Spinoza: ETHICA

II. Ea res dicitur in suo genere finita quæ alia ejusdem naturæ terminari potest. Exempli gratia corpus dicitur finitum quia aliud semper majus concipimus. Sic cogitatio alia cogitatione terminatur.

2. That thing is said to be finite in its genus which can be terminated by another of the same nature. For example, a body is said to be finite because we always conceive another greater. Thus thought is terminated by another thought.

At corpus non terminatur cogitatione nec cogitatio corpore.

But the body is not terminated by thought, nor thought by the body.

III. Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur hoc est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo formari debeat.

3. By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that whose concept does not need the concept of another thing from which it must be formed.

IV. Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.

4. By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting the same essence.

V. Per modum intelligo substantiæ affectiones sive id quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur.

V. By mode I understand the affections of substance, or that which is in another, by which it is also conceived.

VI. Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum hoc est substantiam constantem infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.

VI. By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.

EXPLICATIO: Dico absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere; quicquid enim in suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo attributa negare possumus; quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad ejus essentiam pertinet quicquid essentiam exprimit et negationem nullam involvit.

EXPLICATIO: I mean absolutely infinite, not however infinite in its kind; for whatever is infinite only in its kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it; but that which is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence pertains to its essence and involves no negation.

VII. Ea res libera dicitur quæ ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur. Necessaria autem vel potius coacta quæ ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.

7. That thing is called free which exists from the sole necessity of its own nature and is determined by itself alone to act. Necessary, however, or rather coerced, is that which is determined by another to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner.

VIII. Per æternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam quatenus ex sola rei æternæ definitione necessario sequi concipitur.

8. By eternity I understand existence itself insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition of the eternal thing alone.

EXPLICATIO : Talis enim existentia ut æterna veritas sicut rei essentia concipitur proptereaque per durationem aut tempus explicari non potest tametsi duratio principio et fine carere concipiatur.

EXPLICATIO : For such an existence, as eternal truth, is conceived as the essence of a thing and therefore cannot be explained by duration or time, although duration is conceived as lacking beginning and end.

I. Omnia quæ sunt vel in se vel in alio sunt.

I. All things which are either in themselves or in another are.

II. Id quod per aliud non potest concipi, per se concipi debet.

II. That which cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself.

III. Ex data causa determinata necessario sequitur effectus et contra si nulla detur determinata causa, impossibile est ut effectus sequatur.

3. From a given determinate cause a determinate effect necessarily follows, and conversely if no determinate cause is given, it is impossible that the effect should follow.

IV. Effectus cognitio a cognitione causæ dependet et eandem involvit.

4. The cognition of the effect depends on the cognition of the cause and involves it.

V. Quæ nihil commune cum se invicem habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi non possunt sive conceptus unius alterius conceptum non involvit.

5. Things which have nothing in common with one another cannot even be understood through one another, since the concept of one does not involve the concept of the other.

VI. Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire.

6. The true idea ought to agree with its own ideatum.

VII. Quicquid ut non existens potest concipi, ejus essentia non involvit existentiam.

VII. Whatever can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence.

PROPOSITIO I: Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus.

PROPOSITIO 1: Substance is prior to nature in its affections.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex definitione 3 et 5.

DEMONSTRATION: It is clear from definitions 3 and 5.

PROPOSITIO II: Duæ substantiæ diversa attributa habentes nihil inter se commune habent.

PROPOSITIO 2: Two substances, having different attributes, have nothing in common with one another.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet etiam ex definitione 3. Unaquæque enim in se debet esse et per se debet concipi sive conceptus unius conceptum alterius non involvit.

DEMONSTRATIO: It is also clear from definition 3. For each thing must be in itself and must be conceived per se, that is, the concept of one does not involve the concept of another.

PROPOSITIO III: Quæ res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa esse non potest.

PROPOSITIO 3: Things which have nothing common among themselves, one of them cannot be the cause of the other.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si nihil commune cum se invicem habent, ergo (per axioma 5) nec per se invicem possunt intelligi adeoque (per axioma 4) una alterius causa esse non potest. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: If they have nothing common with one another, then (by axiom 5) nor can they be understood per se of one another and therefore (by axiom 4) one cannot be the cause of the other. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO IV: Duæ aut plures res distinctæ vel inter se distinguuntur ex diversitate attributorum substantiarum vel ex diversitate earundem affectionum.

PROPOSITIO 4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by the diversity of the attributes of substances or by the diversity of their affections.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnia quæ sunt vel in se vel in alio sunt (per axioma 1) hoc est (per definitiones 3 et 5) extra intellectum nihil datur præter substantias earumque affectiones. Nihil ergo extra intellectum datur per quod plures res distingui inter se possunt præter substantias sive quod idem est (per definitionem 4) earum attributa earumque affectiones. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: All things which are, are either in themselves or in another (per axiom 1), that is (per definitions 3 and 5) nothing is given outside the intellect except substances and their affections. Nothing therefore is given outside the intellect by which several things can be distinguished from one another except substances, or which is the same (per definition 4) their attributes and their affections. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO V: In rerum natura non possunt dari duæ aut plures substantiæ ejusdem naturæ sive attributi.

PROPOSITION 5: In the nature of things two or more substances of the same nature or of the same attribute cannot be given.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si darentur plures distinctæ, deberent inter se distingui vel ex diversitate attributorum vel ex diversitate affectionum (per propositionem præcedentem). Si tantum ex diversitate attributorum, concedetur ergo non dari nisi unam ejusdem attributi. At si ex diversitate affectionum, cum substantia sit prior natura suis affectionibus (per propositionem 1) depositis ergo affectionibus et in se considerata hoc est (per definitionem 3 et axioma 6) vere considerata, non poterit concipi ab alia distingui hoc est (per propositionem præcedentem) non poterunt dari plures sed tantum una. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: If several distinct were given, they must be distinguished among themselves either from a diversity of attributes or from a diversity of affections (by the preceding proposition). If only from a diversity of attributes, it will therefore be conceded that none are given save one of the same attribute. But if from a diversity of affections, since substance is by nature prior to its affections (by proposition 1), therefore with the affections removed and the substance considered in itself — that is, truly considered (by definition 3 and axiom 6) — it cannot be conceived as distinguished by another; that is (by the preceding proposition), not several can be given but only one. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO VI: Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia.

PROPOSITIO 6: One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

DEMONSTRATIO: In rerum natura non possunt dari duæ substantiæ ejusdem attributi (per propositionem præcedentem) hoc est (per propositionem 2) quæ aliquid inter se commune habent. Adeoque (per propositionem 3) una alterius causa esse nequit sive ab alia non potest produci. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: In the nature of things two substances of the same attribute cannot be given (by the preceding proposition), that is (by proposition 2) which have something in common among themselves. And therefore (by proposition 3) one cannot be the cause of the other, that is, cannot be produced by another. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur substantiam ab alio produci non posse. Nam in rerum natura nihil datur præter substantias earumque affectiones ut patet ex axiomate 1 et definitionibus 3 et 5. Atqui a substantia produci non potest (per præcedentem propositionem). Ergo substantia absolute ab alio produci non potest. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by another. For in the nature of things nothing is given except substances and their affections, as is evident from axiom 1 and definitions 3 and 5. Moreover a substance cannot be produced by another (by the preceding proposition). Therefore a substance absolutely cannot be produced by another. Q.E.D.

ALITER: Demonstratur hoc etiam facilius ex absurdo contradictorio. Nam si substantia ab alio posset produci, ejus cognitio a cognitione suæ causæ deberet pendere (per axioma 4) adeoque (per definitionem 3) non esset substantia.

OTHERWISE: This is demonstrated even more easily from a contradictory absurdity. For if a substance could be produced by another, its cognition would have to depend on the cognition of its cause (per axiom 4) and therefore (per definition 3) it would not be a substance.

PROPOSITIO VII: Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere.

PROPOSITIO 7: To the nature of substance pertains to exist.

DEMONSTRATIO: Substantia non potest produci ab alio (per corollarium propositionis præcedentis); erit itaque causa sui id est (per definitionem 1) ipsius essentia involvit necessario existentiam sive ad ejus naturam pertinet existere. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: Substance cannot be produced by another (by the corollary of the preceding proposition); it will therefore be a cause of itself, that is (by definition 1) its very essence necessarily involves existence, or it belongs to its nature to exist. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO VIII: Omnis substantia est necessario infinita.

PROPOSITIO 8: Every substance is necessarily infinite.

DEMONSTRATIO: Substantia unius attributi non nisi unica existit (per propositionem 5) et ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere (per propositionem 7). Erit ergo de ipsius natura vel finita vel infinita existere. At non finita. Nam (per definitionem 2) deberet terminari ab alia ejusdem naturæ quæ etiam necessario deberet existere (per propositionem 7) adeoque darentur duæ substantiæ ejusdem attributi, quod est absurdum (per propositionem 5). Existit ergo infinita.

DEMONSTRATIO: A substance of a single attribute exists only as one (by proposition 5) and it pertains to its nature to exist (by proposition 7). Therefore, with respect to its nature it will exist either finitely or infinitely. But not finitely. For, by definition 2, it would have to be terminated by another of the same nature, which likewise would necessarily have to exist (by proposition 7), and so two substances of the same attribute would be given, which is absurd (by proposition 5). Therefore it exists infinitely.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM I: Cum finitum esse revera sit ex parte negatio et infinitum absoluta affirmatio existentiæ alicujus naturæ, sequitur ergo ex sola 7 propositione omnem substantiam debere esse infinitam.

SCHOLIUM I: Since being finite is in truth a negation on one side and infinite an absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows therefore from proposition 7 alone that every substance must be infinite.

SCHOLIUM II: Non dubito quin omnibus qui de rebus confuse judicant nec res per primas suas causas noscere consueverunt, difficile sit demonstrationem 7 propositionis concipere; nimirum quia non distinguunt inter modificationes substantiarum et ipsas substantias neque sciunt quomodo res producuntur. Unde fit ut principium quod res naturales habere vident, substantiis affingant; qui enim veras rerum causas ignorant, omnia confundunt et sine ulla mentis repugnantia tam arbores quam homines loquentes fingunt et homines tam ex lapidibus quam ex semine formari et quascunque formas in alias quascunque mutari imaginantur. Sic etiam qui naturam divinam cum humana confundunt, facile Deo affectus humanos tribuunt præsertim quamdiu etiam ignorant quomodo affectus in mente producuntur.

SCHOLIUM II: I do not doubt that for all who judge of things confusedly and are not accustomed to know things by their first causes, it will be difficult to conceive the demonstration of the 7th proposition; namely because they do not distinguish between modifications of substances and the substances themselves, nor do they know how things are produced. Hence it happens that the principle which natural things seem to have they ascribe to substances; for those who are ignorant of the true causes of things confuse all things and, without any repugnance of mind, invent both trees and speaking men, and imagine men to be formed as much from stones as from seed, and any forms to be changed into any other forms. Thus also those who confound the divine nature with the human easily attribute human affections to God, especially so long as they are ignorant how affections are produced in the mind.

Si autem homines ad naturam substantiæ attenderent, minime de veritate 7 propositionis dubitarent; imo hæc propositio omnibus axioma esset et inter notiones communes numeraretur. Nam per substantiam intelligerent id quod in se est et per se concipitur hoc est id cujus cognitio non indiget cognitione alterius rei. Per modificationes autem id quod in alio est et quarum conceptus a conceptu rei in qua sunt, formatur : quocirca modificationum non existentium veras ideas possumus habere quandoquidem quamvis non existant actu extra intellectum, earum tamen essentia ita in alio comprehenditur ut per idem concipi possint.

If, however, men were to attend to the nature of substance, they would in no wise doubt the truth of the 7 proposition; indeed this proposition would be an axiom to all and would be counted among common notions. For by substance they would understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose cognition does not need the cognition of another thing. By modifications, however, that which is in another, and whose concept is formed from the concept of the thing in which they are: wherefore we can have true ideas of modifications that do not exist, since although they do not exist actually outside the intellect, yet their essence is so comprehended in another that they can be conceived through the same.

Verum substantiarum veritas extra intellectum non est nisi in se ipsis quia per se concipiuntur. Si quis ergo diceret se claram et distinctam hoc est veram ideam substantiæ habere et nihilominus dubitare num talis substantia existat, idem hercle esset ac si diceret se veram habere ideam et nihilominus dubitare num falsa sit (ut satis attendenti sit manifestum); vel si quis statuat substantiam creari, simul statuit ideam falsam factam esse veram, quo sane nihil absurdius concipi potest adeoque fatendum necessario est substantiæ existentiam sicut ejus essentiam æternam esse veritatem. Atque hinc alio modo concludere possumus non dari nisi unicam ejusdem naturæ, quod hic ostendere operæ pretium esse duxi.

But the truth of substances outside the intellect is nowhere else than in themselves, because they are conceived per se. If therefore anyone should say that he has a clear and distinct—that is, a true—idea of a substance and nevertheless doubt whether such a substance exists, the same, by Hercules, would be as if he said he has a true idea and nevertheless doubted whether it is false (as will be manifest to any attentive person); or if anyone asserts that a substance is created, he at once asserts that a false idea made has become true, which indeed nothing more absurd can be conceived, and therefore it must be confessed that necessarily the existence of the substance, as also its eternal essence, is truth. And hence we can conclude in another way that not more than one of the same nature is given, which I have here judged worth demonstrating.

Ut autem hoc ordine faciam notandum est Iƒ veram uniuscujusque rei definitionem nihil involvere neque exprimere præter rei definitæ naturam. Ex quo sequitur hoc IIƒ nempe nullam definitionem certum aliquem numerum individuorum involvere neque exprimere quandoquidem nihil aliud exprimit quam naturam rei definitæ. Exempli gratia definitio trianguli nihil aliud exprimit quam simplicem naturam trianguli; at non certum aliquem triangulorum numerum. IIIƒ notandum dari necessario uniuscujusque rei existentis certam aliquam causam propter quam existit.

But in order that I do this in sequence it must be noted 1ƒ that the true definition of each thing involves or expresses nothing besides the nature of the thing defined. From which it follows 2ƒ namely that no definition involves or expresses any certain number of individuals, since it expresses nothing other than the nature of the thing defined. For example the definition of triangle expresses nothing other than the simple nature of triangle; but not any certain number of triangles. 3ƒ it must be noted that necessarily for each existing thing there is given some certain cause for which it exists.

IVƒ denique notandum hanc causam propter quam aliqua res existit, vel debere contineri in ipsa natura et definitione rei existentis (nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere) vel debere extra ipsam dari. His positis sequitur quod si in natura certus aliquis numerus individuorum existat, debeat necessario dari causa cur illa individua et cur non plura nec pauciora existunt. Si exempli gratia in rerum natura 20 homines existant (quos majoris perspicuitatis causa suppono simul existere nec alios antea in natura exstitisse) non satis erit (ut scilicet rationem reddamus cur 20 homines existant) causam naturæ humanæ in genere ostendere sed insuper necesse erit causam ostendere cur non plures nec pauciores quam 20 existant quandoquidem (per III notam) uniuscujusque debet necessario dari causa cur existat.

4ƒ lastly it must be noted that this cause for which some thing exists must either be contained in the very nature and definition of the existing thing (namely that which pertains to the thing’s nature to exist) or must be given outside it. Having posited these things, it follows that if in nature a certain number of individuals exists, there must necessarily be given a cause why those individuals exist and why not more nor fewer. If, for example, in the nature of things 20 men exist (whom, for the sake of greater perspicuity, I suppose to exist together and that no others had previously existed in nature) it will not suffice (that is, that we render an account why 20 men exist) merely to show the cause of human nature in general, but moreover it will be necessary to show the cause why not more nor fewer than 20 exist, since (by note 3) for each individual there must necessarily be given a cause why he exists.

At hæc causa (per notam II et III) non potest in ipsa natura humana contineri quandoquidem vera hominis definitio numerum vicenarium non involvit adeoque (per notam IV) causa cur hi viginti homines existunt et consequenter cur unusquisque existit, debet necessario extra unumquemque dari et propterea absolute concludendum omne id cujus naturæ plura individua existere possunt, debere necessario ut existant causam externam habere. Jam quoniam ad naturam substantiæ (per jam ostensa in hoc scholio) pertinet existere, debet ejus definitio necessariam existentiam involvere et consequenter ex sola ejus definitione debet ipsius existentia concludi. At ex ipsius definitione (ut jam ex nota II et III ostendimus) non potest sequi plurium substantiarum existentia; sequitur ergo ex ea necessario unicam tantum ejusdem naturæ existere, ut proponebatur.

But this cause (by note 2 and 3) cannot be contained in the human nature itself, since the true definition of a man does not involve a twentyfold number; and therefore (by note 4) the cause why these twenty men exist, and consequently why each one exists, must necessarily be given outside each individual, and therefore it must be absolutely concluded that anything whose nature can admit of many individuals must necessarily have an external cause of existence. Now since existence belongs to the nature of a substance (as already shown in this scholium), its definition must involve necessary existence and consequently from its definition alone its existence must be concluded. But from its definition (as we have already shown by notes 2 and 3) the existence of many substances cannot follow; it follows therefore from it necessarily that only one of the same nature exists, as was proposed.

PROPOSITIO IX: Quo plus realitatis aut esse unaquæque res habet eo plura attributa ipsi competunt.

PROPOSITIO 9: The more reality or being any one thing has, the more attributes pertain to it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex definitione 4.

DEMONSTRATION: It is clear from definition 4.

PROPOSITIO X: Unumquodque unius substantiæ attributum per se concipi debet.

PROPOSITION 10: Each attribute of a single substance must be conceived through itself.

DEMONSTRATIO: Attributum enim est id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejus essentiam constituens (per definitionem 4) adeoque (per definitionem 3) per se concipi debet. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: For an attribute is that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence (by definition 4) and therefore (by definition 3) must be conceived per se. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Ex his apparet quod quamvis duo attributa realiter distincta concipiantur hoc est unum sine ope alterius, non possumus tamen inde concludere ipsa dua entia sive duas diversas substantias constituere; id enim est de natura substantiæ ut unumquodque ejus attributorum per se concipiatur quandoquidem omnia quæ habet attributa, simul in ipsa semper fuerunt nec unum ab alio produci potuit sed unumquodque realitatem sive esse substantiæ exprimit. Longe ergo abest ut absurdum sit uni substantiæ plura attributa tribuere; quin nihil in natura clarius quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo debeat concipi et quo plus realitatis aut esse habeat eo plura attributa quæ et necessitatem sive æternitatem et infinitatem exprimunt, habeat et consequenter nihil etiam clarius quam quod ens absolute infinitum necessario sit definiendum (ut definitione 6 tradidimus) ens quod constat infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam certam essentiam exprimit. Si quis autem jam quærit ex quo ergo signo diversitatem substantiarum poterimus dignoscere, legat sequentes propositiones, quæ ostendunt in rerum natura non nisi unicam substantiam existere eamque absolute infinitam esse, quapropter id signum frustra quæreretur.

SCHOLIUM: From these things it appears that although two attributes really distinct are conceived — that is, one without the aid of the other — we cannot therefore conclude that the two things themselves constitute two diverse substances; for it is of the nature of substance that each of its attributes be conceived per se, since all the things which it has as attributes were always together in it and one could not be produced from another, but each expresses the reality or being of the substance. Far, therefore, is it from absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance; yea, nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and that the more reality or being it has, the more attributes it will have — attributes which express necessity or eternality and infinity — and consequently nothing is clearer than that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined (as we delivered in definition 6) as a being which consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence. If anyone now asks by what sign we can discern diversity of substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that in the nature of things only a single substance exists and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore that sign would be sought in vain.

PROPOSITIO XI: Deus sive substantia constans infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit, necessario existit.

PROPOSITION 11: God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, exists necessarily.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si negas, concipe si fieri potest, Deum non existere. Ergo (per axioma 7) ejus essentia non involvit existentiam. Atqui hoc (per propositionem 7) est absurdum : ergo Deus necessario existit.

DEMONSTRATIO: If you deny, conceive, if it be possible, God not to exist. Therefore (by axiom 7) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by proposition 7) is absurd: therefore God necessarily exists.

Q.E.D.

Q.E.D. — Which was to be demonstrated.

ALITER: Cujuscunque rei assignari debet causa seu ratio tam cur existit quam cur non existit. Exempli gratia si triangulus existit, ratio seu causa dari debet cur existit; si autem non existit, ratio etiam seu causa dari debet quæ impedit quominus existat sive quæ ejus existentiam tollat. Hæc vero ratio seu causa vel in natura rei contineri debet vel extra ipsam.

ALITER: A cause or reason must be assigned for any thing both why it exists and why it does not exist. For example, if a triangle exists, a reason or cause must be given why it exists; but if it does not exist, a reason or cause must likewise be given which prevents its existing or which takes away its existence. And this reason or cause must be either contained in the nature of the thing or outside it.

Exempli gratia rationem cur circulus quadratus non existat, ipsa ejus natura indicat; nimirum quia contradictionem involvit. Cur autem contra substantia existat, ex sola etiam ejus natura sequitur quia scilicet existentiam involvit (vide propositionem 7). At ratio cur circulus vel triangulus existit vel cur non existit, ex eorum natura non sequitur sed ex ordine universæ naturæ corporeæ; ex eo enim sequi debet vel jam triangulum necessario existere vel impossibile esse ut jam existat. Atque hæc per se manifesta sunt.

For example, the reason why a square circle does not exist is indicated by its very nature; namely because it involves a contradiction. But why, on the other hand, a substance exists, from its nature alone also follows, since it involves existence (see proposition 7). Yet the reason why a circle or triangle exists or why it does not exist does not follow from their nature but from the order of the universal corporeal nature; for from that it must follow either that a triangle already necessarily exists or that it is impossible that it already exists. And these things are manifest in themselves.

Ex quibus sequitur id necessario existere cujus nulla ratio nec causa datur quæ impedit quominus existat. Si itaque nulla ratio nec causa dari possit quæ impedit quominus Deus existat vel quæ ejus existentiam tollat, omnino concludendum est eundem necessario existere. At si talis ratio seu causa daretur, ea vel in ipsa Dei natura vel extra ipsam dari deberet hoc est in alia substantia alterius naturæ. Nam si ejusdem naturæ esset, eo ipso concederetur dari Deum.

From which it follows that that which no reason nor cause is given that hinders its existing must necessarily exist. If therefore no reason nor cause can be given which prevents God from existing or which abolishes his existence, one must altogether conclude that he exists necessarily. But if such a reason or cause were given, it ought to be given either in the very nature of God or outside it, that is, in another substance of a different nature. For if it were of the same nature, by that very fact God would be conceded to be given.

At substantia quæ alterius esset naturæ, nihil cum Deo commune habere (per 2 propositionem) adeoque neque ejus existentiam ponere neque tollere posset. Cum igitur ratio seu causa quæ divinam existentiam tollat, extra divinam naturam dari non possit, debebit necessario dari, siquidem non existit, in ipsa ejus natura, quæ propterea contradictionem involveret. Atqui hoc de Ente absolute infinito et summe perfecto affirmare absurdum est; ergo nec in Deo nec extra Deum ulla causa seu ratio datur quæ ejus existentiam tollat ac proinde Deus necessario existit.

But a substance that would be of another nature has nothing in common with God (by proposition 2) and therefore could neither posit nor remove his existence. Since therefore a reason or cause that would abolish the divine existence cannot be given outside the divine nature, it must necessarily be given, if it is not given elsewhere, in its very nature, which would therefore involve a contradiction. Yet to affirm this concerning the Being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd; therefore neither in God nor outside God is any cause or reason given that would abolish his existence, and hence God necessarily exists.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

ALITER: Posse non existere impotentia est et contra posse existere potentia est (ut per se notum). Si itaque id quod jam necessario existit, non nisi entia finita sunt, sunt ergo entia finita potentiora Ente absolute infinito atque hoc (ut per se notum) absurdum est; ergo vel nihil existit vel Ens absolute infinitum necessario etiam existit. Atqui nos vel in nobis vel in alio quod necessario existit, existimus (vide axioma 1 et propositionem 7). Ergo Ens absolute infinitum hoc est (per definitionem 6) Deus necessario existit. Q.E.D.

ALTERNATELY: The power not to exist is impotence and the power to exist is potency (as self-evident). If therefore that which now exists, only finite beings exist, then finite beings are more powerful than the Being absolutely infinite, and this (as self-evident) is absurd; therefore either nothing exists or the Being absolutely infinite necessarily also exists. But we exist either in ourselves or in another which exists necessarily (see axiom 1 and proposition 7). Therefore the Being absolutely infinite — that is (by definition 6) God — necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: In hac ultima demonstratione Dei existentiam a posteriori ostendere volui ut demonstratio facilius perciperetur; non autem propterea quod ex hoc eodem fundamento Dei existentia a priori non sequatur. Nam cum posse existere potentia sit, sequitur quo plus realitatis alicujus rei naturæ competit eo plus virium a se habere ut existat adeoque Ens absolute infinitum sive Deum infinitam absolute potentiam existendi a se habere, qui propterea absolute existit. Multi tamen forsan non facile hujus demonstrationis evidentiam videre poterunt quia assueti sunt eas solummodo res contemplari quæ a causis externis fiunt et ex his quæ cito fiunt hoc est quæ facile existunt, eas etiam facile perire vident et contra eas res factu difficiliores judicant hoc est ad existendum non adeo faciles ad quas plura pertinere concipiunt.

SCHOLIUM: In this last demonstration I wished to show the existence of God a posteriori so that the demonstration might be more easily perceived; not however because from this same foundation the existence of God does not follow a priori. For since the possibility of existing is potency, it follows that insofar as more reality pertains to the nature of a thing, so much more power it has in itself to exist, and therefore the Being absolutely infinite or God has an absolutely infinite power of existing from himself, and hence exists absolutely. Many, however, perhaps will not easily be able to see the evidence of this demonstration because they are accustomed to contemplate only those things which are made by external causes, and from those which are quickly made — that is, which easily exist — they also see easily perish; and conversely they judge those things more difficult of making, that is, not so easy to exist, to which they conceive more things as pertaining.

Verum ut ab his præjudiciis liberentur, non opus habeo hic ostendere qua ratione hoc enunciatum "quod cito fit cito perit" verum sit nec etiam an respectu totius naturæ omnia æque facilia sint an secus. Sed hoc tantum notare sufficit me hic non loqui de rebus quæ a causis externis fiunt sed de solis substantiis, quæ (per propositionem 6) a nulla causa externa produci possunt. Res enim quæ a causis externis fiunt, sive eæ multis partibus constent sive paucis, quicquid perfectionis sive realitatis habent, id omne virtuti causæ externæ debetur adeoque earum existentia ex sola perfectione causæ externæ, non autem suæ oritur.

But that they may be freed from these prejudices, I do not need here to show by what reasoning this enunciation "that which is quickly made quickly perishes" is true, nor even whether with respect to the whole of nature all things are equally easy or the contrary. But it is enough to note this: that here I do not speak of things which are made by external causes but of the sole substances, which (per propositionem 6) can be produced by no external cause. For things which are made by external causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, whatever perfection or reality they have, all of that is owed to the power of the external cause, and therefore their existence arises from the mere perfection of the external cause, not from their own.

Contra quicquid substantia perfectionis habet, nulli causæ externæ debetur; quare ejus etiam existentia ex sola ejus natura sequi debet, quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam ejus essentia. Perfectio igitur rei existentiam non tollit sed contra ponit; imperfectio autem contra eandem tollit adeoque de nullius rei existentia certiores esse possumus quam de existentia Entis absolute infiniti seu perfecti hoc est Dei. Nam quandoquidem ejus essentia omnem imperfectionem secludit absolutamque perfectionem involvit, eo ipso omnem causam dubitandi de ipsius existentia tollit summamque de eadem certitudinem dat, quod mediocriter attendenti perspicuum fore credo.

On the contrary, whatever a substance has of perfection is owed to no external cause; therefore its existence must also follow from its mere nature, which therefore is nothing else than its essence. Perfection therefore does not remove a thing's existence but on the contrary posits it; imperfection, however, removes that same existence, and accordingly we can be more certain of the existence of no thing than of the existence of the Being absolutely infinite or perfect, that is, of God. For since his essence excludes every imperfection and involves absolute perfection, by that very fact it removes every cause for doubting his existence and gives the highest certainty concerning it, which I believe will be apparent to one moderately attentive.

PROPOSITIO XII: Nullum substantiæ attributum potest vere concipi ex quo sequatur substantiam posse dividi.

PROPOSITIO 12: No attribute of substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that substance is able to be divided.

DEMONSTRATIO: Partes enim in quas substantia sic concepta divideretur, vel naturam substantiæ retinebunt vel non. Si primum, tum (per 8 propositionem) unaquæque pars debebit esse infinita et (per propositionem 6) causa sui et (per propositionem 5) constare debebit ex diverso attributo adeoque ex una substantia plures constitui poterunt, quod (per propositionem 6) est absurdum. Adde quod partes (per propositionem 2) nihil commune cum suo toto haberent et totum (per definitionem 4 et propositionem 10) absque suis partibus et esse et concipi posset, quod absurdum esse nemo dubitare poterit.

DEMONSTRATIO: For the parts into which a substance so conceived would be divided will either retain the nature of the substance or not. If the former, then (per propositionem 8) each part must be infinite, and (per propositionem 6) causa sui, and (per propositionem 5) must consist of a distinct attribute and so from one substance many could be constituted, which (per propositionem 6) is absurd. Add that the parts (per propositionem 2) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (per definitione 4 et propositione 10) could both be and be conceived without its parts, which no one can doubt is absurd.

Si autem secundum ponatur quod scilicet partes naturam substantiæ non retinebunt, ergo cum tota substantia in æquales partes esset divisa, naturam substantiæ amitteret et esse desineret, quod (per propositionem 7) est absurdum.

But if the second is supposed, namely that the parts would not retain the nature of the substance, then, since the whole substance would be divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of the substance and cease to be, which (by proposition 7) is absurd.

PROPOSITIO XIII: Substantia absolute infinita est indivisibilis.

PROPOSITIO 13: An absolutely infinite substance is indivisible.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim divisibilis esset, partes in quas divideretur vel naturam substantiæ absolute infinitæ retinebunt vel non. Si primum, dabuntur ergo plures substantiæ ejusdem naturæ, quod (per propositionem 5) est absurdum. Si secundum ponatur, ergo (ut supra) poterit substantia absolute infinita desinere esse, quod (per propositionem 11) est etiam absurdum.

DEMONSTRATIO: For if it were divisible, the parts into which it would be divided would either retain the nature of the absolutely infinite substance or not. If the former, then there would be given many substances of the same nature, which (by proposition 5) is absurd. If the latter is supposed, then (as above) the absolutely infinite substance could cease to be, which (by proposition 11) is also absurd.

COROLLARIUM: Ex his sequitur nullam substantiam et consequenter nullam substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, esse divisibilem.

COROLLARY: From these things it follows that no substance, and consequently no corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, is divisible.

SCHOLIUM: Quod substantia sit indivisibilis, simplicius ex hoc solo intelligitur quod natura substantiæ non potest concipi nisi infinita et quod per partem substantiæ nihil aliud intelligi potest quam substantia finita, quod (per propositionem 8) manifestam contradictionem implicat.

SCHOLIUM: That substance is indivisible is more simply understood from this alone: that the nature of substance cannot be conceived except as infinite, and that by a part of substance nothing else can be understood than a finite substance, which (by proposition 8) entails a manifest contradiction.

PROPOSITIO XIV: Præter Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia.

PROPOSITIO 14: Except God, no substance can be given nor conceived.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cum Deus sit ens absolute infinitum de quo nullum attributum quod essentiam substantiæ exprimit, negari potest (per definitionem 6) isque necessario existat (per propositionem 11) si aliqua substantia præter Deum daretur, ea explicari deberet per aliquod attributum Dei sicque duæ substantiæ ejusdem attributi existerent, quod (per propositionem 5) est absurdum adeoque nulla substantia extra Deum dari potest et consequenter non etiam concipi. Nam si posset concipi, deberet necessario concipi ut existens; atqui hoc (per primam partem hujus demonstrationis) est absurdum. Ergo extra Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia.

DEMONSTRATIO: Since God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (per definition 6) and who necessarily exists (per proposition 11), if any substance besides God were given, it would have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances of the same attribute would exist, which (per proposition 5) is absurd; therefore no substance outside God can be given and consequently not even conceived. For if it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existing; but this (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. Ergo no substance besides God can be given or conceived.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

COROLLARIUM I: Hinc clarissime sequitur Iƒ Deum esse unicum hoc est (per definitionem 6) in rerum natura non nisi unam substantiam dari eamque absolute infinitam esse, ut in scholio propositionis 10 jam innuimus.

COROLLARIUM 1: Hence most clearly follows that God is the one (per definition 6), that in the nature of things no more than one substance is given, and that it is absolutely infinite, as we have already hinted in the scholium to proposition 10.

COROLLARIUM II: Sequitur IIƒ rem extensam et rem cogitantem vel Dei attributa esse vel (per axioma 1) affectiones attributorum Dei.

COROLLARIUM II: It follows IIƒ that the extended thing and the thinking thing are either attributes of God or (per axioma 1) affections of the attributes of God.

PROPOSITIO XV: Quicquid est, in Deo est et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest.

PROPOSITION 15: Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist nor be conceived without God.

DEMONSTRATIO: Præter Deum nulla datur neque concipi potest substantia (per 14 propositionem) hoc est (per definitionem 3) res quæ in se est et per se concipitur. Modi autem (per definitionem 5) sine substantia nec esse nec concipi possunt; quare hi in sola divina natura esse et per ipsam solam concipi possunt. Atqui præter substantias et modos nil datur (per axioma 1). Ergo nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest.

DEMONSTRATIO: Besides God no substance is given nor can be conceived (by Proposition 14), that is (by Definition 3) a thing which is in itself and is conceived through itself. Modes, however (by Definition 5), without a substance can neither be nor be conceived; wherefore these can be in the divine nature alone and be conceived through it alone. Furthermore, besides substances and modes nothing is given (by Axiom 1). Therefore nothing can exist or be conceived without God.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM: Sunt qui Deum instar hominis corpore et mente constantem atque passionibus obnoxium fingunt sed quam longe hi a vera Dei cognitione aberrent, satis ex jam demonstratis constat. Sed hos mitto : nam omnes qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse corporeum negant. Quod etiam optime probant ex eo quod per corpus intelligimus quamcunque quantitatem longam, latam et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam, quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest.

SCHOLIUM: There are those who imagine God like a man, constant in body and mind and subject to passions; but how far these wander from true knowledge of God is sufficiently clear from what has already been demonstrated. Yet I let these pass: for all who have in any way contemplated the divine nature deny that God is corporeal. Which they also demonstrate most clearly from the fact that by body we understand any quantity extended in length, breadth, and depth, terminated by some definite figure — than which nothing more absurd can be said of God, that is, of an absolutely infinite being.

Attamen interim aliis rationibus quibus hoc idem demonstrare conantur, clare ostendunt se substantiam ipsam corpoream sive extensam a natura divina omnino removere atque ipsam a Deo creatam statuunt. Ex qua autem divina potentia creari potuerit, prorsus ignorant; quod clare ostendit illos id quod ipsimet dicunt, non intelligere. Ego saltem satis clare meo quidem judicio demonstravi (vide corollarium propositionis 6 et scholium II propositionis 8) nullam substantiam ab alio produci vel creari.

Yet meanwhile, by other reasons whereby they strive to demonstrate the same thing, they plainly show that they remove the substance itself, corporeal or extended, entirely from the divine nature and posit that same substance as created by God. From what divine potency, however, it could have been created they are utterly ignorant; which clearly shows that they do not understand that which they themselves assert. I at least have, in my own judgment, sufficiently clearly demonstrated (see corollary of proposition 6 and scholium II of proposition 8) that no substance is produced or created by another.

Porro propositione 14 ostendimus præter Deum nullam dari neque concipi posse substantiam atque hinc conclusimus substantiam extensam unum ex infinitis Dei attributis esse. Verum ad pleniorem explicationem adversariorum argumenta refutabo quæ omnia huc redeunt primo quod substantia corporea quatenus substantia constat ut putant partibus et ideo eandem infinitam posse esse et consequenter ad Deum pertinere posse negant. Atque hoc multis exemplis explicant ex quibus unum aut alterum afferam.

Moreover, in proposition 14 we showed that besides God no substance is given nor can be conceived, and from this we concluded that an extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. But for a fuller explanation I will refute the arguments of the adversaries, which all return to this: first, that corporeal substance, insofar as it subsists as substance, as they suppose, from parts, and therefore they deny that the same can be infinite and consequently pertain to God. And they explain this by many examples, of which I will adduce one or another.

Si substantia corporea aiunt est infinita, concipiatur in duas partes dividi; erit unaquæque pars vel finita vel infinita. Si illud, componitur ergo infinitum ex duabus partibus finitis, quod est absurdum. Si hoc, datur ergo infinitum duplo majus alio infinito, quod etiam est absurdum.

If they say that a corporeal substance is infinite, let it be conceived as divided into two parts; each part will be either finite or infinite. If the former, then the infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then an infinite twice as great as another infinite is given, which likewise is absurd.

Porro si quantitas infinita mensuratur partibus pedes æquantibus, infinitis talibus partibus constare debebit ut et si partibus mensuretur digitos æquantibus ac propterea unus numerus infinitus erit duodecies major alio infinito. Denique si ex uno puncto infinitæ cujusdam quantitatis concipiatur duas lineas ut AB, AC, certa ac determinata in initio distantia in infinitum protendi, certum est distantiam inter B et C continuo augeri et tandem ex determinata indeterminabilem fore. Cum igitur hæc absurda sequantur ut putant ex eo quod quantitas infinita supponitur, inde concludunt substantiam corpoream debere esse finitam et consequenter ad Dei essentiam non pertinere.

Moreover, if an infinite quantity is measured by parts equal to feet, it must consist of an infinite number of such parts, so that if it were measured by parts equal to fingers one infinite number would therefore be twelve times greater than another infinite one. Finally, if from one point of some infinite quantity two lines, as AB and AC, are conceived, with a certain and determinate initial distance and are extended to infinity, it is certain that the distance between B and C will be continuously increased and at last will become indeterminate from what was determinate. Therefore, since these absurdities follow, as they think, from the supposition that quantity is infinite, they conclude that corporeal substance must be finite and consequently does not pertain to the essence of God.

Secundum argumentum petitur etiam a summa Dei perfectione. Deus enim inquiunt cum sit ens summe perfectum, pati non potest : atqui substantia corporea quandoquidem divisibilis est, pati potest; sequitur ergo ipsam ad Dei essentiam non pertinere. Hæc sunt quæ apud scriptores invenio argumenta quibus ostendere conantur substantiam corpoream divina natura indignam esse nec ad eandem posse pertinere.

A second argument is also drawn from the supreme perfection of God. For they say that God, since he is a being of highest perfection, cannot suffer; but a corporeal substance, inasmuch as it is divisible, can suffer; it follows therefore that the same does not pertain to the essence of God. These are the arguments I find among writers by which they endeavour to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of divine nature and cannot pertain to it.

Verumenimvero si quis recte attendat, me ad hæc jam respondisse comperiet quandoquidem hæc argumenta in eo tantum fundantur quod substantiam corpoream ex partibus componi supponunt, quod jam (per propositionem 12 cum corollario propositionis 13) absurdum esse ostendi. Deinde si quis rem recte perpendere velit, videbit omnia illa absurda (siquidem omnia absurda sunt, de quo non jam disputo) ex quibus concludere volunt substantiam extensam finitam esse, minime ex eo sequi quod quantitas infinita supponatur sed quod quantitatem infinitam mensurabilem et ex partibus finitis conflari supponunt; quare ex absurdis quæ inde sequuntur, nihil aliud concludere possunt quam quod quantitas infinita non sit mensurabilis et quod ex partibus finitis conflari non possit. Atque hoc idem est quod nos supra (propositione 12 etc.) jam demonstravimus.

But if indeed anyone attentively considers, he will learn that I have already answered these things, since these arguments are grounded only in the supposition that corporeal substance is composed of parts — which has already been shown to be absurd (by proposition 12 with the corollary of proposition 13). Moreover, if anyone wishes to weigh the matter rightly, he will see that all those absurdities (for all are absurd, of which I do not now dispute) from which they wish to conclude that extended substance is finite do not at all imply that infinite quantity is supposed, but rather that they suppose an infinite quantity to be measurable and to be formed from finite parts; therefore from the absurdities that follow from this they can conclude nothing other than that infinite quantity is not measurable and cannot be formed from finite parts. And this same thing is what we have already demonstrated above (proposition 12 etc.).

Quare telum quod in nos intendunt, in se ipsos revera conjiciunt. Si igitur ipsi ex suo hoc absurdo concludere tamen volunt substantiam extensam debere esse finitam, nihil aliud hercle faciunt quam si quis ex eo quod finxit circulum quadrati proprietates habere, concludit circulum non habere centrum ex quo omnes ad circumferentiam ductæ lineæ sunt æquales. Nam substantiam corpoream quæ non nisi infinita, non nisi unica et non nisi indivisibilis potest concipi (vide propositiones 8, 5 et 12) eam ipsi ad concludendum eandem esse finitam, ex partibus finitis conflari et multiplicem esse et divisibilem concipiunt.

Therefore the spear which they aim at us they in truth hurl upon themselves. If then they from this absurdity nevertheless wish to conclude that extended substance must be finite, they do nothing else, truly, than if one from what he has fancied a circle to have the properties of a square should conclude that the circle has no center from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For the corporeal substance which can be conceived only as infinite, only unique, and only indivisible (see propositions 8, 5 and 12), they themselves, in order to conclude it finite, conceive it as being composed of finite parts and as multiple and divisible.

Sic etiam alii postquam fingunt lineam ex punctis componi, multa sciunt invenire argumenta quibus ostendant lineam non posse in infinitum dividi. Et profecto non minus absurdum est ponere quod substantia corporea ex corporibus sive partibus componatur quam quod corpus ex superficiebus, superficies ex lineis, lineæ denique ex punctis componantur. Atque hoc omnes qui claram rationem infallibilem esse sciunt, fateri debent et imprimis ii qui negant dari vacuum.

Thus also others, after they suppose that a line is composed of points, know how to find many arguments by which they show that a line cannot be divided to infinity. And certainly it is no less absurd to posit that corporeal substance is composed out of bodies or parts than that a body is composed out of surfaces, a surface out of lines, and lines, finally, out of points. And this all who know that a clear, infallible reason exists ought to confess, and especially those who deny that a vacuum is given.

Nam si substantia corporea ita posset dividi ut ejus partes realiter distinctæ essent, cur ergo una pars non posset annihilari manentibus reliquis ut ante inter se connexis? et cur omnes ita aptari debent ne detur vacuum? Sane rerum quæ realiter ab invicem distinctæ sunt, una sine alia esse et in suo statu manere potest.

For if corporeal substance could be divided so that its parts were really distinct, why then could one part not be annihilated while the remaining parts remain, as before, connected among themselves? And why must all be so fitted that no vacuum is given? Certainly things which are really distinct from one another can be one without the other and remain in their own state.

Cum igitur vacuum in natura non detur (de quo alias) sed omnes partes ita concurrere debent ne detur vacuum, sequitur hinc etiam easdem non posse realiter distingui hoc est substantiam corpoream quatenus substantia est, non posse dividi. Si quis tamen jam quærat cur nos ex natura ita propensi simus ad dividendam quantitatem? ei respondeo quod quantitas duobus modis a nobis concipitur, abstracte scilicet sive superficialiter prout nempe ipsam imaginamur vel ut substantia, quod a solo intellectu fit.

Since therefore vacuum is not given in nature (of which elsewhere), but all parts must so concur that no vacuum is given, it follows from this also that they cannot be really distinguished — that is, corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, cannot be divided. If anyone now asks why we are by nature so disposed to divide quantity, I answer that quantity is conceived by us in two ways, namely abstractly or superficially, that is, as when we imagine it itself or as substance, which is effected by the intellect alone.

Si itaque ad quantitatem attendimus prout in imaginatione est, quod sæpe et facilius a nobis fit, reperietur finita, divisibilis et partibus conflata; si autem ad ipsam prout in intellectu est, attendimus et eam quatenus substantia est, concipimus, quod difficillime fit, tum ut jam satis demonstravimus, infinita, unica et indivisibilis reperietur. Quod omnibus qui inter imaginationem et intellectum distinguere sciverint, satis manifestum erit, præcipue si ad hoc etiam attendatur quod materia ubique eadem est nec partes in eadem distinguuntur nisi quatenus materiam diversimode affectam esse concipimus, unde ejus partes modaliter tantum distinguuntur, non autem realiter. Exempli gratia aquam quatenus aqua est, dividi concipimus ejusque partes ab invicem separari; at non quatenus substantia est corporea; eatenus enim neque separatur neque dividitur.

Therefore if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which often and more easily we do, it will be found finite, divisible, and made up of parts; but if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is substance, which is done with great difficulty, then as we have already sufficiently shown it will be found infinite, one and indivisible. This will be sufficiently clear to all who know how to distinguish between imagination and intellect, especially if it is also noted that matter is everywhere the same and that parts are not distinguished really in the same thing except insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, whence its parts are distinguished only modaliter, not really. For example, we conceive water, insofar as it is water, to be divisible and its parts separable from one another; but not insofar as it is corporeal substance; for to that extent it is neither separable nor divisible.

Porro aqua quatenus aqua generatur et corrumpitur; at quatenus substantia nec generatur nec corrumpitur. Atque his me ad secundum argumentum etiam respondisse puto quandoquidem id in eo etiam fundatur quod materia quatenus substantia divisibilis sit et partibus confletur. Et quamvis hoc non esset, nescio cur divina natura indigna esset quandoquidem (per propositionem 14) extra Deum nulla substantia dari potest a qua ipsa pateretur.

Moreover water, insofar as it is water, is generated and corrupted; but insofar as it is substance it is neither generated nor corrupted. And to these things I think I have likewise answered the second argument, since that argument is also founded on this: that matter, insofar as it is substance, is divisible and composed of parts. And even if this were not so, I do not see why the divine nature would be unworthy, since (by proposition 14) outside God no substance can be given from which it itself could suffer.

Omnia inquam in Deo sunt et omnia quæ fiunt per solas leges infinitæ Dei naturæ fiunt et ex necessitate ejus essentiæ (ut mox ostendam) sequuntur; quare nulla ratione dici potest Deum ab alio pati aut substantiam extensam divina natura indignam esse tametsi divisibilis supponatur dummodo æterna et infinita concedatur. Sed de his impræsentiarum satis.

All things, I say, are in God, and all things which are done are done by the sole laws of the infinite nature of God and follow from the necessity of his essence (as I will shortly show); therefore in no way can it be said that God can be acted upon by another, or that an extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, although it be supposed divisible, provided only that it is conceded to be eternal and infinite. But of these matters for the present, enough.

PROPOSITIO XVI: Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.

PROPOSITION 16: From the necessity of the divine nature infinite things must follow in infinite modes (that is, all things which can fall under the infinite intellect).

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio unicuique manifesta esse debet si modo ad hoc attendat quod ex data cujuscunque rei definitione plures proprietates intellectus concludit, quæ revera ex eadem (hoc est ipsa rei essentia) necessario sequuntur et eo plures quo plus realitatis rei definitio exprimit hoc est quo plus realitatis rei definitæ essentia involvit. Cum autem natura divina infinita absolute attributa habeat (per definitionem 6) quorum etiam unumquodque infinitam essentiam in suo genere exprimit, ex ejusdem ergo necessitate infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) necessario sequi debent. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: This proposition ought to be manifest to everyone, if only he attends to the fact that from the given definition of any thing one concludes several properties of the intellect, which in truth necessarily follow from the same (that is, the very essence of the thing), and are more numerous the more the definition of the thing expresses reality, that is, the more reality the essence of the defined thing involves. But since the divine nature has infinite attributes absolutely (by definition 6), each of which expresses an infinite essence in its own kind, from the same therefore, by necessity, infinite things in infinite modes (that is, all things which can fall under the infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM I: Hinc sequitur Deum omnium rerum quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, esse causam efficientem.

COROLLARIUM 1: Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall under the infinite intellect.

COROLLARIUM II: Sequitur IIƒ Deum causam esse per se, non vero per accidens.

COROLLARIUM II: It follows (from II) that God is a cause per se, not, however, per accidens.

COROLLARIUM III: Sequitur IIIƒ Deum esse absolute causam primam.

COROLLARIUM 3: It follows from 3 that God is absolutely the first cause.

PROPOSITIO XVII: Deus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus et a nemine coactus agit.

PROPOSITION 17: God acts from the sole laws of his nature and is constrained by no one.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex sola divinæ naturæ necessitate vel (quod idem est) ex solis ejusdem naturæ legibus infinita absolute sequi modo propositione 16 ostendimus et propositione 15 demonstravimus nihil sine Deo esse nec concipi posse sed omnia in Deo esse; quare nihil extra ipsum esse potest a quo ad agendum determinetur vel cogatur atque adeo Deus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus et a nemine coactus agit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: From the sole necessity of the divine nature, or (which is the same) from the sole laws of that same nature, that the infinite absolutely follows we showed in the manner of Proposition 16 and demonstrated in Proposition 15 that nothing can be or be conceived without God but that all things are in God; wherefore nothing can be outside Him from whom it is determined or compelled to act, and therefore God acts from the sole laws of His nature and is compelled by no one. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM I: Hinc sequitur Iƒ nullam dari causam quæ Deum extrinsece vel intrinsece præter ipsius naturæ perfectionem incitet ad agendum.

COROLLARIUM 1: Hence it follows 1. that no cause is given which incites God, either extrinsically or intrinsically, apart from the perfection of his own nature, to act.

COROLLARIUM II: Sequitur IIƒ solum Deum esse causam liberam. Deus enim solus ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate existit (per propositionem 11 et corollarium I propositionis 14) et ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate agit (per propositionem præcedentem). Adeoque (per definitionem 7) solus est causa libera. Q.E.D.

COROLLARY II: It follows IIƒ that only God is a free cause. For God alone exists from the sole necessity of his nature (by proposition 11 and corollary I of proposition 14) and from the sole necessity of his nature acts (by the preceding proposition). And therefore (by definition 7) he alone is a free cause. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Alii putant Deum esse causam liberam propterea quod potest ut putant efficere ut ea quæ ex ejus natura sequi diximus hoc est quæ in ejus potestate sunt, non fiant sive ut ab ipso non producantur. Sed hoc idem est ac si dicerent quod Deus potest efficere ut ex natura trianguli non sequatur ejus tres angulos æquales esse duobus rectis sive ut ex data causa non sequatur effectus, quod est absurdum. Porro infra absque ope hujus propositionis ostendam ad Dei naturam neque intellectum neque voluntatem pertinere.

SCHOLIUM: Some think that God is a free cause because He can, as they suppose, effect that those things which we said follow from His nature—that is, which are in His power—not be done or not be produced by Him. But this is the same as if they were to say that God can effect that from the nature of a triangle it does not follow that its three angles are equal to two right angles, or that from a given cause the effect does not follow, which is absurd. Moreover below, without the aid of this proposition, I will show that neither intellect nor will pertains to the nature of God.

Scio equidem plures esse qui putant se posse demonstrare ad Dei naturam summum intellectum et liberam voluntatem pertinere; nihil enim perfectius cognoscere sese aiunt quod Deo tribuere possunt quam id quod in nobis summa est perfectio. Porro tametsi Deum actu summe intelligentem concipiant, non tamen credunt eum posse omnia quæ actu intelligit, efficere ut existant nam se eo modo Dei potentiam destruere putant. Si omnia inquiunt quæ in ejus intellectu sunt, creavisset, nihil tum amplius creare potuisset, quod credunt Dei omnipotentiæ repugnare ideoque maluerunt Deum ad omnia indifferentem statuere nec aliud creantem præter id quod absoluta quadam voluntate decrevit creare.

I know indeed that there are many who think they can demonstrate that the highest intellect and a free will pertain to the nature of God; for they say they can attribute to God nothing more perfect than that which in us is the highest perfection. Moreover, although they conceive God to be supremely intelligent in act, yet they do not believe that he can effect to exist all things which he actually understands, for in that way they think to destroy the power of God. If, they say, he had created all things that are in his intellect, he could then create nothing more, which they believe is contrary to the omnipotence of God; and therefore they preferred to suppose God indifferent to all things and creating nothing else besides that which by an absolute will he decreed to create.

Verum ego me satis clare ostendisse puto (vide propositionem 16) a summa Dei potentia sive infinita natura infinita infinitis modis hoc est omnia necessario effluxisse vel semper eadem necessitate sequi eodem modo ac ex natura trianguli ab æterno et in æternum sequitur ejus tres angulos æquari duobus rectis. Quare Dei omnipotentia actu ab æterno fuit et in æternum in eadem actualitate manebit. Et hoc modo Dei omnipotentia longe meo quidem judicio perfectior statuitur.

But I think I have shown myself quite clearly (see proposition 16) that from the highest power of God, or from infinite nature, there has infinitely in infinite modes flowed forth, that is, that all things have necessarily flowed forth or always follow with the same necessity in the same manner, just as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity that its three angles equal two right angles. Wherefore God's omnipotence was in act from eternity and will remain in the same actuality for eternity. And in this way God's omnipotence is established, in my judgment, as far more perfect.

Imo adversarii Dei omnipotentiam (liceat aperte loqui) negare videntur. Coguntur enim fateri Deum infinita creabilia intelligere quæ tamen nunquam creare poterit. Nam alias si scilicet omnia quæ intelligit crearet, suam juxta ipsos exhauriret omnipotentiam et se imperfectum redderet.

Indeed the adversaries seem to deny the omnipotence of God (let me speak openly). For they are forced to confess that God understands infinite creatabilia which nevertheless he will never be able to create. For otherwise, if indeed he were to create all things which he understands, he would, according to them, exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect.

Ut igitur Deum perfectum statuant, eo rediguntur ut simul statuere debeant ipsum non posse omnia efficere ad quæ ejus potentia se extendit, quo absurdius aut Dei omnipotentiæ magis repugnans non video quid fingi possit. Porro ut de intellectu et voluntate quos Deo communiter tribuimus, hic etiam aliquid dicam, si ad æternam Dei essentiam intellectus scilicet et voluntas pertinent, aliud sane per utrumque hoc attributum intelligendum est quam quod vulgo solent homines. Nam intellectus et voluntas qui Dei essentiam constituerent, a nostro intellectu et voluntate toto cælo differre deberent nec in ulla re præterquam in nomine convenire possent; non aliter scilicet quam inter se conveniunt canis, signum cæleste et canis, animal latrans.

Therefore, that they may assert God to be perfect, they are driven to the point of having to assert at the same time that he cannot effect all things to which his power extends — I do not see what could be imagined more absurd or more repugnant to God’s omnipotence. Moreover, as to the intellect and will which we commonly attribute to God, I will say something here also: if intellect and will pertain to the eternal essence of God, then by each of these attributes something certainly must be understood other than what men commonly suppose. For intellect and will that would constitute God’s essence ought to differ from our intellect and will as far as heaven differs from earth, nor could they coincide in any respect except in name; not otherwise, namely, than between “canis, a heavenly sign” and “canis, a barking animal.”

Quod sic demonstrabo. Si intellectus ad divinam naturam pertinet, non poterit uti noster intellectus posterior (ut plerisque placet) vel simul natura esse cum rebus intellectis quandoquidem Deus omnibus rebus prior est causalitate (per corollarium I propositionis 16) sed contra veritas et formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est quia talis in Dei intellectu existit objective. Quare Dei intellectus quatenus Dei essentiam constituere concipitur, est revera causa rerum tam earum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ, quod ab iis videtur etiam fuisse animadversum qui Dei intellectum, voluntatem et potentiam unum et idem esse asseruerunt.

Which I will thus demonstrate. If intellect pertains to the divine nature, our posterior intellect will not be able to use it (as most please) nor can it together be by nature with the things understood, since God is prior to all things by causality (by corollary I of proposition 16); but on the contrary the truth and the formal essence of things are such because they objectively exist thus in God’s intellect. Therefore God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute God’s essence, is truly the cause of things both of their essences and of their existences, which seems also to have been noticed by those who asserted that God’s intellect, will, and power are one and the same.

Cum itaque Dei intellectus sit unica rerum causa videlicet (ut ostendimus) tam earum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ, debet ipse necessario ab iisdem differre tam ratione essentiæ quam ratione existentiæ. Nam causatum differt a sua causa præcise in eo quod a causa habet. Exempli gratia homo est causa existentiæ, non vero essentiæ alterius hominis; est enim hæc æterna veritas et ideo secundum essentiam prorsus convenire possunt; in existendo autem differre debent et propterea si unius existentia pereat, non ideo alterius peribit sed si unius essentia destrui posset et fieri falsa, destrueretur etiam alterius essentia. Quapropter res quæ et essentiæ et existentiæ alicujus effectus est causa, a tali effectu differre debet tam ratione essentiæ quam ratione existentiæ. Atqui Dei intellectus est et essentiæ et existentiæ nostri intellectus causa; ergo Dei intellectus quatenus divinam essentiam constituere concipitur, a nostro intellectu tam ratione essentiæ quam ratione existentiæ differt nec in ulla re præterquam in nomine cum eo convenire potest, ut volebamus.

Therefore, since God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely (as we have shown) both of their essences and of their existences, it must necessarily differ from them both in respect of essence and in respect of existence. For the caused thing differs from its cause precisely in that it has being from the cause. For example, one man is the cause of another man's existence, not of the other's essence; for essence is an eternal truth and therefore in respect of essence they can wholly coincide; in existing, however, they must differ, and therefore if the existence of one perishes, the other will not thereby perish; but if the essence of one could be destroyed and made false, the essence of the other would likewise be destroyed. Wherefore a thing which is the cause of both the essence and the existence of something must differ from that effect both in respect of essence and in respect of existence. Now God's intellect is the cause of both the essence and the existence of our intellect; therefore God's intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect of essence and of existence, and can agree with it in no respect except in name, as we wished.

Circa voluntatem eodem modo proceditur, ut facile unusquisque videre potest.

Concerning the will one proceeds in the same way, as anyone can easily see.

PROPOSITIO XVIII: Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens.

PROPOSITIO 18: God is the immanent cause of all things, not, however, a transient one.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnia quæ sunt, in Deo sunt et per Deum concipi debent (per propositionem 15) adeoque (per corollarium I propositionis 16 hujus) Deus rerum quæ in ipso sunt, est causa, quod est primum. Deinde extra Deum nulla potest dari substantia (per propositionem 14) hoc est (per definitionem 3) res quæ extra Deum in se sit, quod erat secundum. Deus ergo est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens.

DEMONSTRATIO: All things that are, are in God and ought to be conceived through God (per propositionem 15) and therefore (per corollarium 1 propositionis 16 hujus) God of the things which are in Him is the cause of that which is first. Moreover outside God no substance can be given (per propositionem 14), that is (per definitionem 3) a thing which is outside God in itself, which was the second. Therefore God is the immanent cause of all things, not however the transitive.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITIO XIX: Deus sive omnia Dei attributa sunt æterna.

PROPOSITIO 19: God, or all the attributes of God, are eternal.

DEMONSTRATIO: Deus enim (per definitionem 6) est substantia quæ (per propositionem 11) necessario existit hoc est (per propositionem 7) ad cujus naturam pertinet existere sive (quod idem est) ex cujus definitione sequitur ipsum existere adeoque (per definitionem 8) est æternus. Deinde per Dei attributa intelligendum est id quod (per definitionem 4) divinæ substantiæ essentiam exprimit hoc est id quod ad substantiam pertinet : id ipsum inquam ipsa attributa involvere debent. Atqui ad naturam substantiæ (ut jam ex propositione 7 demonstravi) pertinet æternitas.

DEMONSTRATIO: For God (per definitione 6) is the substance which (per propositionem 11) necessarily exists, that is (per propositionem 7) of whose nature it pertains to exist or (which is the same) from whose definition it follows that it exists, and therefore (per definitionem 8) is eternal. Next, by God’s attributes is to be understood that which (per definitione 4) expresses the essence of the divine substance, that is that which pertains to the substance: that very thing, I say, the attributes themselves ought to involve. And indeed eternity pertains to the nature of substance (as I have already demonstrated from proposition 7).

Ergo unumquodque attributorum æternitatem involvere debet adeoque omnia sunt æterna. Q.E.D.

Therefore each one of the attributes must involve eternity, and therefore all things are eternal. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc propositio quam clarissime etiam patet ex modo quo (propositione 11) Dei existentiam demonstravi; ex ea inquam demonstratione constat Dei existentiam sicut ejus essentiam æternam esse veritatem. Deinde (propositione 19 Principiorum Cartesii) alio etiam modo Dei æternitatem demonstravi nec opus est eum hic repetere.

SCHOLIUM: This proposition also appears most clearly from the manner in which (proposition 11) I demonstrated God’s existence; from that demonstration, I say, it is established that God’s existence, as his essence, is eternal truth. Then (proposition 19 of the Principles of Descartes) I have demonstrated God’s eternity in another way as well, and there is no need to repeat it here.

PROPOSITIO XX: Dei existentia ejusque essentia unum et idem sunt.

PROPOSITION 20: The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.

DEMONSTRATIO: Deus (per antecedentem propositionem) ejusque omnia attributa sunt æterna hoc est (per definitionem 8) unumquodque ejus attributorum existentiam exprimit. Eadem ergo Dei attributa quæ (per definitionem 4) Dei æternam essentiam explicant, ejus simul æternam existentiam explicant hoc est illud ipsum quod essentiam Dei constituit, constituit simul ipsius existentiam adeoque hæc et ipsius essentia unum et idem sunt. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: God (per the antecedent proposition) and all his attributes are eternal; this is (per definition 8) to express the existence of each of his attributes. Therefore the same attributes of God which (per definition 4) explain God's eternal essence, explain also his simultaneous eternal existence; that is, that very thing which constitutes the essence of God, constitutes at the same time his existence, and therefore these and his essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM I: Hinc sequitur Iƒ Dei existentiam sicut ejus essentiam æternam esse veritatem.

COROLLARIUM 1: Hence it follows that the existence of God, like his essence, is eternal truth.

COROLLARIUM II: Sequitur IIƒ Deum sive omnia Dei attributa esse immutabilia. Nam si ratione existentiæ mutarentur, deberent etiam (per propositionem præcedentem) ratione essentiæ mutari hoc est (ut per se notum) ex veris falsa fieri, quod est absurdum.

COROLLARIUM 2: It follows (Corollary 2) that God, or all the attributes of God, are immutable. For if they were changed with respect to existence, they would also (by the preceding proposition) have to be changed with respect to essence; that is (as is self-evident) for truths to become false, which is absurd.

PROPOSITIO XXI: Omnia quæ ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei sequuntur, semper et infinita existere debuerunt sive per idem attributum æterna et infinita sunt.

PROPOSITIO 21: All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God ought always and infinitely to have existed, or by the same attribute are eternal and infinite.

DEMONSTRATIO: Concipe si fieri potest (siquidem neges) aliquid in aliquo Dei attributo ex ipsius absoluta natura sequi quod finitum sit et determinatam habeat existentiam sive durationem exempli gratia ideam Dei in cogitatione. At cogitatio quandoquidem Dei attributum supponitur, est necessario (per propositionem 11) sua natura infinita. Verum quatenus ipsa ideam Dei habet, finita supponitur.

DEMONSTRATIO: Conceive, if it can be done (for you will deny it), that something in any attribute of God, from its absolute nature, should follow that is finite and have a determinate existence or duration — for example, the idea of God in cogitation. But cogitation, since it is supposed an attribute of God, is necessarily by its nature infinite (by proposition 11). Yet insofar as it itself has the idea of God, it is supposed finite.

At (per definitionem 2) finita concipi non potest nisi per ipsam cogitationem determinetur. Sed non per ipsam cogitationem quatenus ideam Dei constituit; eatenus enim finita supponitur esse : ergo per cogitationem quatenus ideam Dei non constituit, quæ tamen (per propositionem 11) necessario existere debet. Datur igitur cogitatio non constituens ideam Dei ac propterea ex ejus natura quatenus est absoluta cogitatio, non sequitur necessario idea Dei (concipitur enim ideam Dei constituens et non constituens). Quod est contra hypothesin.

But a finite thing (by definition 2) cannot be conceived except insofar as it is determined by thought itself. Yet not by thought itself insofar as it constitutes the idea of God; for insofar as it is supposed finite. Therefore by the thought insofar as it does not constitute the idea of God — which nevertheless (by proposition 11) must necessarily exist. Therefore a thought is given that does not constitute the idea of God and therefore, from its nature insofar as it is an absolute thought, the idea of God does not necessarily follow (for the idea of God is conceived as constituting and not constituting). Which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Quare si idea Dei in cogitatione aut aliquid (perinde est quicquid sumatur quandoquidem demonstratio universalis est) in aliquo Dei attributo ex necessitate absolutæ naturæ ipsius attributi sequatur, id debet necessario esse infinitum; quod erat primum.

Wherefore if the idea of God in thought, or anything (it is the same whatever be taken since the demonstration is universal), in any attribute of God follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of that attribute itself, that must necessarily be infinite; which was the first.

Deinde id quod ex necessitate naturæ alicujus attributi ita sequitur, non potest determinatam habere existentiam sive durationem. Nam si neges, supponatur res quæ ex necessitate naturæ alicujus attributi sequitur, dari in aliquo Dei attributo exempli gratia idea Dei in cogitatione eaque supponatur aliquando non exstitisse vel non exstitura. Cum autem cogitatio Dei attributum supponatur, debet et necessario et immutabilis existere (per propositionem 11 et corollarium II propositionis 20). Quare ultra limites durationis ideæ Dei (supponitur enim aliquando non exstitisse aut non exstitura) cogitatio sine idea Dei existere debebit; atqui hoc est contra hypothesin; supponitur enim ex data cogitatione necessario sequi ideam Dei.

Next, that which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a determinate existence or duration. For if you deny this, suppose a thing which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute is given in some attribute of God — for example, the idea of God in thought — and suppose that it sometimes did not exist or will not exist. But when the thought of God is supposed to be an attribute, it must exist both necessarily and immutably (by proposition 11 and corollary II of proposition 20). Therefore, beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for it is supposed sometimes not to have existed or not to exist) thought without the idea of God would have to exist; and this is contrary to the hypothesis; for it is supposed that from a given thought the idea of God necessarily follows.

Ergo idea Dei in cogitatione aut aliquid quod necessario ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei sequitur, non potest determinatam habere durationem sed per idem attributum æternum est, quod erat secundum. Nota hoc idem esse affirmandum de quacunque re quæ in aliquo Dei attributo ex Dei absoluta natura necessario sequitur.

Therefore the idea of God in cognition, or anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, cannot have a determinate duration but by the same attribute is eternal, which was the second. Note that the same must be affirmed concerning any thing which in any attribute of God necessarily follows from the absolute nature of God.

PROPOSITIO XXII: Quicquid ex aliquo Dei attributo quatenus modificatum est tali modificatione quæ et necessario et infinita per idem existit, sequitur, debet quoque et necessario et infinitum existere.

PROPOSITION 22: Whatever follows from any attribute of God, insofar as it is modified by such a modification which both necessarily and infinitely exists through the same, must also necessarily and infinitely exist.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus propositionis demonstratio procedit eodem modo ac demonstratio præcedentis.

DEMONSTRATIO: The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the same manner as the demonstration of the preceding one.

PROPOSITIO XXIII: Omnis modus qui et necessario et infinitus existit, necessario sequi debuit vel ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei vel ex aliquo attributo modificato modificatione quæ et necessario et infinita existit.

PROPOSITION 23: Every mode which exists both necessarily and infinitely must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists both necessarily and infinitely.

DEMONSTRATIO: Modus enim in alio est per quod concipi debet (per definitionem 5) hoc est (per propositionem 15) in solo Deo est et per solum Deum concipi potest. Si ergo modus concipitur necessario existere et infinitus esse, utrumque hoc debet necessario concludi sive percipi per aliquod Dei attributum quatenus idem concipitur infinitatem et necessitatem existentiæ sive (quod per definitionem 8 idem est) æternitatem exprimere hoc est (per definitionem 6 et propositionem 19) quatenus absolute consideratur. Modus ergo qui et necessario et infinitus existit, ex absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi sequi debuit hocque vel immediate (de quo vide propositionem 21) vel mediante aliqua modificatione quæ ex ejus absoluta natura sequitur hoc est (per propositionem præcedentem) quæ et necessario et infinita existit.

DEMONSTRATIO: For a mode in another is that by which it must be conceived (by definition 5), that is (by proposition 15) it is in God alone and can be conceived by God alone. If therefore a mode is conceived to exist necessarily and to be infinite, both this must be concluded necessarily either to be perceived from some attribute of God insofar as the same expresses infinity and the necessity of existence, or (which by definition 8 is the same) eternity, that is (by definition 6 and proposition 19) insofar as it is considered absolutely. A mode therefore which exists both necessarily and infinitely ought to follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, and this either immediately (of which see proposition 21) or by means of some modification which follows from its absolute nature, that is (by the preceding proposition) which exists both necessarily and infinitely.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITIO XXIV: Rerum a Deo productarum essentia non involvit existentiam.

PROPOSITION 24: The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex definitione 1. Id enim cujus natura (in se scilicet considerata) involvit existentiam, causa est sui et ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate existit.

DEMONSTRATIO: It is clear from definition 1. For that thing whose nature (considered in itself, namely) involves existence, is the cause of itself and exists from the necessity of its own nature alone.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur Deum non tantum esse causam ut res incipiant existere sed etiam ut in existendo perseverent sive (ut termino scholastico utar) Deum esse causam essendi rerum. Nam sive res existant sive non existant, quotiescunque ad earum essentiam attendimus, eandem nec existentiam nec durationem involvere comperimus adeoque earum essentia neque suæ existentiæ neque suæ durationis potest esse causa sed tantum Deus ad cujus solam naturam pertinet existere (per corollarium I propositionis 14).

COROLLARY: Hence it follows that God is not only the cause that things begin to exist but also that they persevere in existing, or (to use the scholastic term) that God is the cause of the being of things. For whether things exist or do not exist, whenever we attend to their essence we find that it involves neither existence nor duration, and therefore their essence can be the cause neither of their existence nor of their duration, but only God, to whose sole nature it pertains to exist (by corollary 1 of proposition 14).

PROPOSITIO XXV: Deus non tantum est causa efficiens rerum existentiæ sed etiam essentiæ.

PROPOSITIO 25: God is not only the efficient cause of the existence of things but also of their essence.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si negas, ergo rerum essentiæ Deus non est causa adeoque (per axioma 4) potest rerum essentia sine Deo concipi : atqui hoc (per propositionem 15) est absurdum. Ergo rerum etiam essentiæ Deus est causa. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: If you deny, then God is not the cause of the essences of things and therefore (by axiom 4) the essence of things can be conceived without God; but this (by proposition 15) is absurd. Therefore God is also the cause of the essences of things. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc propositio clarius sequitur ex propositione 16. Ex ea enim sequitur quod ex data natura divina tam rerum essentia quam existentia debeat necessario concludi et ut verbo dicam eo sensu quo Deus dicitur causa sui, etiam omnium rerum causa dicendus est, quod adhuc clarius ex sequenti corollario constabit.

SCHOLIUM: This proposition follows more clearly from proposition 16. For from it it follows that from a given divine nature both the essence and the existence of things ought necessarily to be concluded, and, so to speak, in the sense in which God is called the cause of Himself, He must also be called the cause of all things, which will be made still clearer by the following corollary.

COROLLARIUM: Res particulares nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones sive modi quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur. Demonstratio patet ex propositione 15 et definitione 5.

COROLLARY: Particular things are nothing but the affections or modes of God’s attributes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way. The demonstration is clear from proposition 15 and definition 5.

PROPOSITIO XXVI: Res quæ ad aliquid operandum determinata est, a Deo necessario sic fuit determinata et quæ a Deo non est determinata, non potest se ipsam ad operandum determinare.

PROPOSITION 26: A thing which is determined to act for some purpose was necessarily thus determined by God; and that which is not determined by God cannot determine itself to act.

DEMONSTRATIO: Id per quod res determinatæ ad aliquid operandum dicuntur, necessario quid positivum est (ut per se notum). Adeoque tam ejus essentiæ quam existentiæ Deus ex necessitate suæ naturæ est causa efficiens (per propositiones 25 et 16) quod erat primum. Ex quo etiam quod secundo proponitur clarissime sequitur. Nam si res quæ a Deo determinata non est, se ipsam determinare posset, prima pars hujus falsa esset, quod est absurdum, ut ostendimus.

DEMONSTRATIO: That by which things determined to act toward something are said to be determined is necessarily some positive quid (as known per se). Therefore both the essence and the existence God, from the necessity of his nature, is the efficient cause (by propositions 25 and 16) which was first. From which also what is proposed second most clearly follows. For if a thing which is not determined by God could determine itself, the first part of this would be false, which is absurd, as we have shown.

PROPOSITIO XXVII: Res quæ a Deo ad aliquid operandum determinata est, se ipsam indeterminatam reddere non potest.

PROPOSITION 27: A thing which is determined by God to operate for some end cannot render itself indeterminate.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio patet ex axiomate tertio.

DEMONSTRATIO: This proposition is clear from the third axiom.

PROPOSITIO XXVIII: Quodcunque singulare sive quævis res quæ finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, non potest existere nec ad operandum determinari nisi ad existendum et operandum determinetur ab alia causa quæ etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus hæc causa non potest etiam existere neque ad operandum determinari nisi ab alia quæ etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, determinetur ad existendum et operandum et sic in infinitum.

PROPOSITIO 28: Whatever singular thing, or any thing that is finite and has a determinate existence, cannot exist nor be determined to act unless it is determined to exist and to act by another cause that is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again this cause cannot itself exist nor be determined to act except by another which is also finite and has a determinate existence, determined to exist and to act, and so on to infinity.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid determinatum est ad existendum et operandum, a Deo sic determinatum est (per propositionem 26 et corollarium propositionis 24). At id quod finitum est et determinatam habet existentiam, ab absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi produci non potuit; quicquid enim ex absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi sequitur, id infinitum et æternum est (per propositionem 21). Debuit ergo ex Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo sequi quatenus aliquo modo affectum consideratur; præter enim substantiam et modos nil datur (per axioma 1 et definitionibus 3 et 5) et modi (per corollarium propositionis 25) nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones. At ex Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo quatenus affectum est modificatione quæ æterna et infinita est, sequi etiam non potuit (per propositionem 22). Debuit ergo sequi vel ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo quatenus modificatum est modificatione quæ finita est et determinatam habet existentiam. Quod erat primum.

DEMONSTRATIO: Whatever is determined to exist and to act is thus determined by God (by proposition 26 and the corollary of proposition 24). But that which is finite and has a determinate existence could not be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by proposition 21). It therefore had to follow from God, or from some attribute of him, insofar as it is considered as an affection; for besides substance and modes nothing is given (by axiom 1 and definitions 3 and 5), and modes (by the corollary of proposition 25) are nothing but affections of God’s attributes. But it could not follow from God, or from some attribute of him, insofar as it is an affection by a modification which is eternal and infinite (by proposition 22). Therefore it had to follow, or be determined to exist and to act, from God or from some attribute of him insofar as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence. Which was to be demonstrated.

Deinde hæc rursus causa sive hic modus (per eandem rationem qua primam partem hujus jam jam demonstravimus) debuit etiam determinari ab alia quæ etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus hæc ultima (per eandem rationem) ab alia et sic semper (per eandem rationem) in infinitum. Q.E.D.

Then this cause again, or this mode, (by the same reasoning by which we have just now demonstrated the first part of this) must also be determined by another which is likewise finite and has a determinate existence, and again this last (by the same reasoning) by another, and so always (by the same reasoning) to infinity. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Cum quædam a Deo immediate produci debuerunt videlicet ea quæ ex absoluta ejus natura necessario sequuntur et alia mediantibus his primis quæ tamen sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt, hinc sequitur Iƒ quod Deus sit rerum immediate ab ipso productarum causa absolute proxima, non vero in suo genere ut aiunt. Nam Dei effectus sine sua causa nec esse nec concipi possunt (per propositionem 15 et corollarium propositionis 24). Sequitur IIƒ quod Deus non potest proprie dici causa esse remota rerum singularium nisi forte ea de causa ut scilicet has ab iis quas immediate produxit vel potius quæ ex absoluta ejus natura sequuntur, distinguamus. Nam per causam remotam talem intelligimus quæ cum effectu nullo modo conjuncta est.

SCHOLIUM: Since certain things had to be produced by God immediately, namely those which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, and others by means of these first ones, which nevertheless without God can neither be nor be conceived, hence follows Iƒ that God is the absolutely proximate cause of things immediately produced by him, not, however, a cause remote in his genus, as they say. For God's effects without their cause can neither be nor be conceived (by proposition 15 and the corollary of proposition 24). It follows IIƒ that God cannot properly be said to be a remote cause of singular things, unless perhaps we distinguish them for the sake of distinguishing these from those which he produced immediately, or rather which follow from his absolute nature. For by a remote cause we understand one which is in no way conjoined with the effect.

At omnia quæ sunt in Deo sunt et a Deo ita dependent ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint.

But all things that are in God are, and are dependent on God so that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

PROPOSITIO XXIX: In rerum natura nullum datur contingens sed omnia ex necessitate divinæ naturæ determinata sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum.

PROPOSITIO 29: In the nature of things no contingent thing is given, but all things are determined by the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to act in a certain manner.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid est in Deo est (per propositionem 15) : Deus autem non potest dici res contingens. Nam (per propositionem 11) necessario, non vero contingenter existit. Modi deinde divinæ naturæ ex eadem etiam necessario, non vero contingenter secuti sunt (per propositionem 16) idque vel quatenus divina natura absolute (per propositionem 21) vel quatenus certo modo ad agendum determinata consideratur (per propositionem 27). Porro horum modorum Deus non tantum est causa quatenus simpliciter existunt (per corollarium propositionis 24) sed etiam (per propositionem 26) quatenus ad aliquid operandum determinati considerantur.

DEMONSTRATIO: Whatever is in God is so (by proposition 15): but God cannot be said to be a contingent thing. For (by proposition 11) he exists necessarily, not contingently. The modes of the divine nature therefore follow from the same likewise necessarily, not contingently (by proposition 16), and this either insofar as the divine nature is considered absolutely (by proposition 21) or insofar as it is considered determined to act in a certain way (by proposition 27). Moreover, God is not only the cause of these modes insofar as they simply exist (by the corollary of proposition 24) but also (by proposition 26) insofar as they are considered determined to operate for some end.

Quod si a Deo (per eandem propositionem) determinati non sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est ut se ipsos determinent et contra (per propositionem 27) si a Deo determinati sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est ut se ipsos indeterminatos reddant. Quare omnia ex necessitate divinæ naturæ determinata sunt, non tantum ad existendum sed etiam ad certo modo existendum et operandum nullumque datur contingens. Q.E.D.

But if they are not determined by God (by the same proposition), it is impossible, not contingent, that they should determine themselves; and conversely (by proposition 27), if they are determined by God, it is impossible, not contingent, that they should render themselves indeterminate. Therefore all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist but also to exist and to act in a certain manner, and no contingent thing is given. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Antequam ulterius pergam, hic quid nobis per Naturam naturantem et quid per Naturam naturatam intelligendum sit, explicare volo vel potius monere. Nam ex antecedentibus jam constare existimo nempe quod per Naturam naturantem nobis intelligendum est id quod in se est et per se concipitur sive talia substantiæ attributa quæ æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimunt hoc est (per corollarium I propositionis 14 et corollarium II propositionis 17) Deus quatenus ut causa libera consideratur. Per naturatam autem intelligo id omne quod ex necessitate Dei naturæ sive uniuscujusque Dei attributorum sequitur hoc est omnes Dei attributorum modos quatenus considerantur ut res quæ in Deo sunt et quæ sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt.

SCHOLIUM: Before I go further, I wish here to explain, or rather to warn, what is to be understood by Nature naturing and what by Nature naturated. For from the foregoing I now judge it to be established, namely that by Nature naturing is to be understood that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, or such attributes of substance which express an eternal and infinite essence, that is (per corollarium I propositionis 14 et corollarium II propositionis 17) God insofar as he is considered as a free cause. By naturated, however, I understand all that follows from the necessity of the nature of God or of each of God’s attributes, that is, all the modes of God’s attributes insofar as they are considered as things which are in God and which without God can neither be nor be conceived.

PROPOSITIO XXX: Intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud.

PROPOSITION 30: The intellect, finite in act or infinite in act, ought to comprehend the attributes of God and the affections of God and nothing else.

DEMONSTRATIO: Idea vera debet convenire cum suo ideato (per axioma 6) hoc est (ut per se notum) id quod in intellectu objective continetur, debet necessario in natura dari. Atqui in natura (per corollarium I propositionis 14) non nisi una substantia datur nempe Deus nec ullæ aliæ affectiones (per propositionem 15) quam quæ in Deo sunt et quæ (per eandem propositionem) sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt; ergo intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: A true idea must agree with its ideate (per axiom 6), that is (as self-evident) that which is objectively contained in the intellect must necessarily be given in nature. Yet in nature (per corollary I of proposition 14) only one substance is given, namely God, nor any other affections (per proposition 15) than those which are in God and which (by the same proposition) without God can neither be nor be conceived; therefore the intellect, finite in act or infinite in act, must comprehend the attributes of God and the affections of God and nothing else. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXXI: Intellectus actu sive is finitus sit sive infinitus, ut et voluntas, cupiditas, amor etc. ad Naturam naturatam, non vero ad naturantem referri debent.

PROPOSITION 31: The intellect in act, whether it be finite or infinite, as also the will, desire, love, etc., ought to be referred to Nature that is natured, and not to the naturing (one).

DEMONSTRATIO: Per intellectum enim (ut per se notum) non intelligimus absolutam cogitationem sed certum tantum modum cogitandi, qui modus ab aliis scilicet cupiditate, amore, etc. differt adeoque (per definitionem 5) per absolutam cogitationem concipi debet nempe (per propositionem 15 et definitionem 6) per aliquod Dei attributum quod æternam et infinitam cogitationis essentiam exprimit, ita concipi debet ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possit ac propterea (per scholium propositionis 29) ad Naturam naturatam, non vero naturantem referri debet ut etiam reliqui modi cogitandi. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: For by the intellect (as self-evident) we do not understand absolute thought but only a certain mode of thinking, which mode differs from others, namely cupiditas, amor, etc., and therefore (by definition 5) must be conceived by absolute thought, namely (by proposition 15 and definition 6) through some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought; thus it must be conceived so that without it it can neither be nor be conceived and therefore (by the scholium of proposition 29) it is to be referred to Nature naturatam, not really to the naturans, as are likewise the remaining modes of thinking. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Ratio cur hic loquar de intellectu actu non est quia concedo ullum dari intellectum potentia sed quia omnem confusionem vitare cupio, nolui loqui nisi de re nobis quam clarissime percepta, de ipsa scilicet intellectione qua nihil nobis clarius percipitur. Nihil enim intelligere possumus quod ad perfectiorem intellectionis cognitionem non conducat.

SCHOLIUM: The reason why I speak here of the intellect in act is not that I grant any intellect in potency to be given, but because I wish to avoid all confusion; I did not want to speak except of a thing perceived by us as plainly as possible, namely of that very intellection by which nothing is perceived more clearly by us. For we can understand nothing that does not conduce to a more perfect cognition of intellection.

PROPOSITIO XXXII: Voluntas non potest vocari causa libera sed tantum necessaria.

PROPOSITIO 32: The will cannot be called a free cause but only a necessary one.

DEMONSTRATIO: Voluntas certus tantum cogitandi modus est sicuti intellectus adeoque (per propositionem 28) unaquæque volitio non potest existere neque ad operandum determinari nisi ab alia causa determinetur et hæc rursus ab alia et sic porro in infinitum. Quod si voluntas infinita supponatur, debet etiam ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, non quatenus substantia absolute infinita est sed quatenus attributum habet quod infinitam et æternam cogitationis essentiam exprimit (per propositionem 23). Quocunque igitur modo sive finita sive infinita concipiatur, causam requirit a qua ad existendum et operandum determinetur adeoque (per definitionem 7) non potest dici causa libera sed tantum necessaria vel coacta. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: The will is only a certain mode of thinking, just as the intellect, and therefore (per proposition 28) each particular volition cannot exist nor be determined to act unless it is determined by another cause, and this again by another and so on to infinity. But if the will is supposed infinite, it must likewise be determined to exist and to act by God, not insofar as substance is absolutely infinite but insofar as it has an attribute which expresses an infinite and eternal essence of thinking (per proposition 23). Therefore, in whatever way it is conceived, whether finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and to act and consequently (per definition 7) cannot be called a free cause but only a necessary or coerced one. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM I: Hinc sequitur Iƒ Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis.

COROLLARIUM I: Hence follows Iƒ That God does not operate from the freedom of the will.

COROLLARIUM II: Sequitur IIƒ voluntatem et intellectum ad Dei naturam ita sese habere ut motus et quies et absolute ut omnia naturalia quæ (per propositionem 29) a Deo ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari debent. Nam voluntas, ut reliqua omnia, causa indiget a qua ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinetur. Et quamvis ex data voluntate sive intellectu infinita sequantur, non tamen propterea Deus magis dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere quam propter ea quæ ex motu et quiete sequuntur (infinita enim ex his etiam sequuntur) dici potest ex libertate motus et quietis agere.

COROLLARIUM II: It follows IIƒ that the will and the intellect, with regard to the nature of God, stand in such a way that motion and rest are absolute, and likewise all natural things which (by proposition 29) ought to be determined by God to exist and to operate in a certain manner. For the will, as all the rest, needs a cause from which it is determined to exist and to operate in a certain manner. And although infinite things may follow from a given will or intellect, nevertheless for that reason God cannot be said to act more from the freedom of the will than He can be said to act from the freedom of motion and rest on account of those things which follow from motion and rest (for infinite things also follow from these).

Quare voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet quam reliqua naturalia sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet ut motus et quies et omnia reliqua quæ ostendimus ex necessitate divinæ naturæ sequi et ab eadem ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari.

Therefore the will pertains to God's nature no more than the other natural things, but it relates to that nature in the same way as motion and rest and all the rest which we have shown necessarily follow from the divine nature and are by that same nature determined in a certain way for existing and for operating.

PROPOSITIO XXXIII: Res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt quam productæ sunt.

PROPOSITIO 33: Things could in no other manner, nor in any other order, have been produced by God than as they have been produced.

DEMONSTRATIO: Res enim omnes ex data Dei natura necessario sequutæ sunt (per propositionem 16) et ex necessitate naturæ Dei determinatæ sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum (per propositionem 29). Si itaque res alterius naturæ potuissent esse vel alio modo ad operandum determinari ut naturæ ordo alius esset, ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse quam jam est ac proinde (per propositionem 11) illa etiam deberet existere et consequenter duo vel plures possent dari Dii, quod (per corollarium I propositionis 14) est absurdum. Quapropter res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For all things have followed necessarily from the given nature of God (by proposition 16) and from the necessity of God’s nature they are determined to exist and to operate in a certain way (by proposition 29). If therefore things of another nature could have been or could have been determined to act in another manner so that the order of natures were different, then God’s nature likewise could be other than it now is and consequently (by proposition 11) that other nature would also have to exist, and therefore two or more Gods could be given, which (by corollary I of proposition 14) is absurd. Wherefore things in no other way nor in another order etc. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM I: Quoniam his luce meridiana clarius ostendi nihil absolute in rebus dari propter quod contingentes dicantur, explicare jam paucis volo quid nobis per contingens erit intelligendum sed prius quid per necessarium et impossibile. Res aliqua necessaria dicitur vel ratione suæ essentiæ vel ratione causæ. Rei enim alicujus existentia vel ex ipsius essentia et definitione vel ex data causa efficiente necessario sequitur. Deinde his etiam de causis res aliqua impossibilis dicitur; nimirum quia vel ipsius essentia seu definitio contradictionem involvit vel quia nulla causa externa datur ad talem rem producendam determinata.

SCHOLIUM 1: Since by this meridian light it is shown more clearly than anything that nothing is given in things absolutely for the sake of which they are called contingent, I now wish in a few words to explain what is to be understood by the contingent for us, but first what is meant by the necessary and the impossible. A thing is said to be necessary either by reason of its own essence or by reason of a cause. For the existence of a thing follows necessarily either from its very essence and definition or from a given efficient cause. Moreover, by reference to these causes a thing is said to be impossible; namely, either because its very essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause is given, determined to produce such a thing.

At res aliqua nulla alia de causa contingens dicitur nisi respectu defectus nostræ cognitionis. Res enim cujus essentiam contradictionem involvere ignoramus vel de qua probe scimus eandem nullam contradictionem involvere et tamen de ipsius existentia nihil certo affirmare possumus propterea quod ordo causarum nos latet, ea nunquam nec ut necessaria nec ut impossibilis videri nobis potest ideoque eandem vel contingentem vel possibilem vocamus.

But a thing is called contingent for no other reason than with respect to the defect of our cognition. For a thing whose essence we do not know to involve contradiction, or concerning which we know well that it involves no contradiction, and yet about whose existence we can affirm nothing with certainty because the order of causes is hidden from us, that thing can never appear to us either as necessary or as impossible; and therefore we call it either contingent or possible.

SCHOLIUM II: Ex præcedentibus clare sequitur res summa perfectione a Deo fuisse productas quandoquidem ex data perfectissima natura necessario secutæ sunt. Neque hoc Deum ullius arguit imperfectionis; ipsius enim perfectio hoc nos affirmare coegit. Imo ex hujus contrario clare sequeretur (ut modo ostendi) Deum non esse summe perfectum; nimirum quia si res alio modo fuissent productæ, Deo alia natura esset tribuenda, diversa ab ea quam ex consideratione Entis perfectissimi coacti sumus ei tribuere.

SCHOLIUM 2: From the foregoing it clearly follows that things were produced by God with highest perfection, since they necessarily followed from a most perfect nature given. Nor does this in any way charge God with imperfection; for his very perfection forced us to affirm this. Indeed, on the contrary it would clearly follow (as was just shown) that God would not be supremely perfect; namely, because if things had been produced otherwise, another nature would have to be ascribed to God, different from that which, from consideration of the Most Perfect Being, we are compelled to ascribe to him.

Verum non dubito quin multi hanc sententiam ut absurdam explodant nec animum ad eandem perpendendam instituere velint idque nulla alia de causa quam quia Deo aliam libertatem assueti sunt tribuere, longe diversam ab illa quæ a nobis (definitione 7) tradita est videlicet absolutam voluntatem. Verum neque etiam dubito si rem meditari vellent nostrarumque demonstrationum seriem recte secum perpendere, quin tandem talem libertatem qualem jam Deo tribuunt, non tantum ut nugatoriam sed ut magnum scientiæ obstaculum plane rejiciant. Nec opus est ut ea quæ in scholio propositionis 17 dicta sunt, hic repetam.

But I do not doubt that many will explode this opinion as absurd and will not wish to set their minds to weigh it, and for no other reason than because they are accustomed to attribute to God another liberty, far different from that which has been handed down by us (definition 7), namely absolute will. Nor do I doubt that if they wished to meditate on the matter and rightly ponder with themselves the series of our demonstrations, they would at last plainly reject the sort of liberty they now ascribe to God, not only as nugatory but as a great obstacle to knowledge. Nor is it necessary that I repeat here those things which are said in the scholium of proposition 17.

Attamen in eorum gratiam adhuc ostendam quod quamvis concedatur voluntatem ad Dei essentiam pertinere, ex ejus perfectione nihilominus sequatur res nullo alio potuisse modo neque ordine a Deo creari; quod facile erit ostendere si prius consideremus id quod ipsimet concedunt videlicet ex solo Dei decreto et voluntate pendere ut unaquæque res id quod est sit. Nam alias Deus omnium rerum causa non esset. Deinde quod omnia decreta ab æterno ab ipso Deo sancita fuerunt.

However, in their favor I will yet show that although it is conceded that the will pertains to God’s essence, from his perfection nevertheless it follows that nothing could have been created by God in any other way nor order; which will be easy to show if we first consider that which they themselves concede, namely that by God’s sole decree and will it depends that each thing be that which it is. For otherwise God would not be the cause of all things. And furthermore, that all decrees were sanctioned from eternity by God himself.

Nam alias imperfectionis et inconstantiæ argueretur. At cum in æterno non detur quando, ante nec post, hinc ex sola scilicet Dei perfectione sequitur Deum aliud decernere nunquam posse nec unquam potuisse sive Deum ante sua decreta non fuisse nec sine ipsis esse posse. At dicent quod quamvis supponeretur quod Deus aliam rerum naturam fecisset vel quod ab æterno aliud de natura ejusque ordine decrevisset, nulla inde in Deo sequeretur imperfectio.

For otherwise he would be charged with imperfection and inconstancy. But since in the eternal there is no when, neither before nor after, it follows from the sole perfection of God that God could never and in no way have decreed otherwise, nor that God was not before his decrees nor could be without them. Yet they will say that although it be supposed that God had made another nature of things or had from eternity decreed something else concerning their nature and order, no imperfection would thereupon follow in God.

Verum si hoc dicant, concedent simul Deum posse sua mutare decreta. Nam si Deus de natura ejusque ordine aliud quam decrevit decrevisset hoc est ut aliud de natura voluisset et concepisset, alium necessario quam jam habet intellectum et aliam quam jam habet voluntatem habuisset. Et si Deo alium intellectum aliamque voluntatem tribuere licet absque ulla ejus essentiæ ejusque perfectionis mutatione, quid causæ est cur jam non possit sua de rebus creatis decreta mutare et nihilominus æque perfectus manere?

But if they say this, they will at the same time concede that God can change his decrees. For if God concerning the nature and order of things had decreed other than he decreed — that is, had willed and conceived otherwise in respect of nature — he would necessarily have had an intellect other than he now has and a will other than he now has. And if it is permitted to attribute to God another intellect and another will without any change of his essence and of his perfection, what reason is there why he could not now change his decrees about created things and nevertheless remain equally perfect?

Ejus enim intellectus et voluntas circa res creatas et earum ordinem in respectu suæ essentiæ et perfectionis perinde est, quomodocunque concipiatur. Deinde omnes quos vidi philosophi concedunt nullum in Deo dari intellectum potentia sed tantum actu; cum autem et ejus intellectus et ejus voluntas ab ejusdem essentia non distinguantur ut etiam omnes concedunt, sequitur ergo hinc etiam quod si Deus alium intellectum actu habuisset et aliam voluntatem, ejus etiam essentia alia necessario esset ac proinde (ut a principio conclusi) si aliter res quam jam sunt, a Deo productæ essent, Dei intellectus ejusque voluntas hoc est (ut conceditur) ejus essentia alia esse deberet, quod est absurdum.

For his intellect and will concerning created things and their order are, in respect of his essence and perfection, the same, however they be conceived. Moreover all the philosophers whom I have seen concede that in God no intellect is given in potency but only in act; and since both his intellect and his will are not distinguished from the same essence, as all likewise concede, it follows therefore from this also that if God had another intellect in act and another will, his essence would necessarily also be other; and consequently (as concluded from the beginning) if things other than those now were produced by God, God’s intellect and his will—that is (as is conceded) his essence—would have to be other, which is absurd.

Cum itaque res nullo alio modo nec ordine a Deo produci potuerint et hoc verum esse ex summa Dei perfectione sequatur, nulla profecto sana ratio persuadere nobis potest ut credamus quod Deus noluerit omnia quæ in suo intellectu sunt, eadem illa perfectione qua ipsa intelligit, creare. At dicent in rebus nullam esse perfectionem neque imperfectionem sed id quod in ipsis est propter quod perfectæ sunt aut imperfectæ et bonæ aut malæ dicuntur, a Dei tantum voluntate pendere atque adeo si Deus voluisset, potuisset efficere ut id quod jam perfectio est, summa esset imperfectio et contra. Verum quid hoc aliud esset quam aperte affirmare quod Deus qui id quod vult necessario intelligit, sua voluntate efficere potest ut res alio modo quam intelligit, intelligat, quod (ut modo ostendi) magnum est absurdum.

Therefore, since things could not be produced by God in any other manner or order, and this follows from the highest perfection of God, no sound reason can certainly persuade us to believe that God would not will to create all the things that are in His intellect with that same perfection with which He Himself understands them. But they will say that in things there is no perfection nor imperfection, but that which is in them whereby they are called perfect or imperfect and good or bad depends only on the will of God, and therefore if God had willed, He could have brought it about that what is now perfection would be the utmost imperfection, and vice versa. Yet what would this be but to assert plainly that God, who necessarily understands what He wills, can by His will effect that things be otherwise than He understands them to be — which, as was just shown, is a great absurdity.

Quare argumentum in ipsos retorquere possum hoc modo. Omnia a Dei potestate pendent. Ut res itaque aliter se habere possint, Dei necessario voluntas aliter se habere etiam deberet; atqui Dei voluntas aliter se habere nequit (ut modo ex Dei perfectione evidentissime ostendimus). Ergo neque res aliter se habere possunt.

Therefore I can turn the argument back upon them in this way. All things depend upon the power of God. Hence, for things to be otherwise, the will of God would necessarily have to be otherwise as well; but the will of God cannot be otherwise (as we have just most clearly shown from God’s perfection). Therefore neither can things be otherwise.

Fateor hanc opinionem quæ omnia indifferenti cuidam Dei voluntati subjicit et ab ipsius beneplacito omnia pendere statuit, minus a vero aberrare quam illorum qui statuunt Deum omnia sub ratione boni agere. Nam hi aliquid extra Deum videntur ponere quod a Deo non dependet, ad quod Deus tanquam ad exemplar in operando attendit vel ad quod tanquam ad certum scopum collineat. Quod profecto nihil aliud est quam Deum fato subjicere, quo nihil de Deo absurdius statui potest, quem ostendimus tam omnium rerum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ primam et unicam liberam causam esse.

I confess that this opinion, which subjects all things as indifferent to a certain will of God and declares that everything hangs from his good-pleasure, errs less from the truth than those who maintain that God causes all things under the notion of the good. For these seem to posit something outside God which does not depend on God, to which God attends as to a model in operating, or toward which he aims as toward a certain end. Which indeed is nothing other than to subject God to fate, than which nothing more absurd can be asserted of God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause both of the essence of all things and of their existence.

Quare non est ut in hoc absurdo refutando tempus consumam.

Therefore it is not necessary that I spend time in refuting this absurdity.

PROPOSITIO XXXIV: Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia.

PROPOSITION 34: The power of God is his very essence.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex sola enim necessitate Dei essentiæ sequitur Deum esse causam sui (per propositionem 11) et (per propositionem 16 ejusque corollarium) omnium rerum. Ergo potentia Dei qua ipse et omnia sunt et agunt, est ipsa ipsius essentia. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: From the sole necessity of God’s essence it follows that God is the cause of himself (by proposition 11) and (by proposition 16 and its corollary) of all things. Therefore the power of God by which he and all things are and act, is itself his very essence. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXXV: Quicquid concipimus in Dei potestate esse, id necessario est.

PROPOSITIO 35: Whatever we conceive to be in God's power, that is necessary.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid enim in Dei potestate est, id (per propositionem præcedentem) in ejus essentia ita debet comprehendi ut ex ea necessario sequatur adeoque necessario est. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: For whatever is in God’s power, that (by the preceding proposition) must be so comprehended in his essence that it necessarily follows from it and is therefore necessary. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXXVI: Nihil existit ex cujus natura aliquis effectus non sequatur.

PROPOSITIO 36: Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid existit, Dei naturam sive essentiam certo et determinato modo exprimit (per corollarium propositionis 25) hoc est (per propositionem 34) quicquid existit, Dei potentiam quæ omnium rerum causa est, certo et determinato modo exprimit adeoque (per propositionem 16) ex eo aliquis effectus sequi debet. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: Whatever exists expresses God's nature or essence in a certain and determinate way (by the corollary of proposition 25); that is (by proposition 34) whatever exists expresses God's power, which is the cause of all things, in a certain and determinate way and therefore (by proposition 16) from it some effect must follow. Q.E.D.

APPENDIX: His Dei naturam ejusque proprietates explicui ut quod necessario existit; quod sit unicus; quod ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate sit et agat; quod sit omnium rerum causa libera et quomodo; quod omnia in Deo sint et ab ipso ita pendeant ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint; et denique quod omnia a Deo fuerint prædeterminata, non quidem ex libertate voluntatis sive absoluto beneplacito sed ex absoluta Dei natura sive infinita potentia. Porro ubicunque data fuit occasio, præjudicia quæ impedire poterant quominus meæ demonstrationes perciperentur, amovere curavi sed quia non pauca adhuc restant præjudicia quæ etiam imo maxime impedire poterant et possunt quominus homines rerum concatenationem eo quo ipsam explicui modo, amplecti possint, eadem hic ad examen rationis vocare operæ pretium duxi. Et quoniam omnia quæ hic indicare suscipio præjudicia pendent ab hoc uno quod scilicet communiter supponant homines omnes res naturales ut ipsos propter finem agere, imo ipsum Deum omnia ad certum aliquem finem dirigere pro certo statuant : dicunt enim Deum omnia propter hominem fecisse, hominem autem ut ipsum coleret.

APPENDIX: By these things I have explained the nature of God and its properties, namely that which necessarily exists; that he is unique; that he, from the sole necessity of his own nature, is and acts; that he is the free cause of all things and in what manner; that all things are in God and depend from him so that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally that all things have been predetermined by God, not indeed from the freedom of will or from absolute good-pleasure, but from the absolute nature of God or from infinite power. Moreover, wherever occasion was given I took care to remove prejudices which could prevent my demonstrations from being perceived, but because not a few prejudices still remain which indeed can and especially might hinder men from embracing the concatenation of things in the way I have explained it, I deemed it worthwhile to call those very prejudices here to an examination of reason. And since all the prejudices which I undertake to indicate here hang on this one point, namely that men commonly suppose all natural things to act for ends themselves, indeed even assert with certainty that God directs all things to some particular end: for they say that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship him.

Hoc igitur unum prius considerabo quærendo scilicet primo causam cur plerique hoc in præjudicio acquiescant et omnes natura adeo propensi sint ad idem amplectendum. Deinde ejusdem falsitatem ostendam et tandem quomodo ex hoc orta sint præjudicia de bono et malo, merito et peccato, laude et vituperio, ordine et confusione, pulchritudine et deformitate et de aliis hujus generis. Verum hæc ab humanæ mentis natura deducere non est hujus loci : satis hic erit si pro fundamento id capiam quod apud omnes debet esse in confesso nempe hoc quod omnes homines rerum causarum ignari nascuntur et quod omnes appetitum habent suum utile quærendi, cujus rei sunt conscii.

Therefore I will first consider this one thing, namely by seeking first the cause why most people acquiesce in this prejudice and why all by nature are so disposed to embrace the same. Next I will show its falsity and finally how from this arise the prejudices concerning good and evil, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and deformity, and other matters of that sort. But to deduce these from the nature of the human mind is not the place here: it will suffice for a foundation if I take that which ought to be confessed by all, namely that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things and that all have an appetite to seek their own useful good, of which they are conscious.

Ex his enim sequitur primo quod homines se liberos esse opinentur quandoquidem suarum volitionum suique appetitus sunt conscii et de causis a quibus disponuntur ad appetendum et volendum, quia earum sunt ignari nec per somnium cogitant. Sequitur secundo homines omnia propter finem agere videlicet propter utile quod appetunt; unde fit ut semper rerum peractarum causas finales tantum scire expetant et ubi ipsas audiverint, quiescant; nimirum quia nullam habent causam ulterius dubitandi. Sin autem easdem ex alio audire nequeant, nihil iis restat nisi ut ad semet se convertant et ad fines a quibus ipsi ad similia determinari solent, reflectant et sic ex suo ingenio ingenium alterius necessario judicant.

From these things therefore it follows first that men suppose themselves to be free, since they are conscious of their own volitions and of their own appetite and of the causes by which they are disposed to appetite and volition, because they are ignorant of those causes and do not think of them even in a dream. It follows secondly that men do all things for an end, namely for the useful which they desire; whence it comes about that they always desire to know only the final causes of completed things, and when they have heard those very causes they rest; for plainly they have no reason further to doubt. But if they cannot hear the same from another, nothing remains for them except to turn back to themselves and reflect upon the ends from which they themselves are wont to be determined to similar things, and thus from their own mind they necessarily judge the mind of another.

Porro cum in se et extra se non pauca reperiant media quæ ad suum utile assequendum non parum conducant ut exempli gratia oculos ad videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas et animantia ad alimentum, solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum pisces, hinc factum ut omnia naturalia tanquam ad suum utile media considerent et quia illa media ab ipsis inventa, non autem parata esse sciunt, hinc causam credendi habuerunt aliquem alium esse qui illa media in eorum usum paraverit. Nam postquam res ut media consideraverunt, credere non potuerunt easdem se ipsas fecisse sed ex mediis quæ sibi ipsi parare solent, concludere debuerunt dari aliquem vel aliquos naturæ rectores humana præditos libertate qui ipsis omnia curaverint et in eorum usum omnia fecerint. Atque horum etiam ingenium quandoquidem de eo nunquam quid audiverant, ex suo judicare debuerunt atque hinc statuerunt Deos omnia in hominum usum dirigere ut homines sibi devinciant et in summo ab iisdem honore habeantur; unde factum ut unusquisque diversos Deum colendi modos ex suo ingenio excogitaverit ut Deus eos supra reliquos diligeret et totam naturam in usum cæcæ illorum cupiditatis et insatiabilis avaritiæ dirigeret.

Moreover, when they found within themselves and outside themselves not a few means which contribute not a little to attaining their usefulness — for example eyes for seeing, teeth for masticating, herbs and animals for aliment, the sun for illuminating, the sea for nourishing fishes — it followed that they considered all natural things as means for their use; and because they knew those means to have been discovered by them, not prepared by themselves, they had reason to believe that some other had prepared those means for their use. For after they regarded things as means, they could not bring themselves to believe that the same had made them, but from the means which are wont to prepare things for themselves they were obliged to conclude that some one or some rulers of nature, endowed with human liberty, had been given who had cared for all things and had made all things for their use. And since they had never heard anything of the intellect of these beings, they were forced to judge from their own, and hence they decreed that the Gods direct all things for the use of mankind so that men might bind themselves to them and be held in highest honor by them; whence it came about that each person invented diverse modes of worshiping God from his own ingenuity, so that God would favor him above the rest and would direct the whole of nature to the use of their blind cupiditas and insatiable avarice.

Atque ita hoc præjudicium in superstitionem versum et altas in mentibus egit radices; quod in causa fuit ut unusquisque maximo conatu omnium rerum causas finales intelligere easque explicare studeret. Sed dum quæsiverunt ostendere naturam nihil frustra (hoc est quod in usum hominum non sit) agere, nihil aliud videntur ostendisse quam naturam Deosque æque ac homines delirare. Vide quæso quo res tandem evasit!

And thus this prejudice, having been turned into superstition, struck deep roots in minds; which was the cause that each one with the greatest industry strove to understand the final causes of all things and to expound them. But while they sought to show that nature does nothing in vain (that is, that it is not for the use of men), they seem to have shown nothing else than that nature and the gods, equally with men, rave. See, I pray you, to what a state things have at last come!

Inter tot naturæ commoda non pauca reperire debuerunt incommoda, tempestates scilicet, terræ motus, morbos etc. atque hæc statuerunt propterea evenire quod Dii irati essent ob injurias sibi ab hominibus factas sive ob peccata in suo cultu commissa et quamvis experientia indies reclamaret ac infinitis exemplis ostenderet commoda atque incommoda piis æque ac impiis promiscue evenire, non ideo ab inveterato præjudicio destiterunt : facilius enim iis fuit hoc inter alia incognita quorum usum ignorabant, ponere et sic præsentem suum et innatum statum ignorantiæ retinere quam totam illam fabricam destruere et novam excogitare. Unde pro certo statuerunt Deorum judicia humanum captum longissime superare : quæ sane unica fuisset causa ut veritas humanum genus in æternum lateret nisi mathesis, quæ non circa fines sed tantum circa figurarum essentias et proprietates versatur, aliam veritatis normam hominibus ostendisset et præter mathesin aliæ etiam adsignari possunt causæ (quas hic enumerare supervacaneum est) a quibus fieri potuit ut homines communia hæc præjudicia animadverterent et in veram rerum cognitionem ducerentur.

Among so many advantages of nature not a few inconveniences had to be found, namely storms, earthquakes, diseases, etc.; and they decided that these occurred because the gods were angry at injuries done to them by men or because of sins committed in their worship. And although experience daily protested and by countless examples showed that advantages and disadvantages befall the pious and the impious alike indiscriminately, they did not on that account desist from their long‑standing prejudice: for it was easier for them to assign this, among other unknowns whose use they did not understand, and so to retain their present and innate state of ignorance, than to destroy that whole fabric and devise a new one. Hence they firmly concluded that the judgments of the gods far surpass human judgement: which indeed would have been the sole cause that the truth hid itself from the human race forever, if mathesis — which deals not with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures — had not shown another standard of truth to men; and besides mathesis other causes (which it would be superfluous to enumerate here) may also be assigned by which it was possible that men perceived these common prejudices and were led into true knowledge of things.

His satis explicui id quod primo loco promisi. Ut jam autem ostendam naturam finem nullum sibi præfixum habere et omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta, non opus est multis. Credo enim id jam satis constare tam ex fundamentis et causis unde hoc præjudicium originem suam traxisse ostendi quam ex propositione 16 et corollariis propositionis 32 et præterea ex iis omnibus quibus ostendi omnia naturæ æterna quadam necessitate summaque perfectione procedere.

I have sufficiently explained that which I promised in the first place. But to show now that nature has no end preassigned to itself and that all final causes are nothing but human figments, not many words are needed. For I believe this is already sufficiently established both from the foundations and causes from which I showed this prejudice to have drawn its origin, and from proposition 16 and the corollaries of proposition 32, and moreover from all those things by which I demonstrated that all things of nature proceed by a certain eternal necessity and utmost perfection.

Hoc tamen adhuc addam nempe hanc de fine doctrinam naturam omnino evertere. Nam id quod revera causa est, ut effectum considerat et contra. Deinde id quod natura prius est, facit posterius.

Yet I will add this further, namely that this doctrine about the end altogether subverts nature. For that which truly is the cause considers the effect and the converse. Then that which by nature is prior makes that which is posterior.

Et denique id quod supremum et perfectissimum est, reddit imperfectissimum. Nam (duobus prioribus omissis quia per se manifesta sunt) ut ex propositionibus 21, 22 et 23 constat, ille effectus perfectissimus est qui a Deo immediate producitur et quo aliquid pluribus causis intermediis indiget ut producatur, eo imperfectius est. At si res quæ immediate a Deo productæ sunt, ea de causa factæ essent ut Deus finem assequeretur suum, tum necessario ultimæ quarum de causa priores factæ sunt, omnium præstantissimæ essent.

And finally that which is highest and most perfect renders the most imperfect. For (the two previous things omitted because they are manifest in themselves) as is clear from propositions 21, 22 and 23, that effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God and by which something needs fewer intermediate causes to be produced; the more it needs intermediate causes, the more imperfect it is. But if those things which are produced immediately by God were made for the reason that God might attain his end, then necessarily the ultimate ends for whose sake the earlier were made would be the most excellent of all.

Deinde hæc doctrina Dei perfectionem tollit nam si Deus propter finem agit, aliquid necessario appetit quo caret. Et quamvis theologi et metaphysici distinguant inter finem indigentiæ et finem assimilationis, fatentur tamen Deum omnia propter se, non vero propter res creandas egisse quia nihil ante creationem præter Deum assignare possunt propter quod Deus ageret adeoque necessario fateri coguntur Deum iis propter quæ media parare voluit, caruisse eaque cupivisse, ut per se clarum. Nec hic prætereundum est quod hujus doctrinæ sectatores qui in assignandis rerum finibus suum ingenium ostentare voluerunt, ad hanc suam doctrinam probandam novum attulerunt modum argumentandi reducendo scilicet non ad impossibile sed ad ignorantiam, quod ostendit nullum aliud fuisse huic doctrinæ argumentandi medium.

Then this doctrine removes the perfection of God, for if God acts because of an end, he necessarily desires something which he lacks. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between the end of indigence and the end of assimilation, yet they confess that God did all things for himself, not truly for created things, because they can assign nothing before creation except God for whose sake God would act; and accordingly they are necessarily forced to admit that God lacked and desired those things for which he wished to prepare means, which is clear in itself. Nor should it be passed over here that the followers of this doctrine, who wished to display their ingenuity in assigning the ends of things, have introduced a new method of arguing to prove this their doctrine, namely reducing not to the impossible but to ignorance, which shows that there was no other argumentative means for this doctrine.

Nam si exempli gratia ex culmine aliquo lapis in alicujus caput ceciderit eumque interfecerit, hoc modo demonstrabunt lapidem ad hominem interficiendum cecidisse. Ni enim eum in finem Deo id volente ceciderit, quomodo tot circumstantiæ (sæpe enim multæ simul concurrunt) casu concurrere potuerunt? Respondebis fortasse id ex eo quod ventus flavit et quod homo illac iter habebat, evenisse.

For if, for example, from some summit a stone fell upon someone's head and killed him, in this way they will demonstrate that the stone fell in order to kill the man. For if it did not fall to that end, God willing it, how could so many circumstances (for often many things concur at once) have been able to meet by chance? You will perhaps answer that it happened from the fact that the wind blew and that the man had that route to travel.

At instabunt, cur ventus illo tempore flavit? Cur homo illo eodemque tempore illac iter habebat? Si iterum respondeas ventum tum ortum quia mare præcedenti die tempore adhuc tranquillo agitari inceperat et quod homo ab amico invitatus fuerat, instabunt iterum quia nullus rogandi finis, cur autem mare agitabatur?

But they will press on: why did the wind blow at that time? Why did the man at that same time have that journey there? If you again answer that the wind then arose because the sea on the preceding day in a still tranquil time had begun to be agitated, and because the man had been invited by a friend, they will press again, for there is no end of questioning—why, however, was the sea agitated?

cur homo in illud tempus invitatus fuit? et sic porro causarum causas rogare non cessabunt donec ad Dei voluntatem hoc est ignorantiæ asylum confugeris. Sic etiam ubi corporis humani fabricam vident, stupescunt et ex eo quod tantæ artis causas ignorant, concludunt eandem non mechanica sed divina vel supernaturali arte fabricari talique modo constitui ut una pars alteram non lædat.

why was the man invited at that time? and thus furthermore they will not cease to ask the causes of causes until you take refuge in the will of God, that is, in the asylum of ignorance. Likewise, when they see the fabric of the human body, they stand amazed and from the fact that they are ignorant of the causes of so great an art, they conclude that the same was fashioned not by mechanical but by divine or supernatural art and arranged in such a way that one part does not injure the other.

Atque hinc fit ut qui miraculorum causas veras quærit quique res naturales ut doctus intelligere, non autem ut stultus admirari studet, passim pro hæretico et impio habeatur et proclametur ab iis quos vulgus tanquam naturæ Deorumque interpretes adorat. Nam sciunt quod sublata ignorantia stupor hoc est unicum argumentandi tuendæque suæ auctoritatis medium quod habent, tollitur. Sed hæc relinquo et ad id quod tertio loco hic agere constitui, pergo.

And from this it happens that he who seeks the true causes of miracles and who wishes to understand natural things as a learned man, not to admire them like a fool, is everywhere held and proclaimed a heretic and impious by those whom the mob worships as interpreters of nature and of the gods. For they know that, once ignorance is removed, stupor — that is, the sole means they have of arguing and of defending their authority — is taken away. But I leave these matters and proceed to that which I have determined to treat in the third place here; I go on.

Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt omnia quæ fiunt propter ipsos fieri, id in unaquaque re præcipuum judicare debuerunt quod ipsis utilissimum et illa omnia præstantissima æstimare a quibus optime afficiebantur. Unde has formare debuerunt notiones quibus rerum naturas explicarent scilicet bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem et deformitatem et quia se liberos existimant, inde hæ notiones ortæ sunt scilicet laus et vituperium, peccatum et meritum sed has infra postquam de natura humana egero, illas autem hic breviter explicabo. Nempe id omne quod ad valetudinem et Dei cultum conducit, bonum, quod autem iis contrarium est, malum vocaverunt.

After men persuaded themselves that all things which are done happen for their own sakes, they ought in every matter to have judged that which was most useful to themselves, and to esteem as most excellent all those things by which they were best affected. Whence they ought to have formed the notions by which to explain the natures of things, namely: good, evil, order, confusion, hot, cold, beauty and deformity; and because they deem themselves free, from that these notions arose, namely praise and blame, sin and merit — but I will treat these later, when I discuss human nature, and will explain the former briefly here. For indeed all that which conduces to health and to the worship of God they called good, and what is contrary to these they called evil.

Et quia ii qui rerum naturam non intelligunt sed res tantummodo imaginantur, nihil de rebus affirmant et imaginationem pro intellectu capiunt, ideo ordinem in rebus esse firmiter credunt rerum suæque naturæ ignari. Nam cum ita sint dispositæ ut cum nobis per sensus repræsentantur, eas facile imaginari et consequenter earum facile recordari possimus, easdem bene ordinatas, si vero contra, ipsas male ordinatas sive confusas esse dicimus. Et quoniam ea nobis præ cæteris grata sunt quæ facile imaginari possumus, ideo homines ordinem confusioni præferunt quasi ordo aliquid in natura præter respectum ad nostram imaginationem esset; dicuntque Deum omnia ordine creasse et hoc modo ipsi nescientes Deo imaginationem tribuunt nisi velint forte Deum humanæ imaginationi providentem res omnes eo disposuisse modo quo ipsas facillime imaginari possent; nec moram forsan iis injiciet quod infinita reperiantur quæ nostram imaginationem longe superant et plurima quæ ipsam propter ejus imbecillitatem confundunt.

And because those who do not understand the nature of things but only imagine things assert nothing about realities and take imagination for intellect, therefore, ignorant of the natures of things and of their own nature, they firmly believe that there is order in things. For since they are so disposed that, when things are represented to us through the senses, we can easily imagine them and consequently can easily recall them, we call those same things well ordered; if contrariwise, we say that they themselves are badly ordered or confused. And because those things are to us above others pleasing which we can easily imagine, therefore men prefer order to confusion, as if order were something in nature apart from regard to our imagination; and they say that God created all things in order, and in this way, unknowingly themselves, they attribute imagination to God, unless perhaps they suppose that God, provident toward human imagination, disposed all things in that manner by which they could most easily be imagined; nor will it perhaps delay them that infinites are found which far surpass our imagination and very many things which confound it on account of its weakness.

Sed de hac re satis. Cæteræ deinde notiones etiam præter imaginandi modos quibus imaginatio diversimode afficitur, nihil sunt et tamen ab ignaris tanquam præcipua rerum attributa considerantur quia ut jam diximus, res omnes propter ipsos factas esse credunt et rei alicujus naturam bonam vel malam, sanam vel putridam et corruptam dicunt prout ab eadem afficiuntur. Exempli gratia si motus quem nervi ab objectis per oculos repræsentatis accipiunt, valetudini conducat, objecta a quibus causatur pulchra dicuntur, quæ autem contrarium motum cient, deformia.

But enough of this matter. The other notions, moreover, apart from the modes of imagining by which the imagination is variously affected, are nothing, and yet by the ignorant are considered as principal attributes of things, because, as we have already said, they believe all things to be made for themselves and call the nature of any thing good or bad, healthy or putrid and corrupt, according as they are affected by it. For example, if the motion which the nerves receive from objects represented through the eyes contributes to health, the objects by which it is caused are called beautiful, whereas those that produce the contrary motion are called deformed (ugly).

Quæ deinde per nares sensum movent, odorifera vel fætida vocant, quæ per linguam, dulcia aut amara, sapida aut insipida etc. Quæ autem per tactum, dura aut mollia, aspera aut lævia etc. Et quæ denique aures movent, strepitum, sonum vel harmoniam edere dicuntur quorum postremum homines adeo dementavit ut Deum etiam harmonia delectari crederent.

Those things which then move the sense through the nostrils they call odoriferous or fetid, those through the tongue, sweet or bitter, sapid or insipid, etc. Those however through touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc. And those finally which move the ears are said to emit noise, sound, or harmony, the last of which has so demented men that they believed God to be even delighted by harmony.

Nec desunt philosophi qui sibi persuaserint motus cælestes harmoniam componere. Quæ omnia satis ostendunt unumquemque pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicasse vel potius imaginationis affectiones pro rebus accepisse. Quare non mirum est (ut hoc etiam obiter notemus) quod inter homines tot quot experimur, controversiæ ortæ sint ex quibus tandem scepticismus.

Nor are there wanting philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the celestial motions compose a harmony. All these things sufficiently show that each one has judged matters according to the disposition of the brain, or rather has taken the affections of the imagination for the things themselves. Wherefore it is not marvelous (as we also note this in passing) that among as many men as we encounter controversies have arisen, out of which at length scepticism.

Nam quamvis humana corpora in multis conveniant, in plurimis tamen discrepant et ideo id quod uni bonum, alteri malum videtur; quod uni ordinatum, alteri confusum; quod uni gratum, alteri ingratum est et sic de cæteris quibus hic supersedeo cum quia hujus loci non est de his ex professo agere, tum quia hoc omnes satis experti sunt. Omnibus enim in ore est "quot capita tot sensus", "suo quemque sensu abundare", "non minora cerebrorum quam palatorum esse discrimina" : quæ sententiæ satis ostendunt homines pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicare resque potius imaginari quam intelligere. Res enim si intellexissent, illæ omnes teste mathesi, si non allicerent, ad minimum convincerent.

For although human bodies agree in many things, yet in very many they differ, and therefore that which is a good to one seems an evil to another; that which is ordered for one, confused for another; that which is pleasing to one, displeasing to another — and so likewise as to the rest, on which I here desist, both because this place is not for treating them formally and because all have had sufficient experience of them. For on every tongue are the sayings "quot capita tot sensus", "suo quemque sensu abundare", "non minora cerebrorum quam palatorum esse discrimina": which maxims sufficiently show that men, from the disposition of the brain, judge things or rather take the affections of the imagination for the things themselves. For if they had understood the things, all those, mathesis being witness, if they did not allure, would at least convict.

Videmus itaque omnes notiones quibus vulgus solet naturam explicare, modos esse tantummodo imaginandi nec ullius rei naturam sed tantum imaginationis constitutionem indicare et quia nomina habent, quasi essent entium extra imaginationem existentium, eadem entia non rationis sed imaginationis voco atque adeo omnia argumenta quæ contra nos ex similibus notionibus petuntur, facile propulsari possunt. Solent enim multi sic argumentari. Si omnia ex necessitate perfectissimæ Dei naturæ sunt consecuta, unde ergo tot imperfectiones in natura ortæ? Videlicet rerum corruptio ad fætorem usque, rerum deformitas quæ nauseam moveat, confusio, malum, peccatum etc.

We see therefore that all the notions by which the vulgar is wont to explain nature are only modes of imagining and indicate not the nature of any thing but only the constitution of imagination; and because they have names, as if they were entia existing outside imagination, I call those same entia not of reason but of imagination, and accordingly all the arguments which are urged against us from similar notions can be easily repelled. For many are wont to argue thus. If all things have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, whence then have so many imperfections arisen in nature? namely the corruption of things even to fetor, the deformity of things which excites nausea, confusion, evil, sin, etc.

Sed ut modo dixi, facile confutantur. Nam rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura et potentia est æstimanda nec ideo res magis aut minus perfectæ sunt propterea quod hominum sensum delectant vel offendunt, quod humanæ naturæ conducunt vel quod eidem repugnant. Iis autem qui quærunt cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur?

But as I have just said, they are easily refuted. For the perfection of things is to be estimated from their sole nature and power, and things are not therefore more or less perfect because they delight or offend the senses of men, because they conduce to human nature, or because they are repugnant to it. To those, however, who ask why God did not create all men so that they would be governed by the sole guidance of reason?

nihil aliud respondeo quam quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum creanda vel magis proprie loquendo quia ipsius naturæ leges adeo amplæ fuerunt ut sufficerent ad omnia quæ ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt producenda, ut propositione 16 demonstravi.

I answer nothing else than that he did not lack the matter to create all things from the highest, to be sure, down to the lowest degree of perfection, or, more properly speaking, that the laws of his very nature were so ample that they sufficed for all things which can be conceived by some infinite intellect to be produced, as I demonstrated in proposition 16.

Hæc sunt quæ hic notare suscepi præjudicia. Si quædam hujus farinæ adhuc restant, poterunt eadem ab unoquoque mediocri meditatione emendari.

These are the prejudices which I have here undertaken to note. If certain portions of this flour still remain, the same may be amended by each and every moderate meditation.

Finis partis primæ.

End of the first part.