Gaius: Commentarius Quartus

1. Superest, ut de actionibus loquamur. et si quaeramus, quot genera actionum sint, uerius uidetur duo esse, in rem et in personam. nam qui IIII esse dixerunt ex sponsionum generibus, non animaduerterunt quasdam species actionum inter genera se rettulisse.

1. It remains that we speak about actions. And if we ask how many genera of actions there are, it seems truer that there are two, in rem and in personam. For those who said there are 4, from the genera of sponsions, did not notice that they had referred certain species of actions among the genera.

2. In personam actio est, qua agimus, quotiens litigamus cum aliquo, qui nobis uel ex contractu uel ex delicto obligatus est, id est, cum intendimus DARE FACERE PRAESTARE OPORTERE.

2. An action in personam is that by which we proceed, whenever we litigate with someone who is obligated to us either from contract or from delict, that is, when we assert THAT HE OUGHT TO GIVE, DO, OR RENDER.

3. In rem actio est, cum aut corporalem rem intendimus nostram esse aut ius aliquod nobis conpetere, uelut utendi aut utendi fruendi, eundi, agendi aquamue ducendi uel altius tollendi prospiciendiue, aut cum actio ex diuerso aduersario est negatiua.

3. An action in rem is when either we assert that a corporeal thing is ours, or that some right belongs to us, such as of using or of using-and-enjoying, of going, of driving, or of conducting water, or of raising higher or of looking out; or when, conversely, the action against the adversary is negative.

4. Sic itaque discretis actionibus certum est non posse nos rem nostram ab alio ita petere: SI PARET EVM DARE OPORTERE; nec enim quod nostrum est, nobis dari potest, cum scilicet id dari nobis intellegatur, quod ita datur, ut nostrum fiat; nec res, quae nostra iam est, nostra amplius fieri potest. plane odio furum, quo magis pluribus actionibus teneantur, receptum est, ut extra poenam dupli aut quadrupli rei recipiendae nomine fures etiam hac actione teneantur: SI PARET EOS DARE OPORTERE, quamuis sit etiam aduersus eos haec actio, qua rem nostram esse petimus.

4. Thus, with actions so distinguished, it is certain that we cannot seek our own thing from another in this way: IF IT APPEARS THAT HE OUGHT TO GIVE; for what is ours cannot be given to us, since what is understood as “to be given to us” is that which is given so that it becomes ours; nor can a thing which is already ours become ours any further. Indeed, out of hatred for thieves, so that they may be held by more actions, it has been received that, in addition to the penalty of double or quadruple, thieves are also held by this action under the name of recovering the thing: IF IT APPEARS THAT THEY OUGHT TO GIVE, although there is also against them the action by which we claim that the thing is ours.

5. Appellantur autem in rem quidem actiones uindicationes, in personam uero actiones, quibus dari fieriue oportere intendimus, condictiones.

5. Actions in rem are called vindications, whereas actions in personam, by which we assert that it ought to be given or done, are called condictions.

6. Agimus autem interdum, ut rem tantum consequamur, interdum ut poenam tantum, alias ut rem et poenam.

6. We prosecute, moreover, sometimes so that we may obtain the thing only, sometimes so that we may obtain the penalty only, at other times so that we may obtain both the thing and the penalty.

7. Rem tantum persequimur uelut actionibus, quibus ex contractu agimus.

7. We pursue the thing only, as for example by the actions by which we sue arising from contract.

8. Poenam tantum persequimur uelut actione furti et iniuriarum et secundum quorundam opinionem actione ui bonorum raptorum; nam ipsius rei et uindicatio et condictio nobis conpetit.

8. We pursue the penalty only, for example by the action of theft and of injuries, and, according to the opinion of some, by the action for goods carried off with force; for as to the thing itself, both vindication and condiction are competent to us.

9. Rem uero et poenam persequimur uelut ex his causis, ex quibus aduersus infitiantem in duplum agimus; quod accidit per actionem iudicati, depensi, damni iniuriae legis Aquiliae, aut legatorum nomine, quae per damnationem certa relicta sunt.

9. But we pursue both the thing and the penalty, as in those causes from which we sue for double against one who denies; which happens through the action on a judgment (iudicati), the action of depensi, the action for damage-injury of the Aquilian law, or in respect of legacies which have been left as certain by condemnation.

10. Quaedam praeterea sunt actiones, quae ad legis actionem exprimuntur, quaedam sua ui ac potestate constant. quod ut manifestum fiat, opus est, ut prius de legis actionibus loquamur.

10. Moreover, there are certain actions which are expressed in imitation of the legis actio, and certain others that subsist by their own force and authority. In order that this may be made manifest, there is need that we first speak about the legis actiones.

11. Actiones, quas in usu ueteres habuerunt, legis actiones appellabantur uel ideo, quod legibus proditae erant, quippe tunc edicta praetoris, quibus conplures actiones introductae sunt, nondum in usu habebantur, uel ideo, quia ipsarum legum uerbis accommodatae erant et ideo immutabiles proinde atque leges obseruabantur. unde eum, qui de uitibus succisis ita egisset, ut in actione uites nominaret, responsum est rem perdidisse, quia debuisset arbores nominare, eo quod lex XII tabularum, ex qua de uitibus succisis actio conpeteret, generaliter de arboribus succisis loqueretur.

11. The actions which the ancients had in use were called actions at law, either because they had been brought forth by the laws—for at that time the edicts of the praetor, by which many actions were introduced, were not yet in use—or because they were accommodated to the very words of the laws and for that reason were observed as unchangeable just like the laws. Whence, when someone proceeded about vines cut down in such a way that in the action he named “vines,” it was answered that he had lost the case, because he ought to have named “trees,” for the law of the 12 Tables, from which an action would lie concerning cut-down vines, spoke generally of trees cut down.

12. Lege autem agebatur modis quinque: sacramento, per iudicis postulationem, per condictionem, per manus iniectionem, per pignoris capionem.

12. But one proceeded at law in five modes: by sacrament, by the postulation of a judge, by condiction, by laying-on of hand, by seizure of a pledge.

13. Sacramenti actio generalis erat. de quibus enim rebus ut aliter ageretur, lege cautum non erat, de his sacramento agebatur: eaque actio proinde periculosa erat falsi ******** atque hoc tempore periculosa est actio certae creditae pecuniae propter sponsionem, qua periclitatur reus, si temere neget, et restipulationem, qua periclitatur actor, si non debitum petat. nam qui uictus erat, summam sacramenti praestabat poenae nomine; eaque in publicum cedebat praedesque eo nomine praetori dabantur, non ut nunc sponsionis et restipulationis poena lucro cedit aduersarii, qui uicerit.

13. The action of sacramentum was general. For concerning those matters for which it had not been provided by law that it be proceeded otherwise, concerning these one proceeded by sacramentum: and this action was correspondingly perilous with a condemnation for falsity ********; and at this time the action for a certain loaned money is perilous on account of the sponsion, whereby the defendant runs risk, if he denies rashly, and the restipulation, whereby the plaintiff runs risk, if he seeks what is not owed. For he who was defeated paid the sum of the sacramentum by way of penalty; and it went over to the public, and sureties on that account were given to the praetor, not as now the penalty of sponsion and restipulation goes as gain to the adversary who has prevailed.

14. Poena autem sacramenti aut quingenaria erat aut quinquagenaria. nam de rebus mille aeris plurisue quingentis assibus, de minoris uero quinquaginta assibus sacramento contendebatur; nam ita lege XII tabularum cautum erat. at si de libertate hominis controuersia erat, etiamsi pretiosissimus homo esset, tamen ut L assibus sacramento contenderetur, eadem lege cautum est fauore scilicet libertatis, ne onerarentur adsertores.

14. But the penalty of the sacramentum was either five hundred or fifty. For in matters of one thousand asses in bronze or more, they contended by a sacramentum of five hundred asses; but for lesser matters, by fifty asses; for thus it was provided by the Law of the 12 Tables. But if the controversy was about the liberty of a man, even if the man were most precious, nevertheless that it be contended by a sacramentum of 50 asses, the same law provided—by favor, of course, for liberty—lest the assertors be burdened.

[. . . . . vv. 11 . . . . . . . ]

15. [. . . . . . . . . . ] istae omnes actiones [. . . . . vv. 5 . . . . . . . ] captus [. . . . . vv. 5 . . . . . . . ] ad iudicem accipiundum uenirent. postea uero reuersis dabatur. ut autem die XXX.

15. [. . . . . . . . . . ] all those actions [. . . . . vv. 5 . . . . . . . ] having been seized [. . . . . vv. 5 . . . . . . . ] might come to receive a judge. afterwards indeed it was given to those returning. but that, however, on day 30.

iudex detur, per legem Pinariam factum est; ante eam autem legem statim dabatur iudex. illud ex superioribus intellegimus, si de re minoris quam M aeris agebatur, quinquagenario sacramento, non quingenario eos contendere solitos fuisse. postea tamen quam iudex datus esset, comperendinum diem, ut ad iudicem uenirent, denuntiabant; deinde cum ad iudicem uenerant, antequam apud eum causam perorarent, solebant breuiter ei et quasi per indicem rem exponere; quae dicebatur causae coniectio quasi causae suae in breue coactio.

that a judge be assigned was effected by the Pinarian law; before that law, however, a judge was assigned at once. We understand from the preceding that, if the suit was about a matter of less than 1,000 asses, they were accustomed to contend by a sacrament (wager) of 50, not of 500. Afterwards, however, when a judge had been assigned, they used to give notice of a comperendinous day, that they should come to the judge; then, when they had come to the judge, before they perorated the case before him, they were accustomed briefly to set out the matter to him, as it were by way of an index; which was called the coniectio of the case, as if a contraction of their case into a brief.

16 Si in rem agebatur, mobilia quidem et mouentia, quae modo in ius adferri adduciue possent, in iure uindicabantur ad hunc modum: qui uindicabat, festucam tenebat; deinde ipsam rem adprehendebat, uelut hominem, et ita dicebat: HVNC EGO HOMINEM EX IVRE QVIRITIVM MEVM ESSE AIO SECVNDVM SVAM CAVSAM; SICVT DIXI, ECCE TIBI, VINDICTAM INPOSVI, et simul homini festucam inponebat. aduersarius eadem similiter dicebat et faciebat. cum uterque uindicasset, praetor dicebat: MITTITE AMBO HOMINEM, illi mittebant.

16 If the action was in rem, movables indeed and things that move, which could in any way be brought or led into court, were vindicated in iure in this manner: he who was vindicating held a festuca; then he seized the very thing, for example a man, and thus he said: THIS MAN I SAY TO BE MINE BY QUIRITARY RIGHT ACCORDING TO HIS CAUSE; AS I HAVE SAID, BEHOLD, FOR YOU, I HAVE PLACED THE VINDICTA; and at the same time he placed the festuca upon the man. The adversary said and did the same likewise. When each had vindicated, the praetor said: LET BOTH OF YOU RELEASE THE MAN, and they released him.

qui prior uindicauerat, ita alterum interrogabat: POSTVLO, ANNE DICAS, QVA EX CAVSA VINDICAVERIS? ille respondebat: IVS FECI, SICVT VINDICTAM INPOSVI. deinde qui prior uindicauerat, dicebat: QVANDO TV INIVRIA VINDICAVISTI, QVINGENTIS ASSIBVS SACRAMENTO TE PROVOCO; aduersarius quoque dicebat similiter: ET EGO TE; aut si res infra mille asses erat, quinquagenarium scilicet sacramentum nominabant.

he who had vindicated first thus asked the other: I DEMAND, WILL YOU SAY, FOR WHAT CAUSE YOU HAVE VINDICATED? he answered: I HAVE ACTED BY RIGHT, JUST AS I LAID ON THE ROD. then he who had vindicated first said: SINCE YOU HAVE VINDICATED WRONGFULLY, I CHALLENGE YOU TO THE SACRAMENT IN 500 ASSES; the adversary likewise said similarly: AND I YOU; or if the thing was under 1,000 asses, they named, of course, the 50-ass sacrament.

deinde eadem sequebantur, quae cum in personam ageretur. postea praetor secundum alterum eorum uindicias dicebat, id est interim aliquem possessorem constituebat, eumque iubebat praedes aduersario dare litis et uindiciarum, id est rei et fructuum; alios autem praedes ipse praetor ab utroque accipiebat sacramenti causa, quia id in publicum cedebat. festuca autem utebantur quasi hastae loco, signo quodam iusti dominii, quando iusto dominio ea maxime sua esse credebant, quae ex hostibus cepissent; unde in centumuiralibus iudiciis hasta proponitur.

then the same things followed as when one proceeded in an action in personam. Afterwards the praetor declared vindiciae in favor of one of them—that is, for the meantime he established someone as possessor—and he ordered him to give sureties to his adversary for the suit and for the vindiciae, that is, for the thing and for the fruits; but other sureties the praetor himself took from both parties for the sake of the sacramentum, because that went over into the public treasury. Moreover, they used the festuca as if in place of a spear, as a certain sign of just dominion, since they believed to be most truly their own by just dominion those things which they had taken from enemies; whence in centumviral judgments a spear is set up.

17. Si qua res talis erat, ut sine incommodo non posset in ius adferri uel adduci, uerbigratia si columna aut nauis aut grex alicuius pecoris esset, pars aliqua inde sumebatur eaque in ius adferebatur, deinde in eam partem quasi in totam rem praesentem fiebat uindicatio; itaque ex grege uel una ouis siue capra in ius adducebatur, uel etiam pilus inde sumebatur et in ius adferebatur; ex naue uero et columna aliqua pars defringebatur; similiter si de fundo uel de aedibus siue de hereditate controuersia erat, pars aliqua inde sumebatur et in ius adferebatur, et in eam partem proinde atque in totam rem praesentem fiebat uindicatio, uelut ex fundo gleba sumebatur et ex aedibus tegula, et si de hereditate controuersia erat, aeque res uel rei pars aliqua inde sumebatur.

17. If any thing was of such a sort that it could not, without inconvenience, be brought or led into court, for example if it were a column or a ship or a herd of some cattle, some part was taken from it and brought into court, and then upon that part, as if upon the whole thing present, vindication was made; and so from a flock even a single sheep or goat was led into court, or even a hair was taken from it and brought into court; but from a ship and from a column some part was broken off; similarly, if the controversy was about a farm (fundus) or about a building(s) (aedēs) or about an inheritance, some part was taken from it and brought into court, and upon that part, just as upon the whole thing present, vindication was made, for example from a farm a clod (gleba) was taken and from a building a tile (tegula), and if the controversy was about an inheritance, likewise a thing or some part of a thing was taken from it.

[. . . . . Fol. deperditum in codice Veronensi . . . . . . . ] Que legis actione restitutum est.

[. . . . . Folio lost in the Veronese codex . . . . . . . ] Which has been restored by the legis action.

17a. Per iudicis postulationem agebatur, si qua de re ut ita ageretur lex iussisset sicuti lex XII tabularum de eo quod ex stipulatione petitur. eaque res talis fere erat.

17a. One proceeded through the postulation of a judge, if, concerning any matter, the law had ordered that it be so proceeded, as the Law of the 12 Tables does concerning what is sought from a stipulation; and the matter was generally of this sort.

qui agebat sic dicebat: EX SPONSIONE TE MIII X MILIA SESTERTIORVM DARE OPORTERE AIO: ID POSTVLO AIAS AN NEGES. aduersarius dicebat non oportere. actor dicebat: QVANDO TV NEGAS, TE PRAETOR IVDICEM SIVE ARBITRVM POSTVLO VTI DES.

He who was bringing the action spoke thus: From the sponsio I assert that it is proper that you give me 10,000 sesterces: I demand that you say whether you affirm this or deny it. The adversary said that it was not proper. The plaintiff said: Since you deny it, Praetor, I request that you assign a judge or an arbiter.

itaque in eo genere actionis sine poena quisque negabat. item de hereditate diuidenda inter coheredes eadem lex per iudicis postulationem agi iussit. idem fecit lex Licinnia, si de aliqua re communi diuidenda ageretur.

Therefore in that kind of action, each would deny without penalty. Likewise, concerning an inheritance to be divided among coheirs, the same law ordered the case to be conducted by the postulation of a judge. The Licinian Law did the same, if the suit was about some common thing to be divided.

itaque nominata causa ex qua agebatur statim arbiter petebatur.

and so, once the cause on account of which the action was being prosecuted had been named, an arbiter was immediately requested.

17b. Per condictionem ita agebatur: AIO TE MIHI SESTERTIORVM X MILIA DARE OPORTERE: ID POSTVLO, AIAS AVT NEGES. aduersarius dicebat non oportere.

17b. By condiction, one proceeded thus: I SAY THAT YOU OUGHT TO GIVE TO ME 10,000 SESTERSES: I DEMAND THIS, AFFIRM OR DENY. the adversary would say that it was not owed.

actor dicebat: QVANDO TV NEGAS, IN DIEM TRICENSIMVM TIBI IVDICIS CAPIENDI CAVSA CONDICO. deinde die tricensimo ad iudicem capiendum praesto esse debebant. condicere autem denuntiare est prisca lingua.

the plaintiff said: SINCE YOU DENY IT, I SET FOR YOU THE THIRTIETH DAY FOR THE PURPOSE OF SELECTING A JUDGE. Then on the thirtieth day they had to be present for selecting the judge. Moreover, condicere in the old language means “to give notice.”

. 18 Itaque haec quidem actio proprie condictio uocabatur. nam actor aduersario denuntiabat, ut ad iudicem capiendum die XXX. adesset; nunc uero non proprie condictionem dicimus actionem in personam esse, qua intendimus dari nobis oportere.

. 18 And so this action was properly called a condiction. For the actor gave notice to the adversary to be present on day 30 for the taking of a judge; now, however, we, not properly, call a condiction an action in personam, whereby we allege that it ought to be given to us.

nulla enim hoc tempore eo nomine denuntiatio fit.

for at this time no notice is made under that name.

19. Haec autem legis actio constituta est per legem Siliam et Calpurniam, lege quidem Silia certae pecuniae, lege uero Calpurnia de omni certa re.

19. This legis action, moreover, was constituted by the Lex Silia and the Lex Calpurnia: by the Lex Silia for a definite sum of money, by the Lex Calpurnia concerning any definite thing.

20. Quare autem haec actio desiderata sit, cum de eo, quod nobis dari oportet, potuerit aut sacramento aut per iudicis postulationem agi, ualde quaeritur.

20. Why, however, this action was desired—since, concerning that which ought to be given to us, it could have been proceeded either by sacrament or by a petition for a judge—is much inquired.

21. Per manus iniectionem aeque de his rebus agebatur, de quibus ut ita ageretur, lege aliqua cautum est, uelut iudicati lege XII tabularum. quae actio talis erat: qui agebat, sic dicebat: QVOD TV MIHI IVDICATVS siue DAMNATVS ES SESTERTIVM X MILIA, QVANDOC NON SOLVISTI, OB EAM REM EGO TIBI SESTERTIVM X MILIVM IVDICATI MANVM INICIO, et simul aliquam partem corporis eius prendebat; nec licebat iudicato manum sibi depellere et pro se lege agere, sed uindicem dabat, qui pro se causam agere solebat. qui uindicem non dabat, domum ducebatur ab actore et uinciebatur.

21. By manus iniectio they likewise proceeded in actions about those matters for which it was provided by some law that it be so proceeded, as, for example, in the case of a iudicatus (judgment-debtor) by the Law of the 12 Tables. This action was as follows: the plaintiff spoke thus: QVOD TV MIHI IVDICATVS siue DAMNATVS ES SESTERTIVM X MILIA, QVANDOC NON SOLVISTI, OB EAM REM EGO TIBI SESTERTIVM X MILIVM IVDICATI MANVM INICIO, and at the same time he seized some part of his body; nor was it permitted to the iudicatus to drive off the hand and to plead by law for himself, but he gave a vindex, who was accustomed to plead the cause for him. He who did not give a vindex was led home by the actor (plaintiff) and bound.

22. Postea quaedam leges ex aliis quibusdam causis pro iudicato manus iniectionem in quosdam dederunt, sicut lex Publilia in eum, pro quo sponsor dependisset, si in sex mensibus proximis, quam pro eo depensum esset, non soluisset sponsori pecuniam; item lex Furia de sponsu aduersus eum, qui a sponsore plus quam uirilem partem exegisset, et denique conplures aliae leges in multis causis talem actionem dederunt.

22. Afterwards certain laws, for certain other causes, granted manus iniectio as though adjudged against certain persons, just as the Lex Publilia against him for whom a sponsor had paid down, if within the next six months from when it had been paid on his behalf he had not paid the money to the sponsor; likewise the Lex Furia de sponsu against him who had exacted from a sponsor more than a virile part; and finally several other laws in many cases granted such an action.

23. Sed aliae leges ex quibusdam causis constituerunt quasdam actiones per manus iniectionem, sed puram, id est non pro iudicato, uelut lex Furia testamentaria aduersus eum, qui legatorum nomine mortisue causa plus M assibus cepisset, cum ea lege non esset exceptus, ut ei plus capere liceret; item lex Marcia aduersus faeneratores, ut si usuras exegissent, de his reddendis per manus iniectionem cum eis ageretur.

23. But other laws for certain causes established certain actions by manus-injection, but pure, that is, not as for a judgment-debtor; for example, the lex Furia testamentaria against one who, under the name of legacies or mortis causa, had taken more than 1,000 asses, when he was not excepted by that law so that it might be permitted to him to take more; likewise the lex Marcia against usurers, to the effect that, if they had exacted interest, an action by manus-injection should be brought against them for the returning of these.

24. Ex quibus legibus et si quae aliae similes essent cum agebatur, manum sibi depellere et pro se lege agere reo licebat. nam et actor in ipsa legis actione non adiciebat hoc uerbum PRO IVDICATO, sed nominata causa, ex qua agebat, ita dicebat: OB EAM REM EGO TIBI MANVM INICIO; cum hi, quibus pro iudicato actio data erat, nominata causa, ex qua agebant, ita inferebant: OB EAM REM EGO TIBI PRO IVDICATO MANVM INICIO nec me praeterit in forma legis Furiae testamentariae PRO IVDICATO uerbum inseri, cum in ipsa lege non sit; quod uidetur nulla ratione factum.

24. From these laws, and if there were any others similar, when suit was brought, it was permitted to the defendant to ward off the hand and to plead by the law on his own behalf. For the actor in the legis action did not add this word PRO IVDICATO, but, the cause named from which he was suing, he thus said: OB EAM REM EGO TIBI MANVM INICIO; whereas those to whom an action pro iudicato had been given, the cause named from which they were suing, thus asserted: OB EAM REM EGO TIBI PRO IVDICATO MANVM INICIO. Nor does it escape me that in the formula of the Lex Furia testamentary the word PRO IVDICATO is inserted, although it is not in the law itself; which seems to have been done with no rationale.

25. Sed postea lege Vallia, excepto iudicato et eo, pro quo depensum est, ceteris omnibus, cum quibus per manus iniectionem agebatur, permissum est sibi manum depellere et pro se agere. itaque iudicatus et is, pro quo depensum est, etiam post hanc legem uindicem dare debebant et, nisi darent, domum ducebantur. istaque, quamdiu legis actiones in usu erant, semper ita obseruabantur; unde nostris temporibus is, cum quo iudicati depensiue agitur, iudicatum solui satisdare cogitur.

25. But afterwards, by the lex Vallia, with the iudicatus and the one on whose behalf a payment has been laid down excepted, it was permitted to all the others with whom it was proceeded by manus iniectio to ward off the hand for themselves and to plead on their own behalf. And so the iudicatus and the one on whose behalf a payment has been laid down, even after this law, had to give a vindex, and unless they gave one, they were led home. And these rules, so long as the legis actiones were in use, were always thus observed; whence in our times he, against whom suit is brought as iudicatus or for depensum, is compelled to give surety iudicatum solvi.

26. Per pignoris capionem lege agebatur de quibusdam rebus moribus, de quibusdam rebus lege.

26. By seizure of a pledge, one proceeded in law concerning some matters by custom, concerning others by statute.

27. Introducta est moribus rei militaris. nam [et] propter stipendium licebat militi ab eo, qui aes tribuebat, nisi daret, pignus capere; dicebatur autem ea pecunia, quae stipendii nomine dabatur, aes militare. item propter eam pecuniam licebat pignus capere, ex qua equus emendus erat; quae pecunia dicebatur aes equestre.

27. It was introduced by the customs of military service. For [also] on account of the stipend it was permitted to the soldier to seize a pledge from him who distributed the aes, if he would not give; and the money which was given under the name of stipend was called aes militare. Likewise, on account of the money from which a horse was to be bought, it was permitted to seize a pledge; which money was called aes equestre.

item propter eam pecuniam, ex qua hordeum equis erat conparandum; quae pecunia dicebatur aes hordiarium.

likewise on account of that money, from which barley was to be procured for the horses; which money was called hordiary bronze.

28. Lege autem introducta est pignoris capio uelut lege XII tabularum aduersus eum, qui hostiam emisset nec pretium redderet; item aduersus eum, qui mercedem non redderet pro eo iumento, quod quis ideo locasset, ut inde pecuniam acceptam in dapem, id est in sacrificium, inpenderet; item lege censoria data est pignoris capio publicanis uectigalium publicorum populi Romani aduersus eos, qui aliqua lege uectigalia deberent.

28. By statute, moreover, the taking of a pledge was introduced, as by the Law of the 12 Tables, against him who had purchased a victim and did not render the price; likewise against him who did not render the hire for that beast of burden which someone had leased for this reason, that from it he might expend the money received on a banquet, that is, on a sacrifice; likewise by a censorial law the taking of a pledge was given to the publicani of the public revenues of the Roman People against those who by some law owed vectigalia.

29. Ex omnibus autem istis causis certis uerbis pignus capiebatur, et ob id plerisque placebat hanc quoque actionem legis actionem esse; quibusdam autem placebat legis actionem non esse, primum quod pignoris capio extra ius peragebatur, id est non apud praetorem, plerumque etiam absente aduersario, cum alioquin ceteris actionibus non aliter uti quis posset quam apud praetorem praesente aduersario; praeterea quod nefasto quoque die, id est, quo non licebat lege agere, pignus capi poterat.

29. Moreover, from all those causes a pledge was seized with fixed words, and for that reason it pleased most that this action too was a legis action; but to some it seemed it was not a legis action, first because the pignoris capio was carried on outside the ius, that is, not before the praetor, very often even with the adversary absent, whereas otherwise one could use the other actions in no other way than before the praetor with the adversary present; furthermore, because even on a nefastus day, that is, a day on which it was not permitted by law to bring an action, a pledge could be taken.

30. Sed istae omnes legis actiones paulatim in odium uenerunt. namque ex nimia subtilitate ueterum, qui tunc iura condiderunt, eo res perducta est, ut uel qui minimum errasset, litem perderet; itaque per legem Aebutiam et duas Iulias sublatae sunt istae legis actiones, effectumque est, ut per concepta uerba, id est per formulas, litigaremus.

30. But all those actions of the law gradually came into disfavor. For from the excessive subtlety of the ancients, who then founded the laws, the matter was brought to such a point that even one who had erred the least would lose the lawsuit; and so by the Aebutian law and the two Julian laws those actions of the law were removed, and it was brought about that we should litigate by conceived words, that is, by formulas.

31. Tantum ex duabus causis permissum est [id legis actionem facere] lege agere, damni infecti et si centumuirale iudicium futurum est; sane cum ad centumuiros itur, ante lege agitur sacramento apud praetorem urbanum uel peregrinum; damni uero infecti nemo uult lege agere, sed potius stipulatione, quae in edicto proposita est, obligat aduersarium suum, idque et commodius ius et plenius est. per pignoris capionem [. . . . . tota pag. . . . . . . . ] apparet.

31. Only from two causes has it been permitted [to make that a legis action] to proceed by law: for damage not yet done and if a centumviral judgment is to be; indeed, when one goes to the centumvirs, first one proceeds by law by sacramentum before the urban or the peregrine praetor; but as to damage not yet done, no one wishes to proceed by law, but rather by a stipulation, which is set forth in the edict, he binds his adversary, and that is both a more convenient and a fuller law. by seizure of a pledge [. . . . . the whole page . . . . . . . ] it appears.

32. Contra in ea forma, quae publicano proponitur, talis fictio est, ut quanta pecunia olim, si pignus captum esset, id pignus is, a quo captum erat, luere deberet, tantam pecuniam condemnetur.

32. On the contrary, in that formula which is proposed to the publican, such a fiction obtains, that he is condemned in as much money as, if a pledge had been seized, the person from whom it was seized would have had to redeem that pledge.

33. Nulla autem formula ad condictionis fictionem exprimitur. siue enim pecuniam siue rem aliquam certam debitam nobis petamus, eam ipsam dari nobis oportere intendimus nec ullam adiungimus condictionis fictionem; itaque simul intellegimus eas formulas, quibus pecuniam aut rem aliquam nobis dari oportere intendimus, sua ui ac potestate ualere. eiusdem naturae sunt actiones commodati, fiduciae, negotiorum gestorum et aliae innumerabiles.

33. No formula, however, is expressed for the fiction of a condiction. For whether we seek money or some certain thing owed to us, we intend that that very thing ought to be given to us, and we add no fiction of a condiction; and so at the same time we understand that those formulas, by which we intend that money or some thing ought to be given to us, are valid by their own force and power. Of the same nature are the actions of commodatum, fiducia, negotiorum gestorum, and innumerable others.

34. Habemus adhuc alterius generis fictiones in quibusdam formulis, uelut cum is, qui ex edicto bonorum possessionem petiit, ficto se herede agit. cum enim praetorio iure is, non legitimo, succedat in locum defuncti, non habet directas actiones et neque id, quod defuncti fuit, potest intendere suum esse neque id, quod ei debebatur, potest intendere dari sibi oportere; itaque ficto se herede intendit, uelut hoc modo: IVDEX ESTO. SI AVLVS AGERIVS, id est si ipse actor, LVCIO TITIO HERES ESSET, TVM SI FVNDVM, DE QVO AGITVR, EX IVRE QVIRITIVM EIVS ESSE OPORTERET; et si [. . . . . . . . . . ] praeposita simili fictione heredis ita subicitur: TVM SI NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO SESTERTIVM X MILIA DARE OPORTERET.

34. We have, moreover, fictions of another kind in certain formulae, as when one who has sought possession of the goods by edict prosecutes with the fiction that he is heir. For since by praetorian right, not by the civil (legitimate) law, he succeeds to the place of the deceased, he does not have direct actions, and he can neither allege that what belonged to the deceased is his, nor that what was owed to him ought to be given to himself; and so, with the fiction that he is heir, he alleges, in this way: JUDGE, LET IT BE. IF AULUS AGERIUS, that is, if the plaintiff himself, WERE HEIR TO LUCIUS TITIUS, THEN IF THE ESTATE, ABOUT WHICH ACTION IS BROUGHT, OUGHT TO BE HIS BY QUIRITARY RIGHT; and if [. . . . . . . . . . ] a similar fiction of an heir having been prefixed, it is thus subjoined: THEN IF NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS OUGHT TO GIVE TO AULUS AGERIUS SESTERCES 10,000.

35. Similiter et bonorum emptor ficto se herede agit. sed interdum et alio modo agere solet. nam ex persona eius, cuius bona emerit, sumpta intentione conuertit condemnationem in suam personam, id est, ut quod illius esset uel illi dari oporteret, eo nomine aduersarius huic condemnetur.

35. Similarly, the purchaser of the goods acts with a fiction of himself as heir. But sometimes he is also accustomed to act in another way. For, with an intention taken from the persona of him whose goods he has bought, he converts the condemnation into his own persona, that is, so that what would be that man’s, or ought to be given to that man, under that title the adversary is condemned to this man.

quae species actionis appellatur Rutiliana, quia a praetore Publio Rutilio, qui et bonorum uenditionem introduxisse dicitur, conparata est. superior autem species actionis, qua ficto se herede bonorum emptor agit, Seruiana uocatur.

which species of action is called Rutilian, because it was contrived by the praetor Publius Rutilius, who also is said to have introduced the sale of goods. but the prior species of action, by which the buyer of goods proceeds with himself feigned as heir, is called Servian.

36. Item usucapio fingitur in ea actione, quae Publiciana uocatur. datur autem haec actio ei, qui ex iusta causa traditam sibi rem nondum usu cepit eamque amissa possessione petit; nam quia non potest eam ex iure Quiritium suam esse intendere, fingitur rem usu cepisse, et ita, quasi ex iure Quiritium dominus factus esset, intendit uelut hoc modo: IVDEX ESTO. SI QVEM HOMINEM AVLVS AGERIVS EMIT ET IS EI TRADITVS EST, ANNO POSSEDISSET, TVM SI EVM HOMINEM, DE QVO AGITVR, EIVS EX IVRE QVIRITIVM ESSE OPORTERET et reliqua.

36. Likewise usucapion is feigned in that action which is called the Publician. Moreover, this action is given to one who, from a just cause, has had a thing delivered to him, has not yet taken it by use, and, possession having been lost, sues for it; for since he cannot assert that it is his by Quiritary right, it is feigned that he has taken the thing by use, and thus, as if he had become owner by Quiritary right, he alleges in this manner: JUDGE, LET IT BE SO. IF AULUS AGERIUS BOUGHT SOME MAN AND HE WAS DELIVERED TO HIM, IF HE HAD POSSESSED HIM FOR A YEAR, THEN IF THAT MAN ABOUT WHICH THE ACTION IS BROUGHT OUGHT TO BE HIS BY QUIRITARY RIGHT, and the rest.

37. Item ciuitas Romana peregrino fingitur, si eo nomine agat aut cum eo agatur, quo nomine nostris legibus actio constituta est, si modo iustum sit eam actionem etiam ad peregrinum extendi. uelut si furti agat peregrinus aut cum eo agatur, formula ita concipitur: IVDEX ESTO. SI PARET LVCIO TITIO A DIONE HERMAEI FILIO OPEVE CONSILIO DIONIS HERMAEI FILII FVRTVM FACTVM ESSE PATERAE AVREAE, QVAM OB REM EVM, SI CIVIS ROMANVS ESSET, PRO FVRE DAMNVM DECIDERE OPORTERET et reliqua; item si peregrinus furti agat, ciuitas ei Romana fingitur.

37. Likewise, Roman citizenship is feigned for a foreigner, if he sues or is sued under that designation under which by our laws an action has been constituted, provided only that it is just for that action to be extended also to a foreigner. For example, if a foreigner brings an action of theft or it is brought against him, the formula is conceived thus: LET THE JUDGE BE. IF IT APPEARS THAT TO LUCIUS TITIUS BY DION, SON OF HERMAEUS, BY AID OR BY COUNSEL OF DION, SON OF HERMAEUS, THEFT HAS BEEN COMMITTED OF A GOLDEN PATERA, FOR WHICH REASON IT WOULD BE PROPER THAT HE, IF HE WERE A ROMAN CITIZEN, PAY DAMAGES AS A THIEF, and the rest; likewise, if a foreigner brings an action of theft, Roman citizenship is feigned for him.

similiter si ex lege Aquilia peregrinus damni iniuriae agat aut cum eo agatur, ficta ciuitate Romana iudicium datur.

similarly, if under the Lex Aquilia a peregrine brings an action of wrongful damage or it is brought against him, a proceeding is given with Roman citizenship feigned.

38. Praeterea aliquando fingimus aduersarium nostrum kapite deminutum non esse. nam si ex contractu nobis obligatus obligataue sit et kapite deminutus deminutaue fuerit, uelut mulier per coemptionem, masculus per adrogationem, desinit iure ciuili debere nobis, nec directo intendi potest sibi dare eum eamue oportere; sed ne in potestate eius sit ius nostrum corrumpere, introducta est contra eum eamue actio utilis rescissa kapitis deminutione, id est, in qua fingitur kapite deminutus deminutaue non esse.

38. Furthermore, we sometimes feign that our adversary has not been subjected to capitis diminution. For if someone be bound to us from a contract and has undergone capitis diminution—such as a woman through coemption, a male through adrogation—by civil law he or she ceases to owe us, nor can it be directly pleaded that he or she ought to render to the plaintiff; but lest it be in his or her power to corrupt our right, a useful action has been introduced with the capitis diminution rescinded, that is, in which it is feigned that he or she has not been capitis deminutus/deminuta.

39. Partes autem formularum hae sunt: demonstratio, intentio, adiudicatio, condemnatio.

39. But the parts of the formulae are these: demonstratio, intentio, adiudicatio, condemnatio.

40. Demonstratio est ea pars formulae, quae principio ideo inseritur, ut demonstretur res, de qua agitur, uelut haec pars formulae: QVOD AVLVS AGERIVS NVMERIO NEGIDIO HOMINEM VENDIDIT, item haec: QVOD AVLVS AGERIVS APVD NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM HOMINEM DEPOSVIT.

40. Demonstration is that part of the formula which is inserted at the beginning for this reason, that the thing about which the suit is concerned may be demonstrated, as for example this part of the formula: BECAUSE AULUS AGERIUS SOLD A MAN TO NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS; likewise this: BECAUSE AULUS AGERIUS DEPOSITED A MAN WITH NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS.

41. Intentio est ea pars formulae, qua actor desiderium suum concludit, uelut haec pars formulae: SI PARET NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO SESTERTIVM X MILIA DARE OPORTERE; item haec: QVIDQVID PARET NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO DARE FACERE OPORTERE; item haec: SI PARET HOMINEM EX IVRE QVIRITIVM AVLI AGERII ESSE.

41. The Intentio is that part of the formula in which the actor (plaintiff) concludes his demand, for example this part of a formula: IF IT APPEARS THAT NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS OUGHT TO GIVE TO AULUS AGERIUS 10 THOUSAND SESTERCES; likewise this: WHATEVER IT APPEARS THAT NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS OUGHT TO GIVE OR DO FOR AULUS AGERIUS; likewise this: IF IT APPEARS THAT THE MAN BELONGS TO AULUS AGERIUS BY QUIRITARIAN RIGHT.

42. Adiudicatio est ea pars formulae, qua permittitur iudici rem alicui ex litigatoribus adiudicare, uelut si inter coheredes familiae erciscundae agatur aut inter socios communi diuidundo aut inter uicinos finium regundorum. nam illic ita est: QVANTVM ADIVDICARI OPORTET, IVDEX, Titio ADIVDICATO.

42. Adjudication is that part of the formula by which it is permitted to the judge to adjudicate the thing to one of the litigants, as, for example, if there is litigation among coheirs in a suit for dividing an inheritance (familiae erciscundae), or among partners in a suit for dividing common property (communi dividundo), or among neighbors in a suit for regulating boundaries (finium regundorum). For there it is thus: AS MUCH AS IT IS FITTING TO BE ADJUDGED, JUDGE, ADJUDGE TO TITIUS.

43. Condemnatio est ea pars formulae, qua iudici condemnandi absoluendiue potestas permittitur, uelut haec pars formulae: IVDEX, NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO SESTERTIVM X MILIA CONDEMNA. SI NON PARET, ABSOLVE; item haec: IVDEX, NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO DUMTAXAT X MILIA CONDEMNA, SI NON PARET, ABSOLVITO; item haec: IVDEX, NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO CONDEMNATO et reliqua, ut non adiciatur DVMTAXAT X MILIA.

43. Condemnation is that part of the formula by which power is permitted to the judge for condemning or for absolving, as in this part of the formula: JUDGE, CONDEMN NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS TO AULUS AGERIUS IN THE SUM OF 10,000 SESTERSES. IF IT DOES NOT APPEAR, ABSOLVE; likewise this: JUDGE, CONDEMN NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS TO AULUS AGERIUS ONLY 10,000; IF IT DOES NOT APPEAR, ABSOLVE; likewise this: JUDGE, CONDEMN NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS TO AULUS AGERIUS, and the rest, so that “only 10,000” is not added.

44. Non tamen istae omnes partes simul inueniuntur; sed quaedam inueniuntur, quaedam non inueniuntur. certe intentio aliquando sola inuenitur, sicut in praeiudicialibus formulis, qualis est, qua quaeritur, aliquis libertus sit, uel quanta dos sit, et aliae complures; demonstratio autem et adiudicatio et condemnatio numquam solae inueniuntur; nihil enim omnino demonstratio sine intentione uel condemnatione ualet; item condemnatio sine intentione uel adiudicatio sine demonstratione nullas uires habet et ob id numquam solae inueniuntur.

44. Not, however, are all those parts found together; but certain are found, certain are not found. Certainly the intention is sometimes found alone, as in prejudicial formulae, such as that by which it is asked whether someone is a freedman, or how great the dowry is, and many others; but the demonstration and the adjudication and the condemnation are never found alone; for demonstration avails nothing at all without intention or condemnation; likewise condemnation without intention, or adjudication without demonstration, has no force, and on that account they are never found alone.

45. Sed eas quidem formulas, in quibus de iure quaeritur, in ius conceptas uocamus, quales sunt, quibus intendimus nostrum esse aliquid ex iure Quiritium aut nobis dari oportere aut pro fure damnum decidi oportere; sunt et aliae, in quibus iuris ciuilis intentio est.

45. But those formulas, indeed, in which inquiry is made concerning law, we call conceived in law, such as those by which we assert that something is ours by Quiritary right, or that it ought to be given to us, or that damages ought to be paid as for a thief; and there are others, in which the intentio is of the civil law.

46. Ceteras uero in factum conceptas uocamus, id est, in quibus nulla talis intentio concepta est, sed initio formulae nominato eo, quod factum est, adiciuntur ea uerba, per quae iudici damnandi absoluendiue potestas datur; qualis est formula, qua utitur patronus contra libertum, qui eum contra edictum praetoris in ius uocauit. nam in ea ita est: RECVPERATORES SVNTO. SI PARET ILLVM PATRONVM AB ILLO [PATRONO] LIBERTO CONTRA EDICTVM ILLIVS PRAETORIS IN IVS VOCATVM ESSE, RECVPERATORES, ILLVM LIBERTVM ILLI PATRONO SESTERTIVM X MILIA CONDEMNATE.

46. But the rest we call conceived “on the fact,” that is, those in which no such intention is framed; rather, at the beginning of the formula, with what was done named, there are added those words through which power is given to the judge of condemning or acquitting; such is the formula which a patron uses against a freedman who summoned him into court contrary to the edict of the praetor. For in it it is thus: RECUPERATORS LET THERE BE. IF IT APPEARS THAT THAT PATRON WAS SUMMONED INTO COURT BY THAT FREEDMAN [OF THAT PATRON] CONTRARY TO THE EDICT OF THAT PRAETOR, RECUPERATORS, CONDEMN THAT FREEDMAN TO THAT PATRON IN THE SUM OF 10,000 SESTERSES.

SI NON PARET, ABSOLVITE. ceterae quoque formulae, quae sub titulo DE IN IVS VOCANDO propositae sunt, in factum conceptae sunt, uelut aduersus eum, qui in ius uocatus neque uenerit neque uindicem dederit; item contra eum, qui ui exemerit eum, qui in ius uocaretur; et denique innumerabiles eius modi aliae formulae in albo proponuntur.

IF IT DOES NOT APPEAR, ACQUIT. the other formulas too, which are set forth under the title ON SUMMONING INTO COURT, are framed in fact, as for example against him who, having been summoned to court, has neither come nor provided a guarantor; likewise against him who by force has taken away the one who was being summoned to court; and finally countless other formulas of that sort are posted on the Album.

47. Sed ex quibusdam causis praetor et in ius et in factum conceptas formulas proponit, ueluti depositi et commodati. illa enim formula, quae ita concepta est: IVDEX ESTO. QVOD AVLVS AGERIVS APVD NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM MENSAM ARGENTEAM DEPOSVIT, QVA DE RE AGITVR, QVIDQVID OB EAM REM NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO DARE FACERE OPORTET EX FIDE BONA, EIVS, IVDEX, NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO CONDEMNATO.

47. But in certain causes the praetor proposes formulas conceived both in law and in fact, for instance in actions of deposit and commodatum. For that formula, which is conceived thus: LET THE JUDGE BE. THAT AULUS AGERIUS DEPOSITED A SILVER TABLE WITH NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS, CONCERNING WHICH MATTER THE SUIT IS, WHATEVER ON ACCOUNT OF THAT MATTER IT BEHOOVES NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS TO GIVE OR DO TO AULUS AGERIUS ACCORDING TO GOOD FAITH, IN THAT, JUDGE, CONDEMN NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS TO AULUS AGERIUS.

SI NON PARET, ABSOLVITO, in ius concepta est. at illa formula, quae ita concepta est: IVDEX ESTO. SI PARET AVLVM AGERIVM APVD NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM MENSAM ARGENTEAM DEPOSVISSE EAMQVE DOLO MALO NVMERII NEGIDII AVLO AGERIO REDDITAM NON ESSE, QVANTI EA RES ERIT, TANTAM PECVNIAM, IVDEX, NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO CONDEMNATO.

“If it does not appear, acquit,” is conceived in ius. But that formula, which is conceived thus: LET THE JUDGE BE. IF IT APPEARS THAT AULUS AGERIUS DEPOSITED A SILVER TABLE WITH NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS, AND THAT THE SAME HAS NOT BEEN RETURNED TO AULUS AGERIUS THROUGH THE MALICIOUS FRAUD OF NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS, FOR AS MUCH AS THAT THING WILL BE WORTH, JUDGE, CONDEMN NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS TO AULUS AGERIUS.

SI NON PARET, ABSOLVITO, in factum concepta est. similes etiam commodati formulae sunt.

"If it does not appear, acquit," is conceived on the facts. Similar also are the formulas of commodatum.

48. Omnium autem formularum, quae condemnationem habent, ad pecuniariam aestimationem condemnatio concepta est. itaque et si corpus aliquod petamus, uelut fundum, hominem, uestem, aurum, argentum, iudex non ipsam rem condemnat eum, cum quo actum est, sicut olim fieri solebat, sed aestimata re pecuniam eum condemnat.

48. But of all the formulas that have a condemnation, the condemnation is framed for a pecuniary estimation. And so, even if we claim some specific thing, such as a tract of land, a man, a garment, gold, or silver, the judge does not condemn the party sued to the thing itself, as used formerly to be done, but, once the thing has been appraised, he condemns him to money.

49. Condemnatio autem uel certae pecuniae in formula proponitur uel incertae.

49. However, the condemnation is proposed in the formula either for a certain pecuniary amount or for an uncertain one.

50. Certae pecuniae uelut in ea formula, qua certam pecuniam petimus; nam illic ima parte formulae ita est: IVDEX, NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO SESTERTIVM X MILIA CONDEMNA. SI NON PARET, ABSOLVE.

50. Of a certain sum of money, as in that formula by which we seek a certain money; for there in the lowest part of the formula it is thus: JUDGE, CONDEMN NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS TO AULUS AGERIUS SESTERCES 10,000. IF IT DOES NOT APPEAR, ACQUIT.

51. Incertae uero condemnatio pecuniae duplicem significationem habet. est enim una cum aliqua praefinitione, quae uulgo dicitur cum taxatione, uelut si incertum aliquid petamus; nam illic ima parte formulae ita est: EIVS, IVDEX, NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO DVMTAXAT SESTERTIVM X MILIA CONDEMNA. SI NON PARET, ABSOLVE.

51. But the condemnation of uncertain money has a twofold signification. One is with some predefinition, which is commonly called “with a taxation,” as, for example, if we claim something uncertain; for there at the lowest part of the formula it is thus: OF THIS, JUDGE, CONDEMN NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS TO AULUS AGERIUS UP TO 10,000 SESTERSES. IF IT DOES NOT APPEAR, ACQUIT.

uel incerta est et infinita, uelut si rem aliquam a possidente nostram esse petamus, id est, si in rem agamus uel ad exhibendum. nam illic ita est: QVANTI EA RES ERIT, TANTAM PECVNIAM, IVDEX, NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO CONDEMNA. SI NON PARET, ABSOLVITO.

or it is uncertain and infinite, as when we claim that some thing in the possessor’s hands is ours—that is, when we proceed in rem or by the action for production; for there it is thus: OF HOW MUCH THAT THING SHALL BE, JUST SO MUCH MONEY, JUDGE, CONDEMN NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS TO AULUS AGERIUS. IF IT DOES NOT APPEAR, ABSOLVE.

quid ergo est? iudex, si condemnet, certam pecuniam condemnare debet, etsi certa pecunia in condemnatione posita non sit.

What, then, is it? The judge, if he should condemn, ought to condemn a certain sum of money, even if a certain sum of money has not been set in the condemnation.

52. Debet autem iudex attendere, ut cum certae pecuniae condemnatio posita sit, neque maioris neque minoris summa posita condemnet, alioquin litem suam facit; item si taxatio posita sit, ne pluris condemnet quam taxatum sit; alias enim similiter litem suam facit. minoris autem damnare ei permissum est. at si etiam [. . . . . vv. 1 1/2 . . . . . . . ] qui formulam accipit, intendere debet, nec amplius [. . . . . . . . . . ] certa condemnatione constringi [. . . . . vv. 2 . . . . . . . ] usque uelit.

52. Moreover the judge ought to attend, that when a condemnation for a certain sum of money has been set down, he not condemn for a sum either greater or less than the sum set; otherwise he makes the suit his own; likewise, if a taxation (assessment) has been set down, that he not condemn for more than has been taxed; for otherwise he similarly makes the suit his own. But to condemn for less is permitted to him. But if also [. . . . . vv. 1 1/2 . . . . . . . ] he who receives the formula ought to intend, and not further [. . . . . . . . . . ] to be constrained by a certain condemnation [. . . . . vv. 2 . . . . . . . ] as far as he should wish.

53. Si quis intentione plus conplexus fuerit, causa cadit, id est rem perdit, nec a praetore in integrum restituitur, exceptis quibusdam casibus, in quibus praetor non patitur [. . . . . vv. 2 . . . . . . . ]

53. If anyone has included more in the intention, the case falls, that is, he loses the matter, nor is he restored in integrum by the praetor, except in certain cases, in which the praetor does not allow [. . . . . vv. 2 . . . . . . . ]

53a. Plus autem quattuor modis petitur: re, tempore, loco, causa. re, uelut si quis pro X milibus, quae ei debentur, XX milia petierit, aut si is, cuius ex parte res esset, totam eam aut maiore ex parte suam esse intenderit.

53a. Moreover, a “plus” is claimed in four modes: in the thing, in time, in place, in cause. In the thing, for example, if someone, for 10,000 which are owed to him, should demand 20,000; or if one who owned the thing in part should assert that the whole of it, or a greater part, is his.

53b. Tempore, ueluti si quis ante diem uel ante condicionem petierit.

53b. In respect of time, for instance if someone has petitioned before the day or before the condition.

53c. Loco, ueluti si, quod certo loco dari promissum est, id alio loco sine commemoratione eius loci petatur, uelut si is, qui ita stipulatus fuerit: EPHESI DARE SPONDES? deinde Romae pure intendat dari sibi oportere.

53c. Place, as for example, if that which has been promised to be given in a certain place is demanded in another place without commemoration of that place, for instance if he who has stipulated thus: DO YOU PROMISE TO GIVE AT EPHESUS? then at Rome should purely plead that it ought to be given to him.

[. . . . . vv. 1 . . . . . . . ] DARE MIHI OPORTERE [. . . . . vv. 2 1/2 . . . . . . . ] petere, id est non adiecto loco.

[. . . . . vv. 1 . . . . . . . ] it ought to be given to me [. . . . . vv. 2 1/2 . . . . . . . ] to petition, that is, with no place adjoined.

53d. Causa plus petitur, uelut si quis in intentione tollat electionem debitoris, quam is habet obligationis iure, uelut si quis ita stipulatus sit: SESTERTIVM X MILIA AVT HOMINEM STICHVM DARE SPONDES? deinde alterutrum eorum [ex his] petat; nam quamuis petat, quod minus est, plus tamen petere uidetur, quia potest aduersarius interdum facilius id praestare, quod non petitur.

53d. By cause, more is claimed, as when in the intention (claim) one removes the debtor’s election, which he has by the right of the obligation; for example, if someone has thus stipulated: SESTERTIVM X MILIA AVT HOMINEM STICHVM DARE SPONDES? (Do you promise to give 10,000 sesterces or the slave Stichus?), then he demands one or the other of them [from these]; for although he demands what is less, nevertheless he seems to be demanding more, because the adversary can sometimes more easily perform that which is not being demanded.

similiter si quis genus stipulatus sit, deinde speciem petat, uelut si quis purpuram stipulatus sit generaliter, deinde Tyriam specialiter petat; quin etiam licet uilissimam petat, idem iuris est propter eam rationem, quam proxime diximus. idem iuris est, si quis generaliter hominem stipulatus sit, deinde nominatim aliquem petat, uelut Stichum, quamuis uilissimum. itaque sicut ipsa stipulatio concepta est, ita et intentio formulae concipi debet.

Similarly, if someone has stipulated for a genus, then demands a species—e.g., if one has stipulated generally for purple, then specially demands Tyrian [purple]—nay even if he were to demand the very cheapest, the same rule of law applies for the reason we have just mentioned. The same rule of law applies if someone has generally stipulated for a slave, and then demands someone by name, e.g., Stichus, although a very cheap one. And so, just as the stipulatio itself is framed, so too the intentio of the formula ought to be framed.

54. Illud satis apparet in incertis formulis plus peti non posse, quia cum certa quantitas non petatur, sed QVIDQVID PARET aduersarium DARE FACERE OPORTERE intendatur, nemo potest plus intendere. idem iuris est, et si in rem incertae partis actio data sit, uelut talis: QVANTAM PARTEM PARET IN EO FVNDO, QVO DE AGITUR, actoris ESSE. quod genus actionis in paucissimis causis dari solet.

54. This is sufficiently apparent in uncertain formulas, that more cannot be sought, because, when a definite quantity is not demanded, but WHATEVER IT APPEARS THE OPPONENT OUGHT TO GIVE OR DO is intended, no one can intend more. The same in law, even if an action in rem for an uncertain share be given, such as this: HOW GREAT A PART IT APPEARS IN THAT ESTATE, ABOUT WHICH THE MATTER IS AT ISSUE, of the plaintiff TO BE. This kind of action is wont to be granted in very few causes.

55. Item palam est, si quis aliud pro alio intenderit, nihil eum periclitari eumque ex integro agere posse, quia nihil ante uidetur egisse, uelut si is, qui hominem Stichum petere deberet, Erotem petierit, aut si quis ex testamento dari sibi oportere intenderit, cui ex stipulatu debebatur, aut si cognitor aut procurator intenderit sibi dari oportere.

55. Likewise it is clear that, if someone has intended one thing in place of another, he runs no peril, and he can bring the action anew from the start, because he is seen to have done nothing before; for example, if he who ought to demand the slave Stichus has demanded Eros, or if someone has alleged that it ought to be given to him from a testament, when it was owed to him under a stipulation, or if a cognitor or a procurator has alleged that it ought to be given to himself.

56. Sed plus quidem intendere, sicut supra diximus, periculosum est; minus autem intendere licet. sed de reliquo intra eiusdem praeturam agere non permittitur; nam qui ita agit, per exceptionem excluditur, quae exceptio appellatur litis diuiduae.

56. But to claim more, as we said above, is perilous; to claim less, however, is permitted. But as to the remainder, it is not allowed to bring an action within that same praetorship; for one who proceeds thus is excluded by an exception, which exception is called the exception of a divided suit.

57. At si in condemnatione plus positum sit, quam oportet, actoris quidem periculum nullum est; sed reus, cum iniquam formulam acceperit, in integrum restituitur, ut minuatur condemnatio. si uero minus positum fuerit, quam oportet, hoc solum consequitur actor, quod posuit; nam tota quidem res in iudicium deducitur, constringitur autem condemnationis fine, quam iudex egredi non potest. nec ex ea parte praetor in integrum restituit; facilius enim reis praetor succurrit quam actoribus.

57. But if in the condemnation more has been set than is proper, the plaintiff indeed incurs no peril; but the defendant, since he has received an inequitable formula, is restored in full (in integrum), so that the condemnation may be diminished. If, however, less has been set than is proper, the plaintiff obtains only what he has set; for indeed the whole matter is brought into judgment, but it is constrained by the limit of the condemnation, which the judge cannot pass beyond. Nor on that side does the praetor restore in full; for the praetor more readily comes to the aid of defendants than of plaintiffs.

loquimur autem exceptis minoribus XXV annorum; nam huius aetatis hominibus in omnibus rebus lapsis praetor succurrit.

we speak, however, with those under 25 years excepted; for to persons of this age, having lapsed in all matters, the praetor gives succor.

58. Si in demonstratione plus aut minus positum sit, nihil in iudicium deducitur, et ideo res in integro manet; et hoc est, quod dicitur falsa demonstratione rem non perimi.

58. If in the demonstration more or less has been set down, nothing is brought into judgment, and therefore the matter remains in its integrity; and this is what is said: by a false demonstration the thing is not extinguished.

59. Sed sunt, qui putant minus recte conprehendi, ut qui forte Stichum et Erotem emerit, recte uideatur ita demonstrare: quod ego de te hominem Erotem emi, et si uelit, de Sticho alia formula iterum agat, quia uerum est eum, qui duos emerit, singulos quoque emisse; idque ita maxime Labeoni uisum est. sed si is, qui unum emerit, de duobus egerit, falsum demonstrat. idem et in aliis actionibus est, uelut commodati et depositi.

59. But there are those who think it is less correctly comprehended, for instance that one who by chance has bought Stichus and Eros should be seen to demonstrate thus rightly: “that I bought from you the man Eros,” and, if he wishes, bring another formula again concerning Stichus, because it is true that he who has bought two has also bought each individually; and this especially seemed so to Labeo. But if one who has bought one were to sue concerning two, he demonstrates falsely. The same holds also in other actions, such as of commodatum and of deposit.

60. Sed nos apud quosdam scriptum inuenimus in actione depositi et denique in ceteris omnibus, ex quibus damnatus unusquisque ignominia notatur, eum, qui plus quam oporteret demonstrauerit, litem perdere, uelut si quis una re deposita duas pluresue se deposuisse demonstrauerit, aut si is, cui pugno mala percussa est, in actione iniuriarum etiam aliam partem corporis percussam sibi demonstrauerit; quod an debeamus credere uerius esse, diligentius requiremus. certe cum duae sint depositi formulae, alia in ius concepta, alia in factum, sicut supra quoque notauimus, et in ea quidem formula, quae in ius concepta est, initio res, de qua agitur, demonstratorio modo designetur, deinde inferatur iuris intentio his uerbis: QVIDQVID OB EAM REM ILLVM ILLI DARE FACERE OPORTET, in ea uero, quae in factum concepta est, statim initio intentionis alio modo res, de qua agitur, designetur his uerbis: SI PARET ILLVM APVD ILLVM REM ILLAM DEPOSVISSE, dubitare non debemus, quin si quis in formula, quae in factum composita est, plures res designauerit, quam deposuerit, litem perdat, quia in intentione plus posuisse uidetur. [. . . . . pag.

60. But we have found it written by certain authors, in the action of deposit and, finally, in all the others by which, if condemned, each person is branded with ignominy, that he who has alleged more than he ought loses the suit; as, for instance, if, one thing having been deposited, someone should allege that he deposited two or more; or if he whose cheek has been struck with a fist, in the action of injuries, should also allege that another part of his body was struck; whether we ought to believe this to be truer we shall inquire more carefully. Certainly, since there are two formulae of deposit, one conceived in law, the other on the fact, as we have also noted above, and in that formula which is conceived in law, at the beginning the thing about which the case is is designated in a demonstrative manner, then the legal intent is introduced by these words: QVIDQVID OB EAM REM ILLVM ILLI DARE FACERE OPORTET, whereas in that which is conceived on the fact, straightway at the beginning of the intent the thing at issue is designated in another manner by these words: SI PARET ILLVM APVD ILLVM REM ILLAM DEPOSVISSE, we ought not to doubt that, if someone in the formula which is composed on the fact has designated more things than he deposited, he loses the suit, because he seems to have put more into the intent. [. . . . . pag.

210 et 211 . . . . . . . ]

210 and 211 . . . . . . . ]

61. [. . . . . . . . . . . . ] continetur, ut habita ratione eius, quod inuicem actorem ex eadem causa praestare oporteret, in reliquum eum, cum quo actum est, condemnare.

61. [. . . . . . . . . . . . ] it is contained, that, account being taken of what in turn it would be proper for the actor from the same cause to render, the one with whom it has been litigated is to be condemned for the remainder.

62. Sunt autem bonae fidei iudicia haec: ex empto uendito, locato conducto, negotiorum gestorum, mandati, depositi, fiduciae, pro socio, tutelae, rei uxoriae.

62. But the good‑faith actions are these: from purchase-and-sale, from letting-and-hiring, of the management of affairs, of mandate, of deposit, of fiduciary, for a partner, of tutelage, of uxorial property (dowry).

63. Liberum est tamen iudici nullam omnino inuicem conpensationis rationem habere; nec enim aperte formulae uerbis praecipitur, sed quia id bonae fidei iudicio conueniens uidetur, ideo officio eius contineri creditur.

63. It is nevertheless free to the judge to take no account whatsoever of mutual set-off; for it is not explicitly prescribed by the words of the formula, but because that seems fitting to a good-faith judgment, therefore it is believed to be contained within his office.

64. Alia causa est illius actionis, qua argentarius experitur. nam is cogitur cum conpensatione agere, et ea conpensatio uerbis formulae exprimitur, adeo quidem, ut statim ab initio conpensatione facta minus intendat sibi dari oportere. ecce enim si sestertium X milia debeat Titio, atque ei XX debeantur, sic intendit: SI PARET TITIVM SIBI X MILIA DARE OPORTERE AMPLIVS QVAM IPSE TITIO DEBET.

64. Another case is that action by which a banker proceeds. For he is compelled to sue with set-off, and that set-off is expressed in the words of the formula, indeed to such a degree that, with the set-off made straightaway from the beginning, he alleges that it ought to be given to him in a lesser amount. For look: if he should owe Titius 10,000 sesterces, and 20,000 are owed to him, he thus alleges: IF IT APPEARS THAT TITIUS OUGHT TO GIVE TO HIM 10,000 MORE THAN HE HIMSELF OWES TO TITIUS.

65. Item bonorum emptor cum deductione agere iubetur, id est ut in hoc solum aduersarius eius condemnetur, quod superest deducto eo, quod inuicem ei bonorum emptor defraudatoris nomine debet.

65. Likewise the purchaser of the goods is bidden to sue with deduction, that is, that his adversary be condemned only for that which remains, with that deducted which in turn the purchaser of the goods owes to him in the defrauder’s name.

66. Inter conpensationem autem, quae argentario opponitur, et deductionem, quae obicitur bonorum emptori, illa differentia est, quod in conpensationem hoc solum uocatur, quod eiusdem generis et naturae est; ueluti pecunia cum pecunia conpensatur, triticum cum tritico, uinum cum uino, adeo ut quibusdam placeat non omni modo uinum cum uino aut triticum cum tritico conpensandum, sed ita si eiusdem naturae qualitatisque sit. in deductionem autem uocatur et quod non est eiusdem generis; itaque si pecuniam petat bonorum emptor et inuicem frumentum aut uinum is debeat, deducto quanti id erit, in reliquum experitur.

66. between compensation, which is opposed to the banker, and deduction, which is objected to the buyer of the goods, this is the difference: that into compensation there is called only what is of the same genus and nature; for example, money is compensated with money, wheat with wheat, wine with wine—so much so that it pleases some that wine with wine or wheat with wheat should not in every way be compensated, but only if it is of the same nature and quality. but into deduction there is called even what is not of the same genus; and so, if the buyer of the goods demands money and in turn the other owes grain or wine, after deducting how much that will be worth, he prosecutes for the remainder.

67. Item uocatur in deductionem et id, quod in diem debetur; conpensatur autem hoc solum, quod praesenti die debetur.

67. Likewise, there is called into deduction even that which is owed for a future day; but only that which is owed on the present day is compensated.

68. Praeterea conpensationis quidem ratio in intentione ponitur; quo fit, ut si facta conpensatione plus nummo uno intendat argentarius, causa cadat et ob id rem perdat. deductum uero ad condemnationem ponitur, quo loco plus petenti periculum non interuenit, utique bonorum emptore agente, qui licet de certa pecunia agat, incerti tamen condemnationem concipit.

68. Moreover, the principle of compensation is placed in the intention; wherefore it comes about that, compensation having been made, if the banker claims more by one coin, the case falls and on that account he loses the matter. But the deduction is placed in the condemnation, in which place no peril intervenes for one seeking more, especially with the purchaser of the goods acting, who, although he sues for a certain sum of money, nevertheless conceives a condemnation of an uncertain amount.

69. Quia tamen superius mentionem habuimus de actione, qua in peculium filiorum familias seruorumque ageretur, opus est, ut de hac actione et de ceteris, quae eorundem nomine in parentes dominosue dari solent, diligentius admoneamus.

69. Because, however, above we have had mention of the action by which one would proceed against the peculium of sons-in-power and of slaves, it is necessary that we more diligently admonish about this action and about the others which are wont to be granted in the name of these same persons against parents or masters.

70. In primis itaque si iussu patris dominiue negotium gestum erit, in solidum praetor actionem in patrem dominumue comparauit, et recte, quia qui ita negotium gerit, magis patris dominiue quam filii seruiue fidem sequitur.

70. In the first place, therefore, if a business is transacted by the order of the father or master, the praetor has provided an action against the father or master for the whole (in solidum), and rightly so, because one who thus conducts the business follows the credit of the father or master rather than that of the son or slave.

71. Eadem ratione comparauit duas alias actiones, exercitoriam et institoriam. tunc autem exercitoria locum habet, cum pater dominusue filium seruumue magistrum naui praeposuerit et quid cum eo eius rei gratia, cui praepositus fuerit, [negotium] gestum erit. cum enim ea quoque res ex uoluntate patris dominiue contrahi uideatur, aequissimum esse uisum est in solidum actionem dari; quin etiam licet extraneum quisque magistrum naui praeposuerit, siue seruum siue liberum, exercitoria actio in eum redditur.

71. By the same reasoning he has provided two other actions, the exercitorial and the institorial. The exercitorial, however, has place when a father or master has set a son or slave over a ship as master, and some [business] is transacted with him for the sake of that matter for which he was set over. For since that affair too is seen to be contracted by the will of the father or master, it seemed most equitable that an action be given for the whole; indeed, even if someone has set an outsider as master of a ship, whether a slave or a free person, the exercitorial action is afforded against him.

ideo autem exercitoria actio appellatur, quia exercitor uocatur is, ad quem cotidianus nauis quaestus peruenit. institoria uero formula tum locum habet, cum quis tabernae aut cuilibet negotiationi filium seruumue suum uel quemlibet extraneum, siue seruum siue liberum, praeposuerit et quid cum eo eius rei gratia, cui praepositus est, contractum fuerit. ideo autem institoria uocatur, quia qui tabernae praeponitur, institor appellatur.

and it is called the exercitorial action, because an exercitor is he to whom the daily gain of the ship accrues. The institorial formula, indeed, has place when someone has put in charge of a shop or of any negotiation his son or his slave, or any outsider, whether slave or free, and whatever with him for the sake of that matter, to which he has been appointed, has been contracted. And it is called institorial because he who is put in charge of a shop is called an institor.

quae et ipsa formula in solidum est.

which formula likewise is in solidum.

72. Praeterea tributoria quoque actio in patrem dominumue constituta est, cum filius seruusue in peculiari merce sciente patre dominoue negotietur; nam si quid eius rei gratia cum eo contractum fuerit, ita praetor ius dicit, ut quidquid in his mercibus erit, quod inde receptum erit, id pater dominusue inter se, si quid debebitur, et ceteros creditores pro rata portione distribuant et si creditores querantur minus sibi distributum, quam oporteret, in id quod deest hanc eis actionem pollicetur, quae ut diximus, tributoria uocatur. 72a. Est etiam de peculio et de in rem uerso actio a praetore constituta.

72. Furthermore, a tributory action has been established against the father or master, when a son or slave carries on business in merchandise of the peculium, with the father or master knowing; for if anything be contracted with him for the sake of that matter to which he has been appointed, thus the praetor declares the law: that whatever will be in these wares, and whatever will be received therefrom, the father or master shall distribute between himself, if anything is owed to him, and the other creditors, in a pro rata portion; and if the creditors complain that less has been distributed to them than ought, for what is lacking he promises them this action, which, as we have said, is called the tributory action. 72a. There is also an action de peculio and de in rem verso established by the praetor.

licet enim negotium ita gestum sit cum filio seruoue, ut neque uoluntas neque consensus patris dominiue interuenerit, si quid tamen ex ea re, quae cum illis gesta est, in rem patris dominiue uersum sit, quatenus in rem eius uersum fuerit, eatenus datur actio. [uersum autem quid sit, eget plena interpretatione]. at si nihil sit uersum, praetor dat actionem DVMTAXAT DE PECVLIO, et edictum utitur his uerbis. quod edictum loquitur et de eo, qui dolo malo peculium ademerit.

for although the business may have been conducted with the son or the slave in such a way that neither the will nor the consent of the father or master intervened, nevertheless, if anything from the matter which was transacted with them has been turned into the assets of the father or master, insofar as it has been turned into his assets, to that extent an action is granted. [but what “turned” is requires full interpretation]. but if nothing has been turned, the praetor grants an action ONLY ABOUT THE PECULIUM, and in the edict he uses these words. which edict also speaks about him who by malicious fraud has taken away the peculium.

si igitur uerbi gratia ex HS - X, quae seruus tuus a me mutua accepit, creditori tuo HS - V soluerit aut rem necessariam, puta familiae cibaria, HS - V emerit et reliqua V quolibet modo consumpserit, pro V quidem in solidum damnari debes, pro ceteris V eatenus, quatenus in peculio sit. ex quo scilicet apparet, si tota HS - X in rem tuam uersa fuerint, tota te HS - X consequi posse; licet enim una est formula, qua de peculio deque eo, quod in rem (patris) domini(ue) uersum sit, agitur, tamen duas habet condemnationes. itaque iudex, apud quem ea formula agitur, ante dispicere solet, an in rem (patris) domini(ue) uersum sit, nec aliter ad peculii aestimationem transit, quam si aut nihil in rem (patris) domini(ue) uersum intellegatur aut non totum.

accordingly, if, for example, out of HS - 10, which your slave received from me as a mutual loan, he shall have paid HS - 5 to your creditor, or shall have bought a necessary thing, say provisions for the household, for HS - 5, and shall have consumed the remaining 5 in any manner whatsoever, you ought indeed to be condemned in solidum for 5, and for the other 5 only to the extent that it is in the peculium. whence, clearly, it appears that, if the whole HS - 10 has been turned into your property, you can obtain the whole HS - 10; for although there is one formula by which suit is brought de peculio and concerning that which has been turned into the property of (the father) or the master, nevertheless it has two condemnations. and so the judge, before whom that formula is litigated, is accustomed first to examine whether anything has been turned into the property of (the father) or the master, and he does not otherwise pass to the valuation of the peculium, unless either nothing is understood to have been turned into the property of (the father) or the master, or not the whole.

73. Cum autem quaeritur, quantum in peculio sit, ante deducitur, quod patri dominoue quique in eius potestate sit, a filio seruoue debetur, et quod superest, hoc solum peculium esse intellegitur. aliquando tamen id, quod ei debet filius seruusue, qui in potestate patris dominiue sit, non deducitur ex peculio, uelut si is, cui debet, in huius ipsius peculio sit.

73. But when it is inquired how much is in the peculium, there is first deducted what is owed to the father or master, or to anyone who is in his power, by the son or slave; and what remains—this alone is understood to be the peculium. Sometimes, however, that which the son or slave who is in the power of the father or master owes to him is not deducted from the peculium, for instance if the person to whom he owes is in this very one’s peculium.

74. Ceterum dubium non est, quin et is, qui iussu patris dominiue contraxit cuique exercitoria uel institoria formula competit, de peculio aut de in rem uerso agere possit; sed nemo tam stultus erit, ut qui aliqua illarum actionum sine dubio solidum consequi possit, uel in difficultatem se deducat probandi habere peculium eum, cum quo contraxerit, exque eo peculio posse sibi satis fieri uel id, quod persequitur, in rem patris dominiue uersum esse.

74. Moreover, there is no doubt that even he who has contracted by the order of the father or master, and to whom the exercitorial or institorial formula is competent, can sue de peculio or de in rem verso; but no one will be so foolish as, when by some one of those actions he can without doubt obtain the whole in solidum, to lead himself into the difficulty of proving that the person with whom he contracted has a peculium and that out of that peculium he can be satisfied, or that the thing he is pursuing has been turned into the father’s or master’s estate.

74a. Is quoque, cui tributoria actio conpetit, de peculio uel de in rem uerso agere potest. sed huic sane plerumque expedit hac potius actione uti quam tributoria.

74a. He also, to whom the tributorial action lies, can bring an action de peculio or de in rem verso. But for this man, to be sure, it is for the most part expedient to use this action rather than the tributorial.

nam in tributoria eius solius peculii ratio habetur, quod in his mercibus est, in quibus negotiatur filius seruusue quodque inde receptum erit, at in actione peculii, totius. et potest quisque tertia forte aut quarta uel etiam minore parte peculii negotiari, maximam uero partem peculii in aliis rebus habere; longe magis, si potest adprobari id, quod dederit qui contraxit, in rem patris dominiue uersum esse, ad hanc actionem transire debet; nam, ut supra diximus, eadem formula et de peculio et de in rem uerso agitur. 75. Ex maleficio filiorum familias seruorumque, ueluti si furtum fecerint aut iniuriam commiserint, noxales actiones proditae sunt, uti liceret patri dominoue aut litis aestimationem sufferre aut noxae dedere.

for in the tributory action account is had only of that peculium which is in those wares with which the son or slave is trading, and of what will be received from that; but in the action of peculium, of the whole. and one may trade perhaps with a third or a fourth, or even a smaller, part of the peculium, while indeed having the greatest part of the peculium in other things; much more, if it can be approved that that which the one who contracted gave has been turned to the benefit of the father or master (in rem versos), he ought to pass over to this action; for, as we said above, by the same formula suit is brought both de peculio and de in rem verso. 75. From the maleficium of sons in potestate and of slaves, for instance if they have committed theft or an injury, noxal actions have been provided, so that it may be permitted to the father or master either to bear the estimation of the suit (litis aestimatio) or to surrender for the noxa (noxae dedere).

erat enim iniquum nequitiam eorum ultra ipsorum corpora parentibus dominisue damnosam esse.

for it was iniquitous that their wickedness be damaging to parents or masters beyond their own bodies.

76. Constitutae sunt autem noxales actiones aut legibus aut edicto praetoris: legibus, uelut furti lege XII tabularum, damni iniuriae lege Aquilia; edicto praetoris, uelut iniuriarum et ui bonorum raptorum.

76. But noxal actions have been constituted either by laws or by the praetor’s edict: by laws, for example, by the law of theft of the 12 Tables, by the Aquilian law of damage-by-injury; by the praetor’s edict, for example, for injuries and for goods carried off by force.

77. Omnes autem noxales actiones caput sequuntur. nam si filius tuus seruusue noxam commiserit, quamdiu in tua potestate est, tecum est actio; si in alterius potestatem peruenerit, cum illo incipit actio esse; si sui iuris coeperit esse, directa actio cum ipso est, et noxae deditio extinguitur. ex diuerso quoque directa actio noxalis esse incipit.

77. All noxal actions follow the head. For if your son or your slave has committed a noxa (wrong), so long as he is in your power, the action is with you; if he has come into another’s power, the action begins to be with that person; if he has begun to be sui iuris, the direct action is with himself, and noxal surrender (noxae deditio) is extinguished. Conversely, too, a direct action begins to become noxal.

nam si pater familias noxam commiserit et is se in adrogationem tibi dederit aut seruus tuus esse coeperit, quod quibusdam casibus accidere primo commentario tradidimus, incipit tecum noxalis actio esse, quae ante directa fuit.

for if a paterfamilias has committed a wrongdoing and has given himself to you by adrogation, or has begun to be your slave—which we have handed down in the first commentary to occur in certain cases—the noxal action begins to be with you, which before was a direct action.

78. Sed si filius patri aut seruus domino noxam commiserit, nulla actio nascitur. nulla enim omnino inter me et eum, qui in potestate mea est, obligatio nasci potest; ideoque et si in alienam potestatem peruenerit aut sui iuris esse coeperit, neque cum ipso neque cum eo, cuius nunc in potestate est, agi potest. unde quaeritur, si alienus seruus filiusue noxam commiserit mihi et is postea in mea esse coeperit potestate, utrum intercidat actio an quiescat.

78. But if a son commits a delict against his father, or a slave against his master, no action arises. For absolutely no obligation can arise at all between me and him who is in my power; and therefore, even if he comes into another’s power or begins to be sui iuris, it cannot be proceeded either against him himself or against the one in whose power he now is. Whence the question is raised, if another’s slave or son commits a delict against me, and afterward he begins to be in my power, whether the action is extinguished or lies dormant.

nostri praeceptores intercidere putant, quia in eum casum deducta sit, in quo ab initio consistere non potuerit, ideoque licet exierit de mea potestate, agere me non posse. diuersae scholae auctores, quamdiu in mea potestate sit, quiescere actionem putant, quia ipse mecum agere non possum, cum uero exierit de mea potestate, tunc eam resuscitari.

our preceptors think it is cut off, because it has been brought into a case in which from the beginning it could not stand; and therefore, although he has gone out of my power, I am not able to bring an action. The authors of the opposite school think that, so long as he is in my power, the action rests, because I cannot litigate with myself; but when he has gone out of my power, then it is resuscitated.

79. Cum autem filius familias ex noxali causa mancipio datur, diuersae scholae auctores putant ter eum mancipio dari debere, quia lege XII tabularum cautum sit, ne aliter filius de potestate patris exeat, quam si ter fuerit mancipatus; Sabinus et Cassius ceterique nostrae scholae auctores sufficere unam mancipationem crediderunt et illas tres legis XII tabularum ad uoluntarias mancipationes pertinere.

79. But when a son of the household is given by mancipium on account of a noxal cause, the authors of the contrary school think that he ought to be given by mancipium three times, because by the law of the 12 Tables it is provided that a son does not depart from the power of his father otherwise than if he has been mancipated three times; Sabinus and Cassius and the rest of the authors of our school believed that one mancipation suffices, and that those three of the law of the 12 Tables pertain to voluntary mancipations.

80. Haec ita de his personis, quae in potestate sunt, siue ex contractu siue ex maleficio earum controuersia sit. quod uero ad eas personas, quae in manu mancipioue sunt, ita ius dicitur, ut cum ex contractu earum agatur, nisi ab eo, cuius iuri subiectae sint, in solidum defendantur, bona, quae earum futura forent, si eius iuri subiectae non essent, ueneant. sed cum rescissa capitis deminutione cum iis imperio continenti iudicio agitur, [. . . . . initium paginae 219 . . . . . . . ]

80. Thus much concerning those persons who are under potestas, whether the controversy be from contract or from malefice. But as to those persons who are in manus or in mancipium, the law is thus declared: when suit is brought on their contract, unless they are defended in solidum by him to whose ius they are subject, the goods which would be theirs, if they were not subject to his ius, are to be sold. But when, the diminution of status (capitis deminutio) having been rescinded, suit is brought with them by a judgment contained under imperium (imperio continenti iudicio), [. . . . . initium paginae 219 . . . . . . . ]

81. Quid ergo est? etiamsi ** , de qua re modo diximus, quoque non permissum fuerit ei mortuos homines dedere, tamen et si quis eum dederit, qui fato suo uita excesserit, aeque liberatur.

81. What then? even if **, the matter about which we have just spoken, also has not been permitted to him to surrender dead human beings, nevertheless even if someone has surrendered one who has departed life by his own fate, he is equally liberated.

82. Nunc admonendi sumus agere nos aut nostro nomine aut alieno, ueluti cognitorio, procuratorio, tutorio, curatorio, cum olim, quo tempore legis actiones in usu fuissent, alieno nomine agere non liceret, praeterquam ex certis causis.

82. We must now be reminded that we conduct suit either in our own name or in another’s, for example by a cognitor, a procurator, a tutor, or a curator, whereas formerly, at the time when the legis actions were in use, it was not permitted to litigate in another’s name, except in certain causes.

83. Cognitor autem certis uerbis in litem coram aduersario substituitur. nam actor ita cognitorem dat: QVOD EGO A TE uerbi gratia FVNDVM PETO, IN EAM REM LVCIVM TITIVM TIBI COGNITOREM DO; aduersarius ita: QVIA TV A ME FVNDVM PETIS, IN EAM REM TIBI PVBLIVM MEVIVM COGNITOREM DO. potest, ut actor ita dicat: QVOD EGO TECVM AGERE VOLO, IN EAM REM COGNITOREM DO; aduersarius ita: QVIA TV MECVM AGERE VIS, IN EAM REM COGNITOREM DO; nec interest, praesens an absens cognitor detur. sed si absens datus fuerit, cognitor ita erit, si cognouerit et susceperit officium cognitoris.

83. A cognitor, however, is appointed into the suit before the adversary by fixed words. For the actor thus gives a cognitor: BECAUSE I, for example, SEEK FROM YOU A FARM, FOR THAT MATTER I GIVE YOU LVCIVS TITIVS AS COGNITOR; the adversary thus: BECAUSE YOU SEEK A FARM FROM ME, FOR THAT MATTER I GIVE YOU PVBLIVS MEVIVS AS COGNITOR. It can be that the actor says thus: THAT I WISH TO LITIGATE WITH YOU, FOR THAT MATTER I GIVE A COGNITOR; the adversary thus: BECAUSE YOU WISH TO LITIGATE WITH ME, FOR THAT MATTER I GIVE A COGNITOR; nor does it matter whether a cognitor is given present or absent. But if he has been given absent, he will be cognitor if he has come to know and has undertaken the office of cognitor.

84. Procurator uero nullis certis uerbis in litem substituitur, sed ex solo mandato et absente et ignorante aduersario constituitur; quin etiam sunt, qui putant eum quoque procuratorem uideri, cui non sit mandatum, si modo bona fide accedat ad negotium et caueat ratam rem dominum habiturum; quamquam et ille, cui mandatum est, plerumque satisdare debet, quia saepe mandatum initio litis in obscuro est et postea apud iudicem ostenditur.

84. A procurator, however, is constituted into the suit by no fixed words, but by a sole mandate, and with the adversary absent and unaware; indeed there are even those who think that he too is to be seen as a procurator to whom no mandate has been given, provided only that he approaches the business in good faith and gives security that the owner will hold the matter ratified; although even he to whom a mandate has been given generally must furnish surety, because often the mandate at the beginning of the suit is in the dark and is afterwards shown before the judge.

85. Tutores autem et curatores quemadmodum constituantur, primo commentario rettulimus.

85. Tutors and curators, in what manner they are constituted, we have set forth in the first commentary.

86. Qui autem alieno nomine agit, intentionem quidem ex persona domini sumit, condemnationem autem in suam personam conuertit. nam si uerbi gratia L. Titius pro P. Meuio agat, ita formula concipitur: SI PARET NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM PVBLIO MEVIO SESTERTIVM X MILIA DARE OPORTERE, IVDEX, NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM LVCIO TITIO SESTERTIVM X MILIA CONDEMNA. SI NON PARET, ABSOLVE; in rem quoque si agat, intendit: PVBLII MEVII REM ESSE EX IVRE QVIRITIVM, et condemnationem in suam personam conuertit.

86. But he who acts in another’s name takes the intention indeed from the person of the owner, but converts the condemnation into his own person. For if, for example, L. Titius sues on behalf of P. Mevius, the formula is conceived thus: IF IT APPEARS THAT NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS OUGHT TO GIVE TO PUBLIUS MEVIUS 10 THOUSAND SESTERSES, JUDGE, CONDEMN NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS TO LUCIUS TITIUS IN 10 THOUSAND SESTERSES. IF IT DOES NOT APPEAR, ACQUIT; and if he sues in rem as well, he intends: THAT THE THING IS PUBLIUS MEVIUS’S BY QUIRITARY LAW, and he converts the condemnation into his own person.

87. Ab aduersarii quoque parte si interueniat aliquis, cum quo actio constituitur, intenditur dominum DARE OPORTERE, condemnatio autem in eius personam conuertitur, qui iudicium acceperit; sed cum in rem agitur, nihil in intentione facit eius persona, cum quo agitur, siue suo nomine siue alieno aliquis iudicio interueniat; tantum enim intenditur rem actoris esse.

87. Also on the adversary’s side, if someone intervenes with whom the action is constituted, it is alleged that the owner ought to give, but the condemnation is converted into the person of him who has accepted the trial; but when one proceeds in rem, the person of him with whom suit is brought does nothing in the intent, whether someone intervenes in his own name or in another’s; for only this is intended: that the thing is the plaintiff’s.

88. Videamus nunc, quibus ex causis is, cum quo agitur, uel hic, qui agit, cogatur satisdare.

88. Let us now see, from what causes the one with whom suit is brought, or he who brings suit, is compelled to give surety.

89. Igitur si uerbi gratia in rem tecum agam, satis mihi dare debes; aequum enim uisum est te ideo, quod interea tibi rem, quae an ad te pertineat dubium est, possidere conceditur, cum satisdatione mihi cauere, ut si uictus sis nec rem ipsam restituas nec litis aestimationem sufferas, sit mihi potestas aut tecum agendi aut cum sponsoribus tuis.

89. Therefore, if, for example, I bring an action in rem against you, you must give me surety; for it has seemed equitable that you—because in the meantime it is permitted to you to possess the thing, about whether it pertains to you being in doubt—should, by a suretyship, provide me a guarantee, so that if you are defeated and neither restore the thing itself nor bear the valuation of the suit, I shall have the power of proceeding either against you or against your sponsors (sureties).

90. Multoque magis debes satisdare mihi, si alieno nomine iudicium accipias.

90. And much more you ought to give surety to me, if you accept the action in another’s name.

91. Ceterum cum in rem actio duplex sit, aut enim per formulam petitoriam agitur aut per sponsionem, si quidem per formulam petitoriam agitur, illa stipulatio locum habet, quae appellatur IVDICATVM SOLVI si uero per sponsionem, illa, quae appellatur PRO PRAEDE LITIS ET VINDICIARUM.

91. Moreover, since the action in rem is twofold, for it is carried on either by the petitory formula or by sponsio: if indeed it is carried on by the petitory formula, that stipulation has place which is called IVDICATVM SOLVI; but if by sponsio, that which is called PRO PRAEDE LITIS ET VINDICIARUM.

92. Petitoria autem formula haec est, qua actor intendit rem suam esse.

92. However, the petitory formula is this, by which the actor asserts the thing to be his.

93. Per sponsionem uero hoc modo agimus: prouocamus aduersarium tali sponsione: SI HOMO, QVO DE AGITVR, EX IVRE QVIRITIVM MEVS EST, SESTERTIOS XXV NVMMOS DARE SPONDES? deinde formulam edimus, qua intendimus sponsionis summam nobis dari oportere; qua formula ita demum uincimus, si probauerimus rem nostram esse.

93. But by sponsion we proceed in this way: we provoke the adversary by such a sponsion: IF THE MAN ABOUT WHOM THE ACTION IS BROUGHT IS MINE BY QUIRITARY RIGHT, DO YOU PROMISE TO GIVE 25 SESTERCES? then we put forward the formula, by which we intend that the sum of the sponsion ought to be given to us; and by that formula we win only if we have proved the property to be ours.

94. Non tamen haec summa sponsionis exigitur. non enim poenalis est, sed praeiudicialis, et propter hoc solum fit, ut per eam de re iudicetur; unde etiam is, cum quo agitur, non restipulatur. ideo autem appellata est PRO PRAEDE VINDICIARUM stipulatio, quia in locum praedium successit, quia olim, cum lege agebatur, pro lite et uindiciis, id est pro re et fructibus, a possessore petitori dabantur praedes.

94. Nevertheless this sum of the sponsion is not exacted. for it is not penal, but pre-judicial, and it is made for this sole purpose, that through it judgment be given concerning the matter; whence also the one against whom suit is brought does not restipulate. for this reason, however, it has been called the PRO PRAEDE VINDICIARUM stipulation, because it has succeeded in place of the praedes (sureties), since formerly, when action was by statute, for the suit and the vindiciae, that is, for the thing and the fruits, sureties were given by the possessor to the claimant.

95. Ceterum si apud centumuiros agitur, summam sponsionis non per formulam petimus, sed per legis actionem sacramento *** reo prouocato; eaque sponsio sestertiorum CXXV nummum fieri solet propter legem Crepereiam.

95. Moreover, if it is litigated before the centumviral court, we do not seek the sum of the sponsion through a formula, but through the legis actio by sacramentum, the defendant having been provoked to the sacramentum; and that sponsion is wont to be made for 125 sesterces on account of the Lex Crepereia.

96. Ipse autem, qui in rem agit, si suo nomine agat, satis non dat.

96. But he himself, who acts in rem, if he acts in his own name, does not give surety.

97. Ac nec si per cognitorem quidem agat, ulla satisdatio uel ab ipso uel a domino desideratur. cum enim certis et quasi sollemnibus uerbis in locum domini substituatur cognitor, merito domini loco habetur.

97. And not even if he brings suit through a cognitor is any surety required either from himself or from the master; for since the cognitor is substituted into the master’s place by certain and, as it were, solemn words, he is rightly held in the place of the master.

98. Procurator uero si agat, satisdare iubetur ratam rem dominum habiturum. periculum enim est, ne iterum dominus de eadem re experiatur; quod periculum non interuenit, si per cognitorem actum fuerit, quia de qua re quisque per cognitorem egerit, de ea non magis amplius actionem habet, quam si ipse egerit.

98. But if a procurator should act, he is ordered to give surety that the principal will hold the matter ratified. For there is a danger lest the principal should again try the same matter; which danger does not intervene if it has been done through a cognitor, because concerning that matter which one has proceeded through a cognitor, he has no further action any more than if he had proceeded himself.

99. Tutores et curatores eo modo, quo et procuratores, satisdare debere uerba edicti faciunt; sed aliquando illis satisdatio remittitur.

99. Tutors and curators, in the same way as procurators, the words of the edict make bound to furnish security; but sometimes to them the furnishing of security is remitted.

100. Haec ita, si in rem agatur; si uero in personam, ab actoris quidem parte, quando satisdari debeat, quaerentes eadem repetemus, quae diximus in actione, qua in rem agitur.

100. These things are thus, if suit be brought in rem; but if rather in personam, on the plaintiff’s part, as we inquire when surety must be given, we will repeat the same things that we said in the action which is brought in rem.

101. Ab eius uero parte, cum quo agitur, si quidem alieno nomine aliquis interueniat, omni modo satisdari debet, quia nemo alienae rei sine satisdatione defensor idoneus intellegitur; sed si quidem cum cognitore agatur, dominus satisdare iubetur, si uero cum procuratore, ipse procurator. idem et de tutore et de curatore iuris est.

101. But on the part of him with whom the action is brought, if indeed someone intervenes in another’s name, in every way surety must be given, because no defender of another’s matter is understood to be suitable without surety; but if the suit is with a cognitor, the principal is ordered to give surety, whereas if with a procurator, the procurator himself. The same rule of law holds concerning a tutor and a curator.

102. Quod si proprio nomine aliquis iudicium aliquid accipiat in personam, certis ex causis satisdare solet, quas ipse praetor significat. quarum satisdationum duplex causa est; nam aut propter genus actionis satisdatur aut propter personam, quia suspecta sit: propter genus actionis, uelut iudicati depensiue aut cum de moribus mulieris agitur; propter personam, uelut si cum eo agitur, qui decoxerit cuiusue bona a creditoribus possessa proscriptaue sunt, siue cum eo herede agatur, quem praetor suspectum aestimauerit.

102. But if someone, in his own name, undertakes some in personam proceeding, he is wont to give surety for certain causes, which the praetor himself indicates. The causes of such suretyships are twofold; for surety is furnished either on account of the kind of action or on account of the person, because it is suspect: on account of the kind of action, as in an iudicati or for a depensum (sum paid), or when the matter concerns a woman’s morals; on account of the person, as when suit is with one who has “cooked his pot” (gone bankrupt), or whose goods have been possessed or proscribed by creditors, or when suit is with that heir whom the praetor has judged suspect.

103. Omnia autem iudicia aut legitimo iure consistunt aut imperio continentur.

103. All judgments, however, either consist by legitimate law or are contained by imperium.

104. Legitima sunt iudicia, quae in urbe Roma uel intra primum urbis Romae miliarium inter omnes ciues Romanos sub uno iudice accipiuntur; eaque e lege Iulia iudiciaria, nisi in anno et sex mensibus iudicata fuerint, expirant. et hoc est, quod uulgo dicitur e lege Iulia litem anno et sex mensibus mori.

104. Legitimate trials are those which are taken in the city of Rome or within the first milestone of the city of Rome between all Roman citizens under a single judge; and these, by the Julian judicial law, unless they have been adjudged within a year and six months, expire. And this is what is commonly said: by the Julian law a lawsuit dies in a year and six months.

105. Imperio uero continentur recuperatoria et quae sub uno iudice accipiuntur interueniente peregrini persona iudicis aut litigatoris; in eadem causa sunt, quaecumque extra primum urbis Romae miliarium tam inter ciues Romanos quam inter peregrinos accipiuntur. ideo autem imperio contineri iudicia dicuntur, quia tamdiu ualent, quamdiu is, qui ea praecepit, imperium habebit.

105. By imperium, however, are held the recuperatorial proceedings and those which are heard before a single judge when the person of a foreigner intervenes, whether as judge or litigant; in the same category are whatever are heard outside the first milestone of the city of Rome, both among Roman citizens and among foreigners. For proceedings are said to be contained by imperium because they are valid so long as he who ordered them shall have imperium.

106. Et si quidem imperio continenti iudicio actum fuerit, siue in rem siue in personam, siue ea formula, quae in factum concepta est, siue ea, quae in ius habet intentionem, postea nihilo minus ipso iure de eadem re agi potest; et ideo necessaria est exceptio rei iudicatae uel in iudicium deductae.

106. And if indeed in a proceeding dependent on imperium there has been action, whether in rem or in personam, whether by that formula which is conceived in factum, or by that which has an intentio in ius, afterwards nonetheless by the law itself it is possible to proceed concerning the same matter; and therefore the exceptio of res judicata or of a matter brought into judgment is necessary.

107. Si uero legitimo iudicio in personam actum sit ea formula, quae iuris ciuilis habet intentionem, postea ipso iure de eadem re agi non potest, et ob id exceptio superuacua est; si uero uel in rem uel in factum actum fuerit, ipso iure nihilo minus postea agi potest, et ob id exceptio necessaria est rei iudicatae uel in iudicium deductae.

107. But if, in a legitimate trial, an action in personam has been brought by that formula which has an intention of the civil law, thereafter by the law itself one cannot proceed about the same matter, and on that account the exception is superfluous; but if either an action in rem or one in factum has been brought, by the law itself nonetheless one can proceed afterward, and on that account an exception of res judicata or of a matter brought into judgment is necessary.

108. Alia causa fuit olim legis actionum. nam qua de re actum semel erat, de ea postea ipso iure agi non poterat; nec omnino ita, ut nunc, usus erat illis temporibus exceptionum.

108. A different rule once held for the actions at law. For as to a matter about which action had once been taken, about that afterward by the law itself action could not be brought; nor at all, as now, was there in those times the use of exceptions.

109. Ceterum potest ex lege quidem esse iudicium, sed legitimum non esse; et contra ex lege non esse, sed legitimum esse. nam si uerbi gratia ex lege Aquilia uel Ollinia uel Furia in prouinciis agatur, imperio continebitur iudicium; idemque iuris est, et si Romae apud recuperatores agamus uel apud unum iudicem interueniente peregrini persona; et ex diuerso si ex ea causa, ex qua nobis edicto praetoris datur actio, Romae sub uno iudice inter omnes ciues Romanos accipiatur iudicium, legitimum est.

109. Moreover, a judgment can indeed be by statute, yet not legitimate; and conversely, it can be not by statute, yet be legitimate. For if, for example, suit is brought in the provinces under the Lex Aquilia or the Lex Ollinia or the Lex Furia, the judgment will be contained by imperium; and the same law holds if we litigate at Rome before recuperatores, or before a single judge with the person of a peregrinus intervening. And conversely, if from that cause from which an action is granted to us by the praetor’s edict a judgment is taken at Rome before a single judge among all Roman citizens, it is legitimate.

110. Quo loco admonendi sumus eas quidem actiones, quae ex lege senatusue consultis proficiscuntur, perpetuo solere praetorem accommodare, eas uero, quae ex propria ipsius iurisdictione pendent, plerumque intra annum dare.

110. At this point we must be reminded that those actions which proceed from a law or from senatus-consults the praetor is accustomed to accommodate perpetually; but those which depend upon his own proper jurisdiction he for the most part grants within a year.

111. Aliquando tamen et perpetuo eas dat, uelut quibus imitatur ius legitimum, quales sunt eae, quas bonorum possessoribus ceterisque, qui heredis loco sunt, accommodat. furti quoque manifesti actio, quamuis ex ipsius praetoris iurisdictione proficiscatur, perpetuo datur; et merito, cum pro capitali poena pecuniaria constituta sit.

111. Sometimes, however, he also gives them perpetually, namely those by which he imitates legitimate law, such as those which he accommodates to the bonorum possessors and the others who are in the place of an heir. The action of manifest theft too, although it proceeds from the praetor’s own jurisdiction, is given perpetually; and deservedly, since in place of a capital penalty a pecuniary one has been established.

112. Non omnes autem actiones, quae in aliquem aut ipso iure conpetunt aut a praetore dantur, etiam in heredem aeque conpetunt aut dari solent. est enim certissima iuris regula ex maleficiis poenales actiones in heredem nec conpetere nec dari solere, uelut furti, ui bonorum raptorum, iniuriarum, damni iniuriae. sed heredi ****dem [uidelicet actoris] huiusmodi actiones competunt nec denegantur, excepta iniuriarum actione et si qua alia similis inueniatur actio.

112. However, not all actions which either by the law itself are competent against someone or are granted by the praetor, likewise are competent against, or are wont to be granted against, the heir. For there is a most certain rule of law that, from misdeeds, penal actions are neither competent against an heir nor are wont to be granted, such as those of theft, of rapine (goods snatched by force), of injuries (insults), and of wrongful damage. But to the heir ****dem [uidelicet actoris] actions of this kind are competent and are not denied, except for the action of injuries and, if any other similar action be found.

113. Aliquando tamen etiam ex contractu actio neque heredi neque in heredem conpetit. nam adstipulatoris heres non habet actionem, sed et sponsoris et fidepromissoris heres non tenetur.

113. Sometimes, however, even from a contract an action neither lies to the heir nor against the heir. For the heir of an adstipulator does not have an action, and likewise the heir of a sponsor and of a fidepromissor is not held liable.

114. Superest, ut dispiciamus, si ante rem iudicatam is, cum quo agitur, post acceptum iudicium satisfaciat actori, quid officio iudicis conueniat, utrum absoluere an ideo potius damnare, quia iudicii accipiendi tempore in ea causa fuerit, ut damnari debeat. nostri praeceptores absoluere eum debere existimant; nec interesse, cuius generis sit iudicium. et hoc est, quod uolgo dicitur Sabino et Cassio placere omnia iudicia absolutoria esse.

114. It remains that we consider, if before res judicata the person against whom suit is brought, after the judicium has been accepted, satisfies the plaintiff, what befits the office of the judge—whether to absolve, or rather for this reason to condemn, because at the time of accepting the judicium he was in such a condition that he ought to be condemned. Our preceptors think that he ought to be absolved; nor does it matter of what genus the judicium is. And this is what is commonly said: that it pleases Sabinus and Cassius that all judicia are absolutory.

[. . . . . . . . . . . . ] de bonae fidei autem iudiciis idem sentiunt, quia in eiusmodi iudiciis liberum est officium iudicis. tantumdem et de in rem actionibus putant, quia formulae uerbis id ipsum exprimatur [. . . . . vv. 7 . . . . . . . ] sunt etiam in personam tales actiones in quibus ex-primitur [. . . . . vv. 7 . . . . . . . ] actum fuit.

[. . . . . . . . . . . . ] but concerning good‑faith judgments they think the same, because in judgments of this kind the office of the judge is free. They think just as much also about actions in rem, because by the words of the formula that very thing is expressed [. . . . . vv. 7 . . . . . . . ] there are also such actions in personam in which it is ex‑pressed [. . . . . vv. 7 . . . . . . . ] it was done.

115. Sequitur, ut de exceptionibus dispiciamus.

115. It follows, that we should examine the exceptions.

116. Conparatae sunt autem exceptiones defendendorum eorum gratia, cum quibus agitur. saepe enim accidit, ut quis iure ciuili teneatur, sed iniquum sit eum iudicio condemnari. uelut si stipulatus sim a te pecuniam tamquam credendi causa numeraturus nec numerauerim.

116. Exceptions, moreover, have been devised for the sake of defending those against whom suit is brought. For it often happens that someone is bound by the civil law, but it would be inequitable for him to be condemned in judgment. For example, if I have stipulated from you money, as though for the sake of lending I were going to count it out, and I have not counted it out.

nam eam pecuniam a te peti posse certum est. dare enim te oportet, cum ex stipulatu tenearis; sed quia iniquum est te eo nomine condemnari, placet per exceptionem doli mali te defendi debere. item si pactus fuero tecum, ne id, quod mihi debeas, a te petam, nihilo minus id ipsum a te petere possum dari mihi oportere, quia obligatio pacto conuento non tollitur; sed placet debere me petentem per exceptionem pacti conuenti repelli.

for it is certain that that money can be demanded from you. For you ought to give, since you are bound ex stipulatu; but because it is iniquitous for you to be condemned under that head, it is held that you ought to be defended by the exception of fraud. Likewise, if I shall have made a pact with you that I will not demand from you that which you owe me, nonetheless I can demand that very thing from you—that it ought to be given to me—because the obligation is not removed by the pact agreed; but it is held that I, when demanding, ought to be repelled by the exception of the agreed pact.

117. In his quoque actionibus, quae non in personam sunt, exceptiones locum habent. uelut si metu me coegeris aut dolo induxeris, ut tibi rem aliquam mancipio dem, tua est; sin eam rem a me petas, datur mihi exceptio, per quam, si metus causa te fecisse uel dolo malo arguero, repelleris. item si fundum litigiosum sciens a non possidente emeris eumque a possidente petas, opponitur tibi exceptio, per quam omni modo summoueris.

117. In these actions too, which are not in personam, exceptions have their place. For example, if through fear you have compelled me or by fraud you have induced me to give you some thing by mancipation, it is yours; but if you demand that thing from me, an exception is granted to me, by which, if I allege that you did it by reason of fear or with evil fraud (dolus malus), you will be repelled. Likewise, if, knowing it to be litigious, you have bought a landed estate from a non‑possessor and demand it from the possessor, an exception is opposed to you, by which you will in every way be removed.

118. Exceptiones autem alias in edicto praetor habet propositas, alias causa cognita accommodat. quae omnes uel ex legibus uel ex his, quae legis uicem optinent, substantiam capiunt uel ex iurisdictione praetoris proditae sunt.

118. Exceptions, moreover, the praetor has some set forth in the edict, others he grants upon cognizance of the case. All of them either take their substance from statutes, or from those things which have the force of a statute, or have proceeded from the praetor’s jurisdiction.

119. Omnes autem exceptiones in contrarium concipiuntur, quam adfirmat is, cum quo agitur. nam si uerbi gratia reus dolo malo aliquid actorem facere dicat, qui forte pecuniam petit, quam non numerauit, sic exceptio concipitur: SI IN EA RE NIHIL DOLO MALO AVLI AGERII FACTVM SIT NEQVE FIAT; item si dicat contra pactionem pecuniam peti, ita concipitur exceptio: SI INTER AVLVM AGERIVM ET NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM NON CONVENIT, NE EA PECVNIA PETERETUR; et denique in ceteris causis similiter concipi solet, ideo scilicet, quia omnis exceptio obicitur quidem a reo, sed ita formulae inseritur, ut condicionalem faciat condemnationem, id est, ne aliter iudex eum, cum quo agitur, condemnet, quam si nihil in ea re, qua de agitur, dolo actoris factum sit; item ne aliter iudex eum condemnet, quam si nullum pactum conuentum de non petenda pecunia factum fuerit.

119. Moreover, all exceptions are framed in the contrary sense to what is affirmed by the one against whom suit is brought. For if, for example, the defendant says that the plaintiff is doing something with malicious fraud, who perchance is claiming money which he did not pay out, the exception is framed thus: IF IN THAT MATTER NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE NOR BE DONE BY THE MALICIOUS FRAUD OF AULUS AGERIUS; likewise, if he says that money is being demanded contrary to a pact, the exception is framed thus: IF BETWEEN AULUS AGERIUS AND NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS IT WAS NOT AGREED THAT THAT MONEY SHOULD NOT BE SOUGHT; and finally in other cases it is customarily framed similarly, namely for this reason, because every exception is indeed objected by the defendant, but is inserted into the formula in such a way that it makes the condemnation conditional, that is, that the judge not condemn the one with whom the action is, except if nothing in that matter, about which the action is, has been done by the plaintiff’s malice; likewise, that the judge not condemn him except if no pact agreed upon for not seeking the money has been made.

120. Dicuntur autem exceptiones aut peremptoriae aut dilatoriae.

120. Moreover, exceptions are called either peremptory or dilatory.

121. Peremptoriae sunt, quae perpetuo ualent nec euitari possunt, uelut quod metus causa aut dolo malo aut quod contra legem senatusue consultum factum est aut quod res iudicata est uel in iudicium deducta est, item pacti conuenti, quod factum est, ne omnino pecunia peteretur. 122. Dilatoriae sunt exceptiones, quae ad tempus ualent, ueluti illius pacti conuenti, quod factum est uerbi gratia, ne intra quinquennium peteretur; finito enim eo tempore non habet locum exceptio. cui similis exceptio est litis diuiduae et rei residuae.

121. Peremptory are those which prevail perpetually and cannot be evaded, such as where something has been done by reason of fear (metus causa) or by malicious dolus, or contrary to a law or a senatus‑consultum, or where the matter is res judicata or has been brought into judgment; likewise of a pact agreed (pactum conventum), which has been made that money not be sought at all. 122. Dilatory are exceptions which prevail for a time, for example of that pact agreed, which has been made, for instance, that it not be demanded within a five‑year period; for when that time has ended the exception has no place. Similar to this is the exception of the suit divided (litis dividuae) and of the remaining matter (rei residuae).

nam si quis partem rei petierit et intra eiusdem praeturam reliquam partem petat, hac exceptione summouetur, quae appellatur litis diuiduae; item si is, qui cum eodem plures lites habebat, de quibusdam egerit, de quibusdam distulerit, ut ad alios iudices eant, si intra eiusdem praeturam de his, quas distulerit, agat, per hanc exceptionem, quae appellatur rei residuae, summouetur.

for if someone has sought a part of the thing and within the same praetorship seeks the remaining part, he is repelled by this exception, which is called the exception of a divided suit; likewise, if a person who had several suits with the same adversary has proceeded concerning some and has deferred others, so that they go to other judges, if within the same praetorship he brings action regarding those which he deferred, he is repelled by this exception, which is called the exception of the remaining matter.

123. Obseruandum est autem ei, cui dilatoria obicitur exceptio, ut differat actionem; alioquin si obiecta exceptione egerit, rem perdit; non enim post illud tempus, quo integra re eam euitare poterat, adhuc ei potestas agendi superest re in iudicium deducta et per exceptionem perempta.

123. It must be observed, however, by him against whom a dilatory exception is objected, that he defer the action; otherwise, if, the exception having been objected, he prosecutes, he loses the matter; for not after that time at which, with the matter entire, he could avoid it, does the power of bringing an action still remain to him, the matter having been brought into judgment and perempted through the exception.

124. Non solum autem ex tempore, sed etiam ex persona dilatoriae exceptiones intelleguntur, quales sunt cognitoriae, uelut si is, qui per edictum cognitorem dare non potest, per cognitorem agat, uel dandi quidem cognitoris ius habeat, sed eum det, cui non licet cognituram suscipere. nam si obiciatur exceptio cognitoria, si ipse talis erit, ut ei non liceat cognitorem dare, ipse agere potest; si uero cognitori non liceat cognituram suscipere, per alium cognitorem aut per semet ipsum liberam habet agendi potestatem, et tam hoc quam illo modo euitare potest exceptionem. quod si dissimulauerit eam et per cognitorem egerit, rem perdit.

124. Not only, moreover, from time, but also from person are dilatory exceptions understood, such as cognitorial ones; for example, if he who by the edict cannot appoint a cognitor should act through a cognitor, or does indeed have the right of appointing a cognitor, but appoints one to whom it is not permitted to undertake the cognitorial role. For if a cognitorial exception is raised, if he himself is such that it is not permitted to him to appoint a cognitor, he can act himself; but if it is not permitted to the cognitor to undertake the cognitorial function, he has free power of acting through another cognitor or through himself, and in either this way or that he can avoid the exception. But if he ignores it and acts through a cognitor, he loses the case.

125. Sed peremptoria quidem exceptione si reus per errorem non fuerit usus, in integrum restituitur adiciendae exceptionis gratia. dilatoria uero si non fuerit usus, an in integrum restituatur, quaeritur.

125. But with a peremptory exception, if the defendant has not used it through error, he is restored in integrum for the sake of adding the exception. dilatory, however, if he has not used it, whether he should be restored in integrum is a question.

126. Interdum euenit, ut exceptio, quae prima facie iusta uideatur, inique noceat actori. quod cum accidit, alia adiectione opus est adiuuandi actoris gratia. quae adiectio replicatio uocatur, quia per eam replicatur atque resoluitur uis exceptionis.

126. Sometimes it happens that an exception which prima facie seems just unfairly harms the plaintiff. When this occurs, there is need of another addition for the sake of aiding the plaintiff. This addition is called a replication, because through it the force of the exception is folded back and resolved.

nam si uerbi gratia pactus sum tecum, ne pecuniam, quam mihi debes, a te peterem, deinde postea in contrarium pacti sumus, id est ut petere mihi liceat, et, si agam tecum, excipias tu, ut ita demum mihi condemneris, si non conuenerit, ne eam pecuniam peterem, nocet mihi exceptio pacti conuenti; namque nihilo minus hoc uerum manet, etiam si postea in contrarium pacti sumus; sed quia iniquum est me excludi exceptione, replicatio mihi datur ex posteriore pacto hoc modo: AVT SI POSTEA CONVENIT, VT MIHI EAM PECVNIAM PETERE LICERET.

for, for example, if I have made a pact with you that I would not seek the money which you owe me from you, then afterwards we have made a pact to the contrary, that is, that it be permitted for me to seek it, and, if I sue you, you plead by way of exception that only then should you be condemned in my favor, if it has not been agreed that I should not seek that money, the exception of a pact concluded harms me; for nonetheless this remains true, even if afterwards we have made a pact to the contrary; but because it is inequitable that I be excluded by the exception, a replication is given to me from the later pact in this manner: OR IF LATER IT WAS AGREED THAT IT SHOULD BE PERMITTED FOR ME TO SEEK THAT MONEY.

126a. Item si argentarius pretium rei, quae in auctionem uenerit, persequatur, obicitur ei exceptio, ut ita demum emptor damnetur, si ei res, quam emerit, tradita est, et est iusta exceptio. sed si in auctione praedictum est, ne ante emptori res traderetur, quam si pretium soluerit, replicatione tali argentarius adiuuatur: AVT SI PRAEDICTVM EST, NE ALITER EMPTORI RES TRADERETVR, QVAM SI PRETIVM EMPTOR SOLVERIT.. 127 Interdum autem euenit, ut rursus replicatio, quae prima facie iusta sit, inique reo noceat; quod cum accidit, adiectione opus est adiuuandi rei gratia, quae duplicatio uocatur.

126a. Likewise, if a banker pursues the price of a thing which has come into auction, an exception is objected to him, that the buyer be condemned only if the thing which he bought has been delivered to him, and it is a just exception. But if in the auction it has been predeclared that the thing is not to be delivered to the buyer before he pays the price, the banker is aided by such a replication: OR IF IT HAS BEEN PREDECLARED THAT THE THING BE NOT DELIVERED TO THE BUYER OTHERWISE THAN IF THE BUYER HAS PAID THE PRICE..
127 Sometimes, moreover, it happens that, again, a replication, which at prima facie is just, unjustly harms the defendant; and when this occurs, an adjection is needed for the sake of aiding the defendant, which is called a duplication.

128. Et si rursus ea prima facie iusta uideatur, sed propter aliquam causam inique actori noceat, rursus adiectione opus est, qua actor adiuuetur, quae dicitur triplicatio.

128. And if again that, prima facie, seems just, but for some cause unjustly harms the plaintiff, again there is need of an addition, by which the plaintiff is assisted, which is called a triplication.

129. Quarum omnium adiectionum usum interdum etiam ulterius, quam diximus, uarietas negotiorum introduxit.

129. The variety of transactions has sometimes introduced the use of all these additions even further than we have said.

130. Videamus etiam de praescriptionibus, quae receptae sunt pro actore.

130. Let us also consider the prescriptions which have been received for the plaintiff.

131. Saepe enim ex una eademque obligatione aliquid iam praestari oportet, aliquid in futura praestatione est, uelut cum in singulos annos uel menses certam pecuniam stipulati fuerimus. nam finitis quibusdam annis aut mensibus huius quidem temporis pecuniam praestari oportet, futurorum autem annorum sane quidem obligatio contracta intellegitur, praestatio uero adhuc nulla est; si ergo uelimus id quidem, quod praestari oportet, petere et in iudicium deducere, futuram uero obligationis praestationem in integro relinquere, necesse est, ut cum hac praescriptione agamus: EA RES AGATVR, CVIVS REI DIES FVIT. alioquin si sine hac praescriptione egerimus, ea scilicet formula, qua incertum petimus, cuius intentio his uerbis concepta est: QVIDQVID PARET NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO DARE FACERE OPORTERE, totam obligationem, id est etiam futuram, in hoc iudicium deducimus, et quae ante tempus obligati [. . . . . vv. 1 3/4 . . . . . . . ]

131. For often from one and the same obligation something ought already to be rendered, and something lies in future rendering, as when we have stipulated a fixed sum of money for each year or month. For when certain years or months have ended, the money for this present time ought to be rendered, but as to the future years, indeed the obligation is understood to have been contracted, yet there is as yet no rendering; if therefore we should wish to demand and bring into judgment that which ought to be rendered, but to leave intact the future rendering of the obligation, it is necessary that we proceed with this praescription: EA RES AGATVR, CVIVS REI DIES FVIT. Otherwise, if we should act without this praescription, namely with that formula by which we sue for an uncertain thing, whose intentio is conceived in these words: QVIDQVID PARET NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO DARE FACERE OPORTERE, we bring the whole obligation, that is, even the future, into this trial, and we are bound as to matters before their time [. . . . . vv. 1 3/4 . . . . . . . ]

131a. Item si uerbi gratia ex empto agamus, ut nobis fundus mancipio detur, debemus hoc modo praescribere: EA RES AGATVR DE FVNDO MANCIPANDO, ut postea, si uelimus uacuam possessionem nobis tradi, [. . . . . vv. 1 1/4 . . . . . . . ] re sumus, totius illius iuris obligatio illa incerta actione: QVIDQVID OB EAM REM NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO DARE FACERE OPORTET, per intentionem consumitur, ut postea nobis agere uolentibus de uacua possessione tradenda nulla supersit actio.

131a. Likewise, if, for example, we bring an action on purchase, that an estate be given to us by mancipation, we ought to pre-prescribe in this way: LET THIS MATTER BE LITIGATED CONCERNING THE MANCIPATING OF THE ESTATE, so that afterwards, if we should wish that vacant possession be delivered to us, [. . . . . vv. 1 1/4 . . . . . . . ] we are, the entire obligation of that right, by that uncertain action: WHATEVER IT APPEARS THAT NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS OUGHT TO GIVE OR DO TO AULUS AGERIUS ON ACCOUNT OF THAT MATTER, is consumed by the intention, so that afterwards, when we wish to sue for vacant possession to be delivered, no action may remain.

132. Praescriptiones scilicet appellatas esse ab eo, quod ante formulas praescribuntur, plus quam manifestum est.

132. It is more than manifest that the “prescriptions” are so called from the fact that they are prescribed before the formulas.

133. Sed his quidem temporibus, sicut supra quoque notauimus, omnes praescriptiones ab actore proficiscuntur. olim autem quaedam et pro reo opponebantur, qualis illa erat praescriptio: EA RES AGATVR, SI IN EA RE PRAEIVDICIVM HEREDITATI NON FIAT, quae nunc in speciem exceptionis deducta est et locum habet, cum petitor hereditatis alio genere iudicii praeiudicium hereditati faciat, uelut cum singulas res petat; est enim iniquum per unius [. . . . . fol. deperd.

133. But in these times, as we have also noted above, all prescriptions proceed from the plaintiff. Formerly, however, certain ones were also pleaded for the defendant, such as that prescription: LET THE MATTER BE LITIGATED, PROVIDED THAT IN THAT MATTER NO PREJUDICE BE DONE TO THE INHERITANCE, which now has been brought into the species of an exception and has place when a claimant of an inheritance, by another kind of proceeding, creates prejudice to the inheritance, as when he seeks individual things; for it is unjust by means of one [. . . . . fol. deperd.

. . . . . . . ]

134. [. . . . . .] in intentione formulae de iure quaeritur, id est, cui dari oporteat; et sane domino dari oportet, quod seruus stipulatur; at in praescriptione de facto quaeritur, quod secundum naturalem significationem uerum esse debet.

134. [. . . . . .] in the intention of the formula the inquiry is about right (ius), that is, to whom it ought to be given; and indeed it ought to be given to the master, that which the slave stipulates; but in the praescription the inquiry is about fact, which according to the natural signification ought to be true.

135. Quaecumque autem diximus de seruis, eadem de ceteris quoque personis, quae nostro iuri subiectae sunt, dicta intellegemus.

135. Whatever things we have said about slaves, we will understand the same to have been said also about the other persons who are subject to our law.

136. Item admonendi sumus, si cum ipso agamus, qui incertum promiserit, ita nobis formulam esse propositam, ut praescriptio inserta sit formulae loco demonstrationis hoc modo: IVDEX ESTO. QVOD AVLVS AGERIVS DE NVMERIO NEGIDIO INCERTVM STIPVLATVS EST, CVIVS REI DIES FVIT, QVIDQVID OB EAM REM NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO DARE FACERE OPORTET et reliqua.

136. Likewise we must be admonished, if we bring suit against the very person who has promised an indeterminate thing, that the formula is presented to us in such a way that a praescription is inserted into the formula in place of a demonstratio in this manner: LET THE JUDGE BE. THAT AULUS AGERIUS HAS STIPULATED AN INDETERMINATE THING FROM NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS, OF WHICH MATTER THE DAY HAS COME, WHATEVER ON ACCOUNT OF THAT MATTER IT IS PROPER FOR NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS TO GIVE OR DO TO AULUS AGERIUS, and the rest.

137. At si cum sponsore aut fideiussore agatur, praescribi solet in persona quidem sponsoris hoc modo: EA RES AGATVR, QVOD AVLVS AGERIVS DE LVCIO TITIO INCERTVM STIPVLATVS EST, QVO NOMINE NVMERIVS NEGIDIVS SPONSOR EST, CVIVS REI DIES FVIT; in persona uero fideiussoris: EA RES AGATVR, QVOD NVMERIVS NEGIDIVS DE LVCIO TITIO INCERTVM FIDE SVA ESSE IVSSIT, CVIVS REI DIES FVIT; deinde formula subicitur.

137. But if action is brought against a sponsor or a fideiussor (surety), it is customary that a praescriptio be set down—in the person indeed of the sponsor in this way: LET THAT MATTER BE LITIGATED, THAT AULUS AGERIUS HAS STIPULATED AN INDETERMINATE THING FROM LUCIUS TITIUS, UNDER WHICH TITLE NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS IS SPONSOR, OF WHICH MATTER THE DAY HAS COME; but in the person of the fideiussor: LET THAT MATTER BE LITIGATED, THAT NUMERIUS NEGIDIUS HAS ORDERED THAT AN INDETERMINATE THING BE ON HIS OWN FAITH FROM LUCIUS TITIUS, OF WHICH MATTER THE DAY HAS COME; then the formula is subjoined.

138. Superest, ut de interdictis dispiciamus.

138. It remains that we examine the interdicts.

139. Certis igitur ex causis praetor aut proconsul principaliter auctoritatem suam finiendis controuersiis interponit. quod tum maxime facit, cum de possessione aut quasi possessione inter aliquos contenditur; et in summa aut iubet aliquid fieri aut fieri prohibet. formulae autem et uerborum conceptiones, quibus in ea re utitur, interdicta decretaue uocantur.

139. Therefore, for certain causes the praetor or the proconsul principally interposes his authority for bringing controversies to an end. He does this most of all when there is contention between some about possession or quasi-possession; and, in sum, he either orders something to be done or forbids it to be done. The formulas and the conceptions of words which he uses in that matter are called interdicts or decrees.

140. Vocantur autem decreta, cum fieri aliquid iubet, uelut cum praecipit, ut aliquid exhibeatur aut restituatur, interdicta uero, cum prohibet fieri, uelut cum praecipit, ne sine uitio possidenti uis fiat, neue in loco sacro aliquid fiat. unde omnia interdicta aut restitutoria aut exhibitoria aut prohibitoria uocantur.

140. They are called decrees, moreover, when he orders something to be done, for example when he directs that something be exhibited or restored; but interdicts, when he forbids something to be done, for example when he directs that force not be used against a possessor without fault, nor that anything be done in a sacred place. Whence all interdicts are called either restitutory or exhibitory or prohibitory.

141. Nec tamen cum quid iusserit fieri aut fieri prohibuerit, statim peractum est negotium, sed ad iudicem recuperatoresue itur et ibi editis formulis quaeritur, an aliquid aduersus praetoris edictum factum sit uel an factum non sit, quod is fieri iusserit. et modo cum poena agitur modo sine poena: cum poena, uelut cum per sponsionem agitur, sine poena, uelut cum arbiter petitur; et quidem ex prohibitoriis interdictis semper per sponsionem agi solet, ex restitutoriis uero uel exhibitoriis modo per sponsionem, modo per formulam agitur, quae arbitraria uocatur.

141. And yet, when he has ordered that something be done or has forbidden it to be done, the business is not thereby straightway accomplished, but one goes to a judge or to recuperators, and there, the formulas having been set forth, it is inquired whether anything has been done against the praetor’s edict, or whether that which he ordered to be done has not been done. And sometimes the action is brought with a penalty, sometimes without a penalty: with a penalty, as when it is proceeded with by sponsion; without a penalty, as when an arbiter is requested. And indeed from prohibitory interdicts it is always customary to proceed by sponsion; but from restitutory or exhibitory interdicts sometimes it is proceeded by sponsion, sometimes by a formula, which is called arbitrary.

142. Principalis igitur diuisio in eo est, quod aut prohibitoria sunt interdicta aut restitutoria aut exhibitoria.

142. The principal division, therefore, is this: that interdicts are either prohibitory, or restitutory, or exhibitory.

143. Sequens in eo est diuisio, quod uel adipiscendae possessionis causa conparata sunt uel retinendae uel reciperandae.

143. The next division is this: that they have been arranged either for the sake of acquiring possession, or of retaining it, or of recovering it.

144. Adipiscendae possessionis causa interdictum accommodatur bonorum possessori, cuius principium est QVORUM BONORVM; eiusque uis et potestas haec est, ut quod quisque ex his bonis, quorum possessio alicui data est, pro herede aut pro possessore possidet doloue fecit, quo minus possideret, id ei, cui bonorum possessio data est, restituatur. pro herede autem possidere uidetur tam is, qui heres est, quam is, qui putat se heredem esse; pro possessore is possidet, qui sine causa aliquam rem hereditariam uel etiam totam hereditatem sciens ad se non pertinere possidet. ideo autem adipiscendae possessionis uocatur, quia ei tantum utile est, qui nunc primum conatur adipisci rei possessionem; itaque si quis adeptus possessionem amiserit, desinit ei id interdictum utile esse.

144. For the sake of acquiring possession an interdict is accommodated to the bonorum possessor, whose opening is QVORUM BONORVM; and its force and power are these: that whatever anyone from those goods, the possession of which has been given to someone, possesses pro herede or pro possessore, or has done by fraud to the effect that he possess less (i.e., not possess), that be restored to him to whom the possession of the goods has been given. Moreover, one is deemed to possess pro herede both who is an heir and who thinks himself to be an heir; pro possessore he possesses who without cause possesses some hereditary thing or even the whole inheritance, knowing it does not pertain to himself. And it is called an interdict of acquiring possession for this reason, because it is useful only to him who now for the first time strives to acquire possession of the thing; and so, if someone, having obtained possession, has lost it, that interdict ceases to be useful to him.

145. Bonorum quoque emptori similiter proponitur interdictum, quod quidam possessorium uocant.

145. To the purchaser of the goods, likewise, an interdict is set forth, which some call possessory.

146. Item ei, qui publica bona emerit, eiusdem condicionis interdictum proponitur, quod appellatur sectorium, quod sectores uocantur, qui publice bona mercantur.

146. Likewise, for him who has purchased public goods, an interdict of the same condition is proposed, which is called the sectorial (interdict), because those who publicly buy goods are called sectores.

147. Interdictum quoque, quod appellatur Saluianum, apiscendae possessionis causa comparatum est, eoque utitur dominus fundi de rebus coloni, quas is pro mercedibus fundi pignori futuras pepigisset.

147. The interdict also, which is called the Salvianum, has been provided for the purpose of acquiring possession, and the owner of the farm uses it in respect of the colonus’s goods, which he had covenanted to be in pledge for the farm’s rents.

148. Retinendae possessionis causa solet interdictum reddi, cum ab utraque parte de proprietate alicuius rei controuersia est et ante quaeritur, uter ex litigatoribus possidere et uter petere debeat. cuius rei gratia comparata sunt VTI POSSIDETIS et VTRVBI.

148. For the sake of retaining possession an interdict is wont to be issued, when on both sides there is a controversy about the proprietorship of some thing, and first it is inquired which of the litigants ought to possess and which ought to claim. For this purpose UTI POSSIDETIS and UTRUBI have been established.

149. Et quidem VTI POSSIDETIS interdictum de fundi uel aedium possessione redditur, VTRVBI uero de rerum mobilium possessione.

149. And indeed the VTI POSSIDETIS interdict is rendered concerning the possession of a farm (fundus) or of buildings, whereas VTRVBI concerns the possession of movable things.

150. Et si quidem de fundo uel aedibus interdicitur, eum potiorem esse praetor iubet, qui eo tempore, quo interdictum redditur, nec ui nec clam nec precario ab aduersario possideat; si uero de re mobili, eum potiorem esse iubet, qui maiore parte eius anni nec ui nec clam nec precario ab aduersario possederit; idque satis ipsis uerbis interdictorum significatur.

150. And if indeed the interdict is about a tract of land or a house, the praetor orders that the one be preferred who, at the time when the interdict is issued, possesses from his adversary neither by force nor by stealth nor by precarium; but if it is about a movable thing, he orders that the one be preferred who for the greater part of that year has possessed from his adversary neither by force nor by stealth nor by precarium; and this is sufficiently indicated by the very words of the interdicts themselves.

151. Sed in VTRVBI interdicto non solum sua cuique possessio prodest, sed etiam alterius, quam iustum est ei accedere, uelut eius, cui heres extiterit, eiusque, a quo emerit uel ex donatione aut dotis nomine acceperit. itaque si nostrae possessioni iuncta alterius iusta possessio exsuperat aduersarii possessionem, nos eo interdicto uincimus. nullam autem propriam possessionem habenti accessio temporis nec datur nec dari potest.

151. But in the VTRVBI interdict not only each one’s own possession profits him, but also another’s, which it is just to accrue to him, as, for instance, that of one whose heir he has become, and that of the one from whom he has bought, or from whom he has received by donation or in the name of a dowry. And so, if to our possession there be joined another’s just possession which surpasses the adversary’s possession, we win by that interdict. But to one who has no proper possession, an accession of time is neither given nor can be given.

nam ei, quod nullum est, nihil accedere potest. sed et si uitiosam habeat possessionem, id est aut ui aut clam aut precario ab aduersario adquisitam, non datur accessio; nam ei possessio sua nihil prodest.

for to that which is nothing, nothing can accede. but even if he has a vitiated possession, that is, acquired from the adversary either by force or by stealth or precariously, no accession is given; for his own possession profits him nothing.

152. Annus autem retrorsus numeratur. itaque si tu uerbi gratia VIII mensibus possederis prioribus et ego VII posterioribus, ego potior ero, quod trium priorum mensium possessio nihil tibi in hoc interdicto prodest, quod alterius anni possessio est.

152. However, the year is counted backwards. And so, if you, for example, have possessed for 8 months, the prior ones, and I for 7, the posterior ones, I shall be superior, because the possession of the first 3 months profits you nothing in this interdict, since it is the possession of another year.

153. Possidere autem uidemur non solum, si ipsi possideamus, sed etiam si nostro nomine aliquis in possessione sit, licet is nostro iuri subiectus non sit, qualis est colonus et inquilinus. per eos quoque, apud quos deposuerimus aut quibus commodauerimus aut quibus gratuitam habitationem praestiterimus, ipsi possidere uidemur. et hoc est, quod uolgo dicitur retineri possessionem posse per quemlibet, qui nostro nomine sit in possessione.

153. We are deemed to possess not only if we ourselves possess, but also if someone is in possession in our name, although he is not subject to our authority, such as a tenant-farmer (colonus) and a lodger/tenant (inquilinus). Through those also with whom we have deposited something, or to whom we have lent it for use, or to whom we have provided gratuitous lodging, we ourselves are deemed to possess. And this is what is commonly said: that possession can be retained through anyone who is in possession in our name.

quin etiam plerique putant animo quoque retineri possessionem, id est ut, quamuis neque ipsi simus in possessione neque nostro nomine alius, tamen si non relinquendae possessionis animo, sed postea reuersuri inde discesserimus, retinere possessionem uideamur. apisci uero possessionem per quos possimus, secundo commentario rettulimus; nec ulla dubitatio est, quin animo possessionem apisci non possimus.

nay even very many think that possession is retained by intention as well, that is, although neither we ourselves are in possession nor another in our name, nevertheless, if we have departed from there not with the intention of relinquishing the possession, but intending to return afterward, we seem to retain possession. but through whom we can acquire possession, we have set forth in the second commentary; and there is no doubt that we cannot acquire possession by intention alone.

154. Reciperandae possessionis causa solet interdictum dari, si quis ex possessione ui deiectus sit. nam ei proponitur interdictum, cuius principium est VNDE TV ILLVM VI DEIECISTI, per quod is, qui deiecit, cogitur ei restituere rei possessionem, si modo is, qui deiectus est, nec ui nec clam nec precario ab eo possideret. namque eum, qui a me ui aut clam aut precario possidet, inpune deicio.

154. For the sake of recovering possession an interdict is usually given, if someone has been ejected from possession by force. For an interdict is put forward to him, the beginning of which is WHENCE YOU EJECTED HIM BY FORCE, by which he who ejected is compelled to restore to him the possession of the thing, provided that the one who was ejected was possessing from him neither by force nor by stealth nor by precarium (at‑will leave). For one who possesses from me by force or by stealth or by precarium I eject with impunity.

155. Interdum tamen etsi eum ui deiecerim, qui a me ui aut clam aut precario possideret, cogor ei restituere possessionem, uelut si armis eum ui deiecerim. nam propter atrocitatem delicti in tantum patior actionem, ut omni modo debeam ei restituere possessionem. armorum autem appellatione non solum scuta et gladios et galeas significari intellegemus, sed et fustes et lapides.

155. Sometimes, however, even if I have ejected by force one who was possessing from me by force or secretly or precariously, I am compelled to restore possession to him, as, for instance, if I have ejected him by force with arms. For on account of the atrocity of the delict I am liable to an action to such an extent that I must in every way restore possession to him. Moreover, under the appellation of arms we shall understand to be signified not only shields and swords and helmets, but also clubs and stones.

156. Tertia diuisio interdictorum in hoc est, quod aut simplicia sunt aut duplicia.

156. The third division of interdicts consists in this, that they are either simple or double.

157. Simplicia sunt, [uelut] in quibus alter actor, alter reus est, qualia sunt omnia restitutoria aut exhibitoria. namque actor est, qui desiderat aut exhiberi aut restitui, reus is est, a quo desideratur, ut exhibeat aut restituat.

157. Simple are [for example] those in which one is the actor and the other the defendant, such as all restitutory or exhibitory ones. For the actor is he who desires that something be either exhibited or restored; the defendant is he from whom it is desired that he exhibit or restore.

158. Prohibitoriorum autem interdictorum [interdum] alia duplicia, alia simplicia sunt.

158. However, among prohibitory interdicts, [sometimes] some are double, others simple.

159. Simplicia sunt, uelut quibus prohibet praetor in loco sacro aut in flumine publico ripaue eius aliquid facere reum. nam actor est, qui desiderat, ne quid fiat, reus is, qui aliquid facere conatur.

159. They are simple, for example those by which the praetor forbids the reus to do something in a sacred place or in a public river or on its bank. For the actor is he who desires that nothing be done, the reus he who tries to do something.

160. Duplicia sunt uelut VTI POSSIDETIS interdictum et VTRVBI. ideo autem duplicia uocantur, quod par utriusque litigatoris in his condicio est, nec quisquam praecipue reus uel actor intellegitur, sed unusquisque tam rei quam actoris partes sustinet; quippe praetor pari sermone cum utroque loquitur. nam summa conceptio eorum interdictorum haec est: VTI NUNC POSSIDETIS, QVO MINVS ITA POSSIDEATIS, VIM FIERI VETO; item alterius: VTRVBI HIC HOMO, DE QVO AGITVR, [APVD QVEM] MAIORE PARTE HVIVS ANNI FVIT, QVO MINVS IS EVM DVCAT, VIM FIERI VETO.

160. Double are, for instance, the interdict UTI POSSIDETIS and UTRUBI. And they are called double because the condition of each litigant is equal in them, and no one is especially understood as defendant or plaintiff, but each sustains both the parts of defendant and of plaintiff; indeed the praetor speaks with each in equal terms. For the chief conception of those interdicts is this: AS YOU NOW POSSESS, THAT YOU BE NOT HINDERED FROM SO POSSESSING, I FORBID FORCE TO BE USED; likewise of the other: WHICHEVER OF YOU THIS MAN, ABOUT WHOM IT IS BEING LITIGATED, [WITH WHOM] HAS BEEN FOR THE GREATER PART OF THIS YEAR, THAT HE BE NOT HINDERED FROM LEADING HIM AWAY, I FORBID FORCE TO BE USED.

161. Expositis generibus interdictorum sequitur, ut de ordine et de exitu eorum dispiciamus; et incipiamus a simplicibus.

161. With the kinds of interdicts set forth, it follows that we should consider their order and their issue; and let us begin with the simple ones.

162. Si igitur restitutorium uel exhibitorium interdictum redditur, uelut ut restituatur ei possessio, qui ui deiectus est, aut exhibeatur libertus, cui patronus operas indicere uellet, modo sine periculo res ad exitum perducitur, modo cum periculo.

162. If therefore a restitutory or exhibitory interdict is rendered, for example that possession be restored to him who has been ejected by force, or that a freedman be produced, upon whom the patron would wish to impose labors, sometimes the matter is brought to an outcome without peril, sometimes with peril.

163. Namque si arbitrum postulauerit is, cum quo agitur, accipit formulam, quae appellatur arbitraria, et iudicis arbitrio si quid restitui uel exhiberi debeat, id sine periculo exhibet aut restituit et ita absoluitur; quod si nec restituat neque exhibeat, quanti ea res est, condemnatur. sed et actor sine poena experitur cum eo, quem neque exhibere neque restituere quicquam oportet, praeterquam si calumniae iudicium ei oppositum fuerit decimae partis. quamquam Proculo placuit non esse permittendum calumniae iudicio uti ei, qui arbitrum postulauerit, quasi hoc ipso confessus uideatur restituere se uel exhibere debere.

163. For indeed, if he with whom it is litigated shall have requested an arbiter, he receives the formula which is called arbitrary; and, at the judge’s discretion, if anything ought to be restored or exhibited, he, without peril, exhibits or restores it and thus is absolved; but if he neither restores nor exhibits, he is condemned for as much as the thing is worth. But the actor also proceeds without penalty even against one whom it is proper to exhibit or restore nothing, unless an action of calumny for a tenth part has been opposed to him. Although Proculus held that it is not to be permitted for him to use the action of calumny who has requested an arbiter, as by this very thing he seems to have confessed that he ought to restore or exhibit.

sed alio iure utimur et recte; potius enim ut modestiore uia litiget, arbitrum quisque petit, quam quia confitetur.

but we use another law, and rightly; for rather so that he may litigate by a more modest way, each person requests an arbiter, than because he confesses.

164. Ceterum obseruare debet is, qui uult arbitrum petere, ut statim petat, antequam ex iure exeat, [id est antequam a praetore discedat]; sero enim petentibus non indulgetur.

164. Moreover, he who wishes to petition for an arbiter ought to observe this: that he petition at once, before he go out from the court, [that is, before he depart from the praetor]; for indulgence is not granted to those who petition late.

165. Itaque si arbitrum non petierit, sed tacitus de iure exierit, cum periculo res ad exitum perducitur. nam actor prouocat aduersarium sponsione, quod contra edictum praetoris non exhibuerit aut non restituerit; ille autem aduersus sponsionem aduersarii restipulatur; deinde actor quidem sponsionis formulam edit aduersario, ille huic inuicem restipulationis. sed actor sponsionis formulae subicit et aliud iudicium de re restituenda uel exhibenda, ut si sponsione uicerit, nisi ei res exhibeatur aut restituatur, [. . . . . pag.

165. And so, if he shall not have sought an arbiter, but silently has gone out from the ius (court), the matter is brought to an outcome at his peril. For the plaintiff challenges his adversary by a sponsion, on the ground that, contrary to the praetor’s edict, he has not exhibited or not restored; but the latter, against the adversary’s sponsion, re-stipulates; then the plaintiff indeed issues to the adversary the formula of the sponsion, and he in turn to him that of the restipulation. But the plaintiff appends to the formula of the sponsion also another action for the thing to be restored or exhibited, so that, if he should win by the sponsion, unless the thing be exhibited or restored to him, [. . . . . pag.

242 et 243 . . . . . . . ]

242 and 243 . . . . . . . ]

166. [. . . . . . . . ] fructus licitando, is tantisper in possessione constituitur, si modo aduersario suo fructuaria stipulatione cauerit, cuius uis et potestas haec est, ut si contra eum de possessione pronuntiatum fuerit, eam summam aduersario soluat. haec autem licendi contentio fructus licitatio uocatur, scilicet quia [. . . . . vv. 1 1/2 . . . . . . . ] postea alter alterum sponsione prouocat, quod aduersus edictum praetoris possidenti sibi uis facta sit, et inuicem ambo restipulantur aduersus sponsionem: [. . . . . . . . . . ] una inter eos sponsio itemque restipulatio una [. . . . . . . . ] ad eam fit. [. . . . . vv. 2 1/2 . . . . . . . ]

166. [. . . . . . . . ] by liciting the fruits, he is meanwhile established in possession, provided only that he has given surety to his adversary by a fructuary stipulation, whose force and power are these: that, if a pronouncement about the possession shall have been made against him, he shall pay that sum to his adversary. Moreover, this contention of bidding for the fruits is called fruits-licitation, namely because [. . . . . vv. 1 1/2 . . . . . . . ] thereafter the one challenges the other by a sponsion, that, against the praetor’s edict, violence has been done to himself as possessor; and in turn both mutually restipulate against the sponsion: [. . . . . . . . . . ] one sponsion between them, likewise one restipulation [. . . . . . . . ] is made to that. [. . . . . vv. 2 1/2 . . . . . . . ]

166a. [. . . . . . . . . ] iudex, apud quem de ea re agitur, illud scilicet requirit, quod praetor interdicto conplexus est, id est, uter eorum eum fundum easue aedes per id tempus, quo interdictum redditur, nec ui nec clam nec precario possideret. cum iudex id explorauerit et forte secundum me iudicatum sit, aduersarium mihi et sponsionis et restipulationis summas, quas cum eo feci, condemnat et conuenienter me sponsionis et restipulationis, quae mecum factae sunt, absoluit; et hoc amplius si apud aduersarium meum possessio est, quia is fructus licitatione uicit, nisi restituat mihi possessionem, Cascelliano siue secutorio iudicio condemnatur.

166a. [. . . . . . . . . ] the judge, before whom the matter is being tried, inquires into that, namely, which the praetor has encompassed in the interdict—that is, which of the two possessed that estate or those buildings for that time during which the interdict is delivered, neither by force nor secretly nor precariously. When the judge has ascertained this, and it has chanced to be judged in my favor, he condemns my adversary to the sums of the sponsion and the counter-stipulation which I made with him, and correspondingly he absolves me from the sponsion and the counter-stipulation which were made with me; and, moreover, if the possession is with my adversary, because he prevailed by the licitation of the fruits, unless he restore possession to me, he is condemned by the Cascellian or sequitorial action.

167. Ergo is, qui fructus licitatione uicit, si non probat ad se pertinere possessionem, sponsionis et restipulationis et fructus licitationis summam poenae nomine soluere et praeterea possessionem restituere iubetur et hoc amplius fructus, quos interea percepit, reddit; summa enim fructus licitationis non pretium est fructuum, sed poenae nomine soluitur, quod quis alienam possessionem per hoc tempus retinere et facultatem fruendi nancisci conatus est.

167. Therefore he who has won the licitation for the fruits, if he does not prove that the possession pertains to himself, is ordered to pay, under the name of a penalty, the sum of the sponsion and the restipulation and of the licitation for the fruits, and besides to restore the possession, and, beyond this, to give back the fruits which in the meantime he has received; for the sum of the licitation for the fruits is not the price of the fruits, but is paid under the name of a penalty, because one has attempted during this time to retain another’s possession and to obtain the faculty of enjoying it.

168. Ille autem, qui fructus licitatione uictus est, si non probauerit ad se pertinere possessionem, tantum sponsionis et restipulationis summam poenae nomine debet.

168. But he who has been defeated in the licitation of the fruits, if he has not proved that the possession pertains to himself, owes only the sum of the sponsio and restipulatio by way of penalty.

169. Admonendi tamen sumus liberum esse ei, qui fructus licitatione uictus erit, omissa fructuaria stipulatione, sicut Cascelliano siue secutorio iudicio de possessione reciperanda experitur, ita similiter de fructus licitatione agere. in quam rem proprium iudicium conparatum est, quod appellatur fructuarium, quo nomine actor iudicatum solui satis accipit. dicitur autem et hoc iudicium secutorium, quod sequitur sponsionis uictoriam; sed non aeque Cascellianum uocatur.

169. Nevertheless we must be admonished that it is free to him who shall have been defeated in the licitation of the fruits, with the fructuary stipulation omitted, to act concerning the licitation of the fruits in like manner as he proceeds by the Cascellian or secutorial action for recovering possession. For this matter a proper action has been provided, which is called the fructuary [action], under which name the plaintiff receives surety that the judgment be paid (iudicatum solvi). And this action too is called secutorial, because it follows the victory of the sponsio; but it is not likewise called Cascellian.

170. Sed quia nonnulli interdicto reddito cetera ex interdicto facere nolebant atque ob id non poterat res expediri, praetor in eam rem prospexit et comparauit interdicta, quae secundaria appellamus, quod secundo loco redduntur. quorum uis et potestas haec est, ut qui cetera ex interdicto non faciat, uelut qui uim non faciat aut fructus non liceatur aut qui fructus licitationis satis non det aut si sponsiones non faciat sponsionumue iudicia non accipiat, siue possideat, restituat aduersario possessionem, siue non possideat, uim illi possidenti non faciat. itaque etsi alias potuerit interdicto VTI POSSIDETIS uincere, si cetera ex interdicto fecisset [. . . . . . . . ], tamen per interdictum secundarium uincitur.

170. But because some, after the interdict had been issued, were unwilling to do the other things from the interdict, and on that account the matter could not be expedited, the praetor made provision in that matter and provided interdicts which we call “secondary,” because they are rendered in a second stage. Their force and power is this: that one who does not do the other things required by the interdict—such as to forbear from force, or to auction the fruits, or to give surety for the licitation of the fruits, or if he does not make sponsions or does not accept the judicial actions of the sponsions—whether he is in possession, he shall restitute possession to his adversary; or, if he is not in possession, he shall not commit force against the one possessing. And so, even if otherwise he could have won by the interdict UTI POSSIDETIS, if he had done the rest required by the interdict [. . . . . . . . ], nevertheless he is overcome by the secondary interdict.

[. . . . . vv. 4 . . . . . . . ] Sabinus et Cassius secuti fuerint [. . . . . vv. 33 . . . . . . . ] 171. [. . . . . . . ] pecuniaria poena modo iurisiurandi religione coercen[. . . . . . . . . ]. eaque praetor [. . . . . ] ideo [. . . . . . . . . . ] aduersus infitiantes ex quibusdam causis dupli actio constituitur, uelut si iudicati aut depensi aut damni iniuriae aut legatorum per damnationem relictorum nomine agitur. ex quibusdam causis sponsionem facere permittitur, uelut de pecunia certa credita et pecunia constituta, sed certae quidem creditae pecuniae tertiae partis, constitutae uero pecuniae partis dimidiae.

[. . . . . vv. 4 . . . . . . . ] Sabinus and Cassius would have followed [. . . . . vv. 33 . . . . . . . ]
171. [. . . . . . . ] restrained by a pecuniary penalty only by the religion (binding force) of an oath coercen[. . . . . . . . . ]. and the praetor [. . . . . ] therefore [. . . . . . . . . . ] against deniers in certain causes an action for the double is established, as, for instance, if suit is brought in the name of a judgment-debt (iudicati) or of money paid out (depensi) or of wrongful damage (damni iniuriae) or of legacies left by condemnation (of the damnation type). in certain causes a sponsion is permitted, as concerning a certain sum lent (pecunia certa credita) and constituted money (pecunia constituta), but in the case of the certain sum lent, for a third part, while of the constituted money, for a half part.

172. Quod si neque sponsionis neque dupli actionis periculum ei, cum quo agitur, iniungatur ac ne statim quidem ab initio pluris quam simpli sit actio, permittit praetor iusiurandum exigere NON CALVMNIAE CAVSA INFITIAS IRE. unde quamuis heredes uel qui heredum loco habentur [. . . . . . . . . ] obligati sint, item feminae pupillique eximantur periculo sponsionis, iubet tamen eos iurare.

172. But if neither the peril of a sponsion nor of an action for the double be imposed upon the one with whom the suit is conducted, and not even from the very beginning is the action for more than single, the praetor permits an oath to be exacted: NON CALVMNIAE CAVSA INFITIAS IRE. Whence, although heirs or those who are held in the place of heirs [. . . . . . . . . ] are obligated, likewise women and wards are exempted from the peril of a sponsion, nevertheless he orders them to swear.

173. Statim autem ab initio pluris quam simpli actio est uelut furti manifesti quadrupli, nec manifesti dupli, concepti et oblati tripli: nam ex his causis et aliis quibusdam, siue quis neget siue fateatur, pluris quam simpli est actio.

173. At once, however, from the outset the action is for more than single, for example: of manifest theft, quadruple; of non‑manifest, double; of found and of offered (i.e., concepti and oblati), triple: for from these causes and certain others, whether one denies or admits, the action is for more than single.

174. Actoris quoque calumnia coercetur modo calumniae iudicio, modo contrario, modo iureiurando, modo restipulatione.

174. The plaintiff’s calumny likewise is restrained, now by the judgment of calumny, now by the contrary (counter-suit), now by oath, now by restipulation.

175. Et quidem calumniae iudicium aduersus omnes actiones locum habet et est decimae partis, praeterquam quod aduersus adsertorem tertiae partis est.

175. And indeed the action of calumny has place against all actions and is of a tenth part, except that against an adsertor it is of a third part.

176. Liberum est autem ei, cum quo agitur, aut calumniae iudicium opponere aut iusiurandum exigere NON CALVMNIAE CAVSA AGERE.

176. It is free, moreover, to him against whom suit is brought, either to oppose a judgment/action of calumny or to exact an oath NOT TO SUE FOR THE SAKE OF CALUMNY.

177. Contrarium autem iudicium ex certis causis constituitur, uelut si iniuriarum agatur et si cum muliere eo nomine agatur, quod dicatur uentris nomine in possessionem missa dolo malo ad alium possessionem transtulisse, et si quis eo nomine agat, quod dicat se a praetore in possessionem missum ab alio quo admissum non esse. sed aduersus iniuriarum quidem actionem decimae partis datur, aduersus uero duas istas quintae.

177. The contrary judicial action is constituted for certain causes, as, for instance, if an action for injuries is brought; and if suit is brought against a woman on this title, that she, having been sent into possession in the name of the womb, transferred the possession to another by malicious fraud; and if anyone sues on this title, that he says that, having been sent into possession by the praetor, he was not admitted by another by whom he ought to have been admitted. But against the action for injuries, indeed, it is given for a tenth part, while against those other two, for a fifth.

178. Seuerior autem coercitio est per contrarium iudicium. nam calumniae iudicio X. partis nemo damnatur nisi qui intellegit non recte se agere, sed uexandi aduersarii gratia actionem instituit potiusque ex iudicis errore uel iniquitate uictoriam sperat quam ex causa ueritatis. calumnia enim in adfectu est, sicut furti crimen.

178. But severer coercition is through the contrary judgment. For by the calumny action no one is condemned to the 10th part, unless he understands that he is not acting rightly, but has instituted the action for the sake of vexing his adversary, and hopes for victory rather from the judge’s error or iniquity than from the cause of truth. For calumny is in the intent, just as the crime of theft is.

contrario uero iudicio omni modo damnatur actor, si causam non tenuerit, licet aliqua opinione inductus crediderit se recte agere.

by the contrary judgment, however, the actor is condemned in every way if he has not held his cause, even if, led by some opinion, he believed that he was proceeding rightly.

179. Vtique autem ex quibus causis contrario iudicio agi potest, etiam calumniae iudicium locum habet; sed alterutro tantum iudicio agere permittitur. qua ratione si iusiurandum de calumnia exactum fuerit, quemadmodum calumniae iudicium non datur, ita et contrarium non dari debet.

179. And assuredly, in those causes in which a contrary judgment can be brought, the judgment of calumny likewise has a place; but it is permitted to proceed by only one or the other judgment. Accordingly, if the oath concerning calumny has been exacted, just as the calumny-judgment is not granted, so too the contrary ought not to be granted.

180. Restipulationis quoque poena ex certis causis fieri solet; et quemadmodum contrario iudicio omni modo condemnatur actor, si causam non tenuerit, nec requiritur, an scierit non recte se agere, ita etiam restipulationis poena omni modo damnatur actor, si uincere non potuerit.

180. The penalty of restipulation also is wont to arise from certain causes; and just as by a contrary judgment the plaintiff is in every way condemned, if he has not sustained his case, nor is it required whether he knew that he was not proceeding rightly, so also under the penalty of restipulation the plaintiff is in every way condemned, if he has not been able to prevail.

181. Qui autem restipulationis poenam patitur, ei neque calumniae iudicium opponitur neque iurisiurandi religio iniungitur; nam contrarium iudicium ex his causis locum non habere palam est.

181. But he who undergoes the penalty of restipulation, against him neither is the judgment for calumny opposed nor is the obligation of the oath imposed; for it is clear that the contrary judgment has no place in these causes.

182. Quibusdam iudiciis damnati ignominiosi fiunt, uelut furti, ui bonorum raptorum, iniuriarum, item pro socio, fiduciae, tutelae, mandati, depositi. sed furti aut ui bonorum raptorum aut iniuriarum non solum damnati notantur ignominia, sed etiam pacti, ut in edicto praetoris scriptum est; et recte. plurimum enim interest, utrum ex delicto aliquis an ex contractu debitor sit.

182. In certain judgments, those condemned become ignominious, as in theft, in violent carrying-off of goods, in injuries/insults; likewise in actions for a partner, of fiducia (trust), of tutela (guardianship), of mandate, of deposit. But in theft or in violent carrying-off of goods or in injuries/insults, not only those condemned are marked with ignominy, but also those who have made a pact, as is written in the edict of the Praetor; and rightly so. For it makes very great difference whether someone is a debtor from a delict or from a contract.

nec tamen ulla parte edicti id ipsum nominatim exprimitur, ut aliquis ignominiosus sit, sed qui prohibetur et pro alio postulare et cognitorem dare procuratoremue habere, item procuratorio aut cognitorio nomine iudicio interuenire, ignominiosus esse dicitur.

and yet in no part of the edict is that very thing expressly stated, that someone is ignominious, but he who is prohibited both to plead on behalf of another and to appoint a cognitor or to have a procurator, likewise to intervene in a trial under a procuratorial or cognitorial title, is said to be ignominious.

183. In summa sciendum est eum, qui cum aliquo consistere uelit, in ius uocare oportere et eum, qui uocatus est, si non uenerit, poenam ex edicto praetoris committere. quasdam tamen personas sine permissu praetoris in ius uocare non licet, uelut parentes patronos patronas, item liberos et parentes patroni patronaeue; et in eum, qui aduersus ea egerit, poena constituitur.

183. In sum, it is to be known that he who wishes to engage with someone must call him into court; and he who, having been called, does not come, incurs the penalty from the praetor’s edict. Certain persons, however, it is not permitted to summon into court without the praetor’s permission—such as parents, patrons and patronesses, likewise the children and parents of a patron or patroness; and a penalty is constituted against one who has acted contrary to these.

184. Cum autem in ius uocatus fuerit aduersarius neque eo die finiri potuerit negotium, uadimonium ei faciendum est, id est ut promittat se certo die sisti.

184. But when the adversary has been called into court and the matter cannot be concluded on that day, a vadimonium must be made for him—that is, that he promise to appear on a certain day.

185. Fiunt autem uadimonia quibusdam ex causis pura, id est sine satisdatione, quibusdam cum satisdatione, quibusdam iureiurando, quibusdam recuperatoribus suppositis, id est, ut qui non steterit, is protinus a recuperatoribus in summam uadimonii condemnetur; eaque singula diligenter praetoris edicto significantur.

185. Moreover, vadimonia (recognizances) are made for certain causes pure, that is, without satisdation (suretyship), for certain with satisdation, for certain by oath, for certain with recuperators put in place, that is, so that he who has not appeared is immediately condemned by the recuperators in the sum of the vadimonium; and these several points are carefully indicated in the praetor’s edict.

186. Et si quidem iudicati depensiue agetur, tanti fit uadimonium, quanti ea res erit; si uero ex ceteris causis, quanti actor iurauerit non calumniae causa postulare sibi uadimonium promitti: nec tamen pluris quam partis dimidiae nec pluribus quam sestertium C milibus fit uadimonium. itaque si centum milium res erit nec iudicati depensiue agetur, non plus quam sestertium quinquaginta milium fit uadimonium.

186. And if indeed suit be brought on a judgment (iudicati) or for depensum, the vadimonium is set for as much as that matter will be; but if from the other causes, for as much as the plaintiff shall have sworn—not for the sake of calumny—that a vadimonium be promised to him: yet nevertheless a vadimonium is not made for more than one half part, nor for more than 100 thousand sesterces. And so, if the matter will be of 100 thousand, and it is not proceeded on iudicati or depensum, the vadimonium is not made for more than fifty thousand sesterces.

187. Quas autem personas sine permissu praetoris inpune in ius uocare non possumus, easdem nec uadimonio inuitas obligare nobis possumus, praeterquam si praetor aditus permittat.

187. But the persons whom we cannot call into court with impunity without the praetor’s permission, we likewise cannot obligate by a vadimonium when unwilling, except if, when approached, the praetor permits.