Quintilian: INSTITUTIONES

[1] I. Quoniam in libro secundo quaesitum est quid esset rhetorice et quis finis eius, artem quoque esse eam et utilem et virtutem, ut vires nostrae tulerunt, ostendimus, materiamque ei res omnes de quibus dicere oporteret subiecimus: iam hinc unde coeperit, quibus constet, quo quaeque in ea modo invenienda atque tractanda sint exsequar: intra quem modum plerique scriptores artium constiterunt, adeo ut Apollodorus contentus solis iudicialibus fuerit. II. Nec sum ignarus hoc a me praecipue quod hic liber inchoat opus studiosos eius desiderasse, ut inquisitione opinionum, quae diversissimae fuerunt, longe difficillimum, ita nescio an minimae legentibus futurum voluptati, quippe quod prope nudam praeceptorum traditionem desideret. III.

[1] 1. Since in the second book it was asked what rhetoric is and what its end is, that it is also an art and useful and a virtue, as our powers allowed, we have shown, and we have subjected to it as material all the matters about which it would be proper to speak: now from here I will set forth whence it begins, of what it consists, in what manner each thing in it is to be found and handled: within which limit most writers of the arts have halted, to such a degree that Apollodorus was content with judicial matters alone. 2. Nor am I unaware that students of it have especially desired this from me, that this book begins the work—although the inquiry of opinions, which were most diverse, is by far most difficult—yet I do not know whether it will be of the slightest pleasure to readers, since it requires an almost naked transmission of precepts. 3.

In ceteris enim admiscere temptavimus aliquid nitoris, non iactandi ingenii gratia (namque in id eligi materia poterat uberior), sed ut hoc ipso adliceremus magis iuventutem ad cognitionem eorum quae necessaria studiis arbitrabamur, si ducti iucunditate aliqua lectionis libentius discerent ea quorum ne ieiuna atque arida traditio averteret animos et aures praesertim tam delicatas raderet verebamur. IV. Qua ratione se Lucretius dicit praecepta philosophiae carmine esse complexum; namque hac, ut est notum, similitudine utitur:

In the others indeed we have attempted to mix in some polish, not for the sake of flaunting our genius (for material richer for that could have been chosen), but so that by this very thing we might entice the youth more to the cognition of those things which we judged necessary for studies, if, led by some pleasantness of reading, they would more willingly learn those things whose jejune and arid tradition we feared might turn away minds and, especially, graze ears so delicate. 4. By this rationale Lucretius says that he has encompassed the precepts of philosophy in song; for he employs, as is known, this similitude:

ac veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes
cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum
adspirant mellis dulci flavoque liquore

and just as physicians, when they try to give to boys the foul absinthe,
first they rim the cups around the edges
with the sweet and golden liquor of honey

et quae secuntur. V. Sed nos veremur ne parum hic liber mellis et absinthii multum habere videatur, sitque salubrior studiis quam dulcior. Quin etiam hoc timeo, ne ex eo minorem gratiam ineat, quod pleraque non inventa per me sed ab allis tradita continebit, habeat etiam quosdam qui contra sentiant et adversentur, propterea quod plurimi auctores, quamvis eodem tenderent, diversas tamen vias munierunt atque in suam quisque induxit sequentes.

and the things which follow. 5. But we fear lest this book seem to have too little of honey and much of wormwood, and be more salubrious for studies than sweeter. Nay rather, I also fear this, lest it incur less favor on that account, because it will contain very many things not invented by me but handed down by others, and that it may also have some who think contrariwise and are adverse, for the reason that very many authors, although they tended to the same end, nevertheless paved diverse roads, and each led his followers into his own way.

VI. Illi autem probant qualecumque ingressi sunt iter, nec facile inculcatas pueris persuasiones mutaveris, quia nemo non didicisse mavult quam discere. VII. Est autem, ut procedente libro patebit, infinita dissensio auctorum, primo ad ea quae rudia atque inperfecta adhuc erant adicientibus quod invenissent scriptoribus, mox, ut aliquid sui viderentur adferre, etiam recta mutantibus.

6. But they approve whatever path they have entered, nor will you easily change persuasions inculcated in boys, because everyone prefers to have learned rather than to learn. 7. Moreover, as will be evident with the book proceeding, there is an infinite dissension of the authors: at first, the writers adding to those things which were still rude and imperfect whatever they had discovered; soon, so that they might seem to bring something of their own, even changing things that were correct.

VIII. Nam primus post eos quos poetae tradiderunt movisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedocles dicitur. Artium autem scriptores antiquissimi Corax et Tisias Siculi, quos insecutus est vir eiusdem insulae Gorgias Leontinus, Empedoclis, ut traditur, discipulus.

8. For Empedocles is said to be the first, after those whom the poets have transmitted as having initiated certain things concerning rhetoric. But the most ancient writers on the arts were Corax and Tisias, Sicilians, whom there followed a man of the same island, Gorgias of Leontini, a disciple, as it is handed down, of Empedocles.

IX. Is beneficio longissimae aetatis (nam centum et novem vixit annos) cum multis simul floruit, ideoque et illorum de quibus supra dixi fuit aemulus et ultra Socraten usque duravit. X. Thrasymachus Calchedonius cum hoc et Prodicus Cius et Abderites Protagoras, a quo decem milibus denariorum didicisse artem quam edidit Evathlus dicitur, et Hippias Elius, et, quem Palameden Plato appellat, Alcidamas Elaites. XI. Antiphon quoque, qui et orationem primus omnium scripsit et nihilo minus artem et ipse composuit et pro se dixisse optime est creditus.

9. He, by the benefit of a very long life (for he lived 109 years), flourished together with many at the same time, and so was a rival of those of whom I spoke above, and lasted even beyond Socrates. 10. Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian along with him, and Prodicus the Cean, and Protagoras the Abderite—by whom Evathlus is said to have learned, for ten thousand denarii, the art which he published—and Hippias the Elean, and Alcidamas the Elaïte, whom Plato calls a Palamedes. 11. Antiphon too, who both was the first of all to write a speech and, nonetheless, himself composed a treatise on the art, and is believed to have spoken most excellently on his own behalf.

Etiam Polycrates, a quo scriptam in Socraten diximus orationem, et Theodorus Byzantius, ex iis et ipse quos Plato appellat logodaedalos. XII. Horum primi communis locos tractasse dicuntur Protagoras, Gorgias, adfectus Prodicus, Hippias et idem Protagoras et Thrasymachus.

Also Polycrates, by whom we said an oration written against Socrates, and Theodorus the Byzantine, he himself also from among those whom Plato calls word-craftsmen. 12. Of these, the first are said to have handled common places: Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus on affections, Hippias, and likewise Protagoras and Thrasymachus.

Cicero in Bruto negat ante Periclea scriptum quicquam quod ornatum oratorium habeat: eius aliqua ferri. Equidem non reperio quicquam tanta eloquentiae fama dignum, ideoque minus miror esse qui nihil ab eo scriptum putent, haec autem quae feruntur ab aliis esse composita. XIII.

Cicero in the Brutus denies that before the Periclean period anything was written that has oratorical ornament: some pieces of his are said to circulate. For my part I do not find anything worthy of so great a fame for eloquence, and therefore I am the less surprised that there are those who think nothing was written by him, but that these things which are in circulation were composed by others. 13.

His successere multi, sed clarissimus Gorgiae auditor Isocrates (quamquam de praeceptore eius inter auctores non convenit: nos tamen Aristoteli credimus). XIV. Hinc velut diversae secari coeperunt viae. Nam et Isocratis praestantissimi discipuli fuerunt in omni studiorum genere, eoque iam seniore (octavum enim et nonagesimum implevit annum) postmeridianis scholis Aristoteles praecipere artem oratoriam coepit, noto quidem illo, ut traditur, versu ex Philocteta frequenter usus: "turpe esse tacere et Isocraten pati dicere". Ars est utriusque, sed pluribus eam libris Aristoteles complexus est.

Many succeeded these, but the most illustrious, a hearer of Gorgias, was Isocrates (although about his preceptor the authorities do not agree: we, however, trust Aristotle). 14. From here, as it were, the ways began to be cut as diverse. For both Isocrates had most outstanding disciples in every genus of studies, and when he was now an old man (for he completed his ninety-eighth year) Aristotle began, in afternoon schools, to teach the oratorical art, frequently using, as it is handed down, that well-known verse from the Philoctetes: "that it is disgraceful to be silent and to allow Isocrates to speak." An Art belongs to each, but Aristotle has encompassed it in more books.

Eodem tempore Theodectes fuit, de cuius opere supra dictum est. XV. Theophrastus quoque, Aristotelis discipulus, de rhetorice diligenter scripsit, atque hinc vel studiosius philosophi quam rhetores praecipueque Stoicorum ac Peripateticorum principes. XVI.

Eodem tempore Theodectes fuit, about whose work it has been said above. 15. Theophrastus also, a disciple of Aristotle, wrote diligently on rhetoric; and hence, even more zealously, philosophers than rhetors—and especially the leaders of the Stoics and the Peripatetics—wrote on it. 16.

Fecit deinde velut propriam Hermagoras viam, quam plurimi sunt secuti. Cui maxime par atque aemulus videtur Athenaeus fuisse. Multa post Apollonius Molon, multa Areus, multa Caecilius et Halicarnasseus Dionysius.

Then Hermagoras fashioned, as it were, his own proper way, which very many followed. To him Athenaeus seems to have been especially a peer and an emulator. Later Apollonius Molon contributed many things, likewise Areus, likewise Caecilius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

XVII. Praecipue tamen in se converterunt studia Apollodorus Pergamenus, qui praeceptor Apolloniae Caesaris Augusti fuit, et Theodorus Gadareus, qui se dici maluit Rhodium: quem studiose audisse cum in eam insulam secessisset dicitur Tiberius Caesar. XVIII.

17. Especially, however, did Apollodorus of Pergamum, who was the teacher of Caesar Augustus at Apollonia, and Theodorus of Gadara, who preferred to be called the Rhodian, draw studies particularly to themselves: Tiberius Caesar is said to have listened to him diligently when he had withdrawn to that island. 18.

Hi diversas opiniones tradiderunt appellatique inde Apollodorei ac Theodorei ad morem certas in philosophia sectas sequendi. Sed Apollodori praecepta magis ex discipulis cognoscas, quorum diligentissimus in tradendo fuit Latine C. Valgius, Graece Atticus. Nam ipsius sola videtur ars edita ad Matium, quia ceteras missa ad Domitium epistula non agnoscit.

These transmitted diverse opinions, and were thence called Apollodoreans and Theodoreans, after the custom of following fixed sects in philosophy. But you would more readily learn Apollodorus’s precepts from his disciples, the most diligent of whom in transmitting was, in Latin, C. Valgius, in Greek, Atticus. For the only Art of his seems to have been published to Matius, since, in a letter sent to Domitius, he does not acknowledge the rest.

Plura scripsit Theodorus, cuius auditorem Hermagoran sunt qui viderint.

Theodorus wrote more; there are those who have seen Hermagoras as his auditor.

XIX. Romanorum primus, quantum ego quidem sciam, condidit aliqua in hanc materiam M. Cato, post M. Antonius [ille censorius] inchoavit: nam hoc solum opus eius atque id ipsum inperfectum manet. Secuti minus celebres, quorum memoriam, si quo loco res poscet, non omittam.

19. The first of the Romans, so far as I indeed know, M. Cato set down some things on this material; afterward M. Antonius [that Censor] began: for this is his only work, and that itself remains unfinished. Less celebrated men followed, whose memory, if the matter shall require at some point, I will not omit.

XX. Praecipuum vero lumen sicut eloquentiae, ita praeceptis quoque eius dedit unicum apud nos specimen orandi docendique oratorias artes M. Tullius, post quem tacere modestissimum foret, nisi et rhetoricos suos ipse adulescenti sibi elapsos diceret, et in oratoriis haec minora, quae plerumque desiderantur, sciens omisisset. XXI. Scripsit de eadem materia non pauca Cornificius, aliqua Stertinius, non nihil pater Gallio, accuratius vero priores Gallione Celsus et Laenas et aetatis nostrae Verginius Plinius tutilius.

20. The preeminent light not only of eloquence but also of its precepts, M. Tullius gave among us a singular specimen of pleading and of teaching the oratorical arts; after whom it would be most modest to be silent, unless he himself said that his Rhetorics had slipped out from him in his youth, and that in his oratorical works he had, knowingly, omitted these lesser points which are for the most part desired. 21. On the same material Cornificius wrote not a few things, Stertinius some, father Gallio not nothing; but more accurately than Gallio did the earlier Celsus and Laenas, and, of our own age, Verginius and Plinius more usefully.

sunt et hodie clari eiusdem operis auctores, qui si omnia complexi forent, consuluissent labori meo: sed parco nominibus viventium; veniet eorum laudi suum tempus: ad posteros enim virtus durabit, non perveniet invidia.

there are also today renowned authors of the same work, who, if they had encompassed everything, would have spared my labor: but I spare the names of the living; the time for their praise will come: for merit will endure to posterity, envy will not reach them.

XXII. Non tamen post tot ac tantos auctores pigebit meam quibusdam locis posuisse sententiam. Neque enim me cuiusquam sectae velut quadam superstitione inbutus addixi, et electuris quae volent facienda copia fuit, sicut ipse plurium in unum confero inventa, ubicumque ingenio non erit locus curae testimonium meruisse contentus.

22. Nevertheless, after so many and so great authors, it will not irk me to have set down my own judgment in certain places. For I have not, as if imbued with a kind of superstition, bound myself to anyone’s sect; and for those who will choose there has been provision for doing what they wish, just as I myself collate into one the inventions of many, content to have earned the testimony of care wherever there will be no place for genius.

[2] I. Nec diu nos moretur quaestio quae rhetorices origo sit. Nam cui dubium est quin sermonem ab ipsa rerum natura geniti protinus homines acceperint (quod certe principium est eius rei), huic studium et incrementum dederit utilitas, summam ratio et exercitatio? II. Nec video quare curam dicendi putent quidam inde coepisse, quod ii qui in discrimen aliquod vocabantur accuratius loqui defendendi sui gratia instituerint.

[2] 1. Let us not be detained long by the question what the origin of rhetoric is. For who doubts that men received speech straightway from nature herself (which is certainly the beginning of that matter), that utility gave to it zeal and growth, and that reason and exercise gave its consummation? 2. Nor do I see why some think that the care for speaking began at that point, from the fact that those who were summoned into some trial began to speak more carefully for the sake of defending themselves.

Haec enim ut honestior causa, ita non utique prior est, cum praesertim accusatio praecedat defensionem, nisi quis dicet etiam gladium fabricatum ab eo prius qui ferrum in tutelam sui quam qui in perniciem alterius compararit. III. Initium ergo dicendi dedit natura, initium artis observatio.

For this, though the more honorable cause, is not therefore necessarily the earlier, since accusation especially precedes defense, unless someone will say that even a sword was first forged by the one who acquired iron for the protection of himself rather than by the one who acquired it for another’s destruction. 3. Therefore nature gave the beginning of speaking, observation the beginning of art.

Homines enim sicut in medicina, cum viderent alia salubria, alia insalubria, ex observatione eorum effecerunt artem, ita cum in dicendo alia utilia, alia inutilia deprenderent, notarunt ea ad imitandum vitandumque, et quaedam secundum rationem eorum adiecerunt ipsi quoque: haec confirmata sunt usu. Tum quae sciebat quisque docuit. IV. Cicero quidem initium orandi conditoribus urbium ac legum latoribus dedit, in quibus fuisse vim dicendi necesse est: cur tamen hanc primam originem putet non video, cum sint adhuc quaedam vagae et sine urbibus ac sine legibus gentes, et tamen qui sunt in iis nati et legationibus fungantur et accusent aliqua atque defendant et denique alium alio melius loqui credant.

For men, just as in medicine, when they saw some things healthful, others unhealthful, from observation of them they produced an art; so, when in speaking they detected some things useful, others useless, they noted them for imitation and for avoidance, and they themselves also added certain things according to their rationale: these were confirmed by usage. Then each taught what he knew. 4. Cicero indeed assigned the beginning of oratory to the founders of cities and to the lawgivers, in whom it is necessary that there was a power of speaking: why, however, he should think this the first origin I do not see, since there are still certain peoples roaming and without cities and without laws, and yet those born among them both serve on embassies and accuse certain things and defend them, and finally believe one man to speak better than another.

[3] I. Omnis autem orandi ratio, ut plurimi maximique auctores tradiderunt, quinque partibus constat: inventione, dispositione, elocutione, memoria, pronuntiatione sive actione (utroque enim modo dicitur). Omnis vero sermo, quo quidem voluntas aliqua enuntiatur, habeat necesse est rem et verba. II. Ac si est brevis et una conclusione finitus, nihil fortasse ultra desideret: at oratio longior plura exigit. Non enim tantum refert quid et quo modo dicamus, sed etiam quo loco: opus ergo est et dispositione.

[3] 1. But the whole method of orating, as very many and the greatest authors have handed down, consists of five parts: invention, disposition, elocution, memory, pronuntiation or action (for it is said in either way). Every discourse, indeed, by which some will is enunciated, must of necessity have matter and words. 2. And if it is brief and finished with a single conclusion, it perhaps may desire nothing further; but a longer oration demands more. For it is not only of importance what and in what manner we speak, but also in what place: therefore there is need also of disposition.

Sed neque omnia quae res postulat dicere neque suo quaeque loco poterimus nisi adiuvante memoria, quapropter ea quoque pars quarta erit. III. Verum haec cuncta corrumpit ac propemodum perdit indecora vel voce vel gestu pronuntiatio: huic quoque igitur tribuendus est necessario quintus locus.

But neither shall we be able to say all that the matter postulates nor each thing in its proper place unless memory gives aid; wherefore that too will be a fourth part. 3. But an indecorous pronuntiation, either in voice or in gesture, corrupts all these things and almost destroys them; to this, therefore, a fifth place must necessarily be assigned.

IV. Nec audiendi quidam, quorum est Albucius, qui tris modo primas esse partis volunt quoniam memoria atque actio natura, non arte contingant: quarum nos praecepta suo loco dabimus; licet Thrasymachus quoque idem de actione crediderit. V. His adiecerunt quidam sextam partem, ita ut inventioni iudicium subnecterent, quia primum esset invenire, deinde iudicare. Ego porro ne invenisse quidem credo eum qui non iudicavit; neque enim contraria communia stulta invenisse dicitur quisquam, sed non vitasse.

IV. Nor are certain men to be listened to, among whom is Albucius, who are willing that there be only three first parts, since memory and action befall by nature, not by art: for which we will give precepts in their proper place; although Thrasymachus also believed the same about action. V. To these some have added a sixth part, in such a way that they subjoin judgment to invention, because first it is to invent, then to judge. I, moreover, do not even think him to have invented who has not judged; for no one is said to have found foolish contrary commonplaces, but not to have avoided them.

VI. Et Cicero quidem in rhetoricis iudicium subiecit inventioni: mihi autem adeo tribus primis partibus videtur esse permixtum (nam neque dispositio sine eo neque elocutio fuerit) ut pronuntiationem quoque vel plurimum ex eo mutuari putem. VII. Quod hoc audacius dixerim quod in Partitionibus Oratoriis ad easdem de quibus supra dictum est quinque pervenit partes.

6. And Cicero indeed in his rhetorical works subordinated judgment to invention; to me, however, it seems so intermingled with the first three parts (for neither disposition nor elocution would exist without it) that I think pronuntiation (delivery) too borrows very much from it. 7. I say this the more boldly because in the Oratorical Partitions he arrived at the same five parts of which mention was made above.

Nam cum dupliciter primum divisisset in inventionem atque elocutionem, res ac dispositionem inventioni, verba et pronuntiationem elocutioni dedit, quintamque constituit communem ac velut custodem omnium memoriam; idem in Oratore quinque rebus constare eloquentiam dicit: in quibus postea scriptis certior eius sententia est. VIII. Non minus mihi cupidi novitatis alicuius videntur fuisse qui adiecerunt ordinem cum dispositionem dixissent, quasi aliud sit dispositio quam rerum ordine quam optimo conlocatio.

Now, when he had first divided in a twofold way into invention and elocution, he assigned matters and disposition to invention, words and pronuntiation to elocution, and he established a fifth, common and, as it were, the guardian of all, memory; the same man in the Orator says that eloquence consists of five things, and on these, in writings composed later, his view is more definite. 8. No less do those seem to me to have been eager for some novelty who added order when they had already spoken of disposition, as though disposition were anything other than the collocation of things in the best order.

Dion inventionem modo et dispositionem tradidit, sed utramque duplicem rerum et verborum, ut sit elocutio inventionis, pronuntiatio dispositionis, his quinta pars memoriae accedat. Theodorei fere inventionem duplicem rerum atque elocutionis, deinde tris ceteras partes. IX. Hermagoras iudicium partitionem ordinem quaeque sunt elocutionis subicit oeconomiae, quae Graece appellata ex cura rerum domesticarum et hic per abusionem posita nomine Latino caret.

Dion handed down only invention and disposition, but each double, of things and of words, so that elocution is of invention, pronuntiation of disposition; to these a fifth part, memory, is added. Theodorus has nearly the same: a double invention of things and of elocution, then the remaining three parts. 9. Hermagoras subjects judgment, partition, order, and the things that belong to elocution to oeconomy, which, being called in Greek from the care of domestic affairs and here employed by abuse, lacks a Latin name.

X. Est et circa hoc quaestio, quod memoriam in ordine partium quidam inventioni, quidam dispositioni subiunxerunt: nobis quartus eius locus maxime placet. Non enim tantum inventa tenere ut disponamus, nec disposita ut eloquamur, sed etiam verbis formata memoriae mandare debemus; hac enim omnia quaecumque in orationem conlata sunt continentur.

10. There is also a question about this, that some, in the order of the parts, have subjoined memory to invention, others to disposition: to us its place as fourth is most pleasing. For we ought not only to hold the things found so that we may dispose them, nor the things disposed so that we may speak them, but we must also commit to memory the things formed in words; for by this all things whatsoever that have been brought together into an oration are contained.

XI. Fuerunt etiam in hac opinione non pauci, ut has non rhetorices partis esse existimarent, sed opera oratoris; eius enim esse invenire disponere eloqui et cetera. Quod si accipimus, nihil arti relinquemus. XII.

11. There were also not a few in this opinion, that these were not parts of rhetoric, but the works of the orator; for it is his to invent, to dispose, to elocute, and the rest. But if we accept this, we will leave nothing to the art. 12.

Nam bene dicere est oratoris, rhetorice tamen erit bene dicendi scientia: vel (ut alli putant) artificis est persuadere, vis autem persuadendi artis. Ita invenire quidem et disponere oratoris, inventio autem et dispositio rhetorices propria videri potest. XIII.

For to speak well is the orator’s part, yet rhetoric will be the science of speaking well: or (as some think) to persuade is the artist’s part, but the power of persuading belongs to the art. Thus to find/invent and to dispose/arrange are the orator’s, but Invention and Disposition can seem proper to Rhetoric. 13.

In eo plures dissenserunt, utrumne hae partes essent rhetorices an eiusdem opera an, ut Athenaeus credit, elementa, quae vocant stoicheia. Sed neque elementa recte quis dixerit: alioqui tantum initia erunt, ut mundi vel umor vel ignis vel materia vel corpora insecabilia; nec operum recte nomen accipient quae non ab aliis perficiuntur, sed aliud ipsa perficiunt; partes igitur. XIV.

On this point many have dissented, whether these were parts of rhetoric, or its works, or, as Athenaeus believes, elements, which they call stoicheia. But neither would one rightly call them elements: otherwise they will be only beginnings, as of the world either humor or fire or matter or indivisible bodies; nor will they rightly receive the name of “works,” which are not brought to completion by others, but themselves bring something else to completion; therefore, parts. 14.

Nam cum sit ex his rhetorice, fieri non potest ut, cum totum ex partibus constet, non sint partes totius ex quibus constat. Videntur autem mihi qui haec opera dixerant eo quoque moti, quod in alia rursus divisione nollent in idem nomen incidere; partes enim rhetorices esse dicebant laudativam deliberativam iudicialem. Quae si partes sunt, materiae sunt potius quam artis.

For since rhetoric is from these, it cannot be that, since the whole consists of parts, there are not parts of the whole of which it consists. Yet those who had called these “works” seem to me to have been moved also by this, that in another division in turn they did not wish to fall under the same name; for they were saying that the parts of rhetoric are the laudatory, the deliberative, the judicial. Which, if they are parts, are rather materials/subject-matters than of the art.

XV. Namque in his singulis rhetorice tota est, quia et inventionem et dispositionem et elocutionem et memoriam et pronuntiationem quaecumque earum desiderat. Itaque quidam genera tria rhetorices dicere maluerunt, optime autem ii quos secutus est Cicero, genera causarum.

15. For in each of these singly rhetoric is entire, because it comprises invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and pronuntiation—whichever of them it requires. And so certain people preferred to speak of three kinds (genera) of rhetoric; but best are those whom Cicero followed, the kinds of causes.

[4] I. Sed tria an plura sint ambigitur. Nec dubie prope omnes utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis scriptores Aristotelen secuti, qui nomine tantum alio contionalem pro deliberativa appellat, hac partitione contenti fuerunt. II. Verum et tum leviter est temptatum, cum apud Graecos quosdam tum apud Ciceronem in libris de Oratore, et nunc maximo temporum nostrorum auctore prope inpulsum, ut non modo plura haec genera sed paene innumerabilia videantur.

[4] 1. But whether there are three or more is disputed. And doubtless almost all the writers of the highest authority among the ancients, following Aristotle, who merely with another name calls the contional in place of the deliberative, were content with this partition. 2. Yet even then the attempt was lightly made, both among certain Greeks and by Cicero in the books On the Orator, and now, almost driven by the greatest author of our own times, so that not only more of these genera but almost innumerable seem to exist.

III. Nam si laudandi ac vituperandi officium in parte tertia ponimus, in quo genere versari videbimur cum querimur consolamur mitigamus concitamus terremus confirmamus praecipimus, obscure dicta interpretamur, narramus deprecamur, gratias agimus, gratulamur obiurgamus maledicimus describimus mandamus renuntiamus optamus opinamur, plurima alia? IV. Vt mihi in illa vetere persuasione permanenti velut petenda sit venia, quaerendumque quo moti priores rem tam late fusam tam breviter adstrinxerint.

III. For if we place the office of praising and vituperating in the third part, in which genus we will seem to be engaged when we complain, console, mitigate, excite, terrify, confirm, prescribe, interpret obscure sayings, narrate, deprecate, give thanks, congratulate, upbraid, malign, describe, mandate, report back, desire, opine, very many other things? IV. Vt to me, persisting in that old persuasion, as it were pardon should be sought, and it must be inquired by what impulse the priors constricted so briefly a matter spread so widely.

Quos qui errasse putant, hoc secutos arbitrantur, quod in his fere versari tum oratores videbant; V. nam laudes ac vituperationes scribebantur, et epitaphious dicere erat moris, et plurimum in consiliis ac iudiciis insumebatur operae, ut scriptores artium pro solis comprenderint frequentissima. VI. Qui vero defendunt, tria faciunt genera auditorum: unum quod ad delectationem conveniat, alterum quod consilium accipiat, tertium quod de causis iudicet. Mihi cuncta rimanti et talis quaedam ratio succurrit, quod omne orationis officium aut in iudiciis est aut extra iudicia.

Those who think that they erred suppose that they followed this, that they saw the orators then engaged almost in these alone; 5. for praises and vituperations were being written, and it was the custom to deliver epitaphial speeches, and very much effort was expended in councils and in judgments, so that the writers of the arts comprised as the only ones those most frequent. 6. Those, however, who defend, make three kinds of auditors: one which convenes for delectation, another which receives counsel, a third which judges concerning causes. As I scrutinize all things, a certain rationale of such a sort occurs to me, namely that every office of oration is either in the courts or outside the courts.

VII. Eorum de quibus iudicio quaeritur manifestum est genus: ea quae ad iudicem non veniunt aut praeteritum habent tempus aut futurum: praeterita laudamus aut vituperamus, de futuris deliberamus. VIII.

7. The genus of those things about which inquiry is made in court is manifest: those which do not come before a judge have either a past time or a future; we praise or vituperate the past, we deliberate about the future. 8.

Item omnia de quibus dicendum est aut certa sint necesse est aut dubia. Certa ut cuique est animus laudat aut culpat; ex dubiis partim nobis ipsis ad electionem sunt libera: de his deliberatur; partim aliorum sententiae commissa: de his lite contenditur. IX. Anaximenes iudicialem et contionalem generalis partes esse voluit, septem autem species: hortandi dehortandi laudandi vituperandi accusandi defendendi exquirendi (quod exetastikon dicit): quarum duae primae deliberativi, duae sequentes demonstrativi, tres ultimae iudicialis generis sunt partes.

Likewise, all the things about which one must speak must be either certain or doubtful. The certain, as each one’s disposition is, he praises or blames; of the doubtful, some are free for our own choice: about these one deliberates; others are entrusted to the judgment of others: about these the suit is contested. 9. Anaximenes wished the judicial and the assembly (contional) to be the general parts, but seven species: urging, dissuading, praising, blaming, accusing, defending, inquiring (which he calls exetastikon): of which the first two are parts of the deliberative, the next two of the demonstrative, the last three of the judicial genus.

X. Protagoran transeo, qui interrogandi respondendi mandandi precandi (quod eucholen dixit) partes solas putat. Plato in Sophiste iudiciali et contionali tertiam adiecit prosomiletiken, quam sane permittamus nobis dicere. sermocinatricem: quae a forensi ratione diiungitur et est accommodata privatis disputationibus, cuius vis eadem profecto est quae dialecticae.

10. I pass over Protagoras, who thought the only parts to be interrogating, responding, commanding, praying (which he called euchole). Plato in the Sophist added a third to the judicial and contional, the prosomiletic, which we may surely permit ourselves to call sermocinatorial: which is separated from forensic method and is accommodated to private disputations, whose force is assuredly the same as that of dialectic.

XI. Isocrates in omni genere inesse laudem ac vituperationem existimavit.

11. Isocrates judged that praise and blame are present in every kind.

XII. Nobis et tutissimum est auctores plurimos sequi et ita videtur ratio dictare. Est igitur, ut dixi, unum genus, quo laus ac vituperatio continetur, sed est appellatum a parte meliore laudativum: idem alii demonstrativum vocant.

12. For us it is safest to follow very many authors, and thus reason seems to dictate. There is therefore, as I said, one genus, in which praise and vituperation are contained, but it has been appellated from the better part “laudative”: the same others call “demonstrative.”

Vtrumque nomen ex Graeco creditur fluxisse; nam enkomiastikon aut epideiktikon dicunt. XIII. Sed mihi epideiktikon non tam demonstrationis vim habere quam ostentationis videtur et multum ab illo enkomiastikoi differre; nam ut continet laudativum in se genus, ita non intra hoc solum consistit.

Both names are believed to have flowed from Greek; for they say enkomiastikon or epideiktikon. 13. But to me epideiktikon seems to have the force not so much of demonstration as of ostentation, and to differ much from that enkomiastikon; for just as it contains the laudative genus within itself, so it does not consist within this alone.

XIV. An quisquam negaverit panegyricos epideiktikous esse? Atqui formam suadendi habent et plerumque de utilitatibus Graeciae locuntur: ut causarum quidem genera tria sint, sed ea tum in negotiis, tum in ostentatione posita.

14. Would anyone deny that panegyrics are epideictic? And yet they have the form of suasion and for the most part speak about the utilities of Greece: so that, indeed, the kinds of causes are three, but these are situated both in affairs and in ostentation.

Nisi forte non ex Graeco mutantes demonstrativum vocant, verum id secuntur, quod laus ac vituperatio quale sit quidque demonstrat. XV. Alterum est deliberativum, tertium iudiciale. Ceterae species in haec tria incident genera: nec invenietur ex his ulla in qua non laudare aut vituperare, suadere aut dissuadere, intendere quid vel depellere debeamus.

Unless perhaps, not altering it from the Greek, they call it “demonstrative,” but follow this: that praise and blame demonstrate of what sort each thing is. 15. The second is deliberative, the third judicial. The other species fall into these three genera; nor will any be found among these in which we ought not to praise or blame, to persuade or dissuade, to press a claim or to repel it.

Illa quoque sunt communia, conciliare narrare docere augere minuere, concitandis componendisve adfectibus animos audientium fingere. XVI. Ne iis quidem accesserim, qui laudativam materiam honestorum, deliberativam utilium, iudicialem iustorum quaestione contineri putant, celeri magis ac rutunda usi distributione quam vera.

Those things too are common: to conciliate, to narrate, to teach, to augment, to diminish, to fashion the minds of the hearers for affections to be stirred or composed. 16. Nor would I even accede to those who think that the laudative material is contained by the question of things honorable, the deliberative of things useful, the judicial of things just—using a speedier and more rotund distribution rather than a true one.

Stant enim quodam modo mutuis auxiliis omnia; nam et in laude iustitia utilitasque tractatur et in consiliis honestas, et raro iudicialem inveneris causam in cuius non parte aliquid eorum quae supra diximus reperiatur.

For all things, in a certain way, stand by mutual aids; for in praise both justice and utility are treated, and in counsels honorableness; and you will rarely find a judicial cause in which there is not found, in some part, something of those things which we have said above.

[5] I. Omnis autem oratio constat aut ex iis quae significantur aut ex iis quae significant, id est rebus et verbis. Facultas orandi consummatur natura arte exercitatione, cui partem quartam adiciunt quidam imitationis, quam nos arti subicimus. II. Tria sunt item quae praestare debeat orator, ut doceat moveat delectet.

[5] 1. But every oration consists either of those things which are signified or of those which signify, that is, things and words. The faculty of speaking is consummated by nature, art, and exercise, to which some add a fourth part, imitation, which we subordinate to art. 2. There are likewise three things which the orator ought to accomplish: to teach, to move, to delight.

Haec enim clarior divisio quam eorum qui totum opus in res et in adfectus partiuntur. Non semper autem omnia in eam quae tractabitur materiam cadent. Erunt enim quaedam remotae ab adfectibus, qui ut non ubique habent locum, ita quocumque inruperunt plurimum valent.

For this is a clearer division than that of those who partition the whole work into things and into affections. But not always will all items fall under the subject-matter that is to be handled. For there will be certain matters removed from affections; and just as they do not have a place everywhere, so, wherever they break in, they have the utmost force.

III. Praestantissimis auctoribus placet alia in rhetorice esse quae probationem desiderent, alia quae non desiderent, cum quibus ipse consentio. Quidam vero, ut Celsus, de nulla re dicturum oratorem nisi de qua quaeratur existimant: cui cum maxima pars scriptorum repugnat, tum etiam ipsa partitio, nisi forte laudare quae constet esse honesta et vituperare quae ex confesso sint turpia non est oratoris officium.

3. It pleases the most outstanding authors that there are some things in rhetoric which require proof, and others which do not require it, with which view I myself agree. Certain men, however, like Celsus, think that the orator will speak on no matter except one about which inquiry is made; to which not only does the greater part of the writers object, but also the very partition itself—unless, perhaps, it is not the orator’s office to praise things which are agreed to be honorable and to vituperate those which are confessedly base.

IV. Illud iam omnes fatentur, esse quaestiones aut in scripto aut in non scripto. In scripto sunt de iure, in non scripto de re: illud rationale, hoc legale genus Hermagoras atque eum secuti vocant, id est nomikon et logikon. V. Idem sentiunt qui s omnem quaestionem ponunt in rebus et verbis.

4. Now all confess this, that there are questions either in what is written or in what is unwritten. In what is written they are about law (ius), in what is unwritten about fact (res): the former rational, the latter legal—the kind Hermagoras and those who followed him call, that is, nomikon and logikon. 5. The same are of the opinion who place every question in things and in words.

Item convenit quaestiones esse aut infinitas aut finitas. Infinitae sunt quae remotis personis et temporibus et locis ceterisque similibus in utramque partem tractantur, quod Graeci thesin dicunt, Cicero propositum, alii quaestiones universales civiles, alii quaestiones philosopho convenientis, Athenaeus partem causae appellat. VI. Hoc genus Cicero scientia et actione distinguit, ut sit scientiae "an providentia mundus regatur", actionis "an accedendum ad rem publicam administrandam". Prius trium generum, "an sit", "quid sit", "quale sit": omnia enim haec ignorari possunt; sequens duorum, "quo modo adipiscamur", "quo modo utamur". VII.

Likewise it is agreed that questions are either infinite or finite. Infinite are those which, with persons and times and places and other similar circumstances removed, are handled on either side—what the Greeks call a thesis, Cicero a proposition (propositum), some “universal civil questions,” others “questions suitable to a philosopher”; Athenaeus calls it “a part of a cause.” 6. This genus Cicero distinguishes by knowledge and by action, so that of knowledge is “whether the world is governed by providence,” of action “whether one should accede to administering the commonwealth.” The former is of three kinds—“whether it is,” “what it is,” “of what sort it is,” for all these can be unknown; the latter of two—“in what way we may acquire,” “in what way we may use.” 7.

Finitae autem sunt ex complexu rerum personarum temporum ceterorumque: hae hypotheseis a Graecis dicuntur, causae a nostris. In his omnis quaestio videtur circa res personasque consistere. VIII.

Finite, moreover, are those from the complex of things, persons, times, and the rest: these are called hypotheses by the Greeks, causes by our people. In these every question seems to consist about things and persons. 8.

Amplior est semper infinita, inde enim finita descendit. Quod ut exemplo pateat, infinita est: "an uxor ducenda", finita: "an Catoni ducenda" ideoque esse suasoria potest. Sed etiam remotae a personis propriis ad aliquid referri solent.

The infinite is always ampler, for from it the finite descends. That this may be made clear by an example: the infinite is, “whether a wife is to be taken (married)”; the finite: “whether for Cato she is to be taken,” and therefore it can be a suasoria. But even when removed from their proper persons, they are wont to be referred to something.

Est enim simplex: "an res publica administranda"; refertur ad aliquid: "an in tyrannide administranda". IX. Sed hic quoque subest velut latens persona tyrannus enim geminat quaestionem), subestque et temporis et qualitatis tacita vis: nondum tamen hoc proprie dixeris causam. Hae autem quas infinitas voco et generales appellantur: quod si est verum, finitae speciales erunt. In omni autem speciali utique inest generalis, ut quae sit prior.

For it is simple: "whether the republic is to be administered"; it is referred to something: "whether it is to be administered under tyranny". 9. But here too there lies beneath, as it were, a latent persona—the tyrant (for he doubles the question), and there also lies beneath a tacit force both of time and of quality: yet you would not properly call this a cause. But these which I call infinite are termed general; and if that is true, the finite will be special. In every special, however, the general is assuredly inherent, as being prior.

X. Ac nescio an in causis quoque quidquid in quaestionem venit qualitatis generale sit. Milo Clodium occidit, iure occidit insidiatorem: nonne hoc quaeritur, an sit ius insidiatorem occidendi? Quid in coniecturis?

10. And I am not sure whether, in cases too, whatever comes into question of quality is general. Milo killed Clodius—he killed an ambusher by right: is not this what is asked, whether there is a right of killing an ambusher? What about in conjectures?

non illa generalia: "an causa sceleris odium, cupiditas", "an tormentis credendum", "testibus an argumentis maior fides habenda"? Nam finitione quidem comprendi nihil non in universum certum erit. XI. Quidam putant etiam eas theseis posse aliquando nominari quae personis causisque contineantur, aliter tantummodo positas, ut causa sit cum Orestes accusatur, thesis an Orestes recte sit absolutus: cuius generis est: "an Cato recte Marciam Hortensio tradiderit". Hi thesin a causa sic distingunt ut illa sit spectativae partis, haec activae: illic enim veritatis tantum gratia disputari, hic negotium agi.

not those general ones: “whether the cause of the crime was hatred or desire,” “whether credence is to be given to tortures,” “whether greater trust is to be given to witnesses or to arguments”? For indeed by definition everything without exception will be encompassed and made certain in universal terms. 11. Certain people think that even those matters which are contained by persons and causes can sometimes be named theses, only posed otherwise, such that there is a cause when Orestes is accused, a thesis whether Orestes was rightly acquitted; of which kind is: “whether Cato rightly handed over Marcia to Hortensius.” These distinguish the thesis from the cause thus: that the former is of the spectative (contemplative) part, the latter of the active; there one argues for the sake of truth alone, here business is transacted.

XII. Quamquam inutiles quidam orationi putant universales quaestiones, quia nihil prosit quod constet ducendam esse uxorem vel administrandam rem publicam si quis vel aetate vel valetudine impediatur. Sed non omnibus eius modi quaestionibus sic occurri potest, ut illis: "sitne virtus finis", "regaturne providentia mundus". XIII.

12. Although some think universal questions useless to an oration, because it is of no avail that it be established that a wife must be taken or the commonwealth administered if someone is impeded either by age or by health. But not to all questions of that sort can one thus make an answer, as to these: "whether virtue is the end," "whether the world is governed by providence." 13.

Quin etiam in iis quae ad personam referuntur, ut non est satis generalem tractasse quaestionem, ita perveniri ad speciem nisi illa prius excussa non potest. Nam quo modo an sibi uxor ducenda sit deliberabit Cato nisi constiterit uxores esse ducendas? Et quo modo an ducere debeat Marciam quaeretur nisi Catoni ducenda uxor est?

Nay rather, even in those matters which are referred to the person, just as it is not enough to have treated the question in general, so one cannot reach the specific case unless those points have first been threshed out. For how will Cato deliberate whether a wife is to be taken for himself, unless it has been established that wives are to be taken? And how will it be inquired whether he ought to take Marcia in marriage, unless for Cato a wife is to be taken?

XIV. sunt tamen inscripti nomine Hermagorae libri qui confirment illam opinionem, sive falsus est titulus sive alius hic Hermagoras fuit. Nam eiusdem esse quo modo possunt, qui de hac arte mirabiliter multa composuit, cum, sicut ex Ciceronis quoque rhetorico primo manifestum est, materiam rhetorices in thesis et causas diviserit?

14. however, there are books inscribed with the name of Hermagoras which confirm that opinion, whether the title is false or this was another Hermagoras. For how can they be of the same man, who composed many things marvelously about this art, since, as is also manifest from Cicero’s first Rhetoric, he divided the material of rhetoric into theses and causes?

Quod reprehendit Cicero ac thesin nihil ad oratorem pertinere contendit totumque hoc genus quaestionis ad philosophos refert. XV. Sed me liberavit respondendi verecundia et quod ipse hos libros improbat, et quod in Oratore atque iis quos de Oratore scripsit et Topicis praecipit ut a propriis personis atque temporibus avocemus controversiam quia latius dicere liceat de genere quam de specie, et quod in universo probatum sit in parte probatum esse necesse sit.

This Cicero censures and he contends that the thesis has nothing to do with the orator, and he refers this whole genus of question to the philosophers. 15. But he has freed me from the modesty of responding both because he himself disapproves these books, and because in the Orator and in those which he wrote On the Orator and in the Topics he prescribes that we should abstract the controversy from proper persons and times, because it is permitted to speak more broadly about the genus than about the species, and because what has been approved in the universal must necessarily be approved in the part.

XVI. Status autem in hoc omne genus materiae idem qui in causas cadunt. Adhuc adicitur alias esse quaestiones in rebus ipsis, alias quae ad aliquid referantur, illud: "an uxor ducenda", hoc: "an seni ducenda"; illud: "an fortis", hoc: "an fortior", et similia.

16. The statuses, moreover, in this whole genus of material are the same as those that fall in causes. Furthermore it is added that some questions are in the things themselves, others which are referred to something: the former, "whether a wife should be married," the latter, "whether an old man should marry"; the former, "whether [he is] brave," the latter, "whether braver," and the like.

XVII. Causam finit Apollodorus,ut interpretatione,Valgi discipuli eius utar, ita: "causa est negotium omnibus suis partibus spectans ad quaestionem", aut: "causa est negotium cuius finis est controversia." Ipsum deinde negotium sic finit: "negotium est congregatio personarum locorum temporum causarum modorum casuum factorum instrumentorum sermonum scriptorum et non scriptorum". XVIII. Causam nunc intellegamus hypothesin negotium peristasin.

17. Apollodorus defines the cause,as I may use the interpretation,of Valgi his disciple, thus: "a cause is a business (matter) in all its parts looking toward the question", or: "a cause is a business (matter) whose end is a controversy." He then defines the business (matter) itself thus: "a business (matter) is a congregation of persons places times causes modes cases deeds instruments discourses writings and non-writings". 18. Let us now understand the cause as the hypothesis, the business (matter) as the peristasis.

Sed et ipsam causam quidam similiter finierunt ut Apollodorus negotium. Isocrates autem causam esse ait quaestionem finitam civilem aut rem controversam in personarum finitarum complexu, Cicero his verbis: "causa certis personis locis temporibus actionibus negotiis cernitur, aut in omnibus aut in plerisque eorum".

But some have likewise defined the cause itself as Apollodorus [defined] the business. Isocrates, however, says that a cause is a defined civil question or a controversial matter in the complex of defined persons, Cicero in these words: "a cause is discerned by certain persons, places, times, actions, businesses, either in all or in most of them".

[6] I. Ergo cum omnis causa contineatur aliquo statu, prius quam dicere adgredior quo modo genus quodque causae sit tractandum, id quod est commune omnibus, quid sit status et unde ducatur et quot et qui sint intuendum puto. Quamquam id nonnulli ad iudiciales tantum pertinere materias putaverunt, quorum inscitiam, cum omnia tria genera fuero exsecutus, res ipsa deprendet. II. Quod nos statum, id quidam constitutionem vocant, alii quaestionem, alii quod ex quaestione appareat, Theodorus caput [id est kephalaion genikotaton] ad quod referantur omnia, quorum diversa appellatio, vis eadem est, nec interest discentium quibus quidque nominibus appelletur dum res ipsa manifesta sit.

[6] 1. Therefore, since every cause is contained in some status, before I set about to say in what way each genus of cause should be handled, I think it should be contemplated, as a thing common to all, what the status is, and whence it is derived, and how many and what they are. Although some have thought that this pertains only to judicial matters, their ignorance the thing itself will reveal, when I shall have set forth all three kinds. 2. What we call status, some call constitutio, others question, others that which appears from the question; Theodorus calls it the head [that is kephalaion genikotaton] to which all things are referred; though the appellations differ, the force is the same, and it is of no concern to learners by what names each thing is called, provided the thing itself is manifest.

III. Statum Graeci stasin vocant, quod nomen non primum ab Hermagora traditum putant, sed alii a Naucrate Isocratis discipulo, alii a Zopyro Clazomenio; quamquam videtur Aeschines quoque in oratione contra Ctesiphontem uti hoc verbo, cum a iudicibus petit ne Demostheni permittant evagari sed eum dicere de ipso causae statu cogant. IV. Quae appellatio dicitur ducta vel ex eo quod ibi sit primus causae congressus, vel quod in hoc causa consistat.

3. The Greeks call the status stasis, which name they think was not first handed down by Hermagoras, but some by Naucrates, a disciple of Isocrates, others by Zopyrus of Clazomenae; although Aeschines also seems to use this word in the oration against Ctesiphon, when he asks the judges not to permit Demosthenes to wander but to compel him to speak about the very status of the case. 4. Which appellation is said to be derived either from the fact that the first congress of the case is there, or because in this the case consists.

Et nominis quidem haec origo: nunc quid sit. Statum quidam dixerunt primam causarum conflictionem: quos recte sensisse, parum elocutos puto. V. Non enim est status prima conflictio: "fecisti", "non feci", sed quod ex prima conflictione nascitur, id est genus quaestionis: "fecisti", "non feci", "an fecerit": "hoc fecisti", "non hoc feci", "quid fecerit". Quia ex his apparet illud coniectura, hoc finitione quaerendum atque in eo pars utraque insistit, erit quaestio coniecturalis vel finitivi status.

And as to the name indeed, this is the origin: now, what it is. Some have said that status is the first conflict of causes; whom I think to have conceived rightly, but to have expressed it inadequately. 5. For status is not the first conflict: “you did it,” “I did not do it,” but that which is born from the first conflict, that is, the kind (genus) of question: “you did it,” “I did not do it,” “whether he did it”; “this you did,” “this I did not do,” “what he did.” Because from these it appears that that matter is to be sought by conjecture, this by definition, and on that point each side takes its stand, there will be a conjectural question or a definitive status.

VI. Quid si enim dicat quis: "sonus est duorum inter se corporum conflictio"? Erret, ut opinor; non enim sonus est conflictio, sed ex conflictione. Et hoc levius (intellegitur enim utcumque dictum): inde vero ingens male interpretantibus innatus est error, qui, quia primam conflictionem legerant, crediderunt statum semper ex prima quaestione ducendum, quod est vitiosissimum. VII.

VI. What if, indeed, someone should say: "sound is the conflict of two bodies with one another"? He would err, as I think; for sound is not the conflict, but from the conflict. And this is a lighter mistake (for it is somehow understood as spoken): but from this indeed a vast error has arisen for those interpreting badly, who, because they had read "the first conflict," believed the status must always be deduced from the first question, which is most faulty. VII.

Nam quaestio nulla non habet utique statum (constat enim ex intentione et depulsione), sed aliae sunt propriae causarum de quibus ferenda sententia est, aliae adductae extrinsecus, aliquid tamen ad summam causae conferentes velut auxilia quaedam: quo fit ut in controversia una plures quaestiones esse dicantur. VIII. Harum porro plerumque levissima quaeque primo loco fungitur.

For no question is there that does not assuredly have a status (for it consists of the intention and the repulsion), but some are proper to the cases about which a sentence is to be rendered, others are brought in from outside, yet contributing something to the sum of the case, as if certain auxiliaries; whereby it comes about that in one controversy several questions are said to exist. 8. Of these, moreover, for the most part, the very lightest assume the first place.

Namque et illud frequens est, ut ea quibus minus confidimus, cum tractata sunt, omittamus, interim sponte nostra velut donantes, interim ad ea quae sunt potentiora gradum ex iis fecisse contenti. IX. Simplex autem causa, etiamsi varie defenditur, non potest habere plus uno de quo pronuntietur, atque inde erit status causae, quod et orator praecipue sibi optinendum et iudex spectandum maxime intellegit; in hoc enim causa consistet. X. Ceterum quaestionum possunt esse diversi.

For indeed this too is frequent: that those things in which we trust less, when they have been handled, we omit—at times of our own accord as though donating them, at times content to have made from them a step toward those things which are more potent. 9. However, a simple cause, even if it is defended in various ways, cannot have more than one point on which pronouncement is to be made; and from that there will be the status of the cause, which both the orator understands is especially to be secured for himself and the judge is chiefly to regard; for in this the cause will consist. 10. Moreover, the questions can be diverse.

Quod ut brevissimo pateat exemplo, cum dicit reus: "etiam si feci, recte feci", qualitatis utitur statu; cum adicit: "sed non feci", coniecturam movet. Semper autem firmius est non fecisse, ideoque in eo statum esse iudicabo quod dicerem si mihi plus quam unum dicere non liceret. XI. Recte igitur est appellata causarum prima conflictio, non quaestionum.

So that this may be evident by a very brief example, when the defendant says: “even if I did it, I did it rightly,” he uses the status of quality; when he adds: “but I did not do it,” he sets a conjecture in motion. Yet it is always more secure to have not done it, and therefore I shall judge the status to be that which I would say if it were not permitted me to say more than one. 11. Therefore the first conflict is rightly called of causes, not of questions.

Nam et pro Rabirio Postumo Cicero primam partem orationis in hoc intendit? ut actionem competere in equitem Romanum neget, secunda nullam ad eum pecuniam pervenisse confirmat: statum tamen in eo dicam fuisse quod est potentius. XII.

For also, on behalf of Rabirius Postumus, Cicero directed the first part of the oration to this? that he denies that an action lies against a Roman knight; the second confirms that no money had come to him: nevertheless I will say the status was in that which is the more potent. 12.

Nec in causa Milonis circa primas quaestiones, quae sunt +ante prohoemium+ positae, iudicabo conflixisse causam, sed ubi totis viribus insidiator Clodius ideoque iure interfectus ostenditur. Et hoc est quod ante omnia constituere in animo suo debeat orator, etiam si pro causa plura dicturus est: quid maxime liquere iudici velit. Quod tamen ut primum cogitandum, ita non utique primum dicendum erit.

Nor, in the case of Milo, around the first questions, which are set +before the prooemium+, will I judge that the cause clashed, but rather where, with all force, Clodius the waylayer is shown, and therefore rightly slain. And this is what before all things the orator ought to establish in his mind, even if he is going to say more for the cause: what he would most of all have be clear to the judge. Which, however, though to be thought of first, will not necessarily be the first to be said.

XIII. Alii statum crediderunt primam eius cum quo ageretur deprecationem. Quam sententiam his verbis Cicero complectitur: "in quo primum insistit quasi ad repugnandum congressa defensio". Vnde rursus alia quaestio, an eum semper is faciat qui respondet.

13. Others have believed the status to be the first plea of him with whom the case is being conducted. Which opinion Cicero embraces in these words: "that on which the defense, having come to close quarters as if to resist, first takes its stand." Whence in turn another question arises, whether it is always he who answers that establishes it.

cui rei praecipue repugnat Cornelius Celsus, dicens non a depulsione sumi, sed ab eo qui propositionem suam confirmet ut, si hominem occisum reus negat, status ab accusatore nascatur, quia is velit probare; si iure occisum reus dicit, tralata probationis necessitate idem a reo fiat et sit eius intentio. XIV. cui non accedo equidem.

Cornelius Celsus chiefly opposes this matter, saying that it is not to be taken from the depulsion (warding‑off), but from him who confirms his own proposition, so that, if the defendant denies that the man was slain, the status arises from the accuser, because he is the one who wishes to prove; if the defendant says he was slain by right, the necessity of proof being transferred, the same then falls to the defendant and it is his intention. 14. to which I for my part do not accede.

Nam est vero propius quod contra dicitur, nullam esse litem si is cum quo agatur nihil respondeat, ideoque fieri statum a respondente. XV. Mea tamen sententia varium id est et accidit pro condicione causarum, quia et videri potest propositio aliquando statum facere, ut in coniecturalibus causis (utitur enim coniectura magis qui agit, quo moti quidam eundem a reo infitialem esse dixerunt) et in syllogismo tota ratiocinatio ab eo est qui intendit. XVI.

For indeed what is said on the contrary is nearer to the truth: that there is no lawsuit if the one with whom it is litigated answers nothing, and therefore the status is produced by the responder. 15. Yet in my opinion it is variable and happens according to the condition of cases, because the proposition too can sometimes seem to make the status, as in conjectural causes (for he who prosecutes uses conjecture more, whereby some, being moved, have said that the same is, on the defendant’s part, an “infitial” [denial-based] status), and in syllogism the whole ratiocination is from him who intends (presses the claim). 16.

Sed quia videtur illis quoque necessitatem hos status exsequendi facere qui negat (is enim .gi dicat: "non feci", coget adversarium coniectura uti, et si dicat: "non habes legem", syllogismo), concedamus ex depulsione nasci statum. Nihilo minus enim res eo revertetur ut modo is qui agit, modo is cum quo agitur statum faciat. XVII.

But because it seems to them also to make a necessity of carrying through these statuses for the one who denies (for if he should say: "I did not do it", he will compel his adversary to use conjecture, and if he should say: "you have no law", by syllogism), let us concede that the status arises from the defense. Nonetheless, the matter will come back to this, that now the one who brings suit, now the one against whom suit is brought, makes the status. 17.

Sit enim accusatoris intentio: "hominem occidisti"; si negat reus, faciat statum qui negat. Quid si confitetur, sed iure a se adulterum dicit occisum (nempe legem esse certum est quae permittat)? Nisi aliquid accusator respondet, nulla lis est. "Non fuit" inquit "adulter": ergo depulsio incipit esse actoris, ille statum faciet.

Let the accuser’s intention be: “you killed a man”; if the defendant denies it, let the one who denies make the status. What if he confesses, but says that he killed the adulterer by right (for it is certain that there is a law which permits it)? Unless the accuser responds something, there is no lawsuit. “He was not,” he says, “an adulterer”: therefore the repulsion begins to be the accuser’s, he will make the status.

Ita erit quidem status ex prima depulsione, sed ea fiet ab accusatore, non a reo. XVIII. Quid quod eadem quaestio potest eundem vel accusatorem facere vel reum?

Thus indeed there will be an issue from the first rebuttal, but it will be made by the accuser, not by the defendant. 18. What of the fact that the same question can make the same person either accuser or defendant?

"Qui artem ludicram exercuerit, in quattuordecim primis ordinibus ne sedeat: qui se praetori in hortis ostenderat neque erat productus, sedit in quattuordecim ordinibus". XIX. Nempe intentio est: "artem ludicram exercuisti", depulsio: "non exercui artem ludicram", quaestio: "quid sit artem ludicram exercere". Si accusabitur theatrali lege, depulsio erit rei; si excitatus fuerit de spectaculis et aget iniuriarum, depulsio erit accusatoris. XX. Frequentius tamen illud accidet quod est a plurimis traditum.

"He who has practiced the theatrical art, let him not sit in the first fourteen orders; he who had shown himself to the praetor in the gardens and had not been brought out, sat in the fourteen orders." 19. Clearly the intention is: "you practiced the theatrical art," the defense: "I did not practice the theatrical art," the question: "what it is to practice the theatrical art." If he is accused under the theatrical law, the defense will be the defendant’s; if he has been driven out from the spectacles and brings an action for insult, the defense will be the accuser’s. 20. More frequently, however, that case will occur which has been handed down by very many.

Effugerunt has quaestiones qui dixerunt statum esse id quod appareat ex intentione et depulsione, ut: "fecisti"; "non feci" aut "recte feci". XXI. Viderimus tamen utrum id sit status an in eo status. Hermagoras statum vocat per quem subiecta res intellegatur et ad quem probationes etiam partium referantur.

Those have escaped these questions who said that the status is that which appears from the intention and the defense, as: "you did it"; "I did not do it" or "I did it rightly". 21. Yet let us see whether that is the status or whether the status is in that. Hermagoras calls status that by which the subject-matter is understood and to which even the proofs of the parties are referred.

Nostra opinio semper haec fuit, cum essent frequenter in causa diversi quaestionum status, in eo credere statum causae quod esset in ea potentissimum et in quo maxime res verteretur. Id si quis generalem quaestionem vel caput generale dicere malet, cum hoc mihi non erit pugna, non magis quam si aliud adhuc quo idem intellegatur eius rei nomen invenerit, quamquam tota volumina in hanc disputationem inpendisse multos sciam: nobis statum dici placet.

Our opinion has always been this: since there are frequently in a case different statuses of questions, to believe the status of the case to be that which is most powerful in it and on which the matter would most especially turn. If anyone should prefer to call that a general question or a general head, I will not be at strife with this, no more than if he has found some further name by which the same thing is understood, although I know many to have expended whole volumes on this disputation: it pleases us that it be called status.

XXII. Sed cum in aliis omnibus inter scriptores summa dissensio est, tum in hoc praecipue videtur mihi studium quoque diversa tradendi fuisse: adeo nec qui sit numerus nec quae nomina nec qui generales quive speciales sint status convenit. XXIII.

22. But since among the writers there is the utmost disagreement in all other matters, then in this especially it seems to me that there was even a zeal for handing down divergent accounts: to such a degree that there is no agreement either what the number is or what the names are, or which statuses are general and which special. 23.

Ac primum Aristoteles elementa decem constituit, circa quae versari videatur omnis quaestio: ousian, quam Plautus essentiam vocat (neque sane aliud est eius nomen Latinum), sed ea quaeritur "an sit": qualitatem, cuius apertus intellectus est: quantitatem, quae dupliciter a posterioribus divisa est, quam magnum et quam multum sit: ad aliquid, unde ductae tralatio et comparatio: post haec ubi et quando: XXIV. deinde facere pati habere (quod est quasi armatum esse, vestitum esse): novissime keisthai, quod est compositum esse quodam modo, ut iacere stare [irasci]. Sed ex his omnibus prima quattuor ad status pertinere, cetera ad quosdam locos argumentorum videntur. XXV.

And first, Aristotle constituted ten elements, around which the whole question seems to turn: ousian, which Plautus calls essence (nor indeed is there any other Latin name for it), but in that the inquiry is “whether it exists”; quality, whose understanding is plain; quantity, which by later writers has been divided in a twofold way, how great and how much it is; relation (ad aliquid), whence are drawn transference and comparison; after these, where and when: 24. then to do, to suffer, to have (which is as it were to be armed, to be clothed): lastly keisthai, which is to be composed in a certain manner, as to lie, to stand [to be angry]. But of all these, the first four pertain to issues (status), the rest seem to belong to certain loci of arguments. 25.

Alli novem elementa posuerunt: personam, in qua de animo, corpore, extra positis quaeratur, quod pertinere ad coniecturae et qualitatis instrumenta video: tempus, quod chronon vocant, ex quo questio an is quem dum addicta est mater peperit servus sit natus: locum, unde controversia videtur an fas fuerit tyrannum in templo occidere, an exulaverit qui domi latuit: tempus iterum, XXVI. quod kairon appellant - hanc autem videri volunt speciem illius temporis, ut aestatem vel hiemem; huic subicitur ille in pestilentia comissator: actum, id est praxin quod eo referunt, sciens commiserit an insciens, necessitate an casu, et talia: numerum, qui cadit in speciem quantitatis, an Thrasybulo triginta praemia debeantur, qui tot tyrannos sustulerit: XXVII. causam, cui plurimae subiacent lites, quotiens factum non negatur, sed quia iusta ratione sit factum defenditur: tropon, cum id, quod alio modo fieri licet, alio dicitur factum; hinc est adulter loris caesus vel fame necatus: occasionem factorum, quod est apertius quam ut vel interpretandum vel exemplo sit demonstrandum; tamen aphormas ergon vocant.

Others have posited nine elements: the person, in which inquiry is made about the soul, the body, and external things, which I see to pertain to the instruments of conjecture and of quality: time, which they call chronon, whence comes the question whether he is born a slave whom his mother bore while she was addicta; place, whence there seems to arise the controversy whether it was lawful to kill a tyrant in a temple, or whether he has gone into exile who hid at home: time again, 26. which they call kairon — and they wish this to be seen as a species of that time, as summer or winter; under this falls the reveler during a pestilence: the act, that is praxin, which they refer to whether he committed it knowingly or unknowingly, by necessity or by chance, and such things: number, which falls under the species of quantity, whether 30 rewards are owed to Thrasybulus, who removed so many tyrants: 27. the cause, under which very many lawsuits lie, whenever the deed is not denied, but is defended because it was done with a just reason: tropon, when that which could be done in one way is said to have been done in another; hence comes the adulterer beaten with thongs or killed by hunger: the occasion of deeds, which is too plain to need either interpretation or to be demonstrated by example; nevertheless they call it aphormas ergon.

XXVIII. Hi quoque nullam quaestionem extra haec putant. Quidam detrahunt duas partis, numerum et occasionem, et pro illo quem dixi actu subiciunt res, id est pragmata.

28. These also think no question lies outside these. Certain persons remove two parts, number and occasion, and in place of that act which I mentioned they substitute things, that is, pragmata.

Quae ne praeterisse viderer, satis habui attingere. Ceterum his nec status satis ostendi nec omnis contineri locos credo, quod apparebit diligentius legentibus quae de utraque re dicam; erunt enim plura multo quam quae his elementis comprehenduntur.

Lest I should seem to have passed these by, I have deemed it sufficient to touch upon them. Moreover, by these I think neither the statuses have been sufficiently displayed nor that all the places are contained, which will become more apparent to those reading more diligently what I shall say about each of the two matters; for there will be many more things than those which are comprehended by these elements.

XXIX. Apud plures auctores legi placuisse quibusdam unum omnino statum esse coniecturalem, sed quibus placuerit neque illi tradiderunt neque ego usquam reperire potui. Rationem tamen hanc secuti dicuntur, quod res omnis signis colligeretur.

29. Among several authors I have read that it pleased certain persons that there is altogether one status, the conjectural; but they neither transmitted by whom it had been approved nor have I anywhere been able to discover it. They are said, however, to have followed this rationale, that every matter is collected from signs.

Quo modo licet qualitatis quoque solum statum faciant, quia ubique qualis sit cuiusque rei natura quaeri potest. Sed utrocumque modo sequetur summa confusio. XXX.

In this way it is permissible that they also make quality alone the status, since everywhere it can be inquired of what sort the nature of each thing is. But whichever way, the greatest confusion will follow. 30.

Neque interest unum quis statum faciat an nullum, si omnes causae sunt condicionis eiusdem. Coniectura dicta est a coniectu, id est directione quadam rationis ad veritatem, unde etiam somniorum atque ominum interpretes coniectores vocantur. Appellatum tamen est hoc genus varie, sicut sequentibus apparebit.

Nor does it matter whether one makes a single status or none, if all causes are of the same condition. Conjecture is so called from coniectus, that is, a certain direction of reason toward the truth, whence also the interpreters of dreams and omens are called conjectors. Nevertheless this genus has been named in various ways, as will appear in what follows.

XXXI. Fuerunt qui duos status facerent: Archedemus coniecturalem et finitivum exclusa qualitate, quia sic de ea quaeri existimabat: "quid esset inicum", "quid iniustum", "quid dicto audientem non esse". Quod vocat de eodem et alio. XXXII.

31. There were those who made two statuses: Archedemus [made] the conjectural and the definitive, quality excluded, because he thought that inquiry about it is thus: "what would be iniquitous", "what unjust", "what is it to be not obedient to what is said". Which he calls "concerning the same and the other". 32.

huic diversa sententia eorum fuit qui duos quidem status esse voluerunt, sed unum infitialem, alterum iuridicialem. Infitialis est quem dicimus coniecturalem, cui ab infitiando nomen alii in totum dederunt, alii in partem, qui accusatorem coniectura, reum infitiatione uti putaverunt. XXXIII.

To this there was a different opinion on the part of those who indeed wished there to be two statuses, but one “infitial” (of denial), the other juridical. The “infitial” is what we call the conjectural, to which, from denying, some gave the name in whole, others in part—since they thought that the accuser employs conjecture, the defendant denial. 33.

Iuridicialis est qui Graece dicitur dikaiologikos. Sed quem ad modum ab Archedemo qualitas exclusa est, sic ab his repudiata finitio. Nam subiciunt eam iuridiciali, quaerendumque arbitrantur iustumne sit sacrilegium appellari quod obiciatur vel furtum vel amentiam.

The juridical is that which in Greek is called dikaiologikos. But just as quality was excluded by Archedemus, so definition is repudiated by these. For they subordinate it to the juridical, and they think it should be asked whether it is just that what is alleged be called sacrilege, or theft, or insanity.

XXXIV. Qua in opinione Pamphilus fuit, sed qualitatem in plura partitus est. Plurimi deinceps, mutatis tantum nominibus, in rem de qua non constet et in rem de qua constet.

34. In this opinion Pamphilus was, but he divided quality into more parts. Very many thereafter, with only the names changed, into the matter about which it is not agreed and into the matter about which it is agreed.

Nam est verum nec aliter fieri potest quam ut aut certum sit factum esse quid aut non sit; si non est certum, coniectura sit, si certum est, reliqui status. XXXV. Nam idem dicit Apollodorus, cum quaestionem aut in rebus extra positis, quibus coniectura explicatur, aut in nostris opinionibus existimat positam, quorum illud pragmatikon, hoc peri ennoias vocat: idem, qui aprolempton et prolemptikon dicunt, id est dubium et praesumptum, quo significatur de quo liquet.

For it is true and cannot come about otherwise than that either it is certain that something has been done or it is not; if it is not certain, let it be Conjectural; if it is certain, [it belongs to] the remaining statuses. 35. For Apollodorus says the same, since he judges the question to be placed either in things set outside, by which Conjecture is explicated, or in our opinions; of which he calls the former pragmatikon, the latter peri ennoias: likewise, those who say aprolempton and prolemptikon, that is, doubtful and presupposed, by which is signified that about which there is clarity.

XXXVI. Idem Theodorus, qui de eo an sit et de accidentibus ei quod esse constat, id est peri ousias kai symbebekoton, existimat quaeri. Nam in his omnibus prius genus coniecturam habet, sequens reliqua.

36. The same Theodorus judges that the question is raised both about whether it is, and about the accidents of that which is agreed to exist, that is, peri ousias kai symbebekoton. For in all these, the former kind has conjecture, the latter the remaining (statuses).

Sed haec reliqua Apollodorus duo vult esse, qualitatem et de nomine, id est finitivam: Theodorus, quid, quale, quantum, ad aliquid. XXXVII. sunt et qui de eodem et de alio modo qualitatem esse, modo finitionem velint.

But Apollodorus wants these remaining [issues] to be two, quality and about the name, that is, the definitive: Theodorus, what, what sort, how much, with respect to something. 37. There are also those who would have “about the same and about the other” sometimes be quality, sometimes definition.

In duo et Posidonius dividit, vocem et res. In voce quaeri putat an significet, quid, quam multa, quo modo: rebus coniecturam, quod kat'aisthesin vocat, et qualitatem et finitionem, cui nomen dat kat'ennoian, et ad aliquid. Vnde et illa divisio est, alia esse scripta, alia inscripta.

Posidonius also divides into two, voice and things. In voice he thinks it is asked whether it signifies, what, how many, in what manner: in things, inference, which he calls kat'aisthesin, and quality and definition, to which he gives the name kat'ennoian, and relation (to something). Whence also that division is, that some things are written, others inscribed.

XXXVIII. Celsus Cornelius duos et ipse fecit status generales: an sit, quale sit. Priori subiecit finitionem, quia aeque quaeratur an sit sacrilegus qui nihil se sustulisse de templo dicit et qui privatam pecuniam confitetur sustulisse.

38. Celsus Cornelius also himself made two general statuses: whether it is, of what quality it is. To the former he subjoined the definition, because it is equally inquired whether he is sacrilegious who says that he took nothing from the temple and he who confesses to have taken private money.

Qualitatem in rem et scriptum dividit. Scripto quattuor partes legales exclusa tralatione, quantitatem et mentis quaestionem coniecturae subiecit. XXXIX.

He divides quality into matter and writing. For the written, with tralation excluded, he set out four legal parts; and he subjected quantity and the question of mind (intention) to conjecture. 39.

Est etiam illa in duos dividendi status ratio, quae docet aut de substantia controversiam esse aut de qualitate, ipsam porro qualitatem aut in summo genere consistere aut in succedentibus. XL. De substantia est coniectura; quaestio enim tractatur rei, an facta sit, an fiat, an futura sit, interdum etiam mentis: idque melius quam quod iis placuit qui statum eundem facti nominaverunt, tamquam de praeterito tantum et tantum de facto quaereretur. XLI.

There is also that method of dividing statuses into two, which teaches that the controversy is either about substance or about quality, and that quality itself either stands in the highest genus or in the succeeding ones. 40. Conjecture concerns substance; for the question is handled of the thing, whether it has been done, is being done, or will be done, and sometimes also of the mind (intention): and this is better than what pleased those who named the same status “of fact,” as if inquiry were only about the past and only about a deed accomplished. 41.

Pars qualitatis quae est de summo genere raro in iudicium venit, quale est "idne sit honestum quod vulgo laudatur". succedentium autem aliae de communi appellatione, ut "sitne sacrilegus qui pecuniam privatam ex templo furatus est", aut de re denominata, ubi et factum esse certum est nec dubitatur quid sit quod factum est. cui subiacent omnes de honestis iustis utilibus quaestiones. XLII.

The part of quality which is about the highest genus rarely comes into judgment, such as "whether that is honorable which is commonly praised." Of the succeeding ones, some are about the common appellation, as "whether he is sacrilegious who has stolen private money from a temple," or about the denominated matter, where both that it has been done is certain and there is no doubt what it is that has been done. Under this are subordinated all questions about honorable, just, and useful things. 42.

His etiam ceteri status contineri dicuntur, quia et quantitas modo ad coniecturam referatur, ut: "maiorne sol quam terra", modo ad qualitatem: "quanta poena quempiam quantove praemio sit adfici iustum", et tralatio versetur circa qualitatem et definitio pars sit tralationis, XLIII. quin et contrariae leges et ratiocinativus status, id est syllogismos, et plerumque scripti et voluntatis aequo nitantur, nisi quod hic tertius aliquando coniecturam accipit: "quid senserit legis constitutor", ambiguitatem vero semper coniectura explicari necesse sit, quia, cum sit manifestum verborum intellectum esse duplicem, de sola quaeritur voluntate.

By these, moreover, the other statuses are said to be contained, because quantity too is at one time referred to conjecture, as: "whether the sun is greater than the earth," at another to quality: "with what punishment or with what reward it is just that someone be afflicted," and translation is occupied with quality and definition is a part of translation, 43. nay more, both contrary laws and the ratiocinative status, that is, syllogisms, for the most part rely equally on the letter and on intention, except that this third sometimes admits conjecture: "what the framer of the law intended"; but ambiguity must always be explained by conjecture, because, since it is manifest that the understanding of the words is twofold, the inquiry is about intention alone.

XLIV. A plurimis tres sunt facti generales status, quibus et Cicero in Oratore utitur et omnia quae aut in controversiam aut in contentionem veniant contineri putat: sitne, quid sit, quale sit. Quorum nomina apertiora sunt quam ut dicenda sint.

44. By most people there are three general statuses of fact, which Cicero also uses in the Orator and thinks that everything which comes either into controversy or into contention is contained by: whether it is, what it is, what sort it is. Their names are too plain to need to be stated.

XLV. Idem Iatrocles sentit. Tres fecit et M. Antonius his quidem verbis: "paucae res sunt quibus ex rebus omnes orationes nascuntur, factum non factum, ius iniuria, bonum malum". Sed quoniam quod iure dicimur fecisse non hunc solum intellectum habet, ut lege, sed illum quoque, ut iuste fecisse videamur, secuti Antonium apertius voluerunt eosdem status distinguere, itaque dixerunt coniecturalem, legalem, iuridicialem: qui et Verginio placent.

45. Iatrocles thinks the same. Marcus Antonius also made three, indeed in these words: "there are few things from which all orations are born, done or not done, right or injury, good or bad." But since what we are said to have done iure does not have only this understanding, namely, as by statute, but also that, so that we seem to have done justly, those who followed Antonius wished more openly to distinguish the same statuses; and thus they spoke of the conjectural, the legal, and the juridical—which also please Verginius.

XLVI. Horum deinde fecerunt species, ita ut legali subicerent finitionem et alios qui ex scripto ducuntur, legum contrariarum, quae antinomia dicitur, et scripti et sententiae vel voluntatis, id est kata rheton kai dianoian, et metalempsin, quam nos varie tralativam, transumptivam, transpositivam vocamus, sillogismon, quem accipimus ratiocinativum vel collectivum ambiguitatis, quae amphibolia nominatur: quos posui quia et ipsi a plerisque status appellantur, cum quibusdam legales potius quaestiones eas dici placuerit.

46. Of these then they made species, such that under the legal they placed definition and others which are drawn from the written text: of contrary laws, which is called antinomy; and of the letter and of the sense or will—that is, kata rheton kai dianoian; and metalepsis, which we variously call tralative, transumptive, transpositive; the syllogism, which we take as ratiocinative or collective; of ambiguity, which is named amphiboly: which I have set down because they too are by many called “status,” although to some it has pleased that these be called rather legal questions.

XLVII. Quattuor fecit Athenaeus, protreptiken stasin vel parormetiken, id est exhortativum, qui suasoriae est proprius, synteliken, qua coniecturam significari magis ex his quae secuntur quam ex ipso nomine apparet, hypallaktiken (ea finitio est, mutatione enim nominis constat), iuridicialem, eadem appellatione Graeca qua ceteri usus; nam est, ut dixi, multa in nominibus differentia. XLVIII.

47. Athenaeus made four: the protreptic stance, or parormetic—that is, exhortative, which is proper to the suasoria; the syntelic, by which a conjecture is signified, as appears more from the things that follow than from the name itself; the hypallactic (that is a definition, for it consists in a change of the name); the juridical, with the same Greek appellation which the others used; for, as I said, there is much difference in the names. 48.

sunt qui hypallaktiken tralationem esse existiment, secuti hanc mutationis significationem. Fecerunt alii totidem status, sed alios, an sit, quid sit, quale sit, quantum sit, ut Caecilius et Theon. XLIX.

There are those who think the hypallaktic to be a transference, following this signification of change. Others made just as many statuses, but different ones—whether it is, what it is, of what sort it is, how great it is—as Caecilius and Theon. 49.

Aristoteles in rhetoricis an sit, quale, quantum et quam multum sit quaerendum putat. Quodam tamen loco finitionis quoque vim intellegit, quo dicit quaedam sic defendi: "sustuli, sed non furtum feci", "percussi, sed non iniuriam feci". L. Posuerat et Cicero in libris rhetoricis facti, nominis, generis, actionis, ut in facto coniectura, in nomine finitio, in genere qualitas, in actione ius intellegeretur: iuri subiecerat tralationem. Veram hic legales quoque quaestiones alio loco tractat ut species actionis.

Aristotle in the Rhetorics thinks that it must be inquired whether it is, of what kind it is, how great it is, and how much it is. Yet in a certain place he also understands the force of definition, wherein he says that certain matters are thus to be defended: "I took it, but I did not commit theft", "I struck, but I did not commit injury". 50. Cicero too had set forth in his rhetorical books the issues of fact, of name, of genus, of action, so that in the fact conjecture, in the name definition, in the genus quality, in the action law might be understood: to law he had subjected transference. But here he also treats legal questions elsewhere as species of action.

LI. Fuerunt qui facerent quinque: coniecturam, finitionem, qualitatem, quantitatem, ad aliquid. Theodorus quoque, ut dixi, isdem generalibus capitibus utitur: an sit, quid sit, quale sit, quantum sit, ad aliquid. Hoc ultimum maxime in comparativo genere versari putat, quoniam melius ac peius, maius et minus nisi alio relata non intelleguntur; LII.

51. There were those who made five: conjecture, definition, quality, quantity, relation (to something). Theodorus too, as I said, uses the same general headings: whether it is, what it is, of what sort it is, how much it is, in relation to something. He thinks this last is especially engaged in the comparative kind, since better and worse, greater and less are not understood unless referred to another; 52.

sed in illas quoque tralativas, ut supra significavi, quaestiones incidit: "an huic ius agendi sit" vel "facere aliquid conveniat", "an contra hunc", "an hoc tempore", "an sic". Omnia enim ista referri ad aliquid necesse est. LIII. Alii sex status putant: coniecturam, quam genesin vocant, et qualitatem et proprietatem, id est idioteta, quo verbo finitio ostenditur, et quantitatem, quam axeian dicunt, et comparationem et tralationem, cuius adhuc novum nomen inventum est metastasin, novum tamquam in statu, alioqui ab Hermagora inter species iuridicialis usitatum.

but it also falls into those transpositive questions, as I indicated above: "whether this man have the right of action" or "it be fitting to do something," "whether against this man," "whether at this time," "whether thus." For all these must needs be referred to something else. 53. Others think there are six statuses: conjecture, which they call genesis, and quality, and property, that is idioteta, by which word definition is indicated, and quantity, which they call axeia, and comparison, and transference, for which a new name has been found, metastasis—new, so far as status is concerned, though otherwise in use with Hermagoras among the species of the juridical.

LIV. Aliis septem esse placuit, a quibus nec tralatio nec quantitas nec comparatio recepta est, sed in horum trium locum subditae quattuor legales adiectaeque tribus illis rationalibus. LV. Alii pervenerunt usque ad octo tralatione ad septem superiores adiecta.

54. It pleased others that there are seven, by whom neither translation nor quantity nor comparison was accepted; but in the place of these three, four legal ones were put, and were added to those three rational ones. 55. Others have reached as far as eight, with translation added to the preceding seven.

A quibusdam deinde divisa ratio est, ut status rationales appellarent, quaestiones, quem ad modum supra dixi, legales, in illis de re, in his de scripto quaereretur. Quidam in diversum hos status esse, illas quaestiones maluerunt. LVI.

Then by some the method was divided, so that the statuses were called rational, the questions, as I said above, legal, with inquiry in the former about the thing, in the latter about the writing. Certain persons, conversely, preferred that these be statuses, those questions. 56.

Sed alii rationales tres putaverunt, an sit, quid sit, quale sit, Hermagoras solus quattuor, coniecturam, proprietatem, tralationem, qualitatem, quam per accidentia, id est kata symbebekos, vocat hac interpretatione: "an illi accidat viro bono esse vel malo". Hanc ita dividit: de adpetendis et fugiendis, quae est pars deliberativa; de persona (ea ostenditur laudativa); LVII. negotialem (pragmatiken vocat), in qua de rebus ipsis quaeritur remoto personarum complexu, ut "sitne liber qui est in adsertione", "an divitiae superbiam pariant", "an iustum quid, an bonum sit"; iuridicialem, in qua fere eadem, sed certis destinatisque personis quaerantur: "an ille iuste hoc fecerit vel bene".

But others thought the rationals to be three: whether it is, what it is, of what quality it is; Hermagoras alone [made them] four: conjecture, propriety, transference, quality, which he calls “by accidents,” that is kata symbebekos, with this gloss: “whether it befalls that that man be good or bad.” He divides this thus: about things to be sought and avoided, which is the deliberative part; about the person (this is shown to be laudatory); 57. the negotial (he calls it pragmatike), in which inquiry is made about the things themselves with the complex of persons removed, as “whether he is free who is in assertion,” “whether riches beget pride,” “whether something is just, whether it is good”; the juridical, in which nearly the same things are asked, but with certain and designated persons: “whether that man did this justly or well.”

LVIII. Nec me fallit in primo Ciceronis rhetorico aliam esse loci negotialis interpretationem, cum ita scriptum sit: "negotialis est in qua quid iuris ex civili more et aequitate sit consideratur: cui diligentiae praeesse apud nos iure consulti existimantur". LIX. Sed quod ipsius de his libris iudicium fuerit supra dixi.

58. Nor does it escape me that in Cicero’s first rhetorical [work] there is another interpretation of the negotial locus, since it is written thus: "the negotial is that in which what of law, from civil custom and equity, is considered: jurists are thought among us to preside over this diligence." 59. But what his own judgment about these books was, I have said above.

sunt enim velut regestae in hos commentarios quos adulescens deduxerat scholae, et si qua est in his culpa, tradentis est, sive eum movit quod Hermagoras prima in hoc loco posuit exempla ex quaestionibus iuris, sive quod Graeci pragmatikous vocant iuris interpretes. LX. Sed Cicero quidem his pulcherrimos illos de Oratore substituit, ideoque culpari tamquam falsa praecipiat non potest. Nos ad Hermagoran.

for they are, as it were, registers entered into these commentaries which, as a young man, he had drawn out from the schools; and if there is any fault in these, it is the transmitter’s, whether he was moved because Hermagoras placed first in this place examples from questions of law, or because the Greeks call pragmatikous the interpreters of law. 60. But Cicero indeed substituted for these those most beautiful On the Orator, and therefore he cannot be blamed as though he were prescribing false things. Let us return to Hermagoras.

Tralationem hic primus omnium tradidit, quamquam semina eius quaedam citra nomen ipsum apud Aristotelen reperiuntur. LXI. Legales autem quaestiones has fecit: scripti et voluntatis (quam ipse vocat kata rheton kai hypexairesin, id est dictum et exceptionem: quorum prius ei cum omnibus commune est, exceptionis nomen minus usitatum), ratiocinativum, ambiguitatis, legum contrariarum.

He was the first of all to hand down the Transference, although certain seeds of it, short of the very name, are found in Aristotle. 61. But he constituted these legal questions: of the Writing and of the Will (which he himself calls kata rheton kai hypexairesin, that is, the dictum and the exception: of which the former is common to him with all, the name “exception” is less customary), the Ratiocinative, of Ambiguity, of Contrary Laws.

LXII. Albucius eadem divisione usus detrahit tralationem, subiciens eam iuridiciali. In legalibus quoque quaestionibus nullum putat esse qui dicatur ratiocinativus.

62. Albucius, employing the same division, removes the transference, subordinating it to the judicial. In legal questions as well he thinks there is none that is called ratiocinative.

Scio plura inventuros adhuc qui legere antiquos studiosius volent, sed ne haec quoque excesserint modum vereor. LXIII. Ipse me paulum in alia quam prius habuerim opinione nunc esse confiteor.

I know that those who will wish to read the ancients more studiously will still find more, but I fear lest these too have exceeded the measure. 63. I myself confess that I am now in a somewhat different opinion than I previously held.

Et fortasse tutissimum erat famae modo studenti nihil ex eo mutare quod multis annis non sensissem modo verum etiam adprobassem. LXIV. Sed non sustineo esse conscius mihi dissimulati, in eo praesertim opere quod ad bonorum iuvenum aliquam utilitatem componimus, in ulla parte iudicii meI.

And perhaps it was safest, for one studying only fame, to change nothing of that which for many years I had not only sensed but even approved. 64. But I do not endure to be conscious to myself of dissimulation, especially in that work which we are composing for some utility of good youths, in any part of my judgment.

Nam et Hippocrates clarus arte medicinae videtur honestissime fecisse quod quosdam errores suos, ne posteri errarent, confessus est, et M. tullius non dubitavit aliquos iam editos libros aliis postea scriptis ipse damnare, sicut Catulum atque Lucullum et hos ipsos de quibus modo sum locutus, artis rhetoricae. LXV. Etenim supervacuus foret in studiis longior labor si nihil liceret melius invenire praeteritis.

For Hippocrates too, renowned in the art of medicine, seems to have done most honorably in that he confessed certain of his own errors, lest posterity should err; and M. tullius did not hesitate to condemn some books already published by himself by later writings, such as the Catulus and the Lucullus, and these very ones of the art of rhetoric about which I have just spoken. 65. For indeed a longer labor in studies would be superfluous if it were not permitted to discover anything better than what has gone before.

Neque tamen quicquam ex iis quae tum praecepi supervacuum fuit; ad easdem enim particulas haec quoque quae nunc praecipiam revertentur. Ita neminem didicisse paeniteat: colligere tantum eadem ac disponere paulo significantius conor. Omnibus autem satis factum volo non me hoc serius demonstrare aliis quam mihi ipse persuaserim.

Nor, however, was anything of those things which I then prescribed superfluous; for to the same particulars these things too which I now prescribe will revert. Thus let no one regret having learned: I only try to gather the same things and to arrange them somewhat more significantly. Moreover, I wish to satisfy everyone that I am not demonstrating this to others any later than I have myself been persuaded.

LXVI. Secundum plurimos auctores servabam tris rationales status: coniecturam, qualitatem, finitionem, unum legalem. Hi mihi status generales erant.

66. According to most authors I maintained three rational statuses: conjecture, quality, definition, one legal. These statuses were general for me.

Legalem in quinque species partiebar: scripti et voluntatis, legum contrariarum, covectivum, ambiguitatis, tralationis. LXVII. Nunc quartum ex generalibus intellego posse removeri; sufficit enim prima divisio, qua diximus alios rationales, alios legales esse: ita non erit status, sed quaestionum genus; alioqui et rationalis status esset.

I used to partition the legal into five species: of the written text and of intention, of contrary laws, the collective, of ambiguity, of translation. 67. Now I understand that the fourth of the generals can be removed; for the first division suffices, by which we said that some are rational, others legal: thus it will not be a status, but a kind of questions; otherwise the rational too would be a status.

LXVIII. Ex iis etiam quos speciales vocabam removi tralationem, frequenter quidem (sicut omnes qui me secuti sunt meminisse possunt) testatus, et in ipsis etiam illis sermonibus me nolente vulgatis hoc tamen complexus, vix in una controversia tralationis statum posse reperiri ut non et alius in eadem recte dici videretur, ideoque a quibusdam eum exclusum. LXIX.

68. From those too which I was calling special I have removed transference, having often indeed (as all who have followed me can remember) declared, and even in those very discourses of mine, published against my will, I nevertheless included this: that scarcely in a single controversy can the status of transference be found such that some other would not also seem to be rightly asserted in the same case; and for that reason by some it has been excluded. 69.

Neque ignoro multa transferri, cum in omnibus fere causis in quibus cecidisse quis formula dicitur hae sint quaestiones: "an huic, an cum hoc, an hac lege, an apud hunc, an hoc tempore liceat agere", et si qua sunt talia. LXX. Sed personae tempora actiones ceteraque propter aliquam causam transferuntur: ita non est in tralatione quaestio, sed in eo propter quod transferuntur.

Nor am I unaware that many things are transferred, since in almost all cases in which someone is said to have fallen with respect to the formula, these are the questions: "whether against this man, or with this man, or under this law, or before this man, or at this time it is permitted to bring suit," and if there are any such things. 70. But persons, times, actions, and the rest are transferred on account of some cause: thus the question is not in the transference, but in that on account of which they are transferred.

"Non debes apud praetorem petere fidei commissum, sed apud consules: maior enim praetoria cognitione summa est". Quaeritur an maior summa sit: facti controversia est. LXXI. "Non licet tibi agere mecum: cognitor enim fieri non potuisti": iudicatio an potuerit.

"You ought not to seek the fideicommissum before the praetor, but before the consuls: for the amount is greater than praetorian cognizance". It is asked whether the amount is greater: it is a question of fact. 71. "It is not permitted for you to bring an action against me: for you could not become a cognitor": the issue for adjudication is whether he could have.

"Non debuisti interdicere, sed petere": an recte interdictum sit ambigitur. Quae omnia succidunt legitimis quaestionibus. LXXII.

"You ought not to have interdicted, but to have sued": it is disputed whether the interdict was rightly issued. All these are cut down by legitimate questions. 72.

An non praescriptiones etiam, in quibus maxime videtur manifesta tralatio, easdem omnes species habent quas eae leges quibus agitur, ut aut de nomine aut scripto et sententia vel ratiocinatione quaeratur? Deinde status ex quaestione oritur: tralatio non habet quaestionem de qua contendit orator, sed propter quam contendit. LXXIII.

Do not praescriptions also, in which most of all the transference seems manifest, have all the same species as those laws under which suit is brought, so that inquiry is either about the name, or about the writing and the meaning, or about ratiocination? Then the status arises from the question: transference does not have the question about which the orator contends, but the reason on account of which he contends. 73.

Hoc apertius: "occidisti hominem:" "non occidi": quaestio an occiderit, status coniectura. Non est tale "habeo ius actionis": "non habes", ut sit quaestio an habeat, et inde status. Accipiat enim actionem necne ad eventum pertinet, non ad causam, et ad id quod pronuntiat iudex, non id propter quod pronuntiat.

More plainly: “you killed a man;” “I did not kill:” the question is whether he killed, the status is conjectural. It is not like “I have the right of action;” “you do not have it,” so that the question is whether he has it, and from that the status. For whether he receives the action or not pertains to the outcome, not to the case, and to what the judge pronounces, not to that on account of which he pronounces.

LXXIV. Hoc illi simile est "puniendus es": "non sum": videbit iudex an puniendus sit, sed non hic erit quaestio nec hic status. Vbi ergo?

74. This is similar to that: "you are to be punished": "I am not": the judge will see whether he is to be punished, but here there will not be the question nor the status. Where then?

"Puniendus es, hominem occidisti": "non occidi": an occiderit. "Honorandus sum": "non es" num statum habet? Non, ut puto.

"You are to be punished, you killed a man": "I did not kill": whether he killed. "I am to be honored": "you are not"—does it have a status? No, as I think.

"Honorandus sum quia tyrannum occidi": "non occidisti": quaestio et status. Similiter "non recte agis": "recte ago" non habet statum. LXXV.

"I am to be honored because I killed a tyrant": "you did not kill [him]": a question and a status. Similarly, "you do not act rightly": "I act rightly" does not have a status. 75.

Vbi est ergo? "Non recte agis ignominiosus". Quaeritur an ignominiosus sit, aut an agere ignominioso liceat: quaestiones et status. Ergo tralativum genus causae, ut comparativum et mutuae accusationis.

Where is it, then? "You do not act rightly, ignominious man." It is asked whether he is ignominious, or whether it is permitted for an ignominious man to act: questions and statuses. Therefore a translative genus of cause, as the comparative and that of mutual accusation.

LXXVI. At enim simile est illi "habeo ius": "non habes" "occidisti": "recte occidi". Non nego, sed nec haec res statum facit: non enim sunt hae propositiones (alioqui causa non explicabitur), sed cum suis rationibus. "Scelus commisit Horatius, sororem enim occidit": "non commisit, debuit enim occidere eam quae hostis morte maerebat": quaestio an haec iusta causa; ita qualitas.

76. But indeed it is similar to that “I have a right”: “you do not have [it]” “you killed”: “I killed rightly.” I do not deny it, but neither does this make a status: for these are not propositions (otherwise the cause will not be explained), but with their reasons. “Horatius committed a crime, for he killed his sister”: “he did not commit [one], for he ought to have killed her who was mourning an enemy’s death”: the question is whether this is a just cause; thus, quality.

LXXVII. Ac similiter in tralatione: "non habes ius abdicandi, quia ignominioso non est actio": "habeo ius, quia abdicatio actio non est": quaeritur quid sit actio; finiemus. +Non licet abdicare syllogismo.+ Item cetera per omnes et rationales et legales status.

77. And similarly in the translative: "you do not have the right to abdicate, because for an ignominious man there is no action"; "I have the right, because abdication is not an action": the question is what an action is; we shall settle it. +It is not permitted to abdicate by a syllogism.+ Likewise the rest, through all both rational and legal statuses.

LXXVIII. Nec ignoro fuisse quosdam qui tralationem in rationali quoque genere ponerent hoc modo: "hominem occidi iussus ab imperatore": "dona templi cogenti tyranno dedi": "deserui tempestatibus, fluminibus, valetudine impeditus", id est, non per me stetit, sed per illud. LXXIX.

78. Nor do I ignore that there have been certain men who would place transference even in the rational kind in this way: "I killed a man, ordered by the emperor": "I gave the gifts of the temple to the tyrant who was compelling [me]": "I deserted, hindered by storms, rivers, ill-health," that is, it did not stand through me, but through that. 79.

A quibus etiam liberius dissentio; non enim actio transfertur, sed causa facti, quod accidit paene in omni defensione. Deinde is qui tali utitur patrocinio non recedit a forma qualitatis; dicit enim se culpa vacare, ut magis qualitatis duplex ratio facienda sit, altera qua et factum defenditur, altera qua tantum reus.

From whom also I dissent more freely; for it is not the action that is transferred, but the cause of the deed, which happens in almost every defense. Then he who uses such a plea does not depart from the form of quality; for he says that he is void of fault, so that rather a double reckoning of quality should be made, the one by which both the deed is defended, the other by which only the accused.

LXXX. Credendum est igitur iis quorum auctoritatem secutus est Cicero, tria esse quae in omni disputatione quaerantur: an sit, quid sit, quale sit; quod ipsa nobis etiam natura praescribit: nam primum oportet subesse aliquid de quo ambigitur, quod quid sit et quale sit certe non potest aestimari nisi prius esse constiterit; ideoque ea prima quaestio. LXXXI.

80. It ought therefore to be believed, on the authority of those whom Cicero followed, that there are three things which are inquired into in every disputation: whether it is, what it is, of what quality it is; which nature itself also prescribes to us: for first there must be something underlying about which there is dispute, since what it is and of what quality it is surely cannot be estimated unless it has first been established that it exists; and for that reason that is the first question. 81.

Sed non statim, quod esse manifestum est, etiam quid sit apparet. Hoc quoque constituto novissima qualitas superest, neque his exploratis aliud est ultra. His infinitae quaestiones, his finitae continentur; horum aliqua in demonstrativa deliberativa iudiciali materia utique tractatur; LXXXII.

But not immediately, from the fact that it is manifest that something exists, does what it is also appear. With this also established, the very last quality remains, nor, these having been explored, is there anything beyond. In these the infinite questions, in these the finite are contained; of these, some are in demonstrative, deliberative, judicial material assuredly treated; 82.

haec rursus iudicialis causas et rationali parte et legali continent: neque enim ulla iuris disceptatio nisi finitione qualitate coniectura potest explicari. LXXXIII. Sed instituentibus rudes non erit inutilis latius primo fusa ratio, et, si non statim rectissima linea tensa, facilior tamen et apertior via.

these in turn comprise judicial causes both in the rational part and in the legal; for no disputation of law can be explained except by definition, by quality, by conjecture. 83. But for those instructing beginners, a method spread more broadly at the start will not be useless; and, if the straightest line is not drawn taut at once, nevertheless the way is easier and more open.

Discant igitur ante omnia quadripertitam in omnibus causis esse rationem, quam primam intueri debeat qui acturus est. Nam ut a defensore potissimum incipiam, longe fortissima tuendi se ratio est si quod obicitur negari potest: proxima, si non id quod obicitur factum esse dicitur: tertia honestissima, qua recte factum defenditur. Quibus si deficiamur, ultima quidem, sed iam sola superest salus aliquo iuris adiutorio elabendi ex crimine quod rieque negari neque defendi potest, ut non videatur iure actio intendi: LXXXIV.

Let them learn therefore, before all things, that in all cases there is a quadripartite method, which the one who is about to plead ought first to regard. For, to begin especially from the defender, by far the strongest method of defending oneself is if what is objected can be denied: the next, if it is said that that which is objected was not done: the third, the most honorable, whereby the deed is defended as rightly done. If we are lacking in these, the last indeed, but now the only safety remains, of slipping out by some aid of law from a charge which can neither be denied nor defended, so that the action may not seem to be brought by right: 84.

hinc illae quaestiones sive actionis sive tralationis. sunt enim quaedam non laudabilia natura, sed iure concessa, ut in duodecim tabulis debitoris corpus inter creditores dividi licuit, quam legem mos publicus repudiavit: et aliquid aecum, sed prohibitum iure, ut libertas testamentorum. LXXXV.

hence those questions, whether of action or of transference. For there are certain things not laudable by nature, but granted by law, as in the Twelve Tables it was permitted for the debtor’s body to be divided among the creditors, which law public custom repudiated: and there is something equitable, but prohibited by law, such as the freedom of testaments. 85.

Accusatori nihilo plura intuenda sunt, ut probet factum esse, hoc esse factum, non recte factum, iure se intendere. Ita circa species easdem lis omnis versabitur, tralatis tantum aliquando partibus, ut in causis quibus de praemio agitur recte factum petitor probat.

To the accuser no more things are to be considered than these: that he prove the deed was done, that this is what was done, that it was not done rightly, that he is making his claim by law. Thus the whole suit will revolve around the same categories, with only the parts sometimes transposed, as in cases in which a reward is at issue the petitioner proves the deed to have been rightly done.

LXXXVI. Haec quattuor velut proposita formaeque actionis, quae tum generales status vocabam, in duo, ut ostendi, genera discedunt, rationale et legale. Rationale simplicius est, quia ipsius tantum naturae contemplatione constat: itaque in eo satis est ostendisse coniecturam finitionem qualitatem.

86. These four, as it were, propositions and forms of action, which I then was calling general statuses, are divided, as I have shown, into two genera, the rational and the legal. The rational is simpler, because it consists in the contemplation of its own nature alone; therefore in it it is enough to have shown conjecture, definition, quality.

LXXXVII. Legalium plures sint species necesse est, propterea quod multae sunt leges et varias habent formas. Alia est cuius verbis nitimur, alia cuius voluntate: alias nobis, cum ipsi nullam habeamus, adiungimus, alias inter se comparamus, alias in diversum interpretamur.

87. Of legal matters more species must exist, because there are many laws and they have various forms. One is that on whose words we rely, another that on whose will; others we adjoin to ourselves, when we ourselves have none, others we compare among themselves, others we interpret to the contrary.

LXXXVIII. Sic nascuntur haec velut simulacra ex illis tribus, interim simplicia, interim et mixta, propriam tamen faciem ostendentia, ut scripti et voluntatis, quae sine dubio aut qualitate aut coniectura continentur, et sillogismos, qui est maxime qualitatis, et leges contrariae, quae isdem quibus scriptum et voluntas constant, et amphibolia, quae semper coniectura explicatur. LXXXIX.

88. Thus there arise, as it were, these simulacra from those three, sometimes simple, sometimes also mixed, yet showing their own face: such as “of the written [law]” and “of will,” which without doubt are contained either under quality or under conjecture; and syllogisms, which are especially of quality; and contrary laws, which stand by the same things by which writing and will stand; and amphiboly, which is always explained by conjecture. 89.

Finitio quoque utrique generi, quodque rerum quodque scripti contemplatione constat, communis est. Haec omnia, etiamsi in illos tres status veniunt, tamen, quia, ut dixi, habent aliquid velut proprium, videntur demonstranda discentibus, et permittendum ea dicere vel status legales vel quaestiones vel capita quaedam minora, dum sciant nihil ne in his quidem praeter tria quae praediximus quaeri. XC. At quantum et quam multum et ad aliquid et, ut nonnulli putarunt, comparativus non eandem rationem habent: sunt enim haec non ad varietatem iuris, sed ad solam rationem referenda.

Definition too is common to each kind, and is established by the contemplation both of things and of the written. All these items, although they come under those three statuses, yet, because, as I said, they have something as it were proper to them, seem to be things that should be shown to learners; and it should be permitted to call them either legal statuses or questions or certain minor heads, provided they know that nothing, not even in these, is sought beyond the three which we have foretold. 90. But “quantum” and “how much” and “to something” (relation) and, as some have thought, the comparative do not have the same rationale: for these are to be referred not to a variety of law, but to reason alone.

Ideoque semper in parte aut coniecturae aut qualitatis ponenda sunt, ut "qua mente?" et "quo tempore?" et "quo loco?"

And therefore they must always be set in the part either of conjecture or of quality, as “with what mind?” and “at what time?” and “in what place?”

XCI. Sed de singulis dicemus quaestionibus cum tractare praecepta divisionis coeperimus. Hoc inter omnes convenit, in causis simplicibus singulos status esse causarum, quaestionum autem, quae velut subiacent his et ad illud quo iudicium continetur, referuntur, saepe in unam cadere plures posse; XCII.

91. But we will speak about the individual questions when we begin to handle the precepts of division. This is agreed among all: in simple causes there is a single status of the causes; but the questions, which as it were lie beneath these and are referred to that on which the judgment is contained, often several can fall into one; 92.

(etiam credo aliquando dubitari quo statu sit utendum cum adversus unam intentionem plura opponuntur, et sicut in colore dicitur narrationis eum esse optimum quem actor optime tueatur, ita hic quoque posse dici eum statum esse faciendum in quo tuendo plurimum adhibere virium possit orator; XCIII. ideoque pro Milone aliud Ciceroni agenti placuit, aliud Bruto cum exercitationis gratia componeret orationem, cum ille iure tamquam insidiatorem occisum et tamen non Milonis consilio dixerit, ille etiam gloriatus sit occiso malo cive): XCIV. in coniunctis vero posse duos et tris inveniri, vel diversos, ut si quis aliud se non fecisse, aliud recte fecisse defendat, vel generis eiusdem, ut si quis duo crimina vel omnia neget.

(even I believe that it is sometimes doubted which status ought to be used when several things are opposed against one intention, and just as in coloring it is said that that narration is best which the actor/advocate best can defend, so here too it can be said that that status should be adopted in the defending of which the orator can apply the most forces; 93. and therefore, in behalf of Milo, one course pleased Cicero as he was pleading, another pleased Brutus when for the sake of exercise he was composing a speech, since the former said that the man was slain by right as a plotter in ambush and yet not by the counsel of Milo, while the latter even boasted with the evil citizen slain): 94. in conjoined [issues], indeed, two or three can be found, either diverse, as when someone defends that he did not do one thing, but did another rightly, or of the same genus, as when someone denies two crimes or all.

XCV. Quod accidit etiam si de una re quaeratur aliqua, sed eam plures petant, vel eodem iure, ut proximitatis, vel diverso, ut cum hic testamento, ille proximitate nitetur. Quotiens autem aliud alii petitori opponitur, dissimilis esse status necesse est, ut in illa controversia: XCVI.

95. Which happens even if some question is raised about one matter, but several claim it, either by the same right, as of proximity, or by a different one, as when this man relies on a testament, that one on proximity. Whenever, however, one thing is opposed to one petitioner and another to another, it is necessary that the status be dissimilar, as in that controversy: 96.

"testamenta legibus facta rata sint: intestatorum parentium liberi heredes sint: abdicatus ne quid de bonis patris capiat: nothus ante legitimum natus legitimus filius sit, post legitimum natus tantum civis: in adoptionem dare liceat: in adoptionem dato redire in familiam liceat si pater naturalis sine liberis decesserit. XCVII. Qui ex duobus legitimis alterum in adoptionem dederat, alterum abdicaverat, sustulit nothum: instituto herede abdicato decessit.

"let testaments made according to the laws be valid: let the children of parents dying intestate be heirs: let the disowned take nothing of the father’s goods: let a bastard born before a legitimate one be a legitimate son, but if born after a legitimate one, only a citizen: let it be permitted to give into adoption: for one given into adoption let it be permitted to return into the family if the natural father has died without children. 97. One who, out of two legitimate sons, had given one into adoption and had disowned the other, took up a bastard: with the disowned instituted heir, he died."

Tres omnes de bonis contendunt". Nothum qui non sit legitimus Graeci vocant, Latinum rei nomen, ut Cato quoque in oratione quadam testatus est, non habemus, ideoque utimur peregrino; sed ad propositum. XCVIII. Heredi scripto opponitur lex: "abdicatus ne quid de bonis patris capiat"; fit status scripti et voluntatis, an ullo modo capere possit, an ex voluntate patris, an heres scriptus.

Three all contend for the goods". They call nothus one who is not legitimate in Greek; a Latin name for the thing, as Cato also testified in a certain oration, we do not have, and so we use a foreign (peregrine) term; but to the point. 98. To the written heir a law is opposed: "let the disowned take nothing of the father’s goods"; a stasis of the writing and of the will arises—whether he can in any way take, whether by the father’s will, whether as the written heir.

Notho duplex fit quaestio, quod post legitimos natus sit et quod non sit ante legitimum natus. XCIX. Pior sillogismon habet, an pro non natis sint habendi qui a familia sunt alienati; altera scripti et voluntatis: non esse enim hunc natum ante legitimum convenit, sed voluntate legis se tuebitur, quam dicet talem fuisse ut legitimus esset nothus tum natus cum alius legitimus in domo non esset.

A double question arises concerning the nothus, both because he was born after legitimate children and because he was not born before a legitimate one. 99. It has the “pious syllogism”: whether those who have been alienated from the family are to be held as not-born; the other concerns what is written and intention: for it is agreed that this one was not born before the legitimate, but he will defend himself by the will of the law, which he will say was such that the nothus would be legitimate, born at a time when no other legitimate child was in the house.

C. Scriptum quoque legis excludet, dicens non utique si postea legitimus natus non sit notho nocere, uteturque hoc argumento: "Finge solum natum nothum, cuius condicionis erit? Tantum civis? Atqui non erit post legitimum natus.

100. He will also exclude by the written text of the law, saying that it is not necessarily harmful to the nothus if later a legitimate is not born, and he will use this argument: "Imagine the nothus alone born—of what condition will he be? Only a citizen? And yet he will not have been born after a legitimate."

An filius? Atqui non erit ante legitimum natus. Quare si verbis legis stari non potest, voluntate standum est". CI. Nec quemquam turbet quod ex una lege duo status fiant: duplex est, ita vim duarum habet.

Or a son? But indeed he will not have been born before a legitimate one. Wherefore, if it cannot stand by the words of the law, one must stand by intention". 101. Nor let anyone be troubled that from one law two statuses arise: it is double, thus it has the force of two.

Redire in familiam volenti dicitur ab altero primum: "ut tibi redire liceat, heres sum". Idem status qui in petitione abdicati: quaeretur enim an possit esse heres abdicatus. CII. Adicitur communiter a duobus: "redire tibi in familiam non licet; non enim pater sine liberis decessit". Sed in hoc propria quisque eorum quaestione nitetur.

To one wishing to return into the family it is said by the other first: "that it may be permitted for you to return, I am heir". The same status as in the petition of the disinherited: for it will be asked whether a disinherited man can be heir. 102. It is added commonly by both: "it is not permitted for you to return into the family; for the father did not die without children". But in this each of them will rely upon his own proper question.

Alter enim dicet abdicatum quoque inter liberos esse, et argumentum ducet ex ipsa qua repellitur lege; supervacuum enim fuisse prohiberi patris bonis abdicatum si esset numero alienorum: nunc, quia filii iure futurus fuerit intestati heres, oppositam esse legem, quae tamen non id efficiat ne filius sit, sed ne heres sit. CIII. Status finitivus: quid sit filius.

Another, indeed, will say that even the disowned is among the children, and he will draw an argument from the very law by which he is repelled; for it would have been superfluous for the disowned to be barred from the father’s estate if he were in the number of strangers: now, because by the right of a son he would be an heir on intestacy, the law has been set in opposition, which, however, does not bring it about that he not be a son, but that he not be an heir. 103. Definitive status: what a son is.

Rursus nothus eisdem colligit argumentis non sine liberis patrem decessisse quibus in petitione usus est ut probaret esse se filium, nisi forte et hic finitionem movet: an liberi sint etiam non legitimI. Cadent ergo in unam controversiam vel specialiter duo legitimi status, scripti et voluntatis et syllogismos, et praeterea finitio, vel tres illi qui natura soli sunt, coniectura in scripto et voluntate, qualitas in syllogismo et, quae per se est aperta, finitio.

Again, the bastard, by the same arguments which he used in the petition to prove himself a son, infers that the father did not die without children—unless perhaps here too he raises a definition: whether those not legitimate are also “children.” Therefore they will fall into one controversy, either specifically the two legal statuses—of the written (law) and of intention—together with syllogisms, and, besides, definition; or those three which exist by nature alone: conjecture in what is written and in intention, quality in the syllogism, and definition, which is plain in itself.

CIV. Causa quoque et iudicatio et continens est in omni genere causarum. Nihil enim dicitur cui non insit ratio et quo iudicium referatur et quod rem maxime contineat.

104. The cause, the judication, and the containing element are in every kind of cause. For nothing is said which does not have reason inhering in it, and to which judgment is referred, and which most contains the matter.

Sed quia magis haec variantur in litibus et fere tradita sunt ab iis qui de iudicialibus causis aliqua composuerunt, in illam partem differantur. Nunc, quia in tria genera causas divisi, ordinem sequar.

But because these matters vary more in litigations and have for the most part been handed down by those who have composed certain things about judicial causes, let them be deferred to that section. Now, since I have divided causes into three genera, I shall follow the order.

[7] I. Ac potissimum incipiam ab ea quae constat laude ac vituperatione. Quod genus videtur Aristoteles atque eum secutus Theophrastus a parte negotiali, hoc est pragmatikei, removisse totamque ad solos auditores relegasse; et id eius nominis quod ab ostentatione ducitur proprium est. II. Sed mos Romanus etiam negotiis hoc munus inservit.

[7] 1. And chiefly I shall begin from that which consists in laud and vituperation. The genus which Aristotle, and Theophrastus following him, seems to have removed from the negotial part, that is, the pragmatic, and to have relegated wholly to the hearers alone; and it is proper to that designation which is derived from ostentation. 2. But the Roman custom also makes this function serve even for business affairs.

Nam et funebres laudationes pendent frequenter ex aliquo publico officio atque ex senatus consulto magistratibus saepe mandantur, et laudare testem vel contra pertinet ad momentum iudiciorum, et ipsis etiam reis dare laudatores licet, et editi in competitores, in L. Pisonem, in Clodium et curionem libri vituperationem continent et tamen in senatu loco sunt habiti sententiae. III. Neque infitias eo quasdam esse ex hoc genere materias ad solam compositas ostentationem, ut laudes deorum virorumque quos priora tempora tulerunt.

For both funereal laudations frequently depend upon some public office and are often by senatorial decree entrusted to magistrates, and to praise a witness, or conversely to disparage him, pertains to the decisive momentum of judicial proceedings, and it is permitted even to the defendants themselves to provide laudators; and books published against competitors, against L. Piso, against Clodius and Curio, contain vituperation and yet in the senate were counted in the place of opinions. 3. Nor do I deny that certain subjects of this kind are composed for mere ostentation, such as praises of gods and of men whom earlier times have brought forth.

Quo solvitur quaestio supra tractata manifestumque est errare eos qui numquam oratorem dicturum nisi de re dubia putaverunt. IV. An laudes Capitolini Iovis, perpetua sacri certaminis materia, vel dubiae sunt vel non oratorio genere tractantur?

Whereby the question treated above is solved, and it is manifest that those err who have thought that an orator will never speak except on a doubtful matter. 4. Are the praises of Capitoline Jove, the perpetual material of a sacred contest, either doubtful, or not treated in an oratorical genre?

Vt desiderat autem laus quae negotiis adhibetur probationem, sic etiam illa quae ostentationi componitur habet interim aliquam speciem probationis, V. ut qui Romulum Martis filium educatumque a lupa dicat in argumentum caelestis ortus utatur his, quod abiectus in profluentem non potuerit extingui, quod omnia sic egerit ut genitum praeside bellorum deo incredibile non esset, quod ipsum quoque caelo receptum temporis eius homines non dubitaverint. VI. Quaedam vero etiam in defensionis speciem cadent, ut si in laude Herculis permutatum cum regina Lydiae habitum et imperata, ut traditur, pensa orator excuset. Sed proprium laudis est res amplificare et ornare.

As the praise which is applied to affairs desires proof, so also that which is composed for ostentation has meanwhile some semblance of proof, 5. so that one who says that Romulus was the son of Mars and was reared by a she‑wolf may use these points as an argument of a celestial origin: that, cast out into the outflowing stream, he could not be drowned; that he did everything in such a way that his being born under the patronage of the god who presides over wars would not be unbelievable; that the men of his time did not doubt that he himself was received into heaven. 6. Certain things indeed will even fall into the appearance of defense, as, if in the praise of Hercules the orator excuses the garb exchanged with the queen of Lydia and the prescribed spinning‑tasks, as it is handed down. But the proper mark of praise is to amplify and to adorn things.

Quae materia praecipue quidem in deos et homines cadit, est tamen et aliorum animalium, et etiam carentium anima. VII. Verum in deis generaliter primum maiestatem ipsius eorum naturae venerabimur, deinde proprie vim cuiusque et inventa quae utile aliquid hominibus attulerint.

Which matter falls principally indeed upon gods and humans, yet it is also of other animals, and even of things lacking soul. 7. But in the gods, generally, first we shall venerate the majesty of their very nature, then in particular the force of each and the inventions which have brought something useful to human beings.

VIII. Vis ostendetur ut in Iove regendorum omnium, in Marte belli, in Neptuno maris: inventa, ut artium in Minerva, Mercurio litterarum, medicinae Apolline, Cerere frugum, Libero vinI. tum si qua ab iis acta vetustas tradidit, commemoranda.

8. Power will be shown, as in Jupiter of the governing of all things, in Mars of war, in Neptune of the sea; inventions, as of the arts in Minerva, of letters in Mercury, of medicine in Apollo, of grain in Ceres, of wine in Liber. Then, if any deeds done by them antiquity has handed down, they are to be commemorated.

Addunt etiam dis honorem parentes, ut si quis sit filius Iovis, addit antiquitas, ut iis qui sunt ex Chao, progenies quoque, ut Apollo ac Diana Latonae. IX. Laudandum in quibusdam quod geniti inmortales, quibusdam quod inmortalitatem virtute sint consecuti: quod pietas principis nostri praesentium quoque temporum decus fecit.

They also add honor to the gods by [assigning] parents; thus, if anyone be a son of Jove, antiquity adds it; and to those who are from Chaos it adds progeny as well, as Apollo and Diana to Latona. 9. To be praised in some is that they were begotten immortal, in others that they have attained immortality by virtue: which our prince’s piety has made an ornament of the present times as well.

X. Magis est varia laus hominum. Nam primum dividitur in tempora, quodque ante eos fuit quoque ipsi vixerunt, in iis autem qui fato sunt functi etiam quod est insecutum. Ante hominem patria ac parentes maioresque erunt, quorum duplex tractatus est: aut enim respondisse nobilitati pulchrum erit aut humilius genus inlustrasse factis.

10. The praise of men is more varied. For, first, it is divided into times: both what was before them and the time in which they themselves lived; and, in the case of those who have fulfilled their fate, even what ensued. Before the man there will be fatherland and parents and ancestors, of whom there is a twofold treatment: for it will be beautiful to have matched one’s nobility, or to have made a humbler lineage illustrious by deeds.

XI. Illa quoque interim ex eo quod ante ipsum fuit tempore trahentur quae responsis vel auguriis futuram claritatem promiserint, ut eum qui ex Thetide natus esset maiorem patre suo futurum cecinisse dicuntur oracula. XII. Ipsius vero laus hominis ex animo et corpore et extra positis peti debet.

11. Those things also, in the meantime, will be drawn from the time that was before him, which by responses or by auguries promised future renown, as the oracles are said to have chanted that he who was born from Thetis would be destined to be greater than his father. 12. But the praise of the man himself ought to be sought from the mind and the body and from things external.

Et corporis quidem fortuitorumque cum levior, tum non uno modo tractanda est. Nam et pulchritudinem interim roburque prosequimur honore verborum, ut Homerus in Agamemnone atque Achille, interim confert admirationi multum etiam infirmitas, ut cum idem Tydea parvum sed bellatorem dicit fuisse. XIII.

And indeed the treatment of the body and of fortuitous things is both lighter and not to be handled in a single way. For at times we accompany beauty and strength with honorific words, as Homer does in Agamemnon and Achilles; at times even weakness contributes much to admiration, as when the same says that Tydeus was small but a warrior. 13.

Fortuna vero tum dignitatem adfert, ut in regibus principibusque (namque est haec materia ostendendae virtutis uberior), tum quo minores opes fuerunt, maiorem benefactis gloriam parit. Sed omnia quae extra nos bona sunt quaeque hominibus forte optigerunt non ideo laudantur quod habuerit quis ea, sed quod iis honeste sit usus. XIV.

Fortune indeed both brings dignity, as in kings and princes (for this is a more abundant material for exhibiting virtue), and, the smaller the means have been, the greater glory it begets by benefactions. But all the goods which are outside us and which by chance have befallen men are not on that account praised because someone has possessed them, but because he has used them honorably. XIV.

Nam divitiae et potentia et gratia, cum plurimum virium dent, in utramque partem certissimum faciunt morum experimentum: aut enim meliores propter haec aut peiores sumus. XV. Animi semper vera laus, sed non una per hoc opus via ducitur. Namque alias aetatis gradus gestarumque rerum ordinem sequi speciosius fuit, ut in primis annis laudaretur indoles, tum disciplinae, post hoc operum (id est factorum dictorumque) contextus, alias in species virtutum dividere laudem, fortitudinis iustitiae continentiae ceterarumque, ac singulis adsignare quae secundum quamque earum gesta erunt.

For riches and power and favor, while they give very great strength, make the most certain test of morals in either direction: for we are either better on account of these or worse. 15. The soul’s praise is always true, but through this work one is not led along a single way. For sometimes it has been more seemly to follow the stages of age and the order of things accomplished, so that in the earliest years the natural disposition be praised, then training, after this the context of works (that is, of deeds and of words), at other times to divide the praise into kinds of virtues—of fortitude, justice, continence, and the others—and to assign to each the things that have been done in accordance with each of them.

XVI. Vtra sit autem harum via utilior cum materia deliberabimus, dum sciamus gratiora esse audientibus quae solus quis aut primus aut certe cum paucis fecisse dicetur, si quid praeterea supra spem aut expectationem, praecipue quod aliena potius causa quam sua. XVII.

16. Which of these ways is more useful we shall deliberate with the material, while we know that more pleasing to the auditors are the things which someone will be said to have done alone, or first, or certainly with a few, and, moreover, anything beyond hope or expectation, especially what was for another’s cause rather than his own. 17.

Tempus quod finem hominis insequitur non semper tractare contingit, non solum quod viventes aliquando laudamus, sed quod rara haec occasio est, ut referri possint divini honores et decreta et publice statuae constitutae. XVIII. Inter quae numeraverim ingeniorum monumenta quae saeculis probarentur; nam quidam sicut Menander iustiora posterorum quam suae aetatis iudicia sunt consecuti.

The time which follows a man’s end does not always fall to be treated, not only because we sometimes praise the living, but because this is a rare occasion, that divine honors and decrees and statues set up publicly can be recounted. 18. Among these I would number monuments of genius that are approved by the ages; for certain men, like Menander, have obtained judgments of posterity more just than those of their own age.

Adferunt laudem liberi parentibus, urbes conditoribus, leges latoribus, artes inventoribus, nec non instituta quoque auctoribus, ut a Numa traditum deos colere, a publicola fasces populo summittere.

Children bring praise to parents, cities to founders, laws to law-bearers (legislators), arts to inventors, and likewise institutions also to their authors, as the tradition to worship the gods from Numa, and to lower the fasces to the people from publicola.

XIX. Qui omnis etiam in vituperatione ordo constabit, tantum in diversum. Nam et turpitudo generis opprobrio multis fuit et quosdam claritas ipsa notiores circa vitia et invisos magis fecit, et in quibusdam, ut in Paride traditur, est praedicta pernicies, et corporis ac fortunae quibusdam mala contemptum, sicut Thersitae atque Iro, quibusdam bona vitiis corrupta odium attulerunt, XX. ut Nirea inbellem, Plisthenen inpudicum a poetis accepimus, et animi totidem vitia quot virtutes sunt, nec minus quam in laudibus duplici ratione tractantur; et post mortem adiecta quibusdam ignominia est, ut Maelio, cuius domus solo aequata, Marcoque Manlio, cuius praenomen e familia in posterum exemptum est.

19. The whole order will obtain also in vituperation, only in the opposite. For both the turpitude of lineage has been an opprobrium to many, and the very celebrity has made certain men more notorious around their vices and more hated, and in some, as is related of Paris, perdition was pre-dicted; and to some, the evils of body and of fortune brought contempt, as to Thersites and Irus, to some, good things corrupted by vices brought hatred, 20. as we have received from the poets Nireus as unwarlike, Plisthenes as impudent, and there are just as many vices of the mind as there are virtues, and they are treated no less than in praises by a double method; and after death ignominy has been added to some, as to Maelius, whose house was leveled to the ground, and to Marcus Manlius, whose praenomen was removed from the family for the time to come.

XXI. Et parentes malorum odimus: et est conditoribus urbium infame contraxisse aliquam perniciosam ceteris gentem, qualis est primus Iudaicae superstitionis auctor: et Gracchorum leges invisae: et si quod est exemplum deforme posteris traditum, quale libidinis vir Perses in muliere Samia instituere ausus dicitur primus. XXII.

21. And we hate the parents of evils: and for founders of cities it is infamous to have contracted some nation pernicious to the rest, such as is the first author of the Judaic superstition: and the laws of the Gracchi are odious: and if there is any example deformed handed down to posterity, such as of lust which a Persian man is said to have been the first to dare to institute with a Samian woman. 22.

Sed in viventibus quoque iudicia hominum velut argumenta sunt morum, et honos aut ignominia veram esse laudem vel vituperationem probat.

But in those living as well, the judgments of men are, as it were, arguments of mores, and honor or ignominy proves that the praise or vituperation is true.

XXIII. Interesse tamen Aristoteles putat ubi quidque laudetur aut vituperetur. Nam plurimum refert qui sint audientium mores, quae publice recepta persuasio, ut illa maxime quae probant esse in eo qui laudabitur credant, aut in eo contra quem dicemus ea quae oderunt: ita non dubium erit iudicium quod orationem praecesserit.

23. Nevertheless Aristotle thinks it makes a difference where each thing is lauded or vituperated. For it matters very much what the mores of the hearers are, what the publicly received persuasion is, so that they may believe especially those things which they approve to be in him who will be lauded, or, in him against whom we shall speak, those things which they hate: thus the judgment which has preceded the oration will not be in doubt.

XXIV. Ipsorum etiam permiscenda laus semper (nam id benivolos facit), quotiens autem fieri poterit, cum materiae utilitate iungenda. Minus Lacedaemone studia litterarum quam Athenis honoris merebuntur, plus patientia ac fortitudo.

24. Their own praise, too, must always be intermingled (for that makes them benevolent), and whenever it can be done, it should be joined with the utility of the subject-matter. In Lacedaemon the pursuits of letters will deserve less honor than at Athens, but patience and fortitude more.

Rapto vivere quibusdam honestum, aliis cura legum. Frugalitas apud Sybaritas forsitan odio foret, veteribus Romanis summum luxuria crimen. Eadem in singulis differentia.

For some, to live by rapine is honorable; for others, it is care for the laws. Frugality among the Sybarites perhaps would be hateful; to the ancient Romans, luxury was the highest crime. The same difference exists in individuals.

XXV. Maxime favet iudex qui sibi dicentem adsentari putat. Idem praecipit illud quoque, quod mox Cornelius Celsus prope supra modum invasit, quia sit quaedam virtutibus ac vitiis vicinitas, utendum proxima derivatione verborum, ut pro temerario fortem, prodigo liberalem, avaro parcum vocemus: quae eadem etiam contra valent.

25. The judge most favors the one whom he thinks is assenting to him as he speaks. He also prescribes that same point which later Cornelius Celsus pressed almost beyond measure: because there is a certain vicinity between virtues and vices, one should use the nearest derivation of words, so that instead of “rash” we call him “brave,” instead of “prodigal” “liberal,” instead of “avaricious” “sparing”; and these same devices also hold in reverse.

Quod quidem orator, id est vir bonus, numquam faciet, nisi forte communi utilitate ducetur.

Which indeed the orator, that is, a good man, will never do, unless perhaps he will be led by the common utility.

XXVI. Laudantur autem urbes similiter atque homines. Nam pro parente est conditor, et multum auctoritatis adfert vetustas, ut iis qui terra dicuntur orti, et virtutes ac vitia circa res gestas eadem quae in singulis: illa propria quae ex loci positione ac munitione sunt.

26. Moreover, cities are praised similarly to human beings. For the founder stands in place of a parent, and antiquity brings much authority, as with those who are said to be sprung from the earth; and the virtues and vices about their exploits are the same as in individuals: those things are proper which arise from the position of the place and its fortification.

Cives illis ut hominibus liberi sunt decori. XXVII. Est laus et operum, in quibus honor utilitas pulchritudo auctor spectari solet: honor ut in templis, utilitas ut in muris, pulchritudo vel auctor utrubique.

Citizens are to them an adornment, as children are to men. 27. There is praise also of works, in which honor, utility, beauty, and authority are wont to be viewed: honor as in temples, utility as in walls, and beauty or authority in both places.

Est et locorum, qualis Siciliae apud Ciceronem: in quibus similiter speciem et utilitatem intuemur, speciem maritimis planis amoenis, utilitatem salubribus fertilibus. Erit et dictorum honestorum factorumque laus generalis, erit et rerum omnis modi. XXVIII.

There is also praise of places, such as that of Sicily in Cicero; in which we similarly contemplate both appearance and utility: appearance in maritime, level, pleasant plains; utility in healthful and fertile ones. There will also be a general praise of honorable sayings and deeds, and there will be also of things of every kind. 28.

Nam et somni et mortis scriptae laudes et quorundam a medicis ciborum.

For there are also written praises of sleep and of death, and of certain foods by physicians.

Itaque, ut non consensi hoc laudativum genus circa solam versari honesti quaestionem, sic qualitate maxime contineri puto, quamquam tres status omnes cadere in hoc opus possint, iisque usum C. Caesarem in vituperando Catone notaverit Cicero. Totum autem habet aliquid simile suasoriis, quia plerumque eadem illic suaderi, hic laudari solent.

And so, just as I have not consented that this laudatory genus revolves around the question of the honorable alone, so I think it is chiefly contained under quality, although all three statuses can fall into this work, and Cicero has noted that C. Caesar used them in vituperating Cato. The whole, moreover, has something similar to the suasories, because for the most part the same things are there urged, here are wont to be praised.

[8] I. Deliberativas quoque miror a quibusdam sola utilitate finitas. Ac si quid in his unum sequi oporteret, potior fuisset apud me Ciceronis sententia, qui hoc materiae genus dignitate maxime contineri putat. Nec dubito quin ii qui sunt in illa priore sententia secundum opinionem pulcherrimam ne utile quidem nisi quod honestum esset existimarint.

[8] 1. I also marvel that deliberatives are by some limited to utility alone. And if in these one thing had to be followed, the opinion of Cicero would have been preferable with me, who thinks that this genus of material is most of all contained by dignity. Nor do I doubt that those who are in that former opinion, according to a most beautiful opinion, have esteemed not even the useful to be such except what was honest.

II. Et est haec ratio verissima, si consilium contingat semper bonorum atque sapientium. Verum apud imperitos, apud quos frequenter dicenda sententia est, populumque praecipue, qui ex pluribus constat indoctis, discernenda sunt haec et secundum communes magis intellectus loquendum. III.

2. And this ratio is most true, if counsel should always fall to the good and the wise. But among the inexpert, among whom a sententia must often be delivered, and especially the populace, which consists of many unlearned, these things must be discerned, and one must speak according to the more common intellects. 3.

sunt enim multi qui etiam quae credunt honesta non tamen satis eadem utilia quoque existiment, quae turpia esse dubitare non possunt utilitatis specie ducti probent, ut foedus Numantinum iugumque Caudinum.

for there are many who, even the things they believe to be honorable, nevertheless do not sufficiently judge the same to be also useful; and things which they cannot doubt are shameful they approve, led by the appearance of utility, such as the Numantine treaty and the Caudine yoke.

IV. Ne qualitatis quidem statu, in quo et honestorum et utilium quaestio est, complecti eas satis est. Nam frequenter in his etiam coniecturae locus est: nonnumquam tractatur aliqua finitio, aliquando etiam legales possunt incidere tractatus, in privata maxime consilia, si quando ambigetur an liceat. V. De coniectura paulo post pluribus.

4. Nor is it enough to embrace them even under the status of quality, in which the question concerns both the honorable and the useful. For often in these too there is room for conjecture; sometimes some definition is treated, sometimes even legal discussions can arise, especially in private deliberations, if ever it is in doubt whether it is licit. 5. On conjecture, a little later, at greater length.

Interim est finitio apud Demosthenen "det Halonnesum Philippus an reddat", apud Ciceronem in Philippicis "quid sit tumultus". Quid? non illa similis iudicialium quaestio de statua Servi Sulpici, "an iis demum ponenda sit qui in legatione ferro sunt interempti"? VI. Ergo pars deliberativa, quae eadem suasoria dicitur, de tempore futuro consultans quaerit etiam de praeterito. Officiis constat duobus suadendi ac dissuadendi.

Meanwhile, there is a definition with Demosthenes, “whether Philip should give Halonnesus or give it back,” and with Cicero in the Philippics, “what a tumult is.” What? Is not that similar judicial question about the statue of Servius Sulpicius, “whether it should be set up only for those who were slain by the sword while on an embassy”? 6. Therefore the deliberative part, which is likewise called the suasoria, while consulting about future time, also inquires about the past. It consists of two offices: of persuading and of dissuading.

Prohoemio quale est in iudicialibus non ubique eget, quia conciliatus est ei quisque quem consulit. Initium tamen quodcumque debet habere aliquam prohoemii speciem; neque enim abrupte nec unde libuit incipiendum, quia est aliquid in omni materia naturaliter primum. VII.

A proem of the sort used in judicial cases is not needed everywhere, since everyone whom one consults is already won over to him. Nevertheless, whatever the beginning, it ought to have some semblance of a proem; for one must not begin abruptly nor from wherever one pleases, since in every subject there is something naturally first. 7.

In senatu et utique in contionibus eadem ratio quae apud iudices adquirendae sibi plerumque eorum apud quos dicendum sit benivolentiae. Nec mirum, cum etiam in panegyricis petatur audientium favor, ubi emolumentum non utilitate aliqua, sed in sola laude consistit. VIII.

In the senate, and indeed in assemblies, the same rationale as before judges holds: for the most part one must acquire for oneself the benevolence of those before whom one is to speak. Nor is it a wonder, since even in panegyrics the favor of the hearers is sought, where the emolument consists not in any utility, but in praise alone. 8.

Aristoteles quidem, nec sine causa, putat et a nostra et ab eius qui dissentiet persona duci frequenter in consiliis exordium, quasi mutuantibus hoc nobis a iudiciali genere, nonnumquam etiam ut minor res maiorve videatur: in demonstrativis vero prohoemia esse maxime libera existimat: IX. nam et longe a materia duci, ut in Helenae laude Isocrates fecerit, et ex aliqua rei vicinia, ut idem in Panegyrico, cum queritur plus honoris corporum quam animorum virtutibus dari, et Gorgias in Olympico laudans eos qui primi tales instituerint conventus. Quos secutus videlicet C. Sallustius in bello Iugurthino et Catilinae nihil ad historiam pertinentibus principiis orsus est.

Aristotle indeed, and not without cause, thinks that in deliberative matters the exordium is frequently drawn both from our own person and from the person of him who will dissent, as if we were borrowing this from the judicial genus, sometimes also so that the lesser thing may seem greater or the greater lesser: but in demonstratives he judges proems to be most free: 9. for both it may be drawn far from the subject, as Isocrates did in the Praise of Helen, and from some vicinity of the matter, as the same man in the Panegyricus, when he complains that more honor is given to the virtues of bodies than of minds, and Gorgias in the Olympicus, praising those who first established such gatherings. Following these, evidently, C. Sallustius, in the Jugurthine War and in the Catiline, began with beginnings that pertain nothing to history.

X. Sed nunc ad suasoriam: in qua, etiam cum prohoemio utemur, breviore tamen et velut quodam capite tantum et initio debebimus esse contenti. Narrationem vero numquam exigit privata deliberatio, eius dumtaxat rei de qua dicenda sententia est, quia nemo ignorat id de quo consulit. XI. Extrinsecus possunt pertinentia ad deliberationem multa narrari.

10. But now to the suasoria: in which, even when we use a proem, we ought nevertheless to be content with a briefer one, and, as it were, with a certain mere heading and beginning. A narration, however, private deliberation never requires—at most only of the matter about which an opinion is to be stated—since no one is ignorant of that about which he consults. 11. From outside, many things pertinent to the deliberation can be narrated.

In contionibus saepe est etiam illa quae ordinem rei docet necessaria. XII. Adfectus ut quae maxime postulat: nam et concitanda et lenienda frequenter est ira, et ad metum cupiditatem odium conciliationem inpellendi animI.

In public assemblies, that which teaches the order of the matter is often likewise necessary. 12. The passions demand it most of all: for anger must frequently be both stirred up and soothed, and minds must be impelled toward fear, desire, hatred, reconciliation.

Nonnumquam etiam movenda miseratio, sive ut auxilium obsessis feratur suadere oportebit, sive sociae civitatis eversionem deflebimus. Valet autem in consiliis auctoritas plurimum. XIII.

Sometimes also compassion must be stirred, whether it will be fitting to urge that aid be brought to the besieged, or we shall lament the overthrow of an allied city. Authority, moreover, has very great weight in counsels. 13.

Nam et prudentissimus esse haberique et optimus debet qui sententiae suae de utilibus atque honestis credere omnes velit. In iudiciis enim vulgo fas habetur indulgere aliquid studio suo: consilia nemo est qui neget secundum mores dari.

For he ought both to be, and to be held, most prudent and best, who would wish all to trust his opinion concerning the useful and the honest. For in judgments it is commonly held right to indulge something to one’s own zeal; as for counsels, there is no one who denies that they are given according to mores.

XIV. Graecorum quidem plurimi omne hoc officium contionale esse iudicaverunt et in sola rei publicae administratione posuerunt; quin et Cicero in hac maxime parte versatur. Ideoque suasuris de pace bello copiis operibus vectigalibus haec duo esse praecipue nota voluit, vires civitatis et mores, ut ex natura cum ipsarum rerum, tum audientium ratio suadendi duceretur.

14. Indeed, very many of the Greeks judged all this office to be contional and placed it solely in the administration of the republic; nay, even Cicero moves chiefly in this part. And therefore, for those about to advise concerning peace, war, forces, public works, and revenues, he wished these two things to be especially noted: the strength of the state and its mores, so that the method of persuading might be derived from the nature both of the things themselves and of the hearers.

XV. Nobis maior in re videtur varietas; nam et consultantium et consiliorum plura sunt genera.

15. To us the variety in the matter seems greater; for there are more kinds both of those consulting and of counsels.

Quare in suadendo ac dissuadendo tria primum spectanda erunt: quid sit de quo deliberetur, qui sint qui deliberent, qui sit qui suadeat. XVI. Rem de qua deliberatur aut certum est posse fieri aut incertum.

Wherefore, in suading and dissuading three things must first be looked to: what the thing is about which there is deliberation, who are those who deliberate, who is the one who suades. 16. The matter about which there is deliberation is either certain to be able to be done or uncertain.

Si incertum, haec erit quaestio sola aut potentissima; saepe enim accidet ut prius dicamus ne si possit quidem fieri esse faciendum, deinde fieri non posse. cum autem de hoc quaeritur, coniectura est: an Isthmos intercidi, an siccari palus Pomptina, an portus fieri Ostiae possit, an Alexander terras ultra Oceanum sit inventurus. XVII.

If it is uncertain, this will be the only or the most potent question; for it will often happen that we first say that even if it could be done it ought not to be done, then that it cannot be done. But when this is inquired into, it is conjecture: whether the Isthmus can be cut through, whether the Pomptine marsh can be dried, whether a harbor can be made at Ostia, whether Alexander is going to discover lands beyond the Ocean. 17.

Sed in iis quoque quae constabit posse fieri coniectura aliquando erit, si quaeretur an utique futurum sit ut Carthaginem superent Romani, ut redeat Hannibal si Scipio exercitum in Africam transtulerit, ut servent fidem Samnites si Romani arma deposuerint. Quaedam et fieri posse et futura esse credibile est, sed aut alio tempore aut alio loco aut alio modo.

But even in those matters which it will stand established can be done, there will sometimes be conjecture, if it is asked whether it will assuredly be going to happen that the Romans will overcome Carthage, that Hannibal will return if Scipio shall have transferred the army into Africa, that the Samnites will keep faith if the Romans shall have laid down their arms. Certain things are credible both to be able to be done and to be going to occur, but either at another time or in another place or in another mode.

XVIII. Vbi coniecturae non erit locus, alia sunt intuenda. Et primum aut propter ipsam rem de qua sententiae rogantur consultabitur, aut propter alias intervenientes extrinsecus causas.

18. Where there will be no place for conjecture, other things are to be looked to. And first, either there will be consultation on account of the thing itself about which opinions are being asked, or on account of other extrinsic causes intervening from without.

Propter ipsam: "deliberant patres conscripti an stipendium militi constituant". XIX. Haec materia simplex erit. Accedunt causae aut faciendi (ut "deliberant patres conscripti an Fabios dedant Gallis bellum minitantibus") aut non faciendi: "deliberat C. Caesar an perseveret in Germaniam ire cum milites passim testamenta facerent". XX. Hae suasoriae duplices sunt.

On account of the thing itself: "the conscript fathers deliberate whether they should establish a stipend for the soldier." 19. This material will be simple. Causes are added either of doing (for example, "the conscript fathers deliberate whether they should surrender the Fabii to the Gauls threatening war") or of not doing: "C. Caesar deliberates whether he should persevere in going into Germany, when the soldiers everywhere were making wills." 20. These suasories are twofold.

Nam et illic causa deliberandi est quod bellum Galli minitentur, esse tamen potest quaestio dedendine fuerint etiam citra hanc denuntiationem qui contra fas, cum legati missi essent, proelium inierint, regemque ad quem mandata acceperant trucidarint: XXI. et hic nihil Caesar sine dubio deliberaret nisi propter hanc militum perturbationem, est tamen locus quaerendi an citra hunc quoque casum penetrandum in Germaniam fuerit. Semper autem de eo prius loquemur de quo deliberari etiam detractis sequentibus possit.

For there too there is a cause for deliberating, because the Gauls threaten war; yet there can be a question whether they ought to have been surrendered even apart from this denunciation—they who, against divine law, when ambassadors had been sent, entered into battle and butchered the king to whom they had received mandates to deliver. 21. And here Caesar would without doubt be deliberating about nothing except on account of this perturbation of the soldiers; yet there is room for inquiry whether, even apart from this occurrence, it ought to have been penetrated into Germany. However, we shall always speak first about that concerning which deliberation can be had even with the subsequent considerations removed.

XXII. Partes suadendi quidam putaverunt honestum utile necessarium. Ego non invenio huic tertiae locum.

22. Some have thought the parts of advising to be the honorable, the useful, and the necessary. I do not find a place for this third.

Quantalibet enim vis ingruat, aliquid fortasse pati necesse sit, nihil facere, de faciendo autem deliberatur. XXIII. Quod si hanc vocant necessitatem in quam homines graviorum metu coguntur, utilitatis erit quaestio, ut si obsessi et inpares et aqua ciboque defecti de facienda ad hostem deditione deliberent et dicatur "necesse est"; nempe sequitur ut hoc subiciatur: "alioqui pereundum est": ita propter id ipsum non est necesse, quia perire potius licet; denique non fecerunt Saguntini nec in rate Opitergina circumventi.

For however great a force may assail, it may perhaps be necessary to suffer something, to do nothing; but about doing one deliberates. 23. But if they call this “necessity,” into which men are compelled by fear of graver things, it will be a question of utility, as when men besieged, overmatched, and deprived of water and food deliberate about making a surrender to the enemy and it is said “it is necessary”; clearly it follows that this is subjoined: “otherwise one must perish”: thus on account of that very thing it is not necessary, because it is permitted rather to perish; finally, the Saguntines did not do it, nor did those surrounded on the Opitergine raft.

XXIV. Igitur in his quoque causis aut de sola utilitate ambigetur aut quaestio inter utile atque honestum habet ducere uxorem. Quis dubitat?

24. Therefore in these cases too, either the doubt will be only about utility, or the question between the useful and the honorable concerns taking a wife. Who doubts?

Sed ei qui pater vult fieri liqueat necesse est uxorem esse ducendam. XXV. Itaque mihi ne consilium quidem videtur ubi necessitas est, non magis quam ubi constat quid fieri non posse: omnis enim deliberatio de dubiis est.

But for him who wishes to become a father, it is clear that a wife must be taken. 25. And so, to me, there does not even seem to be counsel where there is necessity, any more than where it is established that something cannot be done: for every deliberation is about doubtful things.

Melius igitur qui tertiam partem duxerunt dynaton, quod nostri "possibile" nominant: quae ut dura videatur appellatio, tamen sola est. XXVI. Quas partes non omnes in omnem cadere suasoriam manifestius est quam ut docendum dum sit.

Better, therefore, are those who have taken as the third part the dynaton, which our people nominate “possible”: which, although the appellation may seem hard, yet it alone is. 26. That not all these parts fall into every suasoria is more manifest than that it should have to be taught.

Tamen apud plerosque earum numerus augetur: a quibus ponuntur ut partes quae superiorum species sunt partium. Nam fas iustum pium aecum, mansuetum quoque (sic enim sunt interpretati to hemeron), et si qua adhuc adicere quis eiusdem generis velit, subici possunt honestati. XXVII.

However, among the majority the number of them is increased: by whom there are set down as parts those which are species of the preceding parts. For fas, the just, the pious, the equitable, and the gentle as well (for thus they have interpreted to hemeron), and whatever else anyone should still wish to add of the same kind, can be placed under honesty. 27.

An sit autem facile, magnum, iuctindum, sine periculo, ad quaestionem pertinet utilitatis. Qui loci oriuntur ex contradictione: est quidem utile sed difficile parvum iniucundum periculosum. XXVIII.

Whether it be easy, great, pleasant, without peril, pertains to the question of utility. The topics which arise from contradiction: it is indeed useful but difficult, small, unpleasant, dangerous. 28.

Tamen quibusdam videtur esse nonnumquam de iucunditate sola consultatio, ut si de aedificando theatro, instituendis ludis deliberetur. Sed neminem adeo solutum luxu puto ut nihil in causa suadendi sequatur praeter voluptatem. XXIX.

Nevertheless, to some it seems that sometimes the consultation is about jucundity alone, as if there were deliberation about building a theater, and about the instituting of games. But I think no one is so loosened by luxury that he follows nothing, in the matter of advising, except pleasure. 29.

Praecedat enim semper aliquid necesse est, ut in ludis honor deorum, in theatro non inutilis laborum remissio, deformis et incommoda turbae, si id non sit, conflictatio, et nihilo minus eadem illa religio, cum theatrum veluti quoddam illius sacri templum vocabimus. XXX. Saepe vero et utilitatem despiciendam esse dicimus ut honesta faciamus (ut cum illis Opiterginis damus consilium ne se hostibus dedant, quamquam perituri sint nisi fecerint) et utilia honestis praeferimus, ut cum suademus ut bello punico servi armentur.

For indeed it is necessary that something always go before: as in the games, the honor of the gods; in the theater, a not useless remission from labors; if that is not present, a conflict of the crowd, unsightly and inconvenient; and nonetheless that same religion, since we will call the theater as it were a certain temple of that sacred rite. 30. Often indeed we also say that utility must be despised so that we may do honorable things (as when we give counsel to those Opitergines not to surrender themselves to the enemies, although they will perish unless they do), and we prefer useful things to honorable ones, as when we advise that in the Punic War slaves be armed.

XXXI. Sed tamen neque hic plane concedendum est esse id inhonestum (liberos enim natura omnis et isdem constare elementis, et fortasse antiquis etiam nobilibus ortos dici potest), et illic, ubi manifestum periculum est, opponenda alia, ut crudelius etiam perituros adfirmemus si se dediderint, sive hostis non servarit fidem, sive Caesar vicerit, quod est vero similius. XXXII.

31. Yet nevertheless neither here should it plainly be conceded that that is dishonorable (for by nature all are free and consist of the same elements, and perhaps may even be said to have sprung from ancient nobles), and there, where manifest peril is, other considerations must be set in opposition, so that we affirm they will perish more cruelly if they surrender, whether the enemy does not keep faith, or Caesar should be the victor, which is more likely. 32.

Haec autem quae tantum inter se pugnant plerumque nominibus deflecti solent. Nam et utilitas ipsa expugnatur ab iis qui dicunt non solum potiora esse honesta quam utilia, sed ne utilia quidem esse quae non sint honesta: et contra, quod nos honestum, illi vanum, ambitiosum, stolidum verbis quam re probabilius vocant. XXXIII.

But these things, which so greatly clash among themselves, are for the most part accustomed to be deflected by names. For even “utility” itself is assailed by those who say not only that honorable things are preferable to useful things, but that things which are not honorable are not even useful; and conversely, what we call honorable, they call vain, ambitious, and stolid—more plausibly in words than in reality. 33.

Nec tantum inutilibus comparantur utilia, sed inter se quoque ipsa, ut si ex duobus eligamus, in altero quid sit magis, in altero quid sit minus. Crescit hoc adhuc; nam interim triplices etiam suasoriae incidunt, ut cum Pompeius deliberabat Parthos an Africam an Aegyptum peteret. Ita non tantum utrum melius sed quid sit optimum quaeritur, itemque contra.

Nor are useful things compared only with useless ones, but also among themselves, so that if we choose between two, we consider what there is more of in the one, what less in the other. This grows further still; for sometimes even threefold deliberations (suasoriae) occur, as when Pompey was deliberating whether to seek the Parthians, or Africa, or Egypt. Thus the inquiry is not only which is better but what is best, and likewise conversely.

XXXIV. Nec umquam incidet in hoc genere materiae dubitatio rei quae undique secundum nos sit; nam ubi contradictioni locus non est, quae potest esse causa dubitandi? Ita fere omnis suasoria nihil est aliud quam comparatio, videndumque quid consecuturi simus et per quid, ut aestimari possit plus in eo quod petimus sit commodi, an vero in eo per quod petimus incommodi.

34. Nor will there ever arise, in this kind of material, a doubt about a matter which is on every side favorable to us; for where there is no place for contradiction, what cause can there be for doubting? Thus almost every suasory is nothing else than a comparison, and it must be seen what we shall obtain and by what means, so that it may be estimated whether there is more of advantage in that which we seek, or indeed more of disadvantage in that by which we seek it.

XXXV. Est utilitatis et in tempore quaestio: "expedit, sed non nunc", et in loco: "non hic", et in persona: "non nobis", "non contra hos", et in genere agendi: "non sic", et in modo: "non in tantum".

35. There is also a question of expediency in respect to time: "it is expedient, but not now," and to place: "not here," and to the person: "not for us," "not against these," and to the kind of action: "not thus," and to the degree: "not to such an extent."

Sed personam saepius decoris gratia intuemur: quae et in nobis et in iis qui deliberant spectanda est. XXXVI. Itaque quamvis exempla plurimum in consiliis possint, quia facillime ad consentiendum homines ducuntur experimentis, refert tamen quorum auctoritas et quibus adhibeatur: diversi sunt enim deliberantium animi, duplex condicio.

But we more often look to the persona for the sake of decorum: which must be considered both in ourselves and in those who deliberate. 36. Therefore, although examples can have very great power in counsels, because men are most easily led to consenting by experiments, it nevertheless matters whose authority it is and to whom it is applied: for the minds of those deliberating are diverse, the condition is twofold.

XXXVII. Nam consultant aut plures aut singuli, sed in utrisque differentia, quia et in pluribus multum interest senatus sit an populus, Romani an Fidenates, Graeci an barbari, et in singulis Catoni petendos honores suadeamus an C. Mario, de ratione belli Scipio prior an Fabius deliberet. XXXVIII.

37. For those who consult are either many or individuals, but in both there is a difference, since among many it makes much difference whether it be a senate or a people, Romans or Fidenates, Greeks or barbarians; and among individuals, whether we should urge Cato or Gaius Marius to seek honors, whether Scipio the Elder or Fabius should deliberate about the rationale of war. 38.

Proinde intuenda sexus dignitas aetas; sed mores praecipue discrimen dabunt. Et honesta quidem honestis suadere facillimum est; si vero apud turpes recta optinere conabimur, ne videamur exprobrare diversam vitae sectam cavendum, XXXIX. et animus deliberantis non ipsa honesti natura, quam ille non respicit, permovendus, sed laude, vulgi opinione, et, si parum proficiet haec vanitas, secutura ex his utilitate, aliquanto vero magis obiciendo aliquos, si diversa fecerint, metus.

Accordingly the sex, dignity, and age must be considered; but character will especially give the discriminating mark. And indeed to persuade honorable things to the honorable is most easy; but if we shall try to secure the right among the base, we must beware lest we seem to reproach a different way of life, 39. and the mind of the deliberator must be moved not by the very nature of the honorable, which he does not regard, but by praise, by the opinion of the crowd, and, if this vanity shall profit too little, by the utility to follow from these—yet considerably more by setting before him certain fears, if they should do otherwise.

XL. Nam praeter id, quod his levissimi cuiusque animus facillime terretur nescio an etiam naturaliter apud plurimos plus valeat malorum timor quam spes bonorum, sicut facilior eisdem turpium quam honestorum intellectus est. XLI. Aliquando bonis quoque suadentur parum decora, dantur parum bonis consilia in quibus ipsorum qui consulunt spectatur utilitas.

40. For besides this, that the mind of each most frivolous person is most easily terrified, I do not know whether even naturally among the majority the fear of evils prevails more than the hope of goods, just as for these same people the understanding of shameful things is easier than of honest things. 41. Sometimes things somewhat unseemly are urged even upon good men; counsels are given to the not‑so‑good in which the utility of the advisers themselves is regarded.

Nec me fallit quae statim cogitatio subire possit legentem: hoc ergo praecipis et hoc fas putas? XLII. Poterat me liberare Cicero, qui ita scribit ad Brutum, praepositis plurimis quae honeste suaderi Caesari possint: "Simne bonus vir si haec suadeam?

Nor does the thought escape me which can immediately occur to the reader: do you then prescribe this and think this lawful? 42. Cicero could have freed me, who thus writes to Brutus, with very many things set forth which can be honorably advised to Caesar: "Am I a good man if I should advise these things?

Minime. suasoris enim finis est utilitas eius cui quisque suadet. At recta sunt: quis negat?

By no means. For the end of a suader is the utility of him to whom each one suades. But they are right: who denies it?

Sed non est semper rectis in suadendo locus". Sed quia est altior quaestio nec tantum ad suasorias pertinet, destinatus est mihi hic locus duodecimo, qui summus futurus est, libro. XLIII. Nec ego quicquam fieri turpiter velim.

"But there is not always a place for the right in advising." But because it is a higher question and pertains not only to suasories, this topic has been assigned by me to the twelfth book, which will be the last. 43. Nor would I wish anything to be done disgracefully.

Verum interim haec vel ad scholarum exercitationes pertinere credantur: nam et iniquorum ratio noscenda est, ut melius aequa tueamur. XLIV. Interim si quis bono inhonesta suadebit, meminerit non suadere tamquam inhonesta, ut quidam declamatores Sextum Pompeium ad piraticam propter hoc ipsum, quod turpis et crudelis sit, inpellunt, sed dandus illis deformibus color idque etiam apud malos: neque enim quisquam est tam malus ut videri velit.

But meanwhile let these things be believed to pertain even to the exercises of the schools: for the reasoning of the iniquitous must be known, that we may the better defend the equitable. 44. Meanwhile, if anyone will persuade dishonorable things to a good man, let him remember not to urge them as dishonorable, as certain declaimers impel Sextus Pompeius to piracy for this very reason, that it is base and cruel; but a coloring must be given to those deformed things, and that even among the wicked: for no one is so evil as to wish to seem so.

XLV. Sic Catilina apud Sallustium loquitur ut rem scelestissimam non malitia sed indignatione videatur audere, sic Atreus apud Varium "iam fero" inquit "infandissima, iam facere cogor". Quanto magis eis quibus cura famae fuit conservandus est hic vel ambitus. XLVI.

45. Thus Catiline in Sallust speaks so that he seems to dare a most nefarious deed not from malice but from indignation, thus Atreus in Varius says, "now I endure the most unspeakable things, now I am compelled to do them." How much more should this very circumlocution be preserved for those to whom care of reputation has been a concern. 46.

Quare et cum Ciceroni dabimus consilium ut Antonium roget, vel etiam ut Philippicas, ita vitam pollicente eo, exurat, non cupiditatem lucis adlegabimus (haec enim si valet in animo eius, tacentibus quoque nobis valet), XLVII. sed ut se rei publicae servet hortabimur - hac illi opus est occasione, ne eum talium precum pudeat: et C. Caesari suadentes regnum adfirmabimus stare iam rem publicam nisi uno regente non posse. Nam qui de re nefaria deliberat id solum quaerit, quo modo quam minimum peccare videatur.

Wherefore, even when we give Cicero the counsel to ask Antony, or even to burn the Philippics, with him promising life on that condition, we will not allege a desire for the light (for if this has force in his spirit, it has force even with us keeping silent), 47. but we will exhort him to preserve himself for the republic — this occasion he needs, lest he be ashamed of such prayers: and, advising Gaius Caesar to the kingship, we will affirm that now the republic cannot stand unless with one ruling. For he who deliberates about a nefarious matter seeks only how he may seem to sin as little as possible.

XLVIII. Multum refert etiam quae sit persona suadentis, quia, ante acta vita si inlustris fuit aut clarius genus aut aetas aut fortuna adfert expectationem, providendum est ne quae dicuntur ab eo qui dicit dissentiant. At his contraria summissiorem quendam modum postulant.

48. It matters much also what the persona of the persuader is; for if the previously-acted life has been illustrious, or a more renowned lineage, or age, or fortune brings expectation, care must be taken that the things which are said do not dissent from the one who says them. But things contrary to these demand a certain more submissive manner.

Nam quae in aliis libertas est, in aliis licentia vocatur, et quibusdam sufficit auctoritas, quosdam ratio ipsa aegre tuetur.

For what is liberty in some is called license in others, and for some authority suffices, others reason itself scarcely protects.

XLIX. Ideoque longe mihi difficillimae videntur prosopopoeiae, in quibus ad relicum suasoriae laborem accedit etiam personae difficultas: namque idem illud aliter Caesar, aliter Cicero, aliter Cato suadere debebit. Vtilissima vero haec exercitatio, vel quod duplicis est operis vel quod poetis quoque aut historiarum futuris scriptoribus plurimum confert: verum et oratoribus necessaria.

49. And therefore prosopopoeias seem to me by far the most difficult, in which, in addition to the remaining labor of the suasory, there comes also the difficulty of the persona: for the same point will have to be urged one way by Caesar, another by Cicero, another by Cato. Most useful indeed is this exercise, both because it is a double work and because it contributes very much also to poets or to future writers of histories; indeed it is necessary for orators as well.

L. Nam sunt multae a Graecis Latinisque compositae orationes quibus alii uterentur, ad quorum condicionem vitamque aptanda quae dicebantur fuerunt. An eodem modo cogitavit aut eandem personam induit Cicero cum scriberet Cn. Pompeio et cum T. Ampio ceterisve, ac non unius cuiusque eorum fortunam, dignitatem, res gestas intuitus omnium quibus vocem dabat etiam imaginem expressit, ut melius quidem sed tamen ipsi dicere viderentur? LI. Neque enim minus vitiosa est oratio si ab homine quam si a re cui accommodari debuit dissidet.

50. For there are many orations composed by Greeks and Latins which others would use, to whose condition and way of life the things said had to be adapted. Did Cicero think in the same way or put on the same persona when he wrote to Cn. Pompeius and when to T. Ampius or to the others, and did he not, having looked to the fortune, dignity, and deeds (res gestae) of each one of them, also express the image of all to whom he was giving a voice, so that, indeed better, but yet they themselves seemed to be speaking? 51. For an oration is no less faulty if it differs from the person than if it differs from the matter to which it ought to have been accommodated.

Ideoque Lysias optime videtur in iis quae scribebat indoctis servasse veritatis fidem. Enimvero praecipue declamatoribus considerandum est quid cuique personae conveniat, qui paucissimas controversias ita dicunt ut advocati: plerumque filii patres divites senes asperi lenes avari, denique superstitiosi timidi derisores fiunt, ut vix comoediarum actoribus plures habitus in pronuntiando concipiendi sint quam his in dicendo. LII.

And so Lysias seems best to have preserved the faith of truth for the unlearned in those things which he wrote. Indeed, above all, declaimers must consider what is fitting for each persona, who very rarely plead controversies in such a way as advocates: for the most part they become sons, fathers, rich men, old men, harsh, gentle, avaricious; finally, superstitious, timid, mockers, so that scarcely do actors of comedies have more roles to be conceived in delivery than these have in speaking. 52.

Quae omnia possunt videri prosopopoeiae, quam ego suasoriis subieci quia nullo alio ab his quam persona distat: quamquam haec aliquando etiam in controversias ducitur quae ex historiis compositae certis agentium nominibus continentur. LIII. Neque ignoro plerumque exercitationis gratia poni et poeticas et historicas, ut Priami verba apud Achillem aut sullae dictaturam deponentis in contione.

All these things can seem to be prosopopoeiae, which I have placed under suasoriae because they differ from these in no other respect than the persona: although this is sometimes also brought into controversiae which, composed from histories, are contained under the fixed names of the agents. 53. Nor am I unaware that, for the sake of exercise, both poetic and historical [themes] are often set, as the words of Priam in the presence of Achilles, or of Sulla laying down the dictatorship in the assembly.

Sed haec in partem cedent trium generum in quae causas divisimus. Nam et rogare, indicare, rationem reddere et alia de quibus supra dictum est varie atque ut res tulit in materia iudiciali deliberativa demonstrativa solemus, LIV. frequentissime vero in his utimur ficta personarum quas ipsi substituimus oratione: ut apud Ciceronem pro Caelio Clodiam et Caecus Appius et Clodius frater, ille in castigationem, hic in exhortationem vitiorum compositus, adloquitur.

But these will fall to the share of the three kinds into which we divided causes. For both to ask, to indicate, to render an account, and other things of which mention was made above, we are accustomed to use variously, as the matter has required, in judicial, deliberative, and demonstrative material, 54. but most frequently in these we employ the feigned speech of persons whom we ourselves substitute: as in Cicero’s Pro Caelio, Appius the Blind and Clodius the brother address Clodia—the former composed for chastisement, the latter for an exhortation to vices.

LV. Solent in scholis fingi materiae ad deliberandum similiores controversiis et ex utroque genere commixtae, ut cum apud C. Caesarem consultatio de poena Theodoti ponitur; constat enim accusatione et defensione causa eius, quod est iudicialium proprium, LVI. permixta tamen est et utilitatis ratio: an pro Caesare fuerit occidi Pompeium, an timendum a rege bellum si Theodotus sit occisus, an id minime opportunum hoc tempore et periculosum et certe longum sit futurum. Quaeritur et de honesto: LVII.

55. In the schools materials are wont to be fashioned for deliberation, more similar to controversies and mixed from both kinds, as when before Gaius Caesar a consultation is set forth about the penalty of Theodotus; for the case consists in accusation and defense, which is proper to judicial matters, 56. yet the consideration of utility is also intermingled: whether it was for Caesar’s advantage that Pompey should be killed, or whether a war is to be feared from the king if Theodotus be killed, or whether that would be by no means opportune at this time and perilous and certainly long in prospect. The question is also raised about the honorable: 57.

deceatne Caesarem ultio Pompei, an sit verendum ne peiorem faciat suarum partitun causam si Pompeium indignum morte fateatur. LVIII. Quod genus accidere etiam veritati potest.

whether vengeance for Pompey befits Caesar, or whether it should be feared lest he make the cause of his own party worse, if he acknowledge that Pompey was unworthy of death. 58. A kind of case which can befall even truth.

Non simplex autem circa suasorias error in plerisque declamatoribus in totum illi iudiciali contrarium esse existimaverunt. Nam et principia abrupta et concitatam semper orationem et in verbis effusiorem, ut ipsi vocant, cultum adfectaverunt, et earum breviores utique commentarios quam legalis materiae facere elaborarunt. LIX.

But the error about suasoriae is not simple: most declaimers have supposed it to be altogether contrary to that judicial kind. For they have affected abrupt beginnings and an always agitated speech, and, in words, a more “effusive,” as they themselves call it, style, and they have certainly labored to make shorter commentaries on them than on legal material. 59.

Ego porro ut prohoemio video non utique opus esse suasoriis propter quas dixi supra causas, ita cur initio furioso sit exclamandum non intellego, cum proposita consultatione rogatus sententiam, si modo est sanus, non quiritet, sed quam maxime potest civili et humano ingressu mereri adsensum deliberantis velit. LX. cur autem torrens et utique aequaliter concitata sit in ea dicentis oratio cum vel praecipue moderationem rationemque consilia desiderent? Neque ego negaverim saepius subsidere in controversiis impetum dicendi prohoemio narratione argumentis, quae si detrahas id fere supererit quo suasoriae constant, verum id quoque aequalius erit, non tumultuosius atque turbidius.

Moreover, as for a proem, I for my part see that there is not at all a need of it in suasoriae for the reasons I stated above; likewise I do not understand why at the beginning one must exclaim in a frenzied way, since, when a consultation has been proposed and he is asked his opinion, if only he is sane, he will not scream, but will wish, with the most civil and human ingress he can, to earn the assent of the deliberator. 60. And why, moreover, should the speech of the speaker therein be a torrent and, in any case, uniformly agitated, when counsels especially require moderation and reason? Nor would I deny that in controversiae the impetus of speaking more often subsides in the proem, the narration, and the arguments—if you subtract these, nearly that will remain by which suasoriae consist; but that too will be more even, not more tumultuous and turbid.

LXI. Verborum autem magnificentia non validius est adfectanda suasorias declamantibus, sed contingit magis. Nam et personae fere magnae fingentibus placent, regum principum senatus populi, et res ampliores: ita cum verba rebus aptentur, ipso materiae nitore clarescunt.

61. But the magnificence of words is not to be more strenuously aimed at by those declaiming suasoriae, but rather it occurs more readily. For grand personages commonly please those who invent them—kings, princes, the senate, the people—and themes of ampler scope; thus, when words are fitted to the things, they shine by the very luster of the material.

LXII. Alia veri consilii ratio est, ideoque Theophrastus quam maxime remotum ab omni adfectatione in deliberativo genere voluit esse sermonem, secutus in hoc auctoritatem praeceptoris sui, quamquam dissentire ab eo non timide solet. LXIII.

62. There is another rationale of true counsel, and therefore Theophrastus wished discourse in the deliberative genre to be as far as possible removed from all affectation, following in this the authority of his preceptor, although he does not usually shrink from dissenting from him. 63.

Namque Aristoteles idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrativam proximamque ab ea iudicialem putavit, videlicet quoniam prior illa tota esset ostentationis, haec secunda egeret artis vel ad fallendum, si ita poposcisset utilitas, consilia fide prudentiaque constarent. LXIV. Quibus in demonstrativa consentio (nam et omnes alii scriptores idem tradiderunt), in iudiciis autem consiliisque secundum condicionem ipsius quae tractabitur rei accommodandam dicendi credo rationem.

For Aristotle thought the demonstrative most suitable for writing, and next to it the judicial, namely because the former was wholly a matter of ostentation, the latter required art—even for deceiving, if utility so demanded—whereas counsels consist of good faith and prudence. 64. In these points about the demonstrative I agree (for all the other writers have handed down the same), but in trials and in counsels I believe the method of speaking must be accommodated according to the condition of the very matter that will be handled.

LXV. Nam et Philippicas Demosthenis isdem quibus habitas in iudiciis orationes video eminere virtutibus, et Ciceronis sententiae et contiones non minus clarum quam est in accusationibus ac defensionibus eloquentiae lumen ostendunt. Dicit tamen idem de suasoria hoc modo: "tota autem oratio simplex et gravis et sententiis debet ornatior esse quam verbis". LXVI.

65. For I see that the Philippics of Demosthenes stand out by the same virtues as the speeches delivered in the courts, and the sentences and contiones of Cicero display a light of eloquence no less bright than is in accusations and defenses. Yet he says the same about the suasory in this way: "the whole oration ought to be simple and weighty, and more ornamented with sentences than with words." 66.

Vsum exemplorum nulli materiae magis convenire merito fere omnes consentiunt, cum plerumque videantur respondere futura praeteritis habeaturque experimentum velut quoddam rationis testimonium. LXVII. Brevitas quoque aut copia non genere materiae sed modo constat; nam ut in consiliis plerumque simplicior quaestio est, ita saepe in causis minor.

Almost all rightly consent that the use of examples fits no subject-matter more, since for the most part the things to come seem to respond to the things past, and experience is held as a kind of testimony of reason. 67. Brevity too or copiousness consists not in the kind of material but in the mode; for just as in deliberations the question is for the most part simpler, so often in cases it is smaller.

Quae omnia vera esse sciet si quis non orationes modo sed historias etiam (namque in his contiones atque sententiae plerumque suadendi ac dissuadendi funguntur officio) legere maluerit quam in commentariis rhetorum consenescere; LXVIII. inveniet enim nec in consiliis abrupta initia et concitatius saepe in iudiciis dictum et verba aptata rebus in utroque genere et breviores aliquando causarum orationes quam sententiarum. LXIX.

All these things he will know to be true, if anyone should prefer to read not orations only but also histories (for in these, assemblies and opinions for the most part perform the office of urging and dissuading) rather than to grow old in the commentaries of the rhetors; 68. for he will find not abrupt beginnings in counsels, and more impetuous speech often in trials, and words fitted to the matters in both kinds, and sometimes the orations of causes shorter than those of opinions. 69.

Ne illa quidem in iis vitia deprendet, quibus quidam declamatores laborant, quod et contra sentientibus inhumane conviciantur et ita plerumque dicunt tamquam ab iis qui deliberat utique dissentiat: ideoque obiurgantibus similiores sunt quam suadentibus. LXX. Haec adulescentes sibi scripta sciant, ne aliter quam dicturi sunt exerceri velint et in desuescendis morentur.

Nor will he detect in these even those vices with which certain declaimers struggle, namely that they hurl abuse inhumanely at those who think contrarily, and for the most part speak as though the one who is deliberating must of course dissent from them: and so they are more like objurgators than advisers. 70. Let young men know that these things have been written for themselves, lest they wish to be trained otherwise than they are going to speak and then linger in unlearning.

Ceterum cum advocari coeperint in consilia amicorum, dicere sententiam in senatu, suadere si quid consulet princeps, quod praeceptis fortasse non credant usu docebuntur.

Moreover, when they have begun to be called into the counsels of friends, to speak their opinion in the senate, to advise if the prince should consult about anything, they will be taught by use what perhaps they do not believe on the basis of precepts.

[9] I. Nunc de iudiciali genere, quod est praecipue multiplex sed officiis constat duobus, intentionis ac depulsionis. cuius partes, ut plurimis auctoribus placuit, quinque sunt: prohoemium narratio probatio refutatio peroratio. His adiecerunt quidam partitionem propositionem excessum; quorum priores duae probationi succidunt.

[9] 1. Now concerning the judicial kind, which is especially multiplex but consists of two offices, of intention and depulsion. whose parts, as it has pleased very many authors, are five: proem narration proof refutation peroration. To these some have added partition proposition digression; of which the first two are subordinate to proof.

II. Nam proponere quidem quae sis probaturus necesse est, sed et concludere: cur igitur, si illa pars causae est, non et haec sit? Partitio vero dispositionis est species, ipsa dispositio pars rhetorices et per omnis materias totumque earum corpus aequaliter fusa, sicut inventio elocutio: III. ideoque eam non orationis totius partem unam esse credendum est, sed quaestionum etiam singularum.

2. For to propose what you are going to prove is indeed necessary, but also to conclude: why then, if that is a part of the case, should not this be as well? Partition, however, is a species of disposition; disposition itself is a part of rhetoric and, through all matters and the whole corpus of them, is equally diffused, just like invention and elocution: 3. and therefore it is not to be believed to be one single part of the whole speech, but also of individual questions.

Quae est enim quaestio in qua non promittere possit orator quid primo, quid secundo, quid tertio sit loco dicturus? Quod est proprium partitionis. Quam ergo ridiculum est quaestionem quidem speciem esse probationis, partitionem autem, quae sit species quaestionis, partem totius orationis vocari!

For what question is there in which the orator cannot promise what he will say first, what second, what third in order? Which is proper to partition. How ridiculous, then, that the question should be a species of proof, but the partition, which is a species of the question, should be called a part of the whole oration!

IV. Egressio vero vel, quod usitatius esse coepit, excessus, sive est extra causam, non potest esse pars causae, sive est in causa, adiutorium vel ornamentum partium est earum ex quibus egreditur. Nam si quidquid in causa est pars causae vocabitur, cur non argumentum, similitudo, locus communis, adfectus, exempla partes vocentur? V. Tamen nec iis adsentior qui detrahunt refutationem tamquam probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles.

4. The digression, or, as has begun to be more usual, the excursus—if it is outside the case, it cannot be a part of the case; if it is within the case, it is a help or ornament of those parts from which it departs. For if whatever is in the case is to be called a part of the case, why are not argument, similitude, the commonplace, affect, and examples called parts? 5. Yet I do not agree with those who take away refutation as though subject to proof, as Aristotle does.

Haec enim est quae constituat, illa quae destruat. Hoc quoque idem aliquatenus novat, quod prohoemio non narrationem subiungit sed propositionem; verum id facit quia propositio ei genus, narratio species videtur, et hac non semper, illa semper et ubique credit opus esse.

For the former is what constitutes, the latter what destroys. He also in some measure innovates this same point, in that to the proem he subjoins not the narration but the proposition; yet he does this because the proposition seems to him the genus, the narration the species, and he believes that there is not always need of this, but of that always and everywhere.

VI. Verum ex his quas constitui partibus non ut quidque primum dicendum ita primum cogitandum est, sed ante omnia intueri oportet quod sit genus causae, quid in ea quaeratur, quae prosint, quae noceant, deinde quid confirmandum sit ac refellendum, tum quo modo narrandum: VII. expositio enim probationum est praeparatio nec esse utilis potest nisi prius constituerit quid debeat de probatione promittere. Postremo intuendum quem ad modum iudex sit conciliandus; neque enim nisi totis causae partibus diligenter inspectis scire possumus qualem nobis facere animum cognoscentis expediat, severum an mitem, concitatum an remissum, adversum gratiae an obnoxium.

6. But of the parts which I have set forth, it is not that whatever must be said first must therefore be thought of first; rather, before all, one ought to look to what the genus of the case is, what is sought in it, what things help, what harm; then what is to be confirmed and what refuted; then in what manner it is to be narrated: 7. for the exposition of the proofs is a preparation, nor can it be useful unless it has first determined what it ought to promise about the proof. Finally, one must consider in what way the judge is to be conciliated; for only after all the parts of the case have been diligently inspected can we know what sort of disposition it is expedient for us to create in the one taking cognizance—stern or mild, stirred or relaxed, adverse to favor or compliant.

VIII. Neque ideo tamen eos probaverim qui scribendum quoque prohoemium novissime putant. Nam ut conferri materiam omnem et quid quoque (loco) sit opus constare debet antequam dicere aut scribere ordiamur, ita incipiendum ab iis quae prima sunt.

8. Nor for that reason, however, would I approve those who think that the proem too should be written last. For just as the whole material must be assembled and it must be established what in each (place) is needed before we begin to speak or write, so we must begin from those things which are first.

IX. Nam nec pingere quisquam aut fingere coepit a pedibus, nec denique ars ulla consummatur ibi unde ordiendum est. Quid fiet alioqui si spatium componendi orationem stilo non fuerit? Nonne nos haec inversa consuetudo deceperit?

9. For no one begins to paint or to fashion from the feet; nor, finally, is any art completed at the very point from which one ought to begin. What will happen otherwise if there is no time for composing the oration with the pen? Will not this inverted custom have deceived us?

Inspicienda igitur materia.est quo praecepimus ordine, scribenda quo dicimus.

Therefore the material is to be inspected in the order which we have prescribed, and written in the order which we state.

[10] I. Ceterum causa omnis in qua pars altera agentis est, altera recusantis, aut unius rei controversia constat aut plurium: haec simplex dicitur, illa coniuncta. Vna controversia est per se furti, per se adulterii. Plures aut eiusdem generis, ut in pecuniis repetundis, aut diversi, ut si quis sacrilegii et homicidii simul accusetur.

[10] 1. Moreover, every case in which one party is acting/prosecuting and the other resisting/defending consists either of a controversy over one matter or over several: the former is called simple, the latter conjoined. A single controversy is, in itself, about theft, in itself about adultery. Several are either of the same kind, as in suits for the recovery of monies, or of different kinds, as if someone is accused at the same time of sacrilege and homicide.

Quod nunc in publicis iudiciis non accidit, quoniam praetor certa lege sortitur, principum autem et senatus cognitionibus frequens est et populi fuit. Privata quoque iudicia saepe unum iudicem habere multis et diversis formulis solent. II. Nec aliae species erunt etiam si unus a duobus dumtaxat eandem rem atque ex eadem causa petet, aut duo ab uno, aut plures a pluribus (quod accidere in hereditariis litibus interim scimus): quia, quamvis in multis personis, causa tamen una est, nisi si condicio personarum quaestiones variaverit.

Which now does not happen in public trials, since the praetor, under a fixed law, assigns by lot; yet it is frequent in the cognitions of the princes and of the senate, and it was the practice of the people. Private suits also are wont to have one judge for many and diverse formulae. 2. Nor will there be other kinds even if one alone should demand the same thing and from the same cause from two, or two from one, or many from many (which we know sometimes happens in hereditary lawsuits): because, although there are many persons, nevertheless the cause is one, unless the condition of the persons should vary the questions.

III. Diversum his tertium genus, quod dicitur comparativum. cuius rei tractatus in parte causae frequens est, ut cum apud centumviros post alia quaeritur et hoc, uter dignior hereditate sit.

3. A third kind different from these, which is called comparative. The treatment of this matter is frequent in a part of the case, as when before the Centumviri, after other things are inquired, this too is asked: which of the two is more worthy of the inheritance.

Rarum est autem ut in foro iudicia propter id solum constituantur, sicut divinationes, quae fiunt de accusatore constituendo, et nonnumquam inter delatores, uter praemium meruerit. IV. Adiecerunt quidam numero mutuam accusationem (antikategoria vocatur), aliis videlicet succidere hanc quoque comparativo generi existimantibus. Cui similis erit petitionum invicem diversarum: quod accidit vel frequentissime.

It is rare, however, that in the forum judgments are instituted for that alone, as in the divinations, which are held for establishing the accuser, and sometimes between delators (informers), which of them has merited the reward. 4. Some have added to the number the mutual accusation (it is called antikategoria), others, namely, thinking that this too falls under the comparative kind. Similar to this will be reciprocal actions of differing claims: which happens even most frequently.

Id si et ipsum vocari debet antikategoria (nam proprio caret nomine), duo genera erunt eius: alterum quo litigatores idem crimen invicem intentant, alterum quo aliud atque aliud: cui et petitionum condicio par est.

If this too ought to be called antikategoria (for it lacks a proper name), there will be two kinds of it: one in which the litigants press the same charge against one another, the other in which they press different charges; and to this the condition of petitions is likewise equal.

V. Cum apparuerit genus causae, tum intuebimur negeturne factum quod intenditur, an defendatur, an alio nomine appelletur, an a genere actionis repellatur: unde sunt status.

5. When the genus of the cause has appeared, then we will consider whether the fact that is alleged is denied, or is defended, or is called by another name, or is repelled by the genus of the action: whence the statuses arise.

[11] I. His inventis intuendum deinceps Hermagorae videtur quid sit quaestio ratio iudicatio continens (vel, ut alii vocant, firmamentum). Quaestio latius intellegitur omnis de qua in utramque partem vel in plures dici credibiliter potest. II. In iudiciali autem materia dupliciter accipienda est: altero modo quo dicimus multas quaestiones habere controversiam, quo etiam minores omnis complectimur, altero quo significamus summam illam in qua causa vertitur. De hac nunc loquor, ex qua nascitur status, an factum sit, quid factum sit, an recte factum sit.

[11] 1. With these things discovered, it seems next, following Hermagoras, to be looked into what a quaestio, a ratio, a iudicatio, a continens (or, as others call it, a firmamentum) is. A quaestio is more broadly understood as anything about which it is possible to speak credibly on either side, or on more sides. 2. But in judicial material it is to be taken in a twofold way: in one way, in which we say that a controversy has many quaestiones, in which we also embrace all the lesser ones; in another, in which we signify that chief sum in which the case turns. Of this I now speak, from which the status is born: whether a deed was done, what was done, whether it was done rightly.

III. Has Hermagoras et Apollodorus et alii plurimi scriptores proprie quaestiones vocant, Theodorus, ut dixi, capita generalia, sicut illas minores aut ex illis pendentes specialia: nam et quaestionem ex quaestione nasci et speciem in species dividi convenit. IV. Hanc igitur quaestionem veluti principalem vocant zetema.

3. These Hermagoras and Apollodorus and very many other writers properly call questions; Theodorus, as I said, calls general heads, just as he calls those lesser ones or those depending on them specials: for it is agreed that a question is born from a question and that a species is divided into species. 4. Therefore they call this question, as it were the principal one, zetema.

Ratio autem est qua id quod factum esse constat defenditur. Et cur non utamur eodem quo sunt usi omnes fere exemplo? Orestes matrem occidit: hoc constat.

But the rationale is that by which that which is established to have been done is defended. And why should we not employ the same example which almost all have used? Orestes killed his mother: this is established.

Dicit se iuste fecisse: status erit qualitatis, quaestio an iuste fecerit, ratio quod Clytaemestra maritum suum, patrem Orestis, occidit: hoc aition dicitur, krinomenon autem iudicatio an oportuerit vel nocentem matrem a filio occidi. V. Quidam diviserunt aition et aitian, ut esset altera propter quam iudicium constitutum est, ut occisa Clytaemestra, altera qua factum defenditur, ut occisus Agamemnon. Sed tanta est circa verba dissensio ut alii aitian causam iudicii, aition autem facti vocent, alii eadem in contrarium vertant.

He says that he did justly: the status will be of quality, the question whether he did justly, the rationale that Clytaemestra killed her husband, the father of Orestes: this is called an aition, the krinomenon, however, is the adjudication whether it was proper for even a guilty mother to be killed by her son. 5. Some have divided aition and aitian, so that the one is that on account of which the judgment has been constituted, as “Clytaemestra has been killed,” the other that by which the deed is defended, as “Agamemnon has been killed.” But so great is the dissension about the words that some call aitian the cause of the judgment, and aition that of the deed, while others invert the same.

Latinorum quidam haec initium et rationem vocaverunt, quidam utrumque eodem nomine appellant. VI. Causa quoque ex causa, id est aition ex aitiou, nasci videtur, quale est: occidit Agamemnonem Clytaemestra quia ille filiam communem immolaverat et captivam paelicem adducebat. Idem putant et sub una quaestione esse plures rationes, ut si Orestes et alteram adferat causam matris necatae, quod responsis sit inpulsus: quot autem causas faciendi, totidem iudicationes; nam et haec erit iudicatio, an responsis parere debuerit.

Some of the Latins have called these the inception and the reason; some call both by the same name. 6. A cause also seems to be born from a cause, that is, an aition from an aitiou, such as: Clytaemestra killed Agamemnon because he had immolated their common daughter and was bringing in a captive concubine. The same people think also that under one question there are several reasons, as if Orestes too were to put forward another cause for his mother having been slain, namely that he was impelled by the responses: and as many causes of doing, so many judgments; for this too will be a judgment, whether he ought to have obeyed the responses.

VII. Sed et una causa plures habere quaestiones et iudicationes, ut ego arbitror, potest: ut in eo qui, cum adulteram deprensam occidisset, adulterum, qui tum effugerat, postea in foro occidit; causa enim est una: adulter fuit. Quaestiones et iudicationes an illo tempore, an illo loco licuerit occidere.

VII. But also one cause, as I judge, can have several questions and judgments: as in the case of a man who, after he had killed an adulteress caught in the act, later killed in the forum the adulterer, who at that time had escaped; for the cause is one: he was an adulterer. The questions and judgments are whether it was permitted to kill at that time, and in that place.

VIII. Sed sicut, cum sint plures quaestiones omnesque suos status habeant, causae tamen status unus est ad quem referuntur omnia, ita iudicatio maxime propria de qua pronuntiatur. IX. Synechon autem, quod, ut dixi, continens alii, firmamentum alii putant, Cicero firmissimam argumentationem defensoris et adpositissimam ad iudicationem, quibusdam id videtur esse post quod nihil quaeritur, quibusdam id quod ad iudicationem firmissimum adfertur.

8. But just as, although there are several questions and all have their own statuses, nevertheless the cause has one status to which all things are referred, so the judication is the most proper one, concerning which the pronouncement is made. 9. The Synechon, however, which, as I have said, some think a container, others a firmament, Cicero takes to be the firmest argumentation of the defender and the most apposite to the judication; to some it seems to be that after which nothing is sought, to others that which is brought as the most firm to the judication.

X. Causa facti non in omnis controversias cadit; nam quae fuerit causa faciendi ubi factum negatur? At ubi causa tractetur, negant eodem loco esse iudicationem quo quaestionem, idque et in rhetoricis Cicero et in Partitionibus dicit. XI. Nam in coniectura est quaestio ex illo: factum, non factum, an factum sit.

10. The cause of the deed does not fall into all controversies; for what would be the cause of doing where the deed is denied? But where the cause is handled, they deny that the adjudication is in the same place as the question, and Cicero says this both in the Rhetorics and in the Partitions. 11. For in conjecture the question is from this: done, not done, whether it was done.

Ibi ergo iudicatio ubi quaestio, quia in eadem re prima quaestio et extrema disceptatio. At in qualitate: matrem Orestes occidit recte, non recte, an recte occiderit quaestio, nec statim iudicatio. Quando ergo?

Therefore the judgment is there where the question is, since in the same matter the first question and the final disceptation coincide. But in the qualitative [status]: “Orestes killed his mother—rightly, not rightly, or whether he killed her rightly” is the question, and not immediately the judgment. When, then?

"Illa patrem meum occiderat." "Sed non ideo tu matrem debuisti occidere." An debuerit: hic iudicatio. XII. Firmamentum autem verbis ipsius ponam: "si velit Orestes dicere eius modi animum matris suae fuisse in patrem suum, in se ipsum ac sorores, in regnum, in famam generis et familiae, ut ab ea poenas liberi potissimum sui petere debuerint." XIII.

"She had killed my father." "But not on that account ought you to have killed your mother." Whether he ought to have: here is the judication. 12. Moreover, I will set the supporting proof in his very words: "if Orestes should wish to say that his mother's disposition was of such a sort toward his father, toward himself and his sisters, toward the kingdom, toward the repute of the race and of the family, that from her her children—above all her own—ought to have sought penalties." 13.

Vtuntur alii et talibus exemplis: "qui bona paterna consumpserit, ne contionetur: in opera publica consumpsit": quaestio an quisquis consumpserit prohibendus sit, iudicatio an qui sic. XIV. Vel in causa militis Arrunti, qui Lusium tribunum vim sibi inferentem interfecit, quaestio an iure fecerit, ratio quod is vim adferebat, iudicatio an indemnatum, an tribunum a milite occidi oportuerit.

Others also use such examples: "he who shall have consumed his paternal goods, let him not address the assembly: he consumed them on public works": the issue, whether whoever has consumed ought to be prohibited; the adjudication, whether one who did so. 14. Or in the case of the soldier Arruntius, who killed the tribune Lusius as he was inflicting violence on him, the issue, whether he acted by right; the rationale, that that man was applying force; the adjudication, whether an uncondemned man, whether a tribune, ought to have been killed by a soldier.

XV. Alterius etiam status quaestionem, alterius iudicationem putant. Quaestio qualitatis, an recte Clodium Milo occiderit, iudicatio coniecturalis, an Clodius insidias fecerit. XVI.

15. They think the question belongs to one status, the judgment to another. The question is qualitative: whether Milo rightly killed Clodius; the judgment is conjectural: whether Clodius laid ambushes. 16.

Ponunt et illud, saepe causam in aliquam rem dimitti quae non sit propria quaestionis, et de ea iudicari. A quibus multum dissentio. Nam et illa quaestio "an omnes qui paterna bona consumpserint contione sint prohibendi" habeat oportet suam iudicationem.

They also posit this, that often a case is dismissed into some matter which is not proper to the question, and that judgment is made about it. From whom I greatly dissent. For that question too, “whether all who have consumed their paternal goods ought to be prohibited from the assembly,” ought to have its own judication.

Ergo non alia quaestio, aba iudicatio erit, sed plures quaestiones et plures iudicationes. XVII. Quid?

Therefore there will not be one question and one adjudication, but several questions and several adjudications. 17. What?

non in causa Milonis ipsa coniectura refertur ad qualitatem? Nam si est insidiatus Clodius, sequitur ut recte sit occisus. cum vero in aliquam rem missa causa est, recessum est a quaestione quae erat, et hic constituta quaestio ubi iudicatio est.

Is not, in the case of Milo, the very conjecture referred to quality? For if Clodius laid an ambuscade, it follows that he was rightly slain. But when the cause has been sent off into some particular matter, there has been a retreat from the question which was, and here the question is constituted where the iudication is.

XVIII. Paulum in his secum etiam Cicero dissentit. Nam in rhetoricis, quem ad modum supra dixi, Hermagoran est secutus: in Topicis ex statu effectam contentionem krinomenon existimat, idque Trebatio, qui iuris erat consultus, adludens "qua de re agitur" appellat: quibus id contineatur "continentia", "quasi firmamenta defensionis, quibus sublatis defensio nulla sit". XIX.

18. In these matters Cicero also disagrees with himself a little. For in his rhetorical works, as I said above, he followed Hermagoras; in the Topics he deems the controversy effected from status to be the krinomenon, and, jesting with Trebatius, who was a jurisconsult, he calls it “what the matter at issue is”; the things by which it is contained he calls “containment,” “as it were the props of the defense, with which, if removed, there would be no defense.” 19.

At in Partitionibus Oratoriis firmamentum quod opponitur defensioni, quia continens, quod primum sit, ab accusatore dicatur, ratio a reo, ex rationis et firmamenti quaestione disceptatio sit iudicationum.

But in the Oratorical Partitions the firmament which is opposed to the defense—since the containing point, which is first, is stated by the accuser, and the ratio by the defendant—the disceptation of the judications is from the question of the ratio and the firmament.

Verius igitur et brevius qui statum et continens et iudicationem esse voluerunt: continens autem id esse quo sublato lis esse non possit. XX. Hoc mihi videntur utramque causam complexi, et quod Orestes matrem et quod Clytaemestra Agamemnonem occiderit. Idem iudicationem et statum consentire semper existimarunt: neque enim aliud eorum rationi conveniens fuisset.

Truer therefore and briefer are those who wished that the status, the containing, and the judication be; moreover, the containing is that without which, once removed, a suit cannot exist. 20. This, to me, they seem to have encompassed in both causes, both that Orestes killed his mother and that Clytaemestra killed Agamemnon. The same men always thought that the judication and the status agree: for nothing else would have suited their reasoning.

XXI. Verum haec adfectata subtilitas circa nomina rerum ambitiose laboret, a nobis in hoc adsumpta solum, ne param diligenter inquisisse de opere quod adgressi sumus videremur. Simplicius autem instituenti non est necesse per tam minutas rerum particulas rationem docendi concidere.

21. But this affected subtlety around the names of things strains ambitiously, taken up by us solely for this purpose, lest we should seem to have inquired too little diligently about the work which we have undertaken. But for one who institutes more simply, it is not necessary to cut the rationale of teaching into such minute particles of things.

XXII. Quo vitio multi quidem laborarunt, praecipue tamen Hermagoras, vir alioqui subtilis et in plurimis admirandus, tantum diligentiae nimium sollicitae, ut ipsa eius reprehensio laude aliqua non indigna sit. XXIII.

22. By this fault many indeed have labored, but especially Hermagoras, a man otherwise subtle and in very many things admirable, with such over-solicitous diligence that his very reprehension is not unworthy of some praise. 23.

Haec autem brevior et vel ideo lucidior multo via neque discentem per ambages fatigabit, nec corpus orationis in parva momenta diducendo consumet. Nam qui viderit quid sit quod in controversiam veniat, quid in eo et per quae velit efficere pars diversa, quid nostra, quod in primis est intuendum, nihil eorum ignorare de quibus supra diximus poterit. XXIV.

But this shorter and therefore much more lucid way will neither fatigue the learner through roundabout courses, nor consume the body of the oration by drawing it out into small moments. For whoever has seen what it is that comes into controversy, what the opposing party wishes to effect in it and by what means, what is ours—which is among the first things to be looked at—will be able to be ignorant of none of those things about which we have said above. 24.

Neque est fere quisquam, modo non stultus atque ab omni prorsus usu dicendi remotus, quin sciat et quid litem faciat (quod ab illis causa vel continens dicitur), et quae sit inter litigantes quaestio, et de quo iudicari oporteat: quae omnia,idem sunt. Nam et de eo quaestio est quod in controversiam venit, et de eo iudicatur de quo quaestio est. XXV.

Nor is there almost anyone, provided he is not a fool and utterly removed from all practice of speaking, who does not know both what makes the suit (which by them is called the causa or the continens), and what the question is between the litigants, and what it is about which judgment ought to be given: all of which are the same. For the question is about that which comes into controversy, and judgment is made about that concerning which there is a question. 25.

Sed non perpetuo intendimus in haec animum et cupiditate laudis utcumque adquirendae vel dicendi voluptate evagamur, quando uberior semper extra causam materia est, quia in controversia pauca sunt, extra omnia, et hic dicitur de iis quae accepimus, illic de quibus volumus. XXVI. Nec tam hoc praecipiendum est, ut quaestionem continens iudicationem inveniamus (nam id quidem facile est), quam ut intueamur semper, aut certe, si digressi fuerimus, saltem respiciamus, ne plausum adfectantibus arma excidant.

But we do not perpetually direct our mind to these things, and we wander out in a desire for praise somehow to be acquired, or in the pleasure of speaking, since the material is always more abundant outside the case, because in the controversy there are few things, outside, everything; and here it is spoken about those things which we have received, there about those which we wish. 26. Nor is it so much to be prescribed that we find the judication containing the question (for that indeed is easy), as that we always gaze upon it, or at least, if we shall have digressed, that we at least look back, lest, while courting applause, the weapons fall from the hands.

XXVII. Theodori schola, ut dixi, omnia refert ad capita. His plura intelleguntur, uno modo summa quaestio item ut status, altero ceterae quae ad summam referuntur, tertio propositio cum adfirmatione, ut dicimus "caput rei est" et apud Menandrum Kephalaion estin.

27. The school of Theodorus, as I said, refers everything to heads. By these more things are understood: in one mode, the main question, likewise the status; in another, the rest which are referred to the sum; in a third, the proposition with affirmation—as we say, “it is the head of the matter,” and, with Menander, “it is a kephalaion.”

In universum autem quidquid probandum est erit caput, sed id maius aut minus.

In general, however, whatever is to be proved will be a head, but it will be greater or lesser.

XXVIII. Et quoniam quae de his erant a scriptoribus artium tradita verbosius etiam quam necesse erat exposuimus, praeterea quae partes essent iudicialium causarum supra dictum est, proximus liber a prima, id est exordio, incipiet.

28. And since we have expounded more verbosely than was even necessary those things concerning these matters that were handed down by the writers of the arts, and furthermore it has been said above what the parts of judicial causes are, the next book will begin from the first, that is, the exordium.