Augustine: DE TRINITATE

[I 1] Nemini dubium est sicut interiorem hominem intellegentia sic exteriorem sensu corporis praeditum. Nitamur igitur si possumus in hoc quoque exteriore indagare qualecumque uestigium trinitatis, non quia et ipse eodem modo sit imago dei. Manifesta est quippe apostolica sententia quae interiorem hominem renouari in dei agnitionem declarat secundum imaginem eius qui creauit eum cum et alio loco dicat: Et si exterior homo noster corrumpitur, sed interior renouatur de die in diem.

[1 1] It is doubtful to no one that just as the inner man is endowed with understanding, so the outer is endowed with bodily sense. Let us therefore strive, if we can, to track in this outer man too some sort of vestige of the Trinity, not because he also is in the same way the image of God. For the apostolic sentence is manifest which declares that the inner man is being renewed into the recognition of God according to the image of him who created him, since in another place he also says: "And if our outer man is being corrupted, yet the inner is being renewed day by day."

In hoc ergo qui corrumpitur quaeramus quemadmodum possumus quandam trinitatis effigiem, et si non expressiorem tamen fortassis ad dinoscendum faciliorem. Neque enim frustra et iste homo dicitur nisi quia inest ei nonnulla interioris similitudo, et illo ipso ordine conditionis nostrae quo mortales atque carnales effecti sumus facilius et quasi familiarius uisibilia quam intellegibilia pertractamus cum ista sint exterius, illa interius, et ista sensu corporis sentiamus, illa mente intellegamus; nosque ipsi animi non sensibiles simus, id est corpora, sed intellegibiles quoniam uita sumus; tamen, ut dixi, tanta facta est in corporibus consuetudo et ita in hae miro modo relabens foras se nostra proicit intentio ut cum ab incerto corporum ablata fuerit, ut in spiritu multo certiores ac stabiliore cognitione figatur, refugiat ad ista et ibi appetat requiem unde traxit infirmitatem. Cuius aegritudini congruendum est ut si quando interiora spiritalia adcommodatius distinguere atque facilius insinuare conamur, de corporalibus exterioribus similitudinum documenta capiamus.

In this, then, which is being corrupted let us seek, as we can, a certain effigy of the Trinity, and if not more express, yet perhaps easier for discernment. For neither is this also called “man” to no purpose, save because there is in it some similitude of the inner; and by that very order of our condition whereby we have been made mortal and carnal, we handle visibles more easily and, as it were, more familiarly than intelligibles, since these are exterior, those interior, and these we perceive by the sense of the body, those we understand by the mind; and we ourselves, as souls, are not sensible things, that is, bodies, but intelligible, since we are life; yet, as I said, so great a habit has been formed in regard to bodies, and in this wondrous way our intention, relapsing outward, casts itself outside, that when it has been lifted from the uncertainty of bodies, in order that it may be fixed in the spirit with a much more certain and more stable cognition, it flees back to these things and there seeks rest whence it drew infirmity. To whose sickness it must be accommodated, that, whenever we try to distinguish the inner spiritual things more fittingly and to insinuate them more easily, we may take instructive proofs of likenesses from bodily externals.

Sensu igitur corporis exterior homo praeditus sentit corpora, et iste sensus quod facile aduertitur quinquepertitus est, uidendo, audiendo, olfaciendo, gustando, tangendo. Sed et multum est et non necessarium ut omnes hos quinque sensus id quod quaerimus interrogemus; quod enim nobis unus eorum renuntiat etiam in ceteris ualet. Itaque potissimum testimonio utamur oculorum; is enim sensus corporis maxime excellit et est uisioni mentis pro sui generis diuersitate uicinior.

Therefore the exterior man, endowed with the sense of the body, perceives bodies, and this sense, as is easily adverted, is fivefold: seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But it is both too much and not necessary to question all these five senses about that which we seek; for what one of them reports back to us holds good also in the others. Therefore let us use chiefly the testimony of the eyes; for that sense of the body excels most and is nearer to the vision of the mind, in proportion to the diversity of its own kind.

[II 2] Cum igitur aliquod corpus uidemus, haec tria, quod facillimum est, consideranda sunt et dinoscenda. Primo ipsa res quam uidemus siue lapidem siue aliquam flammam siue quid aliud quod uideri oculis potest, quod utique iam esse poterat et antequam uideretur. Deinde uisio quae non erat priusquam rem illam obiectam sensui sentiremus.

[2 2] When therefore we see some body, these three things, which is most easy, are to be considered and discerned. First, the thing itself which we see, whether a stone or some flame or anything else that can be seen with the eyes, which assuredly could already exist even before it was seen. Then the vision, which was not before we sensed that thing set before the sense.

Tertio quod in ea re quae uidetur quamdiu uidetur sensum detinet oculorum, id est animi intentio. In his igitur tribus non solum est manifesta distinctio sed etiam discreta natura.

Third, that which, in the thing that is seen, so long as it is seen, holds the sense of the eyes, that is, the mind’s intention. In these three, therefore, there is not only a manifest distinction but also a discrete nature.

Primum quippe illud corpus uisibile longe alterius naturae est quam sensus oculorum quo sibimet incidente fit uisio, ipsaque uisio quae quid aliud quam sensus ex ea re quae sentitur informatus apparet? Quamuis re uisibili detracta nulla sit nec ulla omnino esse possit talis uisio si corpus non sit quod uideri queat, nullo modo tamen eiusdem substantiae est corpus quo formatur sensus oculorum cum idem corpus uidetur et ipsa forma quae ab eodem imprimitur sensui, quae uisio uocatur. Corpus enim a uisu in sua natura separabile est; sensus autem qui iam erat in animante etiam priusquam uideret quod uidere posset cum in aliquid uisibile incurreret, uel uisio quae fit in sensu ex uisibili corpore cum iam coniunctum est et uidetur, sensus ergo uel uisio, id est sensus non formatus extrinsecus uel sensus formatus extrinsecus, ad animantis naturam pertinet omnino aliam quam est illud corpus quod uidendo sentimus, quo sensus non ita formatur ut sensus sit sed ut uisio sit.

First, that visible body is by far of a different nature than the sense of the eyes, upon which, when it impinges upon it, there comes to be the vision; and the vision itself—what does it appear to be other than the sense informed from that thing which is sensed? Although, the visible thing having been removed, there is no such vision, nor indeed could there be any at all if there were not a body that could be seen, nevertheless the body by which the sense of the eyes is formed when that same body is seen, and the very form which from that same is imprinted upon the sense, which is called vision, are in no way of the same substance. For the body is, in its own nature, separable from seeing; but the sense which already existed in the animate being even before it saw what it would be able to see when it should run into something visible, or the vision which comes to be in the sense from the visible body when it is now joined and is seen—sense, therefore, or vision, that is, sense not formed from without or sense formed from without—belongs to the nature of the animate being, altogether other than that body which by seeing we sense, by which the sense is not so formed as to be sense, but to be vision.

Nam sensus et ante obiectum rei sensibilis nisi esset in nobis non distaremus a caecis dum nihil uidemus siue in tenebris siue clausis luminibus. Hoc autem distamus quod nobis inest et non uidentibus quo uidere possimus, qui sensus uocatur; illis uero non inest, nec aliunde nisi quod eo carent caeci appellantur.

For the sense, even before the object of a sensible thing, if it were not in us, we should not differ from the blind when we see nothing, whether in darkness or with the eyes closed. But we differ in this: that there is in us—and not in those who do not see—that by which we are able to see, which is called sense; it is not in them, nor are they called blind for any other reason than that they lack it.

Itemque illa animi intentio quae in ea re quam uidemus sensum tenet atque utrumque coniungit non tantum ab ea re uisibili natura differt quandoquidem iste animus, illud corpus est, sed ab ipso quoque sensu atque uisione quoniam solius animi est haec intentio. Sensus autem oculorum non ob aliud sensus corporis dicitur nisi quia et ipsi oculi membra sunt corporis, et quamuis non sentiat corpus exanime, anima tamen commixta corpori per instrumentum sentit corporeum et idem instrumentum sensus uocatur. Qui etiam passione corporis cum quisque excaecatur, interceptus exstinguitur, cum idem maneat animus, et eius intentio luminibus amissis non habeat quidem sensum corporis quem uidendo extrinsecus corpori adiungat atque in eo uiso figat aspectum, nisu tamen ipso indicet se adempto corporis sensu nec perire potuisse nec minui; manet enim quidam uidendi appetitus integer siue id possit fieri siue non possit.

And likewise that intention of the mind which, in the thing we see, holds the sense and conjoins both, differs not only in nature from that visible thing—since this is mind, that is body—but also from the sense itself and from the vision, since this intention belongs to mind alone. The sense of the eyes, moreover, is called a sense of the body for no other reason than that the eyes themselves are members of the body; and although a lifeless body does not feel, nevertheless the soul, commingled with the body, senses by a corporeal instrument, and this same instrument is called sense. This, too, when anyone is blinded through a passion of the body, being intercepted is extinguished, while the same mind remains; and its intention, the lights having been lost, indeed does not have the bodily sense which by seeing it might join from without to the body and upon that seen fix the gaze, yet by its very effort it indicates that, with the bodily sense taken away, it could neither perish nor be diminished; for a certain appetite of seeing remains intact, whether that can be done or cannot.

Haec igitur tria, corpus quod uidetur et ipsa uisio et quae utrumque coniungit intentio, manifesta sunt ad dinoscendum non solum propter propria singulorum uerum etiam propter differentiam naturarum.

These, therefore, three—the body which is seen, and the vision itself, and the intention which conjoins both—are manifest for discerning, not only on account of the properties of each, but also on account of the difference of the natures.

[3] Atque in his cum sensus non procedat ex corpore illo quod uidetur sed ex corpore sentientis animantis cui anima suo quodam miro modo contemperatur, tamen ex corpore quod uidetur gignitur uisio, id est sensus ipse formatur ut iam non tantum sensus qui etiam in tenebris esse integer potest dum est incolumitas oculorum, sed etiam sensus informatus sit, quae uisio uocatur. Gignitur ergo ex re uisibili uisio, sed non ex sola nisi adsit et uidens. Quocirca ex uisibili et uidente gignitur uisio ita sane ut ex uidente sit sensus oculorum et aspicientis atque intuentis intentio; illa tamen informatio sensus quae uisio dicitur a solo imprimatur corpore quod uidetur, id est a re aliqua uisibili.

[3] And in these cases, although the sense does not proceed from that body which is seen, but from the body of the sensing living being, to which the soul is, in its own wondrous way, co-tempered, nevertheless from the body which is seen vision is begotten—that is, the sense itself is formed—so that now there is not only the sense, which can also be intact in darkness so long as the eyes are unharmed, but the sense is also informed, which is called vision. Therefore from the visible thing vision is begotten, but not from it alone unless there be present also the one who sees. Wherefore from the visible and the seer vision is generated, in such a way indeed that from the seer there is the sense of the eyes and the intention of the one looking and beholding; yet that information of the sense which is called vision is imprinted by the body alone which is seen—that is, by some visible thing.

Qua detracta nulla remanet forma quae inerat sensui dum adesset illud quod uidebatur; sensus tamen ipse remanet qui erat et priusquam aliquid sentiretur uelut in aqua uestigium tamdiu est donec ipsum corpus quod imprimitur inest, quo ablato nullum erit cum remaneat aqua quae erat et antequam illam formam corporis caperet. Ideoque non possumus quidem dicere quod sensum gignat res uisibilis; gignit tamen formam uelut similitudinem suam quae fit in sensu cum aliquid uidendo sentimus.

With this withdrawn, no form remains which had been inherent in the sense while that which was being seen was present; the sense itself, however, remains, which existed even before anything was being felt—just as a vestige in water lasts only so long as the very body that makes the impression is present, and when that is taken away there will be none, although the water remains what it was even before it took on that form of the body. And therefore we cannot indeed say that the visible thing begets the sense; it does beget, however, a form, as it were its likeness, which is made in the sense when, by seeing, we perceive something.

Sed formam corporis quod uidemus et formam quae ab illa in sensu uidentis fit per eundem sensum non discernimus quoniam tanta coniunctio est ut non pateat discernendi locus. Sed ratione colligimus nequaquam nos potuisse sentire nisi fieret in sensu nostro aliqua similitudo conspecti corporis. Neque enim cum anulus cerae imprimitur ideo nulla imago facta est quia non discernitur nisi cum fuerit separata.

But we do not discern the form of the body which we see from the form which, from that, is made in the sense of the one seeing through the same sense, since so great a conjunction exists that no room for discerning is open. But by reason we gather that we could by no means have been able to sense unless some similitude of the beheld body were made in our sense. For when a ring is imprinted on wax, it is not the case that no image has been made merely because it is not discerned unless it has been separated.

Sed quoniam post ceram separatam manet quod factum est ut uideri possit, propterea facile persuadetur quod inerat iam cerae forma impressa ex anulo et antequam ab illa separaretur. Si autem liquido humori adiungeretur anulus, eo detracto nihil imaginis appareret. Nec ideo tamen discernere ratio non deberet fuisse in illo humore antequam detraheretur anuli formam factam ex anulo, quae distinguenda est ab ea forma quae in anulo est unde ista facta est quae detracto anulo non erit, quamuis illa in anulo maneat unde ista facta est.

But since, after the wax has been separated, what has been made remains so that it can be seen, therefore it is easily persuaded that the form impressed from the ring was already in the wax even before it was separated from it. If, however, the ring were joined to a liquid humor, with it drawn away nothing of an image would appear. Nor on that account should reason fail to discern that in that humor, before the ring was taken off, the form made from the ring had been, which is to be distinguished from that form which is in the ring, whence this one was made—which, with the ring removed, will not be—although that one remains in the ring whence this was made.

Sic sensus oculorum non ideo non habet imaginem corporis quod uidetur quamdiu uidetur quia eo detracto non remanet. Ac per hoc tardioribus ingeniis difficillime persuaderi potest formari in sensu nostro imaginem rei uisibilis cum eam uidemus, et eandem formam esse uisionem.

Thus the sense of the eyes does not on that account lack the image of the body that is seen while it is seen, because, when it is withdrawn, it does not remain. And on this account it can be most difficult to persuade slower intellects that an image of the visible thing is formed in our sense when we see it, and that the same form is the vision.

[4] Sed qui forte aduerterunt quod commemorabo non ita in hac inquisitione laborabunt. Plerumque cum diuscule attenderimus quaeque luminaria et deinde oculos clauserimus, quasi uersantur in conspectu quidam lucidi colores uarie sese commutantes et minus minusque fulgentes donec omnino desistant, quas intellegendum est reliquias esse formae illius quae facta erat in sensu cum corpus lucidum uideretur, paulatimque et quodam modo gradatim deficiendo uariari. Nam et insertarum fenestrarum cancelli si eos forte intuebamur, saepe in illis apparuere coloribus ut manifestum sit hanc affectionem nostro sensui ex ea re quae uidebatur impressam.

[4] But those who have perchance noticed what I shall recall will not labor so much in this inquiry. For the most part, when we have for a good while attended to whatever luminaries and then have closed our eyes, certain bright colors, as it were, move about in our sight, variously changing themselves and shining less and less until they cease altogether—which must be understood to be the remnants of that form which had been made in the sense when a lucid body was being seen, and to be varied gradually and, in a certain manner, by failing step by step. For even the lattice-bars of fitted windows—if we were by chance gazing at them—often appeared in those colors, so that it is manifest that this affection was impressed upon our sense from the thing that was being seen.

Erat ergo etiam cum uideremus, et illa erat clarior et expressior sed multum coniuncta cum specie rei eius quae cernebatur ut discerni omnino non posset, et ipsa erat uisio. Quin etiam cum lucernae flammula modo quodam diuaricatis radiis oculorum quasi geminatur, duae uisiones fiunt, cum sit res una quae uidetur. Singillatim quippe afficiuntur idem radii de suo quisque oculo emicantes dum non sinuntur in illud corpus intuendum pariter coniuncteque concurrere ut unus fiat ex utroque contuitus, et ideo si unum oculum clauserimus, non geminum ignem sed sicuti est unum uidebimus.

It was therefore also there while we were seeing, and it was clearer and more express, but so closely conjoined with the species of the thing that was being perceived that it could not at all be discerned, and this itself was the vision. Nay more, when the little flame of a lamp, in a certain manner, by the splayed rays of the eyes is as it were doubled, two visions occur, though the thing that is seen is one. For the same rays, each darting from its own eye, are affected singly, while they are not allowed, toward that body that is to be looked at, to run together equally and conjoinedly so that one gaze may be made from both; and therefore, if we close one eye, we shall see not a twin fire but, as it is, one.

Cur autem sinistro clauso illa species uideri desinit quae ad dextrum erat uicissimque dextro clauso illa intermoritur quae ad sinistrum erat, et longum est et rei praesenti non necessarium modo quaerere atque disserere. Quod enim ad susceptam quaestionem sat est nisi fieret in sensu nostro quaedam imago simillima rei eius quam cernimus, non secundum oculorum numerum flammae species geminaretur cum quidam cernendi modus adhibitus fuerit qui possit concursum separare radiorum. Ex uno quippe oculo quolibet modo deducto aut impresso aut intorto si alter clausus est, dupliciter uideri aliquid quod sit unum nullo pacto potest.

But why, when the left is closed, that appearance which was on the right ceases to be seen, and in turn, when the right is closed, that which was on the left dies away—this is both lengthy to inquire into and, for the present matter, not necessary just now to seek and discourse upon. For what suffices for the undertaken question is this: unless there were made in our sense a certain image most similar to the thing which we discern, the appearance of the flame would not be doubled according to the number of the eyes when a certain mode of seeing has been applied which can separate the concurrence of the rays. For from one eye, however it be drawn aside or pressed or twisted, if the other is closed, something that is one cannot in any way be seen doubly.

[5] Quae cum ita sint, tria haec quamuis diuersa natura quemadmodum in quandam unitatem contemperentur meminerimus, id est species corporis quae uidetur et imago eius impressa sensui quod est uisio sensusue formatus et uoluntas animi quae rei sensibili sensum admouet, in eoque ipsam uisionem tenet. Horum primum, id est res ipsa uisibilis, non pertinet ad animantis naturam nisi cum corpus nostrum cernimus. Alterum autem ita pertinet ut et in corpore fiat et per corpus in anima; fit enim in sensu qui neque sine corpore est neque sine anima.

[5] Since these things are so, let us remember how these three, although diverse in nature, are tempered together into a certain unity: namely, the appearance of the body which is seen, and its image impressed upon the sense, which is vision or the sense formed; and the will of the mind, which applies the sense to the sensible thing, and in it holds the vision itself. Of these, the first, that is, the visible thing itself, does not pertain to the nature of the animate being except when we perceive our own body. The second, however, pertains in such a way that it both comes to be in the body and, through the body, in the soul; for it comes to be in the sense, which is neither without the body nor without the soul.

Tertium uero solius animae est quia uoluntas est. Cum igitur horum trium tam diuersae substantiae sint, tamen in tantam coeunt unitatem ut duo priora uix intercedente iudice ratione discerni ualeant, species uidelicet corporis quod uidetur et imago eius quae fit in sensu, id est uisio. Voluntas autem tantam habet uim copulandi haec duo, ut et sensum formandum admoueat ei rei quae cernitur et in ea formatum teneat.

But the third belongs to the soul alone, because it is will. Since, therefore, the substances of these three are so diverse, nevertheless they come together into so great a unity that the two former can scarcely be distinguished, even with reason intervening as judge—namely, the species of the body which is seen and its image which is made in the sense, that is, vision. The will, however, has so great a force of coupling these two that it both applies the sense-to-be-formed to the thing that is discerned and holds it, once formed, upon it.

Et si tam uiolenta est ut possit uocari amor aut cupiditas aut libido, etiam ceterum corpus animantis uehementer afficit, et ubi non resistit pigrior duriorque materies in similem speciem coloremque commutat.

And if it is so violent that it can be called love or cupidity or libido, it also vehemently affects the rest of the animate being’s body, and, where the lazier and harder matter does not resist, it changes it into a similar appearance and color.

Licet uidere corpusculum chamaeleontis ad colores quos uidet facillima conuersione uariari. Aliorum autem animalium, quia non est ad conuersionem facilis corpulentia, fetus plerumque produnt libidines matrum quid cum magna delectatione conspexerint. quam enim teneriora atque ut ita dixerim formabiliora sunt primordia seminum, tam efficaciter et capaciter sequuntur intentionem maternae animae et quae in ea facta est phantasia per corpus quod cupide aspexit.

It may be seen that the corpuscle of the chameleon is varied to the colors which it sees by a most easy conversion. But of other animals, since the corpulence is not easy for conversion, the fetuses for the most part betray the libidines of the mothers—what they have beheld with great delectation. For the more tender and, so to speak, more formable the primordia of the seeds are, the more efficaciously and capaciously they follow the intention of the maternal soul and the phantasy that has been made in it, through the body which she looked upon with desire.

Sunt exempla quae copiose commemorari possint, sed unum sufficit de fidelissimis libris quod fecit Iacob ut oues et caprae uarios coloribus parerent supponendo eis uariata uirgulta in canalibus aquarum quae potantes intuerentur eo tempore quo conceperant.

There are exempla that could be copiously commemorated, but one suffices from the most faithful books: what Jacob did, so that the sheep and goats might bear offspring of various colors, by setting before them variegated rods in the channels of water, which, as they were drinking, they would gaze upon at the time when they conceived.

[6] Sed anima rationalis deformiter uiuit cum secundum trinitatem exterioris hominis uiuit, id est cum ad ea quae forinsecus sensum corporis formant non laudabilem uoluntatem qua haec ad utile aliquid referat, sed turpem cupiditatem qua his inhaerescat accommodat. [III] Quia etiam detracta specie corporis quae corporaliter sentiebatur remanet in memoria similitudo eius quo rursus uoluntas conuertat aciem ut inde formetur intrinsecus sicut ex corpore obiecto sensibili sensus extrinsecus formabatur.

[6] But the rational soul lives in a deformed manner when it lives according to the trinity of the outward man, that is, when, toward those things which from without form the sense of the body, it accommodates not a praiseworthy will by which it would refer these to something useful, but a base cupidity by which it adheres to them. [3] For even with the appearance of the body, which was sensed corporeally, removed, there remains in memory its similitude, to which the will again turns its gaze so that from it it may be formed inwardly, just as from the body, presented as a sensible object, the sense was being formed outwardly.

Atque ita fit illa trinitas ex memoria et interna uisione et quae utrumque copulat uoluntate, quae tria cum in unum coguntur ab ipso coactu cogitatio dicitur. Nec iam in his tribus diuersa substantia est. Neque enim aut corpus illud sensibile ibi est quod omnino discretum est ab animantis natura, aut sensus corporis ibi formatur ut fiat uisio, aut ipsa uoluntas id agit ut formandum sensum sensibili corpori admoueat, in eoque formatum detineat.

And thus that trinity comes to be from memory and internal vision and the will which couples both; and these three, when they are gathered into one, from that very coaction are called cogitation. Nor now is there in these three a diverse substance. For neither is that sensible body there, which is altogether discrete from the nature of an animate being; nor is the sense of the body there being formed so that there may be a vision; nor does the will itself there do this—to bring the sense-to-be-formed to a sensible body, and to detain, in it, the sense once formed.

Sed pro illa specie corporis quae sentiebatur extrinsecus succedit memoria retinens illam speciem quam per corporis sensum combibit anima, proque illa uisione quae foris erat cum sensus ex corpore sensibili formaretur succedit intus similis uisio cum ex eo quod memoria tenet formatur acies animi et absentia corpora cogitantur, uoluntasque ipsa quomodo foris corpori obiecto formandum sensum admouebat formatumque iungebat, sic aciem recordantis animi conuertit ad memoriam ut ex eo quod illa retinuit ista formetur, et fit in cogitatione similis uisio.

But in place of that appearance of the body which was perceived from without there succeeds memory, retaining that appearance which the soul imbibed through the sense of the body; and in place of that vision which was outside, when the sense was being formed from the sensible body, there succeeds within a similar vision, when from what memory holds the gaze of the mind is formed and absent bodies are thought; and the will itself, just as outwardly it used to apply the sense-to-be-formed to the body set before it as an object, and would join what had been formed, so turns the gaze of the remembering mind toward memory, so that from what the latter has retained this may be formed, and in cogitation a similar vision comes to be.

Sicut autem ratione discernebatur species uisibilis qua sensus corporis formabatur et eius similitudo quae fiebat in sensu formato ut esset uisio (alioquin ita erant coniunctae ut omnino una eademque putaretur, sic illa phantasia, cum animus cogitat speciem uisi corporis, cum constet ex corporis similitudine quam memoria tenet et ex ea quae inde formatur in acie recordantis animi, tamen sic una et singularis apparet ut duo quaedam esse non inueniantur nisi iudicante ratione qua intellegimus aliud esse illud quod in memoria manet etiam cum aliunde cogitamus et aliud fieri cum recordamur, id est ad memoriam redimus, et illic inuenimus eandem speciem. Quae si iam non ibi esset, ita oblitos nos esse diceremus ut omnino recolere non possemus; si autem acies recordantis non formaretur ex ea re quae erat in memoria, nullo modo fieret uisio cogitantis. Sed utriusque coniunctio, id est eius quam memoria tenet et eius quae inde exprimitur ut formetur acies recordantis, quia simillimae sunt, ueluti unam facit apparere.

Just as, moreover, by reason the visible species by which the sense of the body was being formed was distinguished from its similitude which was coming to be in the formed sense so that there might be a vision (otherwise they were so conjoined that they would altogether be thought one and the same), so that phantasia, when the mind cogitates the species of the seen body, since it consists of the body’s similitude which memory holds and of that which from it is formed in the acuity of the remembering mind, nevertheless appears so one and singular that two certain things are not found to be there except by the judgment of reason, by which we understand that one is that which remains in memory even when we are thinking of something else, and another comes to be when we remember, that is, we return to memory, and there we find the same species. Which, if it were no longer there, we would say that we were so forgetful that we could not at all recollect; but if the acuity of the remembering were not formed from that thing which was in memory, in no way would a vision of the one cogitating come to be. But the conjunction of both, that is, of that which memory holds and of that which is expressed from it in order that the acuity of the remembering be formed, because they are most similar, makes them appear, as it were, one.

Cum autem cogitantis acies auersa inde fuerit atque id quod in memoria cernebatur destiterit intueri, nihil formae quae impressa erat in eadem acie remanebit, atque inde formabitur quo rursus conuersa fuerit ut alia cogitatio fiat. Manet tamen illud quod reliquit in memoria, quo rursus cum id recordamur conuertatur, et conuersa formetur atque unum cum eo fiat unde formatur.

However, when the focus of the one thinking has been turned away from there and has ceased to gaze upon that which was being discerned in memory, nothing of the form that had been imprinted on that same focus will remain; and it will be formed from that to which it has again been turned, so that another cogitation may come to be. Yet that which it left in memory remains, to which it is again turned when we recollect it, and, being turned, it is formed and becomes one with that from which it is formed.

[IV 7] Voluntas uero illa quae hac atque hac fert et refert aciem formandum coniungitque formatam, si ad interiorem phantasiam tota confluxerit atque a praesentia corporum quae circumiacent sensibus atque ab ipsis sensibus corporis animi aciem omnino auerterit atque ad eam quae intus cernitur imaginem penitus conuerterit, tanta offunditur similitudo speciei corporalis expressa ex memoria ut nec ipsa ratio discernere sinatur utrum foris corpus ipsum uideatur an intus tale aliquid cogitetur. Nam interdum homines nimia cogitatione rerum uisibilium uel inlecti uel territi etiam eiusmodi repente uoces ediderunt quasi reuera in mediis talibus actionibus seu passionibus uersarentur. Et memini me audisse a quodam quod tam expressam et quasi solidam speciem feminei corporis in cogitando cernere soleret ut ei se quasi misceri sentiens etiam genitalibus flueret.

[4 7] But that will, which carries and recarries the focus hither and thither for forming, and also conjoins what has been formed—if it has wholly flowed together to the inner phantasy and has utterly turned the mind’s focus away from the presence of the bodies which lie around the senses and from the very senses of the body, and has turned it entirely to the image that is seen within—such a likeness of bodily form, expressed from memory, is poured over it that not even reason itself is permitted to discern whether the very body is being seen outside, or something of that sort is being cogitated within. For sometimes people, either enticed or terrified by excessive cogitation of visible things, have even suddenly uttered cries of such a kind as if in truth they were engaged in the midst of such actions or passions. And I remember hearing from a certain man that, in thinking, he was wont to behold so exact and as-it-were solid an appearance of a female body that, feeling himself as if to be mingled with it, he even had a flow from the genitals.

Tantum habet uirium anima in corpus suum et tantum ualet ad indumenti qualitatem uertendam atque mutandam quomodo afficiatur indutus qui cohaeret indumento suo. Ex eodem genere affectionis etiam illud est quod in somnis per imagines ludimur. Sed plurimum differt utrum sopitis sensibus corporis sicuti sunt dormientium, aut ab interiore compage turbatis sicuti sunt furentium, aut alio quodam modo alienatis sicuti sunt diuinantium uel prophetantium, animi intentio quadam necessitate incurrat in eas quae occurrunt imagines siue ex memoria siue alia aliqua occulta ui per quasdam spiritales mixturas similiter spiritalis substantiae, an sicut sanis atque uigilantibus interdum contingit ut cogitatione occupata se uoluntas auertat a sensibus atque ita formet animi aciem uariis imaginibus rerum sensibilium tamquam ipsa sensibilia sentiantur.

So much power has the soul over its own body, and so much it prevails to turn and to change the quality of the garment, according to how the clothed one who coheres with his garment is affected. From the same genus of affection is also this, that in dreams we are played with through images. But it makes a very great difference whether, with the senses of the body put to sleep, as in those who sleep, or disturbed in the inner framework, as in those who are frenzied, or alienated in some other way, as in those who divine or prophesy, the intention of the mind by a certain necessity runs into the images that occur, either from memory or by some other occult power, through certain spiritual mixtures of a likewise spiritual substance; or, as sometimes happens to the sane and the wakeful, that, thought being occupied, the will turns itself away from the senses and thus forms the mind’s gaze with various images of sensible things, as though the sensible things themselves were being sensed.

Non tantum autem cum appetendo in talia uoluntas intenditur fiunt istae impressiones imaginum, sed etiam cum deuitandi et cauendi causa rapitur animus in ea contuenda quae fugiat. Vnde non solum cupiendo sed etiam metuendo infertur uel sensus ipsis sensibilibus uel acies animi formanda imaginibus sensibilium. Itaque aut metus aut cupiditas quanto uehementior fuerit tanto expressius formatur acies siue sentientis ex corpore quod in loco adiacet siue cogitantis ex imagine corporis quae memoria continetur.

Not only, moreover, when by appetiting the will is directed toward such things do these impressions of images occur, but also when, for the sake of avoiding and guarding, the mind is snatched into beholding those things which it flees. Whence not only by desiring but also by fearing either the sense is borne to the sensibles themselves, or the acies of the mind is to be formed by images of the sensibles. Therefore, the more vehement either fear or desire is, by so much the more expressly is the acies formed—whether of one perceiving from the body which lies adjacent in place, or of one thinking from the image of the body which is contained in memory.

Quod ergo est ad corporis sensum aliquod corpus in loco, hoc est ad animi aciem similitudo corporis in memoria; et quod est aspicientis uisio ad eam speciem corporis ex qua sensus formatur, hoc est uisio cogitantis ad imaginem corporis in memoria constitutam ex qua formatur acies animi; et quod est intentio uoluntatis ad corpus uisum uisionemque copulandam ut fiat ibi quaedam unitas trium quamuis eorum sit diuersa natura, hoc est eadem uoluntatis intentio ad copulandam imaginem corporis quae inest in memoria et uisionem cogitantis, id est formam quam cepit acies animi rediens ad memoriam, ut fiat et hic quaedam unitas ex tribus non iam naturae diuersitate discretis sed unius eiusdemque substantiae quia hoc totum intus est et totum unus animus.

What therefore a certain body in place is to the sense of the body, this a likeness of a body in memory is to the keen-sight of the mind; and what the vision of the onlooker is to that species of body from which sense is formed, this the vision of the thinker is to the image of a body established in memory, from which the keen-sight of the mind is formed; and what the intention of the will is toward coupling the seen body and the vision, so that there be made there a certain unity of three, although their nature is diverse, this is the same intention of the will toward coupling the image of the body which is in memory and the vision of the thinker, that is, the form which the keen-sight of the mind took on as it returned to memory, so that here too there be made a certain unity out of three, now no longer separated by diversity of nature but of one and the same substance, because this whole is within and the whole is one mind.

[8] Sicut autem cum forma et species corporis interierit non potest ad eam uoluntas sensum reuocare cernentis, ita cum imago quam memoria gerit obliuione deleta est non erit quo animi aciem formandam uoluntas recordando retorqueat.

[8] Just as, however, when the form and species of the body have perished, the will of the beholder cannot recall the sense to it, so, when the image which memory bears has been deleted by oblivion, there will be nothing to which the will, by remembering, may bend back in order to form the mind’s gaze.

[V] Sed quia praeualet animus non solum oblita uerum etiam non sensa nec experta confingere ea quae non exciderunt augendo, minuendo, commutando, et pro arbitrio componendo, saepe imaginatur quasi ita sit aliquid quod aut scit non ita esse aut nescit ita esse. In quo genere cauendum est ne aut mentiatur ut decipiat aut opinetur ut decipiatur. Quibus duobus malis euitatis nihil ei obsunt imaginata phantasmata sicut nihil obsunt experta sensibilia et retenta memoriter si neque cupide appetantur si iuuant neque turpiter fugiantur si offendunt.

[5] But because the mind has the power not only to fashion things forgotten, but even things not sensed nor experienced, out of those which have not fallen out, by augmenting, diminishing, changing, and composing at will, it often imagines as though something were thus which either it knows is not thus or does not know to be thus. In which kind one must beware lest either it lie so as to deceive or opine so as to be deceived. With these two evils avoided, imagined phantasms do it no harm, just as experienced sensibles and things retained by memory do no harm, if they are neither greedily desired if they help nor shamefully shunned if they offend.

Cum autem in his uoluntas relictis melioribus auida uolutatur, immunda fit, atque ita et cum adsunt perniciose et cum absunt perniciosius cogitantur. Male itaque uiuitur et deformiter secundum trinitatem hominis exterioris quia et illam trinitatem quae licet interius imaginetur, exteriora tamen imaginatur, sensibilium corporaliumque utendorum causa peperit. Nullus enim eis uti posset etiam bene nisi sensarum rerum imagines memoria tenerentur, et nisi pars maxima uoluntatis in superioribus atque interioribus habitet, eaque ipsa quae commodatur siue foris corporibus siue intus imaginibus eorum nisi quidquid in eis capit ad meliorem uerioremque uitam referat atque in eo fine cuius intuitu haec agenda iudicat adquiescat.

But when, in these things, the will, with better things left behind, rolls itself about avidly, it becomes unclean, and thus both when they are present they are thought of perniciously, and when they are absent, more perniciously. Ill, therefore, is life lived and deformedly according to the trinity of the outer man, because even that trinity which, although imagined within, nevertheless imagines externals, has been brought forth for the sake of using sensible and corporeal things. For no one could use them even well unless the images of things sensed were held in memory, and unless the greater part of the will dwells in the higher and inner things; and that very thing which is lent either outwardly to bodies or inwardly to their images, unless it refers whatever it takes in among them to a better and truer life and comes to rest in that end in view of which it judges these things are to be done.

Quid aliud facimus nisi quod nos apostolus facere prohibet dicens: Nolite conformari huic saeculo?

What else are we doing except what the apostle forbids us to do, saying: “Do not be conformed to this age”?

Quapropter non est ista trinitas imago dei. Ex ultima quippe, id est corporea creatura qua superior est anima in ipsa anima fit per sensum corporis. Nec tamen est omni modo dissimilis.

Therefore, that trinity is not the image of God. For from the lowest, that is, from the corporeal creature, to which the soul is superior, it comes to be in the soul itself through the sense of the body. Yet it is not in every way dissimilar.

Quid enim non pro suo genere ac pro suo modulo habet similitudinem dei quandoquidem deus fecit omnia bona ualde non ob aliud nisi quia ipse summe bonus est? In quantum ergo bonum est quidquid est in tantum scilicet quamuis longe distantem habet tamen nonnullam similitudinem summi boni, et si naturalem utique rectam et ordinatam; si autem uitiosam utique turpem atque peruersam. Nam et animae in ipsis peccatis suis non nisi quandam similitudinem dei superba et praepostera et, ut ita dicam, seruili libertate sectantur.

For what, indeed, does not, according to its own kind and according to its own measure, have a similitude of God, since God made all things very good for no other reason except that he himself is supremely good? Insofar, therefore, as whatever is is good, to that extent—although far distant—it nevertheless has some similitude of the Highest Good; and if it be natural, assuredly straight and ordered; but if vicious, assuredly base and perverse. For even souls, in their very sins, pursue nothing but a certain similitude of God by a proud and preposterous and, so to speak, servile liberty.

Ita nec primis parentibus nostris persuaderi peccatum posset nisi diceretur: Eritis sicut dii. Non sane omne quod in creaturis aliquo modo simile est deo etiam eius imago dicenda est, sed illa sola qua superior ipse solus est. Ea quippe de illo prorsus exprimitur inter quam et ipsum nulla interiecta natura est.

Thus neither could sin be persuaded to our first parents unless it were said: You shall be like gods. Not, to be sure, is everything which in creatures is in some way similar to God also to be called His image, but only that by which He Himself alone is superior. For that indeed is wholly expressed from Him, between which and Himself no nature is interposed.

[9] Visionis igitur illius, id est formae quae fit in sensu cernentis, quasi parens est forma corporis ex qua fit. Sed parens illa non uera, unde nec ista uera proles est; neque enim omnino inde gignitur quoniam aliquid aliud adhibetur corpori ut ex illo formetur, id est sensus uidentis. Quocirca id amare alienari est.

[9] Of that vision, that is, of the form which is made in the sense of the discerner, the quasi-parent is the form of the body from which it is made. But that parent is not true, whence neither is this a true offspring; for it is not altogether generated from that, since something else is adhibited to the body so that from it it may be formed, that is, the sense of the one seeing. Wherefore to love that is to be alienated.

Itaque uoluntas quae utrumque coniungit quasi parentem et quasi prolem magis spiritalis est quam utrumlibet illorum. Nam corpus illud quod cernitur omnino spiritale non est; uisio uero quae fit in sensu habet admixtum aliquid spiritale quia sine anima fieri non potest, sed non totum ita est quoniam ille qui formatur corporis sensus est. Voluntas ergo quae utrumque coniungit magis, ut dixi, spiritalis agnoscitur, et ideo tamquam personam spiritus insinuare incipit in illa trinitate.

Therefore the will which conjoins both, as it were the parent and as it were the progeny, is more spiritual than either of them. For that body which is beheld is in no way spiritual; but the vision which is made in the sense has something spiritual admixed, because it cannot come to be without the soul, yet it is not wholly so, since that which is formed is the body’s sense. Therefore the will which joins both is acknowledged, as I said, to be more spiritual, and for that reason it begins to insinuate, as it were, the person of the Spirit in that trinity.

Sed magis pertinet ad sensum formatum quam ad illud corpus unde formatur. Sensus enim animantis et uoluntas animae est non lapidis aut alicuius corporis quod uidetur. Non ergo ab illo quasi parente procedit, sed nec ab ista quasi prole, hoc est uisione ac forma quae in sensu est.

But it pertains more to the formed sense than to that body whence it is formed. For sense is of an animate being, and will is of the soul, not of a stone or of any body that is seen. Therefore it does not proceed from that as if from a parent, nor yet from this as if from an offspring, that is, from the vision and the form which is in the sense.

Prius enim quam uisio fieret iam erat uoluntas quae formandum sensum cernendo corpori admouit, sed nondum erat placitum. Quomodo enim placeret quod nondum erat uisum? Placitum autem quieta uoluntas est.

For before the vision came to be, there was already the will, which, by discerning, applied the sense-to-be-formed to the body; but there was not yet an approval. For how would that please which had not yet been seen? But “approval” is a quiet will.

Ideoque nec quasi prolem uisionis possumus dicere uoluntatem quia erat ante uisionem, nec quasi parentem quia non ex uoluntate sed ex uiso corpore formata et expressa est.

And therefore we can neither call the will, as it were, the progeny of the vision, because it existed before the vision, nor, as it were, the parent, because the vision was formed and expressed not from the will but from the body seen.

[10] Finem fortasse uoluntatis et requiem possumus recte dicere uisionem ad hoc dumtaxat unum; neque enim propterea nihil aliud uolet quia uidet aliquid quod uolebat.

[10] Perhaps we can rightly call vision the end and rest of the will, but only to this one point; for it will not on that account will nothing else, because it sees something which it had willed.

[VI] Non itaque omnino ipsa uoluntas hominis cuius finis non est nisi beatitudo, sed ad hoc unum interim uoluntas uidendi finem non habet nisi uisionem siue id referat ad aliud siue non referat. Si enim non referat ad aliud uisionem sed tantum uoluit ut uideret, non est disputandum quomodo ostendatur finem uoluntatis esse uisionem; manifestum est enim. Si autem referat ad aliud, uult utique aliud nec iam uidendi uoluntas erit, aut si uidendi, non hoc uidendi.

[6] Accordingly, not, in the absolute, the will itself of man, whose end is nothing but beatitude; but for this one thing for the time being, the will-to-see has no end except vision, whether it refer this to something else or not. For if it do not refer the vision to something else but only willed in order that it might see, there is no need to dispute how it may be shown that the end of the will is vision; for it is manifest. But if it refer it to something else, it of course wills something else, and it will no longer be a will of seeing—or, if a will of seeing, not a will of seeing this.

Tamquam si uelit quisque uidere cicatricem ut inde doceat uulnus fuisse, aut si uelit uidere fenestram ut per fenestram uideat transeuntes; omnes istae atque aliae tales uoluntates suos proprios fines habent qui referuntur ad finem illius uoluntatis qua uolumus beate uiuere et ad eam peruenire uitam quae non referatur ad aliud sed amanti per se ipsa sufficiat. Voluntas ergo uidendi finem habet uisionem, et uoluntas hanc rem uidendi finem habet huius rei uisionem. Voluntas itaque uidendi cicatricem finem suum expetit, hoc est uisionem cicatricis, et ad eam ultra non pertinet; uoluntas enim probandi uulnus fuisse alia uoluntas est, quamuis ex illa religetur, cuius item finis est probatio uulneris.

Just as if someone should wish to see a cicatrix (scar) so that from it he may demonstrate that there was a wound, or if he should wish to see a window so that through the window he may see those passing by; all these and other such volitions have their own proper ends, which are referred to the end of that volition by which we wish to live blessedly and to arrive at that life which is not referred to another thing but suffices by itself to the lover. Therefore the will of seeing has as its end vision, and the will of seeing this thing has as its end the vision of this thing. Thus the will of seeing a cicatrix seeks its own end, that is, the vision of the cicatrix, and beyond that it does not extend; for the will of proving that there was a wound is another will, although it is tied to that former one, whose end likewise is the proof of the wound.

Et uoluntas uidendi fenestram finem habet fenestrae uisionem; altera est enim quae ex ista nectitur uoluntas per fenestram uidendi transeuntes, cuius item finis est uisio transeuntium. Rectae autem sunt uoluntates et omnes sibimet religatae si bona est illa quo cunctae referuntur; si autem praua est, prauae sunt omnes. Et ideo rectarum uoluntatum conexio iter est quoddam ascendentium ad beatitudinem quod certis uelut passibus agitur; prauarum autem atque distortarum uoluntatum implicatio uinculum est quo alligabitur qui hoc agit ut proiciatur in tenebras exteriores.

And the will of seeing the window has its end in the vision of the window; for there is another will which is linked from this—the will of seeing the passers-by through the window—whose end likewise is the vision of the passers-by. But wills are right, and all bound together, if that is good to which all are referred; if, however, it is depraved, all are depraved. And therefore the connection of right wills is a certain road of those ascending to beatitude, which is carried on by, as it were, fixed steps; but the entanglement of depraved and distorted wills is a bond by which he who does this will be bound, so that he may be cast into the outer darkness.

Beati ergo qui factis et moribus cantant canticum graduum, et uae his qui trahunt peccata sicut restem longam. Sic est autem requies uoluntatis quem dicimus finem si adhuc refertur ad aliud quemadmodum possumus dicere requiem pedis esse in ambulando cum ponitur unde alius innitatur cum passibus pergitur. Si autem aliquid ita placet ut in eo cum aliqua delectatione uoluntats adquiescat, nondum est tamen illud quo tenditur, sed et hoc refertur ad aliud; deputetur non tamquam patria ciuis sed tamquam refectio uel etiam mansio uiatoris.

Blessed, therefore, are they who by deeds and morals sing the Canticle of Degrees, and woe to those who drag sins like a long rope. Now the rest of the will, which we call the end, is of such a sort, if it is still referred to something else, as when we can say that there is a rest of the foot in walking when it is set down so that the other may lean upon it, as one proceeds with steps. But if something so pleases that in it the will with some delectation acquiesces, nevertheless it is not yet that toward which one is tending, but this too is referred to another; let it be reckoned not as the fatherland of a citizen but as the refection, or even the lodging, of a wayfarer.

[VII 11] Iam uero in alia trinitate interiore quidem quam est ista in sensibilibus et in sensibus sed tamen quae inde concepta est, cum iam non ex corpore sensus corporis sed ex memoria formatur acies animi cum in ipsa memoria species inhaeserit corporis quod forinsecus sensimus, illam speciem quae in memoria est quasi parentem dicimus eius quae fit in phantasia cogitantis. Erat enim in memoria et priusquam cogitaretur a nobis sicut erat corpus in loco et priusquam sentiretur ut uisio fieret. Sed cum cogitatur ex illa quam memoria tenet, exprimitur in acie cogitantis et reminiscendo formatur ea species quae quasi proles est eius quam memoria tenet.

[7 11] Now indeed in another trinity, interior, to be sure, than that which is in sensibles and in the senses, yet nevertheless conceived from it, when now the edge/acuity of the mind is formed not from the body by the sense of the body, but from memory, when in memory itself there has adhered the species (image) of the body which we sensed from without, we call that species which is in memory as it were the parent of that which comes to be in the phantasy of the one thinking. For it was in memory even before it was thought by us, just as the body was in a place even before it was sensed so that a vision might come to be. But when it is thought from that which memory holds, it is expressed in the acuity of the thinker, and by remembering there is formed that species which is, as it were, the offspring of that which memory holds.

Sed neque illa uera parens, neque ista uera proles est. Acies quippe animi quae formatur ex memoria cum recordando aliquid cogitamus non ex ea specie procedit quam meminimus uisam quandoquidem eorum meminisse non possemus nisi uidissemus; acies autem animi quae reminiscendo formatur erat etiam priusquam corpus quod meminimus uideremus. Quanto magis priusquam id memoriae mandaremus.

But neither that is a true parent, nor this a true progeny. For the acies of the mind, which is formed from memory when by recalling we think something, does not proceed from that species which we remember as seen—since indeed we could not remember those things unless we had seen them; but the acies of the mind which is formed by remembering existed even before we saw the body which we remember. How much more before we committed it to memory.

Quamquam itaque forma quae fit in acie recordantis ex ea fiat quae inest memoriae, ipsa tamen acies non inde exsistit, sed erat ante ista. Consequens est autem ut si non est illa uera parens, nec ista uera sit proles. Sed et illa quasi parens et ista quasi proles aliquid insinuant unde interiora atque ueriora exercitatius certiusque uideantur.

Although therefore the form which is made in the mind’s eye of the one recalling is made from that which is present in memory, nevertheless the mind’s eye itself does not exist from thence, but existed before these things. It follows, moreover, that if that is not a true parent, neither is this a true progeny. But both that as it were a parent and this as it were an offspring insinuate something, whence the more inward and truer things may be seen more practicedly and more certainly.

[12] Difficilius iam plane discernitur utrum uoluntas quae memoriae copulat uisionem non sit alicuius eorum siue parens siue proles, et hanc discretionis difficultatem facit eiusdem naturae atque substantiae parilitas et aequalitas. Neque enim sicut foris facile discernebatur formatus sensus a sensibili corpore et uoluntas ab utroque propter naturae diuersitatem quae inest ab inuicem omnibus tribus, de qua satis supra disseruimus, ita et hic potest. Quamuis enim haec trinitas de qua nunc quaeritur forinsecus inuecta est animo, intus tamen agitur et non est quidquam eius praeter ipsius animi naturam.

[12] It is now plainly more difficult to discern whether the will which couples the vision to memory is the parent or the progeny of either of them; and the parity and equality of the same nature and substance make this difficulty of discrimination. For neither can it be done here as, outside, the formed sense-perception was easily discerned from the sensible body, and the will from both, on account of the diversity of nature which is present between all three mutually, about which we have discoursed enough above. For although this trinity about which inquiry is now made has been brought in from without into the mind, yet it is transacted within, and there is nothing of it apart from the mind’s own nature.

Quo igitur pacto demonstrari potest, uoluntatem nec quasi parentem nec quasi prolem esse, siue corporeae similitudinis quae memoria continetur siue eius quae inde cum recordamur exprimitur, quando utrumque in cogitando ita copulat ut tamquam unum singulariter appareat et discerni nisi ratione non possit? Atque illud primum uidendum est non esse posse uoluntatem reminscendi nisi uel totum uel aliquid rei eius quam reminisci uolumus in penetralibus memoriae teneamus. Quod enim omni modo et omni ex parte obliti fuerimus, nec reminiscendi uoluntas exoritur quoniam quidquid recordari uolumus recordati iam sumus in memoria nostra esse uel fuisse.

By what pact, then, can it be demonstrated that the will is neither as it were a parent nor as it were an offspring, whether of the corporeal similitude which is contained in memory or of that which from it is expressed when we recollect, since in thinking it so couples both that it appears singly as if one and cannot be discerned save by reason? And this first must be seen: there cannot be a will of reminiscing unless we hold either the whole or some part of the thing which we wish to remember in the inner chambers of memory. For that which we have forgotten in every way and in every part, not even a will of reminiscing arises; since whatever we wish to recall, we have already recalled to be or to have been in our memory.

Verbi gratia si recordari uolo quid heri coenauerim, aut recordatus iam sum coenasse me, aut si et hoc nondum, certe circa ipsum tempus aliquid recordatus sum, si nihil aliud ipsum saltem hesternum diem et eius eam partem qua coenari solet et quid sit coenare. Nam si nihil tale recordatus essem, quid heri coenauerim recordari ulle non possem. Vnde intellegi potest uoluntatem reminiscendi ab his quidem rebus quae memoria continentur procedere adiunctis simul eis quae inde per recordationem cernendo exprimuntur, id est ex copulatione rei cuiusdam quam recordati sumus et uisionis quae inde facta est in acie cogitantis cum recordati sumus.

For example, if I want to recall what I dined on yesterday, either I have already recalled that I dined, or, if not even this, surely I have recalled something about that very time—if nothing else, at least the very day yesterday and that part of it in which one is accustomed to dine, and what it is to dine. For if I had recalled nothing of this sort, I could by no means recall what I dined on yesterday. Whence it can be understood that the will to reminisce proceeds from those things which are contained in memory, with those at the same time adjoined which from there are expressed by discerning through recordation—that is, from the coupling of a certain thing which we have recalled and of the vision which from there has been made in the keen gaze of the thinker when we have recalled.

Ipsa quae utrumque copulat uoluntas requirit et aliud quod quasi uicinum est atque contiguum recordanti. Tot igitur huius generis trinitates quot recordationes quia nulla est earum ubi non haec tria sint, illud quod in memoria reconditum est etiam antequam cogitetur, et illud quod fit in cogitatione cum cernitur, et uoluntas utrumque coniungens et ex utroque ac tertia se ipsa unum aliquid complens. An potius ita cognoscitur una quaedam in hoc genere trinitas ut unum aliquid generaliter dicamus quidquid corporalium specierum in memoria latet, et rursus unum aliquid generalem uisionem animi talia recordantis atque cogitantis quorum duorum copulationi tertia coniungitur copulatrix uoluntas ut sit hoc totum unum quiddam ex quibusdam tribus?

The will itself, which couples both, also requires another thing which is, as it were, near and contiguous to the one remembering. Therefore there are as many trinities of this kind as there are recollections, since there is none of them where these three are not: that which is stored in memory even before it is thought, and that which is made in thinking when it is discerned, and the will joining both, and from both, and as the third, itself completing one single thing. Or rather, is a certain one trinity in this kind known thus: that we speak generally of one something—whatever of corporeal species lies hidden in memory—and again of one something—the general vision of the mind recalling and thinking such things—to the coupling of which two a third, the coupling will, is joined, so that this whole may be one certain something out of certain three?

[VIII] Sed quoniam non potest acies animi simul omnia quae memoria tenet uno aspectu contueri, alternant uicissim cedendo ac succedendo trinitates cogitationum, atque ita fit ista innumerabiliter numerosissima trinitas, nec tamen infinita si numerus in memoria reconditarum rerum non excedatur. Ex quo enim coepit unusquisque sentire corpora quolibet corporis sensu, etiam si posset adiungere quae oblitus est, certus ac determinatus profecto numerus foret quamuis innumerabilis. Dicimus enim innumerabilia non solum infinita sed etiam quae ita finita sunt ut facultatem numerantis excedant.

[8] But since the sharp sight of the mind cannot at the same time contemplate with one aspect all the things that it holds in memory, the trinities of thoughts alternate in turn by yielding and succeeding, and thus there comes to be that trinity innumerably most numerous; and yet not infinite, if the number of things laid up in memory be not exceeded. For from the point when each person began to perceive bodies by whatever sense of the body, even if he could add those which he has forgotten, assuredly there would be a certain and determinate number, although innumerable. For we call innumerable not only things infinite, but also those which, though finite, are such as to exceed the capacity of the one counting.

[13] Sed hinc aduerti aliquanto manifestius potest aliud esse quod reconditum memoria tenet et aliud quod inde in cogitatione recordantis exprimitur, quamuis cum fit utriusque copulatio unum idemque uideatur, quia meminisse non possumus corporum species nisi tot quot sensimus et quantas sensimus et sicut sensimus (ex corporis enim sensu eas in memoria combibit animus); uisiones tamen illae cogitantium ex his quidem rebus quae sunt in memoria, sed tamen innumerabiliter atque omnino infinite multiplicantur atque uariantur. Vnum quippe solem memini quia sicuti est unum uidi; si uoluero autem duos cogito uel tres uel quotquot uolo, sed ex eadem memoria qua unum memini formatur acies multos cogitantis. Et tantum memini quantum uidi; si enim maiorem uel minorem memini quam uidi, iam non memini quod uidi et ideo nec memini.

[13] But from this it can be noticed somewhat more manifestly that what is held recondite by memory is one thing and what from it is expressed in the thinking of the rememberer is another, although when the copulation of both is made it seems one and the same, because we cannot remember the species of bodies except as many as we sensed, and as great as we sensed, and just as we sensed (for from the body’s sense the mind imbibes them into memory); yet those visions of the ones thinking, though from the very things which are in memory, are nevertheless multiplied and varied innumerably and altogether infinitely. I remember one sun indeed, because I saw one as it is one; but if I will, I think two, or three, or as many as I will, yet from that same memory by which I remember one the mental gaze of one thinking many is formed. And I remember only as much as I saw; for if I remember something greater or smaller than I saw, then I no longer remember what I saw, and therefore I do not remember.

quia uero memini, tantum memini quantum uidi. Vel maiorem tamen pro uoluntate cogito uel minorem. Et ita memini ut uidi, cogito autem sicut uolo currentem et ubi uolo stantem, unde uolo et quo uolo uenientem.

but inasmuch as I do remember, I remember only as much as I saw. Yet I think a greater or a smaller, according to my will. And thus I remember as I saw; but I think as I will—running, and standing where I will, coming from whence I will and whither I will.

Quadrum etiam mihi cogitare in promptu est cum rotundum meminerim, et cuiuslibet coloris cum solem uiridem numquam uiderim et ideo non meminerim, atque ut solem ita cetera. Hae autem rerum formae quoniam corporales atque sensibiles sunt, errat quidem animus cum eas opinatur eo modo foris esse quomodo intus cogitat uel cum iam interierunt foris et adhuc in memoria retinentur, uel cum aliter etiam quod meminimus non recordandi fide sed cogitandi uarietate formatur.

It is also easy for me to think a square when I have remembered the rotund, and of any color whatsoever, although I have never seen a green sun and therefore do not remember it, and as with the sun, so with the rest. But these forms of things, since they are corporeal and sensible, the mind indeed errs when it opines that they exist outside in the manner that it thinks them inside, either when they have already perished outside and are still retained in memory, or when even what we remember is formed otherwise, not by the faith of recollecting but by the variety of thinking.

[14] Quamquam saepissime credamus etiam uera narrantibus quae ipsi sensibus perceperunt. Quae cum in ipso auditu quando narrantur cogitamus, non uidetur ad memoriam retorqueri acies ut fiant uisiones cogitantium; neque enim ea nobis recordantibus sed alio narrante cogitamus. Atque illa trinitas non hic uidetur expleri quae fit cum species in memoria latens et uisio recordantis tertia uoluntate copulantur.

[14] Although very often we believe even those who narrate true things which they themselves have perceived by their senses. When, at the very hearing, as they are being narrated, we think about them, the gaze does not seem to be turned back to memory so that there come to be the visions of those who are thinking; for we think them not as we ourselves are recollecting, but while another is narrating. And that Trinity does not here seem to be fulfilled which comes about when the form lying hidden in memory and the vision of the one recollecting are coupled by a third, the will.

Non enim quod latebat in memoria mea sed quod audio, cogito cum aliquid mihi narratur. Non ipsas uoces loquentis dico ne quisquam putet in illam me exisse trinitatem quae foris in sensibilibus et in sensibus agitur, sed eas cogito corporum species quas narrans uerbis sonisque significat, quas utique non reminiscens sed audiens cogito. Sed si diligentius consideremus, nec tunc exceditur memoriae modus.

For it is not what was lying hidden in my memory, but what I hear, that I think when something is narrated to me. I do not mean the very voices of the speaker, lest anyone think that I have gone out into that trinity which is enacted outside in sensibles and in the senses; rather, I think those species of bodies which the narrator signifies by words and sounds, which assuredly I think not as remembering but as hearing. But if we consider more diligently, not even then is the mode of memory exceeded.

Neque enim uel intellegere possem narrantem si ea quae dicit et si contexta tunc primum audirem, non tamen generaliter singula meminissem. Qui enim mihi narrat uerbi gratia aliquem montem silua exutum et oleis indutum, ei narrat qui meminerim species et montium et siluarum et olearum. Quas si oblitus essem, quid diceret omnino nescirem et ideo narrationem illam cogitare non possem.

For neither could I even understand the one narrating if I were now for the first time hearing the things he says and their contexture, unless I nevertheless remembered in general the several things. For he who tells me, for example, of a certain mountain stripped of forest and clothed with olive-trees, tells it to one who remembers the species (forms) of mountains and of forests and of olive-trees. Which, if I had forgotten, I should not at all know what he was saying, and therefore I would not be able to think that narration.

Ita fit ut omnis qui corporalia cogitat, siue ipse aliquid confingat, siue audiat aut legat uel praeterita narrantem uel futura praenuntiantem, ad memoriam suam recurrat et ibi reperiat modum atque mensuram omnium formarum quas cogitans intuetur. Nam neque colorem quem numquam uidit neque figuram corporis nec sonum quem numquam audiuit nec saporem quem numquam gustauit nec odorem quem numquam olefecit nec ullam contrectationem corporis quam numquam sensit potest quisquam omnino cogitare. At si propterea nemo aliquid corporale cogitat nisi quod sensit, quia nemo meminit corporale aliquid nisi quod sensit, sicut in corporibus sentiendi sic in memoria est cogitandi modus.

Thus it comes about that everyone who cogitates corporeal things, whether he himself fashions something, or hears or reads one who narrates past things or foretells future things, runs back to his memory and there finds the mode and the measure of all the forms which, as he thinks, he beholds. For neither a color which he has never seen, nor a figure of a body, nor a sound which he has never heard, nor a savor which he has never tasted, nor an odor which he has never smelled, nor any handling of a body which he has never felt can anyone at all think. But if for that reason no one cogitates anything corporeal except what he has sensed, because no one remembers anything corporeal except what he has sensed, just as in bodies there is a mode of sensing, so in memory there is a mode of thinking.

Sensus enim accipit speciem ab eo corpore quod sentimus et a sensu memoria, a memoria uero acies cogitantis.

For sense receives the appearance from that body which we sense, and from sense, memory; from memory, in turn, the acumen of the one thinking.

[15] Voluntas porro sicut adiungit sensum corpori, sic memoriam sensui, sic cogitantis aciem memoriae. Quae autem conciliat ista atque coniungit, ipsa etiam disiungit ac separat, id est uoluntas. Sed a sentiendis corporibus motu corporis separat corporis sensus ne aliquid sentiamus aut ut sentire desinamus ueluti cum oculos ab eo quod uidere nolumus auertimus uel claudimus; sic aures a sonis, sic nares ab odoribus.

[15] The will, moreover, just as it adjoins sense to the body, so memory to sense, so the acuity of the thinker to memory. But that which conciliates and conjoins these, the same also disjoins and separates—namely, the will. Yet it separates the senses of the body from bodies-to-be-sensed by movement of the body, lest we sense anything or so that we cease to sense, as when we turn our eyes away from what we do not wish to see or close them; so the ears from sounds, so the nostrils from odors.

Ita etiam uel os claudendo uel aliquid ex ore respuendo a saporibus auersamur. In tactu quoque uel subtrahimus corpus ne tangamus quod nolumus, uel si iam tangebamus, abicimus aut repellimus. Ita motu corporis agit uoluntas ne sensus corporis rebus sensibilibus copuletur.

Thus also, either by closing the mouth or by spitting something out from the mouth, we turn away from savors. In touch likewise, either we withdraw the body so that we may not touch what we do not wish, or, if we were already touching it, we cast it away or repel it. Thus by the motion of the body the will acts, so that the sense of the body may not be coupled to sensible things.

Et agit hoc quantum potest. Nam cum in hac actione propter conditionem seruilis mortalitatis difficultatem patitur, cruciatus est consequens ut uoluntati nihil reliqui fiat nisi tolerantia. Memoriam uero a sensu uoluntas auertit cum in aliud intenta non ei sinit inhaerere praesentia.

And it does this as far as it is able. For since in this action, on account of the condition of servile mortality, it suffers difficulty, torment is consequent, so that nothing is left to the will except tolerance. But the will averts memory from sense when, intent upon something else, it does not allow the things present to inhere in it.

Quod animaduertere facile est cum saepe coram loquentem nobis aliquem aliud cogitando non audisse nobis uidemur. Falsum est autem; audiuimus enim sed non meminimus subinde per aurium sensum labentibus uocibus alienato nutu uoluntatis per quem solent infigi memoriae. Verius itaque dixerimus cum tale aliquid accidit: 'Non meminimus,' quam: 'Non audiuimus.' Nam et legentibus euenit et mihi saepissime ut perlecta pagina uel epistula nesciam quid legerim et repetam.

Which it is easy to observe when often, with someone speaking in our presence, we, by thinking of something else, seem to ourselves not to have heard. Yet that is false; for we did hear, but we do not remember, the voices slipping away through the sense of the ears, the nod of the will—by which they are wont to be infixed into memory—being alienated. More truly, therefore, we should say when such a thing happens: 'We do not remember,' rather than: 'We did not hear.' For it also befalls readers, and to me very often, that, a page or a letter read through, I do not know what I have read and I go back again.

In aliud quippe intento nutu uoluntatis non sic est adhibita memoria sensui corporis quomodo ipse sensus adhibitus est litteris. Ita et ambulantes intenta in aliud uoluntate nesciunt qua transierint. Quod si non uidissent, non ambulassent aut maiore intentione palpando ambulassent, praesertim si per incognita pergerent; sed quia facile ambulauerunt, utique uiderunt.

For when the nod of the will is intent on something else, the memory is not applied to the bodily sense in the way that the sense itself is applied to the letters. So too, people walking, with the will intent on something else, do not know by where they have passed. But if they had not seen, they would not have walked, or they would have walked with greater intention, by groping, especially if they were proceeding through unknown places; but because they walked easily, they certainly saw.

Quia uero non sicut sensus oculorum locis quacumque pergebant ita ipsi sensui memoria iungebatur, nullo modo id quod uiderunt etiam recentissimum meminisse potuerunt. Iam porro ab eo quod in memoria est animi aciem uelle auertere nihil est aliud quam non inde cogitare.

Because, in truth, since memory was not joined to the sense itself in the way the sense of the eyes was applied to the places wherever they were proceeding, they were in no way able to remember what they had seen, even the most recent. Moreover, to will to avert the mind’s gaze from that which is in memory is nothing else than not to think about it.

[IX 16] In hac igitur distributione cum incipimus ab specie corporis et peruenimus usque ad speciem quae fit in contuitu cogitantis, quattuor species reperiuntur quasi gradatim natae altera ex altera, secunda de prima, tertia de secunda, quarta de tertia. Ab specie quippe corporis quod cernitur exoritur ea quae fit in sensu cernentis, et ab hac ea quae fit in memoria, et ab hac ea quae fit in acie cogitantis. Quapropter uoluntas quasi parentem cum prole ter copulat: primo speciem corporis cum ea quam gignit in corporis sensu, et ipsam rursus cum ea quae ex illa fit in memoria, atque istam quoque tertio cum ea quae ex illa paritur in cogitantis intuitu.

[9 16] In this division, therefore, when we begin from the appearance of the body and arrive up to the appearance that is made in the contemplation of the thinker, four appearances are found, as it were born step by step, one from another: the second from the first, the third from the second, the fourth from the third. From the appearance, to be sure, of the body which is discerned, there arises that which is made in the sense of the one discerning; and from this, that which is made in memory; and from this, that which is made in the keen gaze of the thinker. Wherefore the will, as if a parent, thrice couples with its offspring: first, the appearance of the body with that which it begets in the body’s sense; and this again with that which from it is made in memory; and this one also, thirdly, with that which from it is brought forth in the intuition of the thinker.

Sed media copula quae secunda est, cum sit uicinior, non tam similis est primae quam tertiae. Visiones enim duae sunt, una sentientis, altera cogitantis. Vt autem possit esse uisio cogitantis ideo fit in memoria de uisione sentientis simile aliquid quo se ita conuertat in cogitando acies animi, sicut se in cernendo conuertit ad corpus acies oculorum.

But the middle copula, which is the second, although it is nearer, is not so similar to the first as to the third. For there are two visions: one of the perceiver, the other of the thinker. And in order that there may be a vision of the thinker, for this reason something similar is made in the memory from the vision of the perceiver, to which the gaze of the mind thus turns itself in thinking, just as in discerning the gaze of the eyes turns itself to the body.

Propterea duas in hoc genere trinitates uolui commendare, unam cum uisio sentientis formatur ex corpore, aliam cum uisio cogitantis formatur ex memoria. Mediam uero nolui quia non ibi solet uisio dici cum memoriae commendatur forma quae fit in sensu cernentis. Vbique tamen uoluntas non apparet nisi copulatrix quasi parentis et prolis.

Therefore I wished to commend two trinities in this kind: one when the vision of the one sensing is formed from the body, the other when the vision of the one cogitating is formed from memory. But I did not wish the middle one, because there “vision” is not wont to be said when the form which is made in the sense of the one perceiving is entrusted to memory. Everywhere, however, the will does not appear except as the coupler, as it were, of parent and offspring.

Et ideo undecumque procedat, nec parens nec proles dici potest.

And therefore, from whencesoever it proceeds, it can be called neither parent nor progeny.

[X 17] At enim si non meminimus nisi quod sensimus neque cogitamus nisi quod meminimus, cur plerumque falsa cogitamus cum ea quae sensimus non utique falso meminerimus nisi quia uoluntas illa quam coniunctricem ac separatricem huiuscemodi rerum iam quantum potui demonstrare curaui formandam cogitantis aciem per condita memoriae ducit ut libitum est, et ad cogitanda ea quae non meminimus ex eis quae meminimus aliud hinc, aliud inde, ut sumat impellit? Quae in unam uisionem coeuntia faciunt aliquid quod ideo falsum dicatur quia uel non est foris in rerum corporearum natura uel non de memoria uidetur expressum cum tale nihil nos sensisse meminimus. Quis enim uidit cygnum nigrum?

[10 17] But indeed, if we remember only what we have sensed and we cogitate only what we remember, why do we often cogitate false things, when we have by no means falsely remembered the things we sensed—unless because that will, which I have already, as far as I could, taken care to demonstrate to be the conjoiner and separator of matters of this sort, leads, as it pleases, the line of sight of the cogitating mind, to be shaped, through the storerooms of memory, and impels it, from the things we remember, to take up for cogitation the things we do not remember, one thing from here, another from there? Which, coalescing into one vision, make something that is therefore called false because either it is not outside in the nature of corporeal things, or it does not seem to be expressed from memory, since we remember having sensed nothing of the kind. For who has seen a black swan?

Et propterea nemo meminit. Cogitare tamen quis non potest? Facile est enim illam figuram quam uidendo cognouimus nigro colore perfundere quem nihilominus in aliis corporibus uidimus, et quia utrumque sensimus, utrumque meminimus.

And therefore no one remembers. Yet who is not able to think? For it is easy to suffuse that figure which we have come to know by seeing with black color, which nevertheless we have seen in other bodies; and because we have sensed both, we remember both.

Nec auem quadrupedem memini quia non uidi, sed phantasiam talem facillime intueor dum alicui formae uolatili qualem uidi adiungo alios duos pedes quales itidem uidi. Quapropter dum coniuncta cogitamus quae singillatim sensa meminimus, uidemur non id quod meminimus cogitare, cum id agamus moderante memoria unde sumimus omnia quae multipliciter ac uarie pro nostra uoluntate componimus. Nam neque ipsas magnitudines corporum quas numquam uidimus sine ope memoriae cogitamus.

Nor do I remember a four-footed bird because I have not seen one, but I very easily contemplate such a phantasy when to some winged form such as I have seen I add two other feet such as likewise I have seen. Wherefore, while we think together things which we remember as having been sensed singly, we seem not to be thinking that which we remember, while we do this with memory directing, whence we take all the things which we compose in multiple and various ways according to our will. For neither do we think even the magnitudes of bodies which we have never seen without the help of memory.

Quantum enim spatii solet occupare per magnitudinem mundi noster obtutus, in tantum extendimus quaslibet corporum moles cum eas maximas cogitamus. Et ratio quidem pergit in ampliora, sed phantasia non sequitur. Sequitur quippe cum infinitatem quoque numeri ratio renuntiet, quam nulla uisio corporalia cogitantis apprehendit.

Inasmuch as our gaze is accustomed to occupy a certain span of space through the magnitude of the world, to that extent we extend whatever masses of bodies when we think them as greatest. And reason indeed goes on into ampler things, but phantasy does not follow. It does follow, to be sure, when reason also reports the infinitude of number, which no vision of one cogitating corporals apprehends.

Eadem ratio docet minutissima etiam corpuscula infinite diuidi; cum tamen ad eas tenuitates uel minutias peruentum fuerit quas uisas meminimus, exiliores minutioresque phantasias iam non possumus intueri, quamuis ratio non desinat persequi ac diuidere. Ita nulla corporalia nisi aut ea quae meminimus aut ex his quae meminimus cogitamus.

The same reasoning teaches that even the tiniest corpuscles are divided infinitely; yet when it has come to those tenuities or minutiae which we remember having seen, we are no longer able to behold phantasies that are slighter and more minute, although reason does not cease to pursue and to divide. Thus we think no corporeal things except either those which we remember, or those which we think from these which we remember.

[XI 18] Sed quia numerose cogitari possunt quae singillatim sunt impressa memoriae, uidetur ad memoriam mensura, ad uisionem uero numerus pertinere quia licet innumerabilis sit multiplicitas talium uisionum, singulis tamen in memoria praescriptus est intransgressibilis modus. Mensura igitur in memoria, in uisionibus numerus apparet sicut in ipsis corporibus uisibilibus mensura quaedam est cui numerosissime coaptatur sensus uidendi, et ex uno uisibili multorum cernentium formatur aspectus ita ut etiam unus propter duorum oculorum numerum plerumque unam rem geminata specie uideat sicut supra docuimus. In his ergo rebus unde uisiones exprimuntur quaedam mensura est, in ipsis autem uisionibus numerus.

[11 18] But because the things that are imprinted singly upon memory can be thought of numerously, measure seems to pertain to memory, but number to vision; for although the multiplicity of such visions is innumerable, nevertheless for the single items in memory there has been prescribed an untransgressable limit. Measure, therefore, appears in memory; in visions, number—just as in the visible bodies themselves there is a certain measure to which the sense of seeing is most fittingly coapted; and from one visible thing the gaze of many who perceive is formed, so that even one person, on account of the number of two eyes, very often sees one thing with a twinned appearance, as we taught above. Therefore, in the things from which visions are expressed there is a certain measure, but in the visions themselves, number.

Voluntas uero quae ista coniungit et ordinat et quadam unitate copulat, nec sentiendi aut cogitandi appetitum nisi in his rebus unde uisiones formantur adquiescens conlocat, ponderi similis est. Quapropter haec tria, mensuram, numerum, pondus, etiam in ceteris omnibus rebus animaduertenda praelibauerim.

But the will, which conjoins and orders those things and couples them by a certain unity, and, acquiescing, does not place the appetite of sensing or of thinking except in those things from which the visions are formed, is similar to weight. Wherefore these three—measure, number, weight—I would briefly preface are to be adverted to in all other things as well.

Nunc interim uoluntatem copulatricem rei uisibilis atque uisionis quasi parentis et prolis, siue in sentiendo siue in cogitando, nec parentem nec prolem dici posse quomodo ualui et quibus ualui demonstraui. Vnde tempus admonet hanc eandem trinitatem in interiore homine requirere atque ab isto de quo tamdiu locutus sum animali atque carnali qui exterior dicitur introrsus tendere. Vbi speramus inuenire nos posse secundum trinitatem imaginem dei, conatus nostros illo ipso adiuuante quem omnia sicut res ipsae indicant, ita etiam sancta scriptura in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisse testatur.

Now meanwhile I have shown how I was able and by what means I was able to demonstrate that the will, the coupling force, of the visible thing and of the vision—as of parent and offspring—whether in sensing or in thinking, can be called neither parent nor offspring. Whence the time admonishes us to seek this same trinity in the inner man, and to tend inward from that animal and carnal one which is called the outer. Where we hope that we can find, according to the Trinity, the image of God, our endeavors being aided by that very one who, as the things themselves indicate, so also Holy Scripture testifies, has disposed all things in measure and number and weight.