui erat fideiussor condemnatus: an transactio valeat quaeritur: et puto valere, quasi omni causa et adversus reum et adversus fideiussorem dissoluta. si tamen ipse fideiussor condemnatus transegit, etsi transactio non peremit rem iudicatam, tamen eo quod datum est relevari rem iudicatam oportet.

If a fideiussor had been sued and condemned, and soon thereafter the defendant concluded a settlement with the person to whom the fideiussor had been condemned, the question is raised whether the settlement is valid: and I think it is valid, as if every cause were dissolved both against the defendant and against the fideiussor. If, however, the fideiussor himself, after condemnation, settled, although the settlement did not extinguish the res judicata, nevertheless the res judicata ought to be relieved by the amount that was given.

Dig. 2.15.7.2

Digest 2.15.7.2

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian, Disputations 7.

Usque adeo autem quod datum est etiamsi non proficit ad transactionem, extenuat tamen rem iudicatam, ut inde sit et dictum et rescriptum circa alimentorum transactionem citra praetoris auctoritatem factam, ut quod datum est proficiat ad alimenta: ita ut, si quid amplius ex causa alimentorum deberi potest, id praestetur, quod autem datum est, imputetur.

To such an extent, moreover, that what has been given, even if it does not avail for a transaction (settlement), nevertheless extenuates the res judicata, so that there has been both a dictum and a rescript concerning a transaction of alimenta made without the praetor’s authority, that what has been given shall avail for alimenta: such that, if anything further can be owed on account of alimenta, that shall be provided, but what has been given shall be imputed (credited).

Dig. 2.15.8pr.

Digest 2.15.8, preface.

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, book 5, On All Tribunals

Cum hi, quibus alimenta relicta erant, facile transigerent contenti modico praesenti: divus marcus oratione in senatu recitata effecit, ne aliter alimentorum transactio rata esset, quam si auctore praetore facta. solet igitur praetor intervenire et inter consentientes arbitrari, an transactio vel quae admitti debeat.

When those to whom aliments had been bequeathed would readily settle, content with a modest present payment: the deified Marcus, with a speech recited in the senate, effected that the transaction of aliments would not be ratified otherwise
than if made with the praetor as author. therefore the praetor is wont to intervene and, among those consenting, to arbitrate whether the transaction
or what ought to be admitted.

Dig. 2.15.8.1

Digest 2.15.8.1

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, Book 5, On all tribunals.

Eiusdem praetoris notio ob transactionem erit, sive habitatio sive vestiarium sive de praediis alimentum legabitur.

The cognizance of the same praetor will lie on account of a transaction, whether a habitation or a clothing-allowance or maintenance from estates is bequeathed.

Dig. 2.15.8.2

Digest 2.15.8.2

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, Book 5 on All Tribunals.

Haec oratio pertinet ad alimenta, quae testamento vel codicillis fuerint relicta sive ad testamentum factis sive ab intestato. idem erit dicendum et si mortis causa donata fuerint relicta vel ab eo, cui mortis causa donata sunt, relicta. sed et si condicionis implendae gratia relicta sunt, adhuc idem dicemus.

This wording pertains to aliments, which may have been left by testament or by codicils, whether with a testament having been made or ab intestato. the same will have to be said
also if things given mortis causa have been left, or left by him to whom they were given mortis causa. but also if they were left for the sake of fulfilling a condition,
we will still say the same.

plane de alimentis, quae non mortis causa donata sunt, licebit et sine praetore auctore transigi.

Plainly, concerning aliments which were not given mortis causa, it will be permitted to settle even without the praetor as author.

Dig. 2.15.8.3

Digest 2.15.8.3

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, Book 5 On All Tribunals.

Sive igitur in menses singulos sive in dies sive in annos fuerint relicta, oratio locum habet. sed et si non fuerint perpetuo relicta, sed usque ad annos certos, idem est.

Whether, therefore, they have been left for individual months or for days or for years, the oration has place. but also if they have not been left perpetually, but up to certain years, it is the same.

Dig. 2.15.8.4

Digest 2.15.8.4

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5, on all tribunals.

Si integra quantitas alicui fuerit legata, ut ex usuris eius se alat et mortis tempore pecunias restituat: non cessabit oratio, licet non in annos singulos videatur id relictum.

If an entire amount has been bequeathed to someone, so that from its interest he may sustain himself and at the time of death restore the monies: the oratio will not cease to apply, although it does not seem to have been left for each single year.

Dig. 2.15.8.5

Digest 2.15.8.5

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, Book 5 On All Tribunals

Sed et si sit certa quantitas relicta titio vel res ita, ut inde alimenta seio praestentur: magis est ut transigere titius possit, nec enim transactione titii minuuntur alimenta seii. idemque est et si per fideicommissum alimenta ad hoc legatario fuerint relicta.

But also, if a definite quantity has been left to titio, or property in such a way that from it aliments are furnished to seio: the better view is that titius can transact, for by the transaction of titii the aliments of seii are not diminished. And the same is the case also if by a fideicommissum the aliments have been left for this purpose to the legatee.

Dig. 2.15.8.6

Digest 2.15.8.6

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, Book 5, On All Tribunals.

Eam transactionem oratio improbat, quae idcirco fit, ut quis repraesentatam pecuniam consumat. quid ergo si quis citra praetoris auctoritatem transegerit, ut quod per singulos annos erat ei relictum, consequeretur per singulos menses? aut quid si, quod per singulos menses ei relictum erat, consequeretur per singulos dies?

An oration disapproves that transaction which is made for this reason, that someone may consume money paid in advance.
What then if someone, without the praetor’s authority, has transacted so that what was left to him for each year he would obtain for each month?
Or what if, what was left to him for each month, he would obtain for each day?

quid deinde si, quod consummato anno ut acciperet, initio anni consequatur? et puto eam transactionem valere, quia meliorem condicionem suam alimentarius tali transactione facit: noluit enim oratio alimenta per transactionem intercipi.

What then if he obtains at the beginning of the year that which he was to receive upon the completion of the year? And I think that transaction is valid, because by such a transaction the alimentary beneficiary makes his condition better: for the oration did not wish the alimentary allowances to be intercepted by transaction.

Dig. 2.15.8.7

Digest 2.15.8.7

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5 on all the tribunals.

Nihil autem interest, utrum libertini sint quibus alimenta relicta sunt an ingenui, satis locupletes an minus.

However, it makes no difference whether those to whom maintenance has been left are freedmen or freeborn, sufficiently wealthy or less so.

Dig. 2.15.8.8

Digest 2.15.8.8

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5, on all tribunals.

Vult igitur oratio apud praetorem de istis quaeri: in primis de causa transactionis, dein de modo, tertio de persona transigentium.

Thus the oration wants inquiry before the praetor to be made about these matters: first, about the cause of the transaction (settlement); then about the mode; third, about the person of the transacting parties.

Dig. 2.15.8.9

Digest 2.15.8.9

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, Book 5 On All Tribunals

In causa hoc erit requirendum, quae causa sit transigendi: sine causa enim neminem transigentem audiet praetor. causae fere huiusmodi solent allegari: si alibi domicilium heres, alibi alimentarius habeat: aut si destinet domicilium transferre alteruter ^ alter^ eorum: aut si causa aliqua urgueat praesentis pecuniae: aut si a pluribus ei alimenta relicta sint et minutatim singulos convenire difficile ei sit: aut si qua alia causa fuit, ut plures solent incidere, quae praetori suadeant transactionem admittere.

In the case this will have to be inquired, what the cause for transacting is: for without a cause the praetor will hear no one transacting. Causes of this sort are commonly alleged:
if the heir has his domicile in one place, and the alimentary beneficiary in another: or if either of them intends to transfer his domicile: or if some cause presses for present money: or if maintenance has been left to him by several persons and it is difficult for him to proceed against individuals piecemeal: or if there was any other cause, as many are wont to occur, which may persuade the praetor to admit the transaction.

Dig. 2.15.8.10

Digest 2.15.8.10

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5, On All Tribunals

Modus quoque pecuniae, quae in transactionem venit, aestimandus est: ut puta quantitas transactionis. nam etiam ex modo fides transactionis aestimabitur. modus autem pro aetate eius, qui transigit, arbitrandus est et valetudine: nam alias cum puero, alias cum iuvene, alias cum sene transigi palam est: constat enim alimenta cum vita finiri.

The measure also of the money that comes into the settlement (transaction) is to be assessed: for example, the quantity of the settlement. for even from the measure the good faith of the settlement will be assessed. the measure, moreover, is to be determined according to the age of the one who settles and his health: for it is plain that one settles differently with a boy, differently with a youth, differently with an old man: for it is established that maintenance ends with life.

Dig. 2.15.8.11

Digest 2.15.8.11

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5, On All Tribunals.

Sed et personarum contemplatio habenda est, hoc est, cuius vitae sint hi, quibus alimenta relicta sunt: utrum frugi vitae hi sint, qui alias sufficere sibi possint, an sequioris, qui de alimentis pendeant. in persona eius, a quo alimenta relicta sunt, haec erunt specienda: in quibus sunt facultatibus, cuius propositi, cuius opinionis. tunc enim apparebit, numquid circumvenire velit eum, cum quo transigit.

But also a contemplation of the persons must be had, that is, what sort of life those have to whom aliments have been left: whether these are of a frugal life, who otherwise could suffice for themselves, or of a meaner, who depend upon the aliments. as to the person by whom the aliments have been left, these things are to be looked at: in what resources he is, of what purpose, of what repute. for then it will appear whether perhaps he wishes to circumvent the one with whom he settles.

Dig. 2.15.8.12

Digest 2.15.8.12

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5 On All Tribunals

Qui transigit de alimentis, non videbitur neque de habitatione neque de vestiario transegisse, cum divus marcus specialiter etiam de istis transigi voluerit.

One who transacts concerning maintenance will not be deemed to have transacted either about habitation or about the vestiary (clothing), since the deified Marcus wished that a special settlement be made even regarding these.

Dig. 2.15.8.13

Digest 2.15.8.13

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, Book 5 On All the Tribunals.

Sed et si quis de alimentis transegerit, non habebit necesse etiam de habitatione vel ceteris invitus transigere: poterit igitur vel de omnibus simul vel de quibusdam facere transactionem.

But also, if someone has transacted concerning maintenance, he will not be under necessity, even concerning habitation or the other things, to transact against his will: accordingly, he can make a transaction either about all at once or about certain matters.

Dig. 2.15.8.14

Digest 2.15.8.14

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, Book 5, On All Tribunals.

De calciario quoque arbitrio praetoris transigendum est.

A settlement must also be made concerning the calciary, by the praetor’s arbitration.

Dig. 2.15.8.15

Digest 2.15.8.15

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, Book 5 On All Tribunals.

Si uni pluribusve fundus ad alimenta fuerit relictus velintque eum distrahere: necesse est praetorem de distractione eius et transactione arbitrari. sed si pluribus fundus ad alimenta fuerit relictus et hi inter se transigant: sine praetoris auctoritate facta transactio rata esse non debet. idem est et si ager fuerit in alimenta obligatus: nam nec pignus ad hoc datum inconsulto praetore poterit liberari.

If to one or to several an estate has been left for alimentary support and they wish to sell it: it is necessary for the praetor to arbitrate about its sale and settlement
to arbitrate. But if an estate has been left for alimentary support to several and they settle among themselves: without the praetor’s authority the settlement made ought not
to be ratified. The same holds also if a field has been obligated for alimentary support: for not even a pledge given for this can be released without the praetor being consulted.

Dig. 2.15.8.16

Digest 2.15.8.16

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5, On All Tribunals.

Arbitratu praetoris vel de universis alimentis vel de parte eorum transigi oportere plus quam manifestum est.

It is more than manifest that, at the discretion (arbitration) of the praetor, settlement ought to be made either concerning all the maintenance or concerning a part of it.

Dig. 2.15.8.17

Digest 2.15.8.17

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5, on all tribunals.

Si praetor aditus citra causae cognitionem transigi permiserit, transactio nullius erit momenti: praetori enim ea res quaerenda commissa est, non neglegenda nec donanda. sed et si non de omnibus inquisierit, quae oratio mandat, hoc est de causa de modo de personis transigentium, dicendum est, quamvis de quibusdam quaesierit, transactionem esse irritam.

If, the praetor having been approached, he permits a settlement without cognition of the cause, the transaction will be of no moment: for to the praetor the business of inquiry has been committed, not to be neglected nor to be given away. but even if he has not inquired into all the things which the oration mandates, that is, about the cause, about the mode/terms, about the persons of the transacting parties, it must be said that, although he has inquired about some, the transaction is void.

Dig. 2.15.8.18

Digest 2.15.8.18

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, Book 5, On All Tribunals.

Sed nec mandare ex hac causa iurisdictionem vel praeses provinciae vel praetor poterit.

But neither the governor of the province nor the praetor will be able to delegate jurisdiction on this ground.

Dig. 2.15.8.19

Digest 2.15.8.19

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, On All Tribunals, book 5.

Transactiones alimentorum etiam apud procuratorem caesaris fieri possunt: scilicet si a fisco petantur alimenta. secundum quae et apud praefectos aerarii transigi poterit.

Settlements of maintenance may also be made before the procurator of Caesar: namely, if maintenance is sought from the fisc. accordingly, it will be possible to settle also before the prefects of the aerarium.

Dig. 2.15.8.20

Digest 2.15.8.20

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5 on all tribunals

Si cum lis quidem esset de alimentis, transactum autem de lite fuisset: transactio valere inconsulto praetore non potest, ne circumveniatur oratio. fingi enim lites poterunt, ut transactio etiam citra praetoris fiat auctoritatem.

If indeed there was litigation concerning aliments (support), but a settlement had been made about the suit: the settlement cannot be valid with the praetor not consulted, lest the oration be circumvented. for suits could be feigned, so that a settlement might even be made without the praetor’s authority.

Dig. 2.15.8.21

Digest 2.15.8.21

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5 on all tribunals

Si eidem alimenta et praeterea legatum praesenti die datum sit, et transactum fuerit citra praetoris auctoritatem: id quod datum est imputabitur prius in legatum quod praesenti die datum est, superfluum in alimentariam causam.

If to the same person maintenance (alimenta) and, besides, a legacy due on the present day has been given, and a settlement has been made without the praetor’s authority: that which has been given
will be imputed first to the legacy that is due on the present day, the surplus to the maintenance-claim.

Dig. 2.15.8.22

Digest 2.15.8.22

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, Book 5, On All Tribunals.

Si quis de alimentis transegerit sine praetoris auctoritate, id quod datum est in praeterita alimenta cedet. nec interest tantum in quantitate sit debita, quantum datum est, an minus, an plus: nam et si minus sit, adhuc tamen id quod in solutum datum est in praeterita alimenta imputabitur. sane si is, qui de alimentis transegit, locupletior factus sit ea solutione: in quod factus sit locupletior aequissimum erit in eum dari repetitionem: nec enim debet ex alieno damno esse locuples.

If anyone has settled about maintenance without the praetor’s authority, that which has been given will go to past-due maintenance. nor does it matter as to the amount whether as much is owed as was given, or less, or more: for even if it be less, nevertheless that which has been given in payment will be imputed to past-due maintenance will be imputed. indeed, if he who has settled about maintenance has been made richer by that payment: to the extent that he has been made richer, it will be most equitable that repetition be granted against him: for he ought not to be wealthy from another’s loss.

Dig. 2.15.8.23

Digest 2.15.8.23

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5, On All Tribunals.

Si in annos singulos certa quantitas alicui fuerit relicta homini honestioris loci veluti salarium annuum vel usus fructus, transactio et sine praetore fieri poterit: ceterum si usus fructus modicus alimentorum vice sit relictus, dico transactionem citra praetorem factam nullius esse momenti.

If for each year a certain quantity has been left to someone, a man of more honorable rank, such as an annual salary or a usufruct, a transaction can also be effected even without the praetor: however, if a modest usufruct has been left in lieu of aliments, I say that a transaction made short of the praetor is of no moment.

Dig. 2.15.8.24

Digest 2.15.8.24

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, 5, On All Tribunals

Si cui non nummus ad alimenta, sed frumentum atque oleum et cetera, quae ad victum necessaria sunt, fuerint relicta: non poterit de his transigere, sive annua sive menstrua ei relinquantur. si tamen ita sine praetore transegerit, ut in vicem eorum nummum quotannis vel quotmensibus acciperet et neque diem neque modum permutavit, sed tantum genus: vel ex contrario si pactus fuerit, ut in generibus alimenta acciperet, quae in nummis ei relicta fuissent: vel si vinum pro oleo vel oleum pro vino vel quid aliud commutavit: vel locum permutavit, ut quae erant ei romae alimenta relicta, in municipio vel in provincia acciperet vel contra: vel personam commutavit, ut quod a pluribus erat accepturus, ab uno acciperet: vel alium pro alio debitorem acceperit: haec omnia habent disceptationem praetoris et pro utilitate alimentarii recipienda sunt.

If to someone, not money for alimenta, but grain and oil and the other things which are necessary for victuals have been left, he will not be able to settle about these, whether they are left to him annually or monthly. Yet if he has so transacted without the praetor that, in place of them, he receives money year by year or month by month, and he has changed neither the day nor the rate, but only the kind: or conversely if he has bargained that he receive the alimenta in kinds which had been left to him in money: or if he has exchanged wine for oil or oil for wine or anything else: or he has changed the place, so that the alimenta which had been left to him at Rome he should receive in a municipium or in a province, or conversely: or he has changed the person, so that what he was going to receive from several he receives from one: or he has accepted another debtor in place of another: all these things have the praetor’s adjudication and are to be received for the utility of the alimentary beneficiary.

Dig. 2.15.8.25

Digest 2.15.8.25

Ulpianus 5 de omn. trib.

Ulpian, book 5, on all tribunals

Si ad habitationem certa quantitas sit annua relicta et ita sit transactum sine praetore, ut habitatio praestetur, valet transactio, quia fructus habitationis praestatur, licet ruinae vel incendio subiecta transactio est. per contrarium quoque si pro habitatione, quae erat relicta, placuerit certam quantitatem praestari, transactio rata est et citra praetorem.

If for habitation a certain annual amount has been left, and it has been settled without the praetor that the habitation be provided, the settlement is valid, because the fruits of the habitation are provided, although the transaction is subject to ruin or fire. Conversely also, if in place of the habitation which had been left it has been agreed that a certain amount be provided, the settlement is ratified even without the praetor.

Dig. 2.15.9pr.

Digest 2.15.9, preface.

Ulpianus 1 opin.

Ulpian, Opinions, Book 1.

Qui cum tutoribus suis de sola portione administratae tutelae suae egerat et transegerat, adversus eosdem tutores ex persona fratris sui, cui heres extiterat, agens praescriptione factae transactionis non summovetur.

One who had sued his tutors and settled concerning only the share of his own guardianship that had been administered, when suing those same tutors in the person of his brother, whose heir he had become, is not barred by the prescription of the concluded settlement.

Dig. 2.15.9.1

Digest 2.15.9.1

Ulpianus 1 opin.

Ulpian, Opinions, Book 1.

Transactio quaecumque fit, de his tantum, de quibus inter convenientes placuit, interposita creditur.

Whatever settlement is made is deemed interposed only concerning those matters about which it has been agreed between the agreeing parties.

Dig. 2.15.9.2

Digest 2.15.9.2

Ulpianus 1 opin.

Ulpian, Opinions, Book 1.

Qui per fallaciam coheredis ignorans universa, quae in vero erant, instrumentum transactionis sine aquiliana stipulatione interposuit, non tam paciscitur quam decipitur.

He who, through the deceit of a coheir and ignorant of all the things that were in truth, entered an instrument of transaction (settlement) without an Aquilian stipulation is not so much bargaining as being deceived.

Dig. 2.15.9.3

Digest 2.15.9.3

Ulpianus 1 opin.

Ulpian, Opinions, 1.

Ei qui, nondum certus ad se querellam contra patris testamentum pertinere, de aliis causis cum adversariis pacto transegit, tantum in his interpositum pactum nocebit, de quibus inter eos actum esse probatur. his tantum transactio obest, quamvis maior annis viginti quinque eam interposuit, de quibus actum probatur. nam ea, quorum actiones competere ei postea compertum est, iniquum est peremi pacto.

For one who, not yet certain that a complaint against his father's testament pertains to him, has by a pact settled with his adversaries about other causes, only in those will the pact interposed be harmful, which are proven to have been dealt between them. Only in those does the transaction prejudice, although one older than 25 years entered into it, in which it is proven that there was dealing. For it is inequitable that those matters, the actions for which were afterwards found to be available to him, be extinguished by a pact.

id de quo cogitatum non docetur.

that which is not shown to have been considered.

Dig. 2.15.10

Digest 2.15.10

Ulpianus 1 resp.

Ulpian, Responses 1.

De re filiorum, quos in potestate non habuit, transigentem patrem minime eis obesse placet.

Concerning the matter of sons whom he did not have in his power, it is held that a father settling should by no means prejudice them.

Dig. 2.15.11

Digest 2.15.11

Ulpianus 4 ad ed.

Ulpian, book 4 on the Edict.

Post rem iudicatam etiam si provocatio non est interposita, tamen si negetur iudicatum esse vel ignorari potest an iudicatum sit: quia adhuc lis obesse possit, transactio fieri potest.

After the matter has been adjudged, even if an appeal has not been interposed, nevertheless if it is denied that judgment has been given or it can be unknown whether judgment has been given: since the suit may still be able to cause prejudice, a settlement can be made.

Dig. 2.15.12

Digest 2.15.12

Celsus 3 Dig.

Celsus, Digest 3.

Non est ferendus qui generaliter in his, quae testamento ei relicta sunt, transegerit, si postea causetur de eo solo se cogitasse, quod prima parte testamenti ac non etiam quod posteriore legatum sit. si tamen postea codicilli proferuntur, non improbe mihi dicturus videtur de eo dumtaxat se cogitasse, quod illarum tabularum, quas tunc noverat, scriptura continerentur.

He is not to be tolerated who has, in general terms, transacted/settled regarding those things which were left to him by testament, if afterward he alleges that he had thought only of that which had been bequeathed in the first part of the testament and not also of what had been bequeathed in the later part. If, however, codicils are afterward produced, he would not seem to me to speak improperly in saying that he had thought only of that which was contained in the writing of those tablets which he then knew.

Dig. 2.15.13

Digest 2.15.13

Macer 1 ad l. vices. hered.

Macer, Book 1 on the Twentieth Tax on Inheritances.

Nulli procuratorum principis inconsulto principe transigere licet.

None of the emperor’s procurators is permitted to settle without the emperor being consulted.

Dig. 2.15.14

Digest 2.15.14

Scaevola 2 resp.

Scaevola, Book 2 of Replies.

Controversia inter legitimum et scriptum heredem orta est eaque transactione facta certa lege finita est: quaero creditores quem convenire possunt? respondit, si idem creditores essent, qui transactionem fecissent, id observandum de aere alieno, quod inter eos convenisset: si alii creditores essent, propter incertum successionis pro parte hereditatis, quam uterque in transactione expresserit, utilibus actionibus conveniendus est.

A controversy arose between the legitimate heir and the written heir, and it was ended by a settlement made on fixed terms: I ask, whom can the creditors sue?
He answered: if the creditors were the same who had made the settlement, that must be observed concerning the debt which had been agreed between them; if they were other
creditors, because of the uncertainty of the succession, for the share of the inheritance which each had expressed in the settlement, each is to be sued by utile actions.

Dig. 2.15.15

Digest 2.15.15

Paulus 1 sent.

Paulus, Sentences 1.

Pacto convento aquiliana quidem stipulatio subici solet: sed consultius est huic poenalem quoque stipulationem subiungere, quia rescisso forte pacto poena ex stipulatu peti potest.

When a pact has been agreed, the Aquilian stipulation is indeed accustomed to be subjoined; but it is more advisable to subjoin to this a penal stipulation as well, because, the pact having been rescinded,
the penalty can be sought from the stipulation.

Dig. 2.15.16

Digest 2.15.16

Hermogenianus 1 iuris epit.

Hermogenianus, Epitome of Law, book 1.

Qui fidem licitae transactionis rupit, non exceptione tantum summovebitur, sed et poenam, quam, si contra placitum fecerit rato manente pacto, stipulanti recte promiserat, praestare cogetur.

He who has broken the good faith of a lawful transaction (settlement) will be barred not only by an exception, but will also be compelled to render the penalty which—if he should act contrary to the covenant, the pact remaining in force—he had duly promised to the stipulator.

Dig. 2.15.17

Digest 2.15.17

Papinianus 2 quaest.

Papinian, Questions 2.

Venditor hereditatis emptori mandatis actionibus cum debitore hereditario, qui ignorabat venditam esse hereditatem, transegit: si emptor hereditatis hoc debitum ab eo exigere velit, exceptio transacti negotii debitori propter ignorantiam suam accommodanda est. idem respondendum est et in eo, qui fideicommissam recepit hereditatem, si heres cum ignorante debitore transegit.

After the actions had been mandated to the purchaser of the inheritance, the seller of the inheritance settled with the hereditary debtor, who was unaware that the inheritance had been sold: if the purchaser of the inheritance should wish to exact this debt from him, the exception of a transacted matter (settlement) is to be afforded to the debtor on account of his ignorance. The same answer is to be given also in the case of one who received the inheritance in fideicommissum, if the heir settled with a debtor who was ignorant.