Seneca: DIALOGI

1. * * * nobis magno consensu uitia commendant. Licet nihil aliud quod sit salutare temptemus, proderit tamen per se ipsum secedere: meliores erimus singuli. Quid quod secedere ad optimos uiros et aliquod exemplum eligere ad quod uitam derigamus licet?

1. * * * by a great consensus they commend vices to us. Granted that we attempt nothing else which is salutary, nevertheless to withdraw in and of itself will profit: we shall be better singly. What of the fact that it is permitted to withdraw to the best men and to choose some exemplar to which we may direct our life?

Quod <nisi> in otio non fit: tunc potest optineri quod semel placuit, ubi nemo interuenit qui iudicium adhuc inbecillum populo adiutore detorqueat; tunc potest uita aequali et uno tenore procedere, quam propositis diuersissimis scindimus. 2. Nam inter cetera mala illud pessimum est, quod uitia ipsa mutamus. Sic ne hoc quidem nobis contingit, permanere in malo iam familiari.

Which does not happen in leisure: then what once pleased can be obtained, when no one intervenes to wrench aside a judgment still feeble, with the people as helper; then life can proceed with an equal and single tenor, which we split by most diverse proposals. 2. For among other evils this is the worst, that we ourselves change our very vices. Thus not even this befalls us: to remain in an evil already familiar.

Aliud ex alio placet uexatque nos hoc quoque, quod iudicia nostra non tantum praua sed etiam leuia sunt: fluctuamur aliudque ex alio comprendimus, petita relinquimus, relicta repetimus, alternae inter cupiditatem nostram et paenitentiam uices sunt. 3. Pendemus enim toti ex alienis iudiciis et id optimum nobis uidetur quod petitores laudatoresque multos habet, non id quod laudandum petendumque est, nec uiam bonam ac malam per se aestimamus sed turba uestigiorum, in quibus nulla sunt redeuntium.

One thing after another pleases us,
and this too vexes us, that our judgments are not only depraved but also light: we waver, and we grasp one thing out of another, we abandon the things sought, we seek again the things left behind, there are alternate turns between our cupidity and our repentance. 3. For we depend wholly on others’ judgments, and that seems best to us which has many petitioners and praisers, not that which ought to be praised and sought, nor do we estimate the good way and the bad by themselves, but by the crowd of footprints, among which there are none of those returning.

4. Dices mihi: 'quid ais, Seneca? deseris partes? Certe Stoici uestri dicunt: "usque ad ultimum uitae finem in actu erimus, non desinemus communi bono operam dare, adiuuare singulos, opem ferre etiam inimicis senili manu.

4. You will say to me: 'What do you say, Seneca? Do you desert your part? Surely your Stoics say: "up to the uttermost end of life we shall be in action, we shall not cease to give effort to the common good, to aid individuals, to bear help even to enemies with an old man's hand."

Nos sumus qui nullis annis uacationem damus et, quod ait ille uir disertissimus,

We are those who grant vacation in no years, and, as that most eloquent man says,

canitiem galea premimus;

we press our gray hair with a helmet;

nos sumus apud quos usque eo nihil ante mortem otiosum est ut, si res patitur, non sit ipsa mors otiosa." Quid nobis Epicuri praecepta in ipsis Zenonis principiis loqueris? Quin tu bene gnauiter, si partium piget, transfugis potius quam prodis?' 5. Hoc tibi in praesentia respondebo: 'numquid uis amplius quam ut me similem ducibus meis praestem? Quid ergo est?

we are the sort with whom, to such an extent, nothing before death is idle that, if the situation allows, not even death itself is idle." Why do you speak to us of Epicurus’s precepts right in the very principles of Zeno? Why don’t you, properly and vigorously, if you are weary of your faction, desert rather than betray?' 5. This I will answer you for the present: 'do you want anything more than that I show myself like to my leaders? What then is it?

non quo miserint me illi, sed quo duxerint ibo.'

not where they have sent me, but where they will have led me, I will go.'

II.

1. Nunc probabo tibi non desciscere me a praeceptis Stoicorum; nam ne ipsi quidem a suis desciuerunt, et tamen excusatissimus essem, etiam si non praecepta illorum sequerer sed exempla. Hoc quod dico in duas diuidam partes: primum, ut possit aliquis uel a prima aetate contemplationi ueritatis totum se tradere, rationem uiuendi quaerere atque exercere secreto; 2. deinde, ut possit hoc aliquis emeritis stipendiis, profligatae aetatis, iure optimo facere et ~ad alios actus animos~ referre, uirginum Vestalium more, quae annis inter officia diuisis discunt facere sacra et cum didicerunt docent.

1. Now I will prove to you that I do not secede from the precepts of the Stoics; for not even they themselves have seceded from their own, and yet I should be most excusable, even if I were to follow not their precepts but their examples. What I say I will divide into two parts: first, that someone can even from his earliest age hand himself over entirely to the contemplation of truth, seek the reason of living and practice it in seclusion; 2. then, that someone can, with his campaigns served out, with life far-spent, with the best right do this and ~refer the mind to other acts~, in the manner of the Vestal virgins, who, with the years divided among duties, learn to perform sacred rites, and when they have learned they teach.

III.

1. Hoc Stoicis quoque placere ostendam, non quia mihi legem dixerim nihil contra dictum Zenonis Chrysippiue committere, sed quia res ipsa patitur me ire in illorum sententiam, quoniam si quis semper unius sequitur, non in curia sed in factione est. Vtinam quidem iam tenerentur omnia et in aperto et confesso ueritas esset nihilque ex decretis mutaremus! nunc ueritatem cum eis ipsis qui docent quaerimus.

1. I shall show that this pleases the Stoics as well, not because I would have laid down a law for myself to commit nothing against the dictum of Zeno and Chrysippus, but because the matter itself allows me to go over into their opinion, since if someone always follows one man, he is not in a senate but in a faction. Would that indeed all things were already held fast and that truth were in the open and confessed, and that we changed nothing from the decrees! now we seek the truth together with those very men who teach.

2. Duae maxime et in hac re dissident sectae, Epicureorum et Stoicorum, sed utraque ad otium diuersa uia mittit. Epicurus ait: 'non accedet ad rem publicam sapiens, nisi si quid interuenerit'; Zenon ait: 'accedet ad rem publicam, nisi si quid inpedierit.' 3. Alter otium ex proposito petit, alter ex causa; causa autem illa late patet. Si res publica corruptior est quam adiuuari possit, si occupata est malis, non nitetur sapiens in superuacuum nec se nihil profuturus inpendet; si parum habebit auctoritatis aut uirium nec illum erit admissura res publica, si ualetudo illum inpediet, quomodo nauem quassam non deduceret in mare, quomodo nomen in militiam non daret debilis, sic ad iter quod inhabile sciet non accedet.

2. Two sects especially are at variance on this matter also, the Epicureans and the Stoics, but each sends to leisure by a different road. Epicurus says: 'the wise man will not accede to the republic, unless something intervenes'; Zeno says: 'he will accede to the republic, unless something shall impede.' 3. The one seeks leisure by design, the other by cause; but that cause ranges widely. If the republic is more corrupted than that it can be aided, if it is occupied by evils, the wise man will not strive to no purpose nor expend himself when he will profit nothing; if he will have too little authority or strength, and the republic is not going to admit him, if his health will impede him, just as he would not launch a battered ship upon the sea, just as a weak man would not give his name into military service, so he will not accede to a journey for which he knows himself unfit.

4. Potest ergo et ille cui omnia adhuc in integro sunt, antequam ullas experiatur tempestates, in tuto subsistere et protinus commendare se bonis artibus et inlibatum otium exigere, uirtutium cultor, quae exerceri etiam quietissimis possunt. 5. Hoc nempe ab homine exigitur, ut prosit hominibus, si fieri potest, multis, si minus, paucis, si minus, proximis, si minus, sibi. Nam cum se utilem ceteris efficit, commune agit negotium.

4. He can therefore even he for whom all things are still intact, before he experiences any tempests, stand fast in safety and at once commend himself to good arts and spend an unsullied leisure, a cultivator of virtues, which can be exercised even in the quietest conditions. 5. This indeed is exacted from a man: that he be of use to human beings, if it can be done, to many; if not, to few; if not, to those nearest; if not, to himself. For when he makes himself useful to the rest, he conducts a common business.

Quomodo qui se deteriorem facit non sibi tantummodo nocet sed etiam omnibus eis quibus melior factus prodesse potuisset, sic quisquis bene de se meretur hoc ipso aliis prodest quod illis profuturum parat.

Just as he who makes himself worse harms not only himself but also all those whom, having been made better, he could have profited, so whoever merits well of himself by this very fact benefits others, in that he prepares what will be profitable to them.

IV.

1. Duas res publicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et uere publicam qua di atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum sed terminos ciuitatis nostrae cum sole metimur, alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi; haec aut Atheniensium erit aut Carthaginiensium aut alterius alicuius urbis quae non ad omnis pertineat homines sed ad certos. Quidam eodem tempore utrique rei publicae dant operam, maiori minorique, quidam tantum minori, quidam tantum maiori. 2. Huic maiori rei publicae et in otio deseruire possumus, immo uero nescio an in otio melius, ut quaeramus quid sit uirtus, una pluresne sint, natura an ars bonos uiros faciat; unum sit hoc quod maria terrasque et mari ac terris inserta complectitur, an multa eiusmodi corpora deus sparserit; continua sit omnis et plena materia ex qua cuncta gignuntur, an diducta et solidis inane permixtum; quae sit dei sedes, opus suum spectet an tractet, utrumne extrinsecus illi circumfusus sit an toti inditus; inmortalis sit mundus an inter caduca et ad tempus nata numerandus.

1. Let us embrace in mind two commonwealths, one great and truly public in which gods and men are contained, wherein we look not to this corner or to that, but measure the boundaries of our city with the sun; the other to which the condition of birth has enrolled us: this will be either of the Athenians or of the Carthaginians or of some other city which pertains not to all men but to certain ones. Some at the same time give their effort to both commonwealths, the greater and the lesser, some only to the lesser, some only to the greater. 2. To this greater commonwealth we can also render service in leisure—nay indeed, I do not know whether better in leisure—so that we may inquire what virtue is, whether it is one or more, whether nature or art makes good men; whether this is one thing which embraces the seas and lands and the things inserted into sea and lands, or whether god has scattered many bodies of this sort; whether all matter is continuous and full, from which all things are begotten, or whether it is sundered and the void is intermixed among solids; what the seat of god is, whether he looks upon his work or handles it, whether he is encompassed by it from without or is infused into the whole; whether the world is immortal or is to be numbered among things that fall and are born for a time.

Haec qui contemplatur, quid deo praestat? ne tanta eius opera sine teste sint.

He who contemplates these things—what does he render to god? That such great works of his not be without a witness.

1. Solemus dicere summum bonum esse secundum naturam uiuere: natura nos ad utrumque genuit, et contemplationi rerum et actioni. Nunc id probemus quod prius diximus. Quid porro?

1. We are accustomed to say that the supreme good is to live according to nature: nature has begotten us for both, both for the contemplation of things and for action. Now let us prove that which we said earlier. What further?

hoc non erit probatum, si se unusquisque consuluerit quantam cupidinem habeat ignota noscendi, quam ad omnis fabulas excitetur? 2. Nauigant quidam et labores peregrinationis longissimae una mercede perpetiuntur cognoscendi aliquid abditum remotumque. Haec res ad spectacula populos contrahit, haec cogit praeclusa rimari, secretiora exquirere, antiquitates euoluere, mores barbararum audire gentium.

This will not be proved, if each person has consulted himself as to how much cupidity he has of knowing the unknown, how he is excited at every fable? 2. Some sail and endure the labors of a very long peregrination for a single wage: to come to know something hidden and remote. This draws peoples to spectacles, this compels them to pry into what is precluded, to seek out the more secret things, to unroll antiquities, to hear the mores of barbarian nations.

3. Curiosum nobis natura ingenium dedit et artis sibi ac pulchritudinis suae conscia spectatores nos tantis rerum spectaculis genuit, perditura fructum sui, si tam magna, tam clara, tam subtiliter ducta, tam nitida et non uno genere formosa solitudini ostenderet. 4. Vt scias illam spectari uoluisse, non tantum aspici, uide quem nobis locum dederit: in media nos sui parte constituit et circumspectum omnium nobis dedit; nec erexit tantummodo hominem, sed etiam habilem contemplationis factura, ut ab ortu sidera in occasum labentia prosequi posset et uultum suum circumferre cum toto, sublime fecit illi caput et collo flexili inposuit; deinde sena per diem, sena per noctem signa producens nullam non partem sui explicuit, ut per haec quae optulerat oculis eius cupiditatem faceret etiam ceterorum. 5. Nec enim omnia nec tanta uisimus quanta sunt, sed acies nostra aperit sibi inuestigandi uiam et fundamenta uero iacit, ut inquisitio transeat ex apertis in obscura et aliquid ipso mundo inueniat antiquius: unde ista sidera exierint; quis fuerit uniuersi status, antequam singula in partes discederent; quae ratio mersa et confusa diduxerit; quis loca rebus adsignauerit, suapte natura grauia descenderint, euolauerint leuia, an praeter nisum pondusque corporum altior aliqua uis legem singulis dixerit; an illud uerum sit quo maxime probatur homines diuini esse spiritus, partem ac ueluti scintillas quasdam astrorum in terram desiluisse atque alieno loco haesisse.

3. Nature gave to us a curious disposition, and, conscious of her art and of her own pulchritude, she begot us as spectators for such great spectacles of things, about to lose the fruit of herself if she were to display to solitude things so great, so clear, so subtly drawn, so shining, and beautiful not in one kind alone. 4. That you may know she wished to be beheld, not only to be looked at, see what place she has given us: she has set us in the middle part of herself and has given to us a circumspect view of all things; nor did she only raise up the human being, but also, making him apt for contemplation, so that from the rising he could pursue the stars gliding to the setting and could carry his face around with the whole, she made his head lofty and set it upon a flexible neck; then, producing six signs by day, six by night, she has unfolded no part of herself not at all, so that through these things which she had offered to his eyes she might create a desire also for the rest. 5. For we have seen neither all things nor so great as they are, but our keen-sight opens for itself a way of investigation and lays foundations for the true, so that inquiry may pass from the open into the obscure and may find something more ancient than the world itself: whence these stars have gone forth; what the status of the universe was before individual things separated into parts; what ratio, submerged and confounded, drew them apart; who assigned places to things, whether by their own nature the heavy descended, the light flew up, or, beyond the effort and the weight of bodies, some higher force prescribed a law for each; or whether that is true by which it is most proved that the spirits of men are divine, that a part and, as it were, certain scintillae of the stars leapt down to the earth and stuck fast in an alien place.

6. Cogitatio nostra caeli munimenta perrumpit nec contenta est id quod ostenditur scire: 'illud' inquit 'scrutor quod ultra mundum iacet, utrumne profunda uastitas sit an et hoc ipsum terminis suis cludatur; qualis sit habitus exclusis, informia et confusa sint, [an] in omnem partem tantundem loci optinentia, an et illa in aliquem cultum discripta sint; huic cohaereant mundo, an longe ab hoc secesserint et hic in uacuo uolutetur; indiuidua sint per quae struitur omne quod natum futurumque est, an continua eorum materia sit et per totum mutabilis; utrum contraria inter se elementa sint, an non pugnent sed per diuersa conspirent.' 7. Ad haec quaerenda natus, aestima quam non multum acceperit temporis, etiam si illud totum sibi uindicat. Qui licet nihil facilitate eripi, nihil neglegentia patiatur excidere, licet horas suas auarissime seruet et usque in ultimum aetatis humanae terminum procedat nec quicquam illi ex eo quod natura constituit fortuna concutiat, tamen homo ad inmortalium cognitionem nimis mortalis est. 8. Ergo secundum naturam uiuo si totum me illi dedi, si illius admirator cultorque sum.

6. Our cogitation breaks through the bulwarks of the sky and is not content
to know what is shown: ‘that,’ it says, ‘I scrutinize which lies beyond the world,
whether it be a deep vastness or even this very thing be enclosed by its own termini;
what the condition is of the things excluded, whether they are formless and confused, [or] occupying just as much place in every direction, or even those are apportioned into some cultivation/arrangement;
whether they cohere to this world, or have withdrawn far from this and this one is rolled about in the void;
whether the things through which all that has been born and will be born is constructed are indivisible, or their matter is continuous and mutable throughout; whether the elements are contrary among themselves, or do not fight but conspire through their differences.’ 7. Born for seeking these things, reckon how little time he has received, even if he claims all of it for himself. Though he allow nothing to be snatched away by ease, suffer nothing to slip out by negligence, though he guard his hours most avariciously and proceed to the utmost terminus of human age and fortune shake nothing from what nature has established for him, nevertheless man is too mortal for the cognition of immortal things. 8. Therefore I live according to nature if I have given myself wholly to it, if I am its admirer and cultivator/devotee.

Natura autem utrumque facere me uoluit, et agere et contemplationi uacare: utrumque facio, quoniam ne contemplatio quidem sine actione est.

Nature, moreover, has willed me to do both, both to act and to be at leisure for contemplation: I do both, since not even contemplation is without action.

VI.

1. 'Sed refert' inquis 'an ad illam uoluptatis causa accesseris, nihil aliud ex illa petens quam adsiduam contemplationem sine exitu; est enim dulcis et habet inlecebras suas.' Aduersus hoc tibi respondeo: aeque refert quo animo ciuilem agas uitam, an semper inquietus sis nec tibi umquam sumas ullum tempus quo ab humanis ad diuina respicias. 2. Quomodo res adpetere sine ullo uirtutum amore et sine cultu ingeni ac nudas edere operas minime probabile est (misceri enim ista inter se et conseri debent), sic inperfectum ac languidum bonum est in otium sine actu proiecta uirtus, numquam id quod didicit ostendens. 3. Quis negat illam debere profectus suos in opere temptare, nec tantum quid faciendum sit cogitare sed etiam aliquando manum exercere et ea quae meditata est ad uerum perducere?

1. 'But it matters,' you say, 'whether you have approached that for the sake of pleasure, seeking nothing else from it than assiduous contemplation without exit; for it is sweet and has its own enticements.' Against this I reply to you: it matters equally with what spirit you conduct the civil life, whether you are always restless and never take for yourself any time in which you turn your gaze from human to divine things. 2. Just as to appetite things without any love of the virtues and without cultivation of the intellect, and to put forth bare works, is least plausible (for these things ought to be mingled with one another and linked together), so it is an imperfect and languid good, virtue thrown into leisure without action, never showing what it has learned. 3. Who denies that it ought to test its advances in work, and not only to consider what must be done but also at times to exercise the hand and to lead to the real the things which it has meditated?

Quodsi per ipsum sapientem non est mora, si non actor deest sed agenda desunt, ecquid illi secum esse permittes? 4. Quo animo ad otium sapiens secedit? ut sciat se tum quoque ea acturum per quae posteris prosit.

But if, on the wise man himself, there is no delay, if it is not the actor that is lacking but the agenda are lacking, will you permit him to be with himself? 4. With what mind does the wise man withdraw to leisure? So that he may know that then too he will be doing those things by which he may profit posterity.

Nos certe sumus qui dicimus et Zenonem et Chrysippum maiora egisse quam si duxissent exercitus, gessissent honores, leges tulissent; quas non uni ciuitati, sed toti humano generi tulerunt. Quid est ergo quare tale otium non conueniat uiro bono, per quod futura saecula ordinet nec apud paucos contionetur sed apud omnis omnium gentium homines, quique sunt quique erunt? 5. Ad summam, quaero an ex praeceptis suis uixerint Cleanthes et Chrysippus et Zenon.

We, to be sure, are those who say that both Zeno and Chrysippus have done greater things than if they had led armies, borne honors, carried laws; laws which they brought not to a single city, but to the whole human race. What, then, is the reason why such leisure does not befit a good man, by which he may ordain future ages and address not among a few but among all men of all nations, both those who are and those who will be? 5. In sum, I ask whether Cleanthes and Chrysippus and Zeno lived according to their own precepts.

<Non> dubie respondebis sic illos uixisse quemadmodum dixerant esse uiuendum: atqui nemo illorum rem publicam administrauit. 'Non fuit' inquis 'illis aut ea fortuna aut ea dignitas quae admitti ad publicarum rerum tractationem solet.' Sed idem nihilominus non segnem egere uitam: inuenerunt quemadmodum plus quies ipsorum hominibus prodesset quam aliorum discursus et sudor. Ergo nihilominus hi multum egisse uisi sunt, quamuis nihil publice agerent.

No doubt you will answer
that they lived just as they had said one ought to live: and yet none of them
administered the republic. 'It was not,' you say, 'their fortune or their dignity such as is wont
to be admitted to the handling of public affairs.' But nonetheless they did not lead
a sluggish life: they discovered how their own repose might benefit men more than the
running-about and sweat of others. Therefore, nonetheless, these men seemed to have accomplished much,
although they did nothing publicly.

VII.

1. Praeterea tria genera sunt uitae, inter quae quod sit optimum quaeri solet: unum uoluptati uacat, alterum contemplationi, tertium actioni. Primum deposita contentione depositoque odio quod inplacabile diuersa sequentibus indiximus, uideamus ut haec omnia ad idem sub alio atque alio titulo perueniant: nec ille qui uoluptatem probat sine contemplatione est, nec ille qui contemplationi inseruit sine uoluptate est, nec ille cuius uita actionibus destinata est sine contemplatione est. 2. 'Plurimum' inquis 'discriminis est utrum aliqua res propositum sit an propositi alterius accessio.' Sit sane grande discrimen, tamen alterum sine altero non est: nec ille sine actione contemplatur, nec hic sine contemplatione agit, nec ille tertius, de quo male existimare consensimus, uoluptatem inertem probat sed eam quam ratione efficit firmam sibi; ita et haec ipsa uoluptaria secta in actu est.

1. Moreover there are three kinds of life, among which what is best is wont to be sought: one is devoted to pleasure, another to contemplation, a third to action. With the contest laid down and with the hatred laid down which we proclaimed as implacable against those following different courses, let us see how all these come to the same end under one title and another: neither is he who approves pleasure without contemplation, nor he who has devoted himself to contemplation without pleasure, nor he whose life is destined for actions without contemplation. 2. “There is a very great distinction,” you say, “whether some thing is a purpose or an accessory of another purpose.” Granted, let the distinction be great; nevertheless the one is not without the other: nor does that man contemplate without action, nor does this one act without contemplation, nor does that third, about whom we have agreed to think ill, approve an inert pleasure, but that which by reason he makes firm for himself; thus even this very voluptuary sect is in action.

3. Quidni in actu sit, cum ipse dicat Epicurus aliquando se recessurum a uoluptate, dolorem etiam adpetiturum, si aut uoluptati imminebit paenitentia aut dolor minor pro grauiore sumetur? 4. Quo pertinet haec dicere? ut appareat contemplationem placere omnibus; alii petunt illam, nobis haec statio, non portus est.

3. Why should it not be in action, since Epicurus himself says that he will sometimes withdraw from pleasure, and will even seek pain, if either repentance will threaten pleasure or a lesser pain will be taken in place of a graver one? 4. To what end is it said? that it may appear that contemplation pleases all; others seek that, for us this is a station, not a port.

VIII.

1. Adice nunc [huc] quod e lege Chrysippi uiuere otioso licet: non dico ut otium patiatur, sed ut eligat. Negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rem publicam accessurum; quid autem interest quomodo sapiens ad otium ueniat, utrum quia res publica illi deest an quia ipse rei publicae, si omnibus defutura res publica est? Semper autem deerit fastidiose quaerentibus.

1. Add now [here] that, by the law of Chrysippus, it is permitted to live in leisure: I do not say that he should endure leisure, but that he should choose it. Our people deny that the wise man will accede to just any republic; but what does it matter how the wise man comes to leisure, whether because the republic is lacking to him or because he is lacking to the republic, if the republic is going to be lacking to all? Moreover, it will always be lacking to those who seek it fastidiously.

2. Interrogo ad quam rem publicam sapiens sit accessurus. Ad Atheniensium, in qua Socrates damnatur, Aristoteles ne damnetur fugit? in qua opprimit inuidia uirtutes?

2. I ask to which republic the sage will be about to have access. To that of the Athenians,
in which Socrates is condemned, and Aristotle fled lest he be condemned? in which envy oppresses
virtues?

Negabis mihi accessurum ad hanc rem publicam sapientem. Ad Carthaginiensium ergo rem publicam sapiens accedet, in qua adsidua seditio et optimo cuique infesta libertas est, summa aequi ac boni uilitas, aduersus hostes inhumana crudelitas, etiam aduersus suos hostilis? Et hanc fugiet.

You will deny to me that the wise man will approach this commonwealth. Will the wise man then approach the commonwealth of the Carthaginians, in which there is constant sedition,
and a liberty hostile to each and every best man, the greatest cheapening of the equitable and the good, and toward enemies inhuman cruelty,
and even toward its own people a hostility like that of an enemy? He will flee this one too.

3. Si percensere singulas uoluero, nullam inueniam quae sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit. Quodsi non inuenitur illa res publica quam nobis fingimus, incipit omnibus esse otium necessarium, quia quod unum praeferri poterat otio nusquam est. 4. Si quis dicit optimum esse nauigare, deinde negat nauigandum in eo mari in quo naufragia fieri soleant et frequenter subitae tempestates sint quae rectorem in contrarium rapiant, puto hic me uetat nauem soluere, quamquam laudet nauigationem.

3. If I should wish to reckon through them singly, I shall find none which could bear the sage, or which the sage could endure. But if that republic which we fashion for ourselves is not found, leisure begins to be necessary for all, because that one thing which could be preferred to leisure is nowhere. 4. If someone says that it is best to navigate, and then denies that one must navigate on that sea in which shipwrecks are wont to occur and sudden storms are frequent, which drag the helmsman in the contrary direction, I think this man forbids me to loose the ship, although he praises navigation.

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