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Dig. 8.4.0. Communia praediorum tam urbanorum quam rusticorum.
8.3.0. On the servitudes of rural estates.
Dig. 8.4.0. Common matters of estates both urban and rural.
Servitutes ipso quidem iure neque ex tempore neque ad tempus neque sub condicione neque ad certam condicionem ( verbi gratia " quamdiu volam") constitui possunt: sed tamen si haec adiciantur, pacti vel per doli exceptionem occurretur contra placita servitutem vindicanti: idque et sabinum respondisse cassius rettulit et sibi placere.
Servitudes, indeed by the law itself, can be constituted neither from a time nor for a time nor under a condition nor with reference to a definite condition ( for example " so long as I wish"): but nevertheless, if these are added, it will be met by pact or by the exception of fraud against one vindicating a servitude contrary to the agreements: and Cassius reported that Sabinus had also given this response, and that it pleased himself.
Si cui simplicius via per fundum cuiuspiam cedatur vel relinquatur, in infinito, videlicet per quamlibet eius partem, ire agere licebit, civiliter modo: nam quaedam in sermone tacite excipiuntur. non enim per villam ipsam nec per medias vineas ire agere sinendus est, cum id aeque commode per alteram partem facere possit minore servientis fundi detrimento. verum constitit, ut qua primum viam direxisset, ea demum ire agere deberet nec amplius mutandae eius potestatem haberet: sicuti sabino quoque videbatur, qui argumento rivi utebatur, quem primo qualibet ducere licuisset, posteaquam ductus esset, transferre non liceret: quod et in via servandum esse verum est.
If to someone a right of way over another’s fundus be ceded or left more simply, “in the unlimited,” that is, through any part of it, it will be permitted to go or to drive, provided it be done civilly; for certain things are tacitly excepted in our manner of speaking. For he must not be allowed to go or drive through the villa itself nor through the middle of the vineyards, since he can do this just as conveniently by another part, with less detriment to the servient fundus. But it has been established that, along the line where he first directed the way, along that thereafter he must go and drive, and he would no longer have the power of changing it: just as it also seemed to Sabinus, who used the argument from a rivus (channel/stream), which at first it would have been permitted to lead wherever one wished, but after it had been led, it would not be permitted to transfer it; and this is truly to be observed also in the case of a way.
Pro parte dominii servitutem adquiri non posse volgo traditur: et ideo si quis fundum habens viam stipuletur et partem fundi sui postea alienet, corrumpit stipulationem in eum casum deducendo, a quo stipulatio incipere non possit. pro parte quoque neque legari neque adimi via potest et, si id factum est, neque legatum neque ademptio valet.
It is commonly handed down that a servitude cannot be acquired for a fractional share of ownership; and therefore, if someone who has an estate stipulates for a right of way and afterwards alienates a part of his estate, he vitiates the stipulation by bringing it into a case from which a stipulation cannot begin. Likewise, a right of way can neither be bequeathed nor taken away pro parte; and, if that has been done, neither the legacy nor the ademption is valid.
Si tam angusti loci demonstratione facta via concessa fuerit, ut neque vehiculum neque iumentum ea inire possit, iter magis quam via aut actus adquisitus videbitur: sed si iumentum ea duci poterit, non etiam vehiculum, actus videbitur adquisitus.
If, with a demonstration of so narrow a place having been made, a via has been granted such that neither a vehicle nor a jument (beast of burden) can enter upon it, an iter rather than a via or an actus will be deemed to have been acquired; but if a jument can be led there, though not also a vehicle, an actus will be deemed to have been acquired.
Servitutes praediorum rusticorum etiamsi corporibus accedunt, incorporales tamen sunt et ideo usu non capiuntur: vel ideo, quia tales sunt servitutes, ut non habeant certam continuamque possessionem: nemo enim tam perpetuo, tam continenter ire potest, ut nullo momento possessio eius interpellari videatur. idem et in servitutibus praediorum urbanorum observatur.
Servitudes of rural praedia, although they accede to corporeal things, are nevertheless incorporeal and therefore are not acquired by usucapion: or for this reason, because such are the servitudes that they do not have a definite and continuous possession; for no one can go so perpetually and so continuously that at no moment does his possession seem to be interrupted. The same is observed also in the servitudes of urban praedia.
Publico loco interveniente vel via publica haustus servitus imponi potest, aquae ductus non potest: a principe autem peti solet, ut per viam publicam aquam ducere sine incommodo publico liceat. sacri et religiosi loci interventus etiam itineris servitutem impedit, cum servitus per ea loca nulli deberi potest.
With a public place intervening or a public road, a servitude of drawing (water) can be imposed; a leading of water (aqueduct) cannot. It is, however, customary to petition the emperor that it be permitted to conduct water along a public road without public inconvenience. The intervention of sacred and religious places likewise impedes even a servitude of way, since a servitude can be owed to no one over those places.
Quotiens nec hominum nec praediorum servitutes sunt, quia nihil vicinorum interest, non valet, veluti ne per fundum tuum eas aut ibi consistas: et ideo si mihi concedas ius tibi non esse fundo tuo uti frui, nihil agitur: aliter atque si concedas mihi ius tibi non esse in fundo tuo aquam quaerere minuendae aquae meae gratia.
Whenever there are neither personal nor praedial servitudes, because nothing concerns the neighbors, it is not valid—for example, that you not go through your own estate or stand there; and therefore, if you concede to me that you do not have the right to use and enjoy your own estate, nothing is effected; it is otherwise than if you concede to me that you do not have the right on your estate to seek water for the sake of diminishing my water.
Viae itineris actus aquae ductus pars in obligationem deduci non potest, quia usus eorum indivisus est: et ideo si stipulator decesserit pluribus heredibus relictis, singuli solidam viam petunt: et si promissor decesserit pluribus heredibus relictis, a singulis heredibus solida petitio est.
A part of a way, of a path, of a drive, or of an aqueduct cannot be brought into an obligation, because their use is indivisible: and therefore, if the stipulator has died leaving several heirs, each individually demands the entire way; and if the promisor has died leaving several heirs, from each heir there is a solidary claim for the whole.
Ei fundo, quem quis vendat, servitutem imponi, et si non utilis sit, posse existimo: veluti si aquam alicui dedere ducere non expediret, nihilo minus constitui ea servitus possit: quaedam enim debere habere possumus, quamvis ea nobis utilia non sunt.
I consider that a servitude can be imposed upon that estate which someone sells, even if it is not useful; for example, if it would not be expedient to grant someone the right to lead water, nonetheless that servitude can be constituted: for we can have certain things to be owed, although they are not useful to us.
Quotiens via aut aliquid ius fundi emeretur, cavendum putat esse labeo per te non fieri, quo minus eo iure uti possit, quia nulla eiusmodi iuris vacua traditio esset. ego puto usum eius iuris pro traditione possessionis accipiendum esse ideoque et interdicta veluti possessoria constituta sunt.
Whenever a right of way or some other right over a landed estate is purchased, Labeo thinks one must provide that it not be through your act that he is hindered from using that right, since there is no bare delivery of a right of this sort. I, for my part, think that the exercise of that right should be accepted in place of delivery (traditio) of possession; and therefore interdicts, as it were possessory, have been established.
Si intercedat solum publicum vel via publica, neque itineris actusve neque altius tollendi servitutes impedit: sed immittendi protegendi prohibendi, item fluminum et stillicidiorum servitutem impedit, quia caelum, quod supra id solum intercedit, liberum esse debet.
If public ground or a public road intervenes, it does not impede the servitudes of way or of driving, nor the servitude of raising higher; but it does impede the servitudes of immission, of protection, of prohibition, likewise the servitude of streams and of drip-fall, because the sky (airspace), which intervenes above that ground, ought to be free.
Urbanorum praediorum iura talia sunt: altius tollendi et officiendi luminibus vicini aut non extollendi: item stillicidium avertendi in tectum vel aream vicini aut non avertendi: item immittendi tigna in parietem vicini et denique proiciendi protegendive ceteraque istis similia.
The rights of urban properties are such: of raising higher and of obstructing the neighbor’s lights, or of not raising; likewise, of diverting the rain-drip onto the neighbor’s roof or courtyard, or of not diverting; likewise, of inserting beams into the neighbor’s wall, and finally of projecting or of covering, and other things similar to these.
Luminum in servitute constituta id adquisitum videtur, ut vicinus lumina nostra excipiat: cum autem servitus imponitur, ne luminibus officiatur, hoc maxime adepti videmur, ne ius sit vicino invitis nobis altius aedificare atque ita minuere lumina nostrorum aedificiorum.
With a servitude of lights having been established, it is considered that this has been acquired: that the neighbor receive our lights; but when a servitude is imposed that there be no interference with the lights, we seem especially to have obtained this: that the neighbor have no right, against our will, to build higher and thus diminish the lights of our buildings.
Invitum autem in servitutibus accipere debemus non eum qui contra dicit, sed eum qui non consentit. ideo pomponius libro quadragensimo et infantem et furiosum invitos recte dici ait: non enim ad factum, sed ad ius servitutis haec verba referuntur.
Moreover, in servitudes we ought to understand “unwilling” not as one who speaks against, but as one who does not consent. Therefore Pomponius in the fortieth book says that both an infant and an insane person are rightly said to be unwilling: for these words are referred not to the deed, but to the right of the servitude.
Haec autem iura similiter ut rusticorum quoque praediorum certo tempore non utendo pereunt: nisi quod haec dissimilitudo est, quod non omnimodo pereunt non utendo, sed ita, si vicinus simul libertatem usucapiat. veluti si aedes tuae aedibus meis serviant, ne altius tollantur, ne luminibus mearum aedium officiatur, et ego per statutum tempus fenestras meas praefixas habuero vel obstruxero, ita demum ius meum amitto, si tu per hoc tempus aedes tuas altius sublatas habueris: alioquin si nihil novi feceris, retineo servitutem. item si tigni immissi aedes tuae servitutem debent et ego exemero tignum, ita demum amitto ius meum, si tu foramen, unde exemptum est tignum, obturaveris et per constitutum tempus ita habueris: alioquin si nihil novi feceris, integrum ius suum permanet.
However, these rights, similarly as also those of rustic estates, perish by not using them for a certain time: except that this dissimilarity exists, that they do not in every way perish by non-use, but only thus, if the neighbor at the same time should usucapt the freedom. For example, if your house is servient to my house, that it not be raised higher, lest the lights of my house be obstructed, and I during the appointed time have had my windows fastened shut or blocked up, only then do I lose my right, if during this time you have had your house raised higher: otherwise, if you have done nothing new, I retain the servitude. Likewise, if your house owes a servitude of an inserted beam and I have removed the beam, only then do I lose my right, if you have stopped up the hole whence the beam was taken out and have kept it so for the set time: otherwise, if you have done nothing new, my right remains entire.
Quod autem aedificio meo me posse consequi, ut libertatem usucaperem, dicitur, idem me non consecuturum, si arborem eodem loco sitam habuissem, mucius ait, et recte, quia non ita in suo statu et loco maneret arbor quemadmodum paries, propter motum naturalem arboris.
But as for the statement that, through my building, I can achieve that I usucap liberty, the same I would not achieve if I had had a tree set in the same place, Mucius says, and rightly, because a tree would not remain in its own condition and place in the way a wall does, on account of the natural motion of the tree.
Gaurus Marcello: binas aedes habeo, alteras tibi lego, heres aedes alteras altius tollit et luminibus tuis officit: quid cum illo agere potes? et an interesse putes, suas aedes altius tollat an hereditarias? et de illo quaero, an per alienas aedes accessum heres ad eam rem quae legatur praestare debet, sicut solet quaeri, cum usus fructus loci legatus est, ad quem locum accedi nisi per alienum non potest.
Gaurus to Marcellus: I have two houses; I bequeath one to you; the heir raises the other houses higher and obstructs your lights: what action can you bring against him? And do you think it makes a difference whether he raises his own houses higher or the inherited ones? And I ask this besides, whether the heir must provide access through another’s houses to the thing that is bequeathed, as it is wont to be asked when the usufruct of a place has been bequeathed, to which place access cannot be had except through another’s property.
Marcellus answered: one who had two houses, if he bequeathed one, there is no doubt that the heir can, by raising the other higher, obscure the light of the bequeathed house; the same is to be said if he has bequeathed to one person the house, and to another the usufruct of the other. However, the argument from a right of way is not always similar, because without access there is no legacy of usufruct, whereas one can dwell even with the house’s light obscured. Moreover, when the usufruct of a place is bequeathed, access also must be given, because when a right of drawing water is left, a path as well is furnished for drawing it.
Quidam hiberus nomine, qui habet post horrea mea insulam, balnearia fecit secundum parietem communem: non licet autem tubulos habere admotos ad parietem communem, sicuti ne parietem quidem suum per parietem communem: de tubulis eo amplius hoc iuris est, quod per eos flamma torretur paries: qua de re volo cum hibero loquaris, ne rem illicitam faciat. proculus respondit: nec hiberum pro ea re dubitare puto, quod rem non permissam facit tubulos secundum communem parietem extruendo.
A certain Iberian by nation, who has a tenement behind my granaries, has made baths along the party wall: it is not permitted, however, to have tubules (flue-tiles) set against a party wall, just as it is not permitted to carry even one’s own wall through a party wall; moreover, concerning the tubules there is this further rule of law, that through them the wall is scorched by flame: on which account I wish you to speak with the Iberian, so that he not do an illicit thing. Proculus answered: nor do I think the Iberian is in doubt on this account, since by erecting tubules along the party wall he is doing a thing not permitted.
Parietem communem incrustare licet secundum capitonis senteniam, sicut licet mihi pretiosissimas picturas habere in pariete communi: ceterum is demolitus sit vicinus et ex stipulatu actione damni infecti agatur, non pluris quam vulgaria tectoria aestimari debent: quod observari et in incrustatione oportet.
It is permitted to incrust a common wall according to Capito’s opinion, just as it is permitted for me to have most precious paintings on a common wall; but if the neighbor has demolished it and suit is brought ex stipulatu by the action for damnum infectum, they ought not to be valued at more than ordinary plasterwork: which ought to be observed also in the case of incrustation.
Inter servitutes ne luminibus officiatur et ne prospectui offendatur aliud et aliud observatur: quod in prospectu plus quis habet, ne quid ei officiatur ad gratiorem prospectum et liberum, in luminibus autem, non officiere ne lumina cuiusquam obscuriosa fiant. quodcumque igitur faciat ad luminis impedimentum, prohiberi potest, si servitus debeatur, opusque ei novum nuntiari potest, si modo sic faciat, ut lumini noceat.
Among the servitudes “that lights be not obstructed” and “that the prospect be not offended,” different rules are observed: for in respect of a prospect one has more, namely that nothing be done to hinder a more pleasing and free prospect; but as to lights, the rule is not to obstruct, lest anyone’s lights become obscured. Therefore whatever someone does toward an impediment of light can be prohibited, if the servitude is owed, and a “new work” can be announced to him, provided only that he acts in such a way as to harm the light.
Si arborem ponat, ut lumini officiat, aeque dicendum erit contra impositam servitutem eum facere: nam et arbor efficit, quo minus caeli videri possit. si tamen id quod ponitur lumen quidem nihil impediat, solem autem auferat, si quidem eo loci, quo gratum erat eum non esse, potest dici nihil contra servitutem facere: sin vero heliocamino vel solario, dicendum erit, quia umbram facit in loco, cui sol fuit necessarius, contra servitutem impositam fieri.
If he plants a tree so as to obstruct the light, it will equally have to be said that he acts against the servitude imposed: for a tree also brings it about that the sky cannot be seen. If, however, the thing put in place does not impede the light at all, but takes away the sun—if indeed in that location it was welcome for the sun not to be—it can be said that he does nothing against the servitude; but if, however, it concerns a heliocaminus or a solarium, it must be said that, because he casts shade in a place where the sun was necessary, it is done against the servitude imposed.
Haec lex traditionis " stillicidia uti nunc sunt, ut ita sint" hoc significat impositam vicinis necessitatem stillicidiorum excipiendorum, non illud, ut etiam emptor stillicidia suscipiat aedificiorum vicinorum: hoc igitur pollicetur venditor sibi quidem stillicidiorum servitutem deberi, se autem nulli debere.
This term of transfer, "stillicidia uti nunc sunt, ut ita sint," signifies this: that a necessity is imposed on the neighbors to receive the eaves-drips, not that the purchaser also should take on the drips of neighboring buildings. Therefore the seller promises this: that a servitude of eaves-drip is owed to himself indeed, but that he owes it to no one.
Fistulam iunctam parieti communi, quae aut ex castello aut ex caelo aquam capit, non iure haberi proculus ait: sed non posse prohiberi vicinum, quo minus balineum habeat secundum parietem communem, quamvis umorem capiat paries: non magis quam si vel in triclinio suo vel in cubiculo aquam effunderet. sed neratius ait, si talis sit usus tepidarii, ut adsiduum umorem habeat et id noceat vicino, posse prohiberi eum.
A pipe joined to the common wall, which takes in water either from a reservoir or from the sky, Proculus says is not considered lawful: but a neighbor cannot be prohibited from having a bath alongside the common wall, although the wall takes on moisture—no more than if he were to pour out water either in his dining room or in his bedroom. But Neratius says that, if the use of the tepidarium is such that it has constant moisture and this harms the neighbor, he can be prohibited.
Servitutes, quae in superficie consistunt, possessione retinentur. nam si forte ex aedibus meis in aedes tuas tignum immissum habuero, hoc, ut immissum habeam, per causam tigni possideo habendi consuetudinem. idem eveniet et si menianum in tuum immissum habuero aut stillicidium in tuum proiecero, quia in tuo aliquid utor et si quasi facto quodam possideo.
Servitudes which consist upon the surface are retained by possession. For if by chance I have a beam let in from my house into your house, this—that I may have it let in—I possess, by reason of the beam, the custom of having it. The same will occur also if I have a balcony let into yours, or if I have cast an eaves-drip upon your property, because I use something in what is yours, and I possess, as it were, by a certain act.
Si domo mea altior area tua esset tuque mihi per aream tuam in domum meam ire agere cessisti nec ex plano aditus ad domum meam per aream tuam esset, vel gradus vel clivos propius ianuam meam iure facere possum, dum ne quid ultra quam quod necesse esset itineris causa demoliar.
If your area were higher than my house, and you had ceded to me to go and to drive through your area into my house, and there were no level access to my house through your area, I can by right make either steps or a slope nearer to my door, provided that I demolish nothing beyond what would be necessary for the purpose of the way.
Si sublatum sit aedificium, ex quo stillicidium cadit, ut eadem specie et qualitate reponatur, utilitas exigit, ut idem intellegatur: nam alioquin si quid strictius interpretetur, aliud est quod sequenti loco ponitur: et ideo sublato aedificio usus fructus interit, quamvis area pars est aedificii.
If the building from which the eaves-drip falls has been removed, utility requires that “the same” be understood, so that it may be replaced with the same appearance and quality: for otherwise, if one interprets more strictly, what is set forth in the following place is something different; and therefore, with the building removed the usufruct perishes, although the site (area) is a part of the building.
Stillicidium quoquo modo adquisitum sit, altius tolli potest: levior enim fit eo facto servitus, cum quod ex alto, cadet lenius et interdum direptum nec perveniat ad locum servientem: inferius demitti non potest, quia fit gravior servitus, id est pro stillicidio flumen. eadem causa retro duci potest stillicidium, quia in nostro magis incipiet cadere, produci non potest, ne alio loco cadat stillicidium, quam in quo posita servitus est: lenius facere poterimus, acrius non. et omnino sciendum est meliorem vicini condicionem fieri posse, deteriorem non posse, nisi aliquid nominatim servitute imponenda immutatum fuerit.
By whatever manner a drip (stillicidium) has been acquired, it can be raised higher: for by that act the servitude becomes lighter, since what falls from a height will fall more gently and sometimes, being dispersed, will not reach the servient place. It cannot be lowered, because the servitude becomes heavier—namely, instead of a drip, a stream. For the same reason the drip can be drawn back, because it will begin to fall more upon our own property; it cannot be projected forward, lest the drip fall in a place other than that in which the servitude has been established. We will be able to make it gentler, not harsher. And in general it must be known that the neighbor’s condition can be made better, but cannot be made worse, unless something has been expressly altered by the imposition of a servitude.
Si domus tua aedificiis meis utramque servitutem deberet, ne altius tolleretur et ut stillicidium aedificiorum meorum recipere deberet, et tibi concessero ius esse invito me altius tollere aedificia tua, quod ad stillicidium meum attinet, sic statui debebit, ut, si altius sublatis aedificiis tuis stillicidia mea cadere in ea non possint, ea ratione altius tibi aedificare non liceat: si non impediantur stillicidia mea, liceat tibi altius tollere.
If your house should owe to my buildings both servitudes, that it not be raised higher and that it must receive the eaves-drip (stillicidium) from my buildings, and I have conceded to you the right, even with me unwilling, to raise your buildings higher, as far as my eaves-drip is concerned, it ought to be thus determined: that, if, with your buildings raised higher, my eaves-drips cannot fall upon them, for that reason it is not permitted for you to build higher; if my eaves-drips are not impeded, it is permitted for you to raise them higher.
Si servitus imposita fuerit " lumina quae nunc sunt, ut ita sint", de futuris luminibus nihil caveri videtur: quod si ita sit cautum " ne luminibus officiatur", ambigua est scriptura, utrum ne his luminibus officiatur quae nunc sint, an etiam his quae postea quoque fuerint: et humanius est verbo generali omne lumen significari, sive quod in praesenti sive quod post tempus conventionis contigerit.
If a servitude has been imposed " the lights which now are, that they be thus," nothing seems to be provided concerning future lights: but if it has been stipulated thus " that there be no interference with the lights," the wording is ambiguous, whether it is that there be no interference with those lights which now exist, or also with those which shall later likewise exist: and it is more equitable that by a general term every light be meant, whether that which is present or that which occurs after the time of the agreement.
Si ex tribus aedibus in loco inpari positis aedes mediae superioribus serviant aedibus, inferiores autem nulli serviant, et paries communis, qui sit inter aedes inferiores et medias, altius a domino inferiorum aedium sublatus sit, iure eum altius habiturum sabinus ait.
If, out of three houses set on uneven ground, the middle house serves the upper house in servitude, but the lower house serves none; and the common party-wall, which is between the lower and the middle house, has been raised higher by the owner of the lower house, Sabinus says that by right he will have it higher.
In re communi nemo dominorum iure servitutis neque facere quicquam invito altero potest neque prohibere, quo minus alter faciat ( nulli enim res sua servit): itaque propter immensas contentiones plerumque res ad divisionem pervenit. sed per communi dividundo actionem consequitur socius, quo minus opus fiat aut ut id opus quod fecit tollat, si modo toti societati prodest opus tolli.
In a common thing none of the owners can, by right of servitude, either do anything against the other’s will or forbid the other from doing it ( for one’s own thing serves no one): and so, on account of immense contentions, the matter for the most part comes to division. But by the action for dividing common property a partner obtains either that the work not be done, or that he remove the work which he has done, provided only that it benefits the whole partnership for the work to be removed.
Sed si inter te et me communes sunt titianae aedes et ex his aliquid non iure in alias aedes meas proprias immissum sit, nempe tecum mihi agere licet aut rem perdere. idem fiet, si ex tuis propriis aedibus in communes meas et tuas aedes quid similiter esset proiectum: mihi enim soli tecum est actio.
But if the Titian premises are common between you and me, and from these something not by right has been let into my other own private premises, surely it is permitted for me to bring an action against you, or else to lose the thing. The same will occur if from your own private premises something similarly has been thrown into our common premises of mine and yours: for the action is mine alone against you.
Foramen in imo pariete conclavis vel triclinii, quod esset proluendi pavimenti causa, id neque flumen esse neque tempore adquiri placuit. hoc ita verum est, si in eum locum nihil ex caelo aquae veniat ( neque enim perpetuam causam habet quod manu fit): at quod ex caelo cadit, etsi non adsidue fit, ex naturali tamen causa fit et ideo perpetuo fieri existimatur. omnes autem servitutes praediorum perpetuas causas habere debent, et ideo neque ex lacu neque ex stagno concedi aquae ductus potest.
An opening in the lowest wall of a chamber or a triclinium, which would be for the purpose of sluicing the floor, it has been decided is neither a stream nor can be acquired by the passage of time. This is true thus, if no water comes into that place from the sky ( for what is made by hand does not have a perpetual cause): but what falls from the sky, although it does not occur continually, nevertheless arises from a natural cause and is therefore considered to occur perpetually. Moreover, all praedial servitudes ought to have perpetual causes, and therefore a water-conduit cannot be conceded from a lake nor from a pool.
Si partem praedii nanctus sim, quod mihi aut cui ego serviam, non confundi servitutem placet, quia pro parte servitus retinetur. itaque si praedia mea praediis tuis serviant et tuorum partem mihi et ego meorum partem tibi tradidero, manebit servitus. item usus fructus in alterutris praediis adquisitus non interrumpit servitutem.
If I have obtained a part of the estate which either serves me or which I serve, it is held that the servitude is not merged, because the servitude is retained as to the part. And so, if my estates serve your estates, and you have transferred to me a part of yours and I have transferred to you a part of mine, the servitude will remain. Likewise, a usufruct acquired in either set of estates does not interrupt the servitude.
Si aedes meae serviant aedibus lucii titii et aedibus publii maevii, ne altius aedificare mihi liceat, et a titio precario petierim, ut altius tollerem, atque ita per statutum tempus aedificatum habuero, libertatem adversus publium maevium usucapiam: non enim una servitus titio et maevio debebatur, sed duae. argumentum rei praebet, quod, si alter ex his servitutem mihi remisisset, ab eo solo liberarer, alteri nihilo minus servitutem deberem.
If my house is servient to the house of Lucius Titius and to the house of Publius Maevius, so that it is not permitted for me to build higher, and I have asked Titius by way of a precarium to raise it higher, and thus have had it built up for the stipulated time, I shall acquire by usucapion freedom as against Publius Maevius: for not one servitude was owed to Titius and Maevius, but two. The matter provides an argument for this, namely that, if one of these had remitted the servitude to me, I would be freed from him alone, while to the other I would nonetheless owe the servitude.
Libertas servitutis usucapitur, si aedes possideantur: quare si is, qui altius aedificatum habebat, ante statutum tempus aedes possidere desiit, interpellata usucapio est. is autem, qui postea easdem aedes possidere coeperit, integro statuto tempore libertatem usucapiet. natura enim servitutium ea est, ut possideri non possint, sed intellegatur possessionem earum habere, qui aedes possidet.
Freedom from a servitude is acquired by usucaption, if the house be possessed: wherefore, if he who had built higher ceased to possess the house before the prescribed time, the usucaption is interrupted. But he who thereafter begins to possess the same house will usucapt the freedom with the prescribed time entire. For the nature of servitudes is such that they cannot be possessed, but it is understood that he has possession of them who possesses the house.
Eum debere columnam restituere, quae onus vicinarum aedium ferebat, cuius essent aedes quae servirent, non eum, qui imponere vellet. nam cum in lege aedium ita scriptum esset: " paries oneri ferundo uti nunc est, ita sit", satis aperte significari in perpetuum parietem esse debere: non enim hoc his verbis dici, ut in perpetuum idem paries aeternus esset, quod ne fieri quidem posset, sed uti eiusdem modi paries in perpetuum esset qui onus sustineret: quemadmodum si quis alicui cavisset, ut servitutem praeberet, qui onus suum sustineret, si ea res quae servit et tuum onus ferret, perisset, alia in locum eius dari debeat.
He must restore the column which bore the burden of the neighboring buildings—the one whose buildings were serving, not the one who would wish to impose it. For since in the law of buildings it was written thus: "let the wall for bearing the burden be as it now is," it is made clear enough that the wall must be in perpetuity: not that by these words it is said that the very same wall should be eternal (which could not even be done), but that a wall of the same kind should exist in perpetuity which would sustain the burden; just as if someone had stipulated to furnish a servitude, that there be something which would sustain its burden; if the thing which serves and bore your burden had perished, another ought to be given in its place.
Binas quis aedes habebat una contignatione tectas: utrasque diversis legavit. dixi, quia magis placeat tignum posse duorum esse ita, ut certae partes cuiusque sint contignationis, ex regione cuiusque domini fore tigna nec ullam invicem habituros actionem ius non esse immissum habere: nec interest, pure utrisque an sub condicione alteri aedes legatae sint.
Someone had two houses roofed by one contignation; he bequeathed each to different persons. I said, since it is more acceptable that a beam can belong to two, in such a way that definite parts of the contignation are each one’s, that the beams will be over against the quarter of each owner, and that they will have no action against one another; there is no right to have an immission. Nor does it matter whether the houses were bequeathed purely to both, or to the other under a condition.
Olympico habitationem et horreum, quod in ea domo erat, quoad viveret, legavit: iuxta eandem domum hortus et cenaculum, quod olympico legatum non est, fuerunt: ad hortum autem et cenaculum semper per domum, cuius habitatio relicta erat, aditus fuit: quaesitum est, an olympicus aditum praestare deberet. respondi servitutem quidem non esse, sed heredem transire per domum ad ea quae commemorata sunt posse, dum non noceat legatario.
He bequeathed to Olympico a habitation and the granary which was in that house, for as long as he lived: next to the same house there were a garden and an upper room, which were not bequeathed to Olympico: but access to the garden and the upper room was always through the house whose habitation had been left: it was asked whether Olympico ought to provide access. I replied that it was not indeed a servitude, but that the heir can pass through the house to the things that have been mentioned, provided he does not harm the legatee.
Lucius titius aperto pariete domus suae, quatenus stillicidii rigor et tignorum protectus competebat, ianuam in publico aperuit: quaero, cum neque luminibus publii maevii vicini neque itineri vicini officeret neque stillicidium ne vicini domo cadat, an aliquam actionem publius maevius vicinus ad prohibendum haberet. respondi secundum ea quae proponerentur nullam habere.
Lucius Titius, the wall of his house having been opened, in so far as the drip-line and the projection of the beams accorded, opened a doorway onto the public; I ask, since he was not obstructing either the lights of the neighbor Publius Maevius or the neighbor’s way, nor the drip-line, so that it should not fall from the neighbor’s house, whether Publius Maevius the neighbor had any action to prohibit it. I answered that, according to the matters set forth, he had none.
Servitutes rusticorum praediorum sunt hae: iter actus via aquae ductus. iter est ius eundi ambulandi homini, non etiam iumentum agendi. actus est ius agendi vel iumentum vel vehiculum: itaque qui iter habet, actum non habet, qui actum habet, et iter habet etiam sine iumento.
The servitudes of rural estates are these: iter, actus, via, aquae ductus. Iter is the right for a man to go and walk, not also to drive a beast of burden. Actus is the right of driving either a beast of burden or a vehicle: accordingly, he who has iter does not have actus; he who has actus also has iter, even without a beast of burden.
Qui habet haustum, iter quoque habere videtur ad hauriendum et, ut ait neratius libro tertio membranarum, sive ei ius hauriendi et adeundi cessum sit, utrumque habebit, sive tantum hauriendi, inesse et aditum sive tantum adeundi ad fontem, inesse et haustum. haec de haustu ex fonte privato. ad flumen autem publicum idem neratius eodem libro scribit iter debere cedi, haustum non oportere et si quis tantum haustum cesserit, nihil eum agere.
He who has a haustus (drawing of water) is also deemed to have a way for drawing; and, as Neratius says in the third book of the Membranae, whether the right of drawing and of approaching has been ceded to him, he will have both; or if only the right of drawing has been ceded, access is included as well; or if only the right of approaching to the spring has been ceded, the haustus is included as well. So much on haustus from a private spring. But as to a public river, the same Neratius writes in the same book that a way ought to be ceded, the haustus need not; and if someone has ceded only the haustus, he accomplishes nothing.
Pecoris pascendi servitutes, item ad aquam appellendi, si praedii fructus maxime in pecore consistat, praedii magis quam personae videtur: si tamen testator personam demonstravit, cui servitutem praestari voluit, emptori vel heredi non eadem praestabitur servitus.
Servitudes for pasturing of livestock, and likewise for driving (them) to water, if the fruits of the estate consist chiefly in livestock, are seen as belonging to the estate rather than to the person; however, if the testator designated the person to whom he wished the servitude to be rendered, the same servitude will not be furnished to a purchaser or to an heir.
Neratius libris ex plautio ait nec haustum nec appulsum pecoris nec cretae eximendae calcisque coquendae ius posse in alieno esse, nisi fundum vicinum habeat: et hoc proculum et atilicinum existimasse ait. sed ipse dicit, ut maxime calcis coquendae et cretae eximendae servitus constitui possit, non ultra posse, quam quatenus ad eum ipsum fundum opus sit:
Neratius, in the books from Plautius, says that neither a right of drawing (water), nor of the driving-up of livestock, nor of extracting chalk and burning lime, can exist on another’s property unless he has a neighboring estate; and he says that Proculus and Atilicinus thought this too. But he himself says that, even if a servitude of burning lime and extracting chalk can be constituted, it cannot extend beyond so far as is needed for that very estate.
Veluti si figlinas haberet, in quibus ea vasa fierent, quibus fructus eius fundi exportarentur ( sicut in quibusdam fit, ut amphoris vinum evehatur aut ut dolina fiant), vel tegulae vel ad villam aedificandam. sed si, ut vasa venirent, figlinae exercerentur, usus fructus erit.
As, for instance, if he had figlinae (potteries), in which those vessels were made by which the produce of his estate would be exported (as in some places it happens that wine is carried out in amphorae or that dolia are made), or tegulae (roof-tiles), or things for building a villa. But if the figlinae were operated so that the vessels might be sold, it will be a usufruct.
Item longe recedit ab usu fructu ius calcis coquendae et lapidis eximendi et harenae fodiendae aedificandi eius gratia quod in fundo est, item silvae caeduae, ut pedamenta in vineas non desint. quid ergo si praediorum meliorem causam haec faciant? non est dubitandum, quin servitutis sit: et hoc et maecianus probat in tantum, ut et talem servitutem constitui posse putet, ut tugurium mihi habere liceret in tuo, scilicet si habeam pascui servitutem aut pecoris appellendi, ut si hiemps ingruerit, habeam quo me recipiam.
Likewise, the right of burning lime and of extracting stone and of digging sand for the sake of building what is on the estate, likewise of cutting coppice-wood so that props for the vineyards not be lacking, stands far apart from usufruct. What then if these make the condition of the estates better? There is no doubt that it pertains to servitude: and this too maecianus approves, to such an extent that he thinks even such a servitude can be established—that it be permitted for me to have a hut on your property, namely if I have a servitude of pasture or of driving cattle, so that, if winter should set in, I may have somewhere to which to withdraw.
Qui sella aut lectica vehitur, ire, non agere dicitur: iumentum vero ducere non potest, qui iter tantum habet. qui actum habet, et plostrum ducere et iumenta agere potest. sed trahendi lapidem aut tignum neutri eorum ius est: quidam nec hastam rectam ei ferre licere, quia neque eundi neque agendi gratia id faceret et possent fructus eo modo laedi.
He who is carried in a chair or a litter is said to go (ire), not to drive (agere): but he who has only a right of way (iter) cannot lead a draught animal. He who has a right of driving (actus) can both lead a wagon and drive beasts of burden. But neither of them has the right to drag a stone or a beam: some say it is not even permitted for him to carry a spear upright, because he would do that neither for the sake of going nor of driving, and the fruits could be harmed in that way.
Labeo ait talem servitutem constitui posse, ut aquam quaerere et inventam ducere liceat: nam si liceat nondum aedificato aedificio servitutem constituere, quare non aeque liceat nondum inventa aqua eandem constituere servitutem? et si, ut quaerere liceat, cedere possumus, etiam ut inventa ducatur, cedi potest.
Labeo says that such a servitude can be established, namely that it be permitted to seek water and, once found, to conduct it: for if it is permitted to establish a servitude with the building not yet erected, why is it not equally permitted, with the water not yet found, to establish the same servitude? And if we can cede so that it may be permitted to seek, it can also be ceded that, once found, it be conducted.
Per fundum, qui plurium est, ius mihi esse eundi agendi potest separatim cedi. ergo suptili ratione non aliter meum fiet ius, quam si omnes cedant et novissima demum cessione superiores omnes confirmabuntur: benignius tamen dicetur et antequam novissimus cesserit, eos, qui antea cesserunt, vetare uti cesso iure non posse.
Over a farm which is of several owners, the right for me of going and of driving can be ceded separately. Therefore, by a subtle reasoning, my right will not otherwise become mine than if all cede, and only by the latest cession will all the prior ones be confirmed; yet it will be said more benignly that, even before the latest has ceded, those who previously ceded cannot forbid me to use the ceded right.
Certo generi agrorum adquiri servitus potest, velut vineis, quod ea ad solum magis quam ad superficiem pertinet. ideo sublatis vineis servitus manebit: sed si in contrahenda servitute aliud actum erit, doli mali exceptio erit necessaria.
A servitude can be acquired for a certain class of lands, as for vineyards, because this pertains to the soil rather than to the surface. Therefore, even with the vines removed, the servitude will remain; but if, in contracting the servitude, something else was agreed, a defense for malicious fraud will be necessary.
Si totus ager itineri aut actui servit, dominus in eo agro nihil facere potest, quo servitus impediatur, quae ita diffusa est, ut omnes glaebae serviant, aut si iter actusve sine ulla determinatione legatus est: modo determinabitur et qua primum iter determinatum est, ea servitus constitit, ceterae partes agri liberae sunt: igitur arbiter dandus est, qui utroque casu viam determinare debet.
If the whole field serves for a right of way (iter) or for a right of driving (actus), the owner can do nothing in that field by which the servitude is impeded—since it is so diffused that all the clods are subject—or if a right of way or of driving has been bequeathed without any determination: provided that it be determined; and where the way was first determined, that servitude is established, the remaining parts of the field are free: therefore an arbiter must be appointed, who in either case ought to determine the way.
Si locus non adiecta latitudine nominatus est, per eum qualibet iri poterit: sin autem praetermissus est aeque latitudine non adiecta, per totum fundum una poterit eligi via dumtaxat eius latitudinis, quae lege comprehensa est: pro quo ipso, si dubitabitur, arbitri officium invocandum est.
If a place has been named with no latitude (breadth) added, it will be possible to go through it anywhere; but if the place has been omitted likewise with no latitude added, then across the whole estate a single way may be chosen, only of that latitude which is encompassed by law; and for that very point, if there is doubt, the office of an arbiter must be invoked.
Quintus mucius scribit, cum iter aquae vel cottidianae vel aestivae vel quae intervalla longiora habeat per alienum fundum erit, licere fistulam suam vel fictilem vel cuiuslibet generis in rivo ponere, quae aquam latius exprimeret, et quod vellet in rivo facere, licere, dum ne domino praedii aquagium deterius faceret.
Quintus Mucius writes that, when a passage of water—whether quotidian or estival, or one that has longer intervals—will be through another’s estate, it is permitted to place his pipe, whether earthenware or of whatever kind, in the channel, so as to discharge the water more broadly, and it is permitted to do whatever he wishes in the channel, provided that he does not make the water-right (aquagium) worse for the owner of the estate.
Imperatores antoninus et verus augusti rescripserunt aquam de flumine publico pro modo possessionum ad irrigandos agros dividi oportere, nisi proprio iure quis plus sibi datum ostenderit. item rescripserunt aquam ita demum permitti duci, si sine iniuria alterius id fiat.
The emperors Antoninus and Verus, Augusti, issued a rescript that water from a public river ought to be divided, for the purpose of irrigating fields, in proportion to the measure of the holdings, unless someone should show that by his own right more had been granted to him. Likewise they issued a rescript that water is permitted to be led only if that is done without injury to another.
Una est via et si per plures fundos imponatur, cum una servitus sit. denique quaeritur, an, si per unum fundum iero, per alium non per tantum tempus, quanto servitus amittitur, an retineam servitutem? et magis est, ut aut tota amittatur aut tota retineatur: ideoque si nullo usus sum, tota amittitur, si vel uno, tota servatur.
There is one way, and if it is imposed across several estates, since it is one servitude. Finally, the question is asked whether, if I have gone through one estate but not through another for so long a time as that by which a servitude is lost, do I retain the servitude? And the sounder view is that it is either lost in its entirety or retained in its entirety: and therefore, if I have used none, it is wholly lost; if even one, it is wholly preserved.
Si unus ex sociis stipuletur iter ad communem fundum, inutilis est stipulatio, quia nec dari ei potest: sed si omnes stipulentur sive communis servus, singuli ex sociis sibi dari oportere petere possunt, quia ita dari eis potest: ne, si stipulator viae plures heredes reliquerit, inutilis stipulatio fiat.
If one of the partners stipulates a right of way to a common estate, the stipulation is ineffective, because it cannot be given to him; but if all stipulate, or the common slave does, each of the partners can demand that it ought to be given to himself, because in that way it can be given to them: so that, if the stipulator of the way should leave several heirs, the stipulation not become ineffective.
Si mihi eodem tempore concesseris et ire agere per tuum locum et uti frui eo ius esse, deinde ego tibi concessero ius mihi uti frui non esse: non aliter eo loco uteris frueris, quam ut ire agere mihi recte liceat. item si et ducere per tuum fundum aquam iure potuero et in eo tibi aedificare invito me ius non fuerit: si tibi concessero ius esse aedificare, nihilo minus hanc servitutem mihi praestare debebis, ne aliter aedifices, quam ut ductus aquae meus maneat, totiusque eius rei condicio talis esse debet, qualis esset, si una dumtaxat initio concessio facta esset.
If at the same time you have conceded to me both that it is my right to go and to drive (through) your place and to use and enjoy it, and then I have conceded to you that I do not have the right to use and enjoy: you will not use and enjoy that place otherwise than so that it is proper for me to go and to drive. Likewise, if I have had the right to conduct water through your farm and you did not have the right to build there with me unwilling: if I have conceded to you that you have the right to build, nonetheless you must render this servitude to me, namely, not to build otherwise than so that my water-conduit remains; and the condition of the whole matter ought to be such as it would be if at the beginning only a single concession had been made.
Quaecumque servitus fundo debetur, omnibus eius partibus debetur: et ideo quamvis particulatim venierit, omnes partes servitus sequitur et ita, ut singuli recte agant ius sibi esse eundi. si tamen fundus, cui servitus debetur, certis regionibus inter plures dominos divisus est, quamvis omnibus partibus servitus debeatur, tamen opus est, ut hi, qui non proximas partes servienti fundo habebunt, transitum per reliquas partes fundi divisi iure habeant aut, si proximi patiantur, transeant.
Whatever servitude is owed to an estate is owed to all its parts: and therefore, although it may have been sold off in parcels, the servitude follows all the parts, and in such a way that the several owners may rightly bring an action that the right of going belongs to them. If, however, the estate to which the servitude is owed has been divided into fixed regions among several owners, although the servitude is owed to all the parts, nevertheless it is necessary that those who do not have the parts nearest to the servient estate have by right a passage across the remaining parts of the divided estate, or, if the nearest permit, let them pass.
Si partem fundi mei certam tibi vendidero, aquae ductus ius, etiamsi alterius partis causa plerumque ducatur, te quoque sequetur: neque ibi aut bonitatis agri aut usus eius aquae ratio habenda est ita, ut eam solam partem fundi, quae pretiosissima sit aut maxime usum eius aquae desideret, ius eius ducendae sequatur, sed pro modo agri detenti aut alienati fiat eius aquae divisio.
If I have sold to you a definite part of my estate, the right of aqueduct, even if it is for the most part conducted for the sake of the other part, will follow you also; nor there is account to be had either of the goodness of the land or of the use of that water, in such a way that the right of conducting it would follow only that part of the estate which is most precious or most desires the use of that water; but the division of that water shall be made in proportion to the extent of the land retained or alienated.
Si communi fundo meo et tuo serviat fundus sempronianus et eundem in commune redemerimus, servitus extinguitur, quia par utriusque domini ius in utroque fundo esse incipit. at si proprio meo fundo et proprio tuo idem serviat, manebit servitus, quia proprio fundo per communem servitus deberi potest.
If the Sempronian estate is subject in servitude to our common estate of mine and yours, and we have redeemed that same estate in common, the servitude is extinguished, because the equal right of each owner begins to exist in both estates. But if that same estate serves my private estate and your private estate, the servitude will remain, because a servitude can be owed to a private estate by one held in common.
Qui duo praedia confinia habuerat, superiorem fundum vendiderat: in lege ita dixerat, ut aquam sulco aperto emptori educere in fundum inferiorem recte liceat: si emptor ex alio fundo aquam acciperet et eam in inferiorem ducere vellet, quaesitum est, an possit id suo iure facere nec ne. respondi nihil amplius, quam quod ipsius fundi siccandi causa derivaret, vicinum inferiorem recipere debere.
He who had had two adjoining estates had sold the upper fund: in the clause he had thus said, that it is rightly permitted for the purchaser to lead out water by an open furrow into the lower fund. If the purchaser were to take water from another fund and wished to conduct it into the lower one, the question was asked whether he could do that by his own right or not. I replied that the lower neighbor ought to receive nothing more than what he diverted for the sake of drying his own fund.
Qui duo praedia habebat, in unius venditione aquam, quae in fundo nascebatur, et circa eam aquam late decem pedes exceperat: quaesitum est, utrum dominium loci ad eum pertineat an ut per eum locum accedere possit. respondit, si ita recepisset: " circa eam aquam late pedes decem", iter dumtaxat videri venditoris esse.
He who had two estates, in the vendition of one had excepted the water which arose on the estate, and, around that water, ten feet in breadth: the question was asked whether the dominion of the place pertains to him, or (only) that he may access through that place. He responded that, if he had so reserved: "around that water ten feet in breadth," only a right of way is considered to be the seller’s.
Tria praedia continua trium dominorum adiecta erant: imi praedii dominus ex summo fundo imo fundo servitutem aquae quaesierat et per medium fundum domino concedente in suum agrum ducebat: postea idem summum fundum emit: deinde imum fundum, in quem aquam induxerat, vendidit. quaesitum est, num imus fundus id ius aquae amisisset, quia, cum utraque praedia eiusdem domini facta essent, ipsa sibi servire non potuissent. negavit amisisse servitutem, quia praedium, per quod aqua ducebatur, alterius fuisset et quemadmodum servitus summo fundo, ut in imum fundum aqua veniret, imponi aliter non potuisset, quam ut per medium quoque fundum duceretur, sic eadem servitus eiusdem fundi amitti aliter non posset, nisi eodem tempore etiam per medium fundum aqua duci desisset aut omnium tria simul praedia unius domini facta essent.
Three contiguous estates of three owners lay adjacent: the owner of the lowest estate had sought from the highest estate, for the lowest estate, a servitude of water, and, the owner consenting, he was conducting it through the middle estate into his own field. Afterwards the same man bought the highest estate; then he sold the lowest estate, into which he had brought the water. It was asked whether the lowest estate had lost that right of water, because, when both estates had become of the same owner, they could not have served themselves. He denied that it had lost the servitude, because the estate through which the water was conducted had been another’s; and just as the servitude upon the highest estate, so that water might come into the lowest estate, could not have been imposed otherwise than that it also be conducted through the middle estate, so likewise the same servitude of that estate could not be lost otherwise, unless at the same time the water also had ceased to be conducted through the middle estate, or all three estates had at once become of one owner.
Fundus mihi tecum communis est: partem tuam mihi tradidisti et ad eundem viam per vicinum tuum proprium. recte eo modo servitutem constitutam ait neque quod dici soleat per partes nec adquiri nec imponi servitutes posse isto casu locum habere: hic enim non per partem servitutem adquiri, utpote cum in id tempus adquiratur, quo proprius meus fundus futurus sit.
The estate is held in common by me with you: you transferred your share to me, and to the same [estate] a right of way through your own adjoining property. He says that in this manner a servitude was rightly constituted, and that the usual saying—that servitudes can neither be acquired nor imposed by parts—does not have place in this case: for here the servitude is not being acquired through a part, inasmuch as it is acquired for that time at which the estate will be my own exclusively.
Cum essent mihi et tibi fundi duo communes titianus et seianus et in divisione convenisset, ut mihi titianus, tibi seianus cederet, invicem partes eorum tradidimus et in tradendo dictum est, ut alteri per alterum aquam ducere liceret: recte esse servitutem impositam ait, maxime si pacto stipulatio subdita sit.
Since there were for me and for you two estates held in common, titianus and seianus, and upon the partition it had been agreed that titianus should fall to me, seianus to you, we reciprocally delivered their respective parts, and in the act of delivery it was said that it should be permitted for the one to conduct water through the other’s [land]: he says that the servitude has been rightly imposed, especially if a stipulation has been subjoined to the pact.
Per plurium praedia aquam ducis quoquo modo imposita servitute: nisi pactum vel stipulatio etiam de hoc subsecuta est, neque eorum cuivis neque alii vicino poteris haustum ex rivo cedere: pacto enim vel stipulatione intervenientibus et hoc concedi solet, quamvis nullum praedium ipsum sibi servire neque servitutis fructus constitui potest.
You conduct water through the estates of several persons by a servitude imposed in whatever manner: unless a pact or stipulation has also followed concerning this, you will not be able to cede a drawing of water from the watercourse either to any one of them or to another neighbor; for with a pact or stipulation intervening, this too is wont to be conceded, although no praedium can serve itself, nor can the fruits of a servitude be constituted.
Unus ex sociis fundi communis permittendo ius esse ire agere nihil agit: et ideo si duo praedia, quae mutuo serviebant, inter eosdem fuerint communicata, quoniam servitutes pro parte retineri placet, ab altero servitus alteri remitti non potest: quamvis enim unusquisque sociorum solus sit, cui servitus debetur, tamen quoniam non personae, sed praedia deberent, neque adquiri libertas neque remitti servitus per partem poterit.
One of the partners of a common estate, by permitting that there is a right to go and to drive, does nothing; and therefore, if two estates which were mutually serving have been held in common among the same persons, since it is the rule that servitudes are retained pro parte, a servitude cannot be remitted by one to the other: for although each of the partners is alone the one to whom the servitude is owed, nevertheless, since they were owed not to the person but to the estates, neither can freedom be acquired nor the servitude be remitted in part.
Et atilicinus ait caesarem statilio tauro rescripsisse in haec verba: " hi, qui ex fundo sutrino aquam ducere soliti sunt, adierunt me proposueruntque aquam, qua per aliquot annos usi sunt ex fonte, qui est in fundo sutrino, ducere non potuisse, quod fons exaruisset, et postea ex eo fonte aquam fluere coepisse: petieruntque a me, ut quod ius non neglegentia aut culpa sua amiserant, sed quia ducere non poterant, his restitueretur. quorum mihi postulatio cum non iniqua visa sit, succurrendum his putavi. itaque quod ius habuerunt tunc, cum primum ea aqua pervenire ad eos non potuit, id eis restitui placet. "
And Atilicinus says that the Caesar wrote back to Statilius Taurus in these words: "Those who were accustomed to conduct water from the Sutrine estate approached me and set forth that the water which for several years they had used from a spring that is on the Sutrine estate they had not been able to conduct, because the spring had dried up, and afterwards from that spring the water began to flow; and they asked of me that the right which they had lost not through negligence or their own fault, but because they were not able to conduct it, be restored to them. Since their petition did not seem to me inequitable, I thought they should be succored. And so, the right which they had at the time when first that water could not reach them, it is my pleasure that it be restored to them. "
Cum fundo, quem ex duobus retinuit venditor, aquae ducendae servitus imposita sit, empto praedio quaesita servitus distractum denuo praedium sequitur: nec ad rem pertinet, quod stipulatio, qua poenam promitti placuit, ad personam emptoris, si ei forte frui non licuisset, relata est.
When, with respect to the estate which out of two the seller retained, a servitude of conducting water has been imposed, the servitude acquired for the purchased estate follows the estate when it is sold anew; nor is it to the point that the stipulation, by which it was agreed that a penalty be promised, was referred to the person of the buyer, if perhaps it had not been permitted to him to enjoy it.
Loukios titios gaiw seiw tw adelfw pleista xairein. hudatos tou hreontos eis tyn krynyn tyn kataskeuasveisan en isvmw hupo tou patros mou didwmi kai xarizomai soi daktulon eis tyn oikian sou tyn en tw isvmw, y hopou d' an bouly. quaero, an ex hac scriptura usus aquae etiam ad heredes gaii seii pertineat.
LuciUS Titius to Gaius Seius, his brother, very many greetings. I give and graciously grant to you the water that flows into the fountain constructed on the isthmus by my father, and I grant you a “finger” into your house on the isthmus, wherever you wish. I ask whether from this writing the use of water pertains also to the heirs of Gaius Seius.
Flumine interveniente via constitui potest, si aut vado transiri potest aut pontem habeat: diversum, si pontonibus traicitur. haec ita, si per unius praedia flumen currat: alioquin si tua praedia mihi vicina sint, deinde flumen, deinde titii praedia, deinde via publica, in quam iter mihi adquiri volo, dispiciamus ne nihil vetet a te mihi viam dari usque ad flumen, deinde a titio usque ad viam publicam. sed videamus, num et si tu eorum praediorum dominus sis, quae trans flumen intra viam publicam sint, idem iuris sit, quia via consummari solet vel civitate tenus vel usque ad viam publicam vel usque ad flumen, in quo pontonibus traiciatur vel usque ad proprium aliud eiusdem domini praedium: quod si est, non videtur interrrumpi servitus, quamvis inter eiusdem domini praedia flumen publicum intercedat.
With a river intervening, a way can be established if either it can be crossed by a ford or has a bridge: it is otherwise if passage is made by pontoons. These points hold thus, if the river runs through the estates of one owner: otherwise, if your estates are adjacent to mine, then the river, then Titius’s estates, then the public road into which I wish a right of way to be acquired for me, let us consider whether nothing forbids that a way be granted to me by you up to the river, then by Titius up to the public road. But let us see whether likewise, if you are the owner of those estates which are across the river on the side toward the public road, the same law holds, because a way is wont to be consummated either as far as the city or up to the public road or up to a river on which one crosses by pontoons, or up to another property of the same owner: if this is so, the servitude does not seem to be interrupted, although a public river intervenes between estates of the same owner.
De aqua per rotam tollenda ex flumine vel haurienda, vel si quis servitutem castello imposuerit, quidam dubitaverunt, ne hae servitutes non essent: sed rescripto imperatoris antonini ad tullianum adicitur, licet servitus iure non valuit, si tamen hac lege comparavit seu alio quocumque legitimo modo sibi hoc ius adquisivit, tuendum esse eum, qui hoc ius possedit.
Concerning water to be raised by a wheel from a river or to be drawn, or if someone has imposed a servitude upon a reservoir (castellum), some have doubted that these were not servitudes: but it is added by a rescript of Emperor Antoninus to Tullianus that, although the servitude did not have force in law, if nevertheless he obtained it by this covenant or acquired this right for himself by any other legitimate mode whatsoever, the one who possessed this right is to be protected.
Proprium solum vendendo an servitutem talem iniungere possim, ut mihi et vicino serviat? similiter si commune solum vendo, ut mihi et socio serviat, an consequi possim? respondi: servitutem recipere nisi sibi nemo potest: adiectio itaque vicini pro supervacuo habenda est, ita ut tota servitus ad eum, qui receperit, pertineat.
By selling my own land, can I impose such a servitude that it serves me and my neighbor? Similarly, if I sell common land, so that it serves me and my partner, can I achieve this? I answered: no one can receive a servitude except for himself; therefore the addition of the neighbor is to be considered superfluous, so that the whole servitude pertains to him who has received it.
Si quis duas aedes habeat et alteras tradat, potest legem traditioni dicere, ut vel istae quae non traduntur servae sint his quae traduntur, vel contra ut traditae retentis aedibus serviant: parvique refert, vicinae sint ambae aedes an non. idem erit et in praediis rusticis: nam et si quis duos fundos habeat, alium alii potest servum facere tradendo. duas autem aedes simul tradendo non potest efficere alteras alteris servas, quia neque adquirere alienis aedibus servitutem neque imponere potest.
If anyone should have two houses and delivers one set of them, he can pronounce a term to the delivery, either that those which are not delivered be servient to those which are delivered, or conversely that the delivered ones serve the houses retained: and it matters little whether both houses are neighboring or not. The same will be so also in rustic estates: for even if someone has two farms, he can make one serve the other by delivering it. But by delivering two houses at the same time he cannot bring it about that the one be servient to the other, because he can neither acquire a servitude for houses that belong to others nor impose one upon them.
Si quis partem aedium tradet vel partem fundi, non potest servitutem imponere, quia per partes servitus imponi non potest, sed nec adquiri. plane si divisit fundum regionibus et sic partem tradidit pro diviso, potest alterutri servitutem imponere, quia non est pars fundi, sed fundus. quod et in aedibus potest dici, si dominus pariete medio aedificato unam domum in duas diviserit, ut plerique faciunt: nam et hic pro duabus domibus accipi debet.
If someone conveys a part of a building or a part of an estate, he cannot impose a servitude, because a servitude cannot be imposed by parts, nor can it be acquired so. Plainly, if he has divided the estate by regions and thus has conveyed a part as divided, he can impose a servitude on either one, because it is not a part of an estate, but an estate. The same can be said in the case of buildings, if the owner, with a middle wall constructed, has divided one house into two, as many do: for here too it ought to be taken as two houses.
Item si duo homines binas aedes communes habeamus, simul tradendo idem efficere possumus, ac si ego solus proprias binas aedes haberem. sed et si separatim tradiderimus, idem fiet, sic tamen, ut novissima traditio efficiat etiam praecedentem traditionem efficacem.
Likewise, if two men have two houses in common, by delivering simultaneously we can accomplish the same as if I alone had two houses of my own. But even if we have delivered separately, the same will be effected, provided, however, that the latest delivery renders even the preceding delivery effective.
Si in venditione quis dixerit servas fore aedes quas vendidit, necesse non habet liberas tradere: quare vel suis aedibus eas servas facere potest vel vicino concedere servitutem, scilicet ante traditionem. plane si titio servas fore dixit, si quidem titio servitutem concesserit, absolutum est: si vero alii concesserit, ex empto tenebitur. a quo non abhorret, quod Marcellus libro sexto digestorum scribit, si quis in tradendo dixerit fundum titio servire, cum ei non serviret, esset autem obligatus venditor titio ad servitutem praestandam, an agere possit ex vendito, ut emptor servitutem imponi patiatur praedio quod mercatus est: magisque putat permittendum agere.
If in the sale someone has said that the house which he sold will be servient, he does not have to deliver it free: therefore he can either make it servient to his own house or grant a servitude to a neighbor—namely, before delivery. Clearly, if he said that it would be servient to Titius, then if he has granted the servitude to Titius, the matter is settled; but if he has granted it to another, he will be held under the purchase (actio ex empto). This does not differ from what Marcellus writes in the sixth book of the Digest, that if someone, in delivering, said that the estate serves Titius when it did not serve him, but the seller was bound to furnish the servitude to Titius, whether he can bring an action on the sale (actio ex vendito) so that the buyer allows a servitude to be imposed on the estate which he bought: and he rather thinks it should be permitted to sue.
and he likewise says that, if the seller can sell a servitude to Titius, it should equally be permitted to bring the action. These things only on this condition: if, for the sake of receiving the servitude, this was expressed at delivery; but if someone, he says, fearing lest a servitude be owed to Titius, for that reason made this exception, there will not be an action ex vendito, if he promised no servitude.
Interpositis quoque alienis aedibus imponi potest, veluti ut altius tollere vel non tollere liceat vel etiam si iter debeatur, ut ita convalescat, si mediis aedibus servitus postea imposita fuerit: sicuti per plurium praedia servitus imponi etiam diversis temporibus potest. quamquam dici potest, si tria praedia continua habeam et extremum tibi tradam, vel tuo vel meis praediis servitutem adquiri posse: si vero extremo, quod retineam, quia et medium meum sit, servitutem consistere, sed si rursus aut id, cui adquisita sit servitus, aut medium alienavero, interpellari eam, donec medio praedio servitus imponatur.
A servitude can also be imposed even with others’ buildings interposed, for instance that it be permitted to raise higher or not to raise higher, or even if a right of way is owed—on the understanding that it becomes valid if a servitude is afterwards imposed upon the intervening buildings: just as a servitude can be imposed across the estates of several owners even at different times. Although it can be said that, if I have three contiguous estates and I hand over the far one to you, a servitude can be acquired either for your estate or for my estates: and if it is for the far one which I retain, since the middle is also mine, the servitude stands; but if thereafter I alienate either that to which the servitude has been acquired or the middle, it is interrupted until a servitude is imposed upon the middle estate.
Si cum duas haberem insulas, duobus eodem momento tradidero, videndum est, an servitus alterutris imposita valeat, quia alienis quidem aedibus nec imponi nec adquiri servitus potest. sed ante traditionem peractam suis magis adquirit vel imponit is qui tradit ideoque valebit servitus.
If, when I had two tenements, I have delivered them to two persons at the same moment, it must be considered whether a servitude imposed on either of them is valid, because a servitude can neither be imposed upon nor acquired over another’s building. But before the delivery has been completed, the one who delivers more properly acquires or imposes it upon his own property, and therefore the servitude will be valid.
Quidquid venditor servitutis nomine sibi recipere vult, nominatim recipi oportet: nam illa generalis receptio " quibus est servitus utique est" ad extraneos pertinet, ipsi nihil prospicit venditori ad iura eius conservanda: nulla enim habuit, quia nemo ipse sibi servitutem debet: quin immo et si debita fuit servitus, deinde dominium rei servientis pervenit ad me, consequenter dicitur extingui servitutem.
Whatever the seller wishes to reserve to himself under the name of a servitude must be expressly reserved by name; for that general reservation, “whoever has a servitude assuredly has it,” pertains to outsiders, and provides nothing for the seller himself toward preserving his rights: for he had none, because no one owes a servitude to himself; nay rather, even if a servitude had been owed, then when the dominion of the servient thing came to me, the servitude is consequently said to be extinguished.
Refectionis gratia accedendi ad ea loca, quae non serviant, facultas tributa est his, quibus servitus debetur, qua tamen accedere eis sit necesse, nisi in cessione servitutis nominatim praefinitum sit, qua accederetur: et ideo nec secundum rivum nec supra eum ( si forte sub terra aqua ducatur) locum religiosum dominus soli facere potest, ne servitus intereat: et id verum est. sed et depressurum vel adlevaturum rivum, per quem aquam iure duci potestatem habes, nisi si ne id faceres cautum sit.
For the sake of repair, a faculty of approaching those places which do not serve is granted to those to whom the servitude is owed, by which way, however, it is necessary to approach them, unless in the cession of the servitude it has been expressly predetermined by name by what way one should approach: and therefore neither along the channel nor above it ( if perchance the water is conducted under the earth) can the owner of the soil make a religious place, lest the servitude perish: and that is true. But you also have the power to lower or to raise the channel, through which the water may by right be led, unless it has been provided that you should not do this.
Si prope tuum fundum ius est mihi aquam rivo ducere, tacita haec iura sequuntur, ut reficere mihi rivum liceat, ut adire, qua proxime possim, ad reficiendum eum ego fabrique mei, item ut spatium relinquat mihi dominus fundi, qua dextra et sinistra ad rivum adeam et quo terram limum lapidem harenam calcem iacere possim.
If, near your estate, I have the right to conduct water by a channel, these tacit rights follow: that it be permitted me to repair the channel; that I, and my workmen, may approach by the nearest way I can for repairing it; likewise that the owner of the estate leave me a space by which, on the right and on the left, I may go to the channel, and where I can throw earth, silt, stone, sand, and lime.
Venditor fundi geroniani fundo botriano, quem retinebat, legem dederat, ne contra eum piscatio thynnaria exerceatur. quamvis mari, quod natura omnibus patet, servitus imponi privata lege non potest, quia tamen bona fides contractus legem servari venditionis exposcit, personae possidentium aut in ius eorum succedentium per stipulationis vel venditionis legem obligantur.
The seller of the Geronianus estate had, in favor of the Botrianus estate, which he retained, laid down a condition that tuna-fishing not be carried on against it. Although a servitude cannot be imposed upon the sea—which by nature is open to all—by private law, nevertheless the good faith of the contract requires that the condition of the sale be observed, and the persons of the possessors or of those succeeding to their rights are bound by the law of the stipulation or of the sale.
Si constat in tuo agro lapidicinas esse, invito te nec privato nec publico nomine quisquam lapidem caedere potest, cui id faciendi ius non est: nisi talis consuetudo in illis lapidicinis consistat, ut si quis voluerit ex his caedere, non aliter hoc faciat, nisi prius solitum solacium pro hoc domino praestat: ita tamen lapides caedere debet, postquam satisfaciat domino, ut neque usus necessarii lapidis intercludatur neque commoditas rei iure domino adimatur.
If it is established that in your field there are stone‑quarries, against your will no one, under either private or public title, can cut stone who does not have the right to do this: unless such a custom obtains in those quarries, that if anyone should wish to cut from them, he does not otherwise do this unless he first provides to the owner the customary solatium (compensation) for this: yet he ought to cut stones, after he has satisfied the owner, in such a way that neither the necessary use of the stone is cut off nor the convenience/advantage of the thing is, by right, taken from the owner.
Qui per certum locum iter aut actum alicui cessisset, eum pluribus per eundem locum vel iter vel actum cedere posse verum est: quemadmodum si quis vicino suas aedes servas fecisset, nihilo minus aliis quot vellet multis eas aedes servas facere potest.
He who has ceded to someone a right of way (iter) or of driving (actus) through a certain place, it is true that he can cede to several persons, through the same place, either a way or a drive; just as, if someone had made his house servient to a neighbor, nonetheless he can make that house servient to as many others as he wishes.
Potest etiam in testamento heredem suum quis damnare, ne altius aedes suas tollat, ne luminibus aedium vicinarum officiat, vel ut patiatur eum tignum in parietem immittere, vel stillicidia adversus eum habere, vel ut patiatur vicinum per fundum suum vel heredis ire agere aquamve ex eo ducere.
One may also in a testament charge his heir not to raise his house higher, lest he obstruct the lights of neighboring houses, or that he allow him to insert a beam into the wall, or to have eaves-drip against him, or that he allow a neighbor to go or to drive across his estate or that of the heir, or to conduct water from it.
Si precario vicinus in tuo maceriam duxerit, interdicto " quod precario habet" agi non poterit, nec maceria posita donatio servitutis perfecta intellegitur, nec utiliter intendetur ius sibi esse invito te aedificatum habere, cum aedificium soli condicionem secutum inutilem faciat intentionem. ceterum si in suo maceriam precario, qui servitutem tibi debuit, duxerit, neque libertas usucapietur et interdicto " quod precario habet" utiliter cum eo agetur. quod si donationis causa permiseris, et interdicto agere non poteris et servitus donatione tollitur.
If a neighbor, by way of precarium, has put up a wall on your property, it will not be possible to proceed by the interdict "what he holds by precarium," nor is the wall, once set, understood as a perfected donation of a servitude; nor will it be effectively pleaded that he has the right to have a structure erected with you unwilling, since the building, having followed the condition of the soil, renders the claim ineffectual. Moreover, if on his own property the one who owed you a servitude has, by way of precarium, put up a wall, neither will freedom from the servitude be acquired by usucapion, and one will proceed effectively against him by the interdict "what he holds by precarium." But if you permitted it for the sake of a gift, then you will not be able to proceed by the interdict, and the servitude is removed by the donation.
Receptum est, ut plures domini et non pariter cedentes servitutes imponant vel adquirant, ut tamen ex novissimo actu etiam superiores confirmentur perindeque sit, atque si eodem tempore omnes cessissent. et ideo si is qui primus cessit vel defunctus sit vel alio genere vel alio modo partem suam alienaverit, post deinde socius cesserit, nihil agetur: cum enim postremus cedat, non retro adquiri servitus videtur, sed perinde habetur, atque si, cum postremus cedat, omnes cessissent: igitur rursus hic actus pendebit, donec novus socius cedat. idem iuris est et si uni ex dominis cedatur, deinde in persona socii aliquid horum acciderit.
It is a received rule that several owners, even not ceding at the same time, may impose or acquire servitudes, provided, however, that by the most recent act the prior ones also are confirmed, and it is just as if all had ceded at the same time. And therefore, if the one who first ceded has either died, or has alienated his share in some other kind or in some other way, and thereafter a partner has ceded, nothing will be accomplished: for since the last one must cede, the servitude is not considered to be acquired retroactively, but it is held as if, when the last one cedes, all had ceded; therefore this act will again be pending until the new partner cedes. The same law holds also if cession is made to one of the owners, and then in the person of a partner one of these things happens.
Therefore, conversely, if something of this sort befalls the one who has not ceded, then anew all must cede: for only such time has been remitted to them within which they can give or perform, whether they can do so at different times; and therefore it cannot be that one alone cedes, nor that it is ceded to one alone. And the same is to be said also if one cedes and the other legates servitudes. For if all the co-owners legate servitudes and entry is made upon their inheritance at the same time, the legacy can be said to be useful; but if at different times, the day of the legacy accrues to no effect: for it has not been accepted that the acts of the deceased be suspended in the same way as those of the living.
Recte neratius scribit, si medii loci usus fructus legetur, iter quoque sequi ( per ea scilicet loca fundi, per quae qui usum fructum cessit constitueret) quatenus est ad fruendum necessarium: namque sciendum est iter, quod fruendi gratia fructuario praestatur, non esse servitutem, neque enim potest soli fructuario servitus deberi: sed si fundo debeatur, et ipse fructuarius ea utetur.
Neratius rightly writes that, if the usufruct of a middle tract is bequeathed, a right of way also follows ( through those parts of the estate, namely, by which the one who ceded the usufruct would establish it), insofar as is necessary for enjoying it: for it must be known that a way, which for the sake of enjoyment is furnished to the usufructuary, is not a servitude—for a servitude cannot be owed to the usufructuary alone—but if it is owed to the estate (fundus), the usufructuary too will use it.
Pomponius dicit fructuarium interdicto de itinere uti posse, si hoc anno usus est: alibi enim de iure, id est in confessoria actione, alibi de facto, ut in hoc interdicto, quaeritur: quod et iulianus libro quadragensimo octavo digestorum scribit. pro sententia iuliani facit, quod labeo scribit, etiam si testator usus sit qui legavit usum fructum, debere utile interdictum fructuario dari, quemadmodum heredi vel emptori competunt haec interdicta.
Pomponius says that the usufructuary can avail himself of the interdict concerning a right of way, if he has used it in this year: for elsewhere the question is about right (that is, in the confessory action), elsewhere about fact, as in this interdict—which Julian also writes in Book 48 of the Digesta. In favor of Julian’s opinion stands what Labeo writes: even if the testator who bequeathed the usufruct has been the one to use it, a useful (analogical) interdict ought to be given to the usufructuary, just as these interdicts are available to the heir or the purchaser.
In confessoria actione, quae de servitute movetur, fructus etiam veniunt. sed videamus, qui esse fructus servitutis possunt: et est verius id demum fructuum nomine computandum, si quid sit quod intersit agentis servitute non prohiberi. sed et in negatoria actione, ut labeo ait, fructus computantur, quanti interest petitoris non uti fundi sui itinere adversarium: et hanc sententiam et pomponius probat.
In the confessory action, which is brought concerning a servitude, fruits also come into account. But let us see what can be the fruits of a servitude: and it is more correct that only this be reckoned under the name of fruits, namely whatever there is of the plaintiff’s interest in not being prohibited from the servitude. But also in the negatory action, as Labeo says, fruits are computed by how much it is of the petitioner’s interest that the adversary not use a right of way over his land; and Pomponius too approves this opinion.
Si fundus, cui iter debetur, plurium sit, unicuique in solidum competit actio, et ita et pomponius libro quadragensimo primo scribit: sed in aestimationem id quod interest veniet, scilicet quod eius interest, qui experietur. itaque de iure quidem ipso singuli experientur et victoria et aliis proderit, aestimatio autem ad quod eius interest revocabitur, quamvis per unum adquiri servitus non possit.
If a farm to which a right of way is owed belongs to several persons, the action belongs to each for the whole; and Pomponius also writes thus in the 41st book: but as to the assessment, it will come to what the interest is, namely, what it is in the interest of the one who brings suit. Accordingly, as to the right itself, individuals will bring suit, and the victory will also benefit the others; but the valuation will be referred back to what it is in his interest, although a servitude cannot be acquired through one person alone.
Si quis mihi itineris vel actus vel viae controversiam non faciat, sed reficere sternere non patiatur, pomponius libro eodem scribit confessoria actione mihi utendum: nam et si arborem impendentem habeat vicinus, qua viam vel iter invium vel inhabile facit, Marcellus quoque apud iulianum notat iter petendum vel viam vindicandam. sed de refectione viae et interdicto uti possumus, quod de itinere actuque reficiendo competit: non tamen si silice quis sternere velit, nisi nominatim id convenit.
If someone does not raise a controversy with me about a right of way, whether of going (iter), of driving (actus), or of road (via), but does not allow repairing or paving, Pomponius in the same book writes that I should use the confessory action; for even if a neighbor has an overhanging tree, by which he makes the road or the path impassable or unfit, Marcellus also notes, in Julian, that the path is to be sued for or the road vindicated. But for the repairing of a road we can use the interdict, which is competent for the repairing of the iter and actus; not, however, if someone wishes to pave with flint, unless this has been expressly agreed by name.
Competit autem de servitute actio domino aedificii neganti servitutem se vicino debere, cuius aedes non in totum liberae sunt, sed ei cum quo agitur servitutem non debent. verbi gratia habeo aedes, quibus sunt vicinae seianae et sempronianae, sempronianis servitutem debeo, adversus dominum seianarum volo experiri altius me tollere prohibentem: in rem actione experiar: licet enim serviant aedes meae, ei tamen cum quo agitur non serviunt: hoc igitur intendo habere me ius altius tollendi invito eo cum quo ago: quantum enim ad eum pertinet, liberas aedes habeo.
But an action concerning servitude is available to the owner of a building who denies that he owes a servitude to his neighbor, whose house is not entirely free, yet does not owe a servitude to the person with whom the action is carried on. For example, I have a house, next to which are the Seian and the Sempronian houses; I owe a servitude to the Sempronian house; I wish to proceed against the owner of the Seian house, who forbids me to raise higher. I will proceed by an action in rem: for although my house is subject to a servitude, yet it does not serve the one with whom the suit is conducted. Therefore I plead that I have the right of building higher, against the will of him with whom I am litigating: for, so far as he is concerned, I have a free house.
Et ideo si inter meas et titii aedes tuae aedes intercedant, possum titii aedibus servitutem imponere, ne liceat ei altius tollere, licet tuis non imponatur: quia donec tu non extollis, est utilitas servitutis.
And therefore, if between my buildings and Titius’s buildings your buildings intervene, I can impose a servitude upon Titius’s buildings, that it not be permitted to him to raise them higher, although it is not imposed upon yours: because, so long as you do not raise yours, there is the utility of the servitude.
Et si forte qui medius est, quia servitutem non debebat, altius extulerit aedificia sua, ut iam ego non videar luminibus tuis obstaturus, si aedificavero, frustra intendes ius mihi non esse ita aedificatum habere invito te: sed si intra tempus statutum rursus deposuerit aedificium suum vicinus, renasceretur tibi vindicatio.
And if perchance the one who is in the middle, because he did not owe a servitude, has raised his buildings higher, such that now I would not seem about to obstruct your lights if I build, you will in vain contend that I have no right to have it so built against your will: but if within the time fixed the neighbor should again lower his building, the vindicatory claim would be reborn to you.
Sciendum tamen in his servitutibus possessorem esse eum iuris et petitorem. et si forte non habeam aedificatum altius in meo, adversarius meus possessor est: nam cum nihil sit innovatum, ille possidet et aedificantem me prohibere potest et civili actione et interdicto quod vi aut clam: idem et si lapilli iactu impedierit. sed et si patiente eo aedificavero, ego possessor ero effectus.
One must know, however, that in these servitudes the possessor is he who has the right, and the other is the claimant. And if perchance I do not have a higher structure built on my own property, my adversary is the possessor: for since nothing has been innovated, he possesses and can prohibit me, as I build, both by civil action and by the interdict quod vi aut clam; the same too if he has impeded by a throwing of pebbles. But also, if with him tolerating I shall have built, I shall have become the possessor.
Etiam de servitute, quae oneris ferendi causa imposita erit, actio nobis competit, ut et onera ferat et aedificia reficiat ad eum modum, qui servitute imposita comprehensus est. et gallus putat non posse ita servitutem imponi, ut quis facere aliquid cogeretur, sed ne me facere prohiberet: nam in omnibus servitutibus refectio ad eum pertinet, qui sibi servitutem adserit, non ad eum, cuius res servit. sed evaluit servi sententia, in proposita specie ut possit quis defendere ius sibi esse cogere adversarium reficere parietem ad onera sua sustinenda.
Also with respect to a servitude that shall have been imposed for the sake of bearing a burden, an action lies for us, so that he both bear the burdens and restore the buildings to the extent that was included when the servitude was imposed. And gallus thinks that a servitude cannot be imposed in such a way that someone is compelled to do something, but rather that he be prevented from preventing me from doing something: for in all servitudes, the refection pertains to him who asserts the servitude for himself, not to him whose property is servient. But the opinion of servi has prevailed, in the proposed case, that one can maintain that he has the right to compel his adversary to repair the wall for sustaining his own burdens.
Si aedes plurium dominorum sint, an in solidum agatur, papinianus libro tertio quaestionum tractat: et ait singulos dominos in solidum agere, sicuti de ceteris servitutibus excepto usu fructu. sed non idem respondendum inquit, si communes aedes essent, quae onera vicini sustinerent.
If a building should belong to several owners, whether one brings an action in solidum, Papinian treats in the third book of the Questions: and he says that each owner brings an action in solidum, just as with the other servitudes, usufruct excepted. But the same answer is not to be given, he says, if they were common buildings which sustain the neighbor’s burdens.
Harum actionum eventus hic est, ut victori officio iudicis aut res praestetur aut cautio. res ipsa haec est, ut iubeat adversarium iudex emendare vitium parietis et idoneum praestare. cautio haec est, ut eum iubeat de reficiendo pariete cavere neque se neque successores suos prohibituros altius tollere sublatumque habere: et si caverit, absolvetur.
The outcome of these actions is this: that, for the victor, by the judge’s office, either the thing itself be furnished or a security. The thing itself is this: that the judge order the adversary to amend the defect of the wall and to furnish it as suitable. The security is this: that he be ordered to give a bond for repairing the wall, and that neither he nor his successors will forbid its being raised higher and kept raised; and if he shall have given the security, he will be acquitted.
Sicut autem refectio parietis ad vicinum pertinet, ita fultura aedificiorum vicini cui servitus debetur, quamdiu paries reficitur, ad inferiorem vicinum non debet pertinere: nam si non vult superior fulcire, deponat, et restituet, cum paries fuerit restitutus. et hic quoque sicut in ceteris servitutibus actio contraria dabitur, hoc est ius tibi non esse me cogere.
Just as the refection of the wall pertains to the neighbor, so the shoring of the buildings of the neighbor to whom the servitude is owed, so long as the wall is being repaired, ought not to pertain to the lower neighbor: for if the upper (neighbor) is unwilling to shore up, let him take it down, and he will restore it when the wall has been restored. And here too, as in the other servitudes, a contrary action will be given, that is: that you do not have the right to compel me.
Competit mihi actio adversus eum, qui cessit mihi talem servitutem, ut in parietem eius tigna immittere mihi liceat supraque ea tigna verbi gratia porticum ambulatoriam facere superque eum parietem columnas structiles imponere, quae tectum porticus ambulatoriae sustineant.
An action is competent to me against him who has ceded to me such a servitude, to wit, that it be permitted for me to insert beams into his wall and, above those beams, for example, to make an ambulatory portico, and upon that wall to place masonry (structile) columns, which sustain the roof of the ambulatory portico.
Sed si quaeritur, quis possessoris, quis petitoris partes sustineat, sciendum est possessoris partes sustinere, si quidem tigna immissa sint, eum, qui servitutem sibi deberi ait, si vero non sunt immissa, eum qui negat.
But if the question is raised who sustains the part of the possessor, and who of the claimant, it should be known that the part of the possessor is sustained—if indeed the beams have been let in—by the one who says that a servitude is owed to him; but if they have not been let in, by the one who denies it.
Et si quidem is optinuerit, qui servitutem sibi defendit, non debet ei servitus cedi, sive recte pronuntiatum est, quia habet, sive perperam, quia per sententiam non debet servitus constitui, sed quae est declarari. plane si non utendo amisit dolo malo domini aedium post litem contestatam, restitui ei oportet, quemadmodum placet in domino aedium.
And if indeed he has prevailed who defends a servitude for himself, the servitude ought not to be ceded to him, whether it has been rightly pronounced—because he has it—or wrongly—because by a sentence a servitude ought not to be constituted, but that which exists to be declared. Plainly, if he lost it by non-use through the malicious fraud of the owner of the house after issue has been joined, it ought to be restored to him, just as it is held in the case of the owner of the house.
Aristo cerellio vitali respondit non putare se ex taberna casiaria fumum in superiora aedificia iure immitti posse, nisi ei rei servitutem talem admittit. idemque ait: et ex superiore in inferiora non aquam, non quid aliud immitti licet: in suo enim alii hactenus facere licet, quatenus nihil in alienum immittat, fumi autem sicut aquae esse immissionem: posse igitur superiorem cum inferiore agere ius illi non esse id ita facere. alfenum denique scribere ait posse ita agi ius illi non esse in suo lapidem caedere, ut in meum fundum fragmenta cadant.
Aristo answered to Cerellius Vitalis that he does not think smoke can lawfully be let in from a cheese-shop into the upper buildings, unless a servitude of such a kind has been admitted for that matter. And he likewise says: both from the upper into the lower it is not permitted to let in water, nor anything else; for on his own property it is permitted to someone only to this extent, in so far as he sends nothing into another’s, and the letting-in of smoke is an immission just like that of water; therefore the upper can bring an action against the lower, that he does not have the right to do it in that way. Finally, he says that Alfenus wrote that it can be proceeded with thus: that he does not have the right to hew stone on his own land in such a way that the fragments fall into my estate.
Therefore Aristo says that the man who leased a cheese-shop from the Minturnenses can be prohibited by the upper neighbor from letting smoke in, but that the Minturnenses are bound to him under the lease; and he says that suit can thus be brought against the one who lets in that smoke, that he does not have the right to let in smoke. Therefore, by a contrary action, it can be brought that there is a right to let in smoke—which Aristo also seems to approve. But the interdict uti possidetis can also have application, if anyone is forbidden to use his own as he wishes.
Apud pomponium dubitatur libro quadragensimo primo lectionum, an quis possit ita agere licere fumum non gravem, puta ex foco, in suo facere aut non licere. et ait magis non posse agi, sicut agi non potest ius esse in suo ignem facere aut sedere aut lavare.
With Pomponius it is doubted, in the forty-first book of the Readings, whether someone can bring an action to have it be permitted to make non-heavy smoke—say, from a hearth—on his own property, or to have it not be permitted. And he says rather that it cannot be brought, just as one cannot bring an action that there is a right to make a fire on one’s own property, or to sit, or to wash.
Si eo loco, per quem mihi iter debetur, tu aedificaveris, possum intendere ius mihi esse ire agere: quod si probavero, inhibebo opus tuum. item iulianus scripsit, si vicinus in suo aedificando effecerit, ne stillicidium meum reciperet, posse me agere de iure meo, id est ius esse immittendi stillicidium, sicut in via diximus. sed si quidem nondum aedificavit, sive usum fructum sive viam habet, ius sibi esse ire agere vel frui intendere potest: quod si iam aedificavit dominus, is qui iter et actum habet adhuc potest intendere ius sibi esse, fructuarius autem non potest, quia amisit usum fructum: et ideo de dolo actionem dandam hoc casu iulianus ait.
If, in the place through which a route is owed to me, you shall have built, I can plead that the right is mine to go and to drive; and if I shall have proved it, I will inhibit your work. Likewise Julian wrote that, if a neighbor by building on his own has brought it about that he does not receive my eaves-drip (stillicidium), I can sue concerning my right, that is, that there is a right of letting in the eaves-drip, just as we said in the case of a way. But if indeed he has not yet built, whether he has a usufruct or a way, he can allege that the right is his to go and to drive or to enjoy: but if the owner has already built, he who has the right of way on foot and for driving (iter and actus) can still allege that the right is his, but the usufructuary cannot, because he has lost the usufruct; and therefore Julian says that in this case an action for dolus should be granted.
Si quis diuturno usu et longa quasi possessione ius aquae ducendae nactus sit, non est ei necesse docere de iure, quo aqua constituta est, veluti ex legato vel alio modo, sed utilem habet actionem, ut ostendat per annos forte tot usum se non vi non clam non precario possedisse.
If someone has obtained, by prolonged use and, as it were, long possession, the right of conducting water, it is not necessary for him to prove the title by which the water-right was established—for example, from a legacy or some other mode—but he has a useful action, to show that for, say, so many years he has possessed the use not by force, not clandestinely, not precariously.
Agi autem hac actione poterit non tantum cum eo, in cuius agro aqua oritur vel per cuius fundum ducitur, verum etiam cum omnibus agi poterit, quicumque aquam non ducere impediunt, exemplo ceterarum servitutium. et generaliter quicumque aquam ducere impediat, hac actione cum eo experiri potero.
Moreover, by this action it will be possible to proceed not only against him on whose land the water springs or through whose estate it is conducted, but it will also be possible to proceed against all whoever prevent the conducting of the water, on the example of the other servitudes. And, generally, whoever may impede the conducting of water, I shall be able to make trial against him by this action.
An unus ex sociis in communi loco invitis ceteris iure aedificare possit, id est an, si prohibeatur a sociis, possit cum his ita experiri ius sibi esse aedificare, et an socii cum eo ita agere possint ius sibi prohibendi esse vel illi ius aedificandi non esse: et si aedificatum iam sit, non possit cum eo ita experiri ius tibi non esse ita aedificatum habere, quaeritur. et magis dici potest prohibendi potius quam faciendi esse ius socio, quia magis ille, qui facere conatur ut dixi, quodammodo sibi alienum quoque ius praeripit, si quasi solus dominus ad suum arbitrium uti iure communi velit.
Whether one of the partners can, in a place held in common, build as of right with the others unwilling, that is, whether, if he is prohibited by the partners, he can litigate with them in this form, that he has the right to build; and whether the partners can proceed against him in this form, that they have the right of prohibiting, or that he does not have the right of building; and, if it has already been built, whether one cannot proceed against him in this form, that you do not have the right to have it built in that way, is asked. And it can more readily be said that a partner has a right of prohibiting rather than of doing, because the one who, as I said, attempts to do, in a certain way also pre-empts another’s right for himself, if, as though he were the sole owner, he wishes to use the common right at his own discretion.
Altius aedes suas extollendo, ut luminibus domus minoris annis viginti quinque vel impuberis, cuius curator vel tutor erat, officiatur, efficit: quamvis hoc quoque nomine actione ipse heredesque teneantur, quia quod alium facientem prohibere ex officio necesse habuit, id ipse committere non debuit, tamen et adversus possidentem easdem aedes danda est impuberi vel minori actio, ut quod non iure factum est tollatur.
By raising his buildings higher, so that the lights of the house of a minor under twenty-five years or of an impubes, whose curator or tutor he was, are obstructed, he renders himself liable: although on this ground too he and his heirs are held by an action, because what he was obliged by his office to prohibit another from doing, that he ought not himself to commit, nevertheless an action is also to be given to the impubes or the minor against the possessor of those same buildings, so that what was not done according to law may be removed.
Si a te emero, ut mihi liceat ex aedibus meis in aedes tuas stillicidium immittere et postea te sciente ex causa emptionis immissum habeam, quaero, an ex hac causa actione quadam vel exceptione tuendus sim. respondi utroque auxilio me usurum.
If I buy from you that it be permitted to me to discharge from my premises into yours the stillicide (eavesdrip), and thereafter, with you aware, I have it let in on the ground of the purchase, I ask whether from this cause I am to be protected by some action or by an exception. I answered that I would use both aids.
Cum in domo gaii sei locus quidam aedibus anni ita serviret, ut in eo loco positum habere ius seio non esset, et seius in eo silvam sevisset, in qua labra et tenes cucumellas positas haberet, annio consilium omnes iuris periti dederunt, ut cum eo ageret ius ei non esse in eo loco ea posita habere invito se.
When in the house of gaius seius a certain place thus served the house of annius, that seius did not have the right to have anything set there in that place, and seius had planted a grove there, in which he had basins and stands and little pots placed, all the jurists gave annius the counsel that he should bring an action against him that he had not the right to have those things placed in that place against his will.
Secundum cuius parietem vicinus sterculinum fecerat, ex quo paries madescebat, consulebatur, quemadmodum posset vicinum cogere, ut sterculinum tolleret. respondi, si in loco publico id fecisset, per interdictum cogi posse, sed si in privato, de servitute agere oportere: si damni infecti stipulatus esset, possit per eam stipulationem, si quid ex ea re sibi damni datum esset, servare.
Along the wall of which a neighbor had made a manure-heap, from which the wall was becoming damp, the question was put how he could compel the neighbor to remove the manure-heap. I replied that, if he had done it in a public place, he could be compelled by interdict; but if on private property, one ought to proceed on servitude. If he had stipulated for damnum infectum (damage not yet done), he could by that stipulation protect himself, if any damage had been caused to him from that matter.
Is, cuius familia vicinum prohibebat aquam ducere, sui potestatem non faciebat, ne secum agi posset: quaerit actor, quid sibi faciendum esset. respondi oportere praetorem causa cognita iubere bona adversarii possideri et non ante inde discedere, quam is actori ius aquae ducendae constituisset et si quid, quia aquam ducere prohibitus esset, siccitatibus detrimenti cepisset, veluti si prata arboresve exaruisset.
He whose household was prohibiting a neighbor from conducting water did not put himself within power, so that suit could be brought against him: the plaintiff asks what he should do. I answered that the praetor ought, the cause having been inquired into, to order the goods of the adversary to be possessed, and not to depart from that before he had constituted for the plaintiff the right of conducting water, and also, if, because he had been prohibited from conducting water, he had taken any detriment from droughts—such as if meadows or trees had dried out—to make satisfaction for it.
Si de communi servitute quis bene quidem deberi intendit, sed aliquo modo litem perdidit culpa sua, non est aequum hoc ceteris damno esse: sed si per collusionem cessit lite adversario, ceteris dandam esse actionem de dolo celsus scripsit, idque ait sabino placuisse.
If, concerning a common servitude, someone indeed rightly alleges that it is owed, but in some way loses the suit through his own fault, it is not equitable that this be to the harm of the others; but if by collusion he yielded in the suit to his adversary, Celsus wrote that an action for fraud should be given to the others, and he says that this pleased Sabinus.
Testatrix fundo, quem legaverat, casas iunctas habuit: quaesitum est, si hae fundo legato non cederent eumque legatarius vindicasset, an iste fundus aliquam servitutem casis deberet aut, si ex fideicommissi causa cum sibi dari legatarius desideraret, heredes servitutem aliquam casis excipere deberent. respondit deberi.
The testatrix had attached cottages on the farm which she had bequeathed: the question was raised, if these did not pass with the farm that was bequeathed and the legatee had vindicated it, whether that farm would owe some servitude to the cottages; or, if by reason of the fideicommissum, when the legatee desired that it be given to himself, the heirs ought to reserve some servitude for the cottages. He replied that it is owed.
Plures ex municipibus, qui diversa praedia possidebant, saltum communem, ut ius compascendi haberent, mercati sunt idque etiam a successoribus eorum est observatum: sed nonnulli ex his, qui hoc ius habebant, praedia sua illa propria venum dederunt. quaero, an in venditione etiam ius illud secutum sit praedia, cum eius voluntatis venditores fuerint, ut et hoc alienarent. respondit id observandum, quod actum inter contrahentes esset: sed si voluntas contrahentium manifesta non sit, et hoc ius ad emptores transire.
Several of the municipal citizens, who possessed different estates, purchased a common forest-range, so that they might have the right of common pasturing, and this was also observed by their successors; but some of these, who had this right, sold those their own proper estates. I ask whether in the sale that right also followed the estates, since the sellers were of the intention to alienate this as well. He responded that what had been transacted between the contracting parties must be observed; but if the will of the contracting parties is not manifest, this right too passes to the purchasers.
Si ego via, quae nobis per vicini fundum debebatur, usus fuero, tu autem constituto tempore cessaveris, an ius tuum amiseris? et e contrario, si vicinus, cui via per nostrum fundum debebatur, per meam partem ierit egerit, tuam partem ingressus non fuerit, an partem tuam liberaverit? celsus respondit: si divisus est fundus inter socios regionibus, quod ad servitutem attinet, quae ei fundo debebatur, perinde est, atque si ab initio duobus fundis debita sit: et sibi quisque dominorum usurpat servitutem, sibi non utendo deperdit nec amplius in ea re causae eorum fundorum miscentur: nec fit ulla iniuria ei cuius fundus servit, immo si quo melior, quoniam alter dominorum utendo sibi, non toti fundo proficit.
If I have used the road which was owed to us through the neighbor’s estate, but you have been inactive during the fixed time, have you lost your right? And conversely, if the neighbor, to whom a road through our estate was owed, has gone and driven through my part and has not entered your part, has he freed your part? celsus replied: If the estate has been divided among partners by regions, so far as concerns the servitude which was owed to that estate, it is just as if from the beginning it had been owed to two estates; and each of the owners exercises the servitude for himself and by not using it loses it for himself, and in that matter the causes of those estates are no longer mingled; nor is any injury done to him whose estate is the servant, nay rather it is in some respect better, since one of the owners by using it benefits himself, not the whole estate.
Sed si is fundus qui servierit ita divisus est, plusculum dubitationis ea res habet: nam si certus ac finitus viae locus est, tunc, si per longitudinem eius fundus divisus est, eadem omnia servanda erunt, quae si initio constituendae eius servitutis similiter hic duo fundi fuissent: si vero per latitudinem viae fundus divisus est ( nec multum refert, aequaliter id factus est an inaequaliter), tunc manet idem ius servitutis, quod fundo indiviso fuerat, nec aut usu detineri aut non utendo deperire nisi tota via poterit: nec si forte inciderit, ut semita, quae per alterum dumtaxat fundum erit, uteretur, idcirco alter fundus liberabitur, quoniam unum atque eo modo individuum viae ius est.
But if the estate which has served is thus divided, the matter has a little more doubt: for if the place of the road is certain and bounded, then, if the estate has been divided along its length, all the same things must be observed as if at the beginning, when that servitude was being constituted, there had in like manner been here two estates; but if the estate is divided across the width of the road (and it does not much matter whether this has been done equally or unequally), then the same right of servitude remains as had existed when the estate was undivided, nor can it either be maintained by use or be lost by not using, save as to the whole road; nor, if it should chance that a footpath which lies through only one estate is used, will the other estate for that reason be freed, since the right of way is one and in that manner indivisible.
Possunt tamen alterutrum fundum liberare, si modo hoc specialiter convenit: certe si is cui servitus debebatur alterum ex ea divisione fundum redemerit, num ideo minus ea re fundi alterius servitus permanebit? nec video, quid absurde consecuturum sit eam sententiam fundo altero manente servo: si modo et ab initio potuit angustior constitui via quam lege finita est et adhuc id loci superest in eo fundo, cui remissa servitus non est, ut sufficiat viae: quod si minus loci superest quam viae sufficiat, uterque fundus liberabitur, alter propter redemptionem, alter, quia per eum locum qui superest via constitui non potest.
They can, however, release either estate, provided only that this has been specially agreed: certainly, if the person to whom the servitude was owed has redeemed one estate out of that division, does the servitude on the other estate on that account any the less remain? Nor do I see what absurd consequence would follow from that opinion, with the other estate remaining servient: provided that also from the beginning a way narrower than that fixed by statute could be constituted, and there still remains that amount of ground in the estate for which the servitude has not been remitted as suffices for the way; but if less ground remains than suffices for the way, both estates will be freed—one by reason of the redemption, the other because through the space that remains a way cannot be constituted.
Ceterum si ita constitutum est ius viae, ut per quamlibet partem fundi ire agere liceat, idque vel subinde mutare nihil prohibet atque ita divisus est fundus: si per quamlibet eius partem aeque ire atque agi possit, tunc perinde observabimus atque si ab initio duobus fundis duae servitutes iniunctae fuissent, ut altera retineri, altera non utendo possit deperire.
Moreover, if the right of way has been constituted thus, that it is permitted to go and to drive through any part of the estate, and nothing prevents even changing this from time to time, and the estate has been divided thus: if through any part of it one can equally go and drive, then we shall treat it just as if from the beginning two servitudes had been imposed upon two estates, so that one may be retained, the other may perish through non-use.
Nec me fallit alieno facto ius alterius immutatu iri, quoniam ante satius fuerat per alteram partem ire agere, ut idem ius ei in altera parte fundi retineretur: contra illud commodum acessisse ei cui via debebatur, quod per duas pariter vias ire agere possit bisque octonos in porrectum et senos denos in anfractum.
Nor does it escape me that by another’s act the right of someone else would be altered, since earlier it would have been better to go and drive along the other side, so that the same right would be retained to him on the other side of the estate: on the contrary, that advantage would have accrued to the one to whom the way was owed, namely that he might be able to go and drive along two ways alike, and have twice eight in the straight and sixteen in the bend.
Si sic constituta sit aqua, ut vel aestate ducatur tantum vel uno mense, quaeritur quemadmodum non utendo amittatur, quia non est continuum tempus, quo cum uti non potest, non sit usus. itaque et si alternis annis vel mensibus quis aquam habeat, duplicato constituto tempore amittitur. idem et de itinere custoditur.
If a water (right) has been constituted in such a way that it is drawn either only in summer or for one month, the question arises how it is lost by non-use, since there is not a continuous period during which, because he cannot use it, there is non-use. Therefore, even if someone has water in alternate years or months, it is lost, the constituted time being doubled. The same is observed regarding a right of way.
but if it is on alternate days—either for the whole day or only at night—it is lost in the time set by the laws, because it is a single servitude: for even if he has the servitude on alternate hours or for one hour daily, Servius writes that he loses the servitude by not using it, because what he has is quotidian.
Si stillicidii immittendi ius habeam in aream tuam et permisero ius tibi in ea area aedificandi, stillicidii immittendi ius amitto. et similiter si per tuum fundum via mihi debeatur et permisero tibi in eo loco, per quem via mihi debetur, aliquid facere, amitto ius viae.
If I have the right to discharge eavesdrip onto your yard, and I have permitted to you the right of building on that yard, I lose the right to discharge eavesdrip. And similarly, if a right of way is owed to me through your estate, and I have permitted you to do something in the place through which the way is owed to me, I lose the right of way.
Is cui via vel actus debebatur, ut vehiculi certo genere uteretur, alio genere fuerat usus: videamus ne amiserit servitutem et alia sit eius condicio, qui amplius oneris quam licuit vexerit, magisque hic plus quam aliud egisse videatur: sicuti latiore itinere usus esset aut si plura iumenta egerit quam licuit aut aquae admiscuerit aliam. ideoque in omnibus istis quaestionibus servitus quidem non amittitur, non autem conceditur plus quam pactum est in servitute habere.
He to whom a via or an actus was owed, so that he might use a vehicle of a certain kind, has used another kind: let us see whether he has lost the servitude, and whether the condition is different for one who has carried more load than was permitted, and here he would seem rather to have done more than was allowed: just as if he had used a broader roadway, or had driven more beasts of burden than was permitted, or had mixed other water with the water. And therefore in all these questions the servitude indeed is not lost, but it is not conceded to have more in the servitude than was bargained for.
Qui fundum alienum bona fide emit, itinere quod ei fundo debetur usus est: retinetur id ius itineris: atque etiam si precario aut vi deiecto domino possidet: fundus enim qualiter se habens ita, cum in suo habitu possessus est, ius non deperit, neque refert, iuste nec ne possideat, qui talem eum possidet. quare fortius et si aqua per rivum sua sponte perfluxit, ius aquae ducendae retinetur, quod et sabino recte placet, ut apud neratium libro quarto membranarum scriptum est.
He who in good faith buys another’s estate has used the right of way that is owed to that estate: that right of way is retained; and even if he possesses precariously or with the owner cast out by force, the right is not lost, for the estate, being as it is, when possessed in its own condition, does not lose its right, nor does it matter whether the one who possesses it possesses justly or not, provided he possesses it in such condition. Wherefore, with stronger reason, even if water has of its own accord flowed through a channel, the right of conducting water is retained—which also rightly pleases Sabinus, as is written by Neratius in the fourth book of the Membranae.
Si locus, per quem via aut iter aut actus debebatur, impetu fluminis occupatus esset et intra tempus, quod ad amittendam servitutem sufficit, alluvione facta restitutus est, servitus quoque in pristinum statum restituitur: quod si id tempus praeterierit, ut servitus amittatur, renovare eam cogendus est.
If the place through which a road (via) or path (iter) or drive (actus) was owed were occupied by the onrush of a river, and within the period which suffices for losing the servitude it was restored by alluvion, the servitude likewise is restored to its former state: but if that period has passed, so that the servitude is lost, he is to be compelled to renew it.
Si, cum servitus mihi per plures fundos deberetur, medium fundum adquisivi, manere servitutem puto, quia totiens servitus confunditur, quotiens uti ea is ad quem pertineat non potest: medio autem fundo adquisito potest consistere, ut per primum et ultimum iter debeatur.
If, when a servitude was owed to me across several estates, I acquired the middle estate, I think the servitude remains, because a servitude is merged as often as the person to whom it pertains cannot use it; but with the middle estate acquired it can subsist, so that a right of way is owed through the first and the last.
Aquam, quae oriebatur in fundo vicini, plures per eundem rivum iure ducere soliti sunt, ita ut suo quisque die a capite duceret, primo per eundem rivum eumque communem, deinde ut quisque inferior erat, suo quisque proprio rivo, et unus statuto tempore, quo servitus amittitur, non duxit. existimo eum ius ducendae aquae amisisse nec per ceteros qui duxerunt eius ius usurpatum esse: proprium enim cuiusque eorum ius fuit neque per alium usurpari potuit. quod si plurium fundo iter aquae debitum esset, per unum eorum omnibus his, inter quos is fundus communis fuisset, usurpari potuisset.
A water-source, which arose on a neighbor’s estate, several persons were accustomed by right to conduct through the same channel, such that each on his own day drew from the head—first through the same channel, and that one was common—then, as each was lower, each by his own proper channel; and one of them, during the statutory time by which a servitude is lost, did not draw. I consider him to have lost the right of drawing the water, nor was his right maintained by the others who did draw: for the right of each of them was a proper (personal) right, nor could it be exercised by another. But if over the estate of several persons an iter aquae (a “water-way”) were owed, it could have been exercised, through one of them, for all those among whom that estate was common.
Likewise, if any one of those to whom a servitude of leading water was owed and who were conducting water through the same rivulet has lost the right of leading water by not conducting it, no right on that account accrued to the others who were using the rivulet; and that benefit is his through whose estate that water-way, which by non-use has been lost as to one party’s share, runs: for he enjoys freedom from this part of the servitude.
Si partem fundi vendendo lege caverim, uti per eam partem in reliquum fundum meum aquam ducerem, et statutum tempus intercesserit, antequam rivum facerem, nihil iuris amitto, quia nullum iter aquae fuerit, sed manet mihi ius integrum: quod si fecissem iter neque usus essem, amittam.
If, in selling a part of my estate, I have provided by a clause that I might conduct water through that part into the remaining estate of mine, and the appointed time has elapsed before I made the channel, I lose nothing of my right, because there had been no water-way; rather my right remains entire. But if I had made the way and did not use it, I shall lose it.
Si per fundum meum viam tibi legavero et adita mea hereditate per constitutum tempus ad amittendam servitutem ignoraveris eam tibi legatam esse, amittes viam non utendo. quod si intra idem tempus, antequam rescires tibi legatam servitutem, tuum fundum vendideris, ad emptorem via pertinebit, si reliquo tempore ea usus fuerit, quia scilicet tua esse coeperat: ut iam nec ius repudiandi legatum tibi possit contingere, cum ad te fundus non pertineat.
If over my estate I shall have bequeathed a road to you, and, my inheritance having been entered upon, during the time fixed for losing the servitude you were unaware that it had been bequeathed to you, you will lose the road by not using it. But if within the same time, before you learned that the servitude had been bequeathed to you, you sold your estate, the road will pertain to the buyer, if during the remaining time he shall have used it, because, namely, it had begun to be yours: so that now not even the right of repudiating the legacy can accrue to you, since the estate does not pertain to you.