Spinoza: ETHICA

Plerique qui de affectibus et hominum vivendi ratione scripserunt, videntur non de rebus naturalibus quæ communes naturæ leges sequuntur sed de rebus quæ extra naturam sunt, agere. Imo hominem in natura veluti imperium in imperio concipere videntur. Nam hominem naturæ ordinem magis perturbare quam sequi ipsumque in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam nec aliunde quam a se ipso determinari credunt.

Most who have written about the affects and the way of living of men seem to deal not with natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but with things that are outside nature. Nay rather, they seem to conceive man in nature as, so to speak, an empire within an empire. For they believe that man disturbs the order of nature rather than follows it, and that he has absolute power in his own actions and is determined by nothing other than himself.

Humanæ deinde impotentiæ et inconstantiæ causam non communi naturæ potentiæ sed nescio cui naturæ humanæ vitio tribuunt quam propterea flent, rident, contemnunt vel quod plerumque fit, detestantur et qui humanæ mentis impotentiam eloquentius vel argutius carpere novit, veluti divinus habetur. Non defuerunt tamen viri præstantissimi (quorum labori et industriæ nos multum debere fatemur) qui de recta vivendi ratione præclara multa scripserint et plena prudentiæ consilia mortalibus dederint; verum affectuum naturam et vires et quid contra mens in iisdem moderandis possit, nemo quod sciam determinavit. Scio equidem celeberrimum Cartesium, licet etiam crediderit mentem in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam, affectus tamen humanos per primas suas causas explicare simulque viam ostendere studuisse qua mens in affectus absolutum habere possit imperium sed mea quidem sententia nihil præter magni sui ingenii acumen ostendit, ut suo loco demonstrabo.

Then they attribute the cause of human impotence and inconstancy not to the common power of nature but to some I-know-not-what vice of human nature, for which reason they weep, laugh, scorn, or—as most often happens—detest it; and whoever knows how to censure the impotence of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely is held as if divine. Yet there have not been lacking most outstanding men (to whose labor and industry we confess we owe much) who have written many illustrious things about the right way of living and have given to mortals counsels full of prudence; but the nature of the affects and their forces, and what the mind can do against them in moderating them, no one, so far as I know, has determined. I am indeed aware that the most celebrated Descartes, although he also believed the mind to have absolute power in its actions, nevertheless strove both to explain human affects through their first causes and at the same time to show a way by which the mind might have absolute dominion over the affects; but in my judgment he showed nothing beyond the acumen of his great genius, as I shall demonstrate in its proper place.

Nam ad illos revertere volo qui hominum affectus et actiones detestari vel ridere malunt quam intelligere. His sine dubio mirum videbitur quod hominum vitia et ineptias more geometrico tractare aggrediar et certa ratione demonstrare velim ea quæ rationi repugnare quæque vana, absurda et horrenda esse clamitant. Sed mea hæc est ratio.

For I wish to return to those who prefer to detest or to laugh at the affections and actions of men rather than to understand them. To these, without doubt, it will seem strange that I should undertake to treat men’s vices and ineptitudes in the geometric manner, and should wish to demonstrate by a definite reasoning those things which they clamour are opposed to reason and which they proclaim to be vain, absurd, and horrendous. But this is my rationale.

Nihil in natura fit quod ipsius vitio possit tribui; est namque natura semper eadem et ubique una eademque ejus virtus et agendi potentia hoc est naturæ leges et regulæ secundum quas omnia fiunt et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eædem atque adeo una eademque etiam debet esse ratio rerum qualiumcunque naturam intelligendi nempe per leges et regulas naturæ universales. Affectus itaque odii, iræ, invidiæ etc. in se considerati ex eadem naturæ necessitate et virtute consequuntur ac reliqua singularia ac proinde certas causas agnoscunt per quas intelliguntur certasque proprietates habent cognitione nostra æque dignas ac proprietates cujuscunque alterius rei cujus sola contemplatione delectamur.

Nothing in nature happens that can be attributed to a fault of nature itself; for nature is always the same, and everywhere one and the same is its virtue and power of acting—that is, the laws and rules of nature, according to which all things come to pass and are changed from some forms into others, are everywhere and always the same; and so one and the same must also be the method of understanding the nature of things of whatever kind, namely through the universal laws and rules of nature. The affects, therefore, of hatred, wrath, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and virtue of nature as do the other singular things, and accordingly recognize definite causes by which they are understood, and have definite properties equally worthy of our cognition as the properties of any other thing in the mere contemplation of which we take delight.

De affectuum itaque natura et viribus ac mentis in eosdem potentia eadem methodo agam qua in præcedentibus de Deo et mente egi et humanas actiones atque appetitus considerabo perinde ac si quæstio de lineis, planis aut de corporibus esset.

Therefore, concerning the nature of the affects and their forces, and the mind’s power over the same, I shall proceed by the same method as in the preceding I treated of God and the mind, and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if the question were about lines, planes, or bodies.

DEFINITIONES I. Causam adæquatam appello eam cujus effectus potest clare et distincte per eandem percipi. Inadæquatam autem seu partialem illam voco cujus effectus per ipsam solam intelligi nequit.

DEFINITIONS 1. I call an adequate cause that whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through the same. But inadequate, or partial, I call that whose effect cannot be understood through it alone.

II. Nos tum agere dico cum aliquid in nobis aut extra nos fit cujus adæquata sumus causa hoc est (per definitionem præcedentem) cum ex nostra natura aliquid in nobis aut extra nos sequitur quod per eandem solam potest clare et distincte intelligi. At contra nos pati dico cum in nobis aliquid fit vel ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur cujus nos non nisi partialis sumus causa.

2. I say that we act when something happens in us or outside us of which we are the adequate cause; that is (by the preceding definition), when from our nature something follows in us or outside us which can be clearly and distinctly understood through that alone. But on the contrary I say that we suffer (are acted upon) when something happens in us or when from our nature something follows of which we are only a partial cause.

III. Per affectum intelligo corporis affectiones quibus ipsius corporis agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur et simul harum affectionum ideas. Si itaque alicujus harum affectionum adæquata possimus esse causa, tum per affectum actionem intelligo, alias passionem.

3. By affect I understand the affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or coerced, and at the same time the ideas of these affections. If therefore we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, then by affect I understand an action; otherwise, a passion.

POSTULATA I. Corpus humanum potest multis affici modis quibus ipsius agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur et etiam aliis qui ejusdem agendi potentiam nec majorem nec minorem reddunt. Hoc postulatum seu axioma nititur postulato 1 et lemmatibus 5 et 7, quæ vide post propositionem 13 partis II.

POSTULATE 1. The human body can be affected in many modes by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, and also by others which render that same power of acting neither greater nor lesser. This postulate or axiom rests upon postulate 1 and lemmas 5 and 7, which see after proposition 13 of part 2.

II. Corpus humanum multas pati potest mutationes et nihilominus retinere objectorum impressiones seu vestigia (de quibus vide postulatum 5 partis II) et consequenter easdem rerum imagines; quarum definitionem vide in scholio propositionis 17 partis II.

II. The human body can undergo many mutations and nonetheless retain the impressions or vestiges of objects (concerning which see postulate 5 of part II) and consequently the same images of things; the definition of which see in the scholium of proposition 17 of part II.

PROPOSITIO I: Mens nostra quædam agit, quædam vero patitur nempe quatenus adæquatas habet ideas eatenus quædam necessario agit et quatenus ideas habet inadæquatas eatenus necessario quædam patitur.

PROPOSITION 1: Our mind does certain things, and certain things indeed it suffers; namely, insofar as it has adequate ideas, to that extent it necessarily acts, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, to that extent it necessarily suffers.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cujuscunque humanæ mentis ideæ aliæ adæquatæ sunt, aliæ autem mutilatæ et confusæ (per scholia propositionis 40 partis II). Ideæ autem quæ in alicujus mente sunt adæquatæ, sunt in Deo adæquatæ quatenus ejusdem mentis essentiam constituit (per corollarium propositionis 11 partis II) et quæ deinde inadæquatæ sunt in mente, sunt etiam in Deo (per idem corollarium) adæquatæ non quatenus ejusdem solummodo mentis essentiam sed etiam quatenus aliarum rerum mentes in se simul continet. Deinde ex data quacunque idea aliquis effectus sequi necessario debet (per propositionem 36 partis I) cujus effectus Deus causa est adæquata (vide definitionem 1 hujus) non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus data illa idea affectus consideratur (vide propositionem 9 partis II). At ejus effectus cujus Deus est causa quatenus affectus est idea quæ in alicujus mente est adæquata, illa eadem mens est causa adæquata (per corollarium propositionis 11 partis II). Ergo mens nostra (per definitionem 2 hujus) quatenus ideas habet adæquatas, quædam necessario agit, quod erat primum. Deinde quicquid necessario sequitur ex idea quæ in Deo est adæquata, non quatenus mentem unius hominis tantum sed quatenus aliarum rerum mentes simul cum ejusdem hominis mente in se habet, ejus (per idem corollarium propositionis 11 partis II) illius hominis mens non est causa adæquata sed partialis ac proinde (per definitionem 2 hujus) mens quatenus ideas inadæquatas habet, quædam necessario patitur.

DEMONSTRATION: Of any human mind, some ideas are adequate, but others are mutilated and confused (see the scholia on proposition 40 of part 2). Now the ideas which in someone’s mind are adequate are adequate in God, insofar as he constitutes the essence of that same mind (by the corollary of proposition 11 of part 2); and those which then are inadequate in the mind are also in God (by the same corollary) adequate not insofar as he constitutes the essence of that same mind only, but also insofar as he contains within himself at once the minds of other things. Next, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (by proposition 36 of part 1), of which effect God is the adequate cause (see definition 1 of this), not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered as affected by that given idea (see proposition 9 of part 2). But of that effect of which God is the cause, insofar as he is affected by an idea which in someone’s mind is adequate, that same mind is the adequate cause (by the corollary of proposition 11 of part 2). Therefore our mind (see definition 2 of this), insofar as it has adequate ideas, necessarily acts in certain respects, which was the first point. Next, whatever necessarily follows from an idea which in God is adequate, not insofar as he has the mind of one man only, but insofar as he holds within himself at once the minds of other things together with that same man’s mind, of this (by the same corollary of proposition 11 of part 2) that man’s mind is not the adequate but a partial cause, and hence (see definition 2 of this) the mind, insofar as it has inadequate ideas, necessarily suffers in certain respects.

Quod erat secundum. Ergo mens nostra etc. Q.E.D.

Which was the second. Therefore our mind etc. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur mentem eo pluribus passionibus esse obnoxiam quo plures ideas inadæquatas habet et contra eo plura agere quo plures habet adæquatas.

COROLLARY: Hence it follows that the mind is subject to the more passions the more inadequate ideas it has, and conversely does the more the more adequate ideas it has.

PROPOSITIO II: Nec corpus mentem ad cogitandum nec mens corpus ad motum neque ad quietem nec ad aliquid (si quid est) aliud determinare potest.

PROPOSITION 2: Neither can the body determine the mind to think, nor the mind the body to motion or to rest, nor to anything else (if there is any).

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes cogitandi modi Deum quatenus res est cogitans et non quatenus alio attributo explicatur, pro causa habent (per propositionem 6 partis II); id ergo quod mentem ad cogitandum determinat, modus cogitandi est et non extensionis hoc est (per definitionem 1 partis II) non est corpus : quod erat primum. Corporis deinde motus et quies ab alio oriri debet corpore quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio et absolute quicquid in corpore oritur, id a Deo oriri debuit quatenus aliquo extensionis modo et non quatenus aliquo cogitandi modo affectus consideratur (per eandem propositionem 6 partis II) hoc est a mente quæ (per propositionem 11 partis II) modus cogitandi est, oriri non potest : quod erat secundum. Ergo nec corpus mentem etc.

DEMONSTRATION: All modes of thinking have God, insofar as he is a thinking thing and not insofar as he is explicated by another attribute, for their cause (by proposition 6 of part 2); therefore that which determines the mind to think is a mode of thinking and not of extension, that is (by definition 1 of part 2) it is not a body: which was the first. Next, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body, which also was determined to motion or to rest by another; and absolutely whatever arises in a body, that must arise from God insofar as he is considered as affected by some mode of extension and not insofar as he is considered as affected by some mode of thinking (by the same proposition 6 of part 2), that is, from the mind which (by proposition 11 of part 2) is a mode of thinking, it cannot arise: which was the second. Therefore neither the body the mind, etc.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc clarius intelliguntur ex iis quæ in scholio propositionis 7 partis II dicta sunt quod scilicet mens et corpus una eademque res sit quæ jam sub cogitationis jam sub extensionis attributo concipitur. Unde fit ut ordo sive rerum concatenatio una sit sive natura sub hoc sive sub illo attributo concipiatur, consequenter ut ordo actionum et passionum corporis nostri simul sit natura cum ordine actionum et passionum mentis : quod etiam patet ex modo quo propositionem 12 partis II demonstravimus. At quamvis hæc ita se habeant ut nulla dubitandi ratio supersit, vix tamen credo nisi rem experientia comprobavero, homines induci posse ad hæc æquo animo perpendendum adeo firmiter persuasi sunt corpus ex solo mentis nutu jam moveri jam quiescere plurimaque agere quæ a sola mentis voluntate et excogitandi arte pendent.

SCHOLIUM: These things are understood more clearly from those which were said in the scholium to proposition 7 of part 2, namely that mind and body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of cogitation, now under the attribute of extension. Whence it follows that the order or concatenation of things is one and the same, whether nature is conceived under this or under that attribute, and consequently that the order of the actions and passions of our body is by nature simultaneous with the order of the actions and passions of the mind: as is also evident from the manner in which we demonstrated proposition 12 of part 2. But although these things stand thus so that no reason for doubting remains, yet I scarcely believe, unless I shall have verified the matter by experience, that men can be induced to weigh these things with an even mind, so firmly are they persuaded that the body, at the mind’s mere nod, now moves, now is at rest, and does very many things which depend upon the mind’s will alone and the art of excogitation.

Etenim quid corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit hoc est neminem hucusque experientia docuit quid corpus ex solis legibus naturæ quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, possit agere et quid non possit nisi a mente determinetur. Nam nemo hucusque corporis fabricam tam accurate novit ut omnes ejus functiones potuerit explicare ut jam taceam quod in brutis plura observentur quæ humanam sagacitatem longe superant et quod somnambuli in somnis plurima agant quæ vigilando non auderent; quod satis ostendit ipsum corpus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus multa posse quæ ipsius mens admiratur. Deinde nemo scit qua ratione quibusve mediis mens moveat corpus neque quot motus gradus possit corpori tribuere quantaque cum celeritate idem movere queat.

For indeed what the body can do, no one hitherto has determined; that is, experience has taught no one up to now what the body, by the sole laws of nature, insofar as it is considered only as corporeal, can do, and what it cannot do unless it be determined by the mind. For no one hitherto has known the fabric of the body so accurately as to have been able to explicate all its functions— not to mention that in brutes many things are observed which far surpass human sagacity, and that somnambulists in sleep do very many things which they would not dare while awake; which sufficiently shows that the body itself, by the sole laws of its own nature, can do many things at which its own mind marvels. Then no one knows by what rationale or by what means the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can attribute to the body, and with how great a celerity it is able to move the same.

Unde sequitur cum homines dicunt hanc vel illam actionem corporis oriri a mente quæ imperium in corpus habet, eos nescire quid dicant nec aliud agere quam speciosis verbis fateri se veram illius actionis causam absque admiratione ignorare. At dicent sive sciant sive nesciant quibus mediis mens moveat corpus, se tamen experiri quod nisi mens humana apta esset ad excogitandum, corpus iners esset. Deinde se experiri in sola mentis potestate esse tam loqui quam tacere et alia multa quæ proinde a mentis decreto pendere credunt.

Whence it follows that when men say that this or that action of the body arises from the mind, which has dominion over the body, they do not know what they are saying, nor do anything other than, with specious words, confess that they are ignorant—without astonishment—of the true cause of that action. But they will say, whether they know or do not know by what means the mind moves the body, that nevertheless they experience that, unless the human mind were apt to excogitate, the body would be inert. Then, that they experience that both speaking and keeping silence, and many other things, are in the mind’s power alone; and therefore they believe that these depend on the mind’s decree.

Sed quod ad primum attinet, ipsos rogo num experientia non etiam doceat quod si contra corpus iners sit, mens simul ad cogitandum sit inepta? Nam cum corpus somno quiescit, mens simul cum ipso sopita manet nec potestatem habet veluti cum vigilat, excogitandi. Deinde omnes expertos esse credo mentem non semper æque aptam esse ad cogitandum de eodem objecto sed prout corpus aptius est ut in eo hujus vel illius objecti imago excitetur, ita mentem aptiorem esse ad hoc vel illud objectum contemplandum.

But as to the first point, I ask them whether experience does not also teach that, if on the contrary the body be inert, the mind at the same time is inept for thinking? For when the body rests in sleep, the mind remains lulled together with it, and does not have the power, as when it is awake, of excogitating. Then I believe all have experienced that the mind is not always equally apt to cogitate about the same object; but in proportion as the body is more apt such that in it the image of this or that object be excited, so the mind is more apt to contemplate this or that object.

At dicent ex solis legibus naturæ quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, fieri non posse ut causæ ædificiorum, picturarum rerumque hujusmodi quæ sola humana arte fiunt, possint deduci nec corpus humanum nisi a mente determinaretur ducereturque, pote esset ad templum aliquod ædificandum. Verum ego jam ostendi ipsos nescire quid corpus possit quidve ex sola ipsius naturæ contemplatione possit deduci ipsosque plurima experiri ex solis naturæ legibus fieri quæ nunquam credidissent posse fieri nisi ex mentis directione ut sunt ea quæ somnambuli in somnis agunt quæque ipsi, dum vigilant, admirantur. Addo hic ipsam corporis humani fabricam quæ artificio longissime superat omnes quæ humana arte fabricatæ sunt, ut jam taceam, quod supra ostenderim, ex natura sub quovis attributo considerata, infinita sequi.

But they will say that from the sole laws of nature, in so far as only the corporeal is considered, it is impossible that the causes of edifices, paintings, and things of this sort which are produced by human art alone, can be deduced, nor that the human body, unless it were determined and guided by the mind, could be able to build some temple. But I have already shown that they do not know what the body can do, nor what can be deduced from the mere contemplation of its nature alone, and that they themselves experience that very many things are done by the sole laws of nature which they would never have believed could be done except by the direction of the mind, such as those things which somnambulists do in their dreams, and which they themselves, while awake, admire. I add here the very fabric of the human body, which by its artifice far surpasses all those that have been fabricated by human art— to say nothing now of what I have shown above: that from Nature, considered under whatever attribute, infinite things follow.

Quod porro ad secundum attinet, sane longe felicius sese res humanæ haberent si æque in hominis potestate esset tam tacere quam loqui. At experientia satis superque docet homines nihil minus in potestate habere quam linguam nec minus posse quam appetitus moderari suos; unde factum ut plerique credant nos ea tantum libere agere quæ leviter petimus quia earum rerum appetitus facile contrahi potest memoria alterius rei cujus frequenter recordamur sed illa minime quæ magno cum affectu petimus et qui alterius rei memoria sedari nequit. Verumenimvero nisi experti essent nos plura agere quorum postea pænitet nosque sæpe, quando scilicet contrariis affectibus conflictamur, meliora videre et deteriora sequi, nihil impediret quominus crederent nos omnia libere agere.

As to the second point, truly human affairs would be far happier if it were equally in a man’s power both to be silent and to speak. But experience more than enough teaches that men have nothing less in their power than the tongue, and are no less unable to moderate their appetites; whence it has come about that most people believe we do freely only those things which we seek lightly, because the appetite for those things can easily be curbed by the memory of another thing which we frequently recall, but by no means those which we seek with great affection, and which cannot be soothed by the memory of another thing. But in very truth, unless they had experienced that we do many things of which we afterward repent, and that we often, namely when we are conflicted by contrary affections, see the better and follow the worse, nothing would hinder them from believing that we do all things freely.

Sic infans se lac libere appetere credit, puer autem iratus vindictam velle et timidus fugam. Ebrius deinde credit se ex libero mentis decreto ea loqui quæ postea sobrius vellet tacuisse : sic delirans, garrula, puer et hujus farinæ plurimi ex libero mentis decreto credunt loqui cum tamen loquendi impetum quem habent, continere nequeant, ita ut ipsa experientia non minus clare quam ratio doceat quod homines ea sola de causa liberos se esse credant quia suarum actionum sunt conscii et causarum a quibus determinantur, ignari et præterea quod mentis decreta nihil sint præter ipsos appetitus, quæ propterea varia sunt pro varia corporis dispositione. Nam unusquisque ex suo affectu omnia moderatur et qui præterea contrariis affectibus conflictantur, quid velint nesciunt; qui autem nullo, facili momento huc atque illuc pelluntur.

Thus the infant believes himself to desire milk freely, but the angry boy to want vengeance and the timid one flight. The drunk, then, believes that by a free decree of the mind he is saying things which afterward, sober, he would have wished to have kept silent : thus the delirious one, the garrulous woman, the boy, and very many of this sort believe that they speak by a free decree of the mind, although they cannot restrain the impulse of speaking which they have, so that experience itself teaches no less clearly than reason that men for this sole cause believe themselves to be free, because they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined, and, moreover, that the decrees of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which therefore are various according to the various disposition of the body. For each person regulates everything from his own affect, and those who moreover are conflicted by contrary affects do not know what they want; but those by none are driven here and there at the slightest impulse.

Quæ omnia profecto clare ostendunt mentis tam decretum quam appetitum et corporis determinationem simul esse natura vel potius unam eandemque rem quam quando sub cogitationis attributo consideratur et per ipsum explicatur, decretum appellamus et quando sub extensionis attributo consideratur et ex legibus motus et quietis deducitur, determinationem vocamus; quod adhuc clarius ex jam dicendis patebit. Nam aliud est quod hic apprime notari vellem nempe quod nos nihil ex mentis decreto agere possumus nisi ejus recordemur. Exempli gratia non possumus verbum loqui nisi ejusdem recordemur.

All which things assuredly clearly show that the mind’s decree as well as appetite and the body’s determination are by nature together, or rather one and the selfsame thing, which, when it is considered under the attribute of Thought and is explicated through it, we call a decree; and when it is considered under the attribute of Extension and is deduced from the laws of motion and rest, we call a determination; which will be made still clearer from what is now to be said. For there is something else that I would here most especially have noted, namely, that we can do nothing from a decree of the mind unless we recall it. For example, we cannot speak a word unless we recall that same word.

Deinde in libera mentis potestate non est rei alicujus recordari vel ejusdem oblivisci. Quare hoc tantum in mentis potestate esse creditur quod rem cujus recordamur vel tacere vel loqui ex solo mentis decreto possumus. Verum cum nos loqui somniamus, credimus nos ex libero mentis decreto loqui nec tamen loquimur vel si loquimur, id ex corporis spontaneo motu fit.

Then it is not within the free power of the mind to remember a thing or to forget the same. Wherefore only this is believed to be in the mind’s power: that, by the mind’s decree alone, we can either be silent about or speak of the thing we remember. Yet when we dream that we are speaking, we believe that we speak by a free decree of the mind, and yet we do not speak; or, if we do speak, it happens by the spontaneous motion of the body.

Somniamus deinde nos quædam homines celare idque eodem mentis decreto quo dum vigilamus ea quæ scimus, tacemus. Somniamus denique nos ex mentis decreto quædam agere quæ dum vigilamus non audemus atque adeo pervelim scire an in mente duo decretorum genera dentur, phantasticorum unum et liberorum alterum? Quod si eo usque insanire non libet, necessario concedendum est hoc mentis decretum quod liberum esse creditur, ab ipsa imaginatione sive memoria non distingui nec aliud esse præter illam affirmationem quam idea quatenus idea est, necessario involvit (vide propositionem 49 partis II). Atque adeo hæc mentis decreta eadem necessitate in mente oriuntur ac ideæ rerum actu existentium.

Then we dream that we conceal certain people, and that by the same decree of the mind by which, while we are awake, we keep silent about the things we know. Finally, we dream that by a decree of the mind we do certain things which, while awake, we do not dare; and so I would very much like to know whether in the mind there are given two kinds of decrees, one fantastic and the other free. But if one does not wish to be insane to that extent, it must necessarily be conceded that this decree of the mind, which is believed to be free, is not distinguished from imagination itself or from memory, nor is it anything other than that affirmation which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, necessarily involves (see proposition 49 of Part 2). And accordingly these decrees of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of things actually existing.

Qui igitur credunt se ex libero mentis decreto loqui vel tacere vel quicquam agere, oculis apertis somniant.

Therefore, those who believe that they speak, or keep silence, or do anything by a free decree of the mind, dream with eyes open.

PROPOSITIO III: Mentis actiones ex solis ideis adæquatis oriuntur, passiones autem a solis inadæquatis pendent.

PROPOSITION 3: The mind’s actions arise solely from adequate ideas, but passions depend upon only inadequate ones.

DEMONSTRATIO: Primum quod mentis essentiam constituit, nihil aliud est quam idea corporis actu existentis (per propositiones 11 et 13 partis II) quæ (per propositionem 15 partis II) ex multis aliis componitur quarum quædam (per corollarium propositionis 38 partis II) sunt adæquatæ, quædam autem inadæquatæ (per corollarium propositionis 29 partis II). Quicquid ergo ex mentis natura sequitur et cujus mens causa est proxima per quam id debet intelligi, necessario ex idea adæquata vel inadæquata sequi debet. At quatenus mens (per propositionem 1 hujus) ideas habet inadæquatas eatenus necessario patitur; ergo mentis actiones ex solis ideis adæquatis sequuntur et mens propterea tantum patitur quia ideas habet inadæquatas. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: First, that which constitutes the essence of the mind is nothing other than the idea of the body actually existing (by propositions 11 and 13 of part 2), which (by proposition 15 of part 2) is composed from many others, of which some (by the corollary to proposition 38 of part 2) are adequate, and some inadequate (by the corollary to proposition 29 of part 2). Whatever therefore follows from the nature of the mind, and of which the mind is the proximate cause through which it ought to be understood, must necessarily follow from an adequate or an inadequate idea. But insofar as the mind (by proposition 1 of this part) has inadequate ideas, to that extent it necessarily suffers; therefore the actions of the mind follow from adequate ideas alone, and the mind for this reason only suffers because it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque passiones ad mentem non referri nisi quatenus aliquid habet quod negationem involvit sive quatenus consideratur ut naturæ pars quæ per se absque aliis non potest clare et distincte percipi et hac ratione ostendere possem passiones eodem modo ad res singulares ac ad mentem referri nec alia ratione posse percipi sed meum institutum est de sola mente humana agere.

SCHOLIUM: We see, therefore, that passions are referred to the mind only insofar as it has something that involves a negation, or insofar as it is considered as a part of nature which, by itself and without others, cannot be perceived clearly and distinctly; and in this way I could show that passions are referred in the same manner to singular things as to the mind, nor can they be perceived in any other way; but my plan is to treat solely of the human mind.

PROPOSITIO IV: Nulla res nisi a causa externa potest destrui.

PROPOSITION 4: Nothing can be destroyed except by an external cause.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio per se patet; definitio enim cujuscunque rei ipsius rei essentiam affirmat sed non negat sive rei essentiam ponit sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tantum, non autem ad causas externas attendimus, nihil in eadem poterimus invenire quod ipsam possit destruere. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: This proposition is evident per se; for the definition of any thing affirms the essence of the thing itself but does not negate it, or posits the thing’s essence but does not remove it. While, therefore, we attend to the thing itself only, and not to external causes, we shall be able to find nothing in it which could destroy it. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO V: Res eatenus contrariæ sunt naturæ hoc est eatenus in eodem subjecto esse nequeunt quatenus una alteram potest destruere.

PROPOSITION 5: Things are to that extent of a contrary nature, that is, to that extent they cannot be in the same subject, insofar as the one can destroy the other.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim inter se convenire vel in eodem subjecto simul esse possent, posset ergo in eodem subjecto aliquid dari quod ipsum posset destruere, quod (per propositionem præcedentem) est absurdum. Ergo res etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: For if they could agree with each other or be simultaneously in the same subject, then there could be given in the same subject something which could destroy it, which (by the preceding proposition) is absurd. Therefore, the things, etc. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO VI: Unaquæque res quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur.

PROPOSITION 6: Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being.

DEMONSTRATIO: Res enim singulares modi sunt quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I) hoc est (per propositionem 34 partis I) res quæ Dei potentiam qua Deus est et agit, certo et determinato modo exprimunt neque ulla res aliquid in se habet a quo possit destrui sive quod ejus existentiam tollat (per propositionem 4 hujus) sed contra ei omni quod ejusdem existentiam potest tollere, opponitur (per propositionem præcedentem) adeoque quantum potest et in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For singular things are modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determinate mode (by the corollary of proposition 25 of part 1), that is (by proposition 34 of part 1), things which express, in a certain and determinate mode, the power of God by which God is and acts; nor does any thing have in itself anything by which it can be destroyed, or which would take away its existence (by proposition 4 of this part), but on the contrary to everything which can take away its existence there is opposed (by the preceding proposition); and so, as far as it can and is in itself, it strives to persevere in its being. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO VII: Conatus quo unaquæque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est præter ipsius rei actualem essentiam.

PROPOSITION 7: The endeavor whereby each thing endeavors to persevere in its being is nothing except the actual essence of the thing itself.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex data cujuscunque rei essentia quædam necessario sequuntur (per propositionem 36 partis I) nec res aliud possunt quam id quod ex determinata earum natura necessario sequitur (per propositionem 29 partis I); quare cujuscunque rei potentia sive conatus quo ipsa vel sola vel cum aliis quidquam agit vel agere conatur hoc est (per propositionem 6 hujus) potentia sive conatus quo in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est præter ipsius rei datam sive actualem essentiam. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: From the given essence of any thing certain things necessarily follow (by Proposition 36 of Part 1), nor can things do anything other than what necessarily follows from their determined nature (by Proposition 29 of Part 1); wherefore the power or conatus by which a thing, either alone or with others, does anything or tries to do it, that is (by Proposition 6 of this), the power or conatus by which it endeavors to persevere in its being, is nothing other than the given or actual essence of the thing itself. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO VIII: Conatus quo unaquæque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nullum tempus finitum sed indefinitum involvit.

PROPOSITION 8: The conatus by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite time but an indefinite one.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim tempus limitatum involveret quod rei durationem determinaret, tum ex sola ipsa potentia qua res existit, sequeretur quod res post limitatum illud tempus non posset existere sed quod deberet destrui; atqui hoc (per propositionem 4 hujus) est absurdum : ergo conatus quo res existit, nullum tempus definitum involvit sed contra quoniam (per eandem propositionem 4 hujus) si a nulla externa causa destruatur, eadem potentia qua jam existit, existere perget semper, ergo hic conatus tempus indefinitum involvit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For if it were to involve a limited time that would determine the duration of the thing, then from the very power alone by which the thing exists, it would follow that the thing, after that limited time, could not exist but would have to be destroyed; but this (by Proposition 4 of this) is absurd : therefore the conatus by which a thing exists involves no definite time, but on the contrary, since (by the same Proposition 4 of this) if it be destroyed by no external cause, by the same power whereby it now exists it will go on existing always, therefore this conatus involves an indefinite time. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO IX: Mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, conatur in suo esse perseverare indefinita quadam duratione et hujus sui conatus est conscia.

PROPOSITION 9: The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere in its being for a certain indefinite duration, and is conscious of this its striving.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis essentia ex ideis adæquatis et inadæquatis constituitur (ut in propositione 3 hujus ostendimus) adeoque (per propositionem 7 hujus) tam quatenus has quam quatenus illas habet, in suo esse perseverare conatur idque (per propositionem 8 hujus) indefinita quadam duratione. Cum autem mens (per propositionem 23 partis II) per ideas affectionum corporis necessario sui sit conscia, est ergo (per propositionem 7 hujus) mens sui conatus conscia. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The essence of the mind is constituted from adequate and inadequate ideas (as we have shown in proposition 3 of this), and so (by proposition 7 of this) both insofar as it has these and insofar as it has those, it strives to persevere in its being, and this (by proposition 8 of this) for a certain indefinite duration. But since the mind (by proposition 23 of part 2) through the ideas of the affections of the body is necessarily conscious of itself, therefore (by proposition 7 of this) the mind is conscious of its endeavor. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hic conatus cum ad mentem solam refertur, voluntas appellatur sed cum ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, vocatur appetitus, qui proinde nihil aliud est quam ipsa hominis essentia ex cujus natura ea quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt, necessario sequuntur atque adeo homo ad eadem agendum determinatus est. Deinde inter appetitum et cupiditatem nulla est differentia nisi quod cupiditas ad homines plerumque referatur quatenus sui appetitus sunt conscii et propterea sic definiri potest nempe cupiditas est appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia. Constat itaque ex his omnibus nihil nos conari, velle, appetere neque cupere quia id bonum esse judicamus sed contra nos propterea aliquid bonum esse judicare quia id conamur, volumus, appetimus atque cupimus.

SCHOLIUM: This striving, when it is referred to the mind alone, is called will; but when it is referred to mind and body together, it is called appetite, which accordingly is nothing other than the very essence of the human being, from whose nature those things that serve its conservation necessarily follow, and thus the human is determined to act toward the same. Next, between appetite and cupidity there is no difference, except that cupidity is for the most part referred to humans insofar as they are conscious of their appetite; and therefore it can be defined thus, namely, cupidity is appetite with consciousness of the same. It is thus clear from all these things that we strive, will, are appetitive, nor yet desire because we judge that thing to be good; but on the contrary we therefore judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, are appetitive of it, and desire it.

PROPOSITIO X: Idea quæ corporis nostri existentiam secludit in nostra mente dari nequit sed eidem est contraria.

PROPOSITION 10: The idea which secludes the existence of our body cannot be given in our mind, but is contrary to it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid corpus nostrum potest destruere, in eodem dari nequit (per propositionem 5 hujus) adeoque neque ejus rei idea potest in Deo dari quatenus nostri corporis ideam habet (per corollarium propositionis 9 partis II) hoc est (per propositiones 11 et 13 partis II) ejus rei idea in nostra mente dari nequit sed contra quoniam (per propositiones 11 et 13 partis II) primum quod mentis essentiam constituit, est idea corporis actu existentis, primum et præcipuum nostræ mentis conatus est (per propositionem 7 hujus) corporis nostri existentiam affirmare atque adeo idea quæ corporis nostri existentiam negat, nostræ menti est contraria etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Whatever can destroy our body cannot be given in the same (by proposition 5 of this), and thus neither can the idea of that thing be given in God insofar as he has the idea of our body (by the corollary to proposition 9 of part 2); that is (by propositions 11 and 13 of part 2), the idea of that thing cannot be given in our mind; but on the contrary, since (by propositions 11 and 13 of part 2) the first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of a body actually existing, the first and chief conatus of our mind is (by proposition 7 of this) to affirm the existence of our body, and thus the idea which denies the existence of our body is contrary to our mind, etc. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XI: Quicquid corporis nostri agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet, ejusdem rei idea mentis nostræ cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet.

PROPOSITION 11: Whatever increases or diminishes, helps or restrains, our body’s power of acting, the idea of the same thing increases or diminishes, helps or restrains, our mind’s power of thinking.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio patet ex propositione 7 partis II vel etiam ex propositione 14 partis II.

DEMONSTRATION: This proposition is evident from proposition 7 of Part 2, or also from proposition 14 of Part 2.

SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque mentem magnas posse pati mutationes et jam ad majorem jam autem ad minorem perfectionem transire, quæ quidem passiones nobis explicant affectus lætitiæ et tristitiæ. Per lætitiam itaque in sequentibus intelligam passionem qua mens ad majorem perfectionem transit. Per tristitiam autem passionem qua ipsa ad minorem transit perfectionem. Porro affectum lætitiæ ad mentem et corpus simul relatum titillationem vel hilaritatem voco, tristitiæ autem dolorem vel melancholiam.

SCHOLIUM: We see, therefore, that the mind can undergo great changes, and now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection it passes—changes which passions indeed explain to us as the affects of joy and sadness. By joy, therefore, in what follows I shall understand the passion by which the mind passes to greater perfection; by sadness, however, the passion by which it passes to lesser perfection. Furthermore, the affect of joy, when referred simultaneously to mind and body, I call titillation or hilarity; but of sadness, pain or melancholy.

Sed notandum titillationem et dolorem ad hominem referri quando una ejus pars præ reliquis est affecta; hilaritatem autem et melancholiam quando omnes pariter sunt affectæ. Quid deinde cupiditas sit in scholio propositionis 9 hujus partis explicui et præter hos tres nullum alium agnosco affectum primarium nam reliquos ex his tribus oriri in sequentibus ostendam. Sed antequam ulterius pergam, lubet hic fusius propositionem 10 hujus partis explicare ut clarius intelligatur qua ratione idea ideæ sit contraria. In scholio propositionis 17 partis II ostendimus ideam quæ mentis essentiam constituit, corporis existentiam tamdiu involvere quamdiu ipsum corpus existit.

But it must be noted that titillation and pain are referred to the man when one of his parts, before the rest, is affected; but hilarity and melancholy when all are equally affected. What, then, desire is I have explained in the scholium of proposition 9 of this part, and besides these three I acknowledge no other primary affect; for the remaining I shall show in what follows to arise from these three. But before I proceed further, it pleases me here to explain more fully proposition 10 of this part, that it may be more clearly understood by what rationale an idea is contrary to an idea. In the scholium of proposition 17 of part 2 we have shown that the idea which constitutes the mind’s essence involves the body’s existence for as long as the body itself exists.

Deinde ex iis quæ in corollario propositionis 8 partis II et in ejusdem scholio ostendimus, sequitur præsentem nostræ mentis existentiam ab hoc solo pendere quod scilicet mens actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Denique mentis potentiam qua ipsa res imaginatur earumque recordatur, ab hoc etiam pendere ostendimus (vide propositiones 17 et 18 partis II cum ejus scholio) quod ipsa actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Ex quibus sequitur mentis præsentem existentiam ejusque imaginandi potentiam tolli simulatque mens præsentem corporis existentiam affirmare desinit.

Then, from those things which we have shown in the corollary of proposition 8 of part 2 and in the scholium of the same, it follows that the present existence of our mind depends on this alone, namely that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Finally, we have shown that the mind’s potency by which it imagines things and recalls them also depends on this (see propositions 17 and 18 of part 2 together with its scholium), namely that it involves the actual existence of the body. From which it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body.

At causa cur mens hanc corporis existentiam affirmare desinit, non potest esse ipsa mens (per propositionem 4 hujus) nec etiam quod corpus esse desinit. Nam (per propositionem 6 partis II) causa cur mens corporis existentiam affirmat, non est quia corpus existere incepit : quare per eandem rationem nec ipsius corporis existentiam affirmare desinit quia corpus esse desinit sed (per propositionem 8 partis II) hoc ab alia idea oritur quæ nostri corporis et consequenter nostræ mentis præsentem existentiam secludit quæque adeo ideæ quæ nostræ mentis essentiam constituit, est contraria.

But the cause why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body cannot be the mind itself (by Proposition 4 of this Part), nor even that the body ceases to be. For (by Proposition 6 of Part 2) the cause why the mind affirms the existence of the body is not that the body began to exist; wherefore by the same reason neither does it cease to affirm the body’s existence because the body ceases to be, but (by Proposition 8 of Part 2) this arises from another idea which excludes the present existence of our body, and consequently of our mind, and which therefore is contrary to the idea that constitutes our mind’s essence.

PROPOSITIO XII: Mens quantum potest ea imaginari conatur quæ corporis agendi potentiam augent vel juvant.

PROPOSITION 12: The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things which augment or assist the body’s power of acting.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quamdiu humanum corpus affectum est modo qui naturam corporis alicujus externi involvit tamdiu mens humana idem corpus ut præsens contemplabitur (per propositionem 17 partis II) et consequenter (per propositionem 7 partis II) quamdiu mens aliquod externum corpus ut præsens contemplatur hoc est (per ejusdem propositionis 17 scholium) imaginatur tamdiu humanum corpus affectum est modo qui naturam ejusdem corporis externi involvit atque adeo quamdiu mens ea imaginatur quæ corporis nostri agendi potentiam augent vel juvant tamdiu corpus affectum est modis qui ejusdem agendi potentiam augent vel juvant (vide postulatum 1 hujus) et consequenter (per propositionem 11 hujus) tamdiu mentis cogitandi potentia augetur vel juvatur ac proinde (per propositionem 6 vel 9 hujus) mens quantum potest eadem imaginari conatur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: As long as the human body is affected in a mode that involves the nature of some external body, so long will the human mind contemplate that same body as present (by proposition 17 of part 2), and consequently (by proposition 7 of part 2) as long as the mind contemplates some external body as present, that is (by the scholium of the same proposition 17) imagines it, so long the human body is affected in a mode that involves the nature of that same external body; and thus, as long as the mind imagines those things which increase or help our body’s power of acting, so long the body is affected by modes which increase or help that same power of acting (see postulate 1 of this), and consequently (by proposition 11 of this) so long the mind’s power of thinking is increased or helped; and hence (by proposition 6 or 9 of this) the mind, as much as it can, endeavors to imagine the same things. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XIII: Cum mens ea imaginatur quæ corporis agendi potentiam minuunt vel coercent, conatur quantum potest rerum recordari quæ horum existentiam secludunt.

PROPOSITION 13: When the mind imagines those things which lessen or coerce the body’s power of acting, it strives as much as it can to recollect things which exclude the existence of these.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quamdiu mens quicquam tale imaginatur tamdiu mentis et corporis potentia minuitur vel coercetur (ut in præcedenti propositione demonstravimus) et nihilominus id tamdiu imaginabitur donec mens aliud imaginetur quod hujus præsentem existentiam secludat (per propositionem 17 partis II) hoc est (ut modo ostendimus) mentis et corporis potentia tamdiu minuitur vel coercetur donec mens aliud imaginetur quod hujus existentiam secludit quodque adeo mens (per propositionem 9 hujus) quantum potest imaginari vel recordari conabitur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: As long as the mind imagines anything of such a sort, so long the power of the mind and of the body is diminished or coerced (as we have demonstrated in the preceding proposition); and nonetheless it will imagine it until the mind imagines something else that excludes its present existence (by proposition 17 of part 2); that is (as we have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is so long diminished or coerced until the mind imagines something else which excludes its existence, and which accordingly the mind (by proposition 9 of this) will endeavor, as far as it can, to imagine or to recall. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur quod mens ea imaginari aversatur quæ ipsius et corporis potentiam minuunt vel coercent.

COROLLARY: From this it follows that the mind is averse to imagining those things which diminish or constrain its own and the body’s power.

SCHOLIUM: Ex his clare intelligimus quid amor quidque odium sit. Nempe amor nihil aliud est quam lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ et odium nihil aliud quam tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ. Videmus deinde quod ille qui amat necessario conatur rem quam amat præsentem habere et conservare et contra qui odit, rem quam odio habet, amovere et destruere conatur. Sed de his omnibus in sequentibus prolixius.

SCHOLIUM: From these things we clearly understand what love is and what hatred is. Namely, love is nothing other than joy with a concomitant idea of an external cause, and hatred nothing other than sadness with a concomitant idea of an external cause. We see then that he who loves necessarily strives to have the thing he loves present and to preserve it, and conversely he who hates strives to remove and to destroy the thing which he holds in odium. But of all these matters, more at length in what follows.

PROPOSITIO XIV: Si mens duobus affectibus simul affecta semel fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam altero.

PROPOSITION 14: If the mind has once been affected by two affects at the same time, then when afterwards it is affected by either of them, it will also be affected by the other.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si corpus humanum a duobus corporibus simul affectum semel fuit, ubi mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginatur, statim et alterius recordabitur (per propositionem 18 partis II). At mentis imaginationes magis nostri corporis affectus quam corporum externorum naturam indicant (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II) : ergo si corpus et consequenter mens (vide definitionem 3 hujus) duobus affectibus semel affecta fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam altero. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: If the human body has once been simultaneously affected by two bodies, then when the mind later imagines either of them, it will immediately also recall the other (by Proposition 18 of Part 2). But the mind’s imaginations indicate the affects of our own body rather than the nature of external bodies (by Corollary 2 of Proposition 16 of Part 2): therefore, if the body, and consequently the mind (see Definition 3 of this Part), has once been affected by two affects, then when it is later affected by either of them, it will also be affected by the other. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XV: Res quæcunque potest esse per accidens causa lætitiæ, tristitiæ vel cupiditatis.

PROPOSITION 15: Any thing whatsoever can be an accidental cause of joy, sadness, or desire.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ponatur mens duobus affectibus simul affici, uno scilicet qui ejus agendi potentiam neque auget neque minuit et altero qui eandem vel auget vel minuit (vide postulatum 1 hujus). Ex præcedenti propositione patet quod ubi mens postea illo a sua vera causa quæ (per hypothesin) per se ejus cogitandi potentiam nec auget nec minuit, afficietur, statim et hoc altero qui ipsius cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) lætitia vel tristitia afficietur atque adeo illa res non per se sed per accidens causa erit lætitiæ vel tristitiæ. Atque hac eadem via facile ostendi potest rem illam posse per accidens causam esse cupiditatis. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Let it be supposed that the mind is affected at the same time by two affects, one namely which neither increases nor diminishes its power of acting, and another which either increases or diminishes the same (see Postulate 1 of this). From the preceding proposition it is evident that, when later the mind shall be affected by the former from its true cause, which (by the hypothesis) in itself neither increases nor diminishes its power of thinking, immediately it will also be affected by the other which increases or diminishes its power of thinking, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this) by joy or sadness; and thus that thing will be, not per se, but per accidens, a cause of joy or sadness. And by this same route it can easily be shown that that thing can be, per accidens, a cause of desire. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Ex eo solo quod rem aliquam affectu lætitiæ vel tristitiæ cujus ipsa non est causa efficiens, contemplati sumus, eandem amare vel odio habere possumus.

COROLLARY: From this alone, that we have contemplated some thing with the affect of joy or sadness, of which it itself is not the efficient cause, we can love or hold the same in hatred.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam ex hoc solo fit (per propositionem 14 hujus) ut mens hanc rem postea imaginando affectu lætitiæ vel tristitiæ afficiatur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) ut mentis et corporis potentia augeatur vel minuatur etc. Et consequenter (per propositionem 12 hujus) ut mens eandem imaginari cupiat vel (per corollarium propositionis 13 hujus) aversetur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ut eandem amet vel odio habeat. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: For from this alone it comes about (by proposition 14 of this) that the mind, afterward by imagining this thing, is affected by an affect of joy or sadness, that is (by the scholium of proposition 11 of this) that the power of mind and body is increased or diminished, etc. And consequently (by proposition 12 of this) that the mind desires to imagine the same thing, or (by the corollary of proposition 13 of this) is averse to it, that is (by the scholium of proposition 13 of this) that it loves the same thing or holds it in hatred. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hinc intelligimus qui fieri potest ut quædam amemus vel odio habeamus absque ulla causa nobis cognita sed tantum ex sympathia (ut aiunt) et antipathia. Atque huc referenda etiam ea objecta quæ nos lætitia vel tristitia afficiunt ex eo solo quod aliquid simile habent objectis quæ nos iisdem affectibus afficere solent ut in sequentibus propositionibus ostendam. Scio equidem auctores qui primi hæc nomina sympathiæ et antipathiæ introduxerunt, significare iisdem voluisse rerum occultas quasdam qualitates sed nihilominus credo nobis licere per eadem notas vel manifestas etiam qualitates intelligere.

SCHOLIUM: Hence we understand how it can come about that we love certain things or hold them in hatred without any cause known to us, but only from sympathy (as they say) and antipathy. And to this are also to be referred those objects which affect us with joy or sadness from this alone, that they have something similar to objects which are wont to affect us with the same affections, as I shall show in the following propositions. I know indeed the authors who first introduced these names, sympathy and antipathy, wished by them to signify certain occult qualities of things; but nonetheless I believe it is permitted to us by the same to understand even known or manifest qualities.

PROPOSITIO XVI: Ex eo solo quod rem aliquam aliquid habere imaginamur simile objecto quod mentem lætitia vel tristitia afficere solet, quamvis id in quo res objecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum efficiens causa, eam tamen amabimus vel odio habebimus.

PROPOSITION 16: From this alone, that we imagine some thing to have something similar to an object which is accustomed to affect the mind with joy or sadness, although that whereby the thing is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects, nevertheless we shall love it or hate it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Id quod simile est objecto, in ipso objecto (per hypothesin) cum affectu lætitiæ vel tristitiæ contemplati sumus atque adeo (per propositionem 14 hujus) cum mens ejus imagine afficietur, statim etiam hoc vel illo afficietur affectu et consequenter res quam hoc idem habere percipimus, erit (per propositionem 15 hujus) per accidens lætitiæ vel tristitiæ causa adeoque (per præcedens corollarium) quamvis id in quo objecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum causa efficiens, eam tamen amabimus vel odio habebimus. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: That which is similar to the object, we have contemplated in the object itself (by the hypothesis) together with the affect of joy or sadness; and thus (by Proposition 14 of this) when the mind is affected by its image, immediately it will also be affected by this or that affect, and consequently the thing which we perceive to have this same feature will be (by Proposition 15 of this) a cause of joy or sadness by accident; and therefore (by the preceding corollary), although that in which it is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects, nevertheless we shall love it or hold it in hatred. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XVII: Si rem quæ nos tristitiæ affectu afficere solet, aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri quæ nos æque magno lætitiæ affectu solet afficere, eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus.

PROPOSITION 17: If we imagine that a thing which is wont to affect us with the affect of sadness has something similar to another which is wont to affect us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall hate the same and at the same time love it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Est enim (per hypothesin) hæc res per se tristitiæ causa et (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) quatenus eandem hoc affectu imaginamur, eandem odio habemus et quatenus præterea aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri quæ nos æque magno lætitiæ affectu afficere solet, æque magno lætitiæ conamine amabimus (per propositionem præcedentem) atque adeo eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For this thing is (by the hypothesis) of itself a cause of sadness, and (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this) insofar as we imagine the same with this affect, we hate the same; and insofar as, moreover, we imagine it to have something similar to another which is wont to affect us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall love it with an equally great endeavor of joy (by the preceding Proposition), and thus we shall both hate and love the same at once. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc mentis constitutio quæ scilicet ex duobus contrariis affectibus oritur, animi vocatur fluctuatio, quæ proinde affectum respicit ut dubitatio imaginationem (vide scholium propositionis 44 partis II) nec animi fluctuatio et dubitatio inter se differunt nisi secundum majus et minus. Sed notandum me in propositione præcedenti has animi fluctuationes ex causis deduxisse quæ per se unius et per accidens alterius affectus sunt causa; quod ideo feci quia sic facilius ex præcedentibus deduci poterant; at non quod negem animi fluctuationes plerumque oriri ab objecto quod utriusque affectus sit efficiens causa. Nam corpus humanum (per postulatum 1 partis II) ex plurimis diversæ naturæ individuis componitur atque adeo (per axioma 1 post lemma 3, quod vide post propositionem 13 partis II) ab uno eodemque corpore plurimis diversisque modis potest affici et contra quia una eademque res multis modis potest affici, multis ergo etiam diversisque modis unam eandemque corporis partem afficere poterit.

SCHOLIUM: This constitution of the mind, which namely arises from two contrary affects, is called fluctuation of the mind, which accordingly regards the affect as doubt regards imagination (see the scholium of Proposition 44 of Part 2); nor do fluctuation of the mind and doubt differ from each other except according to more and less. But it should be noted that in the preceding proposition I derived these fluctuations of the mind from causes which are per se the cause of the one affect and per accidens of the other; which I did for this reason, because thus they could more easily be deduced from the preceding; but not because I deny that fluctuations of the mind for the most part arise from an object which is the efficient cause of both affects. For the human body (by Postulate 1 of Part 2) is composed of very many individuals of diverse nature and hence (by Axiom 1 after Lemma 3, which see after Proposition 13 of Part 2) by one and the same body it can be affected in very many and diverse ways; and conversely, because one and the same thing can be affected in many ways, therefore it will also be able to affect one and the same part of the body in many and diverse ways.

Ex quibus facile concipere possumus unum idemque objectum posse esse causam multorum contrariorumque affectuum.

From which we can easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of many, and even contrary, affects.

PROPOSITIO XVIII: Homo ex imagine rei præteritæ aut futuræ eodem lætitiæ et tristitiæ affectu afficitur ac ex imagine rei præsentis.

PROPOSITION 18: Man is affected, from the image of a past or future thing, by the same affect of joy and sadness as from the image of a present thing.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quamdiu homo rei alicujus imagine affectus est, rem ut præsentem tametsi non existat, contemplabitur (per propositionem 17 partis II cum ejusdem corollario) nec ipsam ut præteritam aut futuram imaginatur nisi quatenus ejus imago juncta est imagini temporis præteriti aut futuri (vide scholium propositionis 44 partis II). Quare rei imago in se sola considerata eadem est sive ad tempus futurum vel præteritum sive ad præsens referatur hoc est (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II) corporis constitutio seu affectus idem est sive imago sit rei præteritæ vel futuræ sive præsentis atque adeo affectus lætitiæ et tristitiæ idem est sive imago sit rei præteritæ aut futuræ sive præsentis. Q.E.D.

PROOF: As long as a man is affected by the image of some thing, he will contemplate the thing as present, although it does not exist (by proposition 17 of part 2 together with its corollary), nor does he imagine it as past or future except insofar as its image is joined to the image of past or future time (see the scholium of proposition 44 of part 2). Wherefore the image of the thing, considered in itself alone, is the same whether it be referred to future or past time or to the present; that is (by corollary 2 of proposition 16 of part 2), the constitution of the body, or affect, is the same whether the image be of a past or future thing or of a present one, and thus the affect of joy and sorrow is the same whether the image be of a past or future thing or of a present one. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM I: Rem eatenus præteritam aut futuram hic voco quatenus ab eadem affecti fuimus aut afficiemur exempli gratia quatenus ipsam vidimus aut videbimus, nos refecit aut reficiet, nos læsit aut lædet etc. Quatenus enim eandem sic imaginamur eatenus ejus existentiam affirmamus hoc est corpus nullo affectu afficitur qui rei existentiam secludat atque adeo (per propositionem 17 partis II) corpus ejusdem rei imagine eodem modo afficitur ac si res ipsa præsens adesset. Verumenimvero quia plerumque fit ut ii qui plura sunt experti, fluctuent quamdiu rem ut futuram vel præteritam contemplantur deque rei eventu ut plurimum dubitent (vide scholium propositionis 44 partis II) hinc fit ut affectus qui ex similibus rerum imaginibus oriuntur, non sint adeo constantes sed ut plerumque aliarum rerum imaginibus perturbentur donec homines de rei eventu certiores fiant.

SCHOLIUM 1: Here I call a thing past or future insofar as we have been or will be affected by the same, for example, insofar as we saw or will see it, it refreshed us or will refresh us, it hurt us or will hurt us, etc. For insofar as we thus imagine the same, to that extent we affirm its existence—that is, the body is affected by no affect that excludes the existence of the thing—and therefore (by proposition 17 of part 2) the body is affected by the image of the same thing in the same way as if the thing itself were present. But indeed, because it for the most part happens that those who have experienced more waver as long as they contemplate a thing as future or past and for the most part doubt about the outcome of the thing (see the scholium of proposition 44 of part 2), hence it comes about that the affects which arise from similar images of things are not so constant, but for the most part are disturbed by images of other things until people become more certain about the outcome of the thing.

SCHOLIUM II: Ex modo dictis intelligimus quid sit spes, metus, securitas, desperatio, gaudium et conscientiæ morsus. Spes namque nihil aliud est quam inconstans lætitia orta ex imagine rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu dubitamus, metus contra inconstans tristitia ex rei dubiæ imagine etiam orta. Porro si horum affectuum dubitatio tollatur, ex spe sit securitas et ex metu desperatio nempe lætitia vel tristitia orta ex imagine rei quam metuimus vel speravimus.

SCHOLIUM 2: From what has just been said we understand what hope, fear, security, despair, joy, and the remorse of conscience are. For hope is nothing other than inconstant joy arising from the image of a future or past thing whose outcome we doubt; fear, by contrast, is inconstant sadness likewise arising from the image of a doubtful thing. Moreover, if the doubt belonging to these affects is removed, from hope there is security and from fear despair—namely, joy or sadness arising from the image of the thing which we have feared or hoped for.

Gaudium deinde est lætitia orta ex imagine rei præteritæ de cujus eventu dubitavimus. Conscientiæ denique morsus est tristitia opposita gaudio.

Then joy is gladness arisen from the image of a past thing, about whose event we doubted. Finally, the bite of conscience is sadness opposite to joy.

PROPOSITIO XIX: Qui id quod amat destrui imaginatur, contristabitur; si contra autem conservari, lætabitur.

PROPOSITION 19: He who imagines that that which he loves is being destroyed will be saddened; but if, on the contrary, it is being conserved, he will rejoice.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens quantum potest ea imaginari conatur quæ corporis agendi potentiam augent vel juvant (per propositionem 12 hujus) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ea quæ amat. At imaginatio ab iis juvatur quæ rei existentiam ponunt et contra coercetur iis quæ rei existentiam secludunt (per propositionem 17 partis II); ergo rerum imagines quæ rei existentiam ponunt, mentis conatum quo rem amatam imaginari conatur, juvant hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) lætitia mentem afficiunt et quæ contra rei amatæ existentiam secludunt, eundem mentis conatum coercent hoc est (per idem scholium) tristitia mentem afficiunt. Qui itaque id quod amat destrui imaginatur, contristabitur, etc.

DEMONSTRATIO: The mind, so far as it can, endeavors to imagine those things which augment or help the body’s power of acting (by Proposition 12 of this), that is (by the Scholium of Proposition 13 of this), those things which it loves. But the imagination is helped by those things which posit the existence of a thing, and on the contrary is restrained by those which exclude the existence of a thing (by Proposition 17 of Part 2); therefore the images of things which posit the existence of the thing help the mind’s endeavor by which it strives to imagine the loved thing, that is (by the Scholium of Proposition 11 of this), they affect the mind with joy; and those which, on the contrary, exclude the existence of the loved thing, restrain that same endeavor of the mind, that is (by the same Scholium), they affect the mind with sadness. He, therefore, who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened, etc.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITIO XX: Qui id quod odio habet, destrui imaginatur, lætabitur.

PROPOSITION 20: He who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens (per 13 propositionem hujus) ea imaginari conatur quæ rerum existentiam quibus corporis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur, secludunt hoc est (per scholium ejusdem propositionis) ea imaginari conatur quæ rerum quas odio habet, existentiam secludunt atque adeo rei imago quæ existentiam ejus quod mens odio habet, secludit, hunc mentis conatum juvat hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) mentem lætitia afficit. Qui itaque id quod odio habet, destrui imaginatur, lætabitur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The mind (by proposition 13 of this) strives to imagine those things which exclude the existence of the things by which the body’s power of acting is diminished or constrained, that is (by the scholium of the same proposition) it strives to imagine those things which exclude the existence of the things which it hates; and thus the image of a thing which excludes the existence of that which the mind hates helps this conatus of the mind, that is (by the scholium of proposition 11 of this) affects the mind with joy. Therefore, he who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXI: Qui id quod amat lætitia vel tristitia affectum imaginatur, lætitia etiam vel tristitia afficietur et uterque hic affectus major aut minor erit in amante prout uterque major aut minor est in re amata.

PROPOSITION 21: Whoever imagines that what he loves is affected with joy or sadness will likewise be affected with joy or sadness; and each of these affects will be greater or lesser in the lover according as each is greater or lesser in the thing loved.

DEMONSTRATIO: Rerum imagines (ut in propositione 19 hujus demonstravimus) quæ rei amatæ existentiam ponunt, mentis conatum quo ipsam rem amatam imaginari conatur, juvant. Sed lætitia existentiam rei lætæ ponit et eo magis quo lætitiæ affectus major est : est enim (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) transitio ad majorem perfectionem : ergo imago lætitiæ rei amatæ in amante ipsius mentis conatum juvat hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) amantem lætitia afficit et eo majore quo major hic affectus in re amata fuerit. Quod erat primum.

DEMONSTRATION: The images of things (as we have demonstrated in proposition 19 of this) which posit the existence of the loved thing, help the mind’s endeavor whereby it tries to imagine that very loved thing. But joy posits the existence of a joyful thing, and the more so, the greater the affect of joy is : for it is (by the scholium of proposition 11 of this) a transition to greater perfection : therefore the image of the joy of the loved thing helps in the lover the endeavor of his mind, that is (by the scholium of proposition 11 of this) it affects the lover with joy, and the greater, the greater this affect has been in the loved thing. Which was the first.

Deinde quatenus res aliqua tristitia afficitur eatenus destruitur et eo magis quo majore afficitur tristitia (per idem scholium propositionis 11 hujus) adeoque (per propositionem 19 hujus) qui id quod amat tristitia affici imaginatur, tristitia etiam afficietur et eo majore quo major hic affectus in re amata fuerit. Q.E.D.

Then, insofar as a thing is affected with sadness, to that extent it is destroyed, and the more so the greater the sadness with which it is affected (by the same scholium to proposition 11 of this); and so (by proposition 19 of this) he who imagines that what he loves is affected with sadness will also be affected with sadness, and by so much the greater as this affect is greater in the beloved thing. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXII: Si aliquem imaginamur lætitia afficere rem quam amamus, amore erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur tristitia eandem afficere, contra odio etiam contra ipsum afficiemur.

PROPOSITION 22: If we imagine someone to affect with joy the thing which we love, we will be affected with love toward him. If, on the contrary, we imagine the same person to affect the same thing with sadness, conversely we will be affected with hatred also against him.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui rem quam amamus lætitia vel tristitia afficit, ille nos lætitia vel tristitia etiam afficit si nimirum rem amatam lætitia illa vel tristitia affectam imaginamur (per præcedentem propositionem). At hæc lætitia vel tristitia in nobis supponitur dari concomitante idea causæ externæ; ergo (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) si aliquem imaginamur lætitia vel tristitia afficere rem quam amamus, erga eundem amore vel odio afficiemur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: He who affects with joy or with sadness the thing which we love, he also affects us with joy or with sadness, namely if we imagine the loved thing to be affected by that joy or sadness (by the preceding proposition). But this joy or sadness in us is supposed to be given with a concomitant idea of an external cause; therefore (by the scholium of proposition 13 of this) if we imagine someone to affect with joy or with sadness the thing which we love, we shall be affected toward the same with love or with hatred. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Propositio 21 nobis explicat quid sit commiseratio quam definire possumus quod sit tristitia orta ex alterius damno. Quo autem nomine appellanda sit lætitia quæ ex alterius bono oritur, nescio. Porro amorem erga illum qui alteri bene fecit, favorem et contra odium erga illum qui alteri male fecit, indignationem appellabimus.

SCHOLIUM: Proposition 21 explains to us what commiseration is, which we can define as sadness arising from another’s loss. But by what name the joy which arises from another’s good is to be called, I do not know. Moreover, we shall call love toward him who has done well to another favor; and, conversely, the hatred toward him who has done ill to another, indignation.

Denique notandum nos non tantum misereri rei quam amavimus (ut in propositione 21 ostendimus) sed etiam ejus quam antea nullo affectu prosecuti sumus modo eam nobis similem judicemus (ut infra ostendam) atque adeo ei etiam favere qui simili bene fecit et contra in eum indignari qui simili damnum intulit.

Finally it is to be noted that we not only pity the thing which we have loved (as we showed in proposition 21) but also that which previously we have pursued with no affect, provided we judge it similar to ourselves (as I shall show below); and thus also to show favor to him who has done good to someone similar, and on the contrary to be indignant against him who has inflicted damage on someone similar.

PROPOSITIO XXIII: Qui id quod odio habet, tristitia affectum imaginatur, lætabitur; si contra idem lætitia affectum esse imaginetur, contristabitur et uterque hic affectus major aut minor erit prout ejus contrarius major aut minor est in eo quod odio habet.

PROPOSITION 23: He who imagines that what he hates is affected with sadness will rejoice; if, on the contrary, he imagines that the same is affected with joy, he will be saddened; and each of these affects will be greater or lesser according as its contrary is greater or lesser in that which he hates.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus res odiosa tristitia afficitur eatenus destruitur et eo magis quo majore tristitia afficitur (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus). Qui igitur (per propositionem 20 hujus) rem quam odio habet, tristitia affici imaginatur, lætitia contra afficietur et eo majore quo majore tristitia rem odiosam affectam esse imaginatur; quod erat primum. Deinde lætitia existentiam rei lætæ ponit (per idem scholium propositionis 11 hujus) et eo magis quo major lætitia concipitur. Si quis eum quem odio habet, lætitia affectum imaginatur, hæc imaginatio (per propositionem 13 hujus) ejusdem conatum coercebit hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) is qui odio habet, tristitia afficietur etc.

DEMONSTRATION: Insofar as a hateful thing is affected with sadness, to that extent it is destroyed, and the more so, the greater the sadness with which it is affected (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this). Therefore, whoever (by Proposition 20 of this) imagines the thing which he hates to be affected with sadness will, on the contrary, be affected with gladness, and the greater, the greater he imagines the hateful thing to be affected with sadness; which was the first point. Next, gladness posits the existence of the gladsome thing (by the same Scholium to Proposition 11 of this), and the more, the greater the gladness is conceived. If someone imagines him whom he hates to be affected with gladness, this imagination (by Proposition 13 of this) will restrain the same one’s endeavor, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this), he who hates will be affected with sadness, etc.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc lætitia vix solida et absque ullo animi conflictu esse potest. Nam (ut statim in propositione 27 hujus ostendam) quatenus rem sibi similem tristitiæ affectu affici imaginatur eatenus contristari debet et contra si eandem lætitia affici imaginetur. Sed hic ad solum odium attendimus.

SCHOLIUM: This joy can scarcely be solid and without any conflict of mind. For (as I shall show immediately in proposition 27 of this) insofar as one imagines a thing similar to himself to be affected by the affect of sadness, to that extent he must be saddened, and conversely if he imagines the same to be affected with joy. But here we attend only to hatred.

PROPOSITIO XXIV: Si aliquem imaginamur lætitia afficere rem quam odio habemus, odio etiam erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur tristitia eandem rem afficere, amore erga ipsum afficiemur.

PROPOSITION 24: If we imagine someone to affect with joy the thing which we hold in hatred, we shall also be affected with hatred toward him. If on the contrary we imagine the same person to affect the same thing with sadness, we shall be affected with love toward him.

DEMONSTRATIO: Demonstratur eodem modo hæc propositio ac propositio 22 hujus, quam vide.

DEMONSTRATION: This proposition is demonstrated in the same mode as proposition 22 of this, which see.

SCHOLIUM: Hi et similes odii affectus ad invidiam referuntur, quæ propterea nihil aliud est quam ipsum odium quatenus id consideratur hominem ita disponere ut malo alterius gaudeat et contra ut ejusdem bono contristetur.

SCHOLIUM: These and similar affections of hatred are referred to envy, which for that reason is nothing else than hatred itself, insofar as it is considered to dispose a man so that he rejoices at another’s ill and, conversely, is saddened at that same one’s good.

PROPOSITIO XXV: Id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur quod nos vel rem amatam lætitia afficere imaginamur et contra id omne negare quod nos vel rem amatam tristitia afficere imaginamur.

PROPOSITION 25: We endeavor to affirm everything about ourselves and about the beloved thing which we imagine to affect us or the beloved thing with joy, and conversely to deny everything which we imagine to affect us or the beloved thing with sadness.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quod rem amatam lætitia vel tristitia afficere imaginamur, id nos lætitia vel tristitia afficit (per propositionem 21 hujus). At mens (per propositionem 12 hujus) ea quæ nos lætitia afficiunt, quantum potest conatur imaginari hoc est (per propositionem 17 partis II et ejus corollarium) ut præsentia contemplari et contra (per propositionem 13 hujus) quæ nos tristitia afficiunt, eorum existentiam secludere; ergo id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur quod nos vel rem amatam lætitia afficere imaginamur et contra. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: That which we imagine to affect the thing loved with joy or with sadness, affects us with joy or with sadness (by Proposition 21 of this). But the mind (by Proposition 12 of this) strives, so far as it can, to imagine the things which affect us with joy, that is (by Proposition 17 of Part 2 and its corollary), to contemplate them as present; and conversely (by Proposition 13 of this), the things which affect us with sadness, to exclude their existence. Therefore we endeavor to affirm all that of ourselves and of the thing loved which we imagine to affect us or the thing loved with joy, and conversely. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXVI: Id omne de re quam odio habemus, affirmare conamur quod ipsam tristitia afficere imaginamur et id contra negare quod ipsam lætitia afficere imaginamur.

PROPOSITION 26: We endeavor to affirm, concerning the thing which we hold in hatred, everything that we imagine to affect it with sadness, and conversely to deny that which we imagine to affect it with joy.

DEMONSTRATIO: Sequitur hæc propositio ex propositione 23 ut præcedens ex propositione 21 hujus.

DEMONSTRATION: This proposition follows from proposition 23, as the preceding one from proposition 21 of this.

SCHOLIUM: His videmus facile contingere ut homo de se deque re amata plus justo et contra de re quam odit, minus justo sentiat, quæ quidem imaginatio quando ipsum hominem respicit qui de se plus justo sentit, superbia vocatur et species delirii est quia homo oculis apertis somniat se omnia illa posse quæ sola imaginatione assequitur quæque propterea veluti realia contemplatur iisque exultat quamdiu ea imaginari non potest quæ horum existentiam secludunt et ipsius agendi potentiam determinant. Est igitur superbia lætitia ex eo orta quod homo de se plus justo sentit. Deinde lætitia quæ ex eo oritur quod homo de alio plus justo sentit, existimatio vocatur et illa denique despectus quæ ex eo oritur quod de alio minus justo sentit.

SCHOLIUM: From these we easily see it come about that a man may think more than is just about himself and about the thing loved, and conversely less than is just about the thing he hates; and this imagination, when it regards the man himself who thinks more than is just of himself, is called pride, and is a species of delirium, because the man with eyes open dreams that he can do all those things which he attains by imagination alone, and which therefore he contemplates as if real, and he exults in them so long as he cannot imagine the things which exclude the existence of these and determine his power of acting. Pride, therefore, is joy arising from the fact that a man thinks more than is just of himself. Next, the joy which arises from a man’s thinking more than is just of another is called esteem; and that, finally, is contempt which arises from his thinking less than is just of another.

PROPOSITIO XXVII: Ex eo quod rem nobis similem et quam nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, eo ipso simili affectu afficimur.

PROPOSITION 27: From the fact that we imagine a thing similar to us, and which we have accompanied with no affect, to be affected by some affect, we are thereby affected with a similar affect.

DEMONSTRATIO: Rerum imagines sunt corporis humani affectiones quarum ideæ corpora externa veluti nobis præsentia repræsentant (per scholium propositionis 17 partis II) hoc est (per propositionem 16 partis II) quarum ideæ naturam nostri corporis et simul præsentem externi corporis naturam involvunt. Si igitur corporis externi natura similis sit naturæ nostri corporis, tum idea corporis externi quod imaginamur affectionem nostri corporis involvet similem affectioni corporis externi et consequenter si aliquem nobis similem aliquo affectu affectum imaginamur, hæc imaginatio affectionem nostri corporis huic affectui similem exprimet adeoque ex hoc quod rem aliquam nobis similem aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, simili cum ipsa affectu afficimur. Quod si rem nobis similem odio habeamus, eatenus (per propositionem 23 hujus) contrario affectu cum ipsa afficiemur, non autem simili.

DEMONSTRATION: The images of things are affections of the human body, whose ideas represent external bodies as if present to us (by the scholium of proposition 17 of part 2); that is (by proposition 16 of part 2), whose ideas involve the nature of our body and at the same time the present nature of the external body. If therefore the nature of the external body is similar to the nature of our body, then the idea of the external body which we imagine will involve an affection of our body similar to the affection of the external body; and consequently, if we imagine someone similar to us affected by some affect, this imagination will express an affection of our body similar to that affect, and thus from this, that we imagine some thing similar to us to be affected by some affect, we are affected by an affect similar to it. But if we hold in hatred a thing similar to us, then to that extent (by proposition 23 of this part) we shall be affected along with it by a contrary affect, not by a similar one.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc affectuum imitatio quando ad tristitiam refertur, vocatur commiseratio (de qua vide scholium propositionis 22 hujus) sed ad cupiditatem relata æmulatio, quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam alicujus rei cupiditas quæ in nobis ingeneratur ex eo quod alios nobis similes eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur.

SCHOLIUM: This imitation of the affects, when it is referred to sadness, is called commiseration (about which see the scholium to proposition 22 of this), but when referred to desire, emulation, which accordingly is nothing else than a desire for some thing that is engendered in us from the fact that we imagine others similar to us to have the same desire.

COROLLARIUM I: Si aliquem quem nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, imaginamur lætitia afficere rem nobis similem, amore erga eundem afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur eandem tristitia afficere, odio erga ipsum afficiemur.

COROLLARY 1: If we imagine that someone, whom we have pursued with no affect, affects with joy a thing similar to us, we shall be affected with love toward the same person. If, on the contrary, we imagine that the same person affects the same with sadness, we shall be affected with hatred toward him.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hoc eodem modo ex propositione præcedenti demonstratur ac propositio 22 hujus ex propositione 21.

DEMONSTRATION: This is demonstrated in the same manner from the preceding proposition as proposition 22 of this is from proposition 21.

COROLLARIUM II: Rem cujus nos miseret, odio habere non possumus ex eo quod ipsius miseria nos tristitia afficit.

COROLLARY 2: The one for whom we feel pity we cannot hold in hatred, from the fact that his misery afflicts us with sadness.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim ex eo nos eandem odio habere possemus, tum (per propositionem 23 hujus) ex ipsius tristitia lætaremur, quod est contra hypothesin.

DEMONSTRATION: For if from that we could hold the same in hatred, then (by proposition 23 of this) we would rejoice at its sadness, which is against the hypothesis.

COROLLARIUM III: Rem cujus nos miseret, a miseria quantum possumus liberare conabimur.

COROLLARY 3: That which we pity, we will endeavor to liberate from misery as much as we can.

DEMONSTRATIO: Id quod rem cujus nos miseret, tristitia afficit, nos simili etiam tristitia afficit (per propositionem præcedentem) adeoque omne id quod ejus rei existentiam tollit sive quod rem destruit, comminisci conabimur (per propositionem 13 hujus) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus) id destruere appetemus sive ad id destruendum determinabimur atque adeo rem cujus miseremur, a sua miseria liberare conabimur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: That which affects with sadness the thing we pity also affects us with similar sadness (by the preceding proposition); and so we shall try to devise everything that removes the existence of that thing, or that destroys the thing (by proposition 13 of this), that is (by the scholium to proposition 9 of this), we shall crave to destroy it or be determined to destroy it, and thus we shall endeavor to free the thing we pity from its misery. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc voluntas sive appetitus benefaciendi qui ex eo oritur quod rei in quam beneficium conferre volumus, nos miseret, benevolentia vocatur, quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam cupiditas ex commiseratione orta. Cæterum de amore et odio erga illum qui rei quam nobis similem esse imaginamur, bene aut male fecit, vide scholium propositionis 22 hujus.

SCHOLIUM: This will or appetite of beneficence, which arises from the fact that we pity the thing to which we wish to confer a benefit, is called benevolence, which accordingly is nothing else than a desire arising from commiseration. Moreover, concerning love and hate toward him who has done well or ill to the thing which we imagine to be similar to us, see the scholium of proposition 22 of this.

PROPOSITIO XXVIII: Id omne quod ad lætitiam conducere imaginamur, conamur promovere ut fiat; quod vero eidem repugnare sive ad tristitiam conducere imaginamur, amovere vel destruere conamur.

PROPOSITION 28: Everything that we imagine to conduce to joy, we endeavor to promote that it may come to be; but what we imagine to be repugnant to the same, or to conduce to sadness, we endeavor to remove or destroy.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quod ad lætitiam conducere imaginamur, quantum possumus imaginari conamur (per propositionem 12 hujus) hoc est (per propositionem 17 partis II) id quantum possumus conabimur ut præsens sive ut actu existens contemplari. Sed mentis conatus seu potentia in cogitando æqualis et simul natura est cum corporis conatu seu potentia in agendo (ut clare sequitur ex corollario propositionis 7 et corollario propositionis 11 partis II) : ergo ut id existat absolute conamur sive (quod per scholium propositionis 9 hujus idem est) appetimus et intendimus; quod erat primum. Deinde si id quod tristitiæ causam esse credimus hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) si id quod odio habemus, destrui imaginamur, lætabimur (per propositionem 20 hujus) adeoque idem (per primam hujus partem) conabimur destruere sive (per propositionem 13 hujus) a nobis amovere ne ipsum ut præsens contemplemur, quod erat secundum.

DEMONSTRATION: What we imagine to conduce to joy, we strive, as much as we can, to imagine (by proposition 12 of this), that is (by proposition 17 of part 2), we shall strive, as much as we can, to contemplate it as present, or as actually existing. But the mind’s endeavor or power in thinking is equal to, and at the same time in nature with, the body’s endeavor or power in acting (as clearly follows from the corollary of proposition 7 and the corollary of proposition 11 of part 2) : therefore we strive that it exist absolutely, or (which, by the scholium of proposition 9 of this, is the same) we desire and intend; which was the first point. Next, if that which we believe to be a cause of sadness, that is (by the scholium of proposition 13 of this) if that which we hold in hatred, we imagine to be destroyed, we shall rejoice (by proposition 20 of this) and so we shall strive for the same (by the first part of this) to be destroyed, or (by proposition 13 of this) to be removed from us, lest we contemplate it as present; which was the second.

Ergo id omne quod ad lætitiam etc. Q.E.D.

Therefore, everything which conduces to joy, etc. Which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITIO XXIX: Nos id omne etiam agere conabimur quod homines cum lætitia aspicere imaginamur et contra id agere aversabimur quod homines aversari imaginamur.

PROPOSITION 29: We will also endeavor to do everything that we imagine men look upon with joy, and, on the contrary, we will be averse to doing that which we imagine men abhor.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex eo quod imaginamur homines aliquid amare vel odio habere, nos idem amabimus vel odio habebimus (per propositionem 27 hujus) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) eo ipso ejus rei præsentia lætabimur vel contristabimur adeoque (per præcedentem propositionem) id omne quod homines amare sive cum lætitia aspicere imaginamur, conabimur agere etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: From the fact that we imagine men to love something or to hold it in hatred, we shall love or hold the same in hatred (by proposition 27 of this), that is (by the scholium of proposition 13 of this), by that very fact we shall be gladdened or saddened by the presence of that thing; and thus (by the preceding proposition) we shall endeavor to do everything which we imagine men to love or to behold with joy, etc. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hic conatus aliquid agendi et etiam omittendi ea sola de causa ut hominibus placeamus, vocatur ambitio præsertim quando adeo impense vulgo placere conamur ut cum nostro aut alterius damno quædam agamus vel omittamus; alias humanitas appellari solet. Deinde lætitiam qua alterius actionem qua nos conatus est delectari, imaginamur, laudem voco; tristitiam vero qua contra ejusdem actionem aversamur, vituperium voco.

SCHOLIUM: This endeavor to do something, and even to omit something, for the sole reason that we may please men, is called ambition, especially when we strive so earnestly to please the crowd that we do or omit certain things to the detriment of ourselves or of another; otherwise it is wont to be called humanity. Next, the joy with which we take delight in another’s action, inasmuch as we imagine that he has endeavored to delight us, I call praise; but the sadness with which, on the contrary, we are averse to that same action, I call vituperation.

PROPOSITIO XXX: Si quis aliquid egit quod reliquos lætitia afficere imaginatur, is lætitia concomitante idea sui tanquam causa afficietur sive se ipsum cum lætitia contemplabitur. Si contra aliquid egit quod reliquos tristitia afficere imaginatur, se ipsum cum tristitia contra contemplabitur.

PROPOSITION 30: If someone has done something which he imagines affects others with joy, he will be affected with joy, the idea of himself as cause accompanying, or he will contemplate himself with joy. If, on the contrary, he has done something which he imagines affects others with sadness, he will, conversely, contemplate himself with sadness.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui se reliquos lætitia vel tristitia afficere imaginatur, eo ipso (per propositionem 27 hujus) lætitia vel tristitia afficietur. Cum autem homo (per propositiones 19 et 23 partis II) sui sit conscius per affectiones quibus ad agendum determinatur, ergo qui aliquid egit quod ipse imaginatur reliquos lætitia afficere, lætitia cum conscientia sui tanquam causa afficietur sive seipsum cum lætitia contemplabitur et contra. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: He who imagines that he affects others with joy or sadness, by that very fact (by proposition 27 of this Part) will be affected with joy or sadness. But since a man (by propositions 19 and 23 of part 2) is conscious of himself through the affections by which he is determined to act, therefore he who has done something which he himself imagines affects others with joy will be affected with joy together with the consciousness of himself as cause, or will contemplate himself together with joy, and conversely. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Cum amor (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) sit lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ et odium tristitia concomitante etiam idea causæ externæ, erit ergo hæc lætitia et tristitia amoris et odii species. Sed quia amor et odium ad objecta externa referuntur, ideo hos affectus aliis nominibus significabimus nempe lætitiam concomitante idea causæ internæ gloriam et tristitiam huic contrariam pudorem appellabimus : intellige quando lætitia vel tristitia ex eo oritur quod homo se laudari vel vituperari credit, alias lætitiam concomitante idea causæ internæ acquiescentiam in se ipso, tristitiam vero eidem contrariam p™nitentiam vocabo. Deinde quia (per corollarium propositionis 17 partis II) fieri potest ut lætitia qua aliquis se reliquos afficere imaginatur, imaginaria tantum sit et (per propositionem 25 hujus) unusquisque de se id omne conatur imaginari quod se lætitia afficere imaginatur, facile ergo fieri potest ut gloriosus superbus sit et se omnibus gratum esse imaginetur quando omnibus molestus est.

SCHOLIUM: Since love (by the scholium of proposition 13 of this) is joy with the concomitant idea of an external cause, and hatred sadness with the concomitant idea likewise of an external cause, therefore this joy and sadness will be species of love and hatred. But because love and hatred are referred to external objects, for that reason we shall designate these affects by other names, namely: joy with the concomitant idea of an internal cause we shall call glory, and the sadness contrary to this, shame : understand this when the joy or sadness arises from the fact that a man believes himself to be praised or blamed; otherwise, joy with the concomitant idea of an internal cause I shall call acquiescence in oneself, but the sadness contrary to the same, repentance. Next, because (by the corollary of proposition 17 of part 2) it can happen that the joy by which someone imagines that he affects others is merely imaginary, and (by proposition 25 of this) each person strives to imagine of himself all that he imagines will affect him with joy, it can therefore easily happen that a vainglorious man is proud and imagines himself to be pleasing to all when he is a nuisance to all.

PROPOSITIO XXXI: Si aliquem imaginamur amare vel cupere vel odio habere aliquid quod ipsi amamus, cupimus vel odio habemus, eo ipso rem constantius amabimus, etc. Si autem id quod amamus, eum aversari imaginamur vel contra, tum animi fluctuationem patiemur.

PROPOSITION 31: If we imagine someone to love or desire or hold in hatred something which we ourselves love, desire, or hold in hatred, by that very fact we shall love the thing more constantly, etc. But if we imagine that he is averse to that which we love, or conversely, then we shall suffer a fluctuation of mind.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex eo solo quod aliquem aliquid amare imaginamur, eo ipso idem amabimus (per propositionem 27 hujus). At sine hoc nos idem amare supponimus; accedit ergo amori nova causa a qua fovetur atque adeo id quod amamus hoc ipso constantius amabimus. Deinde ex eo quod aliquem aliquid aversari imaginamur, idem aversabimur (per eandem propositionem). At si supponamus nos eodem tempore id ipsum amare, eodem ergo tempore hoc idem amabimus et aversabimur sive (vide scholium propositionis 17 hujus) animi fluctuationem patiemur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: From this alone, that we imagine someone to love something, thereby we shall love the same (by Proposition 27 of this). But even without this we suppose that we already love the same; therefore there accrues to love a new cause by which it is fostered, and thus that which we love we shall for this very reason love more constantly. Then, from the fact that we imagine someone to be averse to something, we shall be averse to the same (by the same Proposition). But if we suppose that at the same time we love that very thing, then at the same time we shall love this same thing and be averse to it, or (see the scholium to Proposition 17 of this) we shall suffer a fluctuation of mind. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc et ex propositione 28 hujus sequitur unumquemque quantum potest conari ut unusquisque id quod ipse amat, amet et quod ipse odit, odio etiam habeat; unde illud poetæ: Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes; Ferreus est si quis quod sinit alter, amat.

COROLLARY: Hence, and from proposition 28 of this, it follows that each person, as far as he is able, endeavors that everyone love what he himself loves, and that what he himself hates they also hold in hatred; whence that of the poet: Let us hope equally, equally let us fear, lovers; he is iron(-hearted) who loves what another permits.

SCHOLIUM: Hic conatus efficiendi ut unusquisque probet id quod ipse amat vel odio habet, revera est ambitio (vide scholium propositionis 29 hujus) atque adeo videmus unumquemque ex natura appetere ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant, quod dum omnes pariter appetunt, pariter sibi impedimento et dum omnes ab omnibus laudari seu amari volunt, odio invicem sunt.

SCHOLIUM: This endeavor of bringing it about that each person approves what he himself loves or holds in hatred is in truth ambition (see the scholium of proposition 29 of this); and thus we see each one by nature to appetite that the rest live according to his own disposition, and since all equally appetite this, they are equally an impediment to themselves, and while all wish to be praised or loved by all, they are in mutual hatred.

PROPOSITIO XXXII: Si aliquem re aliqua qua unus solus potiri potest, gaudere imaginamur, conabimur efficere ne ille illa re potiatur.

PROPOSITION 32: If we imagine someone rejoicing over some thing which only a single person can possess, we will endeavor to bring it about that he not gain possession of that thing.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex eo solo quod aliquem re aliqua gaudere imaginamur (per propositionem 27 hujus cum ejusdem I corollario) rem illam amabimus eaque gaudere cupiemus. At (per hypothesin) huic lætitiæ obstare imaginamur quod ille eadem hac re gaudeat; ergo (per propositionem 28 hujus) ne ille eadem potiatur, conabimur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: From this alone, that we imagine someone to rejoice in some thing (by Proposition 27 of this, together with its Corollary 1), we shall love that thing and shall desire to rejoice in it. But (by the hypothesis) we imagine that this joy is obstructed by his rejoicing in this same thing; therefore (by Proposition 28 of this) we shall endeavor that he not possess the same. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque cum hominum natura plerumque ita comparatum esse ut eorum quibus male est, misereantur et quibus bene est, invideant et (per propositionem præcedentem) eo majore odio quo rem qua alium potiri imaginantur, magis amant. Videmus deinde ex eadem naturæ humanæ proprietate ex qua sequitur homines esse misericordes, sequi etiam eosdem esse invidos et ambitiosos. Denique si ipsam experientiam consulere velimus, ipsam hæc omnia docere experiemur præsertim si ad priores nostræ ætatis annos attenderimus.

SCHOLIUM: We thus see that human nature is for the most part so constituted that people pity those to whom things go ill and envy those to whom things go well, and (by the preceding proposition) with so much the greater hatred, the more they love the thing which they imagine another to possess. We see then from the same property of human nature from which it follows that men are merciful, it also follows that these same men are envious and ambitious. Finally, if we should be willing to consult experience itself, we shall find that she herself teaches all these things, especially if we attend to the earlier years of our age.

Nam pueros quia eorum corpus continuo veluti in æquilibrio est, ex hoc solo ridere vel flere experimur quod alios ridere vel flere vident et quicquid præterea vident alios facere, id imitari statim cupiunt et omnia denique sibi cupiunt quibus alios delectari imaginantur; nimirum quia rerum imagines uti diximus sunt ipsæ humani corporis affectiones sive modi quibus corpus humanum a causis externis afficitur disponiturque ad hoc vel illud agendum.

For children, because their body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium, we observe from this alone that they laugh or weep because they see others laugh or weep; and whatever besides they see others do, that they straightway desire to imitate; and finally they desire for themselves all the things by which they imagine others to be delighted; namely because the images of things, as we have said, are themselves the affections of the human body, or the modes by which the human body is affected by external causes and is disposed to do this or that.

PROPOSITIO XXXIII: Cum rem nobis similem amamus, conamur quantum possumus efficere ut nos contra amet.

PROPOSITION 33: When we love a thing similar to us, we endeavor as much as we are able to effect that it, in turn, loves us.

DEMONSTRATIO: Rem quam amamus præ reliquis quantum possumus imaginari conamur (per propositionem 12 hujus). Si igitur res nobis sit similis, ipsam præ reliquis lætitia afficere conabimur (per propositionem 29 hujus) sive conabimur quantum possumus efficere ut res amata lætitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ut nos contra amet. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: We endeavor to imagine, as much as we can, the thing which we love before the rest (by proposition 12 of this). If therefore the thing be similar to us, we shall endeavor to affect it with joy before the rest (by proposition 29 of this), that is, we shall endeavor as much as we can to bring it about that the loved thing be affected with joy with a concomitant idea of us, that is (by the scholium of proposition 13 of this), that it love us in return. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXXIV: Quo majore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis gloriabimur.

PROPOSITION 34: The greater the affection with which we imagine the beloved thing to be affected toward us, the more we shall glory.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nos (per propositionem præcedentem) conamur quantum possumus ut res amata nos contra amet hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ut res amata lætitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri. Quo itaque rem amatam majore lætitia nostra de causa affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis hic conatus juvatur hoc est (per propositionem 11 hujus cum ejus scholio) eo majore lætitia afficimur. At cum ex eo lætemur quod alium nobis similem lætitia affecimus, tum nosmet cum lætitia contemplamur (per propositionem 30 hujus) : ergo quo majore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo majore lætitia nosmet contemplabimur sive (per scholium propositionis 30 hujus) eo magis gloriabimur.

DEMONSTRATION: We (by the preceding proposition) endeavor as much as we can that the loved thing in return love us, that is (by the scholium of proposition 13 of this) that the loved thing be affected with joy, with the concomitant idea of us. Therefore, the more we imagine the loved thing to be affected with greater joy on account of us, by so much the more this endeavor is aided, that is (by proposition 11 of this with its scholium) we are affected with the greater joy. But since we rejoice from this, that we have affected another similar to us with joy, then we contemplate ourselves with joy (by proposition 30 of this) : therefore, the greater the affect with which we imagine the loved thing to be affected toward us, by so much the greater joy shall we contemplate ourselves, or (by the scholium of proposition 30 of this) by so much the more shall we glory.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITIO XXXV: Si quis imaginatur rem amatam eodem vel arctiore vinculo amicitiæ quo ipse eadem solus potiebatur, alium sibi jungere, odio erga ipsam rem amatam afficietur et illi alteri invidebit.

PROPOSITION 35: If anyone imagines the loved thing to join another to itself with the same or a tighter bond of amity by which he alone possessed the same, he will be affected with hatred toward that very loved thing and will envy that other.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quo quis majore amore rem amatam erga se affectam esse imaginatur, eo magis gloriabitur (per præcedentem propositionem) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 30 hujus) lætabitur adeoque (per propositionem 28 hujus) conabitur quantum potest imaginari rem amatam ipsi quam arctissime devinctam, qui quidem conatus sive appetitus fomentatur si alium idem sibi cupere imaginatur (per propositionem 31 hujus). At hic conatus sive appetitus ab ipsius rei amatæ imagine, concomitante imagine illius quem res amata sibi jungit, coerceri supponitur; ergo (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) eo ipso tristitia afficietur concomitante idea rei amatæ tanquam causa et simul imagine alterius hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) odio erga rem amatam afficietur et simul erga illum alterum (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) cui propterea (per propositionem 23 hujus) quod re amata delectatur, invidebit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The greater the love with which someone imagines the beloved thing to be affected toward him, the more he will glory (by the preceding proposition), that is (by the scholium of proposition 30 of this), he will rejoice; and so (by proposition 28 of this) he will strive as much as he can to imagine the beloved thing as most tightly bound to himself, which endeavor or appetite is fomented if he imagines another desiring the same for himself (by proposition 31 of this). But this endeavor or appetite is supposed to be restrained by the image of the beloved thing itself, with the concomitant image of him whom the beloved thing joins to itself; therefore (by the scholium of proposition 11 of this) by that very fact he will be affected with sadness, the idea of the beloved thing as cause accompanying, and at the same time with the image of the other, that is (by the scholium of proposition 13 of this) he will be affected with hatred toward the beloved thing and at the same time toward that other (by the corollary of proposition 15 of this), whom therefore (by proposition 23 of this), because he is delighted by the beloved thing, he will envy. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hoc odium erga rem amatam invidiæ junctum zelotypia vocatur, quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam animi fluctuatio orta ex amore et odio simul concomitante idea alterius cui invidetur. Præterea hoc odium erga rem amatam majus erit pro ratione lætitiæ qua zelotypus ex reciproco rei amatæ amore solebat affici et etiam pro ratione affectus quo erga illum quem sibi rem amatam jungere imaginatur, affectus erat. Nam si eum oderat, eo ipso rem amatam (per propositionem 24 hujus) odio habebit quia ipsam id quod ipse odio habet, lætitia afficere imaginatur et etiam (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) ex eo quod rei amatæ imaginem imagini ejus quem odit, jungere cogitur, quæ ratio plerumque locum habet in amore erga fæminam; qui enim imaginatur mulierem quam amat alteri sese prostituere, non solum ex eo quod ipsius appetitus coercetur, contristabitur sed etiam quia rei amatæ imaginem pudendis et excrementis alterius jungere cogitur, eandem aversatur; ad quod denique accedit quod zelotypus non eodem vultu quem res amata ei præbere solebat, ab eadem excipiatur, qua etiam de causa amans contristatur, ut jam ostendam.

SCHOLIUM: This hatred toward the beloved thing, joined with envy, is called jealousy (zelotypia), which therefore is nothing else than a fluctuation of mind arising from love and hate together, with the concomitant idea of another who is envied. Moreover, this hatred toward the beloved thing will be greater in proportion to the joy with which the jealous man used to be affected by the reciprocal love of the beloved thing, and also in proportion to the affect with which he was affected toward the one with whom he imagines the beloved thing to join itself. For if he hated him, for that very reason he will hold the beloved thing in hatred (by Proposition 24 of this), because he imagines that she is affected with joy by that which he himself holds in hatred; and also (by the Corollary of Proposition 15 of this) from the fact that he is compelled to join the image of the beloved thing to the image of him whom he hates, which reasoning for the most part has place in love toward a woman; for he who imagines that the woman whom he loves prostitutes herself to another will be saddened not only because his own appetite is restrained, but also because he is compelled to join the image of the beloved thing to another’s pudenda and excrements, he therefore averts himself from the same; to which, finally, there is added that the jealous man is not received by the beloved with the same countenance which she was accustomed to present to him, for which cause also the lover is saddened, as I shall now show.

PROPOSITIO XXXVI: Qui rei qua semel delectatus est, recordatur, cupit eadem cum iisdem potiri circumstantiis ac cum primo ipsa delectatus est.

PROPOSITION 36: He who remembers a thing with which he was once delighted, desires to obtain possession of the same, with the same circumstances as when he was first delighted by it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid homo simul cum re quæ ipsum delectavit, vidit, id omne (per propositionem 15 hujus) erit per accidens lætitiæ causa adeoque (per propositionem 28 hujus) omni eo simul cum re quæ ipsum delectavit, potiri cupiet sive re cum omnibus iisdem circumstantiis potiri cupiet ac cum primo eadem delectatus est. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Whatever a man has seen together with the thing which has delighted him, all that (by proposition 15 of this) will be a cause of joy per accidens, and so (by proposition 28 of this) he will desire to possess all that together with the thing which has delighted him, or he will desire to possess the thing with all the same circumstances as when he was first delighted by it. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Si itaque unam ex iis circumstantiis deficere compererit, amans contristabitur.

COROLLARY: If, therefore, he finds one of those circumstances to be lacking, the lover will be saddened.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam quatenus aliquam circumstantiam deficere comperit eatenus aliquid imaginatur quod ejus rei existentiam secludit. Cum autem ejus rei sive circumstantiæ (per propositionem præcedentem) sit præ amore cupidus, ergo (per propositionem 19 hujus) quatenus eandem deficere imaginatur, contristabitur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For insofar as he has found some circumstance to be lacking, to that extent he imagines something that excludes the existence of that thing. But since he is, by love, desirous of that thing or of the circumstance (by the preceding proposition), therefore (by proposition 19 of this) insofar as he imagines the same to be lacking, he will be saddened. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc tristitia quatenus absentiam ejus quod amamus, respicit, desiderium vocatur.

SCHOLIUM: This sadness, insofar as it regards the absence of that which we love, is called desire.

PROPOSITIO XXXVII: Cupiditas quæ præ tristitia vel lætitia præque odio vel amore oritur, eo est major quo affectus major est.

PROPOSITION 37: Desire which arises from sadness or joy, and from hatred or love, is the greater, the greater the affect is.

DEMONSTRATIO: Tristitia hominis agendi potentiam (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) minuit vel coercet hoc est (per propositionem 7 hujus) conatum quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur, minuit vel coercet adeoque (per propositionem 5 hujus) huic conatui est contraria et quicquid homo tristitia affectus conatur, est tristitiam amovere. At (per tristitiæ definitionem) quo tristitia major est, eo majori parti hominis agendi potentiæ necesse est opponi; ergo quo major tristitia est, eo majore agendi potentia conabitur homo contra tristitiam amovere hoc est (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus) eo majore cupiditate sive appetitu conabitur tristitiam amovere. Deinde quoniam lætitia (per idem scholium propositionis 11 hujus) hominis agendi potentiam auget vel juvat, facile eadem via demonstratur quod homo lætitia affectus nihil aliud cupit quam eandem conservare idque eo majore cupiditate quo lætitia major erit.

DEMONSTRATION: Sadness diminishes or restrains a man’s power of acting (by the scholium of proposition 11 of this), that is (by proposition 7 of this) it diminishes or restrains the conatus by which a man endeavors to persevere in his being, and so (by proposition 5 of this) it is contrary to this conatus; and whatever a man affected by sadness endeavors is to remove sadness. But (by the definition of sadness) the greater the sadness is, the more necessary it is to be opposed to the greater part of the man’s power of acting; therefore, the greater the sadness is, by so much the greater power of acting will a man endeavor to remove sadness, that is (by the scholium of proposition 9 of this) he will endeavor to remove sadness with so much the greater cupiditas, that is, appetite. Next, since joy (by the same scholium of proposition 11 of this) increases or aids a man’s power of acting, it is easily demonstrated by the same route that a man affected by joy desires nothing other than to preserve the same, and that with the greater desire the greater the joy will be.

Denique quoniam odium et amor sunt ipsi tristitiæ vel lætitiæ affectus, sequitur eodem modo quod conatus, appetitus sive cupiditas quæ præ odio vel amore oritur, major erit pro ratione odii et amoris. Q.E.D.

Finally, since hatred and love are themselves affects of sadness or of joy, it follows in the same way that the endeavor, appetite, or desire which arises on account of hatred or love will be greater in proportion to the measure of the hatred and love. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXXVIII: Si quis rem amatam odio habere inceperit ita ut amor plane aboleatur, eandem majore odio ex pari causa prosequetur quam si ipsam nunquam amavisset et eo majore quo amor antea major fuerat.

PROPOSITION 38: If someone begins to hold in hatred a loved thing in such a way that the love is plainly abolished, he will pursue the same with greater hatred, from an equal cause, than if he had never loved it, and by so much the greater as the love had formerly been greater.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam si quis rem quam amat, odio habere incipit, plures ejus appetitus coercentur quam si eandem non amavisset. Amor namque lætitia est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) quam homo quantum potest (per propositionem 28 hujus) conservare conatur idque (per idem scholium) rem amatam ut præsentem contemplando eandemque (per propositionem 21 hujus) lætitia quantum potest afficiendo, qui quidem conatus (per propositionem præcedentem) eo est major quo amor major est ut et conatus efficiendi ut res amata ipsum contra amet (vide propositionem 33 hujus). At hi conatus odio erga rem amatam coercentur (per corollarium propositionis 13 et per propositionem 23 hujus); ergo amans (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) hac etiam de causa tristitia afficietur et eo majore quo amor major fuerat hoc est præter tristitiam quæ odii fuit causa, alia ex eo oritur quod rem amavit et consequenter majore tristitiæ affectu rem amatam contemplabitur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) majore odio prosequetur quam si eandem non amavisset et eo majore quo amor major fuerat. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For if someone begins to hold in hatred a thing which he loves, more of his appetites are constrained than if he had not loved the same. For love is joy (through the scholium of proposition 13 of this), which a man, as far as he is able (through proposition 28 of this), strives to conserve, and that (through the same scholium) by contemplating the loved thing as present and by affecting the same (through proposition 21 of this) with joy as much as he can; which endeavor indeed (through the preceding proposition) is the greater, the greater the love is, as also the endeavor to bring it about that the loved thing loves him in return (see proposition 33 of this). But these endeavors are constrained by hatred toward the loved thing (through the corollary of proposition 13 and through proposition 23 of this); therefore the lover (through the scholium of proposition 11 of this) will for this very reason also be affected with sadness, and the greater, the greater the love had been; that is, besides the sadness which was the cause of the hatred, another arises from this, that he loved the thing; and consequently he will contemplate the loved thing with a greater affect of sadness, that is (through the scholium of proposition 13 of this) he will pursue it with greater hatred than if he had not loved the same, and the greater, the greater the love had been. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXXIX: Qui aliquem odio habet, ei malum inferre conabitur nisi ex eo majus sibi malum oriri timeat et contra qui aliquem amat, ei eadem lege benefacere conabitur.

PROPOSITION 39: Whoever holds someone in hatred will endeavor to inflict evil upon him, unless he fears that from it a greater evil may arise for himself; and conversely, whoever loves someone will endeavor, by the same law, to benefit him.

DEMONSTRATIO: Aliquem odio habere est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) aliquem ut tristitiæ causam imaginari adeoque (per propositionem 28 hujus) is qui aliquem odio habet, eundem amovere vel destruere conabitur. Sed si inde aliquid tristius sive (quod idem est) majus malum sibi timeat idque se vitare posse credit non inferendo ei quem odit malum quod meditabatur, a malo inferendo (per eandem propositionem 28 hujus) abstinere cupiet idque (per propositionem 37 hujus) majore conatu quam quo tenebatur inferendi malum, qui propterea prævalebit, ut volebamus. Secundæ partis demonstratio eodem modo procedit.

DEMONSTRATION: To hold someone in hatred is (per the scholium of proposition 13 of this) to imagine someone as a cause of sadness, and thus (per proposition 28 of this) he who holds someone in hatred will strive to remove or to destroy that same person. But if from that he should fear something sadder or (which is the same) a greater evil for himself, and believes that he can avoid it by not inflicting upon him whom he hates the evil which he was meditating, he will desire to abstain from inflicting evil (per that same proposition 28 of this), and this (per proposition 37 of this) with a greater endeavor than that by which he was held to inflict the evil, which therefore will prevail, as we wished. The demonstration of the second part proceeds in the same way.

Ergo qui aliquem odio habet etc. Q.E.D.

Therefore, he who hates someone, etc. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Per bonum hic intelligo omne genus lætitiæ et quicquid porro ad eandem conducit et præcipue id quod desiderio qualecunque illud sit, satisfacit. Per malum autem omne tristitiæ genus et præcipue id quod desiderium frustratur. Supra enim (in scholio propositionis 9 hujus) ostendimus nos nihil cupere quia id bonum esse judicamus sed contra id bonum vocamus quod cupimus et consequenter id quod aversamur malum appellamus; quare unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat seu æstimat quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius, quid pejus et quid denique optimum quidve pessimum sit.

SCHOLIUM: By good here I understand every kind of joy, and whatever moreover conduces to the same, and especially that which—whatever it may be—satisfies desire. By evil, however, every kind of sadness, and especially that which frustrates desire. For above (in the scholium to proposition 9 of this) we have shown that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary we call that good which we desire, and consequently we call that evil which we are averse to; wherefore each person judges or esteems from his own affect what is good, what evil, what better, what worse, and finally what is best and what is worst.

Sic avarus argenti copiam optimum, ejus autem inopiam pessimum judicat. Ambitiosus autem nihil æque ac gloriam cupit et contra nihil æque ac pudorem reformidat. Invido deinde nihil jucundius quam alterius infelicitas et nihil molestius quam aliena felicitas ac sic unusquisque ex suo affectu rem aliquam bonam aut malam, utilem aut inutilem esse judicat.

Thus the avaricious man judges an abundance of silver the best, but its lack the worst. The ambitious man desires nothing so much as glory, and on the contrary dreads nothing so much as shame. Then for the envious man nothing is more pleasant than another’s infelicity, and nothing more vexatious than another’s felicity; and so each person, from his own affect, judges that some thing is good or bad, useful or useless.

Cæterum hic affectus quo homo ita disponitur ut id quod vult nolit vel ut id quod non vult velit, timor vocatur, qui proinde nihil aliud est quam metus quatenus homo ab eodem disponitur ad malum quod futurum judicat, minore vitandum (vide propositionem 28 hujus). Sed si malum quod timet pudor sit, tum timor appellatur verecundia. Denique si cupiditas malum futurum vitandi coercetur timore alterius mali ita ut quid potius velit, nesciat, tum metus vocatur consternatio præcipue si utrumque malum quod timetur ex maximis sit.

Moreover, this affect by which a man is so disposed that he does not will what he wills, or that he wills what he does not will, is called fear, which accordingly is nothing other than dread, in so far as by the same a man is disposed toward an evil which he judges will be future, to be avoided by a lesser one (see proposition 28 of this). But if the evil which he fears is shame, then the fear is called bashfulness. Finally, if the desire of avoiding a future evil is restrained by fear of another evil, such that he does not know which he would rather will, then the dread is called consternation, especially if each evil that is feared is among the greatest.

PROPOSITIO XL: Qui se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur nec se ullam odii causam illi dedisse credit, eundem odio contra habebit.

PROPOSITION 40: Whoever imagines himself to be held in hatred by someone, and believes that he has given that person no cause of hatred, will hold that same person in hatred in return.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui aliquem odio affectum imaginatur, eo ipso etiam odio afficietur (per propositionem 27 hujus) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ. At ipse (per hypothesin) nullam hujus tristitiæ causam imaginatur præter illum qui ipsum odio habet; ergo ex hoc quod se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, tristitia afficietur concomitante idea ejus qui ipsum odio habet sive (per idem scholium) eundem odio habebit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: He who imagines someone to be affected with hatred will thereby also be affected with hatred (by Proposition 27 of this), that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this) with sadness accompanying the idea of an external cause. But he himself (by the hypothesis) imagines no cause of this sadness except the one who holds him in hatred; therefore, from this, that he imagines himself to be held in hatred by someone, he will be affected with sadness accompanying the idea of him who holds him in hatred, or (by the same scholium) he will hold the same man in hatred. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Quod si se justam odii causam præbuisse imaginatur, tum (per propositionem 30 hujus et ejusdem scholium) pudore afficietur. Sed hoc (per propositionem 25 hujus) raro contingit. Præterea hæc odii reciprocatio oriri etiam potest ex eo quod odium sequatur conatus malum inferendi ei qui odio habetur (per propositionem 39 hujus). Qui igitur se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, eundem alicujus mali sive tristitiæ causam imaginabitur atque adeo tristitia afficietur seu metu concomitante idea ejus qui ipsum odio habet tanquam causa hoc est odio contra afficietur ut supra.

SCHOLIUM: But if he imagines that he has provided a just cause of hatred, then (by Proposition 30 of this and the scholium of the same) he will be affected with shame. But this (by Proposition 25 of this) rarely happens. Moreover, this reciprocation of hatred can also arise from the fact that hatred is followed by a conatus to inflict harm upon him who is held in hatred (by Proposition 39 of this). Therefore he who imagines himself to be held in hatred by someone will imagine that same person as the cause of some evil or of sadness, and thus he will be affected with sadness, or with fear, with the idea of him who holds him in hatred accompanying as cause; that is, he will be affected with counter-hatred as above.

COROLLARIUM I: Qui quem amat odio erga se affectum imaginatur, odio et amore simul conflictabitur. Nam quatenus imaginatur ab eodem se odio haberi, determinatur (per propositionem præcedentem) ad eundem contra odio habendum. At (per hypothesin) ipsum nihilominus amat : ergo odio et amore simul conflictabitur.

COROLLARY 1: He who imagines that someone whom he loves is affected with hatred toward himself will be conflicted by hatred and love at the same time. For insofar as he imagines that he is held in hatred by the same person, he is determined (by the preceding proposition) to hold the same in turn in hatred. But (by the hypothesis) he nevertheless loves him : therefore he will be conflicted by hatred and love at the same time.

COROLLARIUM II: Si aliquis imaginatur ab aliquo quem antea nullo affectu prosecutus est, malum aliquod præ odio sibi illatum esse, statim idem malum eidem referre conabitur.

COROLLARY 2: If someone imagines that by someone toward whom he had previously harbored no affect some evil has been inflicted upon him out of hatred, he will immediately try to return the same evil to that same person.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui aliquem odio erga se affectum esse imaginatur, eum contra (per præcedentem propositionem) odio habebit et (per propositionem 26 hujus) id omne comminisci conabitur quod eundem possit tristitia afficere atque id eidem (per propositionem 39 hujus) inferre studebit. At (per hypothesin) primum quod hujusmodi imaginatur, est malum sibi illatum; ergo idem statim eidem inferre conabitur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: He who imagines someone to be affected toward himself with hatred will, in turn (by the preceding proposition), hold him in hatred, and (by Proposition 26 of this) will try to devise everything that could affect the same person with sadness, and (by Proposition 39 of this) will strive to inflict the same upon him. But (by the hypothesis) the first thing of this sort that he imagines is a harm brought upon himself; therefore he will immediately try to inflict the same upon him. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Conatus malum inferendi ei quem odimus ira vocatur; conatus autem malum nobis illatum referendi vindicta appellatur.

SCHOLIUM: The endeavor to inflict harm upon him whom we hate is called ire; but the endeavor to return the harm inflicted upon us is called revenge.

PROPOSITIO XLI: Si quis ab aliquo se amari imaginatur nec se ullam ad id causam dedisse credit (quod per corollarium propositionis 15 et per propositionem 16 hujus fieri potest) eundem contra amabit.

PROPOSITION 41: If someone imagines that he is loved by someone, and does not believe that he has given any cause for it (which can happen by the corollary of proposition 15 and by proposition 16 of this), he will love the same person in return.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio eadem via demonstratur ac præcedens. Cujus etiam scholium vide.

DEMONSTRATION: This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding. See also its scholium.

SCHOLIUM: Quod si se justam amoris causam præbuisse crediderit, gloriabitur (per propositionem 30 hujus cum ejusdem scholio) quod quidem (per propositionem 25 hujus) frequentius contingit et cujus contrarium evenire diximus quando aliquis ab aliquo se odio haberi imaginatur (vide scholium propositionis præcedentis). Porro hic reciprocus amor et consequenter (per propositionem 39 hujus) conatus benefaciendi ei qui nos amat quique (per eandem propositionem 39 hujus) nobis benefacere conatur, gratia seu gratitudo vocatur atque adeo apparet homines longe paratiores esse ad vindictam quam ad referendum beneficium.

SCHOLIUM: But if he believes that he has furnished a just cause of love, he will glory (by Proposition 30 of this, with its scholium), which indeed (by Proposition 25 of this) happens more frequently; and we have said that the contrary comes to pass when someone imagines that he is held in hatred by someone (see the scholium of the preceding proposition). Moreover, this reciprocal love, and consequently (by Proposition 39 of this) the endeavor of doing good to him who loves us and who (by the same Proposition 39 of this) endeavors to do good to us, is called favor or gratitude; and thus it appears that men are far more prepared for vengeance than for returning a benefit.

COROLLARIUM: Qui ab eo quem odio habet, se amari imaginatur, odio et amore simul conflictabitur. Quod eadem via qua primum propositionis præcedentis corollarium demonstratur.

COROLLARY: He who imagines himself to be loved by him whom he hates will be simultaneously conflicted by hatred and love. Which is demonstrated by the same way by which the first corollary of the preceding proposition is demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM: Quod si odium prævaluerit, ei a quo amatur malum inferre conabitur, qui quidem affectus crudelitas appellatur præcipue si illum qui amat nullam odii communem causam præbuisse creditur.

SCHOLIUM: But if hatred shall have prevailed, he will endeavor to inflict harm on him by whom he is loved; which affect is called cruelty, especially if the one who loves is believed to have furnished no common cause of hatred.

PROPOSITIO XLII: Qui in aliquem amore aut spe gloriæ motus beneficium contulit, contristabitur si viderit beneficium ingrato animo accipi.

PROPOSITION 42: He who, moved toward someone by love or by the hope of glory, has conferred a benefaction, will be saddened if he sees the benefaction received with an ungrateful spirit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui rem aliquam sibi similem amat, conatur quantum potest efficere ut ab ipsa contra ametur (per propositionem 33 hujus). Qui igitur præ amore in aliquem beneficium contulit, id facit desiderio quo tenetur ut contra ametur hoc est (per propositionem 34 hujus) spe gloriæ sive (per scholium propositionis 30 hujus) lætitiæ adeoque (per propositionem 12 hujus) hanc gloriæ causam quantum potest imaginari sive ut actu existentem contemplari conabitur. At (per hypothesin) aliud imaginatur quod ejusdem causæ existentiam secludit : ergo (per propositionem 19 hujus) eo ipso contristabitur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: He who loves some thing similar to himself strives, as much as he can, to bring it about that he be loved in return by it (by proposition 33 of this). Therefore he who, out of love, has conferred a benefit upon someone, does this from the desire by which he is held, that he may be loved in return, that is (by proposition 34 of this) from hope of glory, or (by the scholium of proposition 30 of this) of joy; and thus (by proposition 12 of this) he will, as much as he can, imagine this cause of glory, that is, endeavor to contemplate it as actually existing. But (by the hypothesis) he imagines something else which excludes the existence of the same cause: therefore (by proposition 19 of this) by that very fact he will be saddened. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XLIII: Odium reciproco odio augetur et amore contra deleri potest.

PROPOSITION 43: Hatred is augmented by reciprocal hatred and, on the contrary, can be effaced by love.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui eum quem odit, odio contra erga se affectum esse imaginatur, eo ipso (per propositionem 40 hujus) novum odium oritur durante (per hypothesin) adhuc primo. Sed si contra eundem amore erga se affectum esse imaginetur, quatenus hoc imaginatur eatenus (per propositionem 30 hujus) se ipsum cum lætitia contemplatur et eatenus (per propositionem 29 hujus) eidem placere conabitur hoc est (per propositionem 41 hujus) eatenus conatur ipsum odio non habere nullaque tristitia afficere; qui quidem conatus (per propositionem 37 hujus) major vel minor erit pro ratione affectus ex quo oritur atque adeo si major fuerit illo qui ex odio oritur et quo rem quam odit (per propositionem 26 hujus) tristitia afficere conatur, ei prævalebit et odium ex animo delebit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: He who imagines that the one whom he hates is, in return, affected toward him with hatred, thereby (by Proposition 40 of this) a new hatred arises while (by the hypothesis) the first still endures. But if, on the contrary, he imagines that the same person is affected toward him with love, insofar as he imagines this, to that extent (by Proposition 30 of this) he contemplates himself with joy, and to that extent (by Proposition 29 of this) he will endeavor to please the same person, that is (by Proposition 41 of this), to that extent he endeavors not to hold him in hatred and to affect him with no sadness; which endeavor (by Proposition 37 of this) will be greater or lesser in proportion to the affect from which it arises; and therefore, if it is greater than that which arises from hatred and by which he endeavors (by Proposition 26 of this) to affect with sadness the thing he hates, it will prevail over it and delete hatred from the mind. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XLIV: Odium quod amore plane vincitur in amorem transit et amor propterea major est quam si odium non præcessisset.

PROPOSITION 44: Hatred which is plainly vanquished by love passes into love, and love is on that account greater than if hatred had not preceded.

DEMONSTRATIO: Eodem modo procedit ac propositionis 38 hujus. Nam qui rem quam odit sive quam cum tristitia contemplari solebat, amare incipit, eo ipso quod amat, lætatur et huic lætitiæ quam amor involvit (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 13 hujus) illa etiam accedit quæ ex eo oritur quod conatus amovendi tristitiam quam odium involvit (ut in propositione 37 hujus ostendimus) prorsus juvatur concomitante idea ejus quem odio habuit tanquam causa.

DEMONSTRATION: It proceeds in the same way as that of proposition 38 of this. For he who begins to love the thing which he hates, or which he used to contemplate with sadness, by that very fact that he loves, rejoices; and to this joy which love involves (see its definition in the scholium to proposition 13 of this) there is also added that which arises from the fact that the endeavor of removing the sadness which hatred involves (as we showed in proposition 37 of this) is utterly aided by the concomitant idea of him whom he held in hatred as the cause.

SCHOLIUM: Quamvis res ita se habeat, nemo tamen conabitur rem aliquam odio habere vel tristitia affici ut majore hac lætitia fruatur hoc est nemo spe damnum recuperandi damnum sibi inferri cupiet nec ægrotare desiderabit spe convalescendi. Nam unusquisque suum esse conservare et tristitiam quantum potest amovere semper conabitur. Quod si contra concipi posset hominem posse cupere aliquem odio habere ut eum postea majore amore prosequatur, tum eundem odio habere semper desiderabit.

SCHOLIUM: Although matters stand thus, nevertheless no one will endeavor to hold anything in hatred or to be affected with sadness in order to enjoy this greater gladness; that is, no one, by hope of recovering a loss, will desire to have a loss inflicted upon himself, nor will he desire to be sick in the hope of convalescing. For each person will always strive to conserve his being and to remove sadness as far as he can. But if, on the contrary, it could be conceived that a man could desire to hold someone in hatred so that afterward he may pursue him with greater love, then he would always desire to hold that same one in hatred.

Nam quo odium majus fuerit, eo amor erit major atque adeo desiderabit semper ut odium magis magisque augeatur et eadem de causa homo magis ac magis ægrotare conabitur ut majore lætitia ex restauranda valetudine postea fruatur atque adeo semper ægrotare conabitur, quod (per propositionem 6 hujus) est absurdum.

For the greater the hatred has been, the greater the love will be; and thus he will always desire that the hatred be increased more and more, and for the same reason a man will strive more and more to be ill, so that he may afterwards enjoy greater joy from restored health; and thus he will always strive to be ill, which (by proposition 6 of this) is absurd.

PROPOSITIO XLV: Si quis aliquem sibi similem odio in rem sibi similem quam amat, affectum esse imaginatur, eum odio habebit.

PROPOSITION 45: If someone imagines that someone like himself is affected with hatred toward a thing like himself which he loves, he will hate him.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam res amata eum qui ipsam odit, odio contra habet (per propositionem 40 hujus) adeoque amans qui aliquem imaginatur rem amatam odio habere, eo ipso rem amatam odio hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) tristitia affectam esse imaginatur et consequenter (per propositionem 21 hujus) contristatur idque concomitante idea ejus qui rem amatam odit tanquam causa hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ipsum odio habebit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For the loved thing holds in hatred, in turn, him who hates it (by Proposition 40 of this), and so the lover who imagines that someone holds the loved thing in hatred thereby imagines the loved thing to be affected with hatred, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this) with sadness, and consequently (by Proposition 21 of this) is saddened, and this with the concomitant idea of him who hates the loved thing as cause; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this) he will hold him in hatred. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XLVI: Si quis ab aliquo cujusdam classis sive nationis a sua diversæ lætitia vel tristitia affectus fuerit concomitante ejus idea sub nomine universali classis vel nationis tanquam causa, is non tantum illum sed omnes ejusdem classis vel nationis amabit vel odio habebit.

PROPOSITION 46: If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a certain class or nation different from his own, with the idea of him accompanying under the universal name of the class or nation as cause, he will not only love or hold in hatred that person, but all of the same class or nation.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus rei demonstratio patet ex propositione 16 hujus partis.

DEMONSTRATION: The demonstration of this matter is evident from proposition 16 of this part.

PROPOSITIO XLVII: Lætitia quæ ex eo oritur quod scilicet rem quam odimus destrui aut alio malo affici imaginamur, non oritur absque ulla animi tristitia.

PROPOSITION 47: The joy which arises from the fact that we imagine a thing which we hate to be destroyed or to be affected by some other evil, does not arise without any sadness of mind.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex propositione 27 hujus. Nam quatenus rem nobis similem tristitia affici imaginamur eatenus contristamur.

DEMONSTRATION: It is evident from proposition 27 of this. For insofar as we imagine a thing similar to us to be affected with sadness, to that extent we are saddened.

SCHOLIUM: Potest hæc propositio etiam demonstrari ex corollario propositionis 17 partis II. Quoties enim rei recordamur, quamvis ipsa actu non existat, eandem tamen ut præsentem contemplamur corpusque eodem modo afficitur; quare quatenus rei memoria viget eatenus homo determinatur ad eandem cum tristitia contemplandum; quæ determinatio manente adhuc rei imagine coercetur quidem memoria illarum rerum quæ hujus existentiam secludunt sed non tollitur atque adeo homo eatenus tantum lætatur quatenus hæc determinatio coercetur et hinc fit ut hæc lætitia quæ ex rei quam odimus malo oritur, toties repetatur quoties ejusdem rei recordamur. Nam uti diximus quando ejusdem rei imago excitatur, quia hæc ipsius rei existentiam involvit, hominem determinat ad rem cum eadem tristitia contemplandum qua eandem contemplari solebat cum ipsa existeret. Sed quia ejusdem rei imagini alias junxit quæ ejusdem existentiam secludunt, ideo hæc ad tristitiam determinatio statim coercetur et homo de novo lætatur et hoc toties quoties hæc repetitio fit.

SCHOLIUM: This proposition can also be demonstrated from the corollary of proposition 17 of part II. For whenever we recall a thing, although it does not actually exist, nevertheless we contemplate it as present, and the body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, insofar as the memory of the thing is vigorous, so far a man is determined to contemplate the same with sadness; which determination, the image of the thing still remaining, is indeed checked by the memory of those things which exclude this thing’s existence, but is not removed; and thus the man rejoices only insofar as this determination is checked, and hence it comes about that this joy, which arises from the harm of the thing we hate, is repeated as many times as we recall the same thing. For, as we have said, when the image of the same thing is aroused, because this involves the existence of the thing itself, it determines the man to contemplate the thing with the same sadness with which he was accustomed to contemplate it when it itself existed. But because to the image of the same thing he has joined other images which exclude the existence of the same, therefore this determination toward sadness is immediately checked, and the man is anew gladdened; and this as often as this repetition occurs.

Atque hæc eadem est causa cur homines lætantur quoties alicujus jam præteriti mali recordantur et cur pericula a quibus liberati sunt, narrare gaudeant. Nam ubi aliquod periculum imaginantur, idem veluti adhuc futurum contemplantur et ad id metuendum determinantur, quæ determinatio de novo coercetur idea libertatis quam hujus periculi ideæ junxerunt cum ab eodem liberati sunt quæque eos de novo securos reddit atque adeo de novo lætantur.

And this is the same cause why men rejoice whenever they recall some evil already past, and why they are glad to narrate the dangers from which they have been freed. For when they imagine some danger, they contemplate it as if still about to happen, and they are determined to fear it; which determination is anew restrained by the idea of liberty that they joined to the idea of this danger when they were freed from it, and which makes them anew secure, and thus they rejoice anew.

PROPOSITIO XLVIII: Amor et odium exempli gratia erga Petrum destruitur si tristitia quam hoc et lætitia quam ille involvit, ideæ alterius causæ jungatur et eatenus uterque diminuitur quatenus imaginamur Petrum non solum fuisse alterutrius causam.

PROPOSITION 48: Love and hatred, for example toward Peter, are destroyed if the sadness which hatred, and the gladness which love, involves be joined to the idea of another cause; and to that extent each is diminished, insofar as we imagine Peter not to have been the cause of either alone.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex sola amoris et odii definitione, quam vide in scholio propositionis 13 hujus. Nam propter hoc solum lætitia vocatur amor et tristitia odium erga Petrum quia scilicet Petrus hujus vel illius affectus causa esse consideratur. Hoc itaque prorsus vel ex parte sublato affectus quoque erga Petrum prorsus vel ex parte diminuitur.

DEMONSTRATION: It is evident from the mere definition of love and hatred, which see in the scholium to proposition 13 of this. For for this reason alone joy is called love and sadness hatred toward Peter, namely because Peter is considered to be the cause of this or that affect. Accordingly, with this removed either entirely or in part, the affect toward Peter likewise is diminished either entirely or in part.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITIO XLIX: Amor et odium erga rem quam liberam esse imaginamur, major ex pari causa uterque debet esse quam erga necessariam.

PROPOSITION 49: Love and hatred toward a thing which we imagine to be free, given an equal cause, must each be greater than toward one that is necessary.

DEMONSTRATIO: Res quam liberam esse imaginamur, debet (per definitionem 7 partis I) per se absque aliis percipi. Si igitur eandem lætitiæ vel tristitiæ causam esse imaginemur, eo ipso (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) eandem amabimus vel odio habebimus idque (per propositionem præcedentem) summo amore vel odio qui ex dato affectu oriri potest. Sed si rem quæ ejusdem affectus est causa ut necessariam imaginemur, tum (per eandem definitionem 7 partis I) ipsam non solam sed cum aliis ejusdem affectus causam esse imaginabimur atque adeo (per propositionem præcedentem) amor et odium erga ipsam minor erit.

DEMONSTRATION: A thing which we imagine to be free must (by definition 7 of part 1) be perceived through itself, without others. If therefore we imagine that the same is the cause of joy or of sadness, thereby (by the scholium of proposition 13 of this) we shall love or hold the same in hatred, and that (by the preceding proposition) with the highest love or hatred that can arise from the given affect. But if we imagine the thing which is the cause of the same affect as necessary, then (by the same definition 7 of part 1) we shall imagine it not alone but together with others to be the cause of the same affect; and thus (by the preceding proposition) love and hatred toward it will be lesser.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM: Hinc sequitur homines, quia se liberos esse existimant, majore amore vel odio se invicem prosequi quam alia; ad quod accedit affectuum imitatio, de qua vide propositiones 27, 34, 40 et 43 hujus.

SCHOLIUM: Hence it follows that men, because they reckon themselves to be free, pursue one another with greater love or hatred than other things; to which is added the imitation of affects, on which see propositions 27, 34, 40, and 43 of this.

PROPOSITIO L: Res quæcunque potest esse per accidens spei aut metus causa.

PROPOSITION 50: Anything whatsoever can, by accident, be a cause of hope or of fear.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio eadem via demonstratur qua propositio 15 hujus, quam vide una cum scholio II propositionis 18 hujus.

DEMONSTRATION: This proposition is demonstrated by the same method as proposition 15 of this; see it together with the 2nd scholium of proposition 18 of this.

SCHOLIUM: Res quæ per accidens spei aut metus sunt causæ, bona aut mala omina vocantur. Deinde quatenus hæc eadem omina sunt spei aut metus causa eatenus (per definitionem spei et metus, quam vide in scholio II propositionis 18 hujus) lætitiæ aut tristitiæ sunt causa et consequenter (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) eatenus eadem amamus vel odio habemus et (per propositionem 28 hujus) tanquam media ad ea quæ speramus, adhibere vel tanquam obstacula aut metus causas amovere conamur. Præterea ex propositione 25 hujus sequitur nos natura ita esse constitutos ut ea quæ speramus, facile, quæ autem timemus, difficile credamus et ut de iis plus minusve justo sentiamus.

SCHOLIUM: Things which are by accident causes of hope or fear are called good or evil omens. Then, insofar as these same omens are causes of hope or fear, to that extent (by the definition of hope and fear, which see in scholium 2 of proposition 18 of this) they are causes of joy or sadness; and consequently (by the corollary of proposition 15 of this) to that extent we love the same things or hold them in hatred, and (by proposition 28 of this) we try to employ them as means to the things we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of fear. Moreover, from proposition 25 of this it follows that we are constituted by nature in such a way that we readily believe the things we hope for, whereas the things we fear we believe with difficulty, and that we judge about them more or less than is just.

Atque ex his ortæ sunt superstitiones quibus homines ubique conflictantur. Cæterum non puto operæ esse pretium animi hic ostendere fluctuationes quæ ex spe et metu oriuntur quandoquidem ex sola horum affectuum definitione sequitur non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe (ut fusius suo loco explicabimus) et præterea quandoquidem quatenus aliquid speramus aut metuimus eatenus idem amamus vel odio habemus atque adeo quicquid de amore et odio diximus, facile unusquisque spei et metui applicare poterit.

And from these have arisen the superstitions with which human beings everywhere are beleaguered. However, I do not think it worth the effort here to show the fluctuations of mind that arise from hope and fear, since from the very definition of these affects alone it follows that there is no hope without fear nor fear without hope (as we shall explain more fully in its proper place); and moreover, since insofar as we hope for or fear something, to that extent we love or hate the same, whatever we have said about love and hate each person will easily be able to apply to hope and fear.

PROPOSITIO LI: Diversi homines ab uno eodemque objecto diversimode affici possunt et unus idemque homo ab uno eodemque objecto potest diversis temporibus diversimode affici.

PROPOSITION 51: Different men can be affected in diverse ways by one and the same object, and one and the same man can at different times be affected in diverse ways by one and the same object.

DEMONSTRATIO: Corpus humanum (per postulatum 3 partis II) a corporibus externis plurimis modis afficitur. Possunt igitur eodem tempore duo homines diversimode esse affecti atque adeo (per axioma 1 quod est post lemma 3, quod vide post propositionem 13 partis II) ab uno eodemque objecto possunt diversimode affici. Deinde (per idem postulatum) corpus humanum potest jam hoc jam alio modo esse affectum et consequenter (per idem axioma) ab uno eodemque objecto diversis temporibus diversimode affici.

DEMONSTRATION: The human body (by postulate 3 of part II) is affected in very many ways by external bodies. Therefore two men can at the same time be affected in diverse ways, and hence (by axiom 1 which is after lemma 3, which see after proposition 13 of part II) by one and the same object they can be affected in diverse ways. Then (by the same postulate) the human body can now in this, now in another way be affected, and consequently (by the same axiom) by one and the same object at different times be affected in diverse ways.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque fieri posse ut quod hic amat, alter odio habeat et quod hic metuit, alter non metuat et ut unus idemque homo jam amet quod antea oderit et ut jam audeat quod antea timuit etc. Deinde quia unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius et quid pejus sit (vide scholium propositionis 39 hujus) sequitur homines tam judicio quam affectu variare posse et hinc fit ut cum alios aliis comparamus, ex sola affectuum differentia a nobis distinguantur et ut alios intrepidos, alios timidos, alios denique alio nomine appellemus. Exempli gratia illum ego intrepidum vocabo qui malum contemnit quod ego timere soleo et si præterea ad hoc attendam quod ejus cupiditas malum inferendi ei quem odit et benefaciendi ei quem amat, non coercetur timore mali a quo ego contineri soleo, ipsum audacem appellabo.

SCHOLIUM: We see therefore that it can come about that what this man loves, another holds in hatred, and what this one fears, another does not fear; and that one and the same man now loves what previously he hated, and now dares what previously he feared, etc. Then, since each judges from his own affect what is good, what is evil, what is better and what is worse (see the Scholium of Proposition 39 of this part), it follows that men can vary as much in judgment as in affect; and hence it happens that, when we compare others with others, by the difference of affects alone they are distinguished by us, and that we call some intrepid, others timid, others finally by another name. For example, I shall call that man intrepid who contemns the evil which I am accustomed to fear; and if, besides, I attend to this, that his desire of inflicting evil on him whom he hates and of doing good to him whom he loves is not restrained by fear of the evil by which I am accustomed to be held back, I shall call him audacious.

Deinde ille mihi timidus videbitur qui malum timet quod ego contemnere soleo et si insuper ad hoc attendam quod ejus cupiditas coercetur timore mali quod me continere nequit, ipsum pusillanimem esse dicam et sic unusquisque judicabit. Denique ex hac hominis natura et judicii inconstantia ut et quod homo sæpe ex solo affectu de rebus judicat et quod res quas ad lætitiam vel tristitiam facere credit quasque propterea (per propositionem 28 hujus) ut fiant promovere vel amovere conatur, sæpe non nisi imaginariæ sint ut jam taceam alia quæ in II parte ostendimus de rerum incertitudine, facile concipimus hominem posse sæpe in causa esse tam ut contristetur quam ut lætetur sive ut tam tristitia quam lætitia afficiatur concomitante idea sui tanquam causa atque adeo facile intelligimus quid p™nitentia et quid acquiescentia in se ipso sit. Nempe p™nitentia est tristitia concomitante idea sui et acquiescentia in se ipso est lætitia concomitante idea sui tanquam causa et hi affectus vehementissimi sunt quia homines se liberos esse credunt (vide propositionem 49 hujus).

Then that man will seem timid to me who fears an evil which I am accustomed to contemn; and if, moreover, I attend to this, that his desire is restrained by fear of an evil which cannot restrain me, I shall say that he is pusillanimous—and so each one will judge. Finally, from this nature of man and the inconstancy of judgment—both that man often judges about things from mere affect, and that the things which he believes conduce to joy or to sadness and which therefore (by proposition 28 of this) he strives to promote or to remove so that they may occur are often nothing but imaginary, to say nothing now of other matters which in Part 2 we have shown concerning the uncertainty of things—we easily conceive that a man can often be the cause both that he is saddened and that he is gladdened, that is, that he is affected both by sadness and by joy, with a concomitant idea of himself as cause; and thus we easily understand what repentance and what acquiescence in oneself are. Namely, repentance is sadness with a concomitant idea of oneself, and acquiescence in oneself is joy with a concomitant idea of oneself as cause; and these affects are most vehement, because men believe themselves to be free (see proposition 49 of this).

PROPOSITIO LII: Objectum quod simul cum aliis antea vidimus vel quod nihil habere imaginamur nisi quod commune est pluribus, non tamdiu contemplabimur ac illud quod aliquid singulare habere imaginamur.

PROPOSITION 52: The object which we have previously seen together with others, or which we imagine to have nothing except what is common to many, we shall not contemplate for so long as that which we imagine to have something singular.

DEMONSTRATIO: Simulatque objectum quod cum aliis vidimus, imaginamur, statim et aliorum recordamur (per propositionem 18 partis II, cujus etiam scholium vide) et sic ex unius contemplatione statim in contemplationem alterius incidimus. Atque eadem est ratio objecti quod nihil habere imaginamur nisi quod commune est pluribus. Nam eo ipso supponimus nos nihil in eo contemplari quod antea cum aliis non viderimus.

DEMONSTRATION: As soon as we imagine an object which we have seen together with others, we straightway also recall the others (by Proposition 18 of Part II; see also its scholium), and thus from the contemplation of one we at once fall into the contemplation of another. And the same reasoning holds for an object which we imagine to have nothing except what is common to several: for by that very fact we suppose that we contemplate nothing in it which we had not previously seen with others.

Verum cum supponimus nos in objecto aliquo aliquid singulare quod antea nunquam vidimus, imaginari, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod mens dum illud objectum contemplatur, nullum aliud in se habeat in cujus contemplationem ex contemplatione illius incidere potest atque adeo ad illud solum contemplandum determinata est. Ergo objectum etc. Q.E.D.

But when we suppose that we imagine in some object something singular which we have never seen before, we say nothing other than that the mind, while it contemplates that object, has within itself no other thing into whose contemplation it can fall from the contemplation of that one, and thus is determined to contemplate that one alone. Therefore the object, etc. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc mentis affectio sive rei singularis imaginatio quatenus sola in mente versatur, vocatur admiratio, quæ si ab objecto quod timemus moveatur, consternatio dicitur quia mali admiratio hominem suspensum in sola sui contemplatione ita tenet ut de aliis cogitare non valeat quibus illud malum vitare posset. Sed si id quod admiramur sit hominis alicujus prudentia, industria vel aliquid hujusmodi, quia eo ipso hominem nobis longe antecellere contemplamur, tum admiratio vocatur veneratio; alias horror si hominis iram, invidiam etc. admiramur.

SCHOLIUM: This affection of the mind, or the imagination of a singular thing, insofar as it alone is engaged in the mind, is called admiration; which, if it is moved by an object that we fear, is called consternation, because admiration of an evil holds a man suspended in the contemplation of itself alone in such a way that he is not able to think of other things by which he might be able to avoid that evil. But if that which we admire is someone’s prudence, industry, or something of this sort, because by that very fact we contemplate the man as far excelling us, then admiration is called veneration; otherwise horror, if we admire a man’s anger, envy, etc.

Deinde si hominis quem amamus prudentiam, industriam etc. admiramur, amor eo ipso (per propositionem 12 hujus) major erit et hunc amorem admirationi sive venerationi junctum devotionem vocamus. Et ad hunc modum concipere etiam possumus odium, spem, securitatem et alios affectus admirationi junctos atque adeo plures affectus deducere poterimus quam qui receptis vocabulis indicari solent.

Then, if we admire the prudence, industry, etc., of a man whom we love, the love on that very account (by Proposition 12 of this) will be greater, and we call this love joined to admiration or veneration devotion. And in this way we can also conceive hatred, hope, security, and other affections joined to admiration, and thus we shall be able to deduce more affections than are wont to be indicated by received terms.

Unde apparet affectuum nomina inventa esse magis ex eorum vulgari usu quam ex eorundem accurata cognitione. Admirationi opponitur contemptus cujus tamen causa hæc plerumque est quod scilicet ex eo quod aliquem rem aliquam admirari, amare, metuere etc. videmus vel ex eo quod res aliqua primo aspectu apparet similis rebus quas admiramur, amamus, metuimus etc.

Whence it appears that the names of affects have been invented more from their vulgar use than from an accurate cognition of the same. To admiration there is opposed contempt, the cause of which, however, is for the most part this: namely, either from the fact that we see someone admire, love, fear some thing, or from the fact that some thing at first aspect appears similar to things which we admire, love, fear, etc.

(per propositionem 15 cum ejus corollario et propositionem 27 hujus) determinamur ad eandem rem admirandum, amandum, metuendum etc. Sed si ex ipsius rei præsentia vel accuratiore contemplatione, id omne de eadem negare cogamur quod causa admirationis, amoris, metus etc. esse potest, tum mens ex ipsa rei præsentia magis ad ea cogitandum quæ in objecto non sunt quam quæ in ipso sunt, determinata manet cum tamen contra ex objecti præsentia id præcipue cogitare soleat quod in objecto est.

(by proposition 15 with its corollary and proposition 27 of this) we are determined to admire, to love, to fear, etc., the same thing. But if from the presence of the thing itself or from a more accurate contemplation we are compelled to negate all of that concerning the same which can be a cause of admiration, love, fear, etc., then the mind, from the very presence of the thing, remains determined to think rather on those things which are not in the object than on those which are in it, although, contrariwise, from the object’s presence it is accustomed chiefly to think that which is in the object.

Porro sicut devotio ex rei quam amamus admiratione sic irrisio ex rei quam odimus vel metuimus contemptu oritur et dedignatio ex stultitiæ contemptu sicuti veneratio ex admiratione prudentiæ. Possumus denique amorem, spem, gloriam et alios affectus junctos contemptui concipere atque inde alios præterea affectus deducere quos etiam nullo singulari vocabulo ab aliis distinguere solemus.

Furthermore, just as devotion arises from the admiration of the thing we love, so derision arises from the contempt of the thing we hate or fear, and disdain from the contempt of stupidity, just as veneration from the admiration of prudence. We can, finally, conceive love, hope, glory, and other affects conjoined with contempt, and from there furthermore deduce other affects which we also are wont to distinguish from others by no singular term.

PROPOSITIO LIII: Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur, lætatur et eo magis quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginatur.

PROPOSITION 53: When the mind contemplates itself and its power of acting, it rejoices, and the more so, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting.

DEMONSTRATIO: Homo se ipsum non cognoscit nisi per affectiones sui corporis earumque ideas (per propositiones 19 et 23 partis II). Cum ergo fit ut mens se ipsam possit contemplari, eo ipso ad majorem perfectionem transire hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) lætitia affici supponitur et eo majore quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginari potest. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: A man does not know himself except through the affections of his body and their ideas (by Propositions 19 and 23 of Part 2). When, therefore, it happens that the mind can contemplate itself, by that very fact it is supposed to pass over to a greater perfection, that is (by the scholium to Proposition 11 of this), to be affected with joy, and the greater, the more distinctly it can imagine itself and its power of acting. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hæc lætitia magis magisque fovetur quo magis homo se ab aliis laudari imaginatur. Nam quo magis se ab aliis laudari imaginatur eo majore lætitia alios ab ipso affici imaginatur idque concomitante idea sui (per scholium propositionis 29 hujus) atque adeo (per propositionem 27 hujus) ipse majore lætitia concomitante idea sui afficitur. Q.E.D.

COROLLARY: This joy is fostered more and more, the more a man imagines himself to be praised by others. For the more he imagines himself to be praised by others, the more he imagines others to be affected by him with greater joy, and this with a concomitant idea of himself (by the scholium of proposition 29 of this), and thus (by proposition 27 of this) he himself is affected with greater joy accompanied by the idea of himself. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO LIV: Mens ea tantum imaginari conatur quæ ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt.

PROPOSITION 54: The mind endeavors to imagine only those things which posit its power of acting.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis conatus sive potentia est ipsa ipsius mentis essentia (per propositionem 7 hujus); mentis autem essentia (ut per se notum) id tantum quod mens est et potest, affirmat; at non id quod non est neque potest adeoque id tantum imaginari conatur quod ipsius agendi potentiam affirmat sive ponit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The mind’s striving or power is the very essence of the mind itself (by proposition 7 of this); but the essence of the mind (as is self-evident) affirms only that which the mind is and can do, and not that which it is not nor can; and thus it strives to imagine only that which affirms or posits its power of acting. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO LV: Cum mens suam impotentiam imaginatur, eo ipso contristatur.

PROPOSITION 55: When the mind imagines its own impotence, by that very fact it is saddened.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis essentia id tantum quod mens est et potest, affirmat sive de natura mentis est ea tantummodo imaginari quæ ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt (per propositionem præcedentem). Cum itaque dicimus quod mens dum se ipsam contemplatur, suam imaginatur impotentiam, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod dum mens aliquid imaginari conatur quod ipsius agendi potentiam ponit, hic ejus conatus coercetur sive (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) quod ipsa contristatur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The essence of the mind affirms only that which the mind is and can, or it is of the nature of the mind to imagine only those things which posit its power of acting (by the preceding proposition). When therefore we say that the mind, while it contemplates itself, imagines its impotence, we say nothing else than that while the mind endeavors to imagine something which posits its power of acting, here its endeavor is restrained, or (by the scholium of proposition 11 of this) that it is saddened. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hæc tristitia magis ac magis fovetur si se ab aliis vituperari imaginatur; quod eodem modo demonstratur ac corollarium propositionis 53 hujus.

COROLLARY: This sadness is more and more fostered if it imagines itself to be vituperated by others; which is demonstrated in the same manner as the corollary of proposition 53 of this.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc tristitia concomitante idea nostræ imbecillitatis humilitas appellatur; lætitia autem quæ ex contemplatione nostri oritur, philautia vel acquiescentia in se ipso vocatur. Et quoniam hæc toties repetitur quoties homo suas virtutes sive suam agendi potentiam contemplatur, hinc ergo etiam fit ut unusquisque facta sua narrare suique tam corporis quam animi vires ostentare gestiat et ut homines hac de causa sibi invicem molesti sint. Ex quibus iterum sequitur homines natura esse invidos (vide scholium propositionis 24 et scholium propositionis 32 hujus) sive ob suorum æqualium imbecillitatem gaudere et contra propter eorundem virtutem contristari.

SCHOLIUM: This sadness, with the concomitant idea of our imbecility, is called humility; but the joy which arises from the contemplation of ourselves is called philautia or acquiescence in oneself. And since this is repeated as often as a man contemplates his virtues or his power of acting, hence therefore it also happens that each person longs to narrate his deeds and to display the strengths of himself both of body and of mind, and that men on this account are troublesome to one another. From which it again follows that men are by nature envious (see the scholium to Proposition 24 and the scholium to Proposition 32 of this), that is, that they rejoice at the imbecility of their equals and, conversely, are saddened on account of those same persons’ virtue.

Nam quoties unusquisque suas actiones imaginatur toties lætitia (per propositionem 53 hujus) afficitur et eo majore quo actiones plus perfectionis exprimere et easdem distinctius imaginatur hoc est (per illa quæ in scholio I propositionis 40 partis II dicta sunt) quo magis easdem ab aliis distinguere et ut res singulares contemplari potest. Quare unusquisque ex contemplatione sui tunc maxime gaudebit quando aliquid in se contemplatur quod de reliquis negat. Sed si id quod de se affirmat, ad universalem hominis vel animalis ideam refert, non tantopere gaudebit et contra contristabitur si suas ad aliorum actiones comparatas imbecilliores esse imaginetur, quam quidem tristitiam (per propositionem 28 hujus) amovere conabitur idque suorum æqualium actiones perperam interpretando vel suas quantum potest adornando.

Now, as often as each person imagines his actions, so often he is affected with gladness (by proposition 53 of this), and the greater, the more the actions express more perfection, and the more distinctly he imagines the same, that is (by those things which were said in Scholium 1 of proposition 40 of Part 2), the more he can distinguish the same from others and contemplate them as singular things. Wherefore each one will then most of all rejoice from the contemplation of himself when he contemplates in himself something which he denies of the rest. But if that which he affirms of himself he refers to the universal idea of man or of animal, he will not rejoice so greatly; and on the contrary he will be saddened if he imagines his own actions, compared with those of others, to be more feeble; which sadness indeed (by proposition 28 of this) he will strive to remove, and that by interpreting the actions of his equals wrongly, or by adorning his own as much as he can.

Apparet igitur homines natura proclives esse ad odium et invidiam ad quam accedit ipsa educatio. Nam parentes solo honoris et invidiæ stimulo liberos ad virtutem concitare solent. Sed scrupulus forsan remanet quod non raro hominum virtutes admiremur eosque veneremur.

It therefore appears that human beings are by nature prone to odium and envy, to which education itself accedes. For parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue by the sole stimulus of honor and envy. But perhaps a scruple remains, namely that we not rarely admire the virtues of men and venerate them.

Hunc ergo ut amoveam sequens addam corollarium.

Therefore, to remove this, I will add the following corollary.

COROLLARIUM: Nemo virtutem alicui nisi æquali invidet.

COROLLARY: No one envies anyone’s virtue except an equal.

DEMONSTRATIO: Invidia est ipsum odium (vide scholium propositionis 24 hujus) sive (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) tristitia hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) affectio qua hominis agendi potentia seu conatus coercetur. At homo (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus) nihil agere conatur neque cupit nisi quod ex data sua natura sequi potest; ergo homo nullam de se agendi potentiam seu (quod idem est) virtutem prædicari cupiet quæ naturæ alterius est propria et suæ aliena adeoque ejus cupiditas coerceri hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) ipse contristari nequit ex eo quod aliquam virtutem in aliquo ipsi dissimili contemplatur et consequenter neque ei invidere poterit. At quidem suo æquali qui cum ipso ejusdem naturæ supponitur.

DEMONSTRATION: Envy is hatred itself (see the scholium to proposition 24 of this), or (by the scholium to proposition 13 of this) sadness, that is (by the scholium to proposition 11 of this) an affect by which a human’s power of acting, or endeavor, is constrained. But a human (by the scholium to proposition 9 of this) endeavors to do and desires nothing except what can follow from his given nature; therefore a human will not desire that any power of acting, or (which is the same) virtue, be predicated of himself which is proper to another’s nature and alien to his own, and thus his desire cannot be constrained, that is (by the scholium to proposition 11 of this) he himself cannot be saddened, from the fact that he contemplates some virtue in someone dissimilar to himself, and consequently neither will he be able to envy him. But indeed his equal, who is assumed to be of the same nature with himself.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM: Cum igitur supra in scholio propositionis 52 hujus partis dixerimus nos hominem venerari ex eo quod ipsius prudentiam, fortitudinem etc. admiramur, id fit (ut ex ipsa propositione patet) quia has virtutes ei singulariter inesse et non ut nostræ naturæ communes imaginamur adeoque easdem ipsi non magis invidebimus quam arboribus altitudinem et leonibus fortitudinem etc.

SCHOLIUM: Since therefore above in the scholium of proposition 52 of this part we said that we venerate a man because we admire his prudence, fortitude, etc., this happens (as is evident from the proposition itself) because we imagine these virtues to inhere in him singularly and not as common to our nature; and so we shall no more envy him these same things than we do height in trees and strength in lions, etc.

PROPOSITIO LVI: Lætitiæ, tristitiæ et cupiditatis et consequenter uniuscujusque affectus qui ex his componitur ut animi fluctuationis vel qui ab his derivatur nempe amoris, odii, spei, metus etc. tot species dantur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur.

PROPOSITION 56: Of joy, sadness, and desire, and consequently of each affect that is composed from these—such as fluctuation of mind—or that is derived from them, namely love, hatred, hope, fear, etc., there are as many species as there are species of the objects by which we are affected.

DEMONSTRATIO: Lætitia et tristitia et consequenter affectus qui ex his componuntur vel ex his derivantur, passiones sunt (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus); nos autem (per propositionem 1 hujus) necessario patimur quatenus ideas habemus inadæquatas et quatenus easdem habemus (per propositionem 3 hujus) eatenus tantum patimur hoc est (vide scholium I propositionis 40 partis II) eatenus tantum necessario patimur quatenus imaginamur sive (vide propositionem 17 partis II cum ejus scholio) quatenus afficimur affectu qui naturam nostri corporis et naturam corporis externi involvit. Natura igitur uniuscujusque passionis ita necessario debet explicari ut objecti a quo afficimur, natura exprimatur. Nempe lætitia quæ ex objecto exempli gratia A oritur, naturam ipsius objecti A et lætitia quæ ex objecto B oritur, ipsius objecti B naturam involvit atque adeo hi duo lætitiæ affectus natura sunt diversi quia ex causis diversæ naturæ oriuntur.

DEMONSTRATION: Joy and sadness, and consequently the affects which are composed from these or are derived from these, are passions (by the scholium of proposition 11 of this Part); but we (by proposition 1 of this Part) necessarily suffer insofar as we have inadequate ideas, and insofar as we have the same (by proposition 3 of this Part) only so far do we suffer, that is (see scholium 1 of proposition 40 of Part 2), only so far do we necessarily suffer insofar as we imagine; or (see proposition 17 of Part 2 with its scholium) insofar as we are affected by an affect which involves the nature of our body and the nature of an external body. Therefore the nature of each passion must be explained in such a way that the nature of the object by which we are affected is expressed. Namely, the joy which arises from an object, for example A, involves the nature of the object A itself; and the joy which arises from an object B involves the nature of the object B itself; and thus these two affects of joy are different in nature because they arise from causes of a different nature.

Sic etiam tristitiæ affectus qui ex uno objecto oritur, diversus natura est a tristitia quæ ab alia causa oritur, quod etiam de amore, odio, spe, metu, animi fluctuatione etc. intelligendum est ac proinde lætitiæ, tristitiæ, amoris, odii etc. tot species necessario dantur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur.

Thus also the affect of sadness which arises from one object is different in nature from the sadness which arises from another cause; the same is to be understood of love, hatred, hope, fear, fluctuation of mind, etc.; and accordingly so many species of joy, sadness, love, hatred, etc., are necessarily given as there are species of objects by which we are affected.

At cupiditas est ipsa uniuscujusque essentia seu natura quatenus ex data quacunque ejus constitutione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum (vide scholium propositionis 9 hujus); ergo prout unusquisque a causis externis hac aut illa lætitiæ, tristitiæ, amoris, odii etc. specie afficitur hoc est prout ejus natura hoc aut alio modo constituitur, ita ejus cupiditas alia atque alia esse et natura unius a natura alterius cupiditatis tantum differre necesse est quantum affectus a quibus unaquæque oritur, inter se differunt. Dantur itaque tot species cupiditatis quot sunt species lætitiæ, tristitiæ, amoris etc.

But desire is the very essence of each thing, or nature, insofar as from whatever given constitution of it it is conceived as determined to do something (see the scholium of proposition 9 of this); therefore, insofar as each person is affected by external causes by this or that species of joy, sadness, love, hatred, etc., that is, insofar as his nature is constituted in this or that way, thus his desire must be now one, now another, and the nature of one desire must differ from the nature of another desire by as much as the affects from which each arises differ among themselves. Therefore, there are as many species of desire as there are species of joy, sadness, love, etc.

et consequenter (per jam ostensa) quot sunt objectorum species a quibus afficimur. Q.E.D.

and consequently (by what has already been shown) as many as there are species of objects by which we are affected. Which was to be demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM: Inter affectuum species quæ (per propositionem præcedentem) perplurimæ esse debent, insignes sunt luxuria, ebrietas, libido, avaritia et ambitio, quæ non nisi amoris vel cupiditatis sunt notiones quæ hujus utriusque affectus naturam explicant per objecta ad quæ referuntur. Nam per luxuriam, ebrietatem, libidinem, avaritiam et ambitionem nihil aliud intelligimus quam convivandi, potandi, coeundi, divitiarum et gloriæ immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem. Præterea hi affectus quatenus eos per solum objectum ad quod referuntur ab aliis distinguimus, contrarios non habent.

SCHOLIUM: Among the species of affects which (by the preceding proposition) must be very numerous, noteworthy are luxury, ebriety, libido, avarice, and ambition, which are nothing but notions of love or of desire that explain the nature of either of these affects through the objects to which they are referred. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition we understand nothing else than an immoderate love or desire of feasting, drinking, coupling, riches, and glory. Moreover, these affects, insofar as we distinguish them from others solely by the object to which they are referred, have no contraries.

Nam temperantia quam luxuriæ et sobrietas quam ebrietati et denique castitas quam libidini opponere solemus, affectus seu passiones non sunt sed animi indicant potentiam quæ hos affectus moderatur. Cæterum reliquas affectuum species hic explicare nec possum (quia tot sunt quot objectorum species) nec si possem, necesse est. Nam ad id quod intendimus nempe ad affectuum vires et mentis in eosdem potentiam determinandum, nobis sufficit uniuscujusque affectus generalem habere definitionem.

For the temperance which we are accustomed to oppose to luxury, and sobriety which we oppose to ebriety, and finally chastity which we oppose to libido, are not affects or passions but indicate the mind’s power which moderates these affects. Moreover, the remaining species of affects I cannot here explain (because they are as many as the species of objects), nor, even if I could, is it necessary. For for that which we intend—namely, to determine the forces of the affects and the mind’s power over the same—it suffices for us to have a general definition of each affect.

Sufficit inquam nobis affectuum et mentis communes proprietates intelligere ut determinare possimus qualis et quanta sit mentis potentia in moderandis et coercendis affectibus. Quamvis itaque magna sit differentia inter hunc et illum amoris, odii vel cupiditatis affectum exempli gratia inter amorem erga liberos et inter amorem erga uxorem, nobis tamen has differentias cognoscere et affectuum naturam et originem ulterius indagare, non est opus.

Suffices, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the affects and of the mind, so that we may be able to determine of what kind and how great is the mind’s power in moderating and coercing the affects. Although, therefore, there is a great difference between this and that affect of love, hatred, or cupidity—for example, between love toward children and love toward a wife—nevertheless, for us to know these differences and to investigate further the nature and origin of the affects, there is no need.

PROPOSITIO LVII: Quilibet uniuscujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt.

PROPOSITION 57: Every affect of each individual differs from the affect of another only as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio patet ex axiomate 1, quod vide post lemma 3 scholiumque propositionis 13 partis II. At nihilominus eandem ex trium primitivorum affectuum definitionibus demonstrabimus. Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, lætitiam vel tristitiam referuntur ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones, ostendunt. At cupiditas est ipsa uniuscujusque natura seu essentia (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 9 hujus); ergo uniuscujusque individui cupiditas a cupiditate alterius tantum discrepat quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt.

DEMONSTRATION: This proposition is evident from Axiom 1, which see after Lemma 3 and the Scholium of Proposition 13 of Part 2. But nonetheless we shall demonstrate the same from the definitions of the three primitive affects. All affects are referred to desire, joy, or sadness, as the definitions which we have given of them show. But desire is the very nature or essence of each individual (see its definition in the Scholium of Proposition 9 of this Part); therefore the desire of each individual differs from the desire of another only as much as the nature or essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.

Lætitia deinde et tristitia passiones sunt quibus uniuscujusque potentia seu conatus in suo esse perseverandi augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur (per propositionem 11 hujus et ejus scholium). At per conatum in suo esse perseverandi quatenus ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, appetitum et cupiditatem intelligimus (vide scholium propositionis 9 hujus); ergo lætitia et tristitia est ipsa cupiditas sive appetitus quatenus a causis externis augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur hoc est (per idem scholium) est ipsa cujusque natura atque adeo uniuscujusque lætitia vel tristitia a lætitia vel tristitia alterius tantum etiam discrepat quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt et consequenter quilibet uniuscujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat etc. Q.E.D.

Joy then and sadness are passions by which the power or conatus of each to persevere in its being is increased or diminished, is helped or is restrained (by Proposition 11 of this and its scholium). But by the conatus of persevering in its being, insofar as it is referred to mind and body together, we understand appetite and desire (see the scholium to Proposition 9 of this); therefore joy and sadness are the very desire or appetite insofar as they are increased or diminished, helped or restrained by external causes, that is (by the same scholium) they are the very nature of each; and thus the joy or sadness of each also differs from the joy or sadness of another only as much as the nature or essence of the one differs from the essence of the other, and consequently each affection of each individual differs from the affection of another only so much, etc. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hinc sequitur affectus animalium quæ irrationalia dicuntur (bruta enim sentire nequaquam dubitare possumus postquam mentis novimus originem) ab affectibus hominum tantum differre quantum eorum natura a natura humana differt. Fertur quidem equus et homo libidine procreandi; at ille libidine equina hic autem humana. Sic etiam libidines et appetitus insectorum, piscium et avium alii atque alii esse debent.

SCHOLIUM: Hence it follows that the affects of animals which are called irrational (for we can by no means doubt that brutes feel, after we have come to know the origin of the mind) differ from the affects of men only as much as their nature differs from human nature. Indeed both horse and man are borne along by the libido of procreating; but the former by an equine libido, the latter by a human. Thus also the libidos and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must be of this sort and that, respectively.

Quamvis itaque unumquodque individuum sua qua constat natura, contentum vivat eaque gaudeat, vita tamen illa qua unumquodque est contentum et gaudium nihil aliud est quam idea seu anima ejusdem individui atque adeo gaudium unius a gaudio alterius tantum natura discrepat quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Denique ex præcedenti propositione sequitur non parum etiam interesse inter gaudium quo ebrius exempli gratia ducitur et inter gaudium quo potitur philosophus, quod hic in transitu monere volui. Atque hæc de affectibus qui ad hominem referuntur quatenus patitur.

Although therefore each individual, with the nature by which it consists, lives content and rejoices in it, nevertheless that life with which each is content and that joy are nothing other than the idea or soul of the same individual; and thus the joy of one differs in nature from the joy of another just as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other. Finally, from the preceding proposition it follows that there is not a little difference also between the joy by which a drunkard, for example, is led and the joy which the philosopher possesses, which I wished here in passing to note. And so much for the affects which are referred to man insofar as he suffers.

Superest ut pauca addam de iis qui ad eundem referuntur quatenus agit.

It remains that I add a few things about those which are referred to the same insofar as he acts.

PROPOSITIO LVIII: Præter lætitiam et cupiditatem quæ passiones sunt, alii lætitiæ et cupiditatis affectus dantur qui ad nos quatenus agimus, referuntur.

PROPOSITION 58: Besides joy and cupidity which are passions, other affects of joy and of cupidity are given which are referred to us, insofar as we act.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam concipit, lætatur (per propositionem 53 hujus) : mens autem se ipsam necessario contemplatur quando veram sive adæquatam ideam concipit (per propositionem 43 partis II). At mens quasdam ideas adæquatas concipit (per scholium II propositionis 40 partis II) : ergo eatenus etiam lætatur quatenus ideas adæquatas concipit hoc est (per propositionem 1 hujus) quatenus agit. Deinde mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, in suo esse perseverare conatur (per propositionem 9 hujus) : at per conatum cupiditatem intelligimus (per ejusdem scholium); ergo cupiditas ad nos refertur etiam quatenus intelligimus sive (per propositionem 1 hujus) quatenus agimus. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting, it rejoices (by Proposition 53 of this); but the mind necessarily contemplates itself when it conceives a true or adequate idea (by Proposition 43 of Part II). But the mind conceives certain adequate ideas (by Scholium 2 of Proposition 40 of Part II); therefore, to that extent also it rejoices in so far as it conceives adequate ideas, that is (by Proposition 1 of this), in so far as it acts. Next, the mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas and in so far as it has confused ones, endeavors to persevere in its being (by Proposition 9 of this); but by endeavor we understand desire (by the Scholium of the same); therefore desire is referred to us also in so far as we understand, or (by Proposition 1 of this) in so far as we act. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO LIX: Inter omnes affectus qui ad mentem quatenus agit referuntur, nulli alii sunt quam qui ad lætitiam vel cupiditatem referuntur.

PROPOSITION 59: Among all the affects which are referred to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none other than those which are referred to joy or desire.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, lætitiam vel tristitiam referuntur ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones ostendunt. Per tristitiam autem intelligimus quod mentis cogitandi potentia minuitur vel coercetur (per propositionem 11 hujus et ejus scholium) adeoque mens quatenus contristatur eatenus ejus intelligendi hoc est ejus agendi potentia (per propositionem 1 hujus) minuitur vel coercetur adeoque nulli tristitiæ affectus ad mentem referri possunt quatenus agit sed tantum affectus lætitiæ et cupiditatis qui (per propositionem præcedentem) eatenus etiam ad mentem referuntur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: All affects are referred to desire, joy, or sadness, as the definitions we have given show. By sadness, however, we understand that the mind’s power of thinking is diminished or constrained (by Proposition 11 of this and its Scholium), and so, insofar as the mind is saddened, to that extent its power of understanding, that is, its power of acting (by Proposition 1 of this), is diminished or constrained; and thus no affects of sadness can be referred to the mind insofar as it acts, but only affects of joy and desire, which (by the preceding Proposition) to that extent also are referred to the mind. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Omnes actiones quæ sequuntur ex affectibus qui ad mentem referuntur quatenus intelligit, ad fortitudinem refero quam in animositatem et generositatem distinguo. Nam per animositatem intelligo cupiditatem qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo rationis dictamine conservare. Per generositatem autem cupiditatem intelligo qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines juvare et sibi amicitia jungere.

SCHOLIUM: All actions which follow from affects that are referred to the mind, insofar as it understands, I refer to fortitude, which I distinguish into animosity and generosity. For by animosity I understand the desire by which each person strives to preserve his own being by the sole dictate of reason. By generosity, however, I understand the desire by which each person, by the sole dictate of reason, strives to help the other human beings and to bind them to himself by friendship.

Eas itaque actiones quæ solum agentis utile intendunt, ad animositatem et quæ alterius etiam utile intendunt ad generositatem refero. Temperantia igitur, sobrietas et animi in periculis præsentia etc. animositatis sunt species; modestia autem, clementia etc.

Therefore the actions which intend only the agent’s utility I refer to animosity, and those which intend another’s utility as well to generosity. Temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind in dangers, etc., are species of animosity; modesty, however, clemency, etc.

species generositatis sunt. Atque his puto me præcipuos affectus animique fluctuationes quæ ex compositione trium primitivorum affectuum nempe cupiditatis, lætitiæ et tristitiæ oriuntur, explicuisse perque primas suas causas ostendisse. Ex quibus apparet nos a causis externis multis modis agitari nosque perinde ut maris undæ a contrariis ventis agitatæ fluctuari nostri eventus atque fati inscios.

are species of generosity. And with these I think that I have explained the chief affects and the mind’s fluctuations, which arise from the composition of the three primitive affects, namely desire, gladness, and sadness, and have shown them through their first causes. From which it appears that we are in many ways agitated by external causes, and that we, just like the waves of the sea agitated by contrary winds, fluctuate, unknowing of our outcomes and of our fate.

At dixi me præcipuos tantum, non omnes qui dari possunt animi conflictus ostendisse. Nam eadem via qua supra procedendo facile possumus ostendere amorem esse junctum p™nitentiæ, dedignationi, pudori etc. Imo unicuique ex jam dictis clare constare credo affectus tot modis alios cum aliis posse componi indeque tot variationes oriri ut nullo numero definiri queant.

But I said that I have shown only the principal, not all the conflicts of mind that can be given. For by the same path, proceeding as above, we can easily show that love is joined with penitence, disdain, shame, etc. Nay rather, from what has already been said I believe it is clear to everyone that the affects can be compounded in so many ways, one with another, and that from this so many variations arise that they cannot be defined by any number.

Sed ad meum institutum præcipuos tantum enumeravisse sufficit nam reliqui quos omisi plus curiositatis quam utilitatis haberent. Attamen de amore hoc notandum restat quod scilicet sæpissime contingit dum re quam appetebamus fruimur, ut corpus ex ea fruitione novam acquirat constitutionem a qua aliter determinatur et aliæ rerum imagines in eo excitantur et simul mens alia imaginari aliaque cupere incipit. Exempli gratia cum aliquid quod nos sapore delectare solet, imaginamur, eodem frui nempe comedere cupimus.

But for my undertaking it suffices to have enumerated only the principal ones, for the rest which I omitted would have more curiosity than utility. Yet about love this remains to be noted, namely that it very often happens, while we enjoy the thing which we had desired, that the body from that fruition acquires a new constitution, by which it is determined otherwise, and other images of things are excited in it, and at the same time the mind begins to imagine other things and to desire other things. For example, when we imagine something which is wont to delight us by flavor, we desire to enjoy the same, namely to eat.

At quamdiu eodem sic fruimur, stomachus adimpletur corpusque aliter constituitur. Si igitur corpore jam aliter disposito ejusdem cibi imago quia ipse præsens adest, fomentetur et consequenter conatus etiam sive cupiditas eundem comedendi, huic cupiditati seu conatui nova illa constitutio repugnabit et consequenter cibi quem appetebamus, præsentia odiosa erit et hoc est quod fastidium et tædium vocamus. Cæterum corporis affectiones externas quæ in affectibus observantur, ut sunt tremor, livor, singultus, risus etc.

But as long as we thus enjoy the same thing, the stomach is filled and the body is constituted otherwise. If therefore, with the body now otherwise disposed, the image of the same food, because it itself is present, is fomented and consequently the conatus also, that is, the desire of eating the same, this new constitution will resist this desire or conatus, and consequently the presence of the food which we were craving will be odious; and this is what we call disgust and tedium. Moreover, the external affections of the body which are observed in the affects, such as trembling, lividity, sobbing, laughter, etc.

neglexi quia ad solum corpus absque ulla ad mentem relatione referuntur. Denique de affectuum definitionibus quædam notanda sunt, quas propterea hic ordine repetam et quid in unaquaque observandum est, iisdem interponam.

i have neglected them because they are referred to the body alone, without any relation to the mind. finally, certain things about the definitions of the affects are to be noted, which for that reason i shall here repeat in order, and i will interpose among them what in each one is to be observed.

AFFECTUUM DEFINITIONES I. Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum.

DEFINITIONS OF THE AFFECTS 1. Desire is the very essence of man, insofar as, from whatever given affection of it, it is conceived as determined to do something.

EXPLICATIO: Diximus supra in scholio propositionis 9 hujus partis cupiditatem esse appetitum cum ejusdem conscientia; appetitum autem esse ipsam hominis essentiam quatenus determinata est ad ea agendum quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt. Sed in eodem scholio etiam monui me revera inter humanum appetitum et cupiditatem nullam agnoscere differentiam. Nam sive homo sui appetitus sit conscius sive non sit, manet tamen appetitus unus idemque atque adeo ne tautologiam committere viderer, cupiditatem per appetitum explicare nolui sed eandem ita definire studui ut omnes humanæ naturæ conatus quos nomine appetitus, voluntatis, cupiditatis vel impetus significamus, una comprehenderem.

EXPLANATION: Above, in the scholium to proposition 9 of this part, we said that cupidity is appetite together with consciousness of the same; and that appetite is the very essence of a human being, insofar as it is determined to do those things which serve his preservation. But in the same scholium I also warned that in truth I acknowledge no difference between human appetite and cupidity. For whether a man is conscious of his appetite or is not, the appetite nevertheless remains one and the same; and so, lest I should seem to commit a tautology, I did not wish to explicate cupidity by appetite, but have endeavored to define the same in such a way that I might comprehend at once all the endeavors (conatus) of human nature which we signify by the name of appetite, will, cupidity, or impulse.

Potueram enim dicere cupiditatem esse ipsam hominis essentiam quatenus determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum sed ex hac definitione (per propositionem 23 partis II) non sequeretur quod mens possit suæ cupiditatis sive appetitus esse conscia. Igitur ut hujus conscientiæ causam involverem, necesse fuit (per eandem propositionem) addere "quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata etc.". Nam per affectionem humanæ essentiæ quamcunque ejusdem essentiæ constitutionem intelligimus, sive ea sit innata sive quod ipsa per solum cogitationis sive per solum extensionis attributum concipiatur sive denique quod ad utrumque simul referatur. Hic igitur cupiditatis nomine intelligo hominis quoscunque conatus, impetus, appetitus et volitiones, qui pro varia ejusdem hominis constitutione varii et non raro adeo sibi invicem oppositi sunt ut homo diversimode trahatur et quo se vertat, nesciat.

For I could have said that desire is the very essence of man, insofar as it is conceived as determined to do something; but from this definition (by proposition 23 of part 2) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to involve the cause of this consciousness, it was necessary (by the same proposition) to add “insofar as, from any given affection of it, it is determined, etc.” For by an affection of human essence we understand any constitution of that same essence, whether it be innate, or because it is conceived through the attribute of thought alone or through the attribute of extension alone, or finally because it is referred to both at once. Here, therefore, by the name of desire I understand whatever strivings, impetus, appetites, and volitions of man, which, in accordance with the varying constitution of the same man, are diverse and not rarely so opposed to one another that the man is drawn in different ways and does not know whither to turn.

II. Lætitia est hominis transitio a minore ad majorem perfectionem.

2. Joy is a human’s transition from a lesser to a greater perfection.

III. Tristitia est hominis transitio a majore ad minorem perfectionem.

3. Sadness is man's transition from greater to lesser perfection.

EXPLICATIO: Dico transitionem. Nam lætitia non est ipsa perfectio. Si enim homo cum perfectione ad quam transit nasceretur, ejusdem absque lætitiæ affectu compos esset; quod clarius apparet ex tristitiæ affectu qui huic est contrarius.

EXPLICATION: I say transition. For joy is not the perfection itself. For if a man were born with the perfection to which he transitions, he would be in possession of the same without the affect of joy; which more clearly appears from the affect of sadness that is contrary to this.

Nam quod tristitia in transitione ad minorem perfectionem consistit, non autem in ipsa minore perfectione, nemo negare potest quandoquidem homo eatenus contristari nequit quatenus alicujus perfectionis est particeps. Nec dicere possumus quod tristitia in privatione majoris perfectionis consistat nam privatio nihil est; tristitiæ autem affectus actus est qui propterea nullus alius esse potest quam actus transeundi ad minorem perfectionem hoc est actus quo hominis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur (vide scholium propositionis 11 hujus). Cæterum definitiones hilaritatis, titillationis, melancholiæ et doloris omitto quia ad corpus potissimum referuntur et non nisi lætitiæ aut tristitiæ sunt species.

For that sadness consists in a transition to a lesser perfection, and not in the very lesser perfection itself, no one can deny, since a man cannot, to that extent, be saddened inasmuch as he is a participant of some perfection. Nor can we say that sadness consists in the privation of a greater perfection, for privation is nothing; but the affect of sadness is an act, which therefore can be nothing other than an act of passing over to a lesser perfection—that is, an act by which a man’s power of acting is diminished or constrained (see the scholium of Proposition 11 of this). Moreover, I omit the definitions of hilarity, titillation, melancholy, and dolor, because they refer chiefly to the body and are nothing but species of joy or sadness.

IV. Admiratio est rei alicujus imaginatio in qua mens defixa propterea manet quia hæc singularis imaginatio nullam cum reliquis habet connexionem. Vide propositionem 52 cum ejusdem scholio.

4. Wonder is the imagination of some thing in which the mind remains fixed, for this reason: because this singular imagination has no connection with the rest. See proposition 52 with its scholium.

EXPLICATIO: In scholio propositionis 18 partis II ostendimus quænam sit causa cur mens ex contemplatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat videlicet quia earum rerum imagines invicem concatenatæ et ita ordinatæ sunt ut alia aliam sequatur, quod quidem concipi nequit quando rei imago nova est sed mens in ejusdem rei contemplatione detinebitur donec ab aliis causis ad alia cogitandum determinetur. Rei itaque novæ imaginatio in se considerata ejusdem naturæ est ac reliquæ et hac de causa ego admirationem inter affectus non numero nec causam video cur id facerem quandoquidem hæc mentis distractio ex nulla causa positiva quæ mentem ab aliis distrahat, oritur sed tantum ex eo quod causa cur mens ex unius rei contemplatione ad alia cogitandum determinatur, deficit. Tres igitur (ut in scholio propositionis 11 hujus monui) tantum affectus primitivos seu primarios agnosco nempe lætitiæ, tristitiæ et cupiditatis nec alia de causa verba de admiratione feci quam quia usu factum est ut quidam affectus qui ex tribus primitivis derivantur, aliis nominibus indicari soleant quando ad objecta quæ admiramur, referuntur; quæ quidem ratio me ex æquo movet ut etiam contemptus definitionem his adjungam.

EXPLANATION: In the scholium to proposition 18 of part 2 we have shown what is the cause why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway falls into the thought of another thing—namely, because the images of those things are concatenated with one another and are so ordered that one follows another, which indeed cannot be conceived when the image of the thing is new; but the mind will be detained in the contemplation of the same thing until by other causes it is determined to think of others. Therefore the imagination of a new thing, considered in itself, is of the same nature as the rest; and for this cause I do not number admiration among the affects, nor do I see a cause why I should do so, since this distraction of the mind does not arise from any positive cause that distracts the mind from other things, but only from the fact that the cause fails by which the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, is determined to think of others. Three, therefore (as I have warned in the scholium to proposition 11 of this Part), only primitive or primary affects I acknowledge, to wit joy, sadness, and cupidity; nor for any other cause have I said words about admiration than because by usage it has come to pass that certain affects which are derived from the three primitive ones are wont to be indicated by other names when they are referred to objects which we admire; and this very reason moves me equally to add the definition of contempt to these.

V. Contemptus est rei alicujus imaginatio quæ mentem adeo parum tangit ut ipsa mens ex rei præsentia magis moveatur ad ea imaginandum quæ in ipsa re non sunt quam quæ in ipsa sunt. Vide scholium propositionis 52 hujus. Definitiones venerationis et dedignationis missas hic facio quia nulli quod sciam affectus ex his nomen trahunt.

5. Contempt is the imagination of some thing which touches the mind so little that the mind itself, from the presence of the thing, is moved more to imagine those things which are not in the thing itself than those which are in it. See the scholium of this Proposition 52. The definitions of veneration and disdain I here pass over, because, so far as I know, no affects draw their name from these.

VI. Amor est lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ.

VI. Love is joy with the concomitant idea of an external cause.

EXPLICATIO: Hæc definitio satis clare amoris essentiam explicat; illa vero auctorum qui definiunt amorem esse voluntatem amantis se jungendi rei amatæ, non amoris essentiam sed ejus proprietatem exprimit et quia amoris essentia non satis ab auctoribus perspecta fuit, ideo neque ejus proprietatis ullum clarum conceptum habere potuerunt et hinc factum ut eorum definitionem admodum obscuram esse omnes judicaverint. Verum notandum cum dico proprietatem esse in amante se voluntate jungere rei amatæ, me per voluntatem non intelligere consensum vel animi deliberationem seu liberum decretum (nam hoc fictitium esse demonstravimus propositione 48 partis II) nec etiam cupiditatem sese jungendi rei amatæ quando abest vel perseverandi in ipsius præsentia quando adest; potest namque amor absque hac aut illa cupiditate concipi sed per voluntatem me acquiescentiam intelligere quæ est in amante ob rei amatæ præsentiam a qua lætitia amantis corroboratur aut saltem fovetur.

EXPLICATION: This definition explains the essence of love clearly enough; but that of the authors who define love to be the will of the lover to join himself to the thing loved expresses not the essence of love but its property, and because the essence of love was not sufficiently perceived by the authors, therefore they could have no clear concept of its property, and hence it has come about that all have judged their definition to be exceedingly obscure. But it must be noted that when I say the property consists in the lover’s uniting himself by will to the thing loved, by will I do not understand consent or a deliberation of the mind or a free decree (for we have demonstrated this to be fictitious in proposition 48 of part 2), nor yet a desire (cupidity) of uniting oneself to the thing loved when it is absent, or of persevering in its presence when it is present; for love can be conceived without this or that desire; but by will I understand acquiescence which is in the lover on account of the presence of the thing loved, by which the lover’s joy is strengthened or at least fostered.

VII. Odium est tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ.

VII. Hatred is sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

EXPLICATIO: Quæ hic notanda sunt, ex dictis in præcedentis definitionis explicatione facile percipiuntur. Vide præterea scholium propositionis 13 hujus.

EXPLANATION: The things that are to be noted here are easily perceived from what was said in the explanation of the preceding definition. See, moreover, the scholium to proposition 13 of this [part].

VIII. Propensio est lætitia concomitante idea alicujus rei quæ per accidens causa est lætitiæ.

8. Propensity is joy accompanied by the idea of some thing which is, per accidens, the cause of joy.

IX. Aversio est tristitia concomitante idea alicujus rei quæ per accidens causa est tristitiæ. De his vide scholium propositionis 15 hujus.

IX. Aversion is sadness with a concomitant idea of some thing which is by accident the cause of sadness. On these matters see the scholium of proposition 15 of this work.

X. Devotio est amor erga eum quem admiramur.

10. Devotion is love toward him whom we admire.

EXPLICATIO: Admirationem oriri ex rei novitate ostendimus propositione 52 hujus. Si igitur contingat ut id quod admiramur sæpe imaginemur, idem admirari desinemus atque adeo videmus devotionis affectum facile in simplicem amorem degenerare.

EXPLICATION: We have shown in proposition 52 of this that admiration arises from the novelty of a thing. If therefore it happens that we often imagine that which we admire, we cease to admire the same; and thus we see that the affect of devotion easily degenerates into simple love.

XI. Irrisio est lætitia orta ex eo quod aliquid quod contemnimus in re quam odimus inesse imaginamur.

11. Derision is joy arisen from the fact that we imagine that something which we contemn inheres in a thing that we hate.

EXPLICATIO: Quatenus rem quam odimus contemnimus eatenus de eadem existentiam negamus (vide scholium propositionis 52 hujus) et eatenus (per propositionem 20 hujus) lætamur. Sed quoniam supponimus hominem id quod irridet odio tamen habere, sequitur hanc lætitiam solidam non esse. Vide scholium propositionis 47 hujus.

EXPLANATION: Insofar as we contemn the thing which we hate, to that extent we deny of the same its existence (see the scholium of proposition 52 of this), and to that extent (by proposition 20 of this) we rejoice. But since we suppose that the man nevertheless holds in hatred that which he ridicules, it follows that this joy is not firm. See the scholium of proposition 47 of this.

XII. Spes est inconstans lætitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus.

12. Hope is an inconstant joy arising from the idea of a thing future or past, about whose event we to some extent doubt.

XIII. Metus est inconstans tristitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus. Vide de his scholium II propositionis 18 hujus.

13. Fear is an inconstant sadness arisen from the idea of a thing future or past, about the event of which we in some measure doubt. See concerning these scholium 2 of proposition 18 of this work.

EXPLICATIO: Ex his definitionibus sequitur non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe. Qui enim spe pendet et de rei eventu dubitat, is aliquid imaginari supponitur quod rei futuræ existentiam secludit atque adeo eatenus contristari (per propositionem 19 hujus) et consequenter dum spe pendet, metuere ut res eveniat. Qui autem contra in metu est hoc est de rei quam odit eventu dubitat, aliquid etiam imaginatur quod ejusdem rei existentiam secludit atque adeo (per propositionem 20 hujus) lætatur et consequenter eatenus spem habet ne eveniat.

EXPLICATIO: From these definitions it follows that there is no hope without fear, nor fear without hope. For he who hangs in hope and doubts about the event of a thing is supposed to imagine something that excludes the existence of the future thing, and thus, insofar, is saddened (by Proposition 19 of this), and consequently, while he hangs in hope, fears that the thing may come about. But conversely, he who is in fear, that is, doubts about the event of a thing which he hates, also imagines something that excludes the existence of that same thing, and thus (by Proposition 20 of this) is gladdened, and consequently, insofar, has hope that it may not come about.

XIV. Securitas est lætitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

14. Assurance is joy arisen from the idea of a future or past thing, about which the cause for doubting has been removed.

XV. Desperatio est tristitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

15. Despair is sadness arisen from the idea of a future or past thing about which the cause for doubting has been removed.

EXPLICATIO: Oritur itaque ex spe securitas et ex metu desperatio quando de rei eventu dubitandi causa tollitur, quod fit quia homo rem præteritam vel futuram adesse imaginatur et ut præsentem contemplatur vel quia alia imaginatur quæ existentiam earum rerum secludunt quæ ipsi dubium injiciebant. Nam tametsi de rerum singularium eventu (per corollarium propositionis 31 partis II) nunquam possumus esse certi, fieri tamen potest ut de earum eventu non dubitemus. Aliud enim esse ostendimus (vide scholium propositionis 49 partis II) de re non dubitare, aliud rei certitudinem habere atque adeo fieri potest ut ex imagine rei præteritæ aut futuræ eodem lætitiæ vel tristitiæ affectu afficiamur ac ex rei præsentis imagine, ut in propositione 18 hujus demonstravimus, quam cum ejusdem scholiis vide.

EXPLANATION: Accordingly, from hope arises security and from fear desperation when the cause for doubting about the outcome of the thing is removed, which happens because a man imagines a past or future thing to be present and contemplates it as present, or because he imagines other things which exclude the existence of those things which were injecting doubt into him. For although concerning the outcome of singular things (through the corollary of Proposition 31 of Part II) we can never be certain, nevertheless it can come about that we do not doubt about their outcome. For we have shown (see the scholium of Proposition 49 of Part II) that not to doubt about a thing is one thing, to have certainty of the thing is another; and thus it can come about that from the image of a past or future thing we are affected by the same affect of joy or sadness as from the image of a present thing, as we have demonstrated in Proposition 18 of this, which see together with its scholia.

XVI. Gaudium est lætitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ quæ præter spem evenit.

16. Gladness is joy with the concomitant idea of a past thing which has happened beyond hope.

XVII. Conscientiæ morsus est tristitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ quæ præter spem evenit.

17. Remorse is sadness accompanied by the idea of a past thing which came about beyond hope.

XVIII. Commiseratio est tristitia concomitante idea mali quod alteri quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit. Vide scholium propositionis 22 et scholium propositionis 27 hujus.

18. Commiseration is sadness concomitant with the idea of an evil that befalls another whom we imagine to be similar to us. See the scholium of Proposition 22 and the scholium of Proposition 27 of this.

EXPLICATIO: Inter commiserationem et misericordiam nulla videtur esse differentia nisi forte quod commiseratio singularem affectum respiciat, misericordia autem ejus habitum.

EXPLANATION: Between commiseration and mercy there seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that commiseration regards the singular affect, but mercy the habit of it.

XIX. Favor est amor erga aliquem qui alteri benefecit.

19. Favor is love toward someone who has benefited another.

XX. Indignatio est odium erga aliquem qui alteri malefecit.

20. Indignation is hatred toward someone who has done harm to another.

EXPLICATIO: Hæc nomina ex communi usu aliud significare scio. Sed meum institutum non est verborum significationem sed rerum naturam explicare easque iis vocabulis indicare quorum significatio quam ex usu habent, a significatione qua eadem usurpare volo, non omnino abhorret, quod semel monuisse sufficiat. Cæterum horum affectuum causam vide in corollario I propositionis 27 et scholio propositionis 22 hujus partis.

EXPLANATION: I know that these names, in common usage, signify something else. But my purpose is not to explain the signification of words, but the nature of things, and to indicate these by those vocables whose signification, which they have from usage, does not altogether abhor from the signification in which I wish to employ the same; which it should suffice to have warned once. Moreover, see the cause of these affects in Corollary 1 of Proposition 27 and in the Scholium of Proposition 22 of this part.

XXI. Existimatio est de aliquo præ amore plus justo sentire.

21. Estimation is, out of love, to think more of someone than is just.

XXII. Despectus est de aliquo præ odio minus justo sentire.

22. Contempt is to feel concerning someone, on account of hatred, less than is just.

EXPLICATIO: Est itaque existimatio amoris et despectus odii effectus sive proprietas atque adeo potest existimatio etiam definiri quod sit amor quatenus hominem ita afficit ut de re amata plus justo sentiat et contra despectus quod sit odium quatenus hominem ita afficit ut de eo quem odio habet, minus justo sentiat. Vide de his scholium propositionis 26 hujus.

EXPLANATION: Therefore estimation is the effect or property of love, and disdain the effect or property of hatred; and indeed estimation can also be defined as love, insofar as it affects a person in such a way that he judges about the loved thing more than is just, and conversely disdain as hatred, insofar as it affects a person in such a way that concerning him whom he holds in hatred, he judges less than is just. See on these matters the scholium to proposition 26 of this work.

XXIII. Invidia est odium quatenus hominem ita afficit ut ex alterius felicitate contristetur et contra ut ex alterius malo gaudeat.

23. Envy is hatred insofar as it affects a person such that he is saddened by another’s felicity, and conversely such that he rejoices at another’s misfortune.

EXPLICATIO: Invidiæ opponitur communiter misericordia quæ proinde invita vocabuli significatione sic definiri potest.

EXPLANATION: To Envy there is commonly opposed Mercy, which accordingly, with the signification of the word forced, can thus be defined.

XXIV. Misericordia est amor quatenus hominem ita afficit ut ex bono alterius gaudeat et contra ut ex alterius malo contristetur.

24. Mercy is love, in so far as it affects a man in such a way that he rejoices at another’s good, and conversely that he is saddened by another’s ill.

EXPLICATIO: Cæterum de invidia vide scholium propositionis 24 et scholium propositionis 32 hujus. Atque hi affectus lætitiæ et tristitiæ sunt quos idea rei externæ comitatur tanquam causa per se vel per accidens. Hinc ad alios transeo quos idea rei internæ comitatur tanquam causa.

EXPLICATION: Moreover, concerning envy see the scholium of proposition 24 and the scholium of proposition 32 of this. And these are affects of joy and sadness which the idea of an external thing accompanies as a cause per se or per accidens. Hence I pass to others which the idea of an internal thing accompanies as a cause.

XXV. Acquiescentia in se ipso est lætitia orta ex eo quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur.

25. Acquiescence in oneself is joy arisen from this, that a man contemplates himself and his own power of acting.

XXVI. Humilitas est tristitia orta ex eo quod homo suam impotentiam sive imbecillitatem contemplatur.

26. Humility is sadness arisen from the fact that a man contemplates his own impotence or imbecility.

EXPLICATIO: Acquiescentia in se ipso humilitati opponitur quatenus per eandem intelligimus lætitiam quæ ex eo oritur quod nostram agendi potentiam contemplamur sed quatenus per ipsam etiam intelligimus lætitiam concomitante idea alicujus facti quod nos ex mentis libero decreto fecisse credimus, tum p™nitentiæ opponitur quæ a nobis sic definitur.

EXPLANATION: Acquiescence in oneself is opposed to humility, insofar as by the same we understand a joy which arises from our contemplating our power of acting; but insofar as by it we also understand a joy with the concomitant idea of some deed which we believe we have done by the free decree of the mind, then it is opposed to penitence, which by us is thus defined.

XXVII. P™nitentia est tristitia concomitante idea alicujus facti quod nos ex libero mentis decreto fecisse credimus.

27. Penitence is sadness with a concomitant idea of some deed which we believe we have done by a free decree of the mind.

EXPLICATIO: Horum affectuum causas ostendimus in scholio propositionis 51 hujus et propositionibus 53, 54 et 55 hujus ejusque scholio. De libero autem mentis decreto vide scholium propositionis 35 partis II. Sed hic præterea notandum venit mirum non esse quod omnes omnino actus qui ex consuetudine pravi vocantur, sequatur tristitia et illos qui recti dicuntur, lætitia. Nam hoc ab educatione potissimum pendere facile ex supra dictis intelligimus.

EXPLANATION: The causes of these affects we have shown in the scholium of proposition 51 of this, and in propositions 53, 54, and 55 of this and in its scholium. But concerning the free decree of the mind, see the scholium of proposition 35 of part 2. But here, moreover, it is to be noted that it is not a marvel that absolutely all acts which by custom are called perverse are followed by sadness, and those which are called right, by joy. For we readily understand from the above-said that this depends most especially on education.

Parentes nimirum illos exprobrando liberosque propter eosdem sæpe objurgando, hos contra suadendo et laudando effecerunt ut tristitiæ commotiones illis, lætitiæ vero his jungerentur. Quod ipsa etiam experientia comprobatur. Nam consuetudo et religio non est omnibus eadem sed contra quæ apud alios sacra, apud alios profana et quæ apud alios honesta, apud alios turpia sunt.

Parents, to be sure, by reproaching those [acts] and by often objurgating the children on account of the same, and, conversely, by persuading and lauding these, have effected that commotions of sadness are joined to those, but of joy to these. Which is likewise corroborated by experience itself. For custom and religion are not the same for all, but on the contrary what among some is sacred is among others profane, and what among some is honorable is among others base.

Prout igitur unusquisque educatus est, ita facti alicujus p™nitet vel eodem gloriatur.

Accordingly, just as each person has been educated, so he either repents of some act or glories in the same.

XXVIII. Superbia est de se præ amore sui plus justo sentire.

28. Pride is to think of oneself more than is just out of love of oneself.

EXPLICATIO: Differt igitur superbia ab existimatione quod hæc ad objectum externum, superbia autem ad ipsum hominem de se plus justo sentientem referatur. Cæterum ut existimatio amoris sic superbia philautiæ effectus vel proprietas est, quæ propterea etiam definiri potest quod sit amor sui sive acquiescentia in se ipso quatenus hominem ita afficit ut de se plus justo sentiat (vide scholium propositionis 26 hujus). Huic affectui non datur contrarius. Nam nemo de se præ odio sui minus justo sentit; imo nemo de se minus justo sentit quatenus imaginatur se hoc vel illud non posse.

EXPLICATION: Therefore pride differs from estimation in that the latter has regard to an external object, whereas pride refers to the man himself who feels more than is just about himself. Moreover, as estimation is an effect or property of love, so pride is an effect or property of philautia (self-love), which therefore can also be defined as love of oneself or an acquiescence in oneself, insofar as it affects a man in such a way that he feels more than is just about himself (see the scholium of proposition 26 of this). No contrary is given to this affect. For no one, from hatred of himself, feels less than is just about himself; indeed, no one feels less than is just about himself insofar as he imagines that he cannot do this or that.

Nam quicquid homo imaginatur se non posse, id necessario imaginatur et hac imaginatione ita disponitur ut id agere revera non possit quod se non posse imaginatur. Quamdiu enim imaginatur se hoc vel illud non posse tamdiu ad agendum non est determinatus et consequenter tamdiu impossibile ei est ut id agat. Verumenimvero si ad illa attendamus quæ a sola opinione pendent, concipere poterimus fieri posse ut homo de se minus justo sentiat; fieri enim potest ut aliquis dum tristis imbecillitatem contemplatur suam, imaginetur se ab omnibus contemni idque dum reliqui nihil minus cogitant quam ipsum contemnere.

For whatever a man imagines himself not to be able to do, he necessarily imagines, and by this imagination he is so disposed that he really cannot do what he imagines himself unable to do. For as long as he imagines that he cannot do this or that, so long he is not determined to act, and consequently so long it is impossible for him to do it. But indeed, if we attend to those things which depend on opinion alone, we shall be able to conceive it possible that a man thinks less than justly of himself; for it can happen that someone, while sad, contemplates his own imbecility, imagines himself to be contemned by all, and this while the rest are by no means thinking of contemning him.

Potest præterea homo de se minus justo sentire si aliquid de se in præsenti neget cum relatione ad futurum tempus cujus est incertus; ut quod neget se nihil certi posse concipere nihilque nisi prava vel turpia posse cupere vel agere etc. Possumus deinde dicere aliquem de se minus justo sentire cum videmus ipsum ex nimio pudoris metu ea non audere quæ alii ipsi æquales audent. Hunc igitur affectum possumus superbiæ opponere quem abjectionem vocabo nam ut ex acquiescentia in se ipso superbia, sic ex humilitate abjectio oritur quæ proinde a nobis sic definitur.

Moreover, a man can feel less than is just about himself if he denies something about himself in the present with relation to a future time of which he is uncertain; as when he denies that he can conceive anything certain, and that he can desire or do nothing except depraved or turpid things, to desire or to do, etc. We can then say that someone feels less than is just about himself when we see him, from an excessive fear of shame, not daring those things which others his equals dare. This affect, therefore, we can oppose to pride, which I will call abjection; for just as from acquiescence in oneself pride arises, so from humility abjection arises, which accordingly is defined by us thus.

XXIX. Abjectio est de se præ tristitia minus justo sentire.

29. Abjection is, on account of sadness, to feel less than is just about oneself.

EXPLICATIO: Solemus tamen sæpe superbiæ humilitatem opponere sed tum magis ad utriusque effectus quam naturam attendimus. Solemus namque illum superbum vocare qui nimis gloriatur (vide scholium propositionis 30 hujus) qui non nisi virtutes suas et aliorum non nisi vitia narrat, qui omnibus præferri vult et qui denique ea gravitate et ornatu incedit quo solent alii qui longe supra ipsum sunt positi. Contra illum humilem vocamus qui sæpius erubescit, qui sua vitia fatetur et aliorum virtutes narrat, qui omnibus cedit et qui denique submisso capite ambulat et se ornare negligit.

EXPLICATION: Nevertheless we are often accustomed to oppose humility to pride; but then we attend more to the effects of each than to the nature. For we are wont to call him proud who boasts excessively (see the scholium of proposition 30 of this), who recounts nothing except his own virtues and nothing except others’ vices, who wishes to be preferred before all, and who, finally, proceeds with that gravity and adornment with which those are wont to go who are placed far above him. By contrast we call him humble who blushes more often, who confesses his own vices and recounts the virtues of others, who yields to everyone, and who, finally, walks with lowered head and neglects to adorn himself.

Cæterum hi affectus nempe humilitas et abjectio rarissimi sunt. Nam natura humana in se considerata contra eosdem quantum potest nititur (vide propositiones 13 et 54 hujus) et ideo qui maxime creduntur abjecti et humiles esse, maxime plerumque ambitiosi et invidi sunt.

Moreover, these affects, namely humility and abjection, are most rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives against these as much as it can (see propositions 13 and 54 of this), and therefore those who are most believed to be abject and humble are, for the most part, the most ambitious and envious.

XXX. Gloria est lætitia concomitante idea alicujus nostræ actionis quam alios laudare imaginamur.

30. Glory is joy with the concomitant idea of some action of ours which we imagine others to praise.

XXXI. Pudor est tristitia concomitante idea alicujus actionis quam alios vituperare imaginamur.

31. Shame is sadness with the concomitant idea of some action which we imagine others vituperate.

EXPLICATIO: De his vide scholium propositionis 30 hujus partis. Sed hic notanda est differentia quæ est inter pudorem et verecundiam. Est enim pudor tristitia quæ sequitur factum cujus pudet.

EXPLANATION: On these matters see the scholium to proposition 30 of this part. But here the difference which is between shame and modesty is to be noted. For shame is a sadness that follows a deed of which one is ashamed.

Verecundia autem metus seu timor pudoris quo homo continetur ne aliquid turpe committat. Verecundiæ opponi solet impudentia, quæ revera affectus non est ut suo loco ostendam sed affectuum nomina (ut jam monui) magis eorum usum quam naturam respiciunt. Atque his lætitiæ et tristitiæ affectus quos explicare proposueram, absolvi.

Modesty, however, is a fear or dread of shame by which a man is restrained, lest he commit anything base. To modesty there is commonly opposed impudence, which in truth is not an affect (as I shall show in its proper place); but the names of affects (as I have already warned) regard their use rather than their nature. And with these I have finished the affects of joy and sadness which I had proposed to explicate.

Pergo itaque ad illos quos ad cupiditatem refero.

I proceed therefore to those which I refer to desire.

XXXII. Desiderium est cupiditas sive appetitus re aliqua potiundi quæ ejusdem rei memoria fovetur et simul aliarum rerum memoria quæ ejusdem rei appetendæ existentiam secludunt, coercetur.

32. Desire is cupidity or appetite of getting possession of some thing, which is fostered by the memory of that same thing, and at the same time is restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of that same thing as-to-be-sought.

EXPLICATIO: Cum alicujus rei recordamur, ut jam sæpe diximus, eo ipso disponimur ad eandem eodem affectu contemplandum ac si res præsens adesset sed hæc dispositio seu conatus dum vigilamus plerumque cohibetur ab imaginibus rerum quæ existentiam ejus cujus recordamur, secludunt. Quando itaque rei meminimus quæ nos aliquo lætitiæ genere afficit, eo ipso conamur eandem cum eodem lætitiæ affectu ut præsentem contemplari, qui quidem conatus statim cohibetur memoria rerum quæ illius existentiam secludunt. Quare desiderium revera tristitia est quæ lætitiæ opponitur illi quæ ex absentia rei quam odimus oritur, de qua vide scholium propositionis 47 hujus partis.

EXPLANATION: When we recall some thing, as we have often said already, by that very fact we are disposed to contemplate the same with the same affect as if the thing were present; but this disposition or conatus, while we are awake, is for the most part restrained by images of things which exclude the existence of that which we remember. Therefore, whenever we remember a thing which affects us with some kind of joy, by that very fact we endeavor to contemplate it as present with the same affect of joy; and this endeavor is immediately restrained by the memory of things which exclude its existence. Wherefore desire is truly a sadness which is opposed to that joy which arises from the absence of a thing which we hate; on which see the scholium to proposition 47 of this part.

Sed quia nomen "desiderium" cupiditatem respicere videtur, ideo hunc affectum ad cupiditatis affectus refero.

But because the name "desire" seems to regard cupidity, therefore I refer this affect to the affects of cupidity.

XXXIII. Æmulatio est alicujus rei cupiditas quæ nobis ingeneratur ex eo quod alios eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur.

33. Emulation is a desire for some thing which is engendered in us from the fact that we imagine others to have the same desire.

EXPLICATIO: Qui fugit quia alios fugere vel qui timet quia alios timere videt vel etiam ille qui ex eo quod aliquem manum suam combussisse videt, manum ad se contrahit corpusque movet quasi ipsius manus combureretur, eum imitari quidem alterius affectum sed non eundem æmulari dicemus, non quia aliam æmulationis aliam imitationis novimus causam sed quia usu factum est ut illum tantum vocemus æmulum qui id quod honestum, utile vel jucundum esse judicamus, imitatur. Cæterum de æmulationis causa vide propositionem 27 hujus partis cum ejus scholio. Cur autem huic affectui plerumque juncta sit invidia, de eo vide propositionem 32 hujus cum ejusdem scholio.

EXPLANATION: He who flees because he sees others flee, or who fears because he sees others fear, or even he who, from the fact that he sees someone has burned his hand, draws his own hand toward himself and moves his body as if his own hand were being burned—we shall indeed say that he imitates another’s affect, but that he does not emulate the same; not because we know one cause of emulation and another of imitation, but because by usage it has come about that we call only him an emulator who imitates that which we judge to be honorable, useful, or pleasant. As for the cause of emulation, see Proposition 27 of this Part together with its scholium. And as to why envy is for the most part joined to this affect, see Proposition 32 of this [Part] together with the same scholium.

XXXIV. Gratia seu gratitudo est cupiditas seu amoris studium quo ei benefacere conamur qui in nos pari amoris affectu beneficium contulit. Vide propositionem 39 cum scholio propositionis 41 hujus.

34. Gratia, or gratitude, is a desire, or an endeavor of love, whereby we strive to do good to him who has conferred a benefit upon us with an equal affection of love. See proposition 39 together with the scholium of proposition 41 of this part.

XXXV. Benevolentia est cupiditas benefaciendi ei cujus nos miseret. Vide scholium propositionis 27 hujus.

35. Benevolence is the desire of doing-good to the one whom we pity. See the scholium on proposition 27 of this.

XXXVI. Ira est cupiditas qua ex odio incitamur ad illi quem odimus malum inferendum. Vide propositionem 39 hujus.

36. Anger is a desire by which, out of hatred, we are incited to inflict an evil upon the one whom we hate. See Proposition 39 of this.

XXXVII. Vindicta est cupiditas qua ex reciproco odio concitamur ad malum inferendum ei qui nobis pari affectu damnum intulit. Vide II corollarium propositionis 40 hujus cum ejusdem scholio.

37. Vengeance is the desire by which, from reciprocal hatred, we are incited to inflict evil on him who has inflicted damage on us with an equal affect. See the 2nd corollary of proposition 40 of this together with its scholium.

XXXVIII. Crudelitas seu sævitia est cupiditas qua aliquis concitatur ad malum inferendum ei quem amamus vel cujus nos miseret.

XXXVIII. Cruelty or savagery is a desire by which someone is incited to inflict harm on one whom we love or for whom we feel pity.

EXPLICATIO: Crudelitati opponitur clementia, quæ passio non est sed animi potentia qua homo iram et vindictam moderatur.

EXPLANATION: Clemency is opposed to cruelty, which is not a passion but a power of the mind by which a man moderates anger and vengeance.

XXXIX. Timor est cupiditas majus quod metuimus malum minore vitandi. Vide scholium propositionis 39 hujus.

39. Fear is a desire to avoid by a lesser the greater evil which we fear. See the scholium of proposition 39 of this.

XL. Audacia est cupiditas qua aliquis incitatur ad aliquid agendum cum periculo quod ejus æquales subire metuunt.

40. Audacity is a desire by which someone is incited to do something with a peril which his equals fear to undergo.

XLI. Pusillanimitas dicitur de eo cujus cupiditas coercetur timore periculi quod ejus æquales subire audent.

41. Pusillanimity is said of one whose cupidity is restrained by fear of a danger which his equals dare to undergo.

EXPLICATIO: Est igitur pusillanimitas nihil aliud quam metus alicujus mali quod plerique non solent metuere; quare ipsam ad cupiditatis affectus non refero. Eandem tamen hic explicare volui quia quatenus ad cupiditatem attendimus, affectui audaciæ revera opponitur.

EXPLICATION: Therefore pusillanimity is nothing other than a fear of some evil which most people are not wont to fear; wherefore I do not refer it to the affections of desire. Nevertheless I have wished to explain the same here, because, insofar as we attend to desire, it is truly opposed to the affection of audacity.

XLII. Consternatio dicitur de eo cujus cupiditas malum vitandi coercetur admiratione mali quod timet.

42. Consternation is said of him whose desire of avoiding an evil is restrained by admiration at the evil which he fears.

EXPLICATIO: Est itaque consternatio pusillanimitatis species. Sed quia consternatio ex duplici timore oritur, ideo commodius definiri potest quod sit metus qui hominem stupefactum aut fluctuantem ita continet ut is malum amovere non possit. Dico stupefactum quatenus ejus cupiditatem malum amovendi admiratione coerceri intelligimus.

EXPLANATION: Consternation is therefore a species of pusillanimity. But because consternation arises from a double fear, it can more conveniently be defined as a fear which so holds a man stupefied or wavering that he cannot remove the evil. I say “stupefied” insofar as we understand that his desire of removing the evil is restrained by admiration.

Fluctuantem autem dico quatenus concipimus eandem cupiditatem coerceri timore alterius mali quod ipsum æque cruciat : unde fit ut quodnam ex duobus avertat, nesciat. De his vide scholium propositionis 39 et scholium propositionis 52 hujus. Cæterum de pusillanimitate et audacia vide scholium propositionis 51 hujus.

But I say “wavering” insofar as we conceive the same desire to be coerced by fear of another evil which equally torments it; whence it comes about that it does not know which of the two to avert. On these matters see the scholium to Proposition 39 and the scholium to Proposition 52 of this. Moreover, on pusillanimity and audacity see the scholium to Proposition 51 of this.

XLIII. Humanitas seu modestia est cupiditas ea faciendi quæ hominibus placent et omittendi quæ displicent.

43. Humanity or modesty is the desire of doing those things which please men and of omitting those which displease.

XLIV. Ambitio est immodica gloriæ cupiditas.

44. Ambition is an immoderate desire for glory.

EXPLICATIO: Ambitio est cupiditas qua omnes affectus (per propositiones 27 et 31 hujus) foventur et corroborantur et ideo hic affectus vix superari potest. Nam quamdiu homo aliqua cupiditate tenetur, hac simul necessario tenetur. Optimus quisque inquit Cicero maxime gloria ducitur.

EXPLICATION: Ambition is the cupidity by which all affects (by propositions 27 and 31 of this [work]) are fostered and corroborated, and therefore this affect is scarcely able to be overcome. For as long as a man is held by any cupidity, by this one at the same time he is necessarily held. “Every best man,” says Cicero, “is led most by glory.”

Philosophi etiam libris quos de contemnenda gloria scribunt, nomen suum inscribunt etc.

Philosophers even inscribe their own name upon the books which they write on contemning glory, etc.

XLV. Luxuria est immoderata convivandi cupiditas vel etiam amor.

45. Luxury is an immoderate desire for banqueting, or even a love of it.

XLVI. Ebrietas est immoderata potandi cupiditas et amor.

46. Ebriety is an immoderate desire for and love of drinking.

XLVII. Avaritia est immoderata divitiarum cupiditas et amor.

47. Avarice is an immoderate cupidity and love of riches.

XLVIII. Libido est etiam cupiditas et amor in commiscendis corporibus.

48. Libido is also desire and love in the commingling of bodies.

EXPLICATIO: Sive hæc coeundi cupiditas moderata sit sive non sit, libido appellari solet. Porro hi quinque affectus (ut in scholio propositionis 56 hujus monui) contrarios non habent. Nam modestia species est ambitionis, de qua vide scholium propositionis 29 hujus.

EXPLANATION: Whether this desire for coition be moderate or not, it is usually called libido. Moreover, these five affects (as I have noted in the scholium to proposition 56 of this) do not have contraries. For modesty is a species of ambition, on which see the scholium to proposition 29 of this.

Temperantiam deinde, sobrietatem et castitatem mentis potentiam, non autem passionem indicare jam etiam monui. Et tametsi fieri potest ut homo avarus, ambitiosus vel timidus a nimio cibo, potu et coitu abstineat, avaritia tamen, ambitio et timor luxuriæ, ebrietati vel libidini non sunt contrarii. Nam avarus in cibum et potum alienum se ingurgitare plerumque desiderat.

Then I have already also warned that temperance, sobriety, and chastity indicate a power of the mind, not a passion. And although it can happen that an avaricious, ambitious, or timid man abstains from excessive food, drink, and coitus, nevertheless avarice, ambition, and fear are not contrary to luxury, ebriety, or libido. For the avaricious man for the most part desires to gorge himself on another’s food and drink.

Ambitiosus autem, modo speret fore clam, in nulla re sibi temperabit et si inter ebrios vivat et libidinosos, ideo quia ambitiosus est, proclivior erit ad eadem vitia. Timidus denique id quod non vult, facit. Nam quamvis mortis vitandæ causa divitias in mare projiciat, manet tamen avarus et si libidinosus tristis est quod sibi morem gerere nequeat, non desinit propterea libidinosus esse.

But the ambitious man, so long as he hopes it will be secret, will in no respect temper himself; and if he lives among the inebriate and the libidinous, for this reason—because he is ambitious—he will be more prone to the same vices. The timid man, finally, does what he does not will. For although, for the sake of avoiding death, he may cast his riches into the sea, nevertheless he remains avaricious; and if the libidinous man is sad because he cannot indulge himself, he does not on that account cease to be libidinous.

Et absolute hi affectus non tam ipsos actus convivandi, potandi etc. respiciunt quam ipsum appetitum et amorem. Nihil igitur his affectibus opponi potest præter generositatem et animositatem, de quibus in sequentibus.

And, absolutely, these affects regard not so much the acts themselves of feasting, drinking, etc., as the very appetite and love. Nothing, therefore, can be set in opposition to these affects except generosity and animosity (spiritedness), of which in what follows.

Definitiones zelotypiæ et reliquarum animi fluctuationum silentio prætermitto tam quia ex compositione affectuum quos jam definivimus, oriuntur quam quia pleræque nomina non habent, quod ostendit ad usum vitæ sufficere easdem in genere tantummodo noscere. Cæterum ex definitionibus affectuum quos explicuimus, liquet eos omnes a cupiditate, lætitia vel tristitia oriri seu potius nihil præter hos tres esse quorum unusquisque variis nominibus appellari solet propter varias eorum relationes et denominationes extrinsecas. Si jam ad hos primitivos et ad ea quæ de natura mentis supra diximus, attendere velimus, affectus quatenus ad solam mentem referuntur sic definire poterimus.

Definitions of jealousy and of the remaining fluctuations of the mind I pass over in silence, both because they arise from the composition of the affects which we have already defined and because very many lack names, which shows that for the use of life it suffices to know them only in general. Moreover, from the definitions of the affects which we have explained, it is clear that they all arise from cupidity (desire), joy, or sadness; or rather, that there is nothing besides these three, each of which is wont to be called by various names on account of their various relations and extrinsic denominations. If now we are willing to attend to these primitives and to what we have said above concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the affects, insofar as they are referred to the mind alone.

AFFECTUUM GENERALIS DEFINITIO

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE AFFECTS

Affectus qui animi pathema dicitur, est confusa idea qua mens majorem vel minorem sui corporis vel alicujus ejus partis existendi vim quam antea affirmat et qua data ipsa mens ad hoc potius quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur.

The affect, which is called a pathema of the mind, is a confused idea by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of existing of its own body or of some part of it than before, and by which the mind itself, given this, is determined to think of this rather than of that.

EXPLICATIO: Dico primo affectum seu passionem animi esse confusam ideam. Nam mentem eatenus tantum pati ostendimus (vide propositionem 3 hujus) quatenus ideas inadæquatas sive confusas habet. Dico deinde "qua mens majorem vel minorem sui corporis vel alicujus ejus partis existendi vim quam antea affirmat". Omnes enim corporum ideæ quas habemus magis nostri corporis actualem constitutionem (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II) quam corporis externi naturam indicant; at hæc quæ affectus formam constituit, corporis vel alicujus ejus partis constitutionem indicare vel exprimere debet quam ipsum corpus vel aliqua ejus pars habet ex eo quod ipsius agendi potentia sive existendi vis augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur.

EXPLANATION: I say first that an affect or passion of the mind is a confused idea. For we have shown (see proposition 3 of this) that the mind suffers only to the extent that it has inadequate or confused ideas. I say next, “by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser power of existing of its own body or of some part of it than before.” For all the ideas of bodies that we have indicate more the actual constitution of our own body (by corollary 2 of proposition 16 of part 2) than the nature of an external body; but this which constitutes the form of the affect ought to indicate or express the constitution of the body, or of some part of it, which the body itself or some part of it has from the fact that its power of acting or force of existing is increased or diminished, is helped or is constrained.

Sed notandum cum dico "majorem vel minorem existendi vim quam antea", me non intelligere quod mens præsentem corporis constitutionem cum præterita comparat sed quod idea quæ affectus formam constituit, aliquid de corpore affirmat quod plus minusve realitatis revera involvit quam antea. Et quia essentia mentis in hoc consistit (per propositiones 11 et 13 partis II) quod sui corporis actualem existentiam affirmat et nos per perfectionem ipsam rei essentiam intelligimus, sequitur ergo quod mens ad majorem minoremve perfectionem transit quando ei aliquid de suo corpore vel aliqua ejus parte affirmare contingit quod plus minusve realitatis involvit quam antea. Cum igitur supra dixerim mentis cogitandi potentiam augeri vel minui, nihil aliud intelligere volui quam quod mens ideam sui corporis vel alicujus ejus partis formaverit quæ plus minusve realitatis exprimit quam de suo corpore affirmaverat.

But it must be noted that when I say "a greater or lesser force of existing than before," I do not mean that the mind compares the present constitution of the body with the past, but that the idea which constitutes the form of the affect affirms something about the body which really involves more or less reality than before. And since the essence of the mind consists (by Propositions 11 and 13 of Part 2) in this, that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and we by perfection understand the very essence of a thing, it follows, therefore, that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens to it to affirm something about its own body or some part of it which involves more or less reality than before. Accordingly, since I have said above that the mind’s power of thinking is increased or diminished, I wished to mean nothing else than that the mind has formed an idea of its body or of some part of it which expresses more or less reality than it had affirmed of its own body.

Nam idearum præstantia et actualis cogitandi potentia ex objecti præstantia æstimatur. Addidi denique "et qua data ipsa mens ad hoc potius quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur" ut præter lætitiæ et tristitiæ naturam quam prima definitionis pars explicat, cupiditatis etiam naturam exprimerem.

For the pre-eminence of ideas and the actual power of thinking are assessed from the pre-eminence of the object. I added, finally, "and, this being given, the mind itself is determined to think this rather than that," so that, besides the nature of joy and sadness which the first part of the definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.

Finis tertiæ partis

End of the third part