Seneca: EPISTULAE MORALES AD LUCILIUM

[1] Quereris incidisse te in hominem ingratum: si hoc nunc primum, age aut fortunae aut diligentiae tuae gratias. Sed nihil facere hoc loco diligentia potest nisi te malignum; nam si hoc periculum vitare volueris, non dabis beneficia; ita ne apud alium pereant, apud te peribunt. Non respondeant potius quam non dentur: et post malam segetem serendum est.

[1] You complain that you have fallen upon an ungrateful man: if this is now for the first time, come, give thanks either to Fortune or to your diligence. But diligence can accomplish nothing in this matter except to make you stingy; for if you wish to avoid this danger, you will not give benefactions; thus, lest they perish with another, they will perish with you. Let them rather not be repaid than not be given; and after a bad harvest one must still sow.

Saepe quidquid perierat adsidua infelicis soli sterilitate unius anni restituit ubertas.

Often the abundance of a single year restores whatever had perished through the persistent sterility of an unlucky soil.

[2] Est tanti, ut gratum invenias, experiri et ingratos. Nemo habet tam certam in beneficiis manum ut non saepe fallatur: aberrent, ut aliquando haereant. Post naufragium maria temptantur; feneratorem non fugat a foro coctor.

[2] It is worth it, in order that you may find one grateful, to make trial even of the ungrateful. No one has so sure a hand in benefits as not often to be deceived: let some miss the mark, that at some time some may stick. After a shipwreck the seas are tried again; a usurer is not put to flight from the forum by a bankrupt.

Cito inerti otio vita torpebit, si relinquendum est quidquid offendit. Te vero benigniorem haec ipsa res faciat; nam cuius rei eventus incertus est, id ut aliquando procedat saepe temptandum est.

Quickly will life grow torpid in inert leisure, if whatever offends must be relinquished. But let this very matter make you more benign; for where the event is uncertain, that, in order that it may sometime proceed, must often be attempted.

[3] Sed de isto satis multa in iis libris locuti sumus qui de beneficiis inscribuntur: illud magis quaerendum videtur, quod non satis, ut existimo, explicatum est, an is qui profuit nobis, si postea nocuit, paria fecerit et nos debito solverit. Adice, si vis, et illud: multo plus postea nocuit quam ante profuerat.

[3] But about that we have spoken quite enough in those books which are inscribed On Benefits: this rather seems to be sought into, which has not, as I judge, been sufficiently explicated—whether he who has profited us, if afterwards he has harmed us, has made things equal and has released us from the debt. Add, if you will, also this: that afterwards he harmed much more than he had previously profited.

[4] Si rectam illam rigidi iudicis sententiam quaeris, alterum ab altero absolvet et dicet, 'quamvis iniuriae praeponderent, tamen beneficiis donetur quod ex iniuria superest'. Plus nocuit, sed prius profuit; itaque habeatur et temporis ratio.

[4] If you seek that straight sentence of the rigid judge, he will absolve the one from the other and will say, 'although the injuries preponderate, nevertheless let what remains from the injury be granted to the benefits'. He harmed more, but earlier he benefited; and so let account also be taken of time.

[5] Iam illa manifestiora sunt quam ut admoneri debeas quaerendum esse quam libenter profuerit, quam invitus nocuerit, quoniam animo et beneficia et iniuriae constant. 'Nolui beneficium dare; victus sum aut verecundia aut instantis pertinacia aut spe.'

[5] Now those things are more manifest than that you should need to be admonished that it must be inquired how willingly he conferred benefit, how unwillingly he did harm, since both benefactions and injuries consist in intention. 'I did not wish to give the benefaction; I was overcome either by modesty or by the pertinacity of the one insisting, or by hope.'

[6] Eo animo quidque debetur quo datur, nec quantum sit sed a quali profectum voluntate perpenditur. Nunc coniectura tollatur: et illud beneficium fuit et hoc, quod modum beneficii prioris excessit, iniuria est. Vir bonus utrosque calculos sic ponit ut se ipse circumscribat: beneficio adicit, iniuriae demit.

[6] Each thing is owed in the same spirit in which it is given, and it is weighed not by how much it is but by what sort of will it has proceeded from. Now let conjecture be removed: both that was a benefaction, and this, because it exceeded the measure of the prior benefaction, is an injury. A good man places both counters in such a way as to circumscribe himself: he adds to the benefit, he subtracts from the injury.

Alter ille remissior iudex, quem esse me malo, iniuriae oblivisci iubebit, officii meminisse.

That other, more lenient judge, whom I prefer to be, will bid me to forget the injury, to remember the good office.

[7] 'Hoc certe' inquis 'iustitiae convenit, suum cuique reddere, beneficio gratiam, iniuriae talionem aut certe malam gratiam.' Verum erit istud cum alius iniuriam fecerit, alius beneficium dederit; nam si idem est, beneficio vis iniuriae extinguitur. Nam cui, etiam si merita non antecessissent, oportebat ignosci, post beneficia laedenti plus quam venia debetur.

[7] '“This certainly,” you say, “befits justice: to render to each his own—gratitude for a benefit, talion for an injury, or at least ill favor.” That will be true when one person has done the injury and another has given the benefit; for if it is the same person, the force of the injury is extinguished by the benefit. For to one whom, even if merits had not preceded, it was proper to be pardoned, after benefits, when he offends, more than mere pardon is owed.'

[8] Non pono utrique par pretium: pluris aestimo beneficium quam iniuriam. Non omnes esse grati sciunt: debere beneficium potest etiam inprudens et rudis et unus e turba, utique dum prope est ab accepto, ignorat autem quantum pro eo debeat. Uni sapienti notum est quanti res quaeque taxanda sit.

[8] I do not set an equal price for both: I estimate a benefit at more than an injury. Not everyone knows how to be grateful: even the imprudent, the untrained, the one from the crowd can owe a benefit—especially while it is close upon having been received—yet he does not know how much he owes for it. To the wise man alone is it known at what worth each thing ought to be assessed.

Nam ille de quo loquebar modo stultus, etiam si bonae voluntatis est, aut minus quam debet aut <alio quam debet> tempore aut quo non debet loco reddit; id quod referendum est effundit atque abicit.

For that fool of whom I was just speaking, even if he is of good will, either renders less than he ought or <at another time than he ought> or in a place where he ought not; he pours out and casts away that which is to be rendered.

[9] Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quaedam efficacissimis et officia docentibus notis signat. Sic certe solemus loqui: 'ille illi gratiam rettulit'. Referre est ultro quod debeas adferre. Non dicimus 'gratiam reddidit'; reddunt enim et qui reposcuntur et qui inviti et qui ubilibet et qui per alium.

[9] There is a marvelous propriety of words in certain matters, and the custom of ancient speech marks some things with most efficacious signs that teach duties. Thus surely we are accustomed to speak: "he returned gratitude to him." To return is to bring of your own accord what you owe. We do not say "he paid back gratitude"; for they pay back who are demanded, and who are unwilling, and who do it wherever, and who do it through another.

Non dicimus 'reposuit beneficium' aut 'solvit': nullum nobis placuit quod aeri alieno convenit verbum.

We do not say 'he put back the benefit' or 'he paid': no term that is proper to indebtedness has pleased us.

[10] Referre est ad eum a quo acceperis rem ferre. Haec vox significat voluntariam relationem: qui rettulit, ipse se appellavit. Sapiens omnia examinabit secum, quantum acceperit, a quo, quando, ubi, quemadmodum.

[10] To refer is to bear the thing to him from whom you have received it. This word signifies a voluntary return: he who has returned it has summoned himself. The wise man will examine everything with himself—how much he has received, from whom, when, where, in what manner.

Itaque negamus quemquam scire gratiam referre nisi sapientem, non magis quam beneficium dare quisquam scit nisi sapiens -- hic scilicet qui magis dato gaudet quam alius accepto.

Accordingly, we deny that anyone knows how to render gratitude except the wise man, no more than anyone knows how to give a benefaction except the wise man -- this man, of course, who rejoices more in the giving than another in the receiving.

[11] Hoc aliquis inter illa numerat quae videmur inopinata omnibus dicere (paradoxa Graeci vocant) et ait, 'nemo ergo scit praeter sapientem referre gratiam? ergo nec quod debet creditori suo reponere quisquam scit alius nec, cum emit aliquam rem, pretium venditori persolvere?' nobis fiat invidia, scito idem dicere Epicurum. Metrodorus certe ait solum sapientem referre gratiam scire.

[11] Someone counts this among those things which we seem to say as unexpected to everyone (the Greeks call them paradoxes) and says, 'So then no one besides the wise man knows how to return gratitude? Therefore neither does anyone else know how to repay what he owes to his creditor, nor, when he buys some thing, to pay the price in full to the seller?' let there be ill-will against us, know that Epicurus says the same. Metrodorus certainly says that only the wise man knows how to return gratitude.

[12] Deinde idem admiratur cum dicimus, 'solus sapiens scit amare, solus sapiens amicus est'. Atqui et amoris et amicitiae pars est referre gratiam, immo hoc magis vulgare est et in plures cadit quam vera amicitia. Deinde idem admiratur quod dicimus fidem nisi in sapiente non esse, tamquam non ipse idem dicat. An tibi videtur fidem habere qui referre gratiam nescit?

[12] Then the same man admires when we say, 'only the wise man knows how to love, only the wise man is a friend.' And yet to return gratitude is a part of love and of friendship; indeed this is more vulgar, and falls to more people, than true friendship. Then the same man admires that we say faith (fidelity) exists only in the wise man, as though he himself did not say the same. Does he seem to you to have faith who does not know how to return gratitude?

[13] Desinant itaque infamare nos tamquam incredibilia iactantes et sciant apud sapientem esse ipsa honesta, apud vulgum simulacra rerum honestarum et effigies. Nemo referre gratiam scit nisi sapiens. Stultus quoque, utcumque scit et quemadmodum potest, referat; scientia illi potius quam voluntas desit: velle non discitur.

[13] Let them cease, therefore, to defame us as though we were bandying about incredible things, and let them know that with the wise man are the honorable things themselves, with the crowd the simulacra and effigies of honorable things. No one knows how to return gratitude except the wise man. Let the fool also, however he knows and as he can, return it; to him there is a lack of knowledge rather than of will: willing is not learned.

[14] Sapiens omnia inter se comparabit; maius enim aut minus fit, quamvis idem sit, tempore, loco, causa. Saepe enim hoc potuere divitiae in domum infusae quod opportune dati mille denarii. Multum enim interest donaveris an succurreris, servaverit illum tua liberalitas an instruxerit; saepe quod datur exiguum est, quod sequitur ex eo magnum.

[14] The wise man will compare all things among themselves; for a thing becomes greater or lesser, although it is the same, by time, place, and cause. For often this could be accomplished by riches poured into a house which a thousand denarii given opportunely could. For there is much difference whether you have donated or have come to the rescue, whether your liberality has preserved him or equipped him; often what is given is scant, what follows from it is great.

Quantum autem existimas interesse utrum aliquis quod daret a se [quod praestabat] sumpserit an beneficium acceperit ut daret?

How much, moreover, do you think it makes a difference whether someone has taken from himself what he was going to give [what he was providing], or has received a benefit in order to give?

[15] Sed ne in eadem quae satis scrutati sumus revolvamur, in hac comparatione beneficii et iniuriae vir bonus iudicabit quidem quod erit aequissimum, sed beneficio favebit; in hanc erit partem proclivior.

[15] But lest we revolve again into the same matters that we have examined enough, in this comparison of benefaction and injury the good man will indeed judge what is most equitable, but he will favor the benefaction; toward this side he will be more inclined.

[16] Plurimum autem momenti persona solet adferre in rebus eiusmodi: 'dedisti mihi beneficium in servo, iniuriam fecisti in patre; servasti mihi filium, sed patrem abstulisti'. Alia deinceps per quae procedit omnis conlatio prosequetur, et si pusillum erit quod intersit, dissimulabit; etiam si multum fuerit, sed si id donari salva pietate ac fide poterit, remittet, id est si ad ipsum tota pertinebit iniuria.

[16] But the person is wont to bring very much of moment in matters of this sort: 'you gave me a benefit in a slave, you did an injury against my father; you saved my son for me, but you took away my father.' He will then, in due order, pursue other points through which the whole comparison proceeds, and if the difference shall be small, he will dissemble it; even if it shall be great, yet if it can be granted with piety and fidelity kept safe, he will remit it—that is, if the whole injury will pertain to himself alone.

[17] Summa rei haec est: facilis erit in commutando; patietur plus inputari sibi; invitus beneficium per compensationem iniuriae solvet; in hanc partem inclinabit, huc verget, ut cupiat debere gratiam, cupiat referre. Errat enim si quis beneficium accipit libentius quam reddit: quanto hilarior est qui solvit quam qui mutuatur, tanto debet laetior esse qui se maximo aere alieno accepti benefici exonerat quam qui cum maxime obligatur.

[17] The sum of the matter is this: he will be easy in making commutation; he will allow more to be imputed to himself; he will, unwillingly, settle a benefit by compensation for an injury; he will incline to this side, will verge this way, to desire to owe gratitude, to desire to return it. For he errs if anyone accepts a benefit more willingly than he repays it: the more cheerful is he who pays than he who borrows, by so much ought he to be the more joyful who exonerates himself from the greatest debt of a received benefit than he who is just now being most obligated.

[18] Nam in hoc quoque falluntur ingrati, quod creditori quidem praeter sortem extra ordinem numerant, beneficiorum autem usum esse gratuitum putant: et illa crescunt mora tantoque plus solvendum est quanto tardius. Ingratus est qui beneficium reddit sine usura; itaque huius quoque rei habebitur ratio, cum conferentur accepta et expensa.

[18] For in this too the ungrateful are mistaken, that to a creditor indeed they pay, beyond the principal, something extra out of the ordinary, but they suppose the use of benefits to be gratuitous; and those grow by delay, and the slower, the more must be paid. He is ungrateful who repays a benefit without interest; and so account will be had of this matter as well, when receipts and expenses are compared.

[19] Omnia facienda sunt ut quam gratissimi simus. Nostrum enim hoc bonum est, quemadmodum iustitia non est (ut vulgo creditur) ad alios pertinens: magna pars eius in se redit. Nemo non, cum alteri prodest, sibi profuit, non eo nomine dico, quod volet adiuvare adiutus, protegere defensus, quod bonum exemplum circuitu ad facientem revertitur (sicut mala exempla recidunt in auctores nec ulla miseratio contingit iis qui patiuntur iniurias quas posse fieri faciendo docuerunt), sed quod virtutum omnium pretium in ipsis est.

[19] All things must be done so that we may be as most grateful as possible. For this is our good, just as justice is not (as is commonly believed) pertaining to others: a great part of it returns back to oneself. No one, when he benefits another, has not benefited himself—not on this account do I say it, that the one helped will wish to help, the one defended to protect, that a good example by a circuit returns to the doer (just as bad examples fall back upon their authors, nor does any compassion befall those who suffer injustices which, by doing, they have taught can be done), but that the value of all virtues is in themselves.

Non enim exercentur ad praemium: recte facti fecisse merces est.

For they are not exercised for a reward: the wage of a right deed is to have done it.

[20] Gratus sum non ut alius mihi libentius praestet priori inritatus exemplo, sed ut rem iucundissimam ac pulcherrimam faciam; gratus sum non quia expedit, sed quia iuvat. Hoc ut scias ita esse, si gratum esse non licebit nisi ut videar ingratus, si reddere beneficium non aliter quam per speciem iniuriae potero, aequissimo animo ad honestum consilium per mediam infamiam tendam. Nemo mihi videtur pluris aestimare virtutem, nemo illi magis esse devotus quam qui boni viri famam perdidit ne conscientiam perderet.

[20] I am grateful not so that another may more willingly render to me, stirred by the prior example, but so that I may do a most pleasant and most beautiful thing; I am grateful not because it is expedient, but because it delights. That you may know this is so: if it will not be permitted to be grateful except on condition that I seem ungrateful, if I shall be able to repay a benefit in no other way than under the appearance of an injury, with a most even mind I shall strive toward an honorable design through the very midst of infamy. No one seems to me to value virtue at a higher price, no one to be more devoted to it, than he who has lost the reputation of a good man lest he lose his conscience.

[21] Itaque, ut dixi, maiore tuo quam alterius bono gratus es; illi enim vulgaris et cotidiana res contigit, recipere quod dederat, tibi magna et ex beatissimo animi statu profecta, gratum fuisse. Nam si malitia miseros facit, virtus beatos, gratum autem esse virtus est, rem usitatam reddidisti, inaestimabilem consecutus es, conscientiam grati, quae nisi in animum divinum fortunatumque non pervenit.

[21] And so, as I said, by being grateful you benefit yourself more than the other; for to him a common and everyday thing has happened, to receive what he had given, to you something great and proceeding from a most blessed state of mind, to have been grateful. For if malice makes men miserable, virtue blessed, and to be grateful is a virtue, you have returned a usual thing, you have obtained something inestimable: the conscience of the grateful, which does not arrive except into a divine and fortunate mind.

[In] Contrarium autem huic adfectum summa infelicitas urget: nemo sibi gratus est qui alteri non fuit. Hoc me putas dicere, qui ingratus est miser erit? non differo illum: statim miser est.

[In] But the utmost infelicity urges the contrary affect: no one is grateful to himself who has not been to another. Do you think me to be saying this, that he who is ungrateful will be wretched? not do I defer him: at once he is wretched.

[22] Itaque ingrati esse vitemus non aliena causa sed nostra. Minimum ex nequitia levissimumque ad alios redundat: quod pessimum ex illa est et, ut ita dicam, spississimum, domi remanet et premit habentem, quemadmodum Attalus noster dicere solebat, 'malitia ipsa maximam partem veneni sui bibit'. Illud venenum quod serpentes in alienam perniciem proferunt, sine sua continent, non est huic simile: hoc habentibus pessimum est.

[22] Therefore let us avoid being ungrateful not for another’s sake but for our own. Of wickedness, the least and lightest part overflows upon others: what is worst in it and, so to speak, the most dense, remains at home and presses the possessor, as our Attalus used to say, 'malice itself drinks the greatest part of its own poison.' That poison which serpents proffer for another’s pernicion, they contain without harm to themselves, is not similar to this: this is worst for those who have it.

[23] Torquet se ingratus et macerat; odit quae accepit, quia redditurus est, et extenuat, iniurias vero dilatat atque auget. Quid autem eo miserius cui beneficia excidunt, haerent iniuriae? At contra sapientia exornat omne beneficium ac sibi ipsa commendat et se adsidua eius commemoratione delectat.

[23] The ungrateful man twists himself and macerates himself; he hates what he has received, because he is going to render it, and he extenuates it; injuries, however, he dilates and augments. What, moreover, is more wretched than one for whom benefits drop out, while injuries stick? But contrariwise wisdom adorns every benefit and commends it to herself, and delights herself with its assiduous commemoration.

[24] Malis una voluptas est et haec brevis, dum accipiunt beneficia, ex quibus sapienti longum gaudium manet ac perenne. Non enim illum accipere sed accepisse delectat, quod inmortale est et adsiduum. Illa contemnit quibus laesus est, nec obliviscitur per neglegentiam sed volens.

[24] To the wicked there is a single pleasure, and this brief: while they are receiving benefactions; from these a long and perennial joy abides for the wise man. For it is not the receiving but the having received that delights him, which is immortal and constant. He scorns those things by which he was hurt, and he does not forget through negligence but willingly.

[25] Non vertit omnia in peius nec quaerit cui inputet casum, et peccata hominum ad fortunam potius refert. Non calumniatur verba nec vultus; quidquid accidit benigne interpretando levat. Non offensae potius quam offici meminit; quantum potest in priore ac meliore se memoria detinet, nec mutat animum adversus bene meritos nisi multum male facta praecedunt et manifestum etiam coniventi discrimen est; tunc quoque in hoc dumtaxat, ut talis sit post maiorem iniuriam qualis ante beneficium.

[25] He does not turn everything to the worse nor seek someone on whom to impute the mishap, and he refers the sins of men rather to Fortune. He does not calumniate words or looks; whatever happens he lightens by benign interpretation. He remembers not the offense rather than the service; so far as he can, he keeps his memory on the earlier and the better, and he does not change his mind toward those who have well deserved unless many evil deeds have preceded and the distinction is manifest even to one who shuts his eyes; then also in this only, that he be such after the greater injury as he was before the benefit.

Nam cum beneficio par est iniuria, aliquid in animo benivolentiae remanet.

For when the injury is equal to the benefaction, something of benevolence remains in the mind.

[26] Quemadmodum reus sententiis paribus absolvitur et semper quidquid dubium est humanitas inclinat in melius, sic animus sapientis, ubi paria maleficiis merita sunt, desinit quidem debere, sed non desinit velle debere, et hoc facit quod qui post tabulas novas solvunt.

[26] Just as a defendant is acquitted when the votes are equal, and humanity always inclines whatever is doubtful to the better, so the mind of the wise man, when the merits are equal to the misdeeds, indeed ceases to owe, but does not cease to wish to owe; and he does what those do who pay after the new tablets.

[27] Nemo autem esse gratus potest nisi contempsit ista propter quae vulgus insanit: si referre vis gratiam, et in exilium eundum est et effundendus sanguis et suscipienda egestas et ipsa innocentia saepe maculanda indignisque obicienda rumoribus. Non parvo sibi constat homo gratus.

[27] No one, however, can be grateful unless he has contemned those things on account of which the common crowd raves: if you wish to render gratitude, one must even go into exile, and blood must be poured out, and poverty must be undertaken, and innocence itself must often be stained and exposed to unworthy rumors. A grateful man is not of small cost to himself.

[28] Nihil carius aestimamus quam beneficium quamdiu petimus, nihil vilius cum accepimus. Quaeris quid sit quod oblivionem nobis acceptorum faciat? cupiditas accipiendorum; cogitamus non quid inpetratum sed quid petendum sit.

[28] We esteem nothing more dearly than a benefaction while we are petitioning, nothing more cheaply when we have received it. You ask what it is that brings upon us oblivion of things received? Cupidity of things to be received; we think not of what has been obtained but of what is to be asked.

Abstrahunt a recto divitiae, honores, potentia et cetera quae opinione nostra cara sunt, pretio suo vilia.

Riches, honors, power, and the rest—which in our opinion are dear, but at their own price are cheap—draw away from rectitude.

[29] Nescimus aestimare res, de quibus non cum fama sed cum rerum natura deliberandum est; nihil habent ista magnificum quo mentes in se nostras trahant praeter hoc, quod mirari illa consuevimus. Non enim quia concupiscenda sunt laudantur, sed concupiscuntur quia laudata sunt, et cum singulorum error publicum fecerit, singulorum errorem facit publicus.

[29] We do not know how to estimate things about which we must deliberate not by reputation but by the nature of things; those items have nothing magnificent by which they draw our minds to themselves, except this: that we have been accustomed to admire them. For they are not praised because they are to be desired, but they are desired because they have been praised; and when the error of individuals has made it public, the public makes the error of individuals.

[30] Sed quemadmodum illa credidimus, sic et hoc eidem populo credamus, nihil esse grato animo honestius; omnes hoc urbes, omnes etiam ex barbaris regionibus gentes conclamabunt; in hoc bonis malisque conveniet.

[30] But just as we believed those things, so too let us believe this also to that same people, that nothing is more honorable than a grateful spirit; all cities, all nations even from barbarian regions will cry this aloud; on this point both good and bad will agree.

[31] Erunt qui voluptates laudent, erunt qui labores malint; erunt qui dolorem maximum malum dicant, erunt qui ne malum quidem appellent; divitias aliquis ad summum bonum admittet, alius illas dicet malo vitae humanae repertas, nihil esse eo locupletius cui quod donet fortuna non invenit: in tanta iudiciorum diversitate referendam bene merentibus gratiam omnes tibi uno, quod aiunt, ore adfirmabunt. In hoc tam discors turba consentiet, cum interim iniurias pro beneficiis reddimus, et prima causa est cur quis ingratus sit si satis gratus esse non potuit.

[31] There will be those who praise pleasures, there will be those who would prefer labors; there will be those who say pain is the greatest evil, there will be those who do not even call it an evil; someone will admit riches into the supreme good, another will say they were discovered as a bane to human life, that nothing is more opulent than he for whom Fortune finds nothing to give: in such diversity of judgments all will, with one, as they say, mouth affirm to you that gratitude is to be rendered to those who have well deserved. On this so discordant a crowd will agree, while meanwhile we pay back injuries in place of benefits, and the first cause why someone is ungrateful is that he could not be grateful enough.

[32] Eo perductus est furor ut periculosissima res sit beneficia in aliquem magna conferre; nam quia putat turpe non reddere, non vult esse cui reddat. Tibi habe quod accepisti; non repeto, non exigo: profuisse tutum sit. Nullum est odium perniciosius quam e beneficii violati pudore.

[32] Madness has been brought to this point, that it is a most perilous thing to confer great benefactions upon anyone; for because he thinks it base not to repay, he does not wish there to be one to whom he may repay. Keep for yourself what you have received; I do not demand back, I do not exact: let it be safe to have benefited. No hatred is more pernicious than that which arises from the shame of a violated benefaction.

Vale.

Farewell.

LXXXII. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

82. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETINGS

[1] Desii iam de te esse sollicitus. 'Quem' inquis 'deorum sponsorem accepisti?' Eum scilicet qui neminem fallit, animum recti ac boni amatorem. In tuto pars tui melior est.

[1] I have already ceased to be anxious about you. 'Which,' you say, 'of the gods have you accepted as sponsor?' That one, of course, who deceives no one—the mind, a lover of the right and the good. Your better part is in safety.

Potest fortuna tibi iniuriam facere: quod ad rem magis pertinet, non timeo ne tu facias tibi. I qua ire coepisti et in isto te vitae habitu compone placide, non molliter.

Fortune can do you injury; what pertains more to the point, I do not fear that you will do injury to yourself. Go where you have begun to go, and in that habit of life compose yourself placidly, not softly.

[2] Male mihi esse malo quam molliter -- <'male'> nunc sic excipe quemadmodum a populo solet dici: dure, aspere, laboriose. Audire solemus sic quorundam vitam laudari quibus invidetur: 'molliter vivit'; hoc dicunt, 'mollis est'. Paulatim enim effeminatur animus atque in similitudinem otii sui et pigritiae in qua iacet solvitur. Quid ergo?

[2] I prefer that it go ill with me rather than softly -- <'badly'> now take thus as it is wont to be said by the people: harshly, roughly, laboriously. We are accustomed to hear the life of certain men who are envied praised thus: 'he lives softly'; this they say, 'he is soft.' For little by little the spirit is effeminated and is dissolved into the likeness of its leisure and the sloth in which it lies. What then?

viro non vel obrigescere satius est? * * * deinde idem delicati timent, [morti] cui vitam suam fecere similem. Multum interest inter otium et conditivum.

is it not better for a man even to stiffen? * * * then the same delicate ones fear [death], to which they have made their life similar. There is a great difference between leisure and indulgence.

[3] 'Quid ergo?' inquis 'non satius est vel sic iacere quam in istis officiorum verticibus volutari?' Utraque res detestabilis est, et contractio et torpor. Puto, aeque qui in odoribus iacet mortuus est quam qui rapitur unco; otium sine litteris mors est et hominis vivi sepultura.

[3] 'What then?' you ask, 'is it not better to lie even thus than to be wallowed in those vortices of duties?' Both things are detestable, both contraction and torpor. I think he who lies amid perfumes is just as dead as he who is dragged off by the hook; leisure without letters is death and the sepulture of a living man.

[4] Quid deinde prodest secessisse? tamquam non trans maria nos sollicitudinum causae persequantur. Quae latebra est in quam non intret metus mortis?

[4] What then does it profit to have withdrawn? As though the causes of anxieties do not pursue us across the seas. What hiding-place is there into which the fear of death does not enter?

quae tam emunita et in altum subducta vitae quies quam non dolor territet? quacumque te abdideris, mala humana circumstrepent. Multa extra sunt quae circumeunt nos quo aut fallant aut urgeant, multa intus quae in media solitudine exaestuant.

What repose of life is so thoroughly fortified and drawn up on high that pain does not terrify it? Wherever you may have hidden yourself, human evils will clamor around. There are many things outside that go about us either to beguile or to press us, and many within that seethe in the very midst of solitude.

[5] Philosophia circumdanda est, inexpugnabilis murus, quem fortuna multis machinis lacessitum non transit. In insuperabili loco stat animus qui externa deseruit et arce se sua vindicat; infra illum omne telum cadit. Non habet, ut putamus, fortuna longas manus: neminem occupat nisi haerentem sibi.

[5] Philosophy must be wrapped around us, an inexpugnable wall which Fortune, though assailing it with many engines, does not overstep. In an insuperable position stands the mind that has deserted external things and vindicates itself in its own citadel; beneath it every missile falls. Fortune does not have, as we suppose, long hands: she occupies no one except one clinging to herself.

[6] Itaque quantum possumus ab illa resiliamus; quod sola praestabit sui naturaeque cognitio. Sciat quo iturus sit, unde ortus, quod illi bonum, quod malum sit, quid petat, quid evitet, quae sit illa ratio quae adpetenda ac fugienda discernat, qua cupiditatum mansuescit insania, timorum saexitia conpescitur.

[6] Therefore, as much as we can, let us recoil from her; which only the cognition of oneself and of nature will furnish. Let him know whither he is going, whence he arose, what for him is good, what is evil, what he should seek, what he should shun, what that Reason is which discerns things to be sought and to be fled, whereby the insanity of cupidities is tamed, the savagery of fears is restrained.

[7] Haec quidam putant ipsos etiam sine philosophia repressisse; sed cum securos aliquis casus expertus est, exprimitur sera confessio; magna verba excidunt cum tortor poposcit manum, cum mors propius accessit. Possis illi dicere, 'facile provocabas mala absentia: ecce dolor, quem tolerabilem esse dicebas, ecce mors, quam contra multa animose locutus es; sonant flagella, gladius micat;

[7] Some think that certain men have repressed even these things without philosophy; but when some mischance has tested the secure, a late confession is squeezed out; grand words fall away when the torturer has demanded your hand, when death has come nearer. You could say to him, 'you easily provoked evils when they were absent: look, the pain which you said was tolerable; look, the death against which you spoke many things stoutly; the scourges resound, the sword flashes;

nunc animis opus, Aenea, nunc pectore firmo'.

now there is need of courage, Aeneas, now of a firm heart'.

[8] Faciet autem illud firmum adsidua meditatio, si non verba exercueris sed animum, si contra mortem te praeparaveris, adversus quam non exhortabitur nec attollet qui cavillationibus tibi persuadere temptaverit mortem malum non esse. Libet enim, Lucili, virorum optime, ridere ineptias Graecas, quas nondum, quamvis mirer, excussi.

[8] But assiduous meditation will make that firm, if you have exercised not words but the mind, if you have prepared yourself against death, against which he who has attempted by cavillations to persuade you that death is not an evil will neither exhort nor uplift you. For it pleases me, Lucilius, best of men, to laugh at Greek ineptitudes, which I have not yet, although I admire them, shaken off.

[9] Zenon noster hac conlectione utitur: 'nullum malum gloriosum est; mors autem gloriosa est; mors ergo non est malum'. Profecisti! liberatus sum metu; post hoc non dubitabo porrigere cervicem. Non vis severius loqui nec morituro risum movere?

[9] Our Zeno uses this syllogism: 'no evil is glorious; but death is glorious; therefore death is not an evil'. You have advanced! I am freed from fear; after this I will not hesitate to stretch out my neck. Do you not wish to speak more severely and not to move laughter in one about to die?

Non mehercules facile tibi dixerim utrum ineptior fuerit qui se hac interrogatione iudicavit mortis metum extinguere, an qui hoc, tamquam ad rem pertineret, conatus est solvere.

Not, by Hercules, would I easily tell you whether the more inept was he who judged that by this interrogation he had extinguished the fear of death, or he who tried to solve this, as though it pertained to the matter.

[10] Nam et ipse interrogationem contrariam opposuit ex eo natam quod mortem inter indifferentia ponimus, quae adiaphora Graeci vocant. 'Nihil' inquit 'indifferens gloriosum est; mors autem gloriosum est; ergo mors non est indifferens.' Haec interrogatio vides ubi obrepat: mors non est gloriosa, sed fortiter mori gloriosum est. Et cum dicis 'indifferens nihil gloriosum est', concedo tibi ita ut dicam nihil gloriosum esse nisi circa indifferentia; tamquam indifferentia esse dico (id est nec bona nec mala) morbum, dolorem, paupertatem, exilium, mortem.

[10] For he himself also set the contrary interrogation in opposition, born from the fact that we place death among the indifferents, which the Greeks call adiaphora. 'Nothing,' he says, 'indifferent is glorious; but death is glorious; therefore death is not indifferent.' You see where this interrogation creeps in: death is not glorious, but to die bravely is glorious. And when you say 'nothing indifferent is glorious,' I concede to you thus, so that I say nothing is glorious except with respect to the indifferents; just as I say that indifferent (that is, neither good nor bad) are disease, pain, poverty, exile, death.

[11] Nihil horum per se gloriosum est, nihil tamen sine his. Laudatur enim non paupertas, sed ille quem paupertas non summittit nec incurvat; laudatur non exilium, sed ille [Rutilius] qui fortiore vultu in exilium iit quam misisset; laudatur non dolor, sed ille quem nihil coegit dolor; nemo mortem laudat, sed eum cuius mors ante abstulit animum quam conturbavit.

[11] None of these, per se, is glorious; yet nothing [is glorious] without them. For it is not poverty that is praised, but the man whom poverty does not lower nor bend; it is not exile that is praised, but the man [Rutilius] who went into exile with a braver countenance than he would have sent another with; it is not pain that is praised, but the man whom pain compelled to nothing; no one praises death, but him whose death took away his spirit before it threw it into disorder.

[12] Omnia ista per se non sunt honesta nec gloriosa, sed quidquid ex illis virtus adiit tractavitque honestum et gloriosum facit: illa in medio posita sunt. Interest utrum malitia illis an virtus manum admoverit; mors enim illa quae in Catone gloriosa est in Bruto statim turpis est et erubescenda. Hic est enim Brutus qui, cum periturus mortis moras quaereret, ad exonerandum ventrem secessit et evocatus ad mortem iussusque praebere cervicem, 'praebebo', inquit 'ita vivam'. Quae dementia est fugere cum retro ire non possis!

[12] All those things in themselves are not honorable nor glorious, but whatever of them virtue has approached and handled it makes honorable and glorious: those are placed in the middle. It matters whether malice or virtue has put a hand to them; for the death which in Cato is glorious is in Brutus at once base and shameworthy. For this is that Brutus who, when about to perish he was seeking delays of death, withdrew to empty his bowels, and, summoned to death and ordered to present his neck, said, 'I will present it; so may I live.' What dementia it is to flee when you cannot go backward!

'Praebebo', inquit 'ita vivam'. Paene adiecit 'vel sub Antonio'. O hominem dignum qui vitae dederetur!

'I will offer it,' he says, 'so may I live.' He almost added, 'even under Antony.' O a man worthy to be granted his life!

[13] Sed, ut coeperam dicere, vides ipsam mortem nec malum esse nec bonum: Cato illa honestissime usus est, turpissime Brutus. Omnis res quod non habuit decus virtute addita sumit. Cubiculum lucidum dicimus, hoc idem obscurissimum est nocte;

[13] But, as I had begun to say, you see that death itself is neither an evil nor a good: Cato used that most honorably, Brutus most disgracefully. Every thing takes on the honor which it did not have, once virtue is added. We call a bedchamber bright, this same is most dark at night;

[14] dies illi lucem infundit, nox eripit: sic istis quae a nobis indifferentia ac media dicuntur, divitiis, viribus, formae, honoribus, regno, et contra morti, exilio, malae valetudini, doloribus quaeque alia aut minus aut magis pertimuimus, aut malitia aut virtus dat boni vel mali nomen. Massa per se nec calida nec frigida est: in fornacem coniecta concaluit, in aquam demissa refrixit. Mors honesta est per illud quod honestum est, id virtus et animus externa contemnens.

[14] the day pours light into it, night snatches it away: so with those things which by us are called indifferent and neutral—riches, strengths, form (beauty), honors, kingship (reign)—and, on the contrary, with death, exile, ill‑health, pains, and whatever other things we have feared more or less, either malice or virtue gives the name of good or of evil. A mass in itself is neither hot nor cold: thrown into the furnace it has grown warm, let down into water it has cooled. Death is honorable through that which is honorable, that virtue and a mind despising externals.

[15] Est et horum, Lucili, quae appellamus media grande discrimen. Non enim sic mors indifferens est quomodo utrum capillos pares habeas: mors inter illa est quae mala quidem non sunt, tamen habent mali speciem: sui amor est et permanendi conservandique se insita voluntas atque aspernatio dissolutionis, * * * quia videtur multa nobis bona eripere et nos ex hac cui adsuevimus rerum copia educere. Illa quoque res morti nos alienat, quod haec iam novimus, illa ad quae transituri sumus nescimus qualia sint, et horremus ignota.

[15] There is also, Lucilius, a great distinction among those things which we call indifferent. For death is not indifferent in the same way as whether you have your hair even: death is among those things which indeed are not evils, yet have the appearance of evil. There is love of self and an inborn will of remaining and conserving oneself, and a rejection of dissolution, * * * because it seems to snatch from us many good things and to lead us out from this abundance of things to which we have grown accustomed. That thing also estranges us from death, namely, that we already know these things, but those to which we are about to pass we do not know of what sort they are, and we shudder at the unknown.

Naturalis praeterea tenebrarum metus est, in quas adductura mors creditur.

Moreover, there is a natural fear of the dark, into which death is believed to lead us.

[16] Itaque etiam si indifferens mors est, non tamen ea est quae facile neglegi possit: magna exercitatione durandus est animus ut conspectum eius accessumque patiatur. Mors contemni debet magis quam solet; multa enim de illa credidimus; multorum ingeniis certatum est ad augendam eius infamiam; descriptus est carcer infernus et perpetua nocte oppressa regio, in qua

[16] Therefore, even if death is indifferent, nevertheless it is not something that can easily be neglected: the spirit must be hardened by great exercise so that it may endure its sight and its approach. Death ought to be contemned more than it is wont; for we have believed many things about it; there has been a contest of many minds to augment its infamy; the infernal prison has been described and a region oppressed by perpetual night, in which

ingens ianitor Orci
ossa super recubans antro semesa cruento
aeternum latrans exsangues terreat umbras.

the huge janitor of Orcus
reclining upon bones half-eaten in a bloody cave
barking eternally, terrifies the bloodless shades.

Etiam cum persuaseris istas fabulas esse nec quicquam defunctis superesse quod timeant, subit alius metus: aeque enim timent ne apud inferos sint quam ne nusquam.

Even when you have persuaded that those tales are fables and that nothing survives to the deceased which they should fear, another fear arises: for they fear equally lest they be among the underworld as lest they be nowhere.

[17] His adversantibus quae nobis offundit longa persuasio, fortiter pati mortem quidni gloriosum sit et inter maxima opera mentis humanae? Quae numquam ad virtutem exsurget si mortem malum esse crediderit: exsurget si putabit indifferens esse. Non recipit rerum natura ut aliquis magno animo accedat ad id quod malum iudicat: pigre veniet et cunctanter.

[17] With these things being opposed by the long-standing persuasion which pours upon us, why should it not be glorious to endure death bravely and to be among the greatest works of the human mind? Which will never rise to virtue if it has believed death to be an evil: it will rise if it will think it to be indifferent. The nature of things does not admit that someone should approach with great spirit that which he judges to be an evil: he will come sluggishly and hesitatingly.

Non est autem gloriosum quod ab invito et tergiversante fit; nihil facit virtus quia necesse est.

However, what is done by one who is unwilling and tergiversating is not glorious; virtue does nothing because it is necessary.

[18] Adice nunc quod nihil honeste fit nisi cui totus animus incubuit atque adfuit, cui nulla parte sui repugnavit. Ubi autem ad malum acceditur aut peiorum metu, aut spe bonorum ad quae pervenire tanti sit devorata unius mali patientia, dissident inter se iudicia facientis: hinc est quod iubeat proposita perficere, illinc quod retrahat et ab re suspecta ac periculosa fugiat; igitur in diversa distrahitur. Si hoc est, perit gloria; virtus enim concordi animo decreta peragit, non timet quod facit.

[18] Add now that nothing is done honorably unless the whole spirit has leaned upon it and been present, and in no part of itself has repugned it. But when one approaches an evil either from fear of worse things, or from hope of good things—to reach which is of such price, with the endurance of a single evil gulped down—the doer’s judgments are at odds among themselves: on the one hand there is that which bids him to complete the things proposed, on the other that which draws him back and makes him flee from a matter suspect and perilous; therefore he is torn in opposite directions. If this is so, glory perishes; for virtue, with a concordant spirit, carries through what has been decreed; it does not fear what it does.

Tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito
quam tua te fortuna sinet.

Do not cede to evils, but go against them more audaciously
than your fortune will permit.

[19] Non ibis audentior si mala illa esse credideris. Eximendum hoc e pectore est; alioqui haesitabit impetum moratura suspicio; trudetur in id quod invadendum est.

[19] You will not go more audaciously if you have believed those things to be evils. This must be extracted from the breast; otherwise a suspicion, about to delay the impulse, will stick fast; you will be thrust into that which is to be attacked.

Nostri quidem videri volunt Zenonis interrogationem

Our people indeed wish Zeno's interrogation to seem

veram esse, fallacem autem alteram et falsam quae illi opponitur. Ego non redigo ista ad legem dialecticam et ad illos artificii veternosissimi nodos: totum genus istuc exturbandum iudico quo circumscribi se qui interrogatur existimat et ad confessionem perductus aliud respondet, aliud putat. Pro veritate simplicius agendum est, contra metum fortius.

to be true, but the other, which is opposed to it, to be fallacious and false. I do not reduce these matters to the dialectic law and to those knots of a most time-worn artifice: I judge that whole kind must be driven out, by which the one questioned thinks himself circumscribed and, led to a confession, answers one thing and thinks another. For truth one should proceed more simply; against fear more bravely.

[20] Haec ipsa quae involvuntur ab illis solvere malim et expandere, ut persuadeam, non ut inponam. In aciem educturus exercitum pro coniugibus ac liberis mortem obiturum quomodo exhortabitur? Do tibi Fabios totum rei publicae bellum in unam transferentes domum.

[20] These very things which are entangled by them I would rather loose and expand, so that I may persuade, not so that I may impose. About to lead the army out into the battle-line, to meet death for wives and children, how will he exhort? I set before you the Fabii, transferring the whole war of the commonwealth into one house.

Laconas tibi ostendo in ipsis Thermopylarum angustiis positos: nec victoriam sperant nec reditum; ille locus illis sepulchrum futurus est.

I show you the Laconians posted in the very narrows of Thermopylae: they hope neither for victory nor for return; that place will be a sepulcher for them.

[21] Quemadmodum exhortaris ut totius gentis ruinam obiectis corporibus excipiant et vita potius quam loco cedant? Dices 'quod malum est gloriosum non est; mors gloriosa est; mors ergo non malum'? O efficacem contionem! Quis post hanc dubitet se infestis ingerere mucronibus et stans mori?

[21] How do you exhort them to intercept the ruin of the whole nation by throwing their bodies in the way, and to yield with life rather than with their position? You will say: 'what is evil is not glorious; death is glorious; therefore death is not an evil'? O efficacious oration! Who, after this, would hesitate to thrust himself upon hostile sword-points and to die standing?

At ille Leonidas quam fortiter illos adlocutus est! 'Sic', inquit 'conmilitones, prandete tamquam apud inferos cenaturi.' Non in ore crevit cibus, non haesit in faucibus, non elapsus est manibus: alacres et ad prandium illi promiserunt et ad cenam.

But Leonidas—how bravely he addressed them! 'Thus,' he said, 'comrades-in-arms, take your luncheon as though about to dine in the Underworld.' The food did not grow in their mouth, it did not stick in their throat, it did not slip from their hands: eager, they pledged themselves both to the luncheon and to the dinner.

[22] Quid? dux ille Romanus, qui ad occupandum locum milites missos, cum per ingentem hostium exercitum ituri essent, sic adlocutus est: 'ire, conmilitones, illo necesse est unde redire non est necesse'. Vides quam simplex et imperiosa virtus sit: quem mortalium circumscriptiones vestrae fortiorem facere, quem erectiorem possunt? frangunt animum, qui numquam minus contrahendus est et in minuta ac spinosa cogendus quam cum aliquid grande conponitur.

[22] What then? That Roman leader, who, when soldiers had been sent to seize a position, as they were about to go through an immense army of the enemy, addressed them thus: 'to go, comrades, thither is necessary, whence to return is not necessary.' You see how simple and imperious Virtue is: whom among mortals can your circumscriptions make braver, whom more erect? They break the spirit, which is never less to be contracted and forced into minute and spinose points than when it is being composed for something great.

[23] Non trecentis, sed omnibus mortalibus mortis timor detrahi debet. Quomodo illos doces malum non esse? quomodo opiniones totius aevi, quibus protinus infantia inbuitur, evincis?

[23] Not for three hundred, but for all mortals, the fear of death ought to be removed. How do you teach them that it is not an evil? how do you overcome the opinions of the whole age, with which infancy is immediately imbued?

quod auxilium invenis [quid dicis] inbecillitati humanae? quid dicis quo inflammati in media pericula inruant? qua oratione hunc timendi consensum, quibus ingenii viribus obnixam contra te persuasionem humani generis avertis?

what aid do you find [what do you say] for human imbecility? what do you say by which, inflamed, they may rush into the very midst of perils? by what oration do you avert this consensus of fearing, this persuasion of the human race, stubbornly set against you—by what forces of ingenuity?

verba mihi captiosa componis et interrogatiunculas nectis? Magnis telis magna portenta feriuntur.

Do you compose captious words for me and weave little interrogatives? Great portents are struck down by great missiles.

[24] Serpentem illam in Africa saevam et Romanis legionibus bello ipso terribiliorem frustra sagittis fundisque petierunt: ne Pythio quidem vulnerabilis erat. Cum ingens magnitudo pro vastitate corporis solida ferrum et quidquid humanae torserant manus reiceret, molaribus demum fracta saxis est. Et adversus mortem tu tam minuta iacularis?

[24] That savage serpent in Africa, more terrible to the Roman legions than the war itself, they assailed in vain with arrows and slings: it was not vulnerable even to the Pythian. Since its enormous magnitude, solid in proportion to the vastness of its body, would throw back iron and whatever human hands had hurled, at last it was shattered with millstone-sized stones. And against death do you hurl such minute missiles?

subula leonem excipis? Acuta sunt ista quae dicis: nihil est acutius arista; quaedam inutilia et inefficacia ipsa subtilitas reddit. Vale.

Do you take on a lion with an awl? Those things you say are acute: nothing is more acute than an awn; certain things their very subtlety renders useless and inefficacious. Farewell.

LXXXIII. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

83. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETINGS

[1] Singulos dies tibi meos et quidem totos indicari iubes:bene de me iudicas si nihil esse in illis putas quod abscondam. Sic certe vivendum est tamquam in conspectu vivamus, sic cogitandum tamquam aliquis in pectus intimum introspicere possit: et potest. Quid enim prodest ab homine aliquid esse secretum?

[1] You order that my individual days, and indeed the whole of them, be reported to you:well you judge of me if you think there is nothing in them that I should hide. Thus, surely, one must live as though we were living in sight, thus one must think as though someone could look into the inmost breast: and he can. For what, in fact, does it profit that something be secret from a man?

nihil deo clusum est; interest animis nostris et cogitationibus medius intervenit -- sic 'intervenit' dico tamquam aliquando discedat.

nothing is closed off to god; he is present to our minds and thoughts and, in the midst, intervenes -- thus I say 'intervenes' as though he ever departs.

[2] Faciam ergo quod iubes, et quid agam et quo ordine libenter tibi scribam. Observabo me protinus et, quod est utilissimum, diem meum recognoscam. Hoc nos pessimos facit, quod nemo vitam suam respicit; quid facturi simus cogitamus, et id raro, quid fecerimus non cogitamus; atqui consilium futuri ex praeterito venit.

[2] I will therefore do what you order, and what I am doing and in what order I will gladly write to you. I will observe myself forthwith and, which is most useful, I will re-cognize (review) my day. This is what makes us the worst: that no one looks back upon his own life; what we are going to do we consider, and that rarely, what we have done we do not consider; and yet the counsel of the future comes from the past.

[3] Hodiernus dies solidus est, nemo ex illo quicquam mihi eripuit; totus inter stratum lectionemque divisus est; minimum exercitationi corporis datum, et hoc nomine ago gratias senectuti: non magno mihi constat. Cum me movi, lassus sum; hic autem est exercitationis etiam fortissimis finis.

[3] Today’s day is solid; no one has snatched anything from it from me; it has been wholly divided between the bed and reading; the least was given to exercise of the body, and for this I give thanks to senectitude: it does not cost me much. When I have moved myself, I am tired; and here, however, is the limit of exercise even for the very strongest.

[4] Progymnastas meos quaeris? unus mihi sufficit Pharius, puer, ut scis, amabilis, sed mutabitur: iam aliquem teneriorem quaero. Hic quidem ait nos eandem crisin habere, quia utrique dentes cadunt.

[4] You ask about my trainers? One suffices for me—Pharius, a boy, as you know, amiable—but he will be replaced: already I am seeking someone more tender. This one, indeed, says that we have the same crisis, because for both of us the teeth are falling out.

Sed iam vix illum adsequor currentem et intra paucissimos dies non potero: vide quid exercitatio cotidiana proficiat. Cito magnum intervallum fit inter duos in diversum euntes: eodem tempore ille ascendit, ego descendo, nec ignoras quanto ex his velocius alterum fiat. Mentitus sum; iam enim aetas nostra non descendit sed cadit.

But now I scarcely keep up with him running, and within very few days I shall not be able to: see how much quotidian exercise profits. Quickly a great interval arises between two going in opposite directions: at the same time he ascends, I descend, nor are you unaware how much, under these conditions, the one becomes faster than the other. I lied; for now our age does not descend but falls.

[5] Quomodo tamen hodiernum certamen nobis cesserit quaeris? quod raro cursoribus evenit, hieran fecimus. Ab hac fatigatione magis quam exercitatione in frigidam descendi: hoc apud me vocatur parum calda.

[5] How, however, today’s contest turned out for us, you ask? What rarely befalls runners, we made a draw. From this fatigue rather than exercise I went down into the cold bath: this, with me, is called too little warm.

Ille tantus psychrolutes, qui kalendis Ianuariis euripum salutabam, qui anno novo quemadmodum legere, scribere, dicere aliquid, sic auspicabar in Virginem desilire, primum ad Tiberim transtuli castra, deinde ad hoc solium quod, cum fortissimus sum et omnia bona fide fiunt, sol temperat: non multum mihi ad balneum superest.

That mighty psychrolute—I, who on the Kalends of January used to salute the euripus, who at the new year, just as I would inaugurate reading, writing, saying something, so I used to take the auspice to leap down into the Virgin—first I transferred my camp to the Tiber, then to this basin which—the sun tempers it—brave as I am and with everything done in good faith: not much remains for me before the bath.

[6] Panis deinde siccus et sine mensa prandium, post quod non sunt lavandae manus. Dormio minimum. Consuetudinem meam nosti: brevissimo somno utor et quasi interiungo; satis est mihi vigilare desisse; aliquando dormisse me scio, aliquando suspicor.

[6] Then dry bread, and a luncheon without a table, after which the hands are not to be washed. I sleep the very least. You know my custom: I use the briefest sleep and, as it were, interjoin it; it is enough for me to have ceased keeping vigil; sometimes I know that I have slept, sometimes I suspect it.

[7] Ecce circensium obstrepit clamor; subita aliqua et universa voce feriuntur aures meae, nec cogitationem meam excutiunt, ne interrumpunt quidem. Fremitum patientissime fero; multae voces et in unum confusae pro fluctu mihi sunt aut vento silvam verberante et ceteris sine intellectu sonantibus.

[7] Behold, the clamor of the circus resounds; my ears are struck by some sudden and universal voice, yet they do not shake loose my thinking—they do not even interrupt it. I bear the roar most patiently; many voices, confused into one, are for me like the surge, or like wind beating the forest, and the rest sounding without understanding.

[8] Quid ergo est nunc cui animum adiecerim? dicam. Superest ex hesterno mihi cogitatio quid sibi voluerint prudentissimi viri qui rerum maximarum probationes levissimas et perplexas fecerint, quae ut sint verae, tamen mendacio similes sunt.

[8] What, then, is it now to which I have applied my mind? I will say. There remains to me from yesterday a thought about what the most prudent men intended—who have made the proofs of the greatest matters most light and perplexed—which, although they be true, nevertheless are similar to a lie.

[9] Vult nos ab ebrietate deterrere Zenon, vir maximus, huius sectae fortissimae ac sanctissimae conditor. Audi ergo quemadmodum colligat virum bonum non futurum ebrium: 'ebrio secretum sermonem nemo committit, viro autem bono committit; ergo vir bonus ebrius non erit'. Quemadmodum opposita interrogatione simili derideatur adtende (satis enim est unam ponere ex multis): 'dormienti nemo secretum sermonem committit, viro autem bono committit; vir bonus ergo non dormit'.

[9] Zeno, a very great man, the founder of this most robust and most sacred sect, wishes to deter us from drunkenness. Hear then how he infers that the good man will not be drunk: 'to a drunk man no one entrusts a secret discourse, but to a good man one does entrust; therefore the good man will not be drunk'. Mark how this is mocked by a similar opposite question (for it is enough to set down one out of many): 'to one sleeping no one entrusts a secret discourse, but to a good man one does entrust; therefore the good man does not sleep'.

[10] Quo uno modo potest Posidonius Zenonis nostri causam agit, sed ne sic quidem, ut existimo, agi potest. Ait enim 'ebrium' duobus modis dici, altero cum aliquis vino gravis est et inpos sui, altero si solet ebrius fieri et huic obnoxius vitio est; hunc a Zenone dici qui soleat fieri ebrius, non qui sit; huic autem neminem commissurum arcana quae per vinum eloqui possit.

[10] In this one way alone can Posidonius plead the cause of our Zeno, but not even thus, as I reckon, can it be pled. For he says that “inebriate” is said in two ways: in the one, when someone is heavy with wine and not in control of himself; in the other, if he is wont to become inebriate and is obnoxious to this vice. It is this man, he says, that Zeno means—the one who is accustomed to become inebriate, not the one who is so at the moment; to such a man, moreover, no one would commit arcana which he might utter under the influence of wine.

[11] Quod est falsum; prima enim illa interrogatio conplectitur eum qui est ebrius, non eum qui futurus est. Plurimum enim interesse concedes et inter ebrium et ebriosum: potest et qui ebrius est tunc primum esse nec habere hoc vitium, et qui ebriosus est saepe extra ebrietatem esse; itaque id intellego quod significari verbo isto solet, praesertim cum ab homine diligentiam professo ponatur et verba examinante. Adice nunc quod, si hoc intellexit Zenon et nos intellegere noluit, ambiguitate verbi quaesiit locum fraudi, quod faciendum non est ubi veritas quaeritur.

[11] Which is false; for that first interrogation embraces him who is drunk, not him who will be. For you will concede that there is a very great difference between the drunk and the drunkard: he who is drunk can be so for the first time and not have this vice, and he who is drunken-prone can often be outside drunkenness; and so I understand that which is wont to be signified by that word, especially since it is set forth by a man professing diligence and examining words. Add now that, if Zeno understood this and did not wish us to understand, he sought room for fraud through the ambiguity of the word—a thing that ought not to be done where truth is being sought.

[12] Sed sane hoc senserit: quod sequitur falsum est, ei qui soleat ebrius fieri non committi sermonem secretum. Cogita enim quam multis militibus non semper sobriis et imperator et tribunus et centurio tacenda mandaverint. De illa C. Caesaris caede, illius dico qui superato Pompeio rem publicam tenuit, tam creditum est Tillio Cimbro quam C. Cassio.

[12] But suppose he did mean this: what follows is false, that to one who is wont to become drunk a secret discourse is not committed. For consider to how many soldiers not always sober both the general and the tribune and the centurion have entrusted things that must be kept silent. Concerning that killing of Gaius Caesar, I mean the one who, with Pompey overcome, held the commonwealth, it was as much entrusted to Tillius Cimber as to Gaius Cassius.

Cassius tota vita aquam bibit, Tillius Cimber et nimius erat in vino et scordalus. In hanc rem iocatus est ipse: 'ego' inquit 'quemquam feram, qui vinum ferre non possum?'.

Cassius drank water his whole life; Tillius Cimber was excessive in wine and a quarrelsome fellow. On this matter he himself made a jest: “I,” he said, “am I to bear anyone, I who cannot bear wine?”

[13] Sibi quisque nunc nominet eos quibus scit et vinum male credi et sermonem bene; unum tamen exemplum quod occurrit mihi referam, ne intercidat. Instruenda est enim vita exemplis inlustribus, nec semper confugiamus ad vetera.

[13] Let each person now nominate for himself those to whom he knows wine is ill-entrusted and discourse well; one example, however, which occurs to me I will relate, lest it be lost. For life is to be instructed by illustrious examples, and let us not always take refuge in the ancients.

[14] L. Piso, urbis custos, ebrius ex quo semel factus est fuit. Maiorem noctis partem in convivio exigebat; usque in horam sextam fere dormiebat: hoc eius erat matutinum. Officium tamen suum, quo tutela urbis continebatur, diligentissime administravit.

[14] L. Piso, guardian of the city, once he had become drunk once, was so thereafter. He would spend the greater part of the night at a convivium; he slept almost up to the sixth hour: this was his morning. Nevertheless he administered his office, by which the guardianship of the city was maintained, most diligently.

Huic et divus Augustus dedit secreta mandata, cum illum praeponeret Thraciae, quam perdomuit, et Tiberius proficiscens in Campaniam, cum multa in urbe et suspecta relinqueret et invisa.

To him both the deified Augustus gave secret mandates, when he was appointing him over Thrace, which he thoroughly subdued, and Tiberius, setting out to Campania, when he was leaving many things in the city both suspect and odious.

[15] Puto, quia bene illi cesserat Pisonis ebrietas, postea Cossum fecit urbis praefectum, virum gravem, moderatum, sed mersum vino et madentem, adeo ut ex senatu aliquando, in quem e convivio venerat, oppressus inexcitabili somno tolleretur. Huic tamen Tiberius multa sua manu scripsit quae committenda ne ministris quidem suis iudicabat: nullum Cosso aut privatum secretum aut publicum elapsum est.

[15] I think, because Piso’s drunkenness had turned out well for him, afterwards he made Cossus prefect of the city, a weighty, moderate man, but submerged in wine and dripping, to such a degree that from the senate, into which he had come from a banquet, overpowered by unrouseable sleep, he was carried out. To this man, nevertheless, Tiberius wrote many things with his own hand, which he judged not to be entrusted even to his own ministers: no secret, either private or public, escaped from Cossus.

[16] Itaque declamationes istas de medio removeamus: 'non est animus in sua potestate ebrietate devinctus: quemadmodum musto dolia ipsa rumpuntur et omne quod in imo iacet in summam partem vis caloris eiectat, sic vino exaestuante quidquid in imo iacet abditum effertur et prodit in medium. Onerati mero quemadmodum non continent cibum vino redundante, ita ne secretum quidem; quod suum alienumque est pariter effundunt.'

[16] Accordingly let us remove these declamations out of the midst: 'the mind is not in its own power, bound by ebriety: just as by must the very casks are burst and the force of heat ejects to the top everything that lies at the bottom, so, as the wine seethes, whatever lies hidden at the bottom is brought out and comes forth into the open. Laden with neat wine, just as, with the wine overflowing, they do not contain food, so neither a secret; what is their own and what is another’s alike they pour out.'

[17] Sed quamvis hoc soleat accidere, ita et illud solet, ut cum iis quos sciamus libentius bibere de rebus necessariis deliberemus; falsum ergo est hoc quod patrocinii loco ponitur, ei qui soleat ebrius fieri non dari tacitum.

[17] But although this is wont to occur, so also this is wont to occur: that we deliberate about necessary matters with those whom we know to drink more freely; false, therefore, is this which is put forward in the place of a defense—that to one who is wont to become drunk no secret is entrusted.

Quanto satius est aperte accusare ebrietatem et vitia eius exponere, quae etiam tolerabilis homo vitaverit, nedum perfectus ac sapiens, cui satis est sitim extinguere, qui, etiam si quando hortata est hilaritas aliena causa producta longius, tamen citra ebrietatem resistit.

How much more advisable it is to accuse ebriety openly and to set forth its vices—such as even a tolerable man would have avoided, to say nothing of the perfect and wise man, for whom it is enough to extinguish thirst—who, even if at times hilarity, urged on on another’s account, has been drawn out farther, nevertheless stops short of ebriety.

[18] Nam de illo videbimus, an sapientis animus nimio vino turbetur et faciat ebriis solita: interim, si hoc colligere vis, virum bonum non debere ebrium fieri, cur syllogismis agis? Dic quam turpe sit plus sibi ingerere quam capiat et stomachi sui non nosse mensuram, quam multa ebrii faciant quibus sobrii erubescant, nihil aliud esse ebrietatem quam voluntariam insaniam. Extende in plures dies illum ebrii habitum: numquid de furore dubitabis?

[18] As for that point, we shall see whether the mind of the wise man is disturbed by too much wine and does the things usual to the drunk; meanwhile, if you wish to infer this—that a good man ought not to become drunk—why do you deal in syllogisms? Say how disgraceful it is to pour into oneself more than one can contain and not to know the measure of one’s stomach; how many things the drunk do at which, sober, they would blush; that drunkenness is nothing other than voluntary insanity. Stretch that state of ebriety out over several days: will you have any doubt that it is frenzy?

nunc quoque non est minor sed brevior.

now too it is not less, but briefer.

[19] Refer Alexandri Macedonis exemplum, qui Clitum carissimum sibi ac fidelissimum inter epulas transfodit et intellecto facinore mori voluit, certe debuit. Omne vitium ebrietas et incendit et detegit, obstantem malis conatibus verecundiam removet; plures enim pudore peccandi quam bona voluntate prohibitis abstinent.

[19] Bring forward the example of Alexander the Macedonian, who ran through Clitus, most dear and most faithful to him, amid the banquet, and, once he understood the deed, wished to die—indeed, he certainly ought to have. Ebriety both inflames and discloses every vice; it removes the shame that stands in the way of evil endeavors; for more people abstain from forbidden things out of shame of sinning than out of good will.

[20] Ubi possedit animum nimia vis vini, quidquid mali latebat emergit. Non facit ebrietas vitia sed protrahit: tunc libidinosus ne cubiculum quidem expectat, sed cupiditatibus suis quantum petierunt sine dilatione permittit; tunc inpudicus morbum profitetur ac publicat; tunc petulans non linguam, non manum continet. Crescit insolenti superbia, crudelitas saevo, malignitas livido; omne vitium laxatur et prodit.

[20] When the excessive force of wine has possessed the mind, whatever of evil was lying hidden emerges. Drunkenness does not make vices but brings them out: then the lustful man does not even wait for the bedroom, but grants to his desires, as much as they have sought, without delay; then the impudent man professes and publishes his disease; then the petulant restrains neither tongue nor hand. Pride grows in the insolent, cruelty in the savage, malignity in the envious; every vice is loosened and comes to light.

[21] Adice illam ignorationem sui, dubia et parum explanata verba, incertos oculos, gradum errantem, vertiginem capitis, tecta ipsa mobilia velut aliquo turbine circumagente totam domum, stomachi tormenta cum effervescit merum ac viscera ipsa distendit. Tunc tamen utcumque tolerabile est, dum illi vis sua est: quid cum somno vitiatur et quae ebrietas fuit cruditas facta est?

[21] Add to that self-ignorance, ambiguous and scantily explained words, uncertain eyes, an errant step, vertigo of the head, the very roofs seeming mobile as if some whirlwind were whirling the whole house around, torments of the stomach when the neat wine effervesces and distends the very viscera. Then, however, it is somehow tolerable, so long as it retains its own force: what about when it is vitiated by sleep and what was drunkenness has become indigestion?

[22] Cogita quas clades ediderit publica ebrietas: haec acerrimas gentes bellicosasque hostibus tradidit, haec multorum annorum pertinaci bello defensa moenia patefecit, haec contumacissimos et iugum recusantes in alienum egit arbitrium, haec invictos acie mero domuit.

[22] Consider what disasters public ebriety has produced: this has handed over the very fierce and warlike nations to their enemies, this has thrown open walls defended by the stubborn war of many years, this has driven the most contumacious and those refusing the yoke into alien arbitration, this has tamed those unconquered in the battle line with neat wine.

[23] Alexandrum, cuius modo feci mentionem, tot itinera, tot proelia, tot hiemes per quas victa temporum locorumque difficultate transierat, tot flumina ex ignoto cadentia, tot maria tutum dimiserunt: intemperantia bibendi et ille Herculaneus ac fatalis scyphus condidit.

[23] Alexander, of whom I just now made mention, so many journeys, so many battles, so many winters, through which, the difficulty of times and places conquered, he had traversed, so many rivers falling from the unknown, so many seas, let him go safe: intemperance of drinking and that Herculean and fatal scyphus-cup laid him low.

[24] Quae gloria est capere multum? cum penes te palma fuerit et propinationes tuas strati somno ac vomitantes recusaverint, cum superstes toti convivio fueris, cum omnes viceris virtute magnifica et nemo vini tam capax fuerit, vinceris a dolio.

[24] What glory is it to take in much? when the palm has been yours and those prostrate with sleep and vomiting have refused your toasts, when you have survived the whole banquet, when you have conquered all by magnificent prowess and no one has been so capacious of wine, you are conquered by a cask.

[25] M. Antonium, magnum virum et ingeni nobilis, quae alia res perdidit et in externos mores ac vitia non Romana traiecit quam ebrietas nec minor vino Cleopatrae amor? Haec illum res hostem rei publicae, haec hostibus suis inparem reddidit; haec crudelem fecit, cum capita principum civitatis cenanti referrentur, cum inter apparatissimas epulas luxusque regales ora ac manus proscriptorum recognosceret, cum vino gravis sitiret tamen sanguinem. Intolerabile erat quod ebrius fiebat cum haec faceret: quanto intolerabilius quod haec in ipsa ebrietate faciebat!

[25] M. Antony, a great man and of noble ingenium, what other thing ruined him and transferred him into foreign manners and not-Roman vices than drunkenness—ebriety—and a love for Cleopatra no less than for wine? This made him an enemy of the Republic, this made him unequal to his enemies; this made him cruel, when the heads of the leading men of the state were brought in to him as he dined, when amid the most elaborate banquets and regal luxuries he recognized the faces and hands of the proscribed, when, heavy with wine, he nevertheless thirsted for blood. It was intolerable that he would grow drunk while doing these things: how much more intolerable that he did these things in ebriety itself!

[26] Fere vinolentiam crudelitas sequitur; vitiatur enim exasperaturque sanitas mentis. Quemadmodum difficilesque faciunt diutini morbi et ad minimam rabidos offensionem, ita ebrietates continuae efferant animos; nam cum saepe apud se non sint, consuetudo insaniae durat et vitia vino concepta etiam sine illo valent.

[26] Cruelty almost always follows vinolence; for the sanity of the mind is vitiated and exasperated. Just as long-continued diseases make men and difficult, and rabid at the slightest offense, so continual ebrieties make their spirits feral; for since they are often not with themselves, the habit of insanity endures, and the vices conceived by wine are potent even without it.

[27] Dic ergo quare sapiens non debeat ebrius fieri; deformitatem rei et inportunitatem ostende rebus, non verbis. Quod facillimum est, proba istas quae voluptates vocantur, ubi transcenderunt modum, poenas esse. Nam si illud argumentaberis, sapientem multo vino non inebriari et retinere rectum tenorem etiam si temulentus sit, licet colligas nec veneno poto moriturum nec sopore sumpto dormiturum nec elleboro accepto quidquid in visceribus haerebit eiecturum deiecturumque.

[27] So then tell why the wise man ought not to become drunken; show the deformity of the thing and its inopportuneness by facts, not by words. Which is very easy: prove that those things which are called pleasures, when they have overstepped the measure, are punishments. For if you will argue this, that the wise man is not made drunk by much wine and keeps a straight tenor even if he is tipsy, you may as well infer that, with poison drunk, he will not die, nor, slumber having been taken, will he sleep, nor, hellebore having been taken, will he eject and discharge whatever will stick in the viscera.

Sed si temptantur pedes, lingua non constat, quid est quare illum existimes in parte sobrium esse, in parte ebrium? Vale.

But if the feet are put to the test and the tongue does not hold firm, what reason is there for you to esteem him sober in part and drunk in part? Farewell.