Contemporary: Fides et Ratio

IOANNIS PAULI PP. II
SUMMI PONTIFICIS
LITTERAE ENCYCLICAE
FIDES ET RATIO
CUNCTIS CATHOLICAE ECCLESIAE EPISCOPIS
DE NECESSITUDINIS NATURA
INTER UTRAMQUE

OF JOHN PAUL PP. 2
SUPREME PONTIFF
ENCYCLICAL LETTER
FAITH AND REASON
TO ALL THE BISHOPS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
ON THE NATURE OF THE BOND
BETWEEN THE TWO

Venerabiles in Episcopatu Fratres,
salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem!

Venerable Brothers in the Episcopate,
greetings and Apostolic Blessing!

FIDES ET RATIO binae quasi pennae videntur quibus veritatis ad contemplationem hominis attollitur animus. Deus autem ipse est qui veritatis cognoscendae studium hominum mentibus insevit, suique tandem etiam cognoscendi ut, cognoscentes Eum diligentesque, ad plenam pariter de se ipsis pertingere possint veritatem (cfr Ex 33,18; Ps 27

FAITH AND REASON seem like two wings by which the spirit of man is lifted up to the contemplation of truth. But God Himself is the one who has implanted in human minds the zeal for the knowledge of truth, and, in the end, even of knowing Himself, so that, knowing Him and loving Him, they may likewise be able to attain to the full truth about themselves (cf. Ex 33,18; Ps 27

[26],8-9; 63

[62],2-3;Io 14,8; 1 Io 3,2).

[62],2-3;Jn 14,8; 1 Jn 3,2).

PROOEMIUM

PROEM

« Nosce te ipsum »

« Know thyself »

1. Fieri quidem potest ut, tam in Orientis orbe quam in Occidentis solis plaga, iter quoddam dignoscatur quod, progredientibus saeculis eo usque hominum genus perduxerit ut cum veritate paulatim congrediatur seque cum illa componat. Hoc quidem iter sic explicatum est — neque aliter accidere potuit — intra prospectum quendam singularis hominum conscientiae: quo namque plenius res orbemque cognovit homo, eo magis ipsemet cognoscit se unica in sua natura, eodemque tempore instans fit interrogatio de significatione rerum suaeque ipsius exsistentiae. Quidquid se nobis obicit veluti cognitionis nostrae argumentum, hanc ipsam ob causam evadit vitae nostrae elementum.

1. It may indeed happen that, as much in the orb of the Orient as in the region of the Occident of the sun, a certain path is discerned which, with the centuries advancing, has led the human race to this point: that it gradually come into engagement with truth and set itself in accord with it. This path, indeed, has been unfolded thus — nor could it have come to pass otherwise — within the prospect of a certain singular human consciousness: for the more fully man has known things and the orb of the world, so much the more he himself recognizes himself as unique in his nature, and at the same time there arises a pressing inquiry concerning the signification of realities and of his own existence. Whatever presents itself to us as, as it were, an argument of our cognition, for this very cause becomes an element of our life.

Admonitio illa Gnwqi seauton in superliminari inscripta erat Delphis in templo, principalem ut veritatem testificaretur quae minima omni homini sumenda erat regula quicumque inter res creatas se extollere cupiebat veluti « hominem » scilicet « sui ipsius cognitorem ».

That admonition Gnwqi seauton, inscribed on the lintel in the temple at Delphi, was so that it might testify to the principal truth, which was the minimal rule to be taken up by every human being, whoever among created things wished to exalt himself as a «man», namely «a cognizer of himself».

Candidus intuitus veteres in annales luculenter aliunde demonstrat, variis in orbis regionibus multiplici humano distinctis cultu, exsistere eodem tempore principales illas interrogationes quibus vita designatur hominum: Quis egomet sum? Unde venio? Quoque vado?

A candid regard into the old annals clearly from elsewhere demonstrates that, in the various regions of the orb, distinguished by a manifold human culture, there exist at the same time those principal interrogations by which the life of human beings is designated: Who am I myself? Whence do I come? Whither do I go?

Cur mala adsunt? Quid nos manet hanc post vitam? Haec quaesita reperiuntur in sacris Israelis scriptionibus, at insunt etiam scriptis Veda necnon Avesta; detegimus ea in operibus Confutii atque Lao-Tze, quemadmodum in praedicatione virorum Tirthankara ipsiusque Buddhae; exsistunt similiter ex Homeri carminibus ac tragoediis Euripidis et Sophoclis, perinde ac philosophicis in Platonis et Aristotelis tractatibus.

Why are evils present? What awaits us after this life? These inquiries are found in the sacred writings of Israel, and they are also present in the writings of the Veda and likewise the Avesta; we detect them in the works of Confucius and Lao-Tze, just as in the preaching of the men called Tirthankaras and of the Buddha himself; they exist likewise in the songs of Homer and the tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles, as well as in the philosophical treatises of Plato and Aristotle.

Hae nempe interrogationes sunt quae ex illa communi profluunt inquisitione de sensu ipso quo numquam non hominis animus inquietatur: ex responsione vero, quae talibus redditur rogationibus, directio pendet quae vitae humanae est imprimenda.

These, namely, are the interrogations which flow forth from that common inquisition about the very sense by which the human mind is never not disquieted; and upon the response that is rendered to such rogations depends the direction that is to be imprinted upon human life.

2. Aliena sane non est Ecclesia, neque esse potest, hoc ab inquirendi opere. Ab eo enim tempore, cum intra Paschale Mysterium postremam accepit de hominis vita veritatem uti donum, facta est illa vicissim peregrina per semitas orbis ut Christum Iesum esse praedicet "viam veritatem et vitam" (cfrIo 14,6). Diversa inter officia, quae hominibus ea offerat oportet, unum illud nimirum esse intellegit sibi plane proprium: Veritatis diaconiam.(1) Hoc officium, una ex parte, facit ut credens ipsa communitas particeps evadat communis illius operae qua homines attingere student veritatem; (2) altera vero ex parte, obstringitur communitas illa officio ut nuntia fiat rerum certarum quas cognovit, licet sibi conscia sit omnem veritatem captam unam dumtaxat stationem esse plenam ad illam veritatem quae ultima in Dei revelatione ostendetur: « Videmus enim nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem; nunc cognosco ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum » (1 Cor 13,12).

2. Truly, the Church is not alien, nor can she be, to this work of inquiring. From that time when, within the Paschal Mystery, she received the ultimate truth about the life of man as a gift, she in turn became a pilgrim along the paths of the world, in order to proclaim that Christ Jesus is “the way, the truth, and the life” (cf.Jn 14:6). Among the diverse offices which it ought to offer to men, she understands that one, namely, to be plainly proper to herself: the diakonia of Truth.(1) This office, on the one hand, makes the believing community itself become a participant in that common work by which human beings strive to attain the truth; (2) on the other hand, that community is bound by the duty to become the herald of certain matters which it has come to know, although she is conscious that every truth grasped is only a single station, complete in itself, toward that Truth which will ultimately be shown in God’s revelation: « For now we see through a mirror, in an enigma; but then, face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know, just as I have been known » (1 Cor 13:12).

3. Multiplices sunt facultates quibus uti potest homo ut veritatum cognoscendarum foveat progressionem, unde exsistentiam suam humaniorem reddat. Inter hasphilosophia eminet, quae recta adiuvat ut et interrogatio ponatur de vitae sensu et ei responsio iam adumbretur: quapropter unum ipsa reperitur nobiliorum hominis munerum. « Philosophiae » vox Graecam ad originem « sapientiae amorem » designat.

3. Multiple are the faculties which a human can use to foster the progression of the knowing of truths, whereby he renders his existence more human. Among these,philosophy stands out, which rightly helps both that the interrogation be posed concerning the sense of life and that a response to it be already sketched: wherefore it is found to be one of the nobler offices of man. The word « Philosophy » by its Greek origin designates « love of wisdom ».

Etenim nata philosophia est atque eo tempore enucleata quo coepit se ipsum homo interrogare de rerum causis finibusque. Diversis quidem formis modisque demonstrat philosophia ad ipsam hominis naturam pertinere veritatis cupiditatem. Innata est eius menti illa proprietas ut de rerum percontetur causis etiamsi responsiones paulatim inde redditae in formam quandam ingrediuntur quae diversas cultus humani species inter se complere manifesto ostendit.

Indeed, philosophy was born and at that time brought into the clear when man began to interrogate himself about the causes and the ends of things. In diverse forms and modes philosophy demonstrates that the desire for truth pertains to the very nature of man. Innate to his mind is that property by which he inquires about the causes of things, even if the responses gradually rendered therefrom enter into a certain form which plainly shows that the diverse kinds of human culture mutually complete one another.

Impulsio vehemens illa, quam ad efformationem progressionemque culturae in orbe Occidentali adhibuit philosophia, facere haud debet ut obliviscamur quatenus ipsa quoque pervaserit vias etiam humanae vitae concipiendae ex quibus Orientalis etiam vivit orbis. Cuique enim populo nativa est atque pristina sapientia quae, tamquam verus animi culturarum thesaurus, eo tendit ut exprimatur et rationibus potissimum philosophicis maturetur. Quam sit hoc verum inde etiam comprobatur quod principalis quaedam philosophicae scientiae figura, nostris etiam temporibus, deprehendi potest in iis postulatis quibus leges Nationum et civitatum informantur ad socialem vitam moderandam.

That vehement impulse which philosophy applied to the efformation and progression of culture in the Western world ought not to make us forget to what extent it too has pervaded the ways even of conceiving human life, from which the Eastern world also lives. For to each people there is native and pristine wisdom which, as the true treasury of the spirit of cultures, tends toward being expressed and being matured by reasons, most of all philosophical ones. How true this is is also proved by the fact that a certain principal form of philosophical science, even in our own times, can be discerned in those postulates by which the laws of Nations and of states are informed for the moderating of social life.

4. Quidquid autem id est, notetur oportet sub uno nomine diversas latere significationes. Praevia igitur explicatio necessaria evadit. Concupiscens extremam vitae veritatem homo adipisci, illas universales studet comparare cognitiones quae ei facultatem dant melius se comprehendendi ulteriusque progrediendi ad se perficiendum.

4. Whatever, however, it is, it ought to be noted that under one name diverse significations lie hidden. Therefore a preliminary explication proves necessary. Desiring to acquire the ultimate truth of life, man strives to procure those universal cognitions which give him the faculty to comprehend himself better and to progress further toward perfecting himself.

Fundamentales hae notiones illa ex admiratione emanant quam rerum creatarum contemplatio in eo excitat: rapitur enim homo stupens quod se in rerum universitatem videt insertum cum aliis sui similibus consociatum quibuscum etiam communicat sortem. Iter hinc incipit quod illum pervehet ad novos usque cognitionis orbes detegendos. Nisi obstupescens miraretur homo, in repetitionem quandam sterilem recideret ac, paulatim, facultatem amitteret vitae reapse personalis ducendae.

These fundamental notions emanate from that admiratione which the contemplation of created things arouses in him: for the human being, astonished, is caught up by the fact that he sees himself inserted into the universe of things, consociated with others like himself with whom he also shares a lot. From here begins the journey which will convey him to the discovery of ever new orbs of knowledge. Unless man, in his astonishment, were to marvel, he would fall back into a certain sterile repetition and, little by little, lose the capacity of leading a truly personal life.

Speculandi potestas, quae humani propria est intellectus, adiuvat ut, philosophicam per industriam, figura enucleetur exactae cogitationis sicque ordinata exstruatur disciplina logico affirmationum consensu atque solido doctrinarum contextu distincta. Hanc propter rationem, variis in cultus humani formis diversisque pariter aetatibus, fructus percepti sunt qui elaborandis veris cogitationum modis profuerunt. Ad historiae fidem factum est ut istud induceret ad unam dumtaxat philosophiae viam confundendam cum tota philosophica disciplina.

The power of speculating, which is proper to the human intellect, helps so that, through philosophical industry, the figure of exact cogitation may be enucleated and thus an ordered discipline may be built up, distinguished by the logical consensus of affirmations and by a solid context of doctrines. For this reason, in the various forms of human culture and likewise in diverse ages, fruits have been reaped which were of profit for elaborating true modes of cogitation. According to the record of history, it came about that this led to only one path of philosophy being confounded with the whole philosophical discipline.

Constat vero, his in casibus, certam quandam exsistere « superbiam philosophicam » quae suos attollere audeat oculos longe prospicientes at imperfectos ad interpretationem aliquam universalem. Re vera quodque philosophiae corpus, quantumvis reverendum sua in summa et amplitudine sine ullis abusibus, agnoscere debet principatum philosophicae cogitationis, ex qua et suam ducit originem et cui congruenter serviat necesse est.

It is established, indeed, in these cases, that there exists a certain « philosophical pride » which dares to lift its own eyes—far-seeing yet imperfect—toward some universal interpretation. In truth, each philosophical corpus, however venerable in its own highest form and amplitude, without any abuses, ought to acknowledge the primacy of philosophical cogitation, from which it also draws its origin and which it must fittingly serve.

Hoc modo, quamquam mutantur tempora cognitionesque progrediuntur, agnosci licet quasi nucleum quendam philosophicarum notionum, quae nonnumquam adsunt in hominum cogitantium historia. Cogitentur verbi gratia, principia non contradictionis, finalitatis ac causalitatis nec non cogitatum personae veluti subiecti liberi et intellegentis eiusque facultas Deum veritatem bonumque cognoscendi; cogitentur pariter nonnullae normae morales praecipuae quae omnium item sunt communes. Haec aliaque argumenta demonstrant, variis doctrinarum praetermissis scholis, corpus exsistere cognitionum in quibus introspici potest genus quoddam spiritalis hominum patrimonii.

In this way, although times change and cognitions advance, it is possible to recognize as it were a certain nucleus of philosophical notions, which are sometimes present in the history of thinking human beings. Let there be considered, for example, the principles of non-contradiction, finality, and causality, and also the notion of the person as a free and intelligent subject and its faculty of knowing God, truth, and the good; let there likewise be considered certain principal moral norms which are likewise common to all. These and other arguments demonstrate—leaving aside the various schools of doctrines—that there exists a corpus of cognitions in which one can look into a certain kind of spiritual patrimony of human beings.

Ita fit ut ante oculos quasi philosophiam implicitam reperiamus cuius principia quisque homo se possidere sentiat, tametsi sub forma omnino universali neque conscia. Quoniam communicantur hae notiones quadamtenus ab omnibus, ipsae efficere debent medium quoddam punctum quo diversae philosophicae scholae confluunt. Quotiens ratio percipere valet atque exprimere prima et universalia vitae principia indeque recte consectaria propria deducere ordinis logici et deontologici, totiens appellari potest ratio recta sive, quemadmodum antiqui loquebantur, orqoV logoV.

Thus it comes about that before our eyes we find, as it were, an implicit philosophy whose principles each person feels himself to possess, though under a wholly universal and not conscious form. Since these notions are communicated in some measure by everyone, they themselves ought to constitute a kind of midpoint at which diverse philosophical schools flow together. Whenever reason is able to perceive and to express the first and universal principles of life, and from there rightly to deduce the proper consequents of the logical and deontological order, then it can be called right reason, or, as the ancients used to speak, orqoV logoV.

5. Sua ex parte facere non potest Ecclesia quin magni officium rationis aestimet ad proposita illa consequenda unde ipsa hominum vita dignior reddatur. Etenim in philosophia viam ipsa conspicatur cognoscendi principales veritates hominum vitam tangentes. Eodem tempore, philosophiam iudicat instrumentum pernecessarium ut fidei intellectus altius inquiratur atque Evangelii veritas iis impertiatur qui eam nondum cognoverunt.

5. On its own part, the Church cannot but esteem highly the office of reason for attaining those aims whence human life itself is rendered more dignified. Indeed, in philosophy she herself beholds a way of knowing the principal truths touching human life. At the same time, she judges philosophy an indispensable instrument, so that the intellect of faith may be inquired into more deeply and the truth of the Gospel may be imparted to those who have not yet come to know it.

Similia igitur Decessorum Nostrorum coepta prosecuti, cupimus etiam Nos ad hoc peculiare rationis humanae opus convertere oculos. Eo praesertim impellimur quod novimus his maxime temporibus veritatis ultimae inquisitionem saepius obscuratam videri. Haud dubitatur quin philosophiae recentiori laudi tribuatur quod mentes iam in hominem ipsum intenduntur.

Therefore, following similar undertakings of Our Predecessors, We too desire to turn our eyes to this particular work of human reason. We are driven to this especially because we know that in these very times the inquiry into ultimate truth seems more often to be obscured. There is no doubt that to more recent philosophy credit is ascribed for the fact that minds are now directed toward the human being himself.

Hinc initio facto, quaedam ratio interrogationum plena ulterius propulit hominis cupiditatem plus plusque cognoscendi atque singula multo altius. Ita doctrinarum formae implexae exstructae sunt quae suos variis in cognitionis provinciis protulerunt fructus, progressui nempe faventes tum culturae tum historiae. Anthropologia, logica disciplina, scientiae naturales, historia et sermo..., immo quodam modo universitas cognitionis humanae est assumpta.

Hence, a beginning having been made, a certain ratio full of interrogations further propelled man’s cupidity of knowing more and more—and the individual things much more deeply. Thus complex forms of doctrines were built up, which have brought forth their fruits in the various provinces of cognition, favoring progress, namely, both of culture and of history. Anthropology, the logical discipline, the natural sciences, history and discourse..., indeed, in a certain way, the universality of human cognition has been taken up.

Effectus re percepti suadere aliunde non debent ut obscuretur quod ipsa ratio, ad investigandum uno solo ex latere hominem uti subiectum intenta, videtur esse omnino oblita eundem hominem semper invitari ut ad veritatem se transcendentem progrediatur. Deficiente habitudine ad illam, quisque homo exponitur arbitrio soli suo atque ipsius velut personae condicio in eo est ut regulis unis pragmaticis aestimetur quae suapte natura experimentis innituntur, cum perperam credatur technicam artem necessario debere reliquis rebus dominari. Sic sane accidit ut, cum melius hanc intentionem ad veritatem exprimere deberet, gravata contra onere tot notitiarum ratio humana in se replicaretur atque de die in diem minus intuitum suum attollere in altiora posset ut veritatem exsistentiae consequi auderet.

The effects perceived in reality ought not otherwise to persuade so that it be obscured that reason itself, intent on investigating the human being as subject from only one side, seems to be utterly forgetful that this same human being is always invited to advance toward the truth transcending himself. With the relation to that truth failing, each person is exposed to his own sole arbitrium, and the condition, as it were, of the person is such that he is judged by merely pragmatic rules which by their very nature rely on experiments, since it is wrongly believed that technical art must of necessity dominate the rest. Thus indeed it comes about that, when it ought rather to express this intention toward truth more fittingly, human reason, burdened on the contrary with the weight of so many items of knowledge, folds back upon itself, and from day to day is less able to lift its gaze to higher things so that it might dare to attain the truth of existence.

Recentior philosophia, omittens suas perquisitiones in ipsum « esse » dirigere, opus suum in cognitionibus hominum collocavit. Non ergo extulit facultatem quae homini data est veritatis cognoscendae, sed extollere eius limites maluit et condiciones.

More recent philosophy, omitting to direct its inquiries toward “being” itself, has situated its task in the cognitions of human beings. It has therefore not extolled the faculty given to man for knowing truth, but has preferred to extol its limits and conditions.

Multiplices hinc enatae sunt agnosticismi et relativismi formae quibus eo usque provecta est philosophica investigatio ut iam in mobili veluti scepticismi universalis tellure pererraret. Recentius praeterea variae invaluerunt doctrinae illuc tendentes ut etiam illae veritates imminuantur quas homo se iam adeptum esse putaverat. Licita sententiarum varietas iam indistincto concessit pluralismo, principio niso omnes opinationes idem prorsus valere: unum hoc est signorum latissime disseminatorum illius diffidentiae de veritate, quam hodiernis in adiunctis deprehendi passim licet.

From this there have arisen multiple forms of agnosticism and relativism, by which philosophical investigation has been advanced so far that it now wanders over the shifting soil, as it were, of universal skepticism. More recently, moreover, various doctrines have gained currency tending to this: that even those verities be diminished which man had supposed himself already to have attained. The lawful variety of opinions has now yielded to an indiscriminate pluralism, on the principle that all opinions are of exactly the same value: this is one of the most widely disseminated signs of that diffidence about truth, which in today’s circumstances one may detect everywhere.

In idem diffidens iudicium incidunt etiam quaedam vitae notiones ex Oriente profectae; in iis, enim, veritati negatur propria eius indoles, cum pro concesso sumatur pari modo veritatem diversis indicari in doctrinis, vel inter se contradicentibus. Hoc in rerum prospectu cuncta ad opinationem quandam rediguntur. Percipitur quasi motus quidam fluctuans: cum hinc philosophica investigatio iam in illam viam se inserere potuit, quae propiorem eam reddit ad hominum vitam eiusque formas expressas, illinc tamen eadem inquisitio explicare iam vult deliberationes exsistentiales, hermeneuticas vel linguisticas quae alienae sunt a fundamentali hac quaestione de veritate cuiusque hominis vitae, exsistentiae atque Dei ipsius.

Into the same distrustful judgment fall also certain notions of life proceeding from the East; in these, indeed, truth is denied its proper nature, since it is taken for granted that truth is indicated in equal measure in diverse doctrines, even in those contradicting one another. In this prospect of things, everything is reduced to a kind of opinion. One perceives, as it were, a certain fluctuating motion: since on the one hand philosophical investigation has already been able to insert itself onto that way which renders it closer to human life and its expressed forms, on the other hand this same inquiry now wishes to explicate existential, hermeneutic, or linguistic deliberations which are alien to this fundamental question concerning the truth of each person’s life, existence, and of God himself.

Quapropter in homine nostrae aetatis, neque tantummodo quosdam apud philosophos, iam emerserunt affectus alicuius diffidentiae passim disseminatae nulliusque fiduciae de permagnis hominum cognoscendi facultatibus. Falso cum pudore quis contentus fit veritatibus ex parte et ad tempus, quin interrogationes radicales ponere iam contendat de sensu extremoque vitae humanae fundamento, in singulis hominibus et in ipsa societate. Brevi: spes iam interiit fieri posse ut talibus interrogationibus decretoriae responsiones reddantur.

Wherefore, in the human being of our age—and not only among certain philosophers—there have now emerged feelings of a certain diffidence, disseminated everywhere, and of no confidence in the very great faculties of human knowing. With a false modesty one becomes content with truths partial and for a time, without striving now to pose radical questions about the meaning and the ultimate foundation of human life, in individual persons and in society itself. In brief: the hope has already perished that to such questions decisive responses can be rendered.

6. Ecclesia vigens auctoritate illa, quae ei obtingit quod Revelationis Iesu Christi est custos, confirmare cupit huius meditationis necessitatem super veritate. Hanc ipsam ob causam in animum induximus appellare tum vos Veneratos in Episcopatu Fratres quibuscum annuntiandi communicamus munus « in manifestatione veritatis » (2 Cor 4,2) tum etiam philosophos atque theologos quorum est diversos veritatis perscrutari aspectus, tum etiam homines omnes adhuc quaerentes, ut nonnullas participemus cogitationes de itinere quod conducit ad veram sapientiam, ut quicumque in pectore amorem ipsius habeat, rectam ingredi valeat viam ut eam consequatur, in eaque quietem reperiat suis a laboribus spiritalemque laetitiam.

6. The Church, flourishing in that authority which accrues to it because it is the custodian of the Revelation of Jesus Christ, wishes to confirm the necessity of this meditation upon truth. For this very reason we have resolved to address both you, Venerated Brothers in the Episcopate, with whom we share the office of announcing « in the manifestation of truth » (2 Cor 4,2), and also philosophers and theologians, whose task it is to scrutinize the diverse aspects of truth, and likewise all human beings still seeking, so that we may share some thoughts about the journey that leads to true wisdom, in order that whoever has love of it in his breast may be able to enter upon the right way to attain it, and in it may find rest from his labors and spiritual joy.

Ad hoc inceptum Nos adducit conscientia in primis quae verbis Concilii Vaticani II significatur cum Episcopos esse adfirmat « divinae et catholicae veritatis testes ».(3) Testificandae igitur veritatis officium est concreditum nobis Episcopis, quod deponere haud possumus quin simul ministerium acceptum deseramus. Fidei veritatem confirmantes, nostrae aetatis hominibus reddere possumus veram fiduciam de propriis cognoscendi facultatibus ipsique philosophicae disciplinae praebere provocationem ut suam plenam recuperare valeat explicareque dignitatem.

To this undertaking there leads us above all the conscience which is signified by the words of Vatican Council 2, when it affirms that the Bishops are « witnesses of the divine and catholic truth ».(3) Therefore the office of testifying to the truth has been entrusted to us Bishops, which we cannot lay down without at the same time abandoning the ministry received. By confirming the truth of the faith, we can render to the people of our age a true confidence concerning their own capacities for knowing, and offer to the philosophical discipline itself a challenge, that it may be able to recover its full dignity and to unfold it.

Alia Nos quoque permovet causa ut has perscribamus deliberationes. Litteris in Encyclicis Veritatis splendor inscriptis animorum intentionem direximus ad quasdam « doctrinae catholicae fundamentales veritates quae in periculo versantur deformationis vel negationis ob rerum adiuncta aetatis nostrae ».(4) His Litteris pergere cupimus easdem meditationes ulterius persequi, mente videlicet conversa ad argumentum ipsius veritatis eiusque fundamentum quod spectat ad fidem. Etenim negari non potest hoc celerium et implicatarum mutationum tempore iuniores praesertim, ad quos pertinet ventura aetas et de quibus ea pendet, illi exponi sensui sive persuasioni se certis privari fundamentalibus principiis ad quae referantur. Necessitas alicuius solidi firmamenti, in quo vita singulorum hominum societatisque exstruatur, vehementius persentitur praesertim quotiens necesse est comprobare partialem naturam propositorum quae res transeuntes ad gradum alicuius ponderis tollunt, dum decipiunt potestatem ipsam assequendi verum vitae sensum.

Another cause likewise moves Us to write out these deliberations. In the Encyclical Letter entitled Veritatis splendor We directed the attention of minds to certain « fundamental truths of Catholic doctrine which are in danger of deformation or negation on account of the circumstances of our age ».(4) With this Letter We desire to continue to pursue further the same meditations, the mind namely turned to the very theme of truth and its foundation as it regards faith. For it cannot be denied that in this time of swift and intricate changes the younger people especially, to whom the coming age pertains and on whom it depends, are exposed to the feeling or persuasion that they are deprived of certain fundamental principles to which they might refer. The necessity of some solid foundation, upon which the life of individual human beings and of society may be built, is felt more strongly, especially whenever it is necessary to prove the partial nature of proposals which lift passing things to the level of a certain weight, while they deceive the very capacity of attaining the true meaning of life.

Ita profecto evenit ut multi suam vitam ad ipsum praecipitii marginem producant, nescientes interea quid ultra maneat. Inde hoc nempe accidit quod nonnumquam ii, quos munus fere proprium obstringebat ut culturae formis fructus proferrent suarum deliberationum, oculos a veritate abstraherent, cum laboris successum subitum praeferrent patientis inquisitionis labori earum rerum quae vivendo sunt experiendae. Strenue igitur pristinam suam vocationem recuperare debet philosophia cuius grave est officium cogitationem humanam informare nec non humanum ipsum cultum, perpetuo revocando homines ad veritatis perquisitionem.

Thus indeed it comes about that many draw out their life to the very brink of the precipice, not knowing meanwhile what lies beyond. Hence it namely happens that sometimes those whom their office, almost proper to them, bound to bring forth for the forms of culture the fruits of their deliberations, turned their eyes away from truth, when they preferred the sudden success of work to the labor of patient inquisition into those things which are to be experienced by living. Therefore philosophy must vigorously recover its pristine vocation, whose grave duty it is to inform human cogitation and likewise human culture itself, by continually calling human beings back to the pursuit of truth.

Hac omnino de causa non solam necessitatem sensimus, verum etiam morale officium ut de hoc argumento eloqueremur, ut hominum genus, limen tertii millenni christiani aetatis supergressurum, magis conscium sibi facultatum magnarum reddatur quae illi sunt concessae seque renovato animi fervore dedat salutis explendo consilio in quod ipsius est inserta historia.

For this very reason we sensed not only a necessity, but also a moral duty to speak on this subject, so that the human race, about to cross the threshold of the 3rd millennium of the Christian age, may be made more conscious of the great faculties that have been granted to it, and may devote itself, with a renewed fervor of spirit, to fulfilling the plan of salvation into which its own history has been inserted.

CAPUT I

CHAPTER 1

SAPIENTIAE DIVINAE PATEFACTIO

PATEFACTION OF DIVINE WISDOM

Iesus Patris Revelator

Jesus Revealer of the Father

7. Omni meditationi quam perficit Ecclesia subiacet conscientia apud ipsam nuntium depositum esse qui suam trahat originem ex Deo ipso (cfr2 Cor 4,1-2). Haud ex propria consideratione provenit haec conscientia etiam profundissima quam hominibus ea praebet, verum ex verbi Dei in fide receptione (cfr 1 Thess 2,13). Ad vitae nostrae uti credentium originem congressio quaedam, sui generis unica, invenitur quae mysterii a saeculis absconditi designat illuminationem (cfr 1 Cor 2,7; Rom 16,25-26), quod autem nunc aperitur: « Placuit Deo in sua bonitate et sapientia seipsum revelare et notum facere sacramentum voluntatis suae (cfr Eph 1,9), quo homines per Christum, Verbum carnem factum, in Spiritu Sancto accessum habent ad Patrem et divinae naturae consortes efficiuntur ».(5) Hoc est plane gratuitum opus quod a Deo proficiscitur et ad homines pervenit ut illi salvi fiant. Tamquam amoris fons Deus se cupit cognosci atque cognitio quam illius habet homo omnem perficit aliam notitiam quam mens eius assequi potest de propriae exsistentiae sensu.

7. To every meditation which the Church brings to completion there underlies the consciousness that with her there has been deposited a message which draws its origin from God himself (cfr2 Cor 4,1-2). This consciousness, even the most profound which it offers to human beings, does not arise from its own consideration, but from the reception in faith of the word of God (cfr 1 Thess 2,13). At the origin of our life as believers there is found a certain encounter, unique in its kind, which designates the illumination of the mystery hidden for ages (cfr 1 Cor 2,7; Rom 16,25-26), which, however, is now opened: «It pleased God in his goodness and wisdom to reveal himself and to make known the mystery of his will (cfr Eph 1,9), by which human beings through Christ, the Word made flesh, in the Holy Spirit have access to the Father and are made sharers of the divine nature».(5) This is plainly a gratuitous work which proceeds from God and reaches human beings so that they may be saved. As a fount of love God desires to be known, and the knowledge which man has of Him perfects every other knowing which his mind can attain concerning the sense of his own existence.

8. Doctrinam fere verbatim repetens, quam Concilii Vaticani I ConstitutioDei Filius exhibet, rationemque ducens principiorum in Concilio Tridentino propositorum Constitutio Concilii Vaticani II Dei Verbum ulterius produxit saeculare iter intellectus fidei, Revelationem ad doctrinae biblicae institutionisque totius patristicae lucem ponderando. Concilii Vaticani I participes supernaturalem revelationis divinae extulerunt indolem. Negabat censura rationalistica, quae eo ipso tempore adversus fidem movebatur secundum falsas lateque disseminatas opinationes, omnem cognitionem quae rationis naturalium potestatum non esset consecutio.

8. Repeating almost verbatim the doctrine which the ConstitutionDei Filius of Vatican Council 1 presents, and drawing out the rationale of the principles proposed in the Council of Trent, the Constitution of Vatican Council 2, Dei Verbum, further advanced the age-long journey of the intellectus fidei, by weighing Revelation in the light of biblical doctrine and of the whole patristic instruction. The participants of Vatican Council 1 extolled the supernatural character of divine revelation. The rationalistic censure, which at that very time was being moved against the faith according to false and widely disseminated opinions, denied every cognition which was not a consequence of the natural powers of reason.

Hoc quidem Concilium induxit ut vehementer inculcaret ultra omnem rationis humanae cognitionem, quae suapte natura ad Conditorem usque agnoscendum progredi valeret, cognitionem etiam reperiri quae fidei propria esset. Haec cognitio veritatem exprimit quae fundamentum invenit in Deo sese revelante quaeque veritas est certissima quandoquidem Deus nec fallit nec fallere cupit.(6)

This indeed led the Council to inculcate strongly that, beyond every cognition of human reason, which by its very nature is able to progress as far as recognizing the Creator, there is also found a cognition which is proper to faith. This cognition expresses the truth which finds its foundation in God revealing himself, and which truth is most certain, since God neither deceives nor wishes to deceive. (6)

9. Docet itaque Concilium Vaticanum I veritatem ex philosophica deliberatione perceptam atque Revelationis veritatem non confundi neutramque earum alteram reddere supervacaneam: « Duplicem esse ordinem cognitionis non solum principio, sed obiecto etiam distinctum: principio quidem, quia in altero naturali ratione, in altero fide divina cognoscimus; obiecto autem, quia praeter ea, ad quae naturalis ratio pertingere potest, credenda nobis proponuntur mysteria in Deo abscondita, quae, nisi revelata divinitus, innotescere non possunt ».(7) Quae Dei testimonio innititur fides atque supernaturali gratiae utitur adiumento, re vera ad alium pertinet ordinem ac philosophicae cognitionis. Sensuum enim haec perceptioni adnititur nec non experientiae ac se sub intellectus solius lumine movet. Philosophia atque scientiae in naturalis rationis versantur ordine, dum contra a Spiritu illuminata et gubernata fides agnoscit in ipso salutis nuntio « gratiae et veritatis plenitudinem » (cfrIo 1,14) quam per historiam patefacere decrevit Deus semelque in sempiternum per Filium suum Iesum Christum (cfr 1 Io 5,9; Io 5,31-32).

9. Thus Vatican I teaches that the truth perceived from philosophical deliberation and the truth of Revelation are not to be confounded, nor does either of them render the other superfluous: «There is a double order of cognition, distinct not only in principle but also in object: in principle, indeed, because in the one we know by natural reason, in the other by divine faith; in object, moreover, because beyond those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to us to be believed mysteries hidden in God which, unless divinely revealed, cannot become known».(7) The faith which relies upon the testimony of God and uses the aid of supernatural grace truly pertains to an order other than that of philosophical cognition. For this latter leans upon the perception of the senses and upon experience as well, and moves itself under the light of intellect alone. Philosophy and the sciences are engaged in the order of natural reason, while on the contrary faith, illuminated and governed by the Spirit, recognizes in the very message of salvation «the plenitude of grace and truth» (cfrJohn 1,14) which God decreed to lay open through history, once and for all forever, through his Son Jesus Christ (cfr 1 John 5,9; John 5,31-32).

10. In Concilio Vaticano II Patres intendentes in Iesum Revelatorem mentes, voluerunt naturam revelationis Dei salutiferam collustrare in historia, cuius hoc modo proprietatem ita significaverunt: « Hac itaque revelatione Deus invisibilis (cfrCol 1,15; 1 Tim 1,17) ex abundantia caritatis suae homines tamquam amicos alloquitur (cfr Ex 33,11; Io 15,14-15) et cum eis conversatur (cfr Bar 3,38), ut eos ad societatem secum invitet in eamque suscipiat. Haec Revelationis oeconomia fit gestis verbisque intrinsece inter se connexis, ita ut opera, in historia salutis a Deo patrata, doctrinam et res verbis significatas manifestent ac corroborent, verba autem opera proclament et mysterium in eis contentum elucident. Intima autem per hanc Revelationem tam de Deo quam de hominis salute veritas nobis in Christo illucescit, qui mediator simul et plenitudo totius revelationis exsistit ».(8)

10. At Vatican Council 2 the Fathers, directing their minds to Jesus the Revealer, wished to illumine in history the salvific nature of God’s revelation, whose property they thus signified in this way: « By this revelation, therefore, the invisible God (cfrCol 1,15; 1 Tim 1,17), out of the abundance of his charity, addresses human beings as friends (cfr Ex 33,11; Io 15,14-15) and converses with them (cfr Bar 3,38), so as to invite them to fellowship with himself and to receive them into it. This economy of Revelation takes place by deeds and words intrinsically connected with one another, so that the works, wrought by God in the history of salvation, manifest and corroborate the doctrine and the realities signified by the words, while the words proclaim the works and elucidate the mystery contained in them. Moreover, through this Revelation the innermost truth both about God and about the salvation of man shines upon us in Christ, who exists as at once the Mediator and the plenitude of the whole revelation ».(8)

11. In tempus propterea inque historiae annales se interserit Dei revelatio. Immo evenit Iesu Christi incarnatio « in plenitudine temporis » (cfrGal 4,4). Duobus ideo milibus annorum post illum eventum necesse esse rursus adseverare istud arbitramur: « Christiana in fide praecipuum habet pondus tempus ».(9) Intra tempus namque profertur in lucem totum creationis ac salutis opus at in primis elucet per Filii Dei incarnationem vivere nos et iam nunc id antecapere quod ipsius temporis erit complementum (cfr Heb 1,2).

11. Therefore God’s revelation inserts itself into time and into the annals of history. Indeed, the Incarnation of Jesus Christ occurs « in the fullness of time » (cfrGal 4,4). Therefore, two thousand years after that event, we deem it necessary to assert again this: « Time has principal weight in the Christian faith ».(9) For within time the whole work of creation and salvation is brought to light, and, in the first place, it shines forth that through the Incarnation of the Son of God we live and already now anticipate that which will be the complement of time itself (cfr Heb 1,2).

Quam veritatem homini Deus concredidit de eo ipso eiusque vita in tempus itaque se introducit nec non in historiam. Semel quidem in perpetuum enuntiata est in mysterio Iesu Nazareni. Hoc eloquentibus quidem verbis edicit Constitutio Dei Verbum: « Postquam vero multifariam multisque modis Deus locutus est in Prophetis, "novissime diebus istis locutus est nobis in Filio" (Heb 1,1-2). Misit enim Filium suum, aeternum scilicet Verbum, qui omnes homines illuminat, ut inter homines habitaret iisque intima Dei enarraret (cfr Io 1,1-18). Iesus Christus [...], Verbum caro factum, "homo ad homines" missus, "verba Dei loquitur" (Io 3,34), et opus salutare consummat quod dedit ei Pater faciendum (cfr Io 5,36; 17,4). Quapropter Ipse, quem qui videt, videt et Patrem (cfr Io 14,9), tota sui ipsius praesentia ac manifestatione, verbis et operibus, signis et miraculis, praesertim autem morte sua et gloriosa ex mortuis resurrectione, misso tandem Spiritu veritatis, Revelationem complendo perficit ».(10)

The truth about Himself and His life which God entrusted to man therefore inserts itself into time and into history. It was once indeed for all time enunciated in the mystery of Jesus the Nazarene. This the Constitution Dei Verbum declares in eloquent words: « After God had spoken in many parts and in many ways in the Prophets, "in these last days he has spoken to us in the Son" (Heb 1,1-2). For he sent his Son, the eternal Word namely, who enlightens all men, that he might dwell among men and recount to them the intimate things of God (cfr Io 1,1-18). Jesus Christ [...], the Word made flesh, "man sent to men," "speaks the words of God" (Io 3,34), and consummates the saving work which the Father gave him to do (cfr Io 5,36; 17,4). Wherefore He Himself, he whom whoever sees, sees the Father also (cfr Io 14,9), by the whole of his own presence and manifestation, by words and works, signs and miracles, but especially by his death and his glorious rising from the dead, the Spirit of truth having at last been sent, by completing, perfects Revelation ».(10)

Efficit itaque populo Dei historia haec iter quoddam ex toto percurrendum, ita ut revelata veritas omnem suam plene aperiat continentiam ob Spiritus Sancti continuam actionem (cfr Io 16,13). Id rursus Constitutio Dei Verbum docet cum adfirmat: « Ecclesia, volventibus saeculis, ad plenitudinem divinae veritatis iugiter tendit, donec in ipsa consummentur verba Dei ».(11)

Accordingly, this history effects for the people of God a certain journey to be traversed in its entirety, so that the revealed truth may fully lay open all its content, on account of the continual action of the Holy Spirit (cfr Io 16,13). This again the Constitution Dei Verbum teaches when it affirms: « The Church, as the ages roll on, unceasingly strives toward the plenitude of divine truth, until in it the words of God are consummated ».(11)

12. Locus ita evadit historia ubi comprobare possumus Dei acta pro hominibus. Nos enim attingit ille in iis quae nobis maxime sunt familiaria et ad demonstrandum facilia, quia cotidiana nostra constituunt adiuncta, quibus submotis haud possemus nosmet ipsos intellegere.

12. Thus history becomes the place where we can verify the acts of God for human beings. For he touches us in those things that are most familiar to us and easy to demonstrate, because our quotidian matters constitute the circumstances, with which removed we would not be able to understand our very selves.

Permittit Dei Filii incarnatio ut perennis ac postrema summa videatur completa quam ex se profecta hominum mens numquam fingere sibi valuisset: Aeternum ingreditur tempus, Quod est Omne absconditur in parte, Deus hominis suscipit vultum. Christi in Revelatione igitur expressa veritas iam nullis circumscribitur artis locorum et culturarum finibus, verum cuivis viro et feminae aperitur quae eam complecti voluerit veluti sermonem penitus validum qui vitae tribuat sensum. In Christo omnes homines iam accessum habent ad Patrem; sua namque morte ac resurrectione Ipse vitam aeternam dono dedit quam primus respuerat Adamus (cfr Rom 5,12-15). Hanc per Revelationem ultima exhibetur homini de propria vita veritas deque historiae sorte: « Reapse nonnisi in mysterio Verbi incarnati mysterium hominis vere clarescit » adseverat Constitutio Gaudium et spes.(12) Extra hunc rerum conspectum mysterium vitae singulorum hominum manet aenigma insolubile.

The Incarnation of the Son of God permits that the perennial and final summa may be seen as completed, which the human mind, proceeding from itself, would never have been able to imagine for itself: the Eternal enters time, the One who is the All is hidden in a part, God takes on the face of man. In the Revelation of Christ, therefore, the expressed truth is now bounded by no narrow limits of places and cultures, but is opened to any man and woman who will have wished to embrace it as a discourse deeply potent that gives meaning to life. In Christ all human beings already have access to the Father; for by His death and resurrection He gave as a gift the eternal life which Adam first spurned (cf. Rom 5,12-15). Through this Revelation the ultimate truth is presented to man about his own life and about the lot of history: “In fact, only in the mystery of the Incarnate Word does the mystery of man truly become clear,” asserts the Constitution Gaudium et spes.(12) Outside this view of things, the mystery of the life of individual human beings remains an insoluble enigma.

Ubi reperire valet homo responsiones illis permoventibus interrogationibus, verbi gratia de dolore atque innocentis cruciatu ac de morte, nisi illo sub lumine quod ex mysterio passionis mortis resurrectionis Christi profluit?

Where can man find responses to those profoundly moving questions—for example, about pain and the torment of the innocent and about death—if not under that light which flows forth from the mystery of Christ’s Passion, Death, and Resurrection?

Coram arcano - ratio

Before the mystery - reason

13. Non tamen oblivisci licebit Revelationem mysteriis abundare. Sane quidem cuncta sua ex vita Iesus vultum Patris revelat utpote qui venerit ut intima Dei enarraret; (13) verumtamen quam habemus talis vultus cognitio semper designatur incompleta quadam ratione atque etiam nostrae comprehensionis finibus. Sinit una fides nos in mysterium ingredi intimum, cuius congruentem fovet intellectum.

13. Nonetheless it will not be permitted to forget that Revelation abounds in mysteries. Indeed, through everything in his life Jesus reveals the Father’s countenance, as one who came to expound the inmost things of God; (13) however, the knowledge which we have of such a countenance is always marked as in some respect incomplete, and even by the limits of our comprehension. The one faith allows us to enter into the inmost mystery, and it fosters a congruent understanding of it.

Docet Concilium quod « Deo revelanti praestanda est "oboeditio fidei" ».(14) Perbrevi hac sed densa affirmatione principalis quaedam fidei christianae declaratur veritas. Dicitur, in primis, fidem esse oboedientiae responsionem Deo. Id poscit ut Ille sua agnoscatur in divinitate, sua in transcendentia supremaque libertate.

The Council teaches that « to the revealing God there is to be rendered an "obedience of faith." » (14) By this very brief yet dense affirmation a certain principal truth of the Christian faith is declared. It is said, in the first place, that faith is the response of obedience to God. This requires that He be acknowledged for what is His: in His divinity, in His transcendence, and in His supreme liberty.

Deus qui facit ut ipse cognoscatur ob suae absolutae transcendentiae auctoritatem, secum etiam adfert credibilitatem eorum quae revelat. Sua fide adsensum suum huiusmodi testificationi divinae tribuit homo. Hoc significat eum plene integreque agnoscere rerum revelatarum veritatem, quoniam ipse se pignus illarum exhibet Deus.

God, who causes himself to be known by the authority of his absolute transcendence, also brings with him the credibility of the things that he reveals. By faith man grants his assent to such divine testimony. This means that he fully and integrally acknowledges the truth of the revealed things, since God himself presents himself as the pledge of them.

Veritas haec, quae homini conceditur neque ab eo exigi potest, in contextum se introducit cuiusdam communicationis singularis inter personas rationemque ipsam humanam impellit ut ei se aperiat eiusque altam percipiat significationem. Hanc ob causam actus ille, quo nos Deo committimus, semper ab Ecclesia tamquam tempus habitus est cuiusdam electionis fundamentalis, qua tota involvitur persona. Usque ad extremum intellectus ac voluntas exercent spiritalem suam naturam ut subiecto humano permittatur actum perficere quo uniuscuiusque libertas pleno modo vivatur.(15) In fide proinde non adest dumtaxat praesens libertas: etiam postulatur.

this truth, which is granted to the human being and cannot be exacted from him, introduces itself into the context of a certain singular communication between persons and impels human reason itself to open itself to it and to perceive its high significance. For this cause that act by which we commit ourselves to God has always been held by the Church as a time of a certain fundamental election, wherein the whole person is involved. To the utmost, intellect and will exercise their spiritual nature, so that the human subject is permitted to bring to completion an act by which each one’s freedom is lived in a full mode.(15) In faith, therefore, not only is present freedom at hand: it is also demanded.

Immo, ipsa fides unicuique facultatem dat suam enuntiandi meliore ratione libertatem. Aliis verbis: libertas non in electionibus contra Deum impletur. Quomodo enim verus libertatis usus iudicari posset nulla sese aperiendi voluntas ad id quod sinit homines se totos explicare?

Rather, faith itself gives to each the faculty of enunciating his liberty in a better way. In other words: liberty is not fulfilled in choices against God. For how could the true use of liberty be judged, if there is no will to open oneself to that which permits human beings to unfold themselves wholly?

Credendo namque persona humana actum suae vitae significantissimum complet; hic enim veritatis certitudinem adsequitur veritas in eaque vivere decernit.

By believing, the human person completes the most significant act of his life; for here he attains the certitude of truth—the truth—and decides to live in it.

In rationis adiumentum, quae mysterii quaerit intellectum, etiam signa praesentia in Revelatione occurrunt. Adiuvant ea ut altius perquiratur veritas utque mentem ex sese intra mysterium scrutari valeat. Quidquid id est, signa haec, si altera ex parte maiorem tribuunt rationi humanae vim quia sinunt eam propriis viribus, quarum ipsa est invidiosa custos, intra mysterium investigare, ex altera vero parte eam incitant ut eorum veluti signorum naturam transgrediatur ut ulteriorem percipiat significationem eorum quae in se continent.

In aid of reason, which seeks the understanding of the mystery, there also occur present signs in Revelation. These help so that truth may be more deeply inquired into, and so that the mind may be able, from itself, to scrutinize within the mystery. Whatever that may be, these signs, if on the one hand they grant greater force to human reason because they allow it, by its own powers—of which it is a jealous custodian—to investigate within the mystery, on the other hand incite it to transgress, as it were, the nature of signs, so that it may perceive the further signification of the things which they contain in themselves.

In iis ideoque iam abscondita subiacet veritas, ad quam dirigitur mens et a qua seiungi non potest quin simul signum ipsum illi praebitum deleatur.

In these, therefore, the truth now lies hidden beneath, toward which the mind is directed and from which it cannot be separated without the very sign proffered to it being at the same time erased.

Quadamtenus revertimur ad sacramentalem Revelationis rationem atque, nominatim, ad eucharisticum signum ubi individua unitas inter rem ipsam eiusque significationem permittit ut mysterii capiatur altitudo. In Eucharistia revera praesens adest ac vivus Christus, suo cum Spiritu operatur, sed, quemadmodum praeclare sanctus Thomas edixit, « Quod non capis, quod non vides, animosa firmat fides, praeter rerum ordinem. Sub diversis speciebus, signis tantum, et non rebus, latent res eximiae ».(16) Refert idem philosophus Blasius Pascal: « Sicut Christus Iesus ignotus inter homines fuit, ita manet veritas eius, communes inter opinationes, sine ulla exteriore distinctione.

To some extent we return to the sacramental rationale of Revelation and, namely, to the eucharistic sign, where the indivisible unity between the thing itself and its signification permits the depth of the mystery to be grasped. In the Eucharist Christ is truly present and living; he works with his own Spirit; but, as Saint Thomas excellently declared, «What you do not grasp, what you do not see, spirited faith makes firm, beyond the order of things. Under diverse species, by signs only, and not by the things themselves, outstanding realities lie hidden».(16) The same is reported by the philosopher Blaise Pascal: «Just as Jesus Christ was unknown among men, so his truth remains, among common opinions, without any exterior distinction.»

Sic etiam Eucharistia restat inter panem communem ».(17)

Thus too the Eucharist remains among common bread ».(17)

Fidei cognitio, demum, mysterium non exstinguit; illud evidentius dumtaxat reddit demonstratque veluti necessarium vitae hominis elementum: Christus Dominus « in ipsa Revelatione mysterii Patris Eiusque amoris, hominem ipsi homini plene manifestat eique altissimam eius vocationem patefacit »,(18) quae nempe ea est ut vitae trinitariae Dei particeps fiat.(19)

The knowledge of faith, finally, does not extinguish the mystery; it only renders it more evident and demonstrates it as, as it were, a necessary element of human life: Christ the Lord «in the very Revelation of the mystery of the Father and of His love, fully manifests man to himself and lays open to him his highest vocation»,(18) which indeed is this: that he may become a participant in the Trinitarian life of God.(19)

14. Verum novitatis prospectum recludunt ipsi scientiae philosophicae doctrinae binorum Conciliorum Vaticanorum. In hominum historiam inducit Revelatio necessitudinis punctum quoddam quo carere non potest homo, si ad suae vitae comprehendendum mysterium pervenire voluerit; aliunde vero haec cognitio continenter ad Dei refertur mysterium quod plane exhaurire mens non valet, sed dumtaxat percipere et in fide complecti. Intra haec duo tempora peculiare habet ratio humana spatium suum unde investigare ei licet atque comprehendere, quin tamen nulla alia re circumscribatur nisi finita natura suae indolis coram Dei infinito mysterio.

14. Indeed, the teachings of the two Vatican Councils open the prospect of novelty for philosophical science itself. Revelation introduces into the history of humankind a certain point of necessity without which man cannot be, if he wishes to arrive at comprehending the mystery of his life; on the other hand, this cognition is continually referred to the mystery of God, which the mind is plainly not able to exhaust, but only to perceive and to embrace in faith. Within these two termini human reason has its own peculiar space whence it is permitted to investigate and to comprehend, yet it is circumscribed by nothing else except the finite nature of its own disposition before the infinite mystery of God.

Quapropter in historiam nostram Revelatio infert aliquam veritatem, universalem atque ultimam, quae hominis mentem incitat ne umquam consistat; immo vero, eam impellit ut suae cognitionis fines perpetuo dilatet, donec ea omnia se perfecisse intellegat quae in ipsius erant potestate, nulla praetermissa parte. Ad hanc autem deliberationem adiuvare nos festinat unum ex fecundissimis ingeniis maximeque significantibus in generis hominum historia, ad quem virum honorifice se convertunt tam philosophia quam theologia: sanctus Anselmus. Ille Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus sic sententiam suo in Proslogion eloquitur: « Ad quod cum saepe studioseque cogitationem converterem atque aliquando mihi videretur iam capi posse quod quaerebam, aliquando mentis aciem omnino fugeret, tandem desperans volui cessare, velut ab inquisitione rei, quam inveniri esset impossibile.

Therefore Revelation introduces into our history a certain truth, universal and ultimate, which incites the human mind never to come to a halt; indeed, it impels it to dilate the boundaries of its cognition perpetually, until it understand that it has perfected all those things which were within its power, with no part overlooked. To this deliberation there hastens to assist us one of the most fecund and most significant intellects in the history of the human race, to whom both philosophy and theology turn honorably: Saint Anselm. That Archbishop of Canterbury thus utters the sentiment in his Proslogion: «As to this, when I often and studiously turned my thought, and sometimes it seemed to me that what I was seeking could already be grasped, sometimes it altogether fled the keenness of my mind; at length, despairing, I wished to cease, as it were, from the inquiry of a thing which it would be impossible to find.»

Sed cum illam cogitationem, ne mentem meam frustra occupando, ab aliis, in quibus proficere possem, impediret, penitus a me vellem excludere, tunc magis ac magis, nolenti et defendenti se coepit cum importunitate quadam ingerere. [...] Sed heu! me miserum, unum de aliis miseris filiis Evae, elongatis a Deo!

But when I wanted to exclude that thought utterly from myself, lest by occupying my mind in vain it should hinder me from other things in which I could make progress, then more and more it began, with a certain importunity, to thrust itself upon me, though I was unwilling and fending it off. [...] But alas! wretched me, one among the other wretched sons of Eve, far removed from God!

Quid incoepi? Quid effeci? Quo tendebam?

What did I begin? What did I effect? Whither was I tending?

Quo deveni? Ad quid aspirabam? In quibus suspiro?

Whither have I come? To what was I aspiring? In what do I sigh?

[...] Ergo, Domine, non solum es id quo maius cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit. Quoniam namque valet cogitari esse aliquid huiusmodi; si tu non es hoc ipsum, potest cogitari aliquid maius te: quod fieri nequit ».(20)

[...] Therefore, Lord, you are not only that than which a greater cannot be thought, but you are something greater than can be thought. For indeed it is possible to think that there is something of this sort; if you are not this very thing, something greater than you can be thought: which cannot be ». (20)

15. Revelationis christianae veritas, quae cum Iesu Nazareno congreditur, quemlibet hominem percipere sinit propriae vitae « mysterium ». Dum perinde ac suprema ipsa veritas observat illa autonomiam creaturae libertatemque eius illam etiam obstringit ut ad transcendentiam sese aperiat. Haec coniunctio libertatis ac veritatis maxima evadit planeque Domini intellegitur sermo: « Cognoscetis veritatem, et veritas liberabit vos » (Io 8,32).

15. The truth of Christian revelation, which meets us in Jesus of Nazareth, allows any human being to perceive the « mystery » of his own life. While, just as truth itself supreme, it respects the autonomy of the creature and its freedom, it also obliges it to open itself to transcendence. This conjunction of freedom and truth proves paramount, and the Lord’s saying is plainly understood: « You will know the truth, and the truth will liberate you » (John 8,32).

Verum veluti astrum conductorium christiana Revelatio fit homini qui inter condiciones progreditur mentis cuiusdam immanentisticae nec non logicae technocraticae angustias; extrema est facultas quae a Deo praebetur ut pristinum amoris consilium, creatione ipsa inchoatum, denuo plene reperiatur. Hominibus verum cognoscere cupientibus, si ultra se adhuc prospicere valent et intuitum suum extra propria proposita attollere, potestas tribuitur veram necessitudinem cum sua vita recuperandi, viam persequendo veritatis. Ad hunc rerum statum bene dicta libri Deuteronomii adhiberi licet: « Mandatum hoc, quod ego praecipio tibi hodie, non supra te est neque procul positum nec in caelo situm, ut possis dicere: "Quis nobis ad caelum valet ascendere, ut deferat illud ad nos, et audiamus atque opere compleamus?". Neque trans mare positum, ut causeris dicas: "Quis nobis transfretare poterit mare et illud ad nos usque deferre, ut possimus audire et facere quod praeceptum est?". Sed iuxta te est sermo valde in ore tuo et in corde tuo, ut facias illum » (30,11-14). Quam notionem quasi vocis celebris imagine refert sententia sancti philosophi et theologi Augustini: « Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi.

Truly, like a guiding star, Christian Revelation becomes for the human being who advances amid the conditions of a certain immanentistic mindset and the constrictions of a technocratic logic; it is the ultimate capacity afforded by God so that the primordial plan of love, begun with creation itself, may be fully found anew. To human beings desiring to know the truth, if they are still able to look beyond themselves and to lift their gaze beyond their own purposes, there is granted the power of recovering a true relationship with their life, by pursuing the way of truth. To this state of affairs the words of the book of Deuteronomy may aptly be applied: « This commandment which I command you today is not above you nor set far away, nor placed in heaven, so that you could say: "Who is able to go up to heaven for us and bring it down to us, that we may hear it and fulfill it in deed?". Nor is it set across the sea, so that you might plead and say: "Who will be able to cross the sea for us and bring it all the way to us, that we may be able to hear and do what has been commanded?". But the word is very near you, in your mouth and in your heart, so that you may do it » (30,11-14). Which notion is echoed, as by the image of a celebrated voice, by the saying of the holy philosopher and theologian Augustine: « Do not go outside; return into yourself.

In interiore homine habitat veritas ».(21)

In the interior man truth dwells ».(21)

His praelucentibus deliberationibus prima iam imponitur conclusio: quam nobis Revelatio cognoscere permittit veritas non fructus est maturus neque summus alicuius cogitationis apex ratione humana enucleatae. Illa contra cum proprietatibus se exhibet gratuiti muneris, gignit notiones poscitque ut amoris tamquam declaratio suscipiatur. Haec veritas revelata locus iam anticipatus in hominum historia est illius postremae ac decretoriae Dei visionis, quae iis destinatur quotquot credunt eumque animo conquirunt sincero.

With these preliminary deliberations casting light, the first conclusion is now laid down: the truth which Revelation permits us to know is not a mature fruit nor the supreme apex of some cogitation elucidated by human reason. That, on the contrary, presents itself with the properties of a gratuitous gift, begets notions and demands that it be received as a declaration of love. This revealed truth is already an anticipated place in the history of human beings of that ultimate and decretory vision of God, which is destined for all who believe and seek him with a sincere mind.

Ultimus propterea singulorum hominum vitae finis tum philosophiae studium exstat tum etiam theologiae. Utraque, licet instrumentis diversis ac doctrinis, hanc "viam vitae" (cfr Ps 16

Therefore the ultimate end of the life of each individual stands forth as both the study of philosophy and also of theology. Each, albeit with diverse instruments and doctrines, pursues this "way of life" (cf. Ps 16

[15],11) respicit quae, perinde ac praecipit nobis fides, novissimum repperit suum egressum plena in laetitia ac perpetua ex Dei Unius ac Trini contemplatione.

[15],11) it looks to that which, just as faith prescribes to us, finds its final outcome in the fullness of joy and in the everlasting contemplation of God, One and Triune.

CAPUT II

CHAPTER 2

CREDO UT INTELLEGAM

I BELIEVE SO THAT I MAY UNDERSTAND

Sapientia scit omnia et intellegit (cfr Sap 9,11)

Wisdom knows all things and understands (cf. Wis 9,11)

16. Quam sit inter fidei cognitionem ac scientiam rationis alta iunctura iam Sacris in Litteris significatur mirabilibus quibusdam perspicuitatis affirmationibus. Hoc comprobantLibri Sapientiales potissimum. Hoc quidem ferit oculos in hac lectione sine praeiudicatis opinationibus facta harum Scripturae paginarum, quod his in locis non sola Israelis concluditur fides, verum etiam thesaurus societatum et culturarum interea exstinctarum.

16. How deep the juncture between the cognition of faith and the science of reason is is already signified in the Sacred Letters by certain wondrous affirmations of perspicuity. The Sapiential Books most especially corroborate this. This indeed strikes the eyes in a reading of these pages of Scripture made without prejudged opinions, namely that in these places there is enclosed not only the faith of Israel, but also the treasure of societies and cultures by now extinct.

Veluti ex peculiari quodam consilio Aegyptus et Mesopotamia faciunt ut sua iterum audiatur vox ac communes quaedam proprietates culturarum antiqui Orientis in his paginis revocentur ad vitam, quae nempe conceptionibus insigniter altis abundant.

As if by a certain peculiar design, Egypt and Mesopotamia bring it about that their voice is heard again, and that certain common properties of the cultures of the ancient Orient are recalled to life on these pages, which indeed abound in remarkably lofty conceptions.

Non fortuito fit ut, cum hominem describere sapientem vult auctor sacer, eum depingat ut diligentem quaerentemque veritatem: « Beatus vir, qui in sapientia morabitur et qui in iustitia sua meditabitur et in sensu cogitabit circumspectionem Dei; qui excogitat vias illius in corde suo et in absconditis suis intellegens, vadens post illam quasi investigator et in viis illius consistens; qui respicit per fenestras illius et in ianuis illius audiens; qui requiescit iuxta domum illius et in parietibus illius figens palum, statuet casulam suam ad manus illius et requiescet in deversorio bonorum per aevum. Statuet filios suos sub tegmine illius et sub ramis eius morabitur; protegetur sub tegmine illius a fervore et in gloria eius requiescet » (Eccli 14,22-27).

It does not happen by chance that, when the sacred author wishes to describe the wise man, he portrays him as a diligent seeker of truth: « Blessed is the man who will dwell in wisdom and who will meditate in his justice, and in understanding will think upon the circumspection of God; who devises her ways in his heart and, understanding in his secret places, going after her as an investigator and standing in her paths; who looks through her windows and listens at her doors; who rests beside her house and, fixing a peg in her walls, will set up his little hut at her hand and will rest in the lodging of good things for an age. He will set his sons beneath her covering and he will dwell under her branches; he will be protected under her covering from the heat, and in her glory he will rest » (Eccli 14,22-27).

Uti patet, scriptori inspirato praebetur cognoscendi cupiditas tamquam proprietas simul omnium hominum communis. Propter intellectum cunctis, tum credentibus tum etiam non credentibus, facultas tribuitur « aquam profundam » cognitionis exhauriendi (cfr Prv 20,5). Procul dubio, apud antiquum Israelem orbis eiusque ostenta cognoscebantur non abstracta a rebus cogitatione, quemadmodum philosopho accidebat Ionico vel sapienti Aegyptio; tanto minus comprehendebat bonus tunc Israelita cognitionem humanam iis ipsis modis qui recentioris proprii sunt aetatis, cum magis ad scientiae partitionem tenditur. Nihilo tamen minus in latissimam provinciam totius cognoscendi rationis fecit orbis biblicus ut peculiares suae confluerent partes.

As is evident, to the inspired writer the desire for knowing is presented as a property at once common to all human beings. On account of understanding, to all, both believers and even non-believers, the ability is granted to draw out the « deep water » of cognition (cf. Prv 20,5). Without doubt, among ancient Israel the world and its portents were known not by thought abstracted from things, as befell the Ionian philosopher or the Egyptian sage; still less did the good Israelite of that time comprehend human cognition by those very modes which are proper to the more recent age, when there is a greater tendency toward the partition of science. Nevertheless, no less did the biblical world, within the very broad province of the whole manner of knowing, cause its own peculiar parts to flow together.

Quales denique? Proprietas ea, qua textus biblicus signatur, in eo consistit quod persuadetur altam et continuam exsistere coniunctionem inter rationis cognitionem atque fidei. Mundus eaque omnia quae in illo contingunt, perinde ac historia variique populi eventus, res quidem sunt respiciendae explorandae et iudicandae propriis rationis instrumentis, fide tamen ab hoc processu haudquaquam subtracta.

What kind, then? That property by which the biblical text is marked consists in this: it is maintained that there exists a deep and continuous conjunction between the cognition of reason and of faith. The world and all the things that happen in it, just as history and the events of various peoples, are indeed matters to be regarded, explored, and judged by the proper instruments of reason, yet with faith by no means subtracted from this process.

Ipsa non ideo intercedit ut autonomiam rationis deiciat aut eius actionis regionem deminuat, sed tantummodo ut homini explicet his in eventibus visibilem fieri agereque Deum Israelis. Fieri itaque non potest ut funditus mundus percipiatur eventaque historiae, nisi simul fides in Deum proferatur qui in illis operatur.

It itself does not therefore intervene so as to cast down the autonomy of reason or diminish the region of its action, but only to explicate to man that in these events the God of Israel becomes visible and acts. Therefore it cannot come to pass that the world be thoroughly perceived and the events of history, unless at the same time faith in God, who operates in them, is brought forth.

Acuit interiorem intuitum fides dum mentem ipsam recludit ad operantem detegendam Providentiae praesentiam in progredientibus eventis. Libri Proverbiorum enuntiatio multum hac in re significat: « Cor hominis disponit viam suam, sed Domini est dirigere gressus eius » (16,9). Quod est: homo rationis lumine collustratus suam novit repperire viam, eam vero percurrere facile valet expediteque sine obicibus usque ad extremum, si recto animo inquisitionem suam in fidei inseruerit prospectum. Quam ob rem segregari ratio ac fides non possunt quin simul homini ipsa facultas deficiat mundum Deumque et seipsum congruo modo cognoscendi.

Faith sharpens the interior intuition while it opens the mind itself to detect the operative presence of Providence in events as they progress. The pronouncement of the Book of Proverbs signifies much in this matter: «The heart of man disposes his way, but it is the Lord’s to direct his steps» (16,9). That is: a man, illuminated by the light of reason, knows how to find his path; indeed he is able to traverse it easily and expeditiously, without obstacles, all the way to the end, if with upright mind he has inserted into his inquiry the prospect of faith. Wherefore reason and faith cannot be segregated without the very faculty of knowing the world, and God, and oneself in a congruent way failing man at the same time.

17. Nihil igitur causae est cur inter se ratio ac fides aemulentur: in altera enim altera invenitur et proprium utraque habet spatium sui explicandi. Proverbiorum rursus liber in hanc nos dirigit partem cum exclamat: « Gloria Dei est celare verbum, est gloria regum investigare sermonem » (25,2). Collocantur suo quisque in orbe Deus et homo quasi unica in necessitudine. Omnium rerum origo reponitur in Deo in Eoque mysterii colligitur plenitudo: quod ipsius efficit gloriam; ad hominem officium pertinet veritatem sua ratione pervestigandi, quod eius profecto constituit nobilitatem.

17. There is therefore no cause why reason and faith should rival one another: for in the one the other is found, and each has its proper space for unfolding itself. The Book of Proverbs again directs us to this side when it exclaims: « It is the glory of God to conceal the word, it is the glory of kings to investigate the discourse » (25,2). God and man are each placed in his own orbit, as if in a singular bond. The origin of all things is set in God, and in Him the fullness of mystery is gathered together: which makes His glory; to man belongs the office of thoroughly investigating the truth by his own reason, which indeed constitutes his nobility.

Alia hoc ad musivum opus additur tessella a Psalmista cum precatur « mihi autem nimis pretiosae cogitationes tuae, Deus; nimis gravis summa earum. Si denumerabo eas, super arenam multiplicabuntur; si ad finem pervenerim, adhuc sum tecum (139

Another tessella is added to this mosaic work by the Psalmist when he prays: « but to me your thoughts, O God, are exceedingly precious; exceedingly weighty the sum of them. If I enumerate them, they will be multiplied beyond the sand; if I should arrive at the end, I am still with you (139

[138],17-18). Cognoscendi cupiditas ita magna est secumque talem infert dynamicam vim ut hominis animus, licet terminum experiatur quem praetergredi par non est, ad infinitam tamen adspiret ubertatem quae ultra iacet, quoniam in ea iam percipit responsionem custodiri consentaneam cuilibet quaestioni cui adhuc non est responsum.

[138],17-18). The desire for knowing is so great, and brings with it such a dynamic force, that the mind of man, although it experiences a limit which it is not fit to overstep, nevertheless aspires to the infinite abundance that lies beyond, because in it it already perceives that a response consonant with any question for which there is not yet an answer is being kept.

18. Quocirca adfirmari licet sua meditatione scivisse Israelem suae rationi viam ad mysterium pandere. In Dei Revelatione potuit altitudinem pertemptare, quousque ratione sua pertingere studebat non autem eo perveniens. Ex hac altiore cognitionis forma profectus, intellexit populus ille electus rationem quasdam observare oportere regulas praecipuas in quibus propriam naturam melius declararet.

18. Therefore it may be affirmed that, by his meditation, Israel knew to open for his reason a way to the mystery. In God’s Revelation he could assay the altitude, as far as he was striving to reach by his reason, yet not arriving there. Setting out from this higher form of cognition, that chosen people understood that reason ought to observe certain principal rules, in which it might better declare its proper nature.

Prima in eo consistit regula ut ratio habeatur huius veritatis: in itinere constitutum esse hominem quod interrumpi non possit; secunda, ex conscientia nascitur neminem hanc in viam introire superbo animo eius qui omnia propriarum virium effecta esse arbitretur; consistit tertia in « timore Dei », cuius supremam agnoscere debet ratio transcendentiam simulque providum in gubernandis rebus amorem.

The first rule consists in this: that account be taken of this truth: that man is set upon a journey which cannot be interrupted; the second, arising from conscience, is that no one enters upon this way with the proud spirit of one who deems everything to be the effects of his own powers; the third consists in « fear of God », whose supreme transcendence reason ought to acknowledge, and at the same time the provident love in governing things.

Quotiens ab hisce receditur regulis, periculo obicitur homo ne deficiat deveniatque in « stulti condicionem ». Ad Bibliae sententiam huic stultitiae inest minatio vitae. Se enim decipit stultus plura cognoscere, verum non potest reapse animum in res necessarias intendere. Hoc etiam eum impedit quominus suam recte ordinet mentem (cfr Prv 1,7) rectumque affectum sumat de se deque rebus circumsistentibus.

As often as one departs from these rules, a human being is exposed to the danger of failing and of coming down into « the condition of a fool ». According to the Bible’s judgment, there is in this foolishness a menace to life. For the fool deceives himself that he knows many things, but in reality he cannot direct his mind to the necessary things. This also prevents him from rightly ordaining his mind (cfr Prv 1,7) and from taking up a right disposition concerning himself and the things that surround him.

Cum adseverat deinde « non est Deus » (cfr Ps 14

When he then asserts "there is no God" (cf. Ps 14

[13],1) clarissime in posterum demonstrat quatenus sua cognitio desit et quam procul ipse a veritate rerum plena absit de rebus, de earum origine atque sorte.

[13],1) most clearly for the future he demonstrates to what extent his own cognition is lacking, and how far he himself is absent from the plenary truth of things—about things, about their origin and their fate.

19. Magni momenti loci qui plus hoc super argumentum lucis effundunt in libro Sapientiae inveniuntur. Inibi loquitur sacer auctor de Deo qui per ipsam rerum naturam sese demonstrat. Penes antiquos naturalium scientiarum studium maxima ex parte cum philosophica cognitione consonabat.

19. Passages of great moment which pour more light upon this argument are found in the Book of Wisdom. Therein the sacred author speaks of God who through the very nature of things demonstrates himself. Among the ancients, the study of the natural sciences for the most part harmonized with philosophical cognition.

Postquam asseveravit sacer textus hominem sui intellectus virtute scire posse « dispositionem orbis terrarum et virtutes elementorum, [...] anni cursus et stellarum dispositiones, naturas animalium et iras bestiarum » (Sap 7,17.19-20), paucis verbis, philosophari eum valere, ulterius gressum facit et quidem praecipuum: repetens philosophiae Graecae notionem, ad quam hoc loco res referri videtur, affirmat auctor hominem omnino super natura ratiocinantem posse ad Deum ascendere: « A magnitudine enim et pulchritudine creaturarum cognoscibiliter potest Creator horum videri » (Sap 13,5). Primum ideo agnoscitur divinae Revelationis stadium quod mirabilis constituit « liber naturae », quo perlegendo homo rationis suae instrumentis ad Creatoris pertingere potest cognitionem. Si porro intellectu suo non eo usque advenit homo ut Deum omnium Conditorem cognoscat, hoc non tam deficienti instrumento est tribuendum, quantum potius impedimento libera ipsius voluntate ac peccatis propriis interiecto.

After the sacred text has asserted that man by the virtue of his intellect is able to know “the disposition of the circle of lands and the powers of the elements, […] the course of the year and the dispositions of the stars, the natures of animals and the angers of beasts” (Sap 7,17.19-20), with a few words—that he is able to philosophize—it makes a further and indeed principal step: taking up again the notion of Greek philosophy, to which at this point the matter seems to be referred, the author affirms that man, reasoning thoroughly over nature, is able to ascend to God: “For from the magnitude and beauty of creatures the Creator of these can intelligibly be seen” (Sap 13,5). Therefore first is acknowledged the stage of divine Revelation which wondrously constitutes the “book of nature,” by the thorough-reading of which man, by the instruments of his reason, can attain to knowledge of the Creator. If furthermore by his intellect man does not arrive so far as to know God the Maker of all, this is to be ascribed not so much to a deficient instrument, as rather to an impediment interposed by his own free will and by his proper sins.

20. Hoc sub prospectu bene aestimatur ratio, sed nimium non existimatur. Quidquid assequitur illa verum esse potest, at plenam suam consequitur significationem tum solum cum notiones ampliorem in rerum prospectum proiciuntur, nempe ipsius fidei: « A Domino diriguntur gressus viri; quis autem hominum intellegere potest viam suam? » (Prv 20,24). Apud Vetus itaque Testamentum rationem fides liberat quatenus ei congruenter attingere permittit proprium cognitionis obiectum idque in supremo reponere ordine ubi omnia suum habent sensum.

20. Under this prospect, reason is well esteemed, but it is not esteemed excessively. Whatever it attains can be true; yet it attains its full signification only when the notions are projected into a broader prospect of things, namely that of faith itself: « A man’s steps are directed by the Lord; but who among men can understand his own way? » (Prv 20,24). In the Old Testament, therefore, faith liberates reason inasmuch as it allows it, congruently, to reach its proper object of cognition and to place it in the supreme order where all things have their meaning.

Brevi: veritatem ratione consequitur homo, quoniam fide collustratus altum rerum omnium detegit sensum ac nominatim suae exsistentiae. Iure igitur ac merito auctor sacer verae cognitionis initium plane collocat in Dei timore: « Timor Domini principium scientiae » (Prv 1,7; cfr Eccli 1,14).

Briefly: man attains truth by reason, since, illumined by faith, he uncovers the deep sense of all things and, namely, of his own existence. Rightly therefore and deservedly the sacred author plainly places the beginning of true cognition in the fear of God: « The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge » (Prv 1,7; cfr Eccli 1,14).

Posside sapientiam, posside prudentiam (Prv 4, 5)

Possess wisdom, possess prudence (Prv 4, 5)

21. Non conditur, pro Veteris Testamenti hominibus, cognitio in observatione dumtaxat hominis et orbis et historiae, verum insolubilem poscit etiam coniunctionem cum fide cumque Revelationis doctrinis. Hic inveniuntur illae provocationes quibus occurrere populus electus debuit reddereque responsum. Hanc suam perpendens condicionem homo biblicus perspexit se intellegere non posse nisi « coniunctum » secum et cum populo, cum reliquo orbe ac cum Deo ipso.

21. For the people of the Old Testament, cognition is not founded upon the mere observation of man and of the world and of history, but it also demands an indissoluble conjunction with faith and with the doctrines of Revelation. Here are found those provocations which the chosen people had to confront and to render an answer to. Weighing this his condition, the biblical man perceived that he could not understand unless « conjoined » with himself and with the people, with the rest of the world, and with God himself.

Haec ad mysterium patefactio, quae ex Revelatione ipsi contingebat, tandem fons illi verae cognitionis exstitit quae permisit rationi eius ut se in infinita spatia propelleret et sic comprehendere posset modis antehac omnino insperatis.

This unveiling to the mystery, which came to him from Revelation, at length stood forth for him as the fount of true cognition, which permitted his reason to propel itself into infinite spaces and thus to comprehend in modes entirely unhoped-for beforehand.

Non deerat inquisitionis impetus, pro auctore sacro, ab illo labore qui oriebatur ex conflictione cum rationis humanae limitibus. Animadvertitur illud, verbi gratia, iis in vocibus quibus Proverbiorum liber fatigationem enarrat qua quis intellegere arcana Dei consilia conatur (cfr 30,1-6). Verumtamen, quantumvis opus fatiget, credens manus non dat. Virtus illa, qua iter suum ad veritatem persequi potest, ei ex certa persuasione obtingit: Deum ipsum veluti « exploratorem » (cfr Eccle 1,13) creavisse eiusque munus esse nihil intemptatum relinquere, licet dubia perpetuo ei minitentur.

There was no lack of an impulse of inquiry, for the sacred author, from that toil which arose out of the conflict with the limits of human reason. This is noticed, for example, in those words by which the Book of Proverbs recounts the weariness with which one tries to understand the arcane counsels of God (cfr 30,1-6). Nevertheless, however much the work wearies, the believer does not surrender. That virtue, by which he can pursue his journey toward truth, accrues to him from a sure persuasion: that God himself, as it were an « investigator » (cfr Eccle 1,13), has created him, and that his task is to leave nothing unattempted, although doubts perpetually threaten him.

Deo innixus, protenditur semper et ubique ille adversus ea omnia quae pulchra sunt, bona et vera.

Leaning on God, he is extended always and everywhere toward all those things which are beautiful, good, and true.

22. Primo in epistulae ad Romanos capite adiuvat nos sanctus Paulus quo melius percipiamus quam sit acuta Librorum Sapientialium deliberatio. Populari sermone argumentationem quandam philosophicam enodans Apostolus altam testificatur veritatem: per creata possunt « oculi mentis » ad Deum cognoscendum advenire. Nam ipse per creaturas facit ut ratio humana « virtutem » suam ac « divinitatem » intueatur (cfrRom 1,20). Hominis rationi ergo illa adsignatur facultas quae excedere videtur ipsos eius naturae limites: non tantum intra sensuum cognitionem non circumscribitur, quoniam de iis critico iudicio meditari valet, sed de sensuum notitiis ratiocinando causam etiam tangere potest quae omnium rerum sensibilium subiacet origini.

22. First, in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, Saint Paul helps us to grasp more fully how acute the deliberation of the Sapiential Books is. Unraveling in popular speech a certain philosophical argumentation, the Apostle bears witness to a deep truth: through created things the « eyes of the mind » can come to know God. For he himself, through creatures, brings it about that human reason gaze upon his « power » and « divinity » (cfrRom 1,20). To human reason, therefore, there is assigned that faculty which seems to exceed the very limits of its own nature: it is not confined only within the cognition of the senses, since it is able to ponder these with critical judgment, but by reasoning from the data of the senses it can even touch the cause which underlies the origin of all sensible things.

Philosophicis vocibus dici licet in pergravi loco illo Paulino potestatem hominis metaphysicam adfirmari.

In philosophical terms, it may be said that, in that most weighty Pauline passage, the human metaphysical power is affirmed.

In prisco creationis proposito, iudicante Apostolo, rationis humanae praevisa erat facultas facile sensuum cognitiones excedendi ut ipsa omnium origo reperiretur: Creator. Propter inoboedientiam, qua maluit homo plena et absoluta libertate sese illi opponere qui eum condiderat, defecit haec potestas ad conditorem Deum revertendi.

In the ancient purpose of creation, as the Apostle judges, there was foreseen for human reason the faculty of easily exceeding the cognitions of the senses so that the very origin of all things might be found: the Creator. On account of disobedience, whereby man preferred, with full and absolute liberty, to oppose himself to Him who had fashioned him, this power of returning to the Creator God failed.

Figuris vivis describit Liber Genesis hanc hominis condicionem, narrans Deum eum collocavisse in hortis Eden quibus in mediis situm erat lignum « scientiae boni et mali » (cfr 2,17). Luculenta est figura: non valebat homo pervidere ex seque statuere quid bonum esset quidve malum, at superius quoddam ad principium se referre debebat. Superbiae caecitas protoparentes nostros ita fefellit ut se supremos esse crederent suique plane iuris et posse idcirco excludere cognitionem a Deo profectam. Sua prima inoboeditione viros mulieresque omnes illi implicaverunt atque rationi humanae vulnera intulerunt quae progressionem illius ad plenam veritatem erant impeditura.

With living figures the Book of Genesis describes this condition of man, narrating that God placed him in the gardens of Eden, in the midst of which there was situated the tree of «knowledge of good and evil» (cf. 2:17). The figure is clear: man was not able, by seeing through on his own, to determine what was good and what evil, but had to refer himself to some higher principle. The blindness of pride so deceived our proto-parents that they believed themselves supreme and entirely a law unto themselves, and thus able to exclude knowledge proceeding from God. By their first disobedience they entangled all men and women, and they inflicted wounds upon human reason which were going to impede its progression toward full truth.

Facultas humana veritatis cognoscendae iam obscurata erat repudiatione Eius qui fons est veritatis atque origo. Iterum Apostolus aperit quantopere cogitationes hominum, propter peccatum, « vanae » factae sint ipsaeque eorum ratiocinationes detortae ad falsumque ordinatae (cfr Rom 1,21-22). Mentis oculi iam non poterant perspicue videre: paulatim facta est ratio humana sui ipsius captiva. Christi dein adventus salutis eventus fuit quo sua ex infirmitate erepta est ratio atque impedimentis liberata quibus ipsa sese omnino incluserat.

The human faculty for knowing truth had already been obscured by the repudiation of Him who is the fount and origin of truth. Again the Apostle lays open how greatly the cogitations of men, on account of sin, became « vain » and their very ratiocinations were twisted and ordered toward falsehood (cfr Rom 1,21-22). The eyes of the mind could no longer see perspicuously: gradually human reason became captive of itself. Then the Advent of Christ was the event of salvation by which reason was rescued from its infirmity and freed from the impediments with which it had wholly enclosed itself.

23. Postulat idcirco Christiani habitudo ad philosophiam fundamentale quoddam iudicium. In Novo Testamento, potissimum in sancti Pauli epistulis, illud manifestum elucet: « huius mundi sapientia » sapientiae a Deo in Christo Iesu patefactae opponitur. Revelatae sapientiae altitudo consuetos nostros deliberationum terminos perrumpit, utpote qui consentaneo modo eam exprimere nequeant.

23. Therefore the Christian habitude demands of philosophy a certain fundamental judgment. In the New Testament, especially in the epistles of Saint Paul, this becomes manifestly clear: « the wisdom of this world » is opposed to the wisdom disclosed by God in Christ Jesus. The depth of the revealed wisdom breaks through the customary limits of our deliberations, inasmuch as they cannot express it in a commensurate way.

Funditus hanc difficultatem imponit initium Primae Epistulae ad Corinthios. Crucifixus Dei Filius ipse historicus est eventus ad quem eliditur omnis mentis conatus exstruendi defensionem de exsistentiae sensu congruam ex humanis dumtaxat ratiocinationibus. Verus enim nodus, quo omnis philosophia lacessitur, est Iesu Christi mors in cruce.

Fundamentally, the beginning of the First Epistle to the Corinthians imposes this difficulty. The Crucified Son of God is himself the historical event against which every effort of the mind to construct, by merely human ratiocinations, a defense of a congruent sense of existence is dashed. For the true knot by which all philosophy is provoked is the death of Jesus Christ on the cross.

Hic namque omne conamen redigendi Patris salutiferum consilium in humanam logicam puram ad interitum destinatur. « Ubi sapiens? ubi scriba?

For here every endeavor to reduce the Father’s salvific counsel into purely human logic is destined for destruction. « Where is the wise? where the scribe?

ubi conquisitor huius saeculi? Nonne stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi? », instanter percontatur Apostolus (1 Cor 1,20). Ad haec quae efficere cogitat Deus non amplius sola hominis sufficit prudentis sapientia, verum gressus decretorius quidam efflagitatur ad rem prorsus complectendam novam: « Quae stulta sunt mundi, elegit Deus, ut confundat sapientes [...] ignobilia mundi et contemptibilia elegit Deus, quae non sunt, ut ea quae sunt, destrueret » (1 Cor 1,27-28). Renuit hominis sapientia contueri sua in infirmitate fundamentum suae fortitudinis; at sanctus Paulus affirmare non haesitat: « Cum enim infirmor, tunc potens sum » (2 Cor 12,10). Non valet percipere homo quo pacto vitae fons amorisque mors esse possit, verumtamen ut sui salutis perficiendae consilii mysterium aperiret instituit Deus id quod humana ratio « stultitiam » et « scandalum » appellat.

where is the inquirer of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? », the Apostle urgently inquires (1 Cor 1,20). For these things that God is thinking to effect, the prudent wisdom of man no longer suffices by itself; rather, a certain decisive (decretory) step is demanded to embrace a reality entirely new: « The things that are foolish in the world, God has chosen, to confound the wise [...] the ignoble things of the world and the contemptible God has chosen, the things that are not, that he might destroy the things that are » (1 Cor 1,27-28). Man’s wisdom refuses to behold, in its own infirmity, the foundation of its strength; but Saint Paul does not hesitate to affirm: « For when I am weak, then I am potent » (2 Cor 12,10). A man is not able to perceive how the fount of life and of love could be death; nevertheless, in order to open the mystery of his plan for the accomplishing of man’s salvation, God instituted that which human reason calls « foolishness » and « scandal ».

Sermone philosophorum suorum aequalium usus, sanctus Paulus attingit culmen magisterii sui atque illius paradoxi quod enuntiare cupit: « Elegit Deus, quae non sunt ut ea, quae sunt, destrueret » (1 Cor 1,28). Amoris demonstrati in cruce Christi gratuitam indolem ut declaret, nihil quidem dubitat Apostolus sermonem multo efficaciorem adhibere quam philosophi usurpabant ipsi suis in disceptationibus de Deo. Vacuefacere non potest ratio humana mysterium amoris quod crux exhibet, cum ex contrario eadem crux praebere potest rationi humanae responsum extremum quod ea conquirit. Non sane verborum sapientiam sed Verbum Sapientiae Paulus recenset veluti veritatis regulam simulque salutis.

Using the discourse of his contemporary philosophers, Saint Paul reaches the summit of his magisterium and of that paradox which he desires to enunciate: « God chose the things that are not, that he might destroy the things that are » (1 Cor 1,28). In order to declare the gratuitous character of the love demonstrated on the cross of Christ, the Apostle does not at all hesitate to employ a discourse much more efficacious than the philosophers themselves used in their disputations about God. Human reason cannot make void the mystery of love which the cross exhibits, since on the contrary that same cross can provide to human reason the ultimate response which it seeks. Not, to be sure, the wisdom of words, but the Word of Wisdom Paul sets forth as the rule of truth and at once of salvation.

Crucis sapientia igitur omnem culturae limitem transgreditur quem ei aliunde imponere nitantur atque imperat ut quisque se aperiat universali veritatis naturae quam in se ipsa gerit. Qualis rationi nostrae obicitur provocatio, qualemve inde percipit utilitatem si se dederit! Philosophia, quae iam ex se agnoscere potest perpetuum hominis ascensum adversus veritatem, adiuvante fide potest se recludere ad recipiendum in « stultitia » Crucis criticum iudicium eorum qui falso arbitrantur se veritatem possidere, dum eam angustiis sui philosophici instituti involvunt.

The wisdom of the Cross, therefore, transgresses every boundary of culture which others may strive to impose upon it, and it commands that each person open himself to the universal nature of truth which it bears in itself. What a challenge is thrown before our reason, and what benefit does it perceive from it if it yields itself! Philosophy, which already of itself can recognize the perpetual ascent of man toward the truth, with the help of faith can open itself to receive, in the « folly » of the Cross, the critical judgment upon those who falsely think they possess the truth, while they wrap it in the narrowness of their philosophical system.

Inter fidem et philosophiam necessitudo in Christi crucifixi ac resuscitati praedicatione scopulum offendit ad quem naufragium facere potest, sed ultra quem patescere potest infinitum veritatis spatium. Hic liquido indicatur inter rationem ac fidem limes; at locus similiter clarus elucescit ubi ambae ipsae congredi possunt.

The bond between faith and philosophy, in the proclamation of Christ crucified and resurrected, strikes upon a rock on which it can make shipwreck, but beyond which there can open an infinite expanse of truth. Here the boundary between reason and faith is plainly indicated; and likewise a clear place shines forth where both themselves can converge.

CAPUT III

CHAPTER 3

INTELLEGO UT CREDAM

I UNDERSTAND SO THAT I MAY BELIEVE

In via veritatem ad inquirendam

On the way to inquire into the truth

24. Lucas Evangelista in Actibus Apostolorum narrat Paulum, varia inter missionis itinera, Athenas pervenisse. Urbs illa, philosophorum sedes, simulacris affluebat, quae diversa idola ostentabant. In altare quoddam repente mentem intendit quare cito exordium sumpsit ad statuendum elementum commune unde nuntium kerigmaticum iniret: « Viri Athenienses, — ait — per omnia quasi superstitiosiores vos video; praeteriens enim et videns simulacra vestra inveni et aram, in qua scriptum erat: "Ignoto Deo". Quod ergo ignorantes colitis, hoc ego annuntio vobis » (Act 17, 22-23).

24. Luke the Evangelist, in the Acts of the Apostles, recounts that Paul, amid various itineraries of the mission, arrived at Athens. That city, the seat of philosophers, was abounding in simulacra, which displayed diverse idols. He suddenly fixed his mind on a certain altar, wherefore he quickly took up an exordium to establish a common element whence he might enter upon the kerygmatic message: « Men of Athens, — he says — in all things I see you as rather more superstitious; for as I was passing by and looking at your simulacra I also found an altar on which was written: "To an Unknown God." Therefore what you, being ignorant, worship, this I announce to you » (Acts 17, 22-23).

Inde exorsus Paulus de Deo loquitur tamquam Creatore, de Eo nempe qui omnia superat et omnia vivificat. Sermonem dein ita prosequitur: « Fecitque ex uno omne genus hominum inhabitare super universam faciem terrae, definiens statuta tempora et terminos habitationis eorum, quaerere Deum si forte attrectent eum et inveniant, quamvis non longe sit ab unoquoque nostrum » (Act 17, 26-27).

Starting thence, Paul speaks about God as Creator, about Him namely who surpasses all things and vivifies all things. He then thus prosecutes the discourse: «And from one he made every race of humans to inhabit over the whole face of the earth, defining the appointed times and the boundaries of their habitation, to seek God, if perhaps they might feel after Him and find Him, although He is not far from each one of us» (Act 17, 26-27).

Apostolus in luce collocat veritatem quam Ecclesia uti thesaurum habere consuevit; in latebris cordis hominis flagrans Dei desiderium est seminatum. Quod vehementer recolit liturgia Feriae VI in Parasceve, cum, in precibus pro non credentibus, nos invitat ad orandum: « Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, qui cunctos homines condidisti, ut te semper desiderando quaererent et inveniendo quiescerent... ».(22) Iter igitur quoddam exstat quod homo sua ex voluntate emetiri potest: quod quidem initium sumit cum ratio facultate ditatur sese ultra res contingentes extollendi ut in infinitum peregrinetur.

The Apostle sets in the light the truth which the Church has been accustomed to hold as a treasure; in the hiding-places of the human heart a burning desire for God has been sown. This the liturgy of Friday in the Parasceve (Good Friday) strongly recalls, when, in the prayers for non-believers, it invites us to pray: « Almighty everlasting God, who created all men, that by always desiring you they might seek you and, by finding you, might rest... ».(22) Therefore there exists a certain journey which a man can traverse by his own will: which indeed takes its beginning when reason is enriched with the capacity of lifting itself beyond contingent things so as to journey toward the infinite.

Diversa ratione ac diversa quoque aetate homo penitum hoc desiderium exprimere scivit. Litterae, ars musica, pictura, sculptura, architectura aliique fructus eius fecundae mentis instrumenta facta sunt quibus significatur desiderium investigandi. Philosophia hunc motum peculiarem in modum in se collegit et, per sua instrumenta et secundum proprios usus scientificos, enuntiavit hoc universale hominis desiderium.

In different ways and at different ages the human being has known how to express this inmost desire. Literature, musical art, painting, sculpture, architecture, and other fruits of his fecund mind have become instruments by which the desire for investigation is signified. Philosophy has gathered this movement into itself in a distinctive manner and, through its own instruments and according to its proper scientific uses, has enunciated this universal desire of man.

25. « Omnes homines scire volunt » (23) et huius desiderii obiectum veritas est. Ipsa vita cotidiana ostendit quantum studium inducat unumquemque nostrum ut, praeter ea quae tantum ex auditu percipiuntur, cognoscere valeat quomodo res vere se habeant. Homo solus est in universo visibili qui non solum facultate pollet sciendi, verum novit etiam se scire, atque hac de causa intendit animum authenticae veritati rerum quae illi obversantur.

25. « All human beings want to know » (23), and the object of this desire is truth. Quotidian life itself shows how much zeal it induces in each of us so that, beyond those things which are perceived only from hearsay, one may be able to know how things truly stand. The human being alone in the visible universe not only is endowed with the faculty of knowing, but also knows that he knows; and for this reason he directs his mind to the authentic truth of the things that present themselves to him.

Nemo indifferens manere potest coram suae scientiae veritate. Si quid falsum homo invenit, eo ipso id respuit; si vero veritatem detegere potest, satiatum se sentit. Hanc doctrinam profitetur sanctus Augustinus scribens: « Multos expertus sum, qui vellent fallere, qui autem falli, neminem ».(24) Persona merito dicitur adultam aetatem attigisse tantum cum, pro viribus, vera a falsis diiudicare potest, constituens ita proprium iudicium de authentica rerum veritate.

No one can remain indifferent before the truth of his knowledge. If a person finds something false, by that very fact he rejects it; but if he can detect the truth, he feels satiated. This doctrine Saint Augustine professes, writing: «I have found many who would wish to deceive, but no one who wishes to be deceived».(24) A person is rightly said to have reached adult age only when, to the extent of his powers, he can judge the true from the false, thus establishing his own judgment about the authentic truth of things.

In hoc consistit tot vestigationum causa, praesertim in ambitu scientiarum, quae novissimis saeculis tantos obtinuerunt exitus, ut authenticae progressioni totius humanae societatis faverent.

In this consists the cause of so many investigations, especially in the ambit of the sciences, which in the most recent centuries have obtained such outcomes that they favored the authentic progression of the whole human society.

Non minus ponderis quam theoretica habet investigatio practica: dicimus veritatis investigationem ad bonum implendum intentam. Persona quidem, ethico more se gerens, si secundum liberum et rectum arbitrium operatur, viam beatitudinis ingreditur atque ad perfectionem intendit. Hoc quoque in casu agitur de veritate.

The practical investigation has no less weight than the theoretical: we mean the investigation of truth aimed at fulfilling the good. The person, indeed, conducting himself in an ethical manner, if he acts according to free and right judgment, enters upon the way of beatitude and strives toward perfection. Here too, in this case, what is at stake is truth.

Hanc sententiam confirmavimus in Litteris Encyclicis Veritatis splendor: « ...sine libertate non datur moralitas... Si ius datur ut quisque observetur in itinere ad inquirendam veritatem, est tamen antea unicuique perquirendae veritatis gravis moralis obligatio eidemque cognitae adhaerescendi ».(25)

We confirmed this tenet in the Encyclical Letters Veritatis Splendor: « ...without freedom no morality is given... If the right is granted that each person be respected on the journey to inquire into the truth, nevertheless beforehand there exists for each one a grave moral obligation of thoroughly seeking the truth and of adhering to the same once known ».(25)

Valores igitur, selecti et propriis viribus comparati, veri sint oportet, quandoquidem dumtaxat valores veri perficere possunt personam eiusque naturam ad effectum deducere. Hanc valorum veritatem homo invenit non in se ipse se recludens sed sese aperiens ad eam accipiendam etiam in modis humanam naturam excedentibus. Haec necessaria est condicio ut quisquis ipse sit et adolescat uti adultam et sapientem decet personam.

Values, therefore, selected and acquired by one’s own powers, ought to be true, since only true values can perfect the person and lead his nature to fulfillment. Man finds this truth of values not by shutting himself up in himself but by opening himself to receive it, even in modes that exceed human nature. This is a necessary condition so that each one may be himself and may mature as befits an adult and wise person.

26. Veritas ab exordiis instar interrogationis homini proponitur:habetne vita sensum? quo illa cursum suum tendit? Prima inspectione, exsistentia personalis ostendi posset sensu radicitus destituta.

26. Truth from the beginnings is proposed to man in the guise of an interrogation:does life have sense? whither does it tend its course? At first inspection, personal existence could be shown radically destitute of sense.

Necesse non est philosophos adire qui absurdum profitentur nec confugere ad provocatorias quaestiones quae inveniuntur in Libro Iob ut dubitetur de vitae sensu. Cotidiana doloris experientia, sive propria sive aliorum, nec non cognitio tot casuum qui sub lumine rationis inexplicabiles videntur, sufficiunt ut quaestio adeo dramatica de sensu vitae vitari nequeat.(26) Huc addendum est quod prima veritas absolute certa nostrae exsistentiae, praeter quam quod iam exsistimus, est inevitabilis mortis nostrae condicio. Hac obstupescenti re praehabita, exhaustum responsum quaeratur oportet.

It is not necessary to go to philosophers who profess the absurd, nor to take refuge in the provocative questions found in the Book of Job, in order to doubt the sense of life. The daily experience of pain, whether one’s own or that of others, and likewise the cognition of so many cases which under the light of reason seem inexplicable, suffice so that the question—so dramatic—about the meaning of life cannot be avoided.(26) To this must be added that the first absolutely certain truth of our existence, besides the fact that we already exist, is the condition of our inevitable death. With this staggering fact presupposed, an exhaustive answer ought to be sought.

Unusquisque optat — immo tenetur — cognoscere veritatem de proprio fine. Scire vult utrum mors sit definitiva conclusio eius exsistentiae an sit aliquid quod mortem praetergrediatur; utrum liceat illi in vita ulteriore spem reponere necne. Non absque re mens philosophica cursum decretorium recepit inde ab obitu Socratis quo plusquam duo millennia sic est insignita.

Each person desires — indeed, is obliged — to know the truth about his own end. He wants to know whether death is the definitive conclusion of his existence or whether there is something that transcends death; whether he may repose hope in an ulterior life or not. Not without reason the philosophical mind took a decisive course since the death of Socrates, by which for more than two millennia it has been thus marked.

Nec casu fit ut philosophi, ob mortis eventum, hanc quaestionem simul cum quaestione de vita deque immortalitate iterum atque iterum sibi proponant.

Nor does it happen by chance that philosophers, on account of the event of death, propose this question to themselves again and again together with the question about life and about immortality.

27. Has interrogationes nemo fugere potest, nec philosophus nec homo plebeius. Ex responsis quae iisdem dantur suprema pendet investigationis pars: utrum fieri possit ut perveniatur necne ad veritatem universalem et absolutam. Ex se, quaevis veritas, etsi non integra, si est authentica, universalis exhibetur et absoluta.

27. These interrogations no one can escape, neither the philosopher nor the plebeian man. Upon the answers that are given to these the supreme part of the investigation hangs: whether it can come to pass that one arrives, or not, at universal and absolute truth. In itself, any truth, even if not integral, if it is authentic, is exhibited as universal and absolute.

Quod verum est, pro omnibus et semper verum esse debet. Hanc praeter universalitatem, tamen, homo quaerit aliquid absolutum quod responsum ferre possit et sensum ad omnia quae vestigantur: ens quoddam supremum quod fundamentum exstet cuiusque rei. Ut aliis utamur verbis, homo quaerit definitivam dilucidationem, valorem quendam supremum, ultra quem nec sint nec esse possint interrogationes aut ulteriora addenda.

What is true ought to be true for all and always. Beyond this universality, however, the human being seeks something absolute which can bear an answer and a meaning for all the things that are investigated: a certain supreme being that exists as the foundation of each and every thing. To use other words, the human being seeks a definitive elucidation, a certain supreme value, beyond which there are not, nor can there be, questions or further addenda.

Opiniones animos allicere possunt, non vero illis satisfacere. Momentum adventat pro omnibus, quo, sive admittitur sive non, necesse est ut propria exsistentia sustentetur veritate absoluta, quae certitudinem pariat nec amplius dubio subiciatur.

Opinions can allure minds, but they do not truly satisfy them. The moment approaches for all when, whether it is admitted or not, it is necessary that one’s own existence be sustained by absolute truth, which brings forth certitude and is no longer subjected to doubt.

Similem veritatem, per saeculorum decursum, philosophi detegere et exprimere curarunt, quandam condendo doctrinam seu scholam philosophicam. Praeter doctrinas philosophicas, tamen, sunt aliae expressiones quibus homo intendit suam « philosophiam » constituere: agitur de suasionibus vel experientiis privatis, de familiae culturaeque traditionibus vel de viis exsistentiae propriis, in quibus quisque alicuius magistri auctoritati se committit. In singulis his indiciis semper flagrans permanet studium assequendi certitudinem veritatis eiusque absoluti valoris.

A similar truth, through the course of the ages, philosophers have taken care to uncover and to express, by founding a certain doctrine or philosophical school. Besides philosophical doctrines, however, there are other expressions by which man intends to constitute his « philosophy »: it is a matter of private persuasions or experiences, of the traditions of family and culture, or of one’s own ways of existence, in which each person commits himself to the authority of some master. In each of these indications there remains ever-flaring the zeal for attaining the certitude of truth and of its absolute value.

Diversae de homine veritatis facies

Diverse faces of the truth about man

28. Veritatis investigatio non semper — quod nobis est agnoscendum! — simili ostenditur perspicuitate et congruentia. Naturalis limitatio rationis et animi iactatio investigationem cuiusque hominis obumbrant saepeque avertunt.

28. The investigation of truth is not always — which we must acknowledge! — shown with similar perspicuity and congruence. The natural limitation of reason and the tossing of the mind overshadow, and often avert, the investigation of each person.

Aliae personales diversae indolis utilitates obruere possunt veritatem. Fieri quoque potest ut homo vitet eam statim ut incipit illam cognoscere, quia eius postulationes metuit. Quo non obstante, etiam cum eam fugit, ipsa illius exsistentiam permovet.

Other personal interests of diverse character can overwhelm the truth. It can also happen that a person avoids it as soon as he begins to know it, because he fears its demands. Nevertheless, even when he flees it, it itself deeply stirs his existence.

Numquam enim ille propriam vitam dubio, incertitudine vel mendacio fulcire posset; eiusmodi exsistentia metu et anxietate infestaretur. Homo igitur definiri potest ille qui veritatem quaeritat.

For he could never shore up his own life with doubt, uncertainty, or mendacity; an existence of that sort would be infested by fear and anxiety. Therefore the human being can be defined as the one who seeks verity.

29. Cogitari nequit investigationem, tam radicitus in hominis natura confirmatam, prorsus inutilem et inanem evadere. Ipsa quaerendi veritatem facultas et interrogandi, ex se, primum iam constituit responsum. Homo quaerere non inciperet quod prorsus ignoraret aut impervium duceret.

29. It cannot be conceived that an investigation, so radically confirmed in the nature of man, should turn out utterly useless and inane. The very faculty of seeking the truth and of questioning, in itself, already constitutes the first answer. Man would not begin to seek what he utterly was ignorant of or would deem impervious.

Tantummodo spes perveniendi ad quoddam responsum potest eum perducere ad primum ferendum gradum. Hoc quidem re accidit in scientifica pervestigatione: cum doctus vir, perspicientia eius quadam praehabita, cuiusdam phaenomeni explicationem logicam et probabilem quaerit, iam ab initio firmam nutrit spem responsum inveniendi, neque animo frangitur prae rebus male gestis. Inanem non considerat originalem intuitum tantummodo ex eo quod scopum non attigit; merito potius dicere poterit se aequum responsum nondum invenisse.

Only the hope of arriving at some response can lead him to take the first step. This indeed happens in reality in scientific investigation: when a learned man, with a certain perspicacity pre-possessed, seeks a logical and probable explanation of some phenomenon, from the beginning he nourishes a firm hope of finding an answer, nor is his spirit broken in the face of things gone badly. He does not consider the original intuition vain merely because it did not attain the goal; rather, with good reason he will be able to say that he has not yet found an adequate answer.

Idem dicendum est de perquisitione veritatis in novissimarum quaestionum contextu. Veritatis sitis ita cordi hominis est insita ut, necessitas quaedam eam praetermittendi, propriam exsistentiam in discrimen adducat. Sufficit ut inquiratur in vitam cotidianam ut probetur quo modo demum unusquisque in seipso patiatur illam sollicitudinem quae fluit de quibusdam essentialibus quaesitis et simul quo modo in mente adumbrationem servet saltem illarum responsionum.

The same must be said about the inquisition for truth in the context of the most ultimate questions. The thirst for truth is so implanted in the heart of man that a certain necessity of passing it over brings one’s own existence into jeopardy. It suffices to inquire into quotidian life to prove how, in the end, each person within himself suffers that solicitude which flows from certain essential questings, and at the same time how he preserves in his mind at least an adumbration of those responses.

Agitur de responsionibus, de quarum veritate conscii sumus, quoniam patet eas quoad substantiam non differre a responsionibus ad quas alii plures pervenerunt. Haud dubie quidem non quaelibet veritas quae acquiritur eodem fruitur pondere. Ex latis attamen exitibus simul sumptis confirmatur hominis facultas perveniendi, in universum, ad veritatem.

It is a matter of responses, of whose truth we are conscious, since it is evident that they, as to substance, do not differ from the responses to which many others have arrived. No doubt, indeed, not every truth that is acquired enjoys the same weight. From the broad outcomes, however, taken together, the human faculty of arriving, in general, at the truth is confirmed.

30. Nunc expedit ut hae diversae veritatum formae properato percurrantur. Numerosiores quidem sunt veritates quae immediata nituntur evidentia vel experimento confirmantur; hae veritates cotidianam vitam scientificamque pervestigationem respiciunt. Alio sub gradu inveniuntur veritates indolis philosophicae, quas homo per speculativam intellectus facultatem attingit.

30. Now it is expedient that these diverse forms of truth be rapidly run through. More numerous indeed are the truths which rely on immediate evidence or are confirmed by experiment; these truths regard quotidian life and scientific investigation. On another level are found truths of a philosophical disposition, which the human being attains through the speculative faculty of the intellect.

Sunt denique veritates religiosae, quarum fundamenta quodammodo etiam in philosophia ponuntur. Hae continentur in responsionibus, quas diversae religiones, suas secundum cuiusque traditiones, novissimis offerunt interrogationibus.(27)

There are, finally, religious truths, the foundations of which are in a certain way also laid in philosophy. These are contained in the responses which the diverse religions, each according to its own traditions, offer to the ultimate questions. (27)

Quod ad philosophicas attinet veritates, notandum est eas non circumscribi solis doctrinis, interdum evanidis, eorum qui philosophiam profitentur. Omnis homo, ut dictum est, quodam sub modo philosophus est et suas possidet philosophicas notiones, quibus vitam gubernat suam: aliter atque aliter universum quisque sibi efformat conspectum responsumque de propriae exsistentiae sensu: hoc sub lumine rem personalem interpretatur atque sese gerendi modum gubernat. Ibidem interrogandum est de habitudine quae inter veritates philosophico-religiosas intercedit et veritatem in Christo Iesu revelatam.

As regards philosophical truths, it should be noted that they are not circumscribed by the doctrines alone, sometimes evanescent, of those who profess philosophy. Every human being, as has been said, is in a certain mode a philosopher and possesses his own philosophical notions, by which he governs his life: each one, in one way and another, fashions for himself a view of the universe and a response concerning the sense of his own existence: under this light he interprets the personal matter and governs the mode of conducting himself. In the same vein, one must inquire about the habitude that intervenes between philosophico-religious truths and the truth revealed in Christ Jesus.

Priusquam huic quaestioni respondeatur, ulterior philosophiae cognitio perpendatur oportet.

Before this question is responded to, a further cognition of philosophy ought to be weighed.

31. Homo creatus non est ut vitam degat solus. Ipse nascitur et crescit in familiae sinu, atque annorum decursu industria sua in societatem cooptatur. Itaque ab incunabulis variis inseritur traditionibus, ex quibus non tantum loquelam et culturae institutionem accipit, verum etiam plurimas veritates, quibus, quasi innata ratione, credit.

31. The human being was not created to pass life alone. He is born and grows in the bosom of a family, and in the course of years by his own industry he is co-opted into society. And so from the cradle he is inserted into various traditions, from which he receives not only language and the formation of culture, but also very many truths, to which, as though by innate reason, he gives credence.

Nihilominus adulescentia et personae maturatio efficiunt ut hae veritates in dubio collocentur et expurgentur per singularem criticam intellectus actionem. Quod non impedit quominus, post hunc transitum, hae eaedem veritates « recuperentur », sive per experientiam ex iisdem factam, sive per subsequentem ratiocinationem. Attamen, in vita hominis veritates simpliciter creditae numerosiores exstant quam illae quas ille obtinet per personalem recognitionem.

Nevertheless, adolescence and the maturation of the person bring it about that these truths are placed in doubt and are expurgated through a singular critical action of the intellect. Which does not prevent that, after this passage, these same truths be « recovered », either through experience made from them, or through subsequent ratiocination. Yet, in the life of man, the truths simply believed are more numerous than those which he obtains through personal recognition.

Quisnam vero stricte cribrare potest innumeros scientiarum exitus, quibus hodierna nititur vita? Quis sua sponte inspicere potest cumulum notitiarum quas ex diversis orbis regionibus cotidie accepimus et quae, generaliter, uti verae habentur? Quis tandem potest iterum terere experientiae et cogitationis vias, per quas tot thesauri sapientiae et religiosi sensus humanae societatis sunt coacervati?

Who indeed can strictly sift the innumerable results of the sciences, upon which present-day life relies? Who of his own accord can inspect the heap of informations which we receive daily from diverse regions of the globe and which, generally, are held as true? Who, finally, can tread again the ways of experience and cogitation, through which so many treasures of wisdom and of religious sense of human society have been heaped together?

Homo, ille nempe qui quaerit, est igitur etiam ille qui vivit alteri fidens.

Man, indeed the one who seeks, is therefore also the one who lives trusting in another.

32. Unusquisque, in credendo, fidem ponit in cognitionibus quas aliae personae sunt adeptae. Hac in re agnoscenda est quaedam significans intentio: una ex parte, cognitio ex fiducia videtur imperfecta cognitionis forma, quae paulatim per evidentiam singillatim comparatam perfici debet; alia ex parte, fiducia divitior saepe exstat quam simplex evidentia, quoniam secum fert necessitudinem interpersonalem atque in discrimen committit non tantum personales intellectus facultates, verum etiam penitiorem facultatem sese aliis personis confidendi, validiorem et intimiorem cum illis necessitudinem statuendo.

32. Each one, in believing, places faith in the cognitions that other persons have attained. In this matter a certain meaningful intention is to be recognized: on the one hand, cognition from trust seems an imperfect form of cognition, which ought gradually to be perfected through evidence acquired piece by piece; on the other hand, trust often stands forth as richer than simple evidence, since it brings with it an interpersonal relationship and puts at stake not only one’s personal faculties of intellect, but also the more inward faculty of entrusting oneself to other persons, by establishing with them a more robust and more intimate relationship.

Expedit ut in luce ponatur veritates in hac interpersonali relatione adeptas ad rerum gestarum vel philosophiae ordinem non attinere. Quod potius petitur est ipsa personae veritas: nempe id quod ipsa est et quidquid intimae suae condicionis ostendit. Hominis enim perfectio non ponitur tantum in sola comparanda cognitione abstracta veritatis, verum stat etiam in vivificanti consuetudine deditionis et fidelitatis erga alterum.

It is expedient that it be brought to light that the truths obtained in this interpersonal relation do not pertain to the order of deeds (history) or of philosophy. What is rather sought is the very truth of the person: namely, that which the person is, and whatever of his or her inmost condition it discloses. For the perfection of the human being is not set only in the merely to-be-acquired abstract cognition of truth, but also stands in the vivifying consuetude of self-surrender and fidelity toward the other.

Hac in fidelitate, cuius vi homo se dedere novit, plenam invenit certitudinem et animi firmitatem. Eodem tamen tempore, cognitio per fiduciam, quae existimatione interpersonali nititur, non datur quin ad veritatem referatur: homo, credendo, veritati quam alter ostendit committitur.

In this fidelity, by whose power a man knows how to surrender himself, he finds full certitude and firmness of mind. Yet at the same time, cognition through trust, which relies on interpersonal estimation, is not given without being referred to truth: the human being, by believing, commits himself to the truth which the other manifests.

Quot exempla proferri possunt ad illustranda quae diximus! Cogitatio autem Nostra statim vertitur ad martyrum testimonium. Martyr, enim, integerrimus testis est veritatis de exsistentia.

How many examples can be brought forward to illustrate what we have said! Our thought, however, immediately turns to the testimony of the martyrs. For the martyr is the most unimpeachable witness of the truth about existence.

Bene novit ille se invenisse, coram Christo Iesu, veritatem de sua vita, quam certitudinem nemo ab eo abstrahere potest. Nec dolor nec saeva mors eum seiungere poterunt a veritate quam detegit cum obviam Christo occurrit. En ratio cur martyrum testimonium ad hodiernum diem admirationem moveat, auditionem inveniat et uti exemplum sumatur.

He knows well that he has found, before Christ Jesus, the truth about his life, a certitude which no one can take away from him. Neither pain nor savage death will be able to sunder him from the truth which he uncovers when he goes to meet Christ. Behold the reason why the testimony of the martyrs to this day stirs admiration, finds a hearing, and is taken as an example.

Haec est causa cur eorum verbo confidatur: in illis invenitur evidentia illius amoris qui diuturnis colloquiis non indiget ad persuadendum, eo quod unicuique nostrum de eo quod penitus percepit uti verum et iam diu quaesitum loquitur. Martyr denique, altam in nobis excitat fiduciam, quoniam declarat quidquid nos percepimus et evidens reddit quod nos quoque aequa vi exprimere velimus.

This is the reason why confidence is placed in their word: in them is found the evidence of that love which has no need of long colloquies to persuade, because it speaks to each of us about what we have deeply perceived as true and long sought. The martyr, finally, arouses deep confidence in us, since he declares whatever we have perceived and renders evident that we too would wish to express it with equal force.

33. Ita intellegere possumus diversas huius quaestionis partes paulatim perfici. Homo ex natura sua veritatem perscrutatur. Haec perscrutatio non tantum destinatur acquisitioni veritatum quarundem partium quae ex eventibus pendent vel scientiis; homo non quaerit tamtummodo verum bonum pro singulis suis consiliis.

33. Thus we can understand the diverse parts of this question to be gradually brought to completion. Man, by his nature, searches out truth. This scrutiny is not destined only for the acquisition of truths of certain sectors that depend on events or on the sciences; man does not seek merely the true good for each of his plans.

Eius perscrutatio in ulteriorem intenditur veritatem quae sensum vitae dilucidare possit; quapropter de illa agitur perscrutatione, quae exitum invenire potest tantum in absoluto.(28) Per facultates in mente insitas, homo similem veritatem et invenire et perspicere potest. Quatenus haec veritas vitalis est et essentialis ad eius exsistentiam, attingitur non tantum per viam rationis, sed etiam per fidentem relictionem in manibus eorum, qui certitudinem et authenticitatem eiusdem veritatis in tuto collocare possint. Facultas et selectio committendi semet ipsos propriamque vitam aliis constituunt sane, secundum anthropologiam, actum significantiorem et expressiorem inter plurimos.

Its investigation is directed toward a further truth that can elucidate the meaning of life; wherefore it is a matter of that investigation which can find an outcome only in the absolute.(28) Through the innate faculties in the mind, the human being can both find and perceive such a truth. Insofar as this truth is vital and essential to his existence, it is attained not only by the way of reason, but also by a confident relinquishment into the hands of those who can secure the certitude and authenticity of that same truth. The faculty and the choice of committing themselves and their own life to others constitute, to be sure—according to anthropology—a more significant and more expressive act among many.

Meminisse liceat quoque rationem in sua perquisitione fidenti dialogo et authentica amicitia esse sustentandam. Suspicionis et diffidentiae aura, quae aliquando speculativam circumplectitur perquisitionem, facit ut in oblivionem detur doctrina priscorum philosophorum qui tenebant amicitiam esse inter contextus magis idoneos ad recte philosophandum.

Let it be permitted also to remember that reason, in its own perquisition, must be sustained by trusting dialogue and authentic friendship. The aura of suspicion and diffidence, which sometimes enfolds speculative perquisition, causes the doctrine of the ancient philosophers—who held that friendship is among the more suitable contexts for philosophizing rightly—to be consigned to oblivion.

Ex hucusque dictis colligitur hominem quodam in itinere versari perquisitionis, quae humano sensu finiri nequit: est perquisitio veritatis et cuiusdam personae cui se committere possit. Christiana fides obviam venit ut ei offerat concretam facultatem contemplandi huius inquisitionis impletionem. Postquam enim gradus simplicis fidei superatur, haec hominem inserit in ordinem gratiae ut Christi mysterium participare possit, cuius vi vera et cohaerens Dei Unius et Trini cognitio offertur illi.

From what has been said thus far it is gathered that the human being is engaged upon a certain journey of inquiry, which cannot be finished by human sense: it is a perquisition of truth and of a certain person to whom he can commit himself. Christian faith comes to meet him so as to offer him a concrete faculty for contemplating the fulfillment of this inquisition. For once the step of simple faith has been surpassed, this inserts the human being into the order of grace so that he may participate in the mystery of Christ, by whose power a true and coherent cognition of the One and Triune God is offered to him.

Ita in Christo Iesu, qui est ipsa Veritas, fides agnoscit novissimam vocationem quae vertitur ad humanam societatem, ut implere possit id quod percipit uti flagrans desiderium.

Thus in Christ Jesus, who is Truth itself, faith acknowledges the ultimate vocation which is directed toward human society, so that it may be able to fulfill that which it perceives as a fervent desire.

34. Haec veritas, quam Deus in Christo Iesu nobis revelat, minime opponitur veritatibus quae per philosophiam assumuntur. Immo, duo cognitionis gradus ducunt ad veritatis plenitudinem. Unitas veritatis est iam fundamentalis postulatus humanae rationis, qui principio non-contradictionis exprimitur.

34. This truth, which God reveals to us in Christ Jesus, is by no means opposed to the truths that are assumed through philosophy. Rather, two degrees of cognition lead to the plenitude of truth. The unity of truth is already a fundamental postulate of human reason, which is expressed by the principle of non-contradiction.

Revelatio offert certitudinem huius unitatis, ostendendo Deum Conditorem esse etiam Deum historiae salutis. Ipse idemque Deus, qui condit et vindicat facultatem intellegendi et ratiocinandi naturalem rerum ordinem, quo docti fidenter nituntur, (29) idem est qui revelatur Pater Domini nostri Iesu Christi. Haec unitas veritatis, naturalis et revelatae, viventem et personalem identitatem suam invenit in Christo, uti Apostolus memorat: « Veritas quae est in Iesu » (Eph 4,21; cfr Col 1,15-20). Ille est Verbum aeternum, in quo omnia creata sunt, simulque est Verbum incarnatum, qui in sua integra persona (30) revelat Patrem (cfr Io 1,14.18). Quidquid humana ratio « ignorans » (cfr Act 17,23) perscrutatur, tantummodo per Christum inveniri potest: quod enim in Ipso revelatur est « plenitudo veritatis » (cfr Io 1,14-16) cuiusque creaturae quae in Ipso et per Ipsum creata est, et ita in Ipso constat (cfr Col 1,17).

Revelation offers certitude of this unity, by showing that God the Creator is also the God of the history of salvation. The selfsame God, who establishes and vindicates the faculty of understanding and of reasoning the natural order of things, upon which the learned confidently rely, (29) is the same who is revealed as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. This unity of truth, natural and revealed, finds its living and personal identity in Christ, as the Apostle recalls: « the Truth which is in Jesus » (Eph 4,21; cfr Col 1,15-20). He is the Eternal Word, in whom all things were created, and at the same time he is the Incarnate Word, who in his whole person (30) reveals the Father (cfr Io 1,14.18). Whatever human reason « not knowing » (cfr Act 17,23) investigates can be found only through Christ: for what is revealed in Him is the « fullness of truth » (cfr Io 1,14-16) of every creature which has been created in Him and through Him, and thus in Him consists (cfr Col 1,17).

35. In contextu huius summi prospectus, penitus inspiciatur oportet relatio inter veritatem revelatam et philosophiam. Haec relatio duplicem secumfert animadversionem, eo sensu quod veritas quae a Revelatione fluit, veritas est quae simul sub rationis lumine est intellegenda. Hoc duplici praehabito sensu, aequam necessitudinem revelatae veritatis cum cognitione philosophica definire licebit.

35. In the context of this highest outlook, the relation between revealed truth and philosophy ought to be examined thoroughly. This relation carries with it a twofold consideration, in the sense that the truth which flows from Revelation is a truth which at the same time is to be understood under the light of reason. With this twofold sense presupposed, it will be possible to define the proper relationship of revealed truth with philosophical cognition.

Qua de re primum perpendamus relationes per saeculorum decursum habitas inter fidem et philosophiam. Hinc igitur quaedam detegi poterunt principia quae constituunt aspectus ad quos referendum est ut inter hos duos gradus cognitionis recta relatio suscipiatur.

On this matter, let us first weigh the relations had over the course of the ages between faith and philosophy. Hence, therefore, certain principles can be detected which constitute the aspects to which reference must be made, so that a right relation may be undertaken between these two grades of cognition.

CAPUT IV

CHAPTER 4

DE HABITUDINE
INTER FIDEM ET RATIONEM

ON THE RELATION
BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON

Praecipui gressus in occursu fidei rationisque

Principal steps in the encounter of faith and reason

36. Ut Actus Apostolorum testantur, nuntius christianus inde ab exordiis cum doctrinis philosophicis illius aetatis est collatus. Idem Liber narrat disceptationem quam Paulus Athenis habuit cum quibusdam philosophis Epicureis et Stoicis (17,18). Exegeticum examen illius sermonis ad Areopagum habiti in luce posuit usitatas mentiones de variis opinionibus populi praesertim ex origine Stoica. Hoc quidem non fortuito factum est.

36. As the Acts of the Apostles testify, the Christian message from the very beginnings was collated with the philosophical doctrines of that age. The same Book recounts the disputation which Paul had at Athens with certain Epicurean and Stoic philosophers (17,18). An exegetical examination of that discourse delivered at the Areopagus has brought to light the customary mentions of the various opinions of the people, especially of Stoic origin. This indeed was not done by chance.

Primi Christiani, ut a paganis recte perciperentur, in suis sermonibus auditores dumtaxat « ad Moysen et prophetas » remittere non poterant; niti quoque tenebantur naturali Dei cognitione et voce conscientiae moralis cuiusque hominis (cfr Rom 1,19-21; 2,14-15; Act 14,16-17). Cum autem haec cognitio naturalis apud paganos in idololatriam prolapsa esset (cfr Rom 1,21-32), Apostolus censuit sapientius esse sermonem coniungere cum doctrina philosophorum qui ab initio fabulis et cultibus mystericis opponebant conceptus divinam transcendentiam magis reverentes.

The first Christians, in order to be rightly perceived by pagans, could not in their discourses refer their hearers only “to Moses and the prophets”; they were also constrained to rely on the natural cognition of God and on the voice of each person’s moral conscience (cf. Rom 1,19-21; 2,14-15; Acts 14,16-17). But since this natural knowledge among the pagans had slipped into idolatry (cf. Rom 1,21-32), the Apostle judged it wiser to conjoin the discourse with the doctrine of the philosophers who from the outset set in opposition to fables and mystery cults conceptions more reverent of the divine transcendence.

Ex praecipuis propositis quae philosophi doctrinae classicae sunt amplexi, consilium exstitit expurgandi a formis mythologicis notionem quam homines de Deo profitebantur. Ut omnibus patet, etiam religio Graeca, non aliter ac pleraeque religiones cosmicae, polytheismum ita profitebatur, ut vel res et eventus naturae in deorum numerum deferret. Conatus hominis ad cognoscendam deorum originem et in eis universi originem, primam suam significationem invenerunt in arte poetica.

From the chief purposes which the philosophers of classical doctrine embraced, there arose the purpose of expurgating from mythological forms the notion which human beings professed about God. As is evident to all, Greek religion too, no otherwise than most cosmic religions, professed polytheism in such a way that it even enrolled things and events of nature into the number of the gods. The human endeavor to know the origin of the gods and in them the origin of the universe found its first signification in the poetic art.

Deorum origines primum hactenus habentur testimonium huius humanae investigationis. Munus fuit parentum philosophiae efficere ut vinculum ostenderetur inter rationem et religionem. Illi quidem contuitum dilatantes ad principia usque universalia, non amplius acquieverunt fabulis antiquis, sed voluerunt ut eorum fides de divinitate fundamento rationali sustentaretur.

The origins of the gods are regarded as the earliest testimony of this human investigation. It was the task of the fathers of philosophy to bring it about that the bond between reason and religion be shown. Indeed, expanding the gaze up to universal principles, they no longer acquiesced in ancient fables, but wished that their faith concerning divinity be sustained by a rational foundation.

Ita susceptum est iter quod, relictis antiquis traditionibus particularibus, se immisit quandam in progressionem quae congruebat cum postulationibus rationis universalis. Scopus ad quem haec progressio tendebat erat criticum iudicium rerum in quas credebatur. Prima hoc in itinere utilitatem tulit divinitatis notio.

Thus a journey was undertaken which, the ancient particular traditions having been left behind, plunged itself into a certain progression that was congruent with the postulations of universal reason. The scope toward which this progression tended was a critical judgment of the things in which one had believed. The notion of divinity was the first to profit on this journey.

Superstitiones uti tales sunt recognitae et religio, saltem partim, per rationalem recognitionem est expurgata. Hoc suffulti fundamento, Patres Ecclesiae fecundum instituerunt colloquium cum antiquis philosophis, iter aperientes ad nuntium et ad cognitionem Dei Christi Iesu.

Superstitions as such were recognized, and religion, at least in part, was expurgated through rational recognition. Supported by this foundation, the Church Fathers established a fecund colloquy with the ancient philosophers, opening a path to the message and to the cognition of God, Christ Jesus.

37. Dum mentionem facimus de hoc motu quo Christiani ad philosophiam accesserunt, merito memorari decet statum circumspectionis quem apud Christianos concitabant alia culturae paganae elementa, uti, exempli gratia, doctrina « gnostica ». Philosophia, tamquam sapientia practica et schola vitae, facile misceri poterat cum cognitione indolis superioris, arcanae, paucis perfectis reservatae. Absque dubio Paulus ad hoc genus speculationum arcanarum mentem vertit, cum Colossenses ita admonet: « Videte, ne quis vos depraedetur per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam secundum traditionem hominum, secundum elementa mundi et non secundum Christum » (2,8). Quam huius aetatis propria sunt Apostoli verba, si ea ad diversas arcanae doctrinae formas remittimus, quae hodie etiam mentes pervadunt quorundam fidelium qui debito critico sensu carent. Sancti Pauli vestigia sectantes, alii auctores I saeculi, praesertim s. Irenaeus et Tertullianus, vicissim exceptiones posuerunt circa excogitationem culturalem quae veritatem Revelationis interpretationi philosophorum subicere intendebat.

37. While we make mention of this movement by which Christians approached philosophy, it is fitting with good reason to recall the stance of circumspection which other elements of pagan culture aroused among Christians, as, for example, the « gnostic » doctrine. Philosophy, as practical wisdom and a school of life, could easily be mingled with a knowledge of a higher, arcane character, reserved to the few who were perfect. Without a doubt Paul had this kind of arcane speculations in mind, when he thus admonishes the Colossians: « See to it that no one takes you captive through philosophy and empty deceit, according to the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world and not according to Christ » (2:8). How proper to our age are the Apostle’s words, if we refer them to the various forms of esoteric doctrine, which today also pervade the minds of certain of the faithful who lack the due critical sense. Following Saint Paul’s footsteps, other authors of the 1st century, especially St. Irenaeus and Tertullian, in their turn lodged objections regarding a cultural contrivance which intended to subject the truth of Revelation to the interpretation of philosophers.

38. Christianismi igitur cum philosophia conventio nec immediata nec facilis exstitit. Usus philosophiae et frequentatio scholarum primis Christianis conturbatio visa sunt potius quam lucrum. Primum et urgens eorum munus erat nuntius Christi a mortuis exsuscitati, qui singulis proponendus erat hominibus, unde illi ad mentis conversionem et ad Baptismi petitionem conducerentur.

38. Therefore the encounter of Christianity with philosophy was neither immediate nor easy. The use of philosophy and the frequenting of the schools appeared to the first Christians as a perturbation rather than a profit. Their first and urgent task was the proclamation of Christ raised from the dead, which had to be set before each individual person, so that they might be led to a conversion of mind and to the request for Baptism.

Quod tamen non significat eos munus ignoravisse perspiciendi cognitionem fidei eiusque causarum. Prorsus aliter! Iniqua ergo et simulata evadit exprobratio Celsi qui Christianum « imperitissimum quemque et rusticissimum » (31) accusare ausus est.

Which nevertheless does not signify that they were ignorant of the office of discerning the cognition of the faith and its causes. Quite otherwise! Therefore the reproach of Celsus proves iniquitous and feigned, who dared to accuse the Christian as «each and every one most inexpert and most rustic» (31).

Causa huius contemptionis initialis aliunde est perquirenda. Revera, lectio Evangelii responsum ferebat tam satisfaciens quaestioni de vitae sensu, illactenus nondum solutae, ut philosophorum frequentatio res praeterita videretur et, quodammodo, superata.

The cause of this initial contempt is to be sought elsewhere. In reality, the reading of the Gospel was bearing an answer so satisfying to the question of the sense of life, hitherto not yet solved, that the frequentation of philosophers seemed a thing of the past and, in a certain manner, overcome.

Quod quidem hodie clarius videtur, si ratio habeatur de contributione Christianismi vindicantis ius universale accedendi ad veritatem. Deiectis repagulis stirpis, ordinis socialis et sexus, Christianismus inde ab exordiis nuntiavit aequalitatem omnium hominum coram Deo. Primum huius conceptus consectarium respexit argumentum de veritate.

Which indeed today seems clearer, if account be taken of the contribution of Christianity vindicating the universal right of access to truth. With the barriers of stock, social order, and sex cast down, Christianity from its beginnings proclaimed the equality of all human beings before God. The first consequence of this concept regarded the argument concerning truth.

Ita aperte superata est notio altioris societatis, cui apud antiquos perquisitio veritatis erat reservata. Quandoquidem accessus ad veritatem bonum est quod ducit ad Deum, omnibus patere debuit haec via percurrenda. Viae quae ducunt ad veritatem multiplices perstant; attamen, eo quod christiana veritas vim salvificam possidet, unaquaeque harum viarum percurri potest ea tamen condicione ut ad extremam metam conducant, videlicet ad Iesu Christi revelationem.

Thus the notion of a higher society, for which among the ancients the perquisition of truth was reserved, has been clearly overcome. Since access to truth is a good that leads to God, this way to be traversed ought to lie open to all. The ways that lead to truth remain multiple; yet, in that Christian truth possesses salvific power, each of these ways can be traversed on the condition that they lead to the ultimate goal, namely to the revelation of Jesus Christ.

Inter principes viros qui positivum nexum cum doctrina philosophica fovent, etsi cauta discretio sit habenda, memorandus est sanctus Iustinus: qui, licet summam professus est existimationem erga Graecam philosophiam, vehementer ac dilucide asseruit se in Christianismo « solam certam et frugiferam philosophiam » (32) invenisse. Pariter Clemens Alexandrinus Evangelium appellavit « veram philosophiam », (33) et philosophiam interpretatus est finitimam Legi Moysis instar praeviae institutionis ad fidem christianam (34) et praeparationis ad Evangelium.(35) Quoniam « philosophia illam appetit sapientiam quae est in probitate animae et verbi atque in integritate vitae, bene praeparatur ad sapientiam et omni ope annititur ad eam assequendam. Apud nos philosophi dicuntur ii qui diligunt illam sapientiam quae omnia condit et docet, id est, cognitionem Filii Dei ».(36) Primum philosophiae Graecae propositum, secundum auctorem Alexandrinum, non est perficere vel confirmare veritatem christianam; potius munus eius est fidem tueri: « Est quidem per se perfecta et nullius indiga Servatoris doctrina, cum sit Dei virtus et sapientia.

Among the leading men who foster a positive nexus with philosophical doctrine, although careful discretion must be maintained, Saint Justin is to be remembered: who, although he professed the highest esteem toward Greek philosophy, vehemently and lucidly asserted that in Christianity he had found «the only certain and fruitful philosophy» (32). Likewise Clement of Alexandria called the Gospel «the true philosophy», (33) and interpreted philosophy as contiguous to the Law of Moses, as a kind of prior institution for the Christian faith (34) and a preparation for the Gospel.(35) Since «philosophy seeks that wisdom which is in the probity of the soul and of the word and in the integrity of life, it is well prepared for wisdom and strives with every effort to attain it. Among us those are called philosophers who love that wisdom which creates and teaches all things, that is, the knowledge of the Son of God».(36) The primary purpose of Greek philosophy, according to the Alexandrian author, is not to perfect or confirm Christian truth; rather its office is to safeguard faith: «The doctrine of the Savior is indeed perfect in itself and in need of nothing, since it is the power and wisdom of God.

Accedens autem Graeca philosophia veritatem non facit potentiorem; sed cum debiles efficiat sophistarum adversus eam argumentationes, et propulset dolosas adversus veritatem insidias, dicta est vineae apta sepes et vallus ».(37)

However, Greek philosophy, coming alongside, does not make the truth more powerful; but since it renders weak the sophists’ arguments against it, and drives back the deceitful snares laid against the truth, it has been called a hedge and a palisade apt for the vineyard ».(37)

39. Hac currente progressione, inspicere licet disputatores christianos cogitationem philosophicam stricto sensu sumpsisse. Prima inter exempla quae inveniri possunt, certe significantius exstat illud Origenis. Adversus impugnationes philosophi Celsi, Origenes ad argumenta responsaque eidem ferenda Platonica usus est philosophia.

39. With this progression running, one may see that Christian disputants took philosophical cogitation in the strict sense. Among the first examples that can be found, certainly the more significant is that of Origen. Against the impugnations of the philosopher Celsus, Origen employed Platonic philosophy to bring arguments and responses to him.

Memorans haud pauca doctrinae Platonicae elementa, rudimenta theologiae christianae excogitare coepit. Ipsum quidem nomen, una cum theologiae notione tamquam rationalis sermonis de Deo, ad illud tempus origini Graecae colligabatur. Verbi gratia, secundum Aristotelis philosophiam, nomen nobiliorem partem et verum culmen sermonis philosophici significabat.

Recalling not a few elements of Platonic doctrine, he began to think out the rudiments of Christian theology. The very name itself, together with the notion of theology as rational discourse about God, up to that time was linked to a Greek origin. For example, according to Aristotle’s philosophy, the name signified the more noble part and the true summit of philosophical discourse.

Sub lumine christianae Revelationis vero, id quod prius doctrinam generatim de deorum natura significabat, sensum prorsus novum assumpsit, eo quod descripsit considerationem quam fidelis faciebat ad veram de Deo doctrinam exhibendam. Haec nova christiana notio, quae iam diffundebatur, philosophia nitebatur, eodemque tamen tempore paulatim curabat ut sese ab illa secerneret. Historia docet eandem Platonicam doctrinam in theologia assumptam profundas subiisse mutationes, praesertim quod attinet ad notiones de immortalitate animae, de deificatione hominis et origine mali.

Under the light of Christian Revelation, however, that which previously signified a doctrine in general concerning the nature of the gods assumed a wholly new sense, in that it described the consideration which the believer undertook to present the true doctrine about God. This new Christian notion, which was already spreading, relied on philosophy, and yet at the same time was gradually taking care to distinguish itself from it. History teaches that this same Platonic doctrine, assumed into theology, underwent profound mutations, especially with respect to the notions of the immortality of the soul, the deification of man, and the origin of evil.

40. Hoc in processu quo doctrina Platonica et Neoplatonica paulatim christianae redduntur, peculiarem in modum memoria digni sunt Patres Cappadoces, Dionysius dictus Areopagita ac maxime sanctus Augustinus. Magnus Doctor occidentalis colloquia instituere valuit cum diversis scholis philosophicis, a quibus tamen omni spe est destitutus. Cum vero christianae fidei veritas apparuit illi, tunc fortitudine roboratus est ad absolutam explendam conversionem, ad quam philosophi, crebro ab ipso frequentati, eum inducere nequiverant.

40. In this process whereby Platonic and Neoplatonic doctrine are gradually rendered Christian, the Cappadocian Fathers, Dionysius called the Areopagite, and most especially Saint Augustine are in a special way worthy of remembrance. The great Western Doctor was able to institute colloquies with diverse philosophical schools, by whom, however, he was deprived of all hope. But when the truth of the Christian faith appeared to him, then he was strengthened with fortitude to accomplish a complete conversion, to which the philosophers, often frequented by him, had not been able to induce him.

Cuius causam ipsemet narrat: « Ex hoc tamen quoque iam praeponens doctrinam catholicam, modestius ibi minimeque fallaciter sentiebam iuberi ut crederetur quod non demonstrabatur (sive esset quid, sed cui forte non esset; sive nec quid esset), quam illic temeraria pollicitatione scientiae credulitatem irrideri; et postea tam multa fabulosissima et absurdissima, quia demonstrari non poterant, credenda imperari ».(38) Augustinus ipsos Platonicos, de quibus praecipuo iure mentionem facere consueverat, exprobravit, qui, quamvis scirent terminum ad quem tendere tenebantur, ignoraverant tamen viam illuc ducentem, nempe Verbum incarnatum.(39) Episcopus Hipponensis edere potuit primam summam synthesim doctrinae philosophicae et theologicae, in quam conflueverant opiniones doctrinae Graecae et Latinae. In Ipso quoque summa scientiae unitas, quae biblica doctrina fulciebatur, summitate doctrinae speculativae confirmari et sustentari potuit. Synthesis quam sanctus Augustinus ad rem perduxit, per saecula habita est altissima speculationis philosophicae et theologicae methodus apud mundum Occidentalem.

He himself relates the reason for this: «From this too, even now preferring Catholic doctrine, I felt that there it was more modestly and in no wise deceitfully enjoined that one should believe what was not being demonstrated (whether it was something, though perhaps it was not for someone; or whether it was nothing), rather than that in that other place, by a rash promissory claim of science, credulity was mocked; and afterwards that so many most fabulous and most absurd things, because they could not be demonstrated, were imposed as to be believed».(38) Augustine reproached the Platonists themselves, of whom he was accustomed with special right to make mention, who, although they knew the terminus to which they were bound to tend, nevertheless had been ignorant of the way leading thither, namely the incarnate Word.(39) The Bishop of Hippo was able to bring forth the first supreme synthesis of philosophical and theological doctrine, into which the opinions of Greek and Latin doctrine had flowed together. In him also the supreme unity of knowledge, which was supported by biblical doctrine, could be confirmed and sustained by the summit of speculative doctrine. The synthesis which Saint Augustine brought to completion was, through the ages, held to be the loftiest method of philosophical and theological speculation in the Western world.

Propriis vitae gestis firmatus sanctimoniaeque spiritu suffultus, inserere etiam potuit in scripta sua innumera argumenta, quae, experientiae respectu habito, futuram quarundam doctrinarum philosophicarum progressionem portendebant.

Strengthened by the deeds of his life and supported by the spirit of sanctity, he was also able to insert into his writings innumerable arguments which, account being taken of experience, portended the future progression of certain philosophical doctrines.

41. Diversi ergo fuerunt modi per quos Patres Orientales et Occidentales convenerunt cum scholis philosophicis. Hoc tamen non significat illos materiam nuntii eandem reddidisse ac systemata quae memorabant. Tertulliani interrogatio: « Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?

41. Therefore there were diverse modes by which the Eastern and Western Fathers convened with the philosophical schools. This, however, does not signify that they rendered the material of the message the same as the systems which they were mentioning. Tertullian’s interrogation: « What then has Athens to do with Jerusalem?

Quid Academiae et Ecclesiae? », (40) evidens iudicium est conscientiae criticae, qua christiani disputatores iam ab initio quaestionem experti sunt de habitudine inter fidem et philosophiam, summatim simul aspectus considerantes sive utilitatis sive limitationis. Non erant incauti disputatores.

« What has the Academy to do with the Church? », (40) is a clear judgment of critical consciousness, by which Christian disputants from the beginning experienced the question about the habitude between faith and philosophy, at the same time summarily considering the aspects both of utility and of limitation. They were not incautious disputants.

Quoniam materiam fidei impense vivebant, altiores speculationis formas attingere sciebant. Quapropter prorsus improbum est eorum operam ad solam translationem veritatum fidei in categorias philosophicas redigere. Immo plura adhuc fecerunt!

Since they intensely lived the matter of faith, they knew how to attain higher forms of speculation. Wherefore it is utterly improper to reduce their effort to the mere translation of the truths of faith into philosophical categories. Rather, they did even more!

Curarunt ut in plenam lucem orirentur omnia quae adhuc manebant implicita et propedeutica in priscorum philosophorum doctrina. (41) Hi enim, uti diximus, munus habuerunt docendi methodum qua mens, externis vinculis liberata, exire poterat ab angustiis fabularum et ad modum excedentem accommodatius sese aperire. Mens igitur purgata et iusta se extollere poterat ad altiores gradus meditationis, validum tribuens fundamentum ad intellegentiam creaturarum, entis transcendentis et absoluti.

They took care that into full light should come forth all those things which had hitherto remained implicit and propaedeutic in the doctrine of the ancient philosophers. (41) For these, as we have said, had the office of teaching the method by which the mind, freed from external bonds, could go out from the narrowness of fables and open itself more fittingly to a transcendent mode. Therefore a mind purified and made just could lift itself to higher grades of meditation, supplying a strong foundation for the understanding of creatures and of the transcendent and absolute Being.

Hic vere inseritur novitas a Patribus excogitata. Illi in plenitudine acceperunt rationem apertam ad absolutum atque Revelationis divitias inseverunt in eam. Coniunctio facta est non tantum in ambitu culturarum, quarum altera alterius fascinationem passa est; illa contigit in intima animorum natura et coniunctio data est inter creaturam eiusque Creatorem.

Here truly the novelty devised by the Fathers is inserted. They in plenitude received an open rationale toward the Absolute and sowed into it the riches of Revelation. A conjunction was effected not only in the ambit of cultures, of which the one underwent the fascination of the other; that took place in the inmost nature of souls, and a conjunction was given between the creature and its Creator.

Ipsum praetergrediens finem versus quem inconscie ex natura sua tendebat, ratio summum bonum et summam veritatem in persona Verbi incarnati attingere potuit. Quod attinet ad philosophias, Patres non timuerunt agnoscere sive elementa communia sive diversitates quas illae ostendebant quod ad Revelationem. Huius confluentiae conscientia recognitionem diversitatum in eis non obscuravit.

By transcending the very goal toward which it was unconsciously tending from its nature, reason was able to attain the supreme good and the supreme truth in the person of the Incarnate Word. As regards the philosophies, the Fathers did not fear to acknowledge both the common elements and the diversities which they displayed with respect to Revelation. Consciousness of this confluence did not obscure the recognition of the diversities in them.

42. In theologia scholastica munus rationis ad philosophiam institutae luculentius efficitur sub impulsu Anselmianae interpretationis de intellectu fidei. Secundum sanctum Cantuariensem Archiepiscopum, primatus fidei certare non intendit cum investigatione rationis propria. Haec enim non vocatur ut iudicium ferat de materia fidei; id facere non potest, quia idoneitate caret.

42. In scholastic theology the office of reason, instituted for philosophy, is made more evident under the impulse of the Anselmian interpretation on the intellect of faith. According to the holy Archbishop of Canterbury, the primacy of faith does not intend to contend with the investigation proper to reason. For it is not called to deliver judgment on the matter of faith; it cannot do that, because it lacks the requisite fitness.

Potius eius munus est invenire sensum, detegere causas quae homines omnes ducere possint ad quandam fidei doctrinam intellegendam. Sanctus Anselmus lucide asserit intellectum investigare teneri quidquid diligat; quo plus diligit, eo plus cognoscere cupit. Qui pro veritate vivit protenditur ad quandam cognitionis formam quae magis magisque amore incenditur erga ea quae cognoscit, quamvis concedere teneatur se non fecisse omnia quae in suis votis fuerunt: « Ad te videndum factus sum; et nondum feci propter quod factus sum ». (42) Desiderium itaque veritatis rationem impellit ad amplius progrediendum; quae, immo, quasi obruitur conscientia propriae facultatis quae in dies latior fit quam id quod attingit.

P rather, its office is to find the sense, to detect the causes which can lead all human beings to understand a certain doctrine of faith. Saint Anselm lucidly asserts that the intellect is held to investigate whatever it loves; the more it loves, the more it longs to know. He who lives for truth is stretched toward a certain form of cognition which is more and more inflamed with love toward the things it knows, although he is constrained to concede that he has not done all the things that were in his vows: « I was made to behold You; and I have not yet done that for which I was made ». (42) The desire, therefore, of truth impels reason to advance further; which, rather, is as it were overwhelmed by the consciousness of its own faculty, which day by day becomes broader than that which it attains.

Hic tamen et nunc ratio detegere potest ubinam iter suum perficiatur: « Sufficere namque debere existimo rem incomprehensibilem indaganti, si ad hoc ratiocinando pervenerit ut eam certissime esse cognoscat; etiamsi penetrare nequeat intellectu, quomodo ita sit. [...] Quid autem tam incomprehensibile, tam ineffabile, quam id quod supra omnia est? Quapropter si ea, quae de summa essentia hactenus disputata sunt, necessariis rationibus sunt asserta, quamvis sic intellectu penetrari non possint, ut et verbis valeant explicari; nullatenus tamen certitudinis eorum nutat soliditas.

Here nevertheless and now reason can uncover where its journey is brought to completion: «For I deem that it ought to suffice to the investigator of an incomprehensible thing, if by ratiocination he has come to know most certainly that it is; even if he cannot penetrate by the intellect how it is thus. [...] But what is so incomprehensible, so ineffable, as that which is above all things? Wherefore, if those things which have hitherto been disputed concerning the highest essence have been asserted by necessary reasons, although they cannot be penetrated by the intellect in such a way that they can also be explicated by words; nevertheless the solidity of their certainty in no way wavers.»

Nam, si superior consideratio rationabiliter comprehendit incomprehensibile esse, quomodo eadem summa sapientia sciat ea quae fecit, [...] quis explicet quomodo sciat aut dicat seipsam, de qua aut nihil, aut vix aliquid ab homine sciri possibile est? ».(43)

For, if the superior consideration reasonably comprehends that the incomprehensible is, how does the same Supreme Wisdom know the things which it made, [...] who will explicate how it knows or speaks itself, of which either nothing, or scarcely anything, can be known by man? ».(43)

Fundamentalis concordia inter cognitionem philosophicam et fidei cognitionem iterum confirmatur: fides postulat ut obiectum suum auxilio rationis comprehendatur; ratio, culmen investigationis attingens, necessarium ducit quidquid fides ostendit.

The fundamental concord between philosophical cognition and the cognition of faith is again confirmed: faith demands that its object be comprehended with the aid of reason; reason, reaching the summit of investigation, takes as necessary whatever faith exhibits.

Perennis sancti Thomae Aquinatis sententiarum novitas

The perennial newness of Saint Thomas Aquinas’s teachings

43. Locus omnino singularis hoc in longo itinere sancto Thomae reservatur, non tantum ob ea quae in eius doctrina continentur, verum etiam ob habitudinem dialogicam quam ille tunc temporis interserere scivit cum Arabica et Hebraica doctrina. Illa quidem aetate, qua christiani disputatores reperiebant veteres thesauros philosophiae, et immediatius philosophiae Aristotelicae, summum eius exstitit meritum quod eminere fecerit concordiam inter rationem et fidem. Utriusque lumen, rationis scilicet et fidei, a Deo procedit, ille ratiocinatus est, idcirco inter se opponere nequeunt.(44)

43. A wholly singular place is reserved for Saint Thomas in this long journey, not only on account of the things contained in his doctrine, but also on account of the dialogical relation which he knew how to interweave at that time with Arabic and Hebrew doctrine. Indeed, in that age, when Christian disputants were discovering the ancient treasures of philosophy, and more immediately of Aristotelian philosophy, his highest merit was that he made the concord between reason and faith stand out. The light of both, namely of reason and of faith, proceeds from God, he reasoned; therefore they cannot be set in opposition to one another. (44)

Thomas adhuc acrius denotat naturam, obiectum proprium philosophiae, ad intellegentiam divinae revelationis conferre posse. Fides igitur rationem non metuit sed eam quaerit fiduciamque in ipsa collocat. Quemadmodum gratia supponit naturam eamque perficit, (45) ita fides supponit et perficit rationem.

Thomas denotes yet more sharply that nature, the proper object of philosophy, can contribute to the understanding of divine revelation. Faith therefore does not fear reason but seeks it and places confidence in it. Just as grace presupposes nature and perfects it, (45) so faith presupposes and perfects reason.

Quae, fidei lumine illustrata, eximitur a fragilitate et a limitatione quae ex peccati commissione proveniunt, et necessariam invenit fortitudinem, qua in cognitionem mysterii Dei Unius et Trini se sublevet. Etsi in luce vehementer ponit supernaturalem fidei indolem, Doctor Angelicus non est oblitus ipsius rationabilitatis praestantiam; immo, penitus descendere scivit et sensum illius sapientiae circumscribere. Fides quidem quodam modo est « exercitium cogitationis »; ratio hominis nec abrogatur nec minuitur, cum fidei veritatibus assentit; hae tamen veritates ex libera et conscia selectione attinguntur.(46)

Which, illumined by the light of faith, is taken out from the fragility and limitation that proceed from the commission of sin, and finds the necessary fortitude by which it may be lifted up into the cognition of the mystery of God One and Triune. Although he strongly sets in light the supernatural character of faith, the Angelic Doctor has not forgotten the excellence of rationality itself; nay rather, he knew how to descend thoroughly and to circumscribe the sense of that wisdom. Faith indeed is in a certain way an « exercise of cogitation »; the reason of man is neither abrogated nor diminished when it assents to the truths of faith; yet these truths are attained by a free and conscious selection.(46)

Hac quidem de causa iure meritoque sanctus Thomas ab Ecclesia Magister doctrinae constanter est habitus et exemplum quod ad modum theologiam tractandi. Nos iuvat in memoriam revocare ea quae Dei Servus Decessor Noster Paulus VI scripsit septimo occurrente centenario ab obitu Doctoris Angelici: « Maxima profecto fuerunt s. Thomae et audacia in veritate quaerenda, et spiritus libertas in novis tractandis quaestionibus, et illa mentis probitas, eorum propria, qui, dum nullo modo patiuntur christianam veritatem contaminari profana philosophia, hanc tamen a priori minime respuunt. Quare, in christianae doctrinae historia eius nomen in numerum refertur praecursorum, quibus novus philosophiae atque scientiae universalis cursus debetur.

For this very reason, rightly and deservedly Saint Thomas has been consistently regarded by the Church as a Master of doctrine and as an example with respect to the mode of treating theology. It pleases us to recall to mind the things which the Servant of God, Our Predecessor Paul 6, wrote on the 7th centenary from the death of the Angelic Doctor: «Indeed, very great in St. Thomas were both the audacity in seeking truth, and the liberty of spirit in handling new questions, and that probity of mind, proper to those who, while they in no way allow the Christian truth to be contaminated by profane philosophy, yet by no means reject this a priori . Wherefore, in the history of Christian doctrine his name is counted among the number of the forerunners, to whom a new course of philosophy and of universal science is owed.»

Caput autem et quasi cardo doctrinae, qua ipse, ut summa et quasi prophetica ingenii acie praeditus erat, quaestionem dissolvit de novis mutuis relationibus inter rationem et fidem, in eo positum est, quod mundi saecularitatem cum arduis ac severis Evangelii postulatis composuit; atque hoc modo sese subduxit ab inclinatione, naturae aliena, ad mundum eiusque bona contemnenda, neque tamen descivit a supremis et indeclinabilibus principiis supernaturalis ordinis ».(47)

The head and, as it were, the hinge of the doctrine by which he—since he was endowed with the highest and almost prophetic keenness of genius—resolved the question about the new mutual relations between reason and faith, is placed in this: that he composed the world’s secularity with the arduous and severe postulates of the Gospel; and in this way he withdrew himself from the inclination, alien to nature, to despise the world and its goods, nor yet did he desert the supreme and indeclinable principles of the supernatural order ».(47)

44. Praecipuas inter perceptiones sancti Thomae illa est quae missionem respicit quam Spiritus Sanctus explicat cum humanam scientiam maturat in sapientia. Iam a primis paginisSummae Theologiae(48) Aquinas Doctor primatum docere voluit illius sapientiae quae est donum Spiritus Sancti et quae ad divinarum rerum cognitionem ducit. Eius theologia nos docet sapientiae proprietatem in eius arta conglutinatione cum fide et cognitione divina.

44. Among the principal perceptions of St. Thomas is that which regards the mission which the Holy Spirit explicates when he matures human science into wisdom. Already from the first pages of theSumma Theologiae (48) the Doctor Aquinas wished to teach the primacy of that wisdom which is the gift of the Holy Spirit and which leads to the cognition of divine things. His theology teaches us the property of wisdom in its tight conglutination with faith and with divine cognition.

Illa cognoscit per connaturalitatem, fidem praesumit et efficit ut concipiatur rectum iudicium suum, initium sumens a veritate ipsius fidei: « ...sapientia quae ponitur donum differt ab ea quae ponitur virtus intellectualis acquisita. Nam illa acquiritur studio humano: haec autem est "de sursum descendens", ut dicitur Iac. 3, 15. Similiter et differt a fide.

It knows by connaturality, presupposes faith, and brings it about that its right judgment be conceived, taking its beginning from the truth of faith itself: « ...the wisdom which is set as a gift differs from that which is set as an acquired intellectual virtue. For the latter is acquired by human study: but this is "descending from above", as is said James 3:15. Likewise it also differs from faith.

Nam fides assentit veritati divinae secundum seipsam: sed iudicium quod est secundum veritatem divinam pertinet ad donum sapientiae ».(49)

For faith assents to the divine truth according to itself; but the judgment which is according to the divine truth pertains to the gift of wisdom ».(49)

Primatus tamen huic sapientiae tributus non inducit Doctorem Angelicum ut duas alias additicias formas sapientiae obliviscatur: formam nempe philosophicam, quae fulcitur facultate qua intellectus, intra proprios limites, instruitur ad res investigandas; et formam theologicam, quae ex Revelatione pendet et fidei veritates scrutatur, ipsum Dei mysterium attingendo.

Nevertheless, the primacy granted to this wisdom does not induce the Angelic Doctor to forget two other additional forms of wisdom: namely the philosophical form, which is supported by the faculty by which the intellect, within its proper limits, is equipped for investigating things; and the theological form, which depends on Revelation and scrutinizes the truths of faith by reaching the very mystery of God.

Intime persuasus de eo quod « omne verum a quocumque dicatur a Spiritu Sancto est », (50) sanctus Thomas nulla adductus utilitate, veritatem dilexit. Quaesivit eam ubicumque ea exprimi potuit, universalem eius indolem quam maxime illustrando. Magisterium Ecclesiae in ipso vidit et aestimavit ardens veritatis studium; doctrina illius, eo quod universalem, obiectivam et transcendentem veritatem semper asseruit, attigit culmina « quibus attingendis impar humana intelligentia est ». (51) Merito quidem ille appellari potest « apostolus veritatis ». (52) Quoniam indubitanter ad veritatem animum attendebat, revera obiectivum eius sensum agnoscere scivit.

Intimately persuaded of this, that «every truth, by whomever it is spoken, is from the Holy Spirit», (50) Saint Thomas, induced by no utility, loved the truth. He sought it wherever it could be expressed, illustrating its universal character as much as possible. The Magisterium of the Church saw in him and esteemed an ardent zeal for truth; his doctrine, in that it always asserted universal, objective, and transcendent truth, reached the summits «to the attaining of which human intelligence is unequal». (51) Deservedly indeed can he be called an «apostle of truth». (52) Since he attended his mind to the truth without doubting, he truly knew how to recognize its objective sense.

Eius vere est philosophia essendi et non apparendi dumtaxat.

His is truly a philosophy of being and not merely of appearing.

Seiunctae a ratione fidei tragoedia

The tragedy of faith separated from reason

45. Primis conditis studiorum universitatibus, theologia propius cum aliis formis investigationis et scientificae cognitionis conferri potuit. Sanctus Albertus Magnus et sanctus Thomas, quamquam asserebant exsistentiam cuiusdam compagis inter theologiam et philosophiam, primi fuerunt viri docti qui necessariam agnoverunt autonomiam qua philosophia et scientiae indigebant, ut singulae argumentis propriae investigationis incumberent. Attamen, inde ab exeunte Medio Aevo legitima distinctio inter has duas cognitionis areas paulatim in nefastum discidium mutata est.

45. With the first universities being founded, theology could be brought more closely into comparison with other forms of investigation and scientific cognition. Saint Albert the Great and Saint Thomas, although they asserted the existence of a certain framework between theology and philosophy, were the first learned men who recognized the necessary autonomy which philosophy and the sciences needed, so that each might rest upon the arguments of its own proper investigation. Yet, from the closing Middle Ages onward, the legitimate distinction between these two areas of cognition was gradually changed into a nefarious sundering.

Post nimiam animi rationalistarum cupiditatem, quorundam disputatorum propriam, sententiae talia posuerunt fundamenta, ut pervenirent ad philosophiam seiunctam et omnino autonomam quod ad fidei veritates. Varia inter consectaria huius seiunctionis diffidentia quaedam exstitit in dies validior quod attinet ad ipsam rationem. Quidam generalem, scepticam et agnosticam diffidentiam profiteri coeperunt, vel ad maius spatium fidei tribuendum, vel ad quamcumque evertendam de eadem mentionem rationalem.

After the excessive zeal of mind of the rationalists, characteristic of certain disputants, opinions laid such foundations as to arrive at a philosophy separate and wholly autonomous as regards the truths of faith. Among the various consequences of this separation, a certain diffidence arose, growing stronger day by day, with respect to reason itself. Some began to profess a general, skeptical, and agnostic diffidence, either to assign a greater space to faith, or to overturn any rational mention concerning the same.

Ut breviter dicamus, quidquid doctrina Patrum doctorumque Medii Aevi cogitaverat atque exsecuta erat veluti profundam unitatem, causam cognitionis accommodatae ad altissimas speculationis formas, omnino reapse deletum est ope doctrinarum faventium defensioni cognitionis rationalis a fide seiunctae eamque substituentis.

To say briefly, whatever the doctrine of the Fathers and of the Doctors of the Middle Ages had conceived and had executed as a profound unity, a ground of cognition accommodated to the loftiest forms of speculation, has entirely, in very fact, been effaced by the aid of doctrines favoring the defense of rational cognition separated from faith and substituting it.

46. Extremae opinationes, quae magis valent, in occidentali praesertim historia, perbene noscuntur et videntur. Nihil est immodestiae edicere philosophicam disciplinam recentioris temporis magna ex parte esse progressam a christiana Revelatione gradatim disiunctam, eo usque opposita palam attingeret. Praeterito saeculo hic motus suum fastigium attigit.

46. The extreme opinions, which hold greater sway, especially in Western history, are very well known and evident. It is no immodesty to declare that the philosophic discipline of more recent times has for the most part progressed as gradually disjoined from Christian Revelation, to the point that it came to be openly opposed. In the past century this movement reached its summit.

Quidam « idealismi » asseclae multifarie fidem eiusque elementa, vel Iesu Christi mortem ac resurrectionem, in dialecticas structuras ratione intellegibiles immutare contenderunt. Huic opinioni variae humanismi athei species, philosophice elucubratae, obstiterunt, quae fidem reputarunt perniciosam atque progressum plenae rationalitatis prohibentem. Haud veritae sunt ipsae ne novas religiones sese exhiberent quorundam consiliorum fulcimento utentes, quae in politica ac sociali ratione, in systemata quaedam evaserunt omnia complectentia humanitati exitiosa.

Some adherents of « idealism » strove in many ways to transmute faith and its elements—even the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ—into dialectical structures intelligible by reason. Various species of atheist humanism, philosophically elaborated, opposed this opinion, reckoning faith pernicious and hindering the progress of full rationality. Nor did they hesitate to present themselves as new religions, using the buttress of certain plans, which, in political and social rationale, evolved into certain all-encompassing systems, ruinous to humanity.

In rebus scientificis vestigandis mens positivistica adolevit, quae non modo discessit ab omni significatione opinationis christianae de mundo, verum etiam, ac potissimum, omnia indicia metaphysicae moralisque rationis prolabi sivit. Inde factum est ut quidam scientiae periti, ethica mente omnino carentes, in periculo versati sint ne amplius persona eiusque tota vita medium teneret studii locum. Immo quidam illorum, de viribus technicae artis progressus plane conscii, concedere videntur sollicitationi, praeter mercatus rationes, demiurgicae potestati in naturam ac in ipsum hominem.

In the investigating of scientific matters a positivistic mind has grown up, which has not only departed from every meaning of the Christian opinion about the world, but also, and most of all, has allowed all indications of metaphysical and moral reason to slip away. Hence it has come about that certain experts of science, wholly lacking an ethical mind, have found themselves in danger lest the person and his whole life no longer hold the central place of study. Indeed some of them, fully conscious of the forces of the progress of the technical art, seem to yield to the temptation, beyond market considerations, to a demiurgic power over nature and over the human being himself.

Veluti consequens discriminis rationalismi tandem nihilismus crevit. Quatenus philosophia nullius rei, pro hominibus nostrae aetatis quandam suam habet pellicientem vim. Eius fautores inquisitionem putant in se ipsam conclusam, nulla data spe neque facultate adipiscendi veritatis metam.

As a consequent of the crisis of rationalism, at length nihilism has grown. Insofar as a philosophy of nothingness, for the people of our age it has a certain alluring force. Its favorers think inquiry to be closed in upon itself, with no hope granted nor capacity for attaining the goal of truth.

In nihilismi opinatione exsistentia dat tantum copiam quiddam sentiendi et experiendi, qua in re evanida primas agunt partes. Ex nihilismo illa opinio orta est de nullo officio definitive tenendo, quandoquidem fugacia et temporaria sunt omnia.

In the opinion of nihilism, existence gives only the opportunity to feel and to experience something, in which matter the evanescent plays the leading parts. From nihilism there has arisen that opinion that no obligation is to be held definitively, since all things are fugacious and temporary.

47. Non est obliviscendum, ceterum, in hodierna cultura philosophiae partes esse immutatas. Ex sapientia et universali scientia, in unam quamlibet e multis scientiae provinciis redacta est; immo, quibusdam ex rationibus, partes omnino supervacanae eidem dumtaxat tribuuntur. Aliae interea rationalitatis formae magis magisque increbuerunt, quae philosophicae disciplinae leve pondus manifeste tribuerunt.

47. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that in today’s culture the parts of philosophy have been altered. From wisdom and universal science, it has been reduced to any one among the many provinces of science; indeed, by some reasons, only entirely superfluous roles are attributed to it. Meanwhile other forms of rationality have grown more and more prevalent, which have manifestly assigned slight weight to the philosophical discipline.

Pro veritatis contemplatione atque finis ultimi sensusque vitae inquisitione, formae hae rationalitatis diriguntur — vel saltem sunt convertibiles — veluti « rationes instrumentales », quae inserviant utilitatis propositis, voluptatibus vel dominationi.

For the contemplation of truth and the inquiry into the ultimate end and the meaning of life, these forms of rationality are directed — or at least are convertible — as “instrumental reasons,” which serve purposes of utility, pleasures, or domination.

Quam lubricum sit hanc viam decurrere inde a Nostris primis Litteris Encyclicis editis ediximus, cum scripsimus: « Nostrae aetatis homo semper urgeri videtur iis ipsis rebus, quas efficit, nempe proventu operis manuum suarum et magis etiam laboris mentis et voluntatum propensionum. Fructus huius multiformis industriae humanae obnoxii sunt — nimis celeriter quidem ac saepe tali modo, qui praevideri non possit — « alienationi », quatenus illis, qui eos protulerunt, simpliciter auferuntur: hoc non solum fieri contigit nec tanta ratione, quanta, saltem ex parte, in quodam ambitu ex eorum effectibus consequenter et oblique enato, iidem fructus contra hominem ipsum convertuntur. Haec videtur esse summa acerbissimae condicionis exsistentiae hominum nostri temporis, prout maxima et universali amplitudine patet.

How slippery it is to run this road we have proclaimed since Our first Encyclical Letters were issued, when we wrote: «The man of our age always seems to be pressed by those very things which he brings about, namely by the yield of the work of his hands and even more by the labor of the mind and by the propensities of wills. The fruits of this multiform human industry are liable — too quickly indeed and often in a manner that cannot be foreseen — to “alienation,” inasmuch as they are simply taken away from those who produced them: this has not only come to pass, nor so much in this way, as that, at least in part, within a certain ambit that has arisen consequently and obliquely from their effects, these same fruits are turned against the human being himself. This seems to be the sum of the most bitter condition of the existence of human beings of our time, as is evident in the greatest and universal amplitude.»

Quare homo maiore in dies afficitur timore. Metuit enim, ne fructus sui, non omnes quidem neque plerique, sed nonnulli et ii sane, qui singularem partem habent ingenii eius et industriae, contra se ipsum convertantur ».(53)

Wherefore man is affected by greater fear day by day. For he fears lest the fruits of his own, not all indeed nor the greater part, but some—and those surely which have a singular share of his genius and industry—be turned against himself ».(53)

His culturae immutationibus praepositis, nonnulli philosophi, veritatem ipsius causa inquirere desistentes, sibi hoc unum statuerunt ut obiectivam certitudinem practicamve utilitatem obtinerent. Proximum fuit ut vera rationis dignitas offunderetur, quae nempe facultatem amisit verum cognoscendi et absolutum vestigandi.

With these cultural changes set before us, certain philosophers, desisting from inquiring into truth for its own sake, established this one aim for themselves: to obtain objective certitude or practical utility. It was close at hand that the true dignity of reason be overshadowed, which indeed lost the faculty of knowing the truth and of investigating the Absolute.

48. Quod in postrema hac historiae philosophiae parte eminet, pertinet, igitur, ad contemplatam progredientem fidei a philosophica ratione distractionem. Omnino verum est quod, res attente cogitanti, in philosophica quoque cogitatione eorum qui operam dederunt spatio inter fidem et rationem dilatando, magni pretii germina cogitationum nonnumquam ostenduntur, quae penitus excussa et recta mente cordeque exculta, efficiunt ut veritatis iter reperiatur. Haec congitationis germina inveniri possunt, exempli gratia, in perpensis explicationibus de perceptione experientiaque, de specierum summa deque irrationali personalitate deque intersubiectivitate, de libertate bonisque, de tempore historiaque.

48. What stands out in this last part of the history of philosophy pertains, therefore, to the considered progressive separation of faith from philosophical reason. It is altogether true that, for one thinking things attentively, even within the philosophical cogitation of those who devoted effort to dilating the space between faith and reason, seeds of thought of great price are sometimes displayed which, when thoroughly sifted and cultivated with a right mind and heart, bring it about that the path of truth is found. These seeds of cogitation can be found, for example, in weighed explanations about perception and experience, about the summa of species and about irrational personality and about intersubjectivity, about liberty and goods, about time and history.

Mortis quoque argumentum graviter unumquemquem philosophum compellare potest, ut in se ipse germanum suae vitae sensum reperiat. Id autem non sibi vult praesentem inter fidem et rationem necessitudinem subtilem iudicii conatum non postulare, quandoquidem tum ratio tum fides sunt extenuatae et sunt factae altera alteri debiles. Ratio, Revelatione nudata, devia itinera decucurrit, quae eandem in discrimen inferunt haud cernendi ultimam metam.

The argument of death, too, can gravely compel each and every philosopher to discover within himself the genuine meaning of his life. Yet that does not mean that the present relationship between faith and reason does not demand a subtle effort of judgment, since both reason and faith have been attenuated and have been made weak one toward the other. Reason, stripped of Revelation, has run down devious paths, which bring it into the peril of not discerning the ultimate goal.

Fides, ratione carens, animi sensum et experientiam extulit, atque sic in periculo versatur ne amplius sit universalis oblatio. Fallax est cogitare fidem, coram infirma ratione, plus posse; ipsa, contra, in grave periculum incidit ne in fabulam ac superstitionem evadat. Eodem modo ratio, quae fidei firmatae non obversatur, ad novitatem et radicalitatem ipsius « esse » contuendas non lacessitur.

Faith, lacking reason, has exalted the feeling and experience of the spirit, and thus is in peril lest it no longer be a universal oblation. It is fallacious to think that faith, before an infirm reason, can do more; it, on the contrary, falls into grave danger lest it pass into fable and superstition. In the same way reason, which is not confronted by a fortified faith, is not challenged to behold the novelty and radicality of «being» itself.

Ne importuna igitur videatur gravis firmaque Nostra compellatio, ut fides et philosophia artam illam coniunctionem redintegrent, quae eas congruas efficiat earum naturae, autonomia vicissim servata. Fidei parrhesiae respondere debet rationis audacia.

Lest, therefore, Our grave and firm address seem importunate, it is so that faith and philosophy may reintegrate that close conjunction which makes them congruent to their nature, with autonomy in turn preserved. To the parrhesia of faith there ought to respond the audacity of reason.

CAPUT V

CHAPTER 5

DE RE PHILOSOPHICA MAGISTERII IUDICIA

THE MAGISTERIUM’S JUDGMENTS ON PHILOSOPHICAL MATTERS

Magisterii prudens discretio uti veritati praestitum officium

The prudent discernment of the magisterium as a service rendered to truth

49. Suam ipsius philosophiam non exhibet Ecclesia, neque quamlibet praelegit peculiarem philosophiam aliarum damno. (54) Recondita huius temperantiae causa in eo reperitur quod philosophia, etiam cum necessitudinem instituit cum theologia, secundum suam rationem suasque regulas agere debet; nullo modo alioquin cavetur ut illa ad veritatem vergat et ad eam per cursum ratione perpendendum tendat. Levis auxilii esset quaedam philosophia quae non procederet ratione gubernante secundum sua ipsius principia peculiaresque methodologias.

49. The Church does not exhibit its own philosophy, nor does it preselect any particular philosophy to the detriment of others. (54) The recondite cause of this temperance is found in this: that philosophy, even when it establishes a bond with theology, ought to act according to its own reason and its own rules; otherwise in no way is it safeguarded that it incline toward truth and tend to it by a course to be weighed by reason. A philosophy would be of slight assistance that did not proceed with reason governing, according to its own principles and particular methodologies.

Quod huius rei caput est, autonomiae radix, qua philosophia fruitur, in eo invenitur quod ratio natura sua ad veritatem vergit ipsaque praeterea ad eam consequendam necessaria habet instrumenta. Philosophia huius « statuti constitutivi » sibi conscia facere non potest quin servet necessitates quoque et perspicuitates veritatis revelatae proprias.

What is the chief point of this matter is that the root of the autonomy which philosophy enjoys is found in this: that reason by its nature inclines toward truth and, moreover, itself has the instruments necessary to attain it. Philosophy, conscious to itself of this « constitutive statute », cannot but also keep the necessities and the perspicuities proper to revealed truth.

Historia tamen demonstravit declinationes et errores in quos haud semel recentiore potissimum aetate philosophicae opinationes inciderint. Munus non est Magisterii neque officium opem ferre ad lacunas philosophicae cogitationis mancae implendas. Eius est, contra, palam et strenue obsistere, cum philosophicae sententiae dubiae periculum iniciunt ne revelatio recte intellegatur nec non cum falsae factiosaeque effunduntur opiniones, quae graves errores disseminant, exturbantes Dei populi simplicitatem et fidei sinceritatem.

History, however, has demonstrated the declinations and errors into which philosophical opinions have fallen not once, especially in the more recent age. It is not the office nor the duty of the Magisterium to bring aid to fill the lacunae of defective philosophical cogitation. Its task is, on the contrary, to oppose openly and strenuously when dubious philosophical opinions introduce a danger lest revelation be rightly understood, and also when false and factious opinions are poured forth, which disseminate grave errors, expelling the simplicity of the People of God and the sincerity of faith.

50. Ecclesiae ideo Magisterium, sub fidei lumine suum iudicium criticum de philosophicis opinationibus ac sententiis, quae cum doctrina christiana contendunt, ex auctoritate proferre potest ac debet. (55) Ad Magisterium in primis pertinet iudicare quae praesumptiones philosophicae et consecutiones veritati revelatae aversentur, pariterque postulata significare quae sub lumine fidei a philosophia requiruntur. In philosophicae praeterea scientiae progressu complures philosophantium scholae sunt ortae.

50. Therefore the Church’s Magisterium, under the light of faith, can and ought, by authority, to put forward its critical judgment about philosophical opinions and positions which contend with Christian doctrine. (55) It belongs to the Magisterium above all to judge which philosophical presumptions and consequences are averse to revealed truth, and likewise to indicate the postulates which, under the light of faith, are required of philosophy. Moreover, in the progress of philosophical science, numerous schools of philosophers have arisen.

Etiam plures hae disciplinae Magisterium compellant ad iudicium officiose enuntiandum an primigenia principia, quibus hae scholae nituntur, cum postulatis Dei verbi ac theologicae cogitationis propriis componi possint necne.

Moreover, these several disciplines compel the Magisterium to announce dutifully a judgment as to whether the primordial principles on which these schools rely can be composed with the postulates of the word of God and those proper to theological cogitation, or not.

Ecclesia quippe demonstrare debet id quod fidei alienum oriri potest in quadam philosophica disciplina. Complures namque philosophicae cogitationes, ut opiniones de Deo, de homine, de eius libertate deque eius ethica agendi ratione, Ecclesiam recta compellant, quandoquidem veritatem revelatam quam ipsa tuetur contingunt. Cum hoc iudicium enuntiamus, nos Episcopi « testes veritatis » esse debemus in diaconia sustinenda humili sed tenaci, quae singulis philosophis aestimanda est, in commodum « rectae rationis », rationis videlicet quae de vero congruenter cogitat.

Indeed the Church ought to demonstrate that which may arise alien to the faith within a certain philosophical discipline. For many philosophical cogitations, such as opinions about God, about man, about his liberty and about his ethical manner of acting, address the Church directly, since they touch upon the revealed truth which she herself safeguards. When we pronounce this judgment, we Bishops ought to be « witnesses of the truth » in sustaining a diakonia humble but tenacious, which is to be esteemed by individual philosophers, for the benefit of « right reason », namely of reason which thinks congruently about the true.

51. Hoc autem iudicium non quaedam infitiatio intellegi primo debet, proinde quasi Magisterium auferre vel imminuere quaslibet actiones velit. Immo eius cohortationes volunt in primis philosophicas vestigationes lacessere, promovere, incitare. Philosophi ceterum primi necessitatem percipiunt se ipsos iudicandi, errores, si qui sunt, corrigendi necnon nimis angustos fines transgrediendi in quibus eorum philosophica cogitatio gignitur.

51. This judgment, however, ought not at the outset to be understood as some denial, as though the Magisterium wished to take away or diminish any activities. Rather, its exhortations wish above all to challenge, promote, and incite philosophical investigations. Philosophers, moreover, are the first to perceive the necessity of judging themselves, of correcting errors, if there are any, and also of transgressing the too narrow boundaries within which their philosophical cogitation is engendered.

Illud praecipuum est considerandum, unam esse veritatem, quamvis eius significationes historiae vestigia exhibeant atque, insuper, e ratione humana propter peccatum sauciata et hebetata oriantur. Inde constat nullam historicam philosophiae formam legitime sibi vindicare posse facultatem totam veritatem complectendi, neque plene explanandi hominem, mundum, hominis necessitudinem cum Deo.

It must be considered paramount that there is one truth, although its significations exhibit the vestiges of history and, moreover, arise from human reason wounded and dulled on account of sin. From this it is clear that no historical form of philosophy can legitimately claim for itself the faculty of comprehending the whole truth, nor of fully explaining man, the world, and man’s relationship with God.

Hodiernis porro temporibus, cum systemata, rationes, opinationes ac argumenta philosophica saepe minutatissime digesta multiplicentur, magis magisque sub fidei lumine acumen iudicii deposcitur. Quod iudicium est arduum, quia, si quidem iam est laboriosum ingenitas ac non alienabiles facultates rationis agnoscere, finibus constitutivis et historicis additis, multo incertius interdum erit iudicium discernendi, in singulis philosophicis notionibus, id quod, sub fidei respectu, validum et frugiferum exhibent, pro eo quod praebent falsum et periculosum. Ecclesia utique scit thesauros sapientiae et scientiae in Christo abscondi (cfr Col 2,3); quocirca operam dat ut philosophica inquisitio evolvatur, ne via intercludatur, quae ad mysterium agnoscendum ducit.

In the present times, moreover, as philosophical systems, methods, opinions, and arguments—very minutely arranged—are multiplied, the keenness of judgment under the light of faith is demanded more and more. That judgment is arduous, because, if indeed it is already toilsome to recognize the inborn and inalienable faculties of reason, with constitutive and historical limits added, at times the judgment of discerning, in individual philosophical notions, what they present, with respect to faith, as valid and fruitful, as opposed to what they proffer as false and dangerous, will be much more uncertain. The Church surely knows that the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden in Christ (cfr Col 2,3); wherefore it devotes effort so that philosophical inquiry may be developed, lest the way be blocked which leads to the recognition of the mystery.

52. Recentioribus non modo temporibus Ecclesiae Magisterium suam mentem de quibusdam philosophicis doctrinis patefecit. Ut quaedam supponamus exempla, sufficit ut memorentur saeculorum decursu declarationes de opinionibus quibusdam quae affirmabant animas praeexsistere, (56) itemque de variis idolatriae esoterismique superstitiosi obnoxiis formis quae in astrologicis enuntiationibus (57) continentur; ne obliviscamur scripta magis systematica adversus averroismi Latini sententias, quae christianae fidei aversantur.(58)

52. In more recent times too, the Magisterium of the Church has disclosed its mind about certain philosophical doctrines. To set down some examples, it suffices to recall, over the course of the centuries, declarations about certain opinions which affirmed that souls pre-exist, (56) and likewise about various forms liable to idolatry and to superstitious esoterism which are contained in astrological enunciations (57); nor should we forget the more systematic writings against the tenets of Latin Averroism, which are averse to the Christian faith.(58)

Si Magisterii verbum crebrius a superiore inde saeculo exauditum est, id accidit quod illa aetate non pauci catholici suum esse officium putarunt suam philosophiam opponere opinionibus recentiorum philosophorum. Tunc autem Ecclesiae Magisterium omnino coactum est ad vigilandum ne hae philosophicae doctrinae vicissim in formas falsas et negatorias transgrederentur. Sunt idcirco censura aequabiliter affecti hinc fideismus (59) et traditionalismus radicalis,(60) propter eorum diffidentiam naturalium rationis facultatum, illinc rationalismus,(61) et ontologismus,(62) quandoquidem rationi naturali id tribuebant, quod solummodo fidei lumine cognosci potest.

If the word of the Magisterium has been heard more frequently since the previous century, that has happened because in that age not a few Catholics thought it their duty to oppose their own philosophy to the opinions of more recent philosophers. Then, however, the Church’s Magisterium was altogether compelled to keep watch lest these philosophical doctrines, in turn, cross over into false and negating forms. Therefore, under censure were equally placed, on the one hand, fideism (59) and radical traditionalism (60), on account of their distrust of the natural faculties of reason; and, on the other hand, rationalism (61) and ontologism (62), since they attributed to natural reason that which can be known only by the light of faith.

Quae valida in his disceptationibus continebantur Constitutione dogmantica Dei filius recepta sunt, qua primum Concilum Oecumenicum quoddam, Vaticanum scilicet I, sollemniter inter Revelationem ac fidem necessitudinem pertractavit. Doctrina quae in documento illo continetur penitus et salubriter philosophicam complurium fidelium inquisitionem affecit atque hodiernis quoque temporibus quiddam perstat praeceptivum ad quod tendere debemus ad iustam congruentemque christianam hac de re inquisitionem consequendam.

What was strong in these disputations was taken up by the dogmatic Constitution Dei filius , by which, for the first time, a certain Ecumenical Council, namely Vatican 1, solemnly treated the nexus between Revelation and faith. The doctrine contained in that document profoundly and salubriously affected the philosophical inquiry of many of the faithful, and even in our own times it remains something prescriptive toward which we ought to tend, in order to achieve a just and congruent Christian inquiry on this matter.

53. Potius quam de singulis philosophorum sententiis, Magisterii effata de necessitate cognitionis naturalis atque, ideo, novissime philosophicae pro fide intellegenda tractaverunt. Concilium Vaticanum I, summatim referendo et sollemniter doctrinam confirmando quam ordinarium in modum constanterque fidelibus Magisterium pontificium ministravit, lucide edixit quam inseparabiles sint simulque plane seiunctae naturalis Dei cognitio et Revelatio, ratio et fides. Concilium ex praecipua postulatione sumpsit initium, quam ipsa Revelatio praesumebat, Deum scilicet esse naturaliter cognosci posse, rerum omnium principum et finem, (63) atque sollemni illa iam memorata enuntiatione desiit: « Duplicem esse ordinem cognitionis, non solum principio, sed obiecto etiam distinctum ».(64) Asseverare ideo contra omnes rationalismi species oportebat fidei mysteria a philosophicis inventis separari, illaque haec praecedere et transcendere; altera ex parte adversus proclivia ad fidem blandimenta, necesse fuit ut veritatis unitas confirmaretur ideoque etiam efficax emolumentum quod rationalis cognitio tribuere potest ac debet fidei cognitioni: « Verum etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen umquam inter fidem et rationem vera dissensio esse potest: cum idem Deus, qui mysteria revelat et fidem infundit, animo humano rationis lumen indiderit, Deus autem negare se ipsum non possit, nec verum vero umquam contradicere ».(65)

53. Rather than about individual philosophers’ opinions, the Magisterium’s pronouncements treated of the necessity of natural cognition and, therefore, most recently, of philosophy for faith to be understood. Vatican Council 1, by summarily recalling and solemnly confirming the doctrine which the pontifical Magisterium, in an ordinary manner and consistently, had ministered to the faithful, clearly declared how inseparable and yet plainly distinct are the natural knowledge of God and Revelation, reason and faith. The Council took its beginning from the principal postulation which Revelation itself presupposed, namely that God, the principle and end of all things, can be known naturally, (63) and it ended with that solemn statement already mentioned: «There is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only in principle, but also in object».(64) It was necessary therefore to assert, against all species of rationalism, that the mysteries of faith are to be separated from philosophical inventions, and that the former precede and transcend the latter; on the other hand, against ingratiating tendencies inclined toward faith, it was necessary that the unity of truth be confirmed and hence also the effective emolument which rational cognition can and ought to bestow upon the cognition of faith: «But although faith is above reason, nevertheless there can never be any true dissension between faith and reason: since the same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has implanted the light of reason in the human mind, and God cannot deny himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth».(65)

54. Nostro quoque saeculo, Magisterium plus quam semel hanc rem agitavit, admonens de rationalismi blanditiis. Hoc in prospectu Pii PP. X est consideranda opera, qui animadvertit modernismi fundamentum illas esse philosophicas notiones, quae phaenomenismum, agnosticismum et immanentismum redolebant.(66) Neque momentum pondusve obliviscendum catholicae detrectationis marxistarum philosophiae atque communismi athei.(67)

54. In our own age as well, the Magisterium has more than once handled this matter, warning about the blandishments of rationalism. In this perspective, the works of Pius PP. 10 are to be considered, who observed that the foundation of modernism was those philosophical notions which were redolent of phenomenism, agnosticism, and immanentism.(66) Nor should the importance and the weight be forgotten of the Catholic rejection of the philosophy of the Marxists and of atheistic communism.(67)

Pius PP. XII deinceps vocem suam intendit cum, in Litteris illis Encyclicis quarum titulus Humani generis, de erratis sententiis moneret, quae cum evolutionismi, exsistentialismi et historicismi opinionibus nectebantur. Idem Pontifex clarius edixit placita haec non a theologis esse elucubrata ac prolata, sed « extra ovile Christi » (68) originem traxisse; simul addidit tales errores non simpliciter eiciendos, sed iudicio critico ponderandos: « Iamvero theologis ac philosophis catholicis, quibus grave incumbit munus divinam humanamque veritatem tuendi animisque inserendi hominum, has opinationes plus minusve e recto itinere aberrantes neque ignorare neque neglegere licet. Quin immo ipsi easdem opinationes perspectas habeant oportet, tum quia morbi non apte curantur nisi rite praecogniti fuerint, tum quia nonnumquam in falsis ipsis commentis aliquid veritatis latet, tum denique quia eadem animum provocant ad quasdam veritates, sive philosophicas sive theologicas, sollertius perscrutandas ac perpendendas ».(69)

Pius PP. 12 thereafter raised his voice when, in those Encyclical Letters whose title is Humani generis, he warned about erroneous opinions which were being linked with the opinions of evolutionism, existentialism, and historicism. The same Pontiff more plainly declared that these tenets had not been elaborated and put forward by theologians, but had drawn their origin “outside the fold of Christ” (68); at the same time he added that such errors were not simply to be cast out, but to be weighed by critical judgment: « Indeed, for Catholic theologians and philosophers, upon whom there presses the grave office of defending divine and human truth and of inserting it into the souls of men, it is not permitted either to ignore or to neglect these opinions that stray more or less from the right way. Nay rather, they themselves ought to have these same opinions well understood, both because diseases are not aptly cured unless they have first been duly diagnosed, and because not seldom in the very false fabrications something of truth lies hidden, and finally because these same things provoke the mind toward certain truths, whether philosophical or theological, to be more skillfully investigated and weighed ».(69)

Postremo etiam Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, peculiare suum explens officium pro universali Romani Pontificis magisterio, (70) iterum de periculo monuit in quo versari possunt quidam theologiae liberationis theologi sumendo sine iudicii acumine principia et rationes a marxismo mutuata.(71)

Finally, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith also, fulfilling its particular office on behalf of the universal magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, (70) again warned about the danger in which certain theologians of liberation theology can find themselves, by adopting, without the acumen of judgment, principles and methods borrowed from Marxism.(71)

Superioribus igitur temporibus identidem ac diversimode de re philosophica iudicium discernendi exercuit Magisterium. Quod autem Decessores Nostri recolendae memoriae attulerunt magni pretii existimatur subsidium quod oblivione obruere haudquaquam licet.

In earlier times, therefore, the Magisterium repeatedly and in diverse ways exercised the judgment of discernment on the philosophical matter. Moreover, what Our Predecessors of cherished memory brought forward is esteemed a support of great value, which it is by no means permitted to bury in oblivion.

55. Si hodiernas condiciones consideramus, animadvertimus pristinas restitui quaestiones, easdemque proprietatibus novis. Non agitur tantum de quaestionibus quae singulas personas coetusve complectuntur, sed de cogitationibus inter homines serpentibus ita ut quodammodo in mentem communem iam convertantur. Talis est, exempli gratia, radicalis de ratione diffidentia, quam recentes multarum inquisitionum philosopharum explicationes ostendunt.

55. If we consider today’s conditions, we notice the former questions being restored, and the same ones with new properties. It is not only a matter of questions that encompass individual persons or groups, but of cogitations creeping among human beings, such that in some manner they are already being converted into a common mind. Such is, for example, a radical diffidence toward reason, which recent explications of many philosophical inquiries show.

Hac de re compluribus ex partibus audita est vox de « interitu metaphysicae »: est voluntas ut philosophia tenuioribus muneribus contenta sit, quae tantum versetur in factis intepretandis vel in vestigationibus de quibusdam certis argumentis humanae cognitionis vel eiusdem de structuris.

On this matter a voice has been heard from several quarters about the «death of metaphysics»: there is a will that philosophy be content with more tenuous functions, which should only be engaged in interpreting facts or in investigations into certain specific arguments of human cognition, or of its very structures.

In ipsa theologia quaedam praeteriti temporis iterum emergunt sollicitationes. In nonnullis huius aetatis theologicis scholis, exempli gratia, quidam rationalismus progreditur, praesertim cum placita, quae philosophice habentur valida, praeceptiva ad theologicam inquisitionem agendam iudicantur. Id potissimum accidit cum theologus, scientiae philosophicae expers, sine iudicio sententiis iam in communem loquelam cultumque receptis, at satis rationali fundamento carentibus, temperatur.(72)

In theology itself certain temptations of a bygone time emerge again. In some theological schools of this age, for example, a certain rationalism advances, especially when tenets which are held as philosophically valid are judged prescriptive for conducting theological inquiry. This happens chiefly when the theologian, lacking philosophical science, without judgment is swayed by opinions already received into common speech and culture, yet lacking a sufficiently rational foundation.(72)

Neque desunt qui in fideismum periculose regrediantur, quippe qui rationalis cognitionis philosophicaeque scientiae pondus ad fidem intellegendam, immo ad ipsam facultatem possidendam in Deum credendi, non agnoscat. Hodie pervagata opinio huius fideisticae propensionis est « bliblicismus », qui Sacrarum Litterarum lectionem earumque explicationem unicum arbitratur veridicae congruentiae caput. Sic evenit ut Dei verbum cum sola Sacra Scriptura aequetur, hoc modo Ecclesiae doctrinam perimendo, quam Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II palam confirmavit.

Nor are there lacking those who dangerously regress into fideism, namely those who do not acknowledge the weight of rational cognition and of philosophical science for understanding faith, indeed even for the very capacity to possess belief in God. Today a widespread opinion expressive of this fideistic propensity is « biblicism », which deems the reading of Sacred Scripture and its explication to be the sole principle of veridical congruence. Thus it comes about that the word of God is made equal to Sacred Scripture alone, thereby doing away with the Church’s doctrine, which the Ecumenical Council Vatican 2 openly confirmed.

Constitutio Dei Verbum postquam commonefecit simul in Sacris Libris simul in Traditione (73) inesse Dei verbum, graviter edicit: « Sacra Traditio et Sacra Scriptura unum verbi Dei sacrum depositum constituunt Ecclesiae commissum, cui inhaerens tota plebs sancta cum Pastoribus suis adunata, in doctrina Apostolorum et communione, fractione panis et orationibus iugiter perseverat (cfr Act 2,42) ».(74) Non ad Sacram Scripturam dumtaxat igitur sese refert Ecclesia. Etenim « suprema fidei eius regula » (75) ex unitate oritur quam inter Sacram Traditionem, Sacram Scripturam et Ecclesiae Magisterium posuit Spiritus, quae sic mutuo implicantur, ut haec tria seiunctim nullo modo esse possint.(76)

The Constitution Dei Verbum , after reminding that the word of God is present both in the Sacred Books and in Tradition (73), solemnly declares: « Sacred Tradition and Sacred Scripture constitute one sacred deposit of the word of God entrusted to the Church; adhering to it, the whole holy people, gathered with their Pastors, perseveres continually in the teaching of the Apostles and in the communion, the breaking of the bread and the prayers (cfr Acts 2,42) ».(74) The Church therefore does not refer itself to Sacred Scripture only. For indeed « its supreme rule of faith » (75) arises from the unity which the Spirit has established among Sacred Tradition, Sacred Scripture, and the Church’s Magisterium; these are so mutually implicated that these three can in no way exist if sundered.(76)

Non est porro subaestimandum periculum quod inest in proposito quodam Sacrae Scripturae veritatem eruendi ex una tantum adhibita methodologia, necessitate neglecta latioris exegesis, quae una cum tota Ecclesia ad textus plene intellegendos accedere sinat. Quotquot in Sacrae Scripturae studium incumbunt prae se usque ferre debent varias methodologias explanatorias in aliqua ipsas etiam inniti opinatione philosophica: est illa acumine pensitanda antequam sacris scriptis aptetur.

Nor is the danger to be underestimated that inheres in the project of extracting the truth of Sacred Scripture by employing only a single methodology, with the necessity neglected of a broader exegesis which, together with the whole Church, would allow one to approach the texts so that they may be fully understood. All who devote themselves to the study of Sacred Scripture ought continually to make manifest the various explanatory methodologies, which themselves also lean upon some philosophical opinion; this is to be weighed with acumen before it is applied to the sacred writings.

Aliae absconditi fideismi formae agnosci possunt eo quod theologia speculativa parvi aestimatur ac pariter philosophia classica despicatui habetur, ex cuius notionibus sive fidei intellectus sive dogmaticae ipsae formulae verba exceperunt. Pius PP. XII, felicis recordationis, de hac traditionis philosophicae oblivione necnon de desertis translaticiis locutionibus monuit.(77)

Other forms of hidden fideism can be recognized by the fact that speculative theology is held of little account, and likewise classical philosophy is held in contempt, from whose notions both the intellect of faith and the very dogmatic formulas have derived their terminology. Pius PP. 12, of happy memory, warned about this oblivion of philosophical tradition and also about the abandonment of traditional locutions.(77)

56. Aliquo modo, postremo, effatis omnia complectentibus et absolutis diffidunt, ii potissimum qui arbitrantur ex consensu, non ex intellectu obiectivae realitati obnoxio depromi veritatem. Certe illud intellegi potest, in mundo qui in multas peculiaresque partes dispertitur, eum complexivum ultimumque vitae sensum difficulter agnosci, quem translaticia philosophia quaesivit. Verumtamen sub lumine fidei quae in Christo Iesu hunc ultimum sensum agnoscit, facere non possumus quin philosophos, christianos vel non christianos, incitemus ut rationis humanae facultati confidant neque metas in philosophandi arte nimis mediocres prae se ferant.

56. In some way, finally, they distrust pronouncements that are all-comprehending and absolute, especially those who suppose that truth is drawn forth from consensus, not from an intellect subject to objective reality. Certainly it can be understood that, in a world which is dispersed into many and peculiar parts, that comprehensive and ultimate sense of life which traditional philosophy sought is acknowledged with difficulty. Nevertheless, under the light of faith, which in Christ Jesus recognizes this ultimate sense, we cannot but incite philosophers, Christians or non-Christians, to have confidence in the faculty of human reason and not to set before themselves goals that are too mediocre in the art of philosophizing.

Huius iam ad finem vergentis millenni historica lectio testatur hanc esse calcandam viam: oportet veritatis ultimae cupido vestigationisque desiderium non amittantur, quae cum audacia novos cursus detegendi coniunguntur. Fides ipsa rationem lacessit ad omnem secessionem deserendam et ad omnia periclitanda, ut persequatur quae pulchra, bona veraque sunt. Fides sic rationis fit certus atque suadens advocatus.

This millennium, now inclining to its end, the historical lesson attests that this is the road to be trodden: it is necessary that the longing for ultimate truth and the desire for investigation not be lost, which are conjoined with the audacity of discovering new courses. Faith itself challenges reason to abandon every retreat and to risk everything, so that it may pursue the things that are beautiful, good, and true. Thus faith becomes the sure and persuasive advocate of reason.

Ecclesia philosophiae studiosa

The Church studious of philosophy

57. Magisterium, utcumque, in erroribus notandis doctrinisque philosophorum aberrantibus non se continuit. Pari cura praecipua principia ad germanam philosophicae cogitationis renovationem assequendam confirmavit, definita demonstrando etiam curricula, quae sunt tenenda. Hac in re, Leo PP. XIII, Litteris suis encyclicisÆterni Patris, vere historicae significationis fecit illam pro Ecclesiae vita progressionem.

57. The Magisterium, at any rate, did not confine itself to noting errors and the aberrant doctrines of the philosophers. With equal care it confirmed chief principles to be attained for the genuine renovation of philosophical cogitation, even by demonstrating the defined curricula that are to be held. In this matter, Pope Leo 13, in his Encyclical LetterÆterni Patris, brought about that advancement of truly historical significance for the life of the Church.

Id scriptum ad hoc usque tempus unum exstat documentum pontificium illius gradus, quod philosophiae totum dicatur. Concilii Vaticani I eximius ille Pontifex doctrinam de necessitudine inter fidem et rationem repetiit atque amplificavit, idemque philosophicas cogitationes fidei ac theologicae scientiae summo esse auxilio demonstravit.(78) Uno plus post saeculo complura illius scripti indicia sive re sive paedagogico usu nihil amiserunt utilitatis; primum ex omnibus est id quod ad incomparabilem sancti Thomae philosophiae praestantiam spectat. Doctoris Angelici doctrina restituta Leoni PP. XIII optima videbatur semita ad illum philosophiae usum recuperandum, quem postulabat fides.

That writing, up to this very time, stands as the one pontifical document of that rank which may be said to be wholly devoted to philosophy. The distinguished Pontiff of the Vatican 1 Council repeated and amplified the doctrine about the necessitude between faith and reason, and likewise demonstrated that philosophical cogitations are of the highest assistance to faith and to theological science.(78) More than one century later, many features of that writing, whether in reality or in pedagogical use, have lost nothing of utility; first among all is that which looks to the incomparable pre-eminence of Saint Thomas’s philosophy. With the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor restored, to Pope Leo 13 there seemed the best path toward recovering that use of philosophy which faith was demanding.

Sanctus Thoma — scripsit ille — « rationem, ut par est, a fide apprime distinguens, utramque tamen amice consocians, utriusque tum iura conservavit, tum dignitati consuluit ».(79)

Saint Thomas — he wrote — « distinguishing reason, as is proper, most especially from faith, yet amicably consociating both, he both preserved the rights of each and looked to the dignity of each ».(79)

58. Quae feliciter consecuta sit haec Pontificis invitatio omnes noverunt. Sancti Thomae de doctrina inquisitiones nec non aliorum scholasticorum auctorum novum impetum habuerunt. Historica studia valde excitata sunt et hanc ob rem mediaevalium philosophorum iterum sunt repertae divitiae, quae tunc temporis fere ignorabantur, atque novae Thomisticae scholae ortae sunt.

58. All know how felicitously this invitation of the Pontiff succeeded. Inquiries into the doctrine of Saint Thomas, as well as of other scholastic authors, received a new impetus. Historical studies were greatly aroused, and for this reason the riches of the medieval philosophers—almost unknown at that time—were rediscovered, and new Thomistic schools arose.

Historica adhibita methodologia, sancti Thomae operum cognitio admodum progressa est atque innumeri fuerunt vestigatores qui animose in rerum philosophicarum theologicarumque disputationes illius aetatis thomisticam traditionem induxerunt. Catholici theologi huius saeculi auctoritate praestantiores, quorum cogitationibus et vestigationibus multum debet Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II, huius renovationis philosophiae Thomisticae filii sunt. Ecclesia, saeculo vertente XX, valida philosophorum turma uti sic potuit, qui Angelici Doctoris in schola sunt instituti.

With a historical methodology applied, the cognition of Saint Thomas’s works advanced very greatly, and there were innumerable investigators who boldly introduced the Thomistic tradition into the philosophical and theological disputations of that time. The most authoritative Catholic theologians of this century—by whose thoughts and investigations the 2nd Vatican Ecumenical Council owes much—are sons of this renewal of Thomistic philosophy. The Church, at the turn of the 20th century, was thus able to make use of a strong cohort of philosophers who were trained in the school of the Angelic Doctor.

59. Thomistica utcumque et neothomistica renovatio, philosophicae repetitae cogitationis in cultura christianae indolis non fuit solum signum. Iam antea, atque una cum Leoniana invitatione, non pauci catholici philosophi exstiterant, qui recentioribus philosophantium cogitationibus innitentes, propria utentes methodologia, magnae auctoritatis duraturique momenti opera philosophica ediderant. Fuerunt qui sic altas summas composuerunt ut nihil ab his esset invidendum maximis idealismi commentis; alii porro ad fidem nova ratione tractandam, lumine praefulgente renovati intellectus conscientiae moralis, epistemologica fundamenta iecerunt; alii quandam induxerunt philosophiam quae, ab immanentia vestiganda sumpto initio, ad transcendentiam aditum reseravit; alii tandem in phaenomenologicae provinciam methodologiae fidei postulata inserere contenderunt.

59. The Thomistic and neo-Thomistic renewal, however, was not the only sign of the resumption of philosophical reflection in a culture of Christian stamp. Already earlier, and together with the Leonine invitation, not a few Catholic philosophers had arisen who, relying on the more recent thoughts of philosophers and employing their own methodology, had published philosophical works of great authority and enduring moment. There were those who composed syntheses so lofty that there was nothing in them to be envied when compared with the greatest constructs of Idealism; others, moreover, for treating faith in a new manner, with the light of a renewed understanding of moral conscience shining forth, laid down epistemological foundations; others introduced a certain philosophy which, taking its beginning from the investigation of immanence, opened access to transcendence; others finally strove to insert the postulata of faith into the province of phenomenological methodology.

Diversis denique rationibus formae philosophicarum cogitationum sunt effectae, quae praeclaram christianae doctrinae traditionem in fidei rationisque unitate vitalem servaverunt.

Finally, by diverse methods, forms of philosophical cogitation were effected, which have preserved the illustrious tradition of Christian doctrine, vital in the unity of faith and reason.

60. Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II autem pro parte sua de philosophia locupletissimam ac fertilissimam exhibet doctrinam. Oblivisci non possumus, his potissimum consideratis Litteris Encyclicis, ConstitutionisGaudium et spes integrum quoddam caput anthropologiae biblicae esse quasi compendium, idemque exstare pro philosophia quoque consilii fontem. Illis in paginis de humanae personae valore agitur, quae ad imaginem Dei creata est, eius dignitatis et praestantiae prae ceteris creaturis ratio affertur atque eius rationis transcendens facultas ostenditur.(80) Atheismi quoque quaestionem Gaudium et spes considerat et illius philosophicae opinationis errorum apposite afferuntur causae, non alienabili praesertim personae spectata dignitate ac libertate.(81) Procul dubio altam philosophicam significationem habent illarum paginarum sententiae, quas Nos in Nostras primas Litteras Encyclicas Redemptor hominis rettulimus, quaeque veluti firmum quoddam constituunt ad quod Nostra doctrina costanter convertitur: « Reapse nonnisi in mysterio Verbi incarnati mysterium hominis vere clarescit.

60. The Ecumenical Vatican Council 2, however, for its part, presents a most richly endowed and most fruitful doctrine concerning philosophy. We cannot forget—especially with these Encyclical Letters particularly considered—that the ConstitutionGaudium et spes is, as it were, a compendium of an entire chapter of biblical anthropology, and that it likewise stands forth as a source of counsel for philosophy as well. In those pages the worth of the human person, who was created in the image of God, is treated; an account is given of his dignity and preeminence before the other creatures, and the transcendent capacity of his reason is shown.(80) Gaudium et spes likewise considers the question of atheism, and the causes of the errors of that philosophical opinion are aptly adduced, especially with regard to the inalienable dignity and freedom of the person.(81) Beyond doubt the sentences of those pages have a deep philosophical significance, which We cited in Our first Encyclical Letter Redemptor hominis, and which constitute, as it were, a certain firm point to which Our teaching constantly turns: « In reality it is only in the mystery of the Word made flesh that the mystery of man truly becomes clear.

Adam enim, primus homo, erat figura futuri (Rom 5,14), scilicet Christi Domini. Christus, novissimus Adam, in ipsa revelatione mysterii Patris eiusque anoris, hominem ipsi homini plene manifestat eidemque altissimam eius vocationem patefacit ».(82)

For Adam, the first man, was a figure of the one to come (Rom 5,14), namely of Christ the Lord. Christ, the last Adam, in the very revelation of the mystery of the Father and of his love, fully manifests man to man himself and lays open to him his most exalted vocation ». (82)

Concilium de philosophia quoque discenda tractavit, cui ad sacerdotium candidati operam dare debent; quae cohortationes in universum sunt ad christianam totam institutionem convertendae. Affirmat enim Concilium: « Philosophicae disciplinae ita tradantur ut alumni imprimis ad solidam et cohaerentem hominis, mundi et Dei cognitionem acquirendam manuducantur, innixi patrimonio philosophico perenniter valido, ratione quoque habita philosophicarum investigationum progredientis aetatis ».(83)

The Council also treated of philosophy likewise to be learned, to which candidates for the priesthood ought to devote effort; and these exhortations are in general to be turned toward the whole Christian formation. For the Council affirms: «Let the philosophical disciplines be handed on in such a way that the alumni are guided above all to acquire a solid and coherent knowledge of man, the world, and God, leaning upon a philosophical patrimony enduringly valid, with consideration also given to the philosophical investigations of the advancing age».(83)

Haec praecepta etiam atque etiam sunt confirmata nec non in aliis Magisterii documentis explicata, ut solida philosophica institutio praestetur, iis praesertim qui ad theologicas disciplinas se comparant. Ipsi autem saepenumero huius institutionis pondus ostentavimus iis qui, in pastorali vita, aliquando cum hodierni mundi necessitatibus contendere et causas aliquorum morum intellegere debebunt, prompta responsa daturi.(84)

These precepts have again and again been confirmed and likewise explicated in other documents of the Magisterium, so that a solid philosophical formation may be provided, especially for those who are preparing themselves for theological disciplines. We ourselves, moreover, have very often pointed out the weight of this formation to those who, in pastoral life, will at times have to contend with the necessities of the modern world and to understand the causes of certain mores, ready to give prompt responses.(84)

61. Si quidem compluribus temporibus necesse habuimus hanc questionem iterum attingere, cogitationum Doctoris Angelici vim confirmavimus atque ut eius philosophia comprehenderetur institimus, id ex eo ortum est quod Magisterii praescripta haud semper optanda animi promptitudine servata sunt. In catholicis scholis multis, annis post Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II finitum, huius rei quaedam visa est hebetatio propterea quod minoris aestimata est non modo philosophia scholastica, verum etiam in universum tota philosophica disciplina. Mirantes ac dolentes animadvertimus haud paucos theologos esse participes huius neglegentiae philosophicae disciplinae.

61. Since indeed on several occasions we have had to touch this question again, we have confirmed the force of the Angelic Doctor’s thoughts and have pressed that his philosophy be comprehended; this arose from the fact that the prescriptions of the Magisterium were not always observed with the desirable readiness of mind. In many Catholic schools, in the years after the Ecumenical Vatican Council 2 was concluded, a certain dulling in this matter was seen, because not only scholastic philosophy but also, in general, the whole philosophical discipline was esteemed as of lesser value. Wondering and grieving, we have noticed that not a few theologians are participants in this neglect of the philosophical discipline.

Diversae numerantur rationes quae alienae huic voluntati subsunt. Diffidentia de ratione apprime est referenda, quam huius aetatis philosophia magnam partem ostendit, quippe quae metaphysicam de ultimis hominis quaestionibus inquisitionem late deserat, ut proprium studium in peculiaria regionaliaque negotia convertatur, quae nonnumquam mere sunt formalia. Huic rei praeterea accedit erratum iudicium quod circa praesertim « scientias humanas » exstitit.

Various reasons are counted which underlie this unwillingness. Distrust of reason is especially to be mentioned, which the philosophy of this age for the most part displays, since it largely deserts metaphysical inquiry about man’s ultimate questions, so that its proper study is turned to particular and regional matters, which are sometimes merely formal. To this, moreover, there is added the mistaken judgment which has arisen especially concerning the « human sciences ».

Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II saepe probandum pondus scientificae inquisitionis confirmavit, ut hominis mysterium altius intellegeretur.(85) Si quidem theologi ad has scientias cognoscendas easdemque recte in suis inquisitionibus adhibendas invitantur, id tamen intellegi non debet ipsis implicite dari potestatem philosophiam segregandi vel amovendi in pastorali institutione ac « fidei praeparatione ». Oblivisci denique non potest in fidei inculturationem reciperatum studium. Vita praesertim novensilium Ecclesiarum effecit ut, una cum praeclaris cogitationis formis, intellegeretur compluras inesse popularis sapientiae manifestationes, quae verum patrimonum culturae et traditionum constituunt. Harum tamen consuetudinum inquisitio una cum philosophiae vestigatione procedere debet.

The Ecumenical Council Vatican 2 has often confirmed the commendable weight of scientific inquiry, so that the mystery of man might be understood more deeply.(85) Indeed, while theologians are invited to become acquainted with these sciences and to apply them rightly in their own inquiries, this nevertheless ought not to be understood as implicitly giving them the power to segregate or remove philosophy in pastoral formation and in the « preparation of faith ». Finally, one cannot forget the renewed zeal for the inculturation of faith. The life especially of the new Churches has brought it about that, along with excellent forms of thought, it has been understood that there are many manifestations of popular wisdom present, which constitute a true patrimony of culture and traditions. Yet the inquiry of these customs ought to proceed together with the investigation of philosophy.

Haec ipsa sinet ut probanda popularis sapientiae lineamenta exsistant, dum necessario illa cum Evangelio enuntiando coniungit.(86)

This very thing will allow the lineaments of popular wisdom that are to be approved to emerge, while it necessarily joins them with the announcing of the Gospel.(86)

62. Firmiter confirmare placet philosophiae disciplinam praecipuum habere momentum quod abstrahi non potest in studiorum theologicorum ratione et in alumnorum apud Seminaria institutione. Haud igitur inconsiderate studiorum theologicorumcurriculum antecedat temporis quoddam spatium, quo peculiare philosophiae ediscendae praevideatur opus. Electio haec, quam Concilium Lateranense V confirmavit, (87) in experientia radices agit quam Media Aetas est adepta, cum convenientia inter philosophicam et theologicam disciplinam conspicuum obtinuit locum et momentum.

62. It is pleasing firmly to confirm that the discipline of philosophy has a principal importance which cannot be abstracted in the plan of theological studies and in the formation of alumni at Seminaries. It is therefore not inconsiderately that the curriculum of theological studies is preceded by a certain span of time, in which a special work for thoroughly learning philosophy is foreseen. This choice, which the Lateran Council 5 confirmed, (87) strikes root in the experience which the Middle Ages attained, when the consonance between the philosophical and the theological discipline obtained a conspicuous place and importance.

Haec studiorum ratio affecit, iuvit et curavit, quamvis oblique, maximam partem promotionis recentioris philosophiae. Conspicuum exemplum exhibet beneficium, quod contulerunt Francisci Suarez Disputationes metaphysicae, quae etiam in Studiorum Universitatibus Germaniae Luteranis reperiebantur. Haec autem methologia relicta sive in sacerdotali institutione sive in theologica inquisitione grave detrimentum attulit.

This plan of studies affected, aided, and fostered, albeit obliquely, the greater part of the promotion of more recent philosophy. A conspicuous example exhibits the benefit conferred by Francisco Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae, which were found even in the Universities of Lutheran Germany. However, this methodology, once abandoned, brought grave detriment both in priestly formation and in theological inquiry.

Conspiciatur, exempli gratia, cogitationis et hodiernae culturae indiligentia, quae effecit ut omnes dialogi formae tollerentur vel omnes philosophiae sine iudicio susciperentur.

Let there be observed, for example, the indiligence of thought and of today’s culture, which has brought it about that all forms of dialogue were removed, or that all philosophies were received without judgment.

Magna Nos tenet spes has difficultates sublatum iri, prudenti intercedente philosophica et theologica institutione, quae numquam in Ecclesia desinere debet.

A great hope holds us that these difficulties will be removed, with prudent philosophical and theological institution interceding, which ought never to cease in the Church.

63. Has propter rationes, Nobis visum est instantem esse rem, his Nostris Litteris Encyclicis, acre studium confirmare, quod philosophiae tribuit Ecclesia; immo artam coniunctionem, qua theologicum opus et philosophica inquisitio nenctuntur. Inde Magisterii officium oritur philosophicam scientiam discernendi et concitandi, quae fidei minime aversetur. Nostrum est quaedam principia et indicia exhibere, quae necessaria arbitramur, ut ordinata necessitudo et efficax inter theologiam et philosophiam instituatur.

63. For these reasons, it has seemed to Us that the matter is urgent, in these Our Encyclical Letters, to confirm the keen zeal which the Church assigns to philosophy; indeed, the close conjunction by which the theological work and philosophical inquiry are bound together. Hence there arises the office of the Magisterium to discern and to spur on philosophical science, which is in no way averse to faith. It is Ours to set forth certain principles and indications which we judge necessary, so that an ordered and effective relationship between theology and philosophy may be established.

Eorum sub lumine clarius iudicari poterit an qualemve necessitudinem cum diversis philosophicis scholis opinationibusque instituere debeat theologia, quas hodiernus mundus exhibet.

Under their light it will be able to be judged more clearly whether, and what kind of, relationship theology ought to establish with the diverse philosophical schools and opinions that the modern world exhibits.

CAPUT VI

CHAPTER 6

MUTUA INTER THEOLOGIAM
ET PHILOSOPHIAM ACTIO

MUTUAL ACTION BETWEEN THEOLOGY
AND PHILOSOPHY

Fidei scientia atque philosophicae rationis postulata

The science of faith and the postulates of philosophical reason

64. Dei verbum singulis hominibus omni tempore et in omnibus terrarum orbis locis destinatur; et homo est naturaliter philosophus. Theologia autem, quatenus repercussa et scientifica elaboratio intellectus huius verbi sub fidei lumine, seu quasdam suas propter rationes seu ad peculiaria munia obeunda facere non potest quin necessitudinem cum philosophicis scholis instituat, quae reapse annorum decursu invaluerunt. Peculiaribus methodologiis theologis haud significatis, quod quidem ad Magisterium non pertinet, quaedam munia theologiae propria memorare potius volumus, in quibus ad philosophicas cogitationes ipsam propter naturam revelati Verbi est decurrendum.

64. The Word of God is destined for individual human beings at every time and in all places of the orb of the lands; and the human being is naturally a philosopher. Theology, however, insofar as it is a reflective and scientific elaboration of the intellect of this Word under the light of faith, whether on account of certain reasons of its own or in order to discharge peculiar duties, cannot but establish a relationship with the philosophical schools, which in very truth have grown strong in the course of years. Without specifying particular methodologies for theologians—which indeed does not pertain to the Magisterium—we rather wish to recall certain tasks proper to theology, in which, on account of the nature of the revealed Word itself, one must have recourse to philosophical cogitations.

65. Theologia veluti scientia fidei ordinatur duobus statutis principiis methodologicis, quae sunt: auditus fidei etintellectus fidei. Altero principio ipsa Revelationis depositum obtinet, quemadmodum id pedetemptim collustraverunt Sacra Traditio, Sacrae Litterae et vivum Ecclesiae Magisterium.(88) Altero, theologia cogitationis postulatis respondere vult per speculativam ratiocinationem.

65. Theology, as a science of faith, is ordered by two established methodological principles, which are: the hearing of faith and theunderstanding of faith. By the one principle it receives the deposit of Revelation, just as Sacred Tradition, Sacred Letters (Sacred Scripture), and the living Magisterium of the Church have step by step cast light upon it.(88) By the other, theology wishes to respond to the demands of thought through speculative ratiocination.

De congrua auditus fidei comparatione, philosophia theologiae suam peculiarem affert opem cum cognitionis personalisque communicationis structuram considerat atque nominatim varias species et officia loquelae. Aequum pariter est pondus quod confert philosophia ut ecclesialis Traditio, Magisterii effata nec non eximiorum theologiae magistrorum sententiae aptius intellegantur: hi enim mentem suam patefaciunt saepe per cogitata formasque cogitationis, quae a certa quadam philosophica traditione mutuo suscipiuntur. Hac in re theologus rogatur ut non modo significet notiones vocabulaque, quibus Ecclesia cogitat suamque docrinam definit, verum etiam ut penitus philosophicas opinationes intellegat quae forte tam notiones quam nomina affecerint, ut ad rectas congruasque significationes perveniatur.

On the fitting comparison of the hearing of faith , philosophy offers its own particular help to theology when it considers the structure of cognition and of personal communication, and namely the various kinds and functions of speech. Likewise of equal weight is the contribution that philosophy brings, so that ecclesial Tradition, the utterances of the Magisterium, and also the judgments of the most eminent masters of theology may be more aptly understood: for these often disclose their mind through concepts and forms of thought which are borrowed from a certain philosophical tradition. In this matter the theologian is asked not only to indicate the notions and the words by which the Church thinks and defines her doctrine, but also to understand thoroughly the philosophical opinions which perhaps have affected both the notions and the names, so that one may arrive at right and congruent significations.

66. Si verointellectus fidei ponderatur, animadvertendum est apprime divinam Veritatem « propositam nobis in Scripturis Sacris secundum doctrinam Ecclesiae intellectis » (89) propria fruere intellegibilitate tam logice congruenti ut proponatur veluti germana sapientia. Intellectus fidei hanc veritatem clarius recludit, non modo logicas intellectivasque structuras percipiens enuntiationum quibus Ecclesiae doctrina componitur, verum etiam, et in primis, salutis sensum extollens quam tales enuntiationes pro singulis et pro humanitate continent. Per has nimirum enuntiationes simul sumptas fidelis ad salutis historiam cognoscendam pervenit, cuius fastigium in persona Christi eiusdemque paschali mysterio reperitur.

66. But if theintellectus fidei is weighed, it must be noted above all that the divine Verity, « set before us in the Sacred Scriptures understood according to the doctrine of the Church » (89), enjoys a proper intelligibility so logically congruent that it is proposed as genuine wisdom. The intellectus fidei lays open this truth more clearly, not only perceiving the logical and intellectual structures of the enunciations by which the doctrine of the Church is composed, but also, and first of all, exalting the sense of salvation which such enunciations contain for individuals and for humanity. Through these enunciations, taken together, the faithful person comes to know the history of salvation, whose summit is found in the person of Christ and in his paschal mystery.

Fidei assentiendo fit ipse huius mysterii particeps.

By assenting to faith, he himself becomes a participant in this mystery.

Theologia dogmatica, ex parte sua, facultatem possidere debet adipiscendi universalem sensum mysterii Dei Unius et Trini atque oeconomiae salutis simul per rationem narrationis, simul, potissimum per formam ratiocinationis. Id efficere debet, profecto, intellectivis adhibitis notionibus quae critico iudicio effinguntur cum omnibus communicabili. Etenim absque philosophiae adiumento res theologicae illustrari non possunt, quales exempli gratia, sermo de Deo, personales intra Trinitatem relationes, actio Dei in mundo creantis, necessitudo inter Deum et hominem, Christi identitas qui est verus Deus et verus homo.

Dogmatic theology, on its part, ought to possess the capacity of attaining a universal sense of the mystery of the One and Triune God and of the economy of salvation both by way of narration and, especially, by the form of ratiocination. It ought to accomplish this, assuredly, by employing intellectual notions which are shaped by critical judgment and are communicable to all. For indeed, without the aid of philosophy, theological matters cannot be elucidated, such as, for example, discourse about God, the personal relations within the Trinity, God’s action in the world as Creator, the necessitude between God and man, the identity of Christ, who is true God and true man.

Idem in diversis theologiae moralis argumentis viget, ubi quaedam notiones immediate usurpantur, veluti lex moralis, conscientia, libertas, personalis responsalitas, culpa, et similia, quae ad philosophicae ethicae rationem definiuntur.

The same holds in diverse arguments of moral theology, where certain notions are immediately employed, such as moral law, conscience, liberty, personal responsibility, guilt, and the like, which are defined according to the rationale of philosophical ethics.

Necesse est ideo ut fidelis ratio naturalem habeat, veram congruentemque cognitionem de rebus creatis, de mundo et de homine, quas res etiam revelatio divina tractat; magis etiam, ipsa facultatem habere debet moderandi hanc cognitionem per modum intellectionis et argumentationis. Quapropter theologia dogmatica speculativa praesumit et complectitur philosophiam hominis, mundi atque, altius, ipsius « esse », quae quidem in obiectiva veritate innititur.

Therefore it is necessary that faithful reason have a natural, true, and congruent cognition concerning created things, the world, and the human being, which things divine revelation also treats; more than this, it ought itself to have the faculty of moderating this cognition by the mode of intellection and argumentation. Wherefore speculative dogmatic theology presupposes and embraces the philosophy of the human, of the world, and, more deeply, of “being” itself, which indeed is grounded in objective truth.

67.Theologia fundamentalis, suam propter disciplinae indolem quae officium sustinet rationem fidei reddendi (cfr 1 Pt 3,15), munus in se recipere debebit comprobandi et enodandi necessitudinem inter fidem et philosophicam scientiam. Concilium iam Vaticanum I, doctrinam resumens Pauli (cfr Rom 1,19-20), in id iam animos converterat, quasdam scilicet exstare veritates quae naturaliter, ideoque phlosophice, cognosci possunt. Earum cognitio necessario anteponitur ad Dei revelationem suscipiendam.

67.Fundamental Theology, on account of the discipline’s character which bears the office of rendering a reason for the faith (cf 1 Pet 3,15), ought to take upon itself the task of proving and untangling the relationship between faith and philosophical science. The First Vatican Council, resuming Paul’s doctrine (cf Rom 1,19-20), had already turned minds to this, namely that there exist certain truths which can be known naturally, and therefore philosophically. Knowledge of these is necessarily set before the acceptance of God’s revelation.

In revelatione eiusque credibilitate vestiganda una cum consentaneo fidei actu, theologia fundamentalis demonstrare debet, sub cognitionis per fidem lumine, quasdam eminere veritates, quas iam ratio suo in autonomo vestigationis itinere percipit. Iisdem plenitudinis sensum tribuit Revelatio, dum eas ad divitias dirigit mysterii revelati, in quo ultimum finem reperiunt. Cogitetur, exempli gratia, de naturali Dei cognitione, de facultate divinam revelationem ab aliis phaenomenis secernendi vel de eius credibilitate agnoscenda, de humana loquela habili, facta ad loquendum significanti veroque modo de illis etiam rebus, quae humanam experientiam praegrediuntur.

In investigating revelation and its credibility together with the consentaneous act of faith, fundamental theology ought to demonstrate, under the light of cognition through faith, that certain truths stand out which reason already perceives on its autonomous path of investigation. To these same truths Revelation imparts the sense of plenitude, while it directs them to the riches of the revealed mystery, in which they find their ultimate end. Let one think, for example, of the natural knowledge of God; of the capacity to discern divine revelation from other phenomena or to recognize its credibility; of human speech as capable, made to speak in a significant and true mode even about those things which surpass human experience.

Omnibus ex his veritatibus mens ducitur ad exsistentiam agnoscendam cuiusdam viae quae est fidei reapse praeparatoria, quae in revelationem accipiendam recidere potest, propriis principiis propriaque autononia haud declinatis.(90)

From all these truths the mind is led to recognize the existence of a certain way which is in reality preparatory to faith, which can issue in the acceptance of revelation, with its own principles and its own autonomy by no means being set aside. (90)

Simili modo theologia fundamentalis intimam convenientiam ostendere debebit inter fidem eiusque praecipuam necessitatem sese explicandi per rationem, quae maxima cum libertate consentire potest. Fides poterit hoc modo « iter plene demonstrare rationi illi, quae sincere veritatem requirit. Sic fides, Dei donum, quamvis ratione haudquaquam innitatur, nullo pacto ea carere potest; similiter exstat necessitas, ut ratio ex fide vim sumat, novosque fines consequatur, ad quos sola pervenire non potest ».(91)

In a similar way fundamental theology will have to show the intimate congruence between faith and its principal necessity of explaining itself through reason, which can consent with the greatest freedom. Faith will be able in this way «to demonstrate fully the path to that reason which sincerely seeks the truth. Thus faith, the gift of God, although it by no means rests upon reason, can in no way be without it; similarly there exists a necessity that reason draw strength from faith and attain new ends, to which it cannot arrive on its own».(91)

68.Theologia moralis fortasse etiam maiore indiget philosophiae auxilio. In Novo Foedere enim humana vita multo minus temperatur quam in Vetere Testamento. Vita in Spiritu fideles ducit ad libertatem responsalitatemque quae ipsam Legem transgrediuntur.

68.Moral theology perhaps even needs the help of philosophy to a greater degree. For in the New Covenant human life is much less regulated than in the Old Testament. Life in the Spirit leads the faithful to a freedom and a responsibility that transcend the Law itself.

Evangelium utcumque et apostolica scripta sive universalia christiane agendi principia ministrant sive doctrinam praeceptaque singularia. Ut eadem peculiaribus vitae individualis et socialis condicionibus accommodentur, oportet Christianus suam conscientiam funditus obstringere possit suique ratiocinii vim. Aliis verbis, id requirit ut theologia moralis recto philosophico prospectu utatur sive quod ad naturam humanam societatemque spectat sive quod ad ethicae deliberationis principia universalia.

The Gospel, in one way or another, and the apostolic writings provide either the universal principles of Christian conduct or particular doctrine and precepts. That the same may be accommodated to the peculiar conditions of individual and social life, it is necessary that the Christian be able to bind his conscience from the foundation and the power of his own ratiocination. In other words, this requires that moral theology use a right philosophical prospect, both as regards human nature and society and as regards the universal principles of ethical deliberation.

69. Quispiam fortasse obiciat in praesenti condicione theologo esse deveniendum ut opem recipiat, potius quam a philosophia, ab aliis humanae scientiae formis quae sunt historia ac potissimum scientiae, quarum omnes homines singulares mirantur recentiores progressus. Alii autem, post auctum de necessitudine inter fidem et culturam sensum, affirmant theologiam esse convertendam potius ad translaticias sapientias quam ad philosophiam quae ex Graecia orta est quaeque Eurocentrica dicitur. Alii denique, initium ex falsa culturarum pluralismi opinatione sumentes, universale plane respuunt patrimonii philosophici bonum, quod recepit Ecclesia.

69. Someone perhaps may object that in the present condition one must have recourse to the theologian in order to receive help, rather than to philosophy, to other forms of human science which are history and especially the sciences, whose more recent advances all individual human beings marvel at. Others, however, after an increased sense of the connectedness between faith and culture, affirm that theology ought rather to be converted to traditional wisdoms than to the philosophy which arose from Greece and which is called Eurocentric. Still others, finally, taking their starting point from a false opinion of the pluralism of cultures, plainly reject the universal good of the philosophical patrimony which the Church has received.

Hae aestimationes, quae ceterum in conciliari doctrina reperiuntur, (92) aliquam veritatem prae se ferunt. Eo quod ratio fit ad scientias, quae ratio compluribus in casibus utilis est quandoquidem pleniorem de obiecto vestigando cognitionem praebet, necessaria tamen non est obliviscenda pars quam agit cogitatio proprie philosophica, critica et in universalem rem vergens, quae ceterum a feraci culturarum permutatione requiritur. Illud proprie confirmare cupimus in uno certoque casu non esse consistendum, princeps munus neglegendo, ostendendi videlicet universalem indolem obiecti fidei.

These estimations, which moreover are found in conciliar doctrine, (92) bear some truth on their face. In that recourse is made to the sciences—a recourse which in many cases is useful, since it offers a fuller cognition of the object under investigation—nevertheless, one must not forget the necessary part played by properly philosophical thought, critical and tending toward the universal, which moreover is required by the fertile interchange of cultures. We wish expressly to affirm that one ought not to stop at a single definite case, neglecting the principal office, namely, of showing the universal nature of the object of faith.

Hoc praeterea non est obliviscendum: quod philosophica cogitatio peculiariter confert, intellegere sinit tum in diversis vitae opinationibus tum in culturis, « non quid homines senserint, sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum ». (93) Non variae hominum opiniones, sed veritas dumtaxat theologiae opitulari potest.

This, moreover, is not to be forgotten: that philosophical cogitation contributes in a distinctive way; it allows one to understand, both within the diverse opinions of life and within cultures, «not what men have thought, but how the truth of things stands». (93) Not the various opinions of men, but truth alone can assist theology.

70. Peculiariter autem est ponderandum argumentum, quod convenientiam tangit inter culturas, etiamsi necessario de ea re penitus non edisseratur, propter implicationes quae inde sive in re philosophica sive in re theologica oriuntur. Quod Ecclesia convenit culturas et cum iisdem contendit, id usque ab Evangelii praedicati initio experta est Ecclesia. Christi praeceptum discipulis datum lustrandi omnia loca, « usque ad ultimum terrae » (Act 1,8), ut ab Eo revelata Veritas transmitteretur, copiam communitati christianae dedit probandi continuo nuntii universalitatem atque impedimenta ex culturarum diversitate inducta.

70. Particularly must the argument be weighed which touches the convenience between cultures, even if of this matter it is not necessarily expounded in depth, because of the implications that arise from it either in the philosophical sphere or in the theological sphere. That the Church meets cultures and contends with the same, the Church has experienced from the very beginning of the Gospel’s preaching. The precept of Christ given to the disciples to traverse all places, «unto the end of the earth» (Act 1,8), so that the Truth revealed by Him might be transmitted, gave the Christian community the opportunity of proving both the universality of the continuous message and the impediments introduced by the diversity of cultures.

Locus epistulae sancti Pauli ad Ephesios efficacem opem fert, ut intellegatur quemadmodum primaeva christiana communitas hoc negotium egerit. Apostolus scribit: « Nunc autem in Christo Iesu vos, qui aliquando eratis longe, facti estis prope in sanguine Christi. Ipse est enim pax nostra, qui fecit utraque unum et medium parietem maceriae solvit » (2,13-14).

The passage of the epistle of Saint Paul to the Ephesians brings efficacious help, so that it may be understood how the primeval Christian community conducted this business. The Apostle writes: « But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been made near in the blood of Christ. For he himself is our peace, who made both one and dissolved the middle wall of the partition » (2,13-14).

Eiusmodi scripto ob oculos habito, nostra cogitatio latius panditur et mutationem attingit quae facta est postquam Gentiles ad fidem pervenerunt. Pro divitiis salutis, quam Christus attulit, decidunt impedimenta quae varias culturas dissociant. Dei repromissio in Christo fit nunc donatio universalis: non amplius circumscripta cuiusdam populi proprietatibus, eius sermone et moribus, sed cunctis destinatur ut patrimonium ex quo quisque haurire libere potest.

With such a writing held before our eyes, our thought is spread more broadly and reaches the change that was made after the Gentiles came to the faith. By virtue of the riches of salvation which Christ brought, the impediments which dissociate various cultures fall. The promise of God in Christ now becomes a universal donation: no longer circumscribed by the properties of a certain people, its language and customs, but destined for all as a patrimony from which each may draw freely.

Locis ex diversis ac consuetudinibus omnes in Christo ad unitatem participandam familiae filiorum Dei vocantur. Christus ipse sinit ut duo populi « unum » sint. Qui erant « longinqui », novitatis beneficio quam paschale mysterium attulit « proximi » fiunt.

From diverse places and customs, all are called in Christ to partake in the unity of the family of the children of God. Christ himself permits that the two peoples be “one.” Those who were “far-off,” by the benefit of the newness which the Paschal mystery brought, become “near.”

Iesus divisionis parietes diruit et peculiari consummatoque modo per participationem sui mysterii unitatem efficit. Haec unitas tam est alta ut cum sancto Paolo effari possit Ecclesia: « Ergo iam non estis extranei et advenae, sed estis concives sanctorum et domestici Dei » (Eph 2,19).

Jesus tore down the walls of division and, in a particular and consummate way, brings about unity through participation in his mystery. This unity is so high that the Church can speak with Saint Paul: «Therefore you are no longer foreigners and sojourners, but you are fellow-citizens of the saints and household-members of God» (Eph 2,19).

Hac tam simplici enuntiatione luculenta veritas significatur: fidei concursus cum diversis culturis reapse effecit novam rem. Culturae, cum altius radices in natura humana agunt, testimonium secum ferunt illius apertionis ad universalitatem et transcendentiam quae propria est hominis. Ipsae ideo exhibent diversas ad veritatem accessiones, quae perutiles sunt homini, cui valores praebent qui magis magisque humanam reddere valent eius exsistentiam.(94) Eo quod culturae antiquarum consuetudinum repetunt valores, ipsae secum ferunt — etiamsi implicite, sed hanc propter rationem haud minus vere — indicium, quod remittit ad Deum in natura sese manifestantem, sicut antea demonstratum est cum de sapientialibus scriptis et de sancti Pauli doctrina sermo factus est.

By this so simple enunciation a lucid truth is signified: the concourse of faith with diverse cultures has in reality brought about a new thing. Cultures, since they strike deeper roots in human nature, bear with them the testimony of that openness to universality and transcendence which is proper to the human being. Therefore they exhibit diverse approaches to truth, which are most useful to the human being, to whom they proffer values that are able to render his existence more and more human. (94) In that cultures reiterate the values of ancient customs, they themselves carry with them — even if implicitly, yet for this reason no less truly — an indication which refers back to God manifesting himself in nature, just as was shown before when discourse was had about the sapiential writings and the doctrine of Saint Paul.

71. Culturae, quippe quae cum hominibus eorumque historia arte coniungantur, eosdem communicant cursus ad quos humanum tempus manifestatur. Immutationes ideo progressionesque recensentur, inductae a congressionibus quas homines inter se convenientes effecerunt quasque mutuae communicationes eorum vitae exemplarium pepererunt. Culturae aluntur bonorum communicatione, earumque vis vitalis ac diuturnitas pendent ex facultate patendi novitatibus suscipiendis.

71. Cultures, inasmuch as they are closely joined with human beings and their history, share the same trajectories along which human time is manifested. Thus changes and progressions are registered, brought about by the encounters that human beings, coming together with one another, have effected, and which the mutual communications of their life-exemplars have engendered. Cultures are nourished by the communication (sharing) of goods, and their vital force and long duration depend on the capacity for being open to novelties to be welcomed.

Quomodo hi motus explicantur? Quisque homo in quadam cultura illigatur, ex ea pendet, eandemque magnopere afficit. Ipse est simul filius perinde ac pater culturae in qua defigitur.

How are these movements explained? Each human being is bound within a certain culture, depends on it, and greatly affects that same culture. He himself is at once the son as well as the father of the culture in which he is rooted.

In omnibus vitae significationibus, is aliquid secum comportat quod eum inter creaturas denotat: id est, duratura ad mysterium apertio eiusque inexplebile cognitionis desiderium. Quapropter unaquaeque cultura habet in se et patefacit inustam intentionem in aliquam consummationem. Itaque dici potest culturam habere in se facultatem suscipiendi divinam revelationem.

In all the significations of life, he brings with himself something that denotes him among creatures: that is, an enduring openness toward mystery and its insatiable desire for cognition. Wherefore each culture has within itself and lays open an indelible intention toward some consummation. Therefore it can be said that culture has within itself the capacity for receiving divine revelation.

Ratio ipsa, secundum quam Christiani suam fidem experiuntur, cultura imbuitur illius loci qui proximus est et efficit vicissim ut eiusdem natura procedente tempore effingatur. Unicuique culturae Christiani immutabilem Dei veritatem praebent, quam Ipse in populi historia et cultura revelavit. Saeculorum sic decursu ille repetitur eventus cuius testes fuerunt peregrini qui die illo Pentecostes Hierosolymis adstabant.

The very way, according to which Christians experience their faith, is imbued with the culture of that place which is closest, and in turn it brings about that the nature of that same culture is fashioned as time goes on. To each culture Christians offer the immutable truth of God, which He Himself revealed in the history and culture of the people. Thus, in the course of the ages, that event is repeated of which the pilgrims were witnesses who on that day of Pentecost were standing in Jerusalem.

Cum Apostolos audivissent, rogaverunt: « Nonne ecce omnes isti, qui loquuntur, Galilaei sunt? Et quomodo nos audimus unusquisque propria lingua nostra, in qua nati sumus? Parthi et Medi et Elamitae, et qui habitant Mesopotamiam, Iudaeam quoque et Cappadociam, Pontum et Asiam, Phrygiam quoque et Pamphyliam, Aegyptum et partes Libyae, quae est circa Cyrenem, et advenae Romani, Iudaei quoque et proselyti, Cretes et Arabes, audimus loquentes eos nostris linguis magnalia Dei » (Act 2,7-11). Evangelium diversis in culturis enuntiatum, dum a singulis quibus destinatur fidei adhaesionem requirit, non impedit quominus ii suam culturalem proprietatem retineant.

CWhen they had heard the Apostles, they asked: « Are not, behold, all these who speak Galileans? And how is it that we hear, each of us, in our own proper language in which we were born? Parthians and Medes and Elamites, and those who dwell in Mesopotamia, Judea also and Cappadocia, Pontus and Asia, Phrygia also and Pamphylia, Egypt and the parts of Libya which are around Cyrene, and Roman visitors, Jews also and proselytes, Cretans and Arabs—we hear them speaking in our tongues the mighty works of God » (Act 2,7-11). The Gospel, enunciated in diverse cultures, while it requires from individuals to whom it is destined adhesion of faith, does not hinder them from retaining their own cultural property.

Id nullam discretionem gignit, quandoquidem baptizatorum populus illa universalitate distinguitur, quae omnes humanos cultus recipit, progressum iuvando illius rei quae in ea implicatur, ad plenam in veritate explicationem consequendam.

This engenders no discrimination, since the people of the baptized is distinguished by that universality which receives all human cultures, aiding the progress of that reality which is implicated in it, so as to achieve a full explication in truth.

Quapropter id quod est cultura numquam fieri potest iudicandi norma, minus ac minus norma veritatis novissima pro Dei revelatione. Huic illive culturae non aversatur Evangelium, proinde quasi, eam conveniens, id quod ad eam pertinet eripere velit eandemque cogat extrarias formas et alienas sumere. Nuntius contra, quem in mundum atque in culturas defert fidelis, vera est liberationis forma ab omni perturbatione a peccato effecta, itemque est vocatio ad plenam veritatem.

Wherefore that which is culture can never become a norm of judging, still less the ultimate norm of truth by reason of God’s revelation. The Gospel does not turn away from this or that culture, as though, in meeting it, it wished to snatch away what pertains to it and to compel it to assume extraneous and alien forms. The message, on the contrary, which the faithful one bears into the world and into cultures, is a true form of liberation from every perturbation effected by sin, and likewise is a calling to the full truth.

Hac in conspiratione, non modo culturae nulla re exuuntur, sed concitantur potius ut sese ad veritatem evangelicam aperiant, unde incitamenta ad alios progressus assequendos nanciscantur.

In this concord, not only are the cultures stripped of nothing, but they are rather stirred so that they open themselves to the evangelical truth, whence they may obtain incitements to attain further progress.

72. Eo quod evangelizationis missio suo in cursu philosophiam Graecam primam convenit, id haudquaquam significat ceteros aditus excludi. Hodie, quotiescumque Evangelium culturae ambitus attingit ad quos christiana doctrina antea non accessit, nova exsurgunt inculturationis opera. Eaedem fere quaestiones, quas primaeva aetate enodare debuit Ecclesia, hodiernis hominibus afferuntur.

72. Because the mission of evangelization in its course first encountered Greek philosophy, that by no means signifies that other approaches are excluded. Today, whenever the Gospel touches ambits of culture to which Christian doctrine had not previously accessed, new works of inculturation arise. Almost the same questions which the Church had to unravel in the primeval age are brought before contemporary people.

Cogitationes Nostrae sua sponte ad orientales plagas convertuntur, quae perantiquis pietatis philosophiaeque traditionibus locupletantur. Inter eas India conspicuum obtinet locum. Grandis spiritalis impetus Indianam impellit mentem ad eam experientiam adipiscendam, quae, temporis spatiique impedimentis animo expedito, absolutum bonum attingat.

Our thoughts of their own accord turn to the eastern regions, which are enriched by most ancient traditions of piety and philosophy. Among them India holds a conspicuous place. A great spiritual impetus drives the Indian mind to attain that experience which, with the spirit unencumbered by the impediments of time and space, may reach the absolute good.

In huius liberationis exquirendae processu, praecipuae metaphysicae scholae ponuntur.

In the process of seeking out this liberation, the principal metaphysical schools are posited.

Huius temporis Christianorum est, praesertim Indianorum, locupleti ex eiusmodi patrimonio elementa illa depromere quae cum illorum fide coniungi possunt, ita ut christiana doctrina ditior fiat. Hac in discretione agenda, quae ex conciliari Declaratione Nostrae aetate sumit consilium, quasdam iudicandi normas ii ob oculos habebunt. Prima norma est humani spiritus universalitas cuius postulata in diversissimis culturis eadem reperiuntur.

It pertains to the Christians of this time, especially the Indians, to draw forth from such a patrimony those elements which can be conjoined with their faith, so that Christian doctrine may become richer. In carrying out this discretion, which takes counsel from the conciliar Declaration Nostrae aetate , they will keep certain norms of judging before their eyes. The first norm is the universality of the human spirit, whose postulates are found to be the same in the most diverse cultures.

Altera, quae ex prima oritur, haec est: cum Ecclesia maioris momenti convenit culturas antea haud attactas, id, quod per inculturationem Graecae et Latinae disciplinae adepta est, posthabere non potest. Talis si repudiaretur hereditas, providum Dei consilium oppugnaretur, qui per temporis historiaeque semitam suam ducit Ecclesiam. Haec, ceteroqui, iudicandi lex propria est Ecclesiae omnium aetatum, etiam subsequentis, quae se persentiet divitem factam iis ex rebus quas adepta erit per orientalium culturarum hodiernum accessum, et in hac hereditate nova indicia reperiet, ut frugifer instituatur dialogus cum culturis illis, quas humanitas iuvabit ut prosperent in suo ad futuram aetatem itinere.

The second, which arises from the first, is this: as the Church comes into more significant contact with cultures hitherto not touched, it cannot subordinate what it has attained through the inculturation of Greek and Latin discipline. If such a heritage were repudiated, the providential plan of God would be assailed, who leads the Church along the path of time and of history. This, moreover, is the proper norm of judging for the Church of all ages, including the subsequent one, which will perceive itself made rich by those things it will have obtained through the contemporary approach of Eastern cultures, and in this heritage it will find new indications, so that a fruitful dialogue may be established with those cultures, which humanity will help to prosper in their journey toward the age to come.

Tertio, cavebitur ne legitima proprietatis singularitatisque Indianae philosophiae etulatio cum sententia illa confundetur, culturalem scilicet traditionem sua in diversitate concludi debere eamque per dissidentiam cum ceteris traditionibus emergere, quod quidem naturae humani spiritus ipsi est contrarium.

Third, care will be taken lest the legitimate exaltation of the property and singularity of Indian philosophy be confused with that opinion, namely, that a cultural tradition ought to be enclosed within its own diversity and that it should emerge through dissidence with the other traditions, which indeed is contrary to the very nature of the human spirit itself.

Quod de India dictum est, adscribitur patrimonio praestantium culturarum Sinensium et Iaponensium aliarumque Asiae Nationum itemque refertur thesauro culturarum Africae translaticiarum, quae verbis potissimum sunt transmissae.

What has been said about India is ascribed to the patrimony of the preeminent cultures of the Chinese and the Japanese and of the other Nations of Asia, and likewise is referred to the treasury of the traditional cultures of Africa, which have been chiefly transmitted by words.

73. His rebus consideratis, necessitudo quae inter theologiam et philosophiam opportune institui debet notam habebit cuiusdam circularis progressionis. Theologiae initium atque primigenius fons est Dei verbum in historia revelatum, dum ultimum propositum necessario erit ipsius intellectio quae sensim est perspecta succedentibus aetatibus. Quandoquidem autem Dei verbum est Veritas (cfrIo 17,17), fieri non potest quin ad eiusdem aptiorem intellectum opem conferat humanae veritatis inquisitio, philosophans scilicet mens, quae suis servatis legibus explicatur.

73. With these things considered, the bond that ought to be opportunely instituted between theology and philosophy will bear the mark of a certain circular progression. The beginning and primordial source of theology is the Word of God revealed in history, while the ultimate purpose will necessarily be the intellection of it, which has been gradually perceived by succeeding ages. Since, moreover, the Word of God is Truth (cf.John 17:17), it cannot but be that the inquiry into human truth—namely, the philosophizing mind, which is explicated with its own laws preserved—contributes aid toward a more fitting understanding of the same.

Non agitur de hac vel illa notione vel parte cuiusdam systematis philosophici in theologico sermone simpliciter adhibenda; decretorium est quod fidelis ratio suae cogitationis facultatem exerceat ad verum reperiendum quendam intra motum, qui, initium ex Dei verbo sumens, consequi conatur pleniorem eiusdem comprehensionem. Omnino porro liquet, agendo has intra duas res — Dei verbum scilicet altioremque eius cognitionem — rationem paene percipi et quodammodo gubernari, ut semitas illas vitet quae extra Veritatem revelatam eandem perducant ac, tandem, simpliciter extra ipsam veritatem; immo ea incitatur ad explorandas semitas, quas sola ne suspicatur quidem se illas decurrere posse. Hoc ex circulari motu cum Dei verbo philosophia locupletior evadit, quia novos et inexspectatos attingit fines.

It is not a matter of this or that notion or part of some philosophical system to be simply applied in theological discourse; what is decisive is that faithful reason exercise its faculty of thought to discover the true within a certain movement which, taking its beginning from the word of God, strives to attain a fuller comprehension of the same. Moreover, it is altogether clear that, by operating within these two things — namely the word of God and a higher cognition of it — reason is almost apprehended and in a certain manner governed, so that it may avoid those paths which lead the same beyond revealed Truth and, finally, simply beyond truth itself; indeed, it is incited to explore paths which by itself it would not even suspect that it could traverse. From this circular motion with the word of God, philosophy comes forth richer, because it attains new and unexpected boundaries.

74. Ubertatis comprobatio huius necessitudinis exhibetur personalibus eventibus clarorum theologorum christianorum, qui ut philosophi etiam eximii enituerunt, qui scripta sic altae speculativae praestantiae reliquerunt, ut iure antiquae philosophiae aequarentur doctoribus. Id tum de Ecclesiae Patribus dici potest, inter quos saltem sanctus Gregorius Nazianzenus atque sanctus Augustinus annumerantur, tum de Doctoribus mediaevalibus, inter quos trias illa elucet quam constituunt sancti Anselmus, Bonaventura et Thomas Aquinas. Fecunda illa philosophiae verbique Dei consociatio etiam ex magnanima emergit investigatione a recentioribus doctis provecta, in quibus memorare placet ex orbe occidentali homines veluti Ioannem Henricum Newman, Antonium Rosmini, Iacobum Maritain, Stephanum Gilson, Edith Stein simulque ex orientali orbe studiosos ut Vladimirum S. Solov'ev, Paulum A. Florenskij, Petrum K. Caadaev, Vladimirum N. Lossky.

74. The corroboration of the fruitfulness of this bond is exhibited by the personal events of renowned Christian theologians, who also shone forth as most eminent philosophers, who left writings of such high speculative pre-eminence that they were rightly equated with the teachers of ancient philosophy. This can be said both of the Fathers of the Church, among whom at least Saint Gregory of Nazianzus and Saint Augustine are numbered, and of the medieval Doctors, among whom there shines that triad constituted by Saints Anselm, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas. That fecund association of philosophy and the word of God also emerges from the magnanimous inquiry advanced by more recent scholars, among whom it is pleasing to mention from the Western world men such as John Henry Newman, Antonio Rosmini, Jacques Maritain, Étienne Gilson, and Edith Stein, and likewise from the Eastern world researchers such as Vladimir S. Solovyov, Pavel A. Florensky, Pyotr K. Chaadayev, and Vladimir N. Lossky.

Uti paret, hi cum memorantur auctores, quibuscum alia pariter proferri possunt nomina, non omnem eorum doctrinae aestimationem prodere cupimus, verum exempla quaedam praestantiora illius efferre itineris investigationum philosophicarum ad quod beneficia singularia comparatio attulit cum fidei doctrinis. De hoc autem non est ambigendum: horum doctorum spiritalis itineris contemplatio non poterit quin progredienti veritatis inquisitioni proficiat atque usui consectariorum in hominum utilitatem. Sperari oportet hanc eximiam philosophicam-theologicam traditionem nunc et futuro de tempore suos successores necnon pro Ecclesiae humanitatisque bono cultores esse inventuram.

As is evident, when these authors are mentioned, along with whom other names can equally be adduced, we do not desire to betray a complete estimation of their doctrine, but rather to bring forward certain more outstanding examples of that journey of philosophical investigations to which singular benefits have been brought by comparison with the doctrines of faith. About this, however, there is no ambiguity: the contemplation of the spiritual journey of these doctors cannot but profit the advancing inquiry into truth and the use of followers, for the benefit of humankind. It should be hoped that this exceptional philosophical-theological tradition, now and in the time to come, will find its successors and also, for the good of the Church and of humanity, its cultivators.

De diversis philosophiae statibus

On the diverse states of philosophy

75. Quemadmodum patet ex historia necessitudinum inter fidem et philosophiam sicut supra paucis dictum est, diversi philosophiae status prae fide christiana distingui possunt. Primus statusphilosophiam a Revelatione evangelica penitus distractam complectitur: philosophiae est condicio quae aetatibus illis ante Redemptorem natum historice exstitit atque post Eum in regionibus nondum ab Evangelio contactis. Hac in condicione philosophia legitime affectat se sui iuris esse inceptum, quae videlicet secundum suas ipsius leges agit, quae suis unis viribus innititur.

75. Just as it is evident from the history of the relationships between faith and philosophy, as was said above in a few words, different states of philosophy can be distinguished in relation to the Christian faith. The first state comprisesphilosophy thoroughly separated from Evangelical Revelation: it is the condition of philosophy which existed historically in those ages before the Redeemer was born, and after Him in regions not yet touched by the Gospel. In this condition philosophy legitimately aims to be an undertaking of its own right, namely one that acts according to its own laws, that relies on its own powers alone.

Quamvis de gravibus limationibus conscii simus, quae ingenitae humanae debilitati adscribuntur, haec affectatio est sustentanda et roboranda. Philosophicum namque studium, prout ad veritatem intra naturalem provinciam perquirendam tendit, saltem implicite rei supernaturali patens est.

Although we are conscious of the serious limitations which are ascribed to inborn human debility, this aspiration is to be sustained and strengthened. For the philosophic study, insofar as it tends to seek the truth within the natural province, is at least implicitly open to the supernatural reality.

Immo magis: etiam cum theologicus ipse sermo philosophicis notionibus et argumentationibus utitur, cogitationis rectae autonomiae necessitas est servanda. Etenim argumentatio, quae secundum strictas normas rationales evolvitur, effecta quaedam universaliter valida consequitur et praestat. Etiam hic viget principium, secundum quod gratia non destruit, sed perficit naturam: fidei assensus, qui tum intellectum tum voluntatem obstringit, liberum arbitrium cuiusque fidelis rem revelatam suscipientis haud dissolvit sed perficit.

Indeed, more: even when theological discourse itself uses philosophical notions and argumentations, the necessity of the autonomy of right thinking must be preserved. For argumentation which unfolds according to strict rational norms attains and furnishes certain universally valid results. Here too the principle holds, according to which grace does not destroy but perfects nature: the assent of faith, which binds both intellect and will, does not dissolve but perfects the free will of each believer receiving the revealed reality.

Ex hoc congruo postulato penitus opinio illa digreditur sic dictae philosophiae « seiunctae », quam complures philosophi recentiores persequuntur. Potius quam ut aequam philosophandi autonomiam affirmet, ipsa sibi arrogat ius quidlibet sua in provincia excogitandi, quod quidem, ut patet, illegitimum est: veritatis adiumenta respuere, quae ex divina revelatione oriuntur, idem est ac aditum intercludere ad altiorem veritatem cognoscendam, ipsius philosophiae detrimento contingente.

From this congruent postulate that opinion departs entirely, of the so‑called «separate» philosophy, which many more recent philosophers pursue. Rather than affirm a fair autonomy of philosophizing, it arrogates to itself the right to devise anything whatever within its own province, which indeed, as is evident, is illegitimate: to spurn the aids of truth which arise from divine revelation is the same as to interclude access to a higher truth to be known, with the detriment of philosophy itself ensuing.

76. Alter philosophiae status locutionephilosophiae christianae a multis designatur. Haec appellatio legitima est, dummodo ipsa in ambiguum ne detrahatur: id enim non significat Ecclesiam philosophiam publicam suam habere, quandoquidem fides qua talis non est philosophia. Hac locutione ars designatur christiane philosophandi, meditatio scilicet philosophica quae vitaliter cum fide coniungitur.

76. Another status of philosophy is designated by the locutionChristian philosophy by many. This appellation is legitimate, provided that it not be drawn into ambiguity: for it does not signify that the Church has its own public philosophy, since faith as such is not philosophy. By this locution the art of philosophizing in a Christian way is designated, namely a philosophical meditation which is vitally conjoined with faith.

Non agitur ideo simpliciter de philosophia quadam a christianis philosophis confecta, qui suis in inquisitionibus aliquid contra fidem dicere noluerunt. Cum de philosophia christiana sermo fit, omnes comprehendi debent praestantes illi progressus philosophicae disciplinae, qui numquam contigissent nisi opem directe vel oblique christiana fides attulisset.

It is not therefore simply a matter of a certain philosophy composed by christian philosophers, who in their inquiries were unwilling to say anything against the faith. When discourse is had about christian philosophy, all those outstanding advances of the philosophical discipline ought to be included, which would never have come to pass unless the christian faith had brought aid directly or indirectly.

Duae ergo sunt christianae philosophiae species, quarum altera est subiectiva, secundum quam fides purificat rationem. Ut theologalis virtus, ipsa rationem a nimia confidentia exsolvit, ad quam illecebram facile philosophi inclinant. Iam sanctus Paulus Ecclesiaeque Patres, atque nobis proximi philosophi veluti Pascal et Kierkegaard, censura quadam id notarunt.

There are therefore two kinds of Christian philosophy, of which one is subjective, according to which faith purifies reason. As a theologal virtue, it frees reason from excessive confidence, toward which allurement philosophers easily incline. Already Saint Paul and the Fathers of the Church, and philosophers nearer to us such as Pascal and Kierkegaard, have noted this with a certain censure.

Humiliter animum colligit philosophus ut quasdam quaestiones tractet, quas difficulter explicare valet haud consideratis Revelationis elementis. Puta, exempli gratia, mali dolorisque quaestiones, personalem Dei identitatem atque interrogationem de vitae sensu vel, strictius, quaestionem metaphysicam radicalem: « Cur est aliquid? ».

The philosopher humbly composes his mind in order to treat certain questions, which he can explain only with difficulty, the elements of Revelation not being considered. Say, for example, the questions of evil and of pain, the personal identity of God and the interrogation concerning the sense of life or, more strictly, the radical metaphysical question: « Why is there something? ».

Pars exinde adest obiectiva, quae ad ipsam materiam spectat: lucide quasdam exhibet veritates Revelatio, quas tametsi attingere potest ratio, nunquam tamen easdem repperisset si suis unis viribus innixa esset. Hoc in rerum prospectu quaestiones ponuntur, veluti notio Dei personalis, liberi et creatoris, quae ad philosophicae cogitationis progressum tantum pondus habuit, potissimum quod spectat ad philosophiam respicientem « esse ». Ad hanc provinciam ipsa peccati realitas quoque pertinet, quemadmodum ipsa fidei lumine manifestatur, quae quidem operam dat ut quaestio de malo congruenti ratione philosophice ponatur. Persona quoque, quae veluti spiritale quiddam consideratur, est peculiaris fidei proprietas: dignitatis christianus nuntius, aequalitatis ac libertatis hominum procul dubio vim habuit in philosophica cogitata, quae recentiores philosophi pepererunt.

An objective part is present thereafter, which regards the matter itself: Revelation lucidly exhibits certain truths which, although reason can attain them, nevertheless it would never have discovered the same if it had relied on its powers alone. In this prospect of things questions are posed, such as the notion of God as personal, free, and creator, which has had so great a weight for the progress of philosophical cogitation, especially in what pertains to the philosophy regarding « being ». To this province the reality of sin itself also pertains, as it is manifested by the light of faith itself, which indeed takes pains that the question of evil be posed philosophically with congruent reason. The person too, which is considered as a spiritual quiddity, is a peculiar property of faith: the Christian message of dignity, and of the equality and liberty of human beings, without doubt has had force upon the philosophical cogitations which more recent philosophers have engendered.

Ad propiora tempora accedentes, id memorare debemus quod agnitum est momentum quod induit etiam pro philosophia historicus eventus, christianae Revelationis culmen. Non casu ille cuiusdam historiae philosophiae factus est cardo, qui veluti novum veritatis humanae inquisitionis caput exhibetur.

Drawing near to more proximate times, we must recall that the significance has been recognized which the historical event—the culmination of Christian Revelation—assumes also for philosophy. Not by chance did that become the hinge of a certain history of philosophy, which is exhibited as, as it were, a new chapter of the inquiry into human truth.

Inter obiectiva philosophiae christianae elementa necessitas quoque adnumeratur perquirendi rationalitatem nonnullarum veritatum, quae in Sacris Scripturis significantur, veluti supernaturalis vocationis hominis possibilitas atque peccatum ipsum originale. Haec munia rationem lacessunt ad agnoscendum quiddam inibi inesse veri rationalisque, longe multumque ultra illos angustos fines quibus ipsa se conclusura erat. Argumenta haec reddunt re rationis provinciam laxiorem.

Among the objective elements of Christian philosophy there is also counted the necessity of searching out the rationality of certain truths which are signified in the Sacred Scriptures, such as the possibility of man’s supernatural vocation and original sin itself. These tasks challenge reason to recognize that there is therein something of the true and rational, far and away beyond those narrow limits within which it was going to shut itself up. These arguments in reality render the province of reason wider.

Has agitantes rationes, philosophi haud facti sunt theologi, propterea quod fidei veritatem intellegere et collustrare non studuerunt sumpto initio a Revelatione. Sua in ipsorum provincia, via meraque ratione sua usi agere perrexerunt, sed suam inquisitionem ad novos veri ambitus explicaverunt. Asseverare licet quod sine hac Dei verbi acri opera, philosophiae recentioris ac recentissimae magna pars haud exsisteret.

Pursuing these considerations, the philosophers did not become theologians, because they did not strive to understand and to cast light upon the truth of faith, taking their starting-point from Revelation. Within their own province they went on acting, using their own path and pure reason; but they unfolded their inquiry to new ambits of the true. One may assert that without this keen work of the Word of God, a great part of the more recent and the most recent philosophy would not exist.

Res suum praecipuum habet momentum, quamvis christianam orthodoxiam a compluribus novissimorum horum saeculorum philosophis deseri observetur.

The matter has its own preeminent moment, although christian orthodoxy is observed to be deserted by many philosophers of these most recent centuries.

77. Alius philosophiae significans status habetur cumipsa theologia ad philosophiam provocat. Theologia reapse semper philosophico indiguit adiumento atque indiget. Cum sub fidei lumine rationis criticae sit opera, theologica inquisitio rationem cognitionibus et argumentationibus excultam et figuratam tota in sua vestigatione praesumit atque deposcit. Theologia porro philosophia indiget quacum paene dialogum instituat, ut comprobet intellegibilitatem universalemque principiorum suorum veritatem.

77. Another significant condition of philosophy is had whentheology itself appeals to philosophy. Theology in reality has always needed—and does need—philosophical aid. Since, under the light of faith, the work is that of critical reason, theological inquiry presumes and demands, throughout its investigation, a reason cultivated and shaped in cognitions and argumentations. Theology, moreover, needs a philosophy with which it may almost establish a dialogue, so that it may verify the intelligibility and the universal truth of its principles.

Non casu accidit ut philosophiae non christianae susciperentur ab Ecclesiae Patribus et mediaevalibus theologis explicandi causa. Haec historica res praestantiam demonstrat autononiae quam etiam hoc in suo tertio statu servat philosophia, sed necessarias praecipuasque immutationes pariter ostendit, quas ipsa pati debet.

It did not happen by chance that non-Christian philosophies were taken up by the Fathers of the Church and medieval theologians for the sake of explanation. This historical fact demonstrates the preeminence of the autonomy which philosophy preserves even in this its third state, but likewise shows the necessary and principal changes which it itself must undergo.

Hoc ipsum propter necessarium insigneque adiumentum a Patrum usque aetate ancilla theologiae vocitata est philosophia. Nomen istud minime usurpatum est ad subiectionem servitutemque quandam significandam vel munus demonstrandum merae functionis philosophiae in theologiam collatum. Locutio potius significatione adhibita est qua usus est Aristoteles, cum de scientiis experimentalibus quasi de « ancillis primae philosophiae » dissereret.

Precisely on account of this necessary and signal aid, philosophy has been commonly called the handmaid of theology since the age of the Fathers. That name was in no way employed to signify some subjection and servitude, or to demonstrate an office of philosophy reduced to a mere function for theology. Rather, the locution was used in the signification in which Aristotle employed it, when he discoursed about the experimental sciences as though about the « handmaids of first philosophy ».

Eiusmodi locutio, quae difficulter hodie propter autonomiae principia, quemadmodum supra dictum est, adhibetur, saeculorum decursu iuvit ut necessaria inter duas scientias necessitudo significaretur earumque dissociationis impossibilitas.

Such a locution, which today, on account of the principles of autonomy, as was said above, is employed with difficulty, has, in the course of the ages, helped that the necessary nexus between the two sciences be signified and the impossibility of their dissociation.

Si autem theologus recusaret philosophia uti, periculum esset ne ipse inscius philosopharetur seque concluderet structuris cogitationis fidei intellegendae parum aptis. Philosophus, ex parte sua, si quodlibet excludendum esse cogitaret cum theologia commercium, per se fidei christianae principia capessere suum esse sentiret, sicut nonnullis recentioribus philosophis contigit. In utroque casu periculum exstaret ne delerentur primaria autonomiae principia, quae omnis scientia servare vult.

If, however, the theologian were to refuse to use philosophy, there would be danger lest he himself, unknowing, philosophize and shut himself in with structures of thought ill-suited for understanding the faith. The philosopher, for his part, if he were to think that any commerce with theology must be excluded, would feel it his own task to seize the principles of the Christian faith per se, as has happened to some more recent philosophers. In either case the danger would exist lest the primary principles of autonomy, which every science wishes to preserve, be effaced.

Hic philosophiae status quem consideravimus, quandoquidem in Revelatione intellegenda implicatur, una cum theologia sub Magisterii eiusque iudicii auctoritate strictius ponitur, sicut antea demonstravimus. Ex fidei namque veritatibus quaedam necessitates derivant, quas philosophia servare debet cum necessitudinem instituit cum theologia.

This status of philosophy which we have considered, since it is implicated in the understanding of Revelation, is set, together with theology, more strictly under the authority of the Magisterium and its judgment, as we have demonstrated earlier. For from the truths of faith certain necessities derive, which philosophy ought to preserve when it institutes a relationship with theology.

78. His praepositis cogitationibus, probe intellegitur cur subinde laudaverit Magisterium sancti Thomae philosophiae merita eundemque putaverit ductorem atque theologicae disciplinae exemplar. Nihil intererat philosophicas quasdam quaestiones complecti, neque imperare peculiares opinationes ut tenerentur. Magisterii propositum erat, atque est, significare quemadmodum sanctus Thomas germanum sit exemplar illorum qui veritatem perquirunt.

78. With these thoughts premised, it is clearly understood why the Magisterium has from time to time praised the merits of Saint Thomas’s philosophy and has considered him a guide and exemplar of the theological discipline. It was not at all its concern to encompass certain philosophical questions, nor to impose particular opinions to be held. The purpose of the Magisterium was, and is, to indicate how Saint Thomas is a genuine exemplar of those who seek the truth.

Eius enim in meditatione rationis postulata et fidei vis altissimam invenerunt summam ex iis quae humana cogitatio unquam attigit, quippe qui Revelationis proprietatem radicitus tuitus sit, proprium rationis cursum numquam deprimendo.

For in his meditation the postulates of reason and the power of faith found the loftiest summa among those things which human thought has ever attained, inasmuch as he safeguarded the proper character of Revelation to the very root, never by depressing the proper course of reason.

79. Clarius quae antea edixit Magisterium ostendentes, novissima hac in parte quaedam postulata enuntiare volumus, quae theologia — immo, antehac Dei verbum — philosophicae cogitationi ac recentioribus philosophicis hodie exhibet. Quemadmodum supra dictum est, ad suas regulas agere suisque principiis inniti debet philosophus; nisi una tamen esse non potest veritas. Revelatio, et quae in ea continentur, rationis inventa eiusque legitimam autonomiam numquam comprimere possunt; at ratio, ex parte sua, sese interrogandi et percontandi facultatem numquam amittere debet, sibi omnino conscia se absolutum quiddam propriumque non esse.

79. Showing more clearly what the Magisterium has previously proclaimed, in this latest part we wish to enunciate certain postulata which theology — nay rather, beforehand the word of God — today offers to philosophical cogitation and to more recent philosophies. As was said above, the philosopher ought to act according to his own rules and lean upon his own principles; nevertheless, truth cannot be other than one. Revelation, and the things contained in it, can never suppress the discoveries of reason and its legitimate autonomy; but reason, on its part, must never lose the faculty of questioning and inquiring, being fully conscious that it is not something absolute and self-sufficient.

Veritas revelata, clare id quod est collustrando sumens initium ex splendore quem efficit id quod per se Est, philosophicae cogitationis iter illuminabit. Revelatio christiana verus fit, itaque, locus ubi philosophica et theologica disciplina, mutuam necessitudinem instituentes, coniunguntur et reciprocantur. Optandum igitur est ut theologi ac philosophi a sola veritatis auctoritate temperentur ita ut philosophia cum Dei verbo congruens contexatur.

Revealed truth, by clearly illuminating what is, taking its beginning from the splendor effected by That which Is through itself, will illumine the path of philosophical cogitation. Christian Revelation thus becomes the true locus where the philosophical and theological disciplines, establishing a mutual necessitude, are conjoined and reciprocate. It is therefore to be wished that theologians and philosophers be tempered by the authority of truth alone, so that a philosophy congruent with the Word of God may be woven together.

Philosophia haec locus erit ubi humani cultus et christiana fides convenient, consensionis erit sedes inter fideles et non fideles. Opem feret ut fideles sibi sint altius conscii altitudinem sinceritatemque fidei iuvari dum nectitur cum cogitatione dumque eam non recusat. Patrum rursus doctrina in hanc nos persuasionem perducit: « Et ipsum credere, nihil aliud est, quam cum assensione cogitare [...] Omnis qui credit, et credendo cogitat, et cogitando credit [...] quoniam fide si non cogitatur nulla est ».(95) Et etiam: « Si tollatur assensio fides tollitur, quia sine assensione nihil creditur ».(96)

This philosophy will be the locus where human culture and the Christian faith come together; it will be the seat of consensus between the faithful and the non‑faithful. It will bring aid, so that the faithful may be more deeply conscious that the loftiness and sincerity of faith are helped as it is woven together with thought and does not refuse it. The doctrine of the Fathers, again, leads us to this persuasion: «And believing itself is nothing else than to think with assent [...] Everyone who believes both by believing thinks, and by thinking believes [...] for if faith is not thought upon, it is nothing».(95) And also: «If assent is taken away, faith is taken away, because without assent nothing is believed».(96)

CAPUT VII

CHAPTER 7

POSTULATA HODIERNA ET OFFICIA

PRESENT-DAY DEMANDS AND DUTIES

Verbi Dei postulationes haud renuntiandae

The petitions of the Word of God are by no means to be renounced

80. Continent Sacrae Litterae, tam explicito quam modo implicito, complura elementa ex quibus haurire licet claram cuiusdam philosophicae crassitudinis aestimationem hominis orbisque. Gradatim conscii facti sunt Christiani iis in paginis sacris divitem concludi thesaurum. Inde quidem elucet id quod experimur non esse absolutum, non esse increatum neque ex se ipso generatum.

80. The Sacred Letters contain, both in an explicit and in an implicit mode, several elements from which one may draw a clear estimation of a certain philosophical crassitude of man and of the world. By degrees Christians became aware that in those sacred pages a rich treasure is enclosed. From there indeed it shines forth that that which we experience is not absolute, is not uncreated, nor generated from itself.

Deus est Absolutus unus. De Bibliorum paginis praeterea manifesto apparet species hominis veluti Dei imaginis, quae certa prae se fert indicia de eius essentia ac libertate nec non animae immortalitate. Quandoquidem orbis creatus non sibi solus sufficit, omnis deceptio autonomiae, quae creaturas omnes a Deo suapte natura pendere proindeque hominem etiam negaverit, ad calamitates perducit quae rationabilem harmoniae inquisitionem sensusque humanae vitae delent.

God is the Absolute One. From the pages of the Bible, moreover, there manifestly appears the aspect of man as the image of God, which bears on its face sure indications of His essence and liberty, as well as of the immortality of the soul. Since the created world does not suffice for itself alone, every deception of autonomy—which would deny that all creatures by their very nature depend on God, and thus the human being as well—leads to calamities that efface the rational inquisition for harmony and the sense of human life.

Mali pariter moralis quaestio, quod omnium est tristissimum, in Bibliis agitatur, ubi illud dicitur haud posse ad aliquod vitium materiae debitum redigi, verum vulnus potius esse quod ex inordinata libertatis humanae affirmatione proficiscitur. Verbum Dei, denique, quaestionem providet de ipsius vitae sensu suumque praebet responsum dum ad Christum Iesum, incarnatum Dei Filium, dirigit hominem qui vitam humanam plenissime complet. Aliae similiter rationes enucleari possunt ex textus sacri lectione; attamen repudiatio inde elucet cuiuslibet formae relativismi, materialismi, pantheismi.

The question of moral evil likewise, which is of all things the saddest, is treated in the Bible, where it is said that it cannot be reduced to any fault owed to matter, but is rather a wound that proceeds from the inordinate affirmation of human liberty. The Word of God, finally, provides the question about the very sense of life and offers its answer, while it directs man to Christ Jesus, the incarnate Son of God, who most fully completes human life. Other reasons likewise can be enucleated from the reading of the sacred text; yet from there there shines forth a repudiation of any form of relativism, materialism, pantheism.

Primaria huius »philosophiae » in Bibliis repositae persuasio haec est: humana vita et mundus ipse aliquid significant et ordinantur ad sui perfectionem quam in Christo Iesu eveniunt. Incarnationis mysterium manebit semper veluti medium punctum ad quod quis referatur ut comprehendere possit arcanum vitae humanae, orbis conditi et Dei ipsius. Hoc in mysterio extremae fiunt philosophiae provocationes, quoniam incitatur ratio humana ut suam efficiat logicam viam ad deruendos muros quibus periculum est ne ipsa circumdetur.

The primary persuasion of this »philosophy » reposed in the Scriptures is this: human life and the world themselves signify something and are ordered toward their own perfection, which comes to pass in Christ Jesus. The mystery of the Incarnation will always remain, as it were, the midpoint to which one is referred, so that one may be able to comprehend the arcanum of human life, of the created orb, and of God himself. In this mystery the utmost challenges of philosophy arise, since human reason is stirred to make its own logical way for tearing down the walls by which there is danger lest it be enclosed itself.

Hic, vero, tantummodo vitae humanae sensus in summum evadit. Intima enim Dei hominisque essentia intellegibilis redditur: in Verbi Incarnati mysterio, divina natura atque humana cum suis cuiusque proprietatibus servantur simulque declaratur necessitudo singularis qua colligantur in coniunctione mutua sine permixtione.(97)

Here, indeed, only the meaning of human life reaches the summit. For the inmost essence of God and of man is rendered intelligible: in the mystery of the Incarnate Word, the divine nature and the human, with the properties of each, are preserved, and at the same time the singular necessitude is declared by which they are bound together in mutual conjunction without permixture.(97)

81. Animadverti oportet inter significantiora hodiernae nostrae condicionis elementa esse « discrimen significationis ». Iudicia, saepe indolis scientificae, de vita et mundo eatenus sunt multiplicata ut praebeatur nobis re vera species aliqua divisarum notitiarum. Istud efficit ut difficulter ac nonnumquam frustra sensus sive significatio rerum conquiratur. Immo vero — id quod magis animum obturbat — in hac datorum factorumque congerie quibus hodie vivitur et quae videntur condere ipsius vitae viam, sunt qui interrogent utrum adhuc interrogare attineat de ipso rerum sensu.

81. It must be noticed that among the more significant elements of our present condition there is the « crisis of meaning ». Judgments, often of a scientific nature, about life and the world have been multiplied to such an extent that there is presented to us, in truth, a certain semblance of fragmented knowledge. This results in the sense, or signification, of things being sought with difficulty and sometimes in vain. Indeed, rather — which is what more perturbs the mind — in this heap of data and facts by which people live today and which seem to establish the very way of life, there are those who ask whether it is still worthwhile to inquire about the very sense of things.

Opinationum multitudo inter quas disputatur cui sit respondendum, aut etiam variae rationes interpretandi et contemplandi mundum hominisque vitam, nihil aliud perficiunt nisi ut exsecutam efficiant intimam hanc dubitationem quae facile in scepticismi atque indifferentiae affectionem transit vel etiam varias in nihilismi indicationes.

The multitude of opinions, amid which it is disputed to whom one ought to respond, and even the various rationales of interpreting and contemplating the world and the life of man, accomplish nothing else except to effectuate this intimate doubt, which easily passes into an affection of skepticism and indifference, or even into various indications of nihilism.

Hinc autem consequitur ut hominum animus quadam forma ambiguae cogitationis occupetur, quae eo illos permovet ut magis etiam in se concludantur intra propriae immanentiae fines, nulla habita transcendentis ratione. Philosophia quae caret omni interrogatione de vitae humanae significatione magno obicitur periculo ne humana ratio in usum dumtaxat alicuius instrumenti reducatur, omni vero veritatis inquirendae studio sublato.

Hence, however, it follows that the human mind is occupied by a certain form of ambiguous cogitation, which thereby moves them to shut themselves up even more within the bounds of their own immanence, with no account taken of the transcendent. A philosophy that lacks all questioning about the signification of human life is exposed to great peril, lest human reason be reduced to the mere use of some instrument, with all zeal for the inquiry of truth removed.

Ut autem verbo Dei conveniat necesse in primis est philosophia suam reperiat sapientialem amplitudinem quaerendi novissimum ac omnia complectentem sensum vitae. Haec prima necessitas, si res bene ponderantur, ipsi philosophiae addit perutile incitamentum ut suae ipsius naturae accomodetur. Id agens, enim, non erit dumtaxat decretoria quaedam et critica postulatio quae diversis scientiae partibus earum fundamentum ac limitem designat, verum proponetur etiam veluti extrema facultas colligandi totam scientiam actionemque hominum, dum ad unum finem eos concurrere cogit adque sensum ultimum.

That, however, it may be congruent with the Word of God, it is before all necessary that philosophy find its sapiential amplitude of seeking the ultimate and all-encompassing meaning of life. This first necessity, if matters are well weighed, adds to philosophy itself a very useful incitement so that it may be accommodated to its own nature. Doing that, indeed, it will not be merely a certain decretory and critical postulation which designates for the diverse parts of science their foundation and limit, but it will also be proposed as the utmost capacity for binding together the whole of knowledge and the action of human beings, while it compels them to converge to one end and to the ultimate meaning.

Haec sapientialis amplitudo eo magis hodie poscitur quia amplior technicae humani generis potentiae auctus renovatam peracutamque petit bonorum supremorum conscientiam. Si technica haec instrumenta forma alicuius ordinationis ad finem non solum utilitatis deficiant, cito videri illa possint inhumana, immo in generis humani potentiales eversores aliquando se convertere.(98)

This sapiential amplitude is all the more demanded today, because the broader increase of the technical power of the human race calls for a renewed and very acute awareness of the supreme goods. If these technical instruments lack the form of some ordering toward an end beyond mere utility, they can quickly appear inhuman; indeed, at times they even turn themselves into potential subverters of the human race.(98)

Ultimum hominis finem patefacit verbum Dei universalemque addit sensum ipsius actionibus in terris. Hanc ob causam philosophiam illud hortatur ut se dedat reperiendo naturali sensus huius fundamento, qui nempe religiosa cuiusque hominis constitutio est. Quaecumque philosophia negare voluerit hunc ultimum et universalem sensum reperiri posse, erit non modo impar verum etiam erronea.

The word of God reveals the ultimate end of man and adds a universal sense to his actions on earth. For this reason it urges philosophy to devote itself to discovering the natural foundation of this sense, which indeed is the religious constitution of each human being. Whatever philosophy should wish to deny that this ultimate and universal sense can be found will be not only inadequate but also erroneous.

82. Ceterum hoc sapientiae munus non potest aliqua philosophia explere quae ipsa vicissim non est vera solidaque scientia, quae scilicet non tantum dirigitur ad elementa peculiaria et relativa — sive functiones tangunt sive formas vel utilitates — rerum ipsarum, sed ad totam ultimamque earum veritatem, id est ad essentiam ipsam obiectorum cognitionis. Ecce itaque secunda postulatio: ut hominis comprobetur facultas adipiscendaeveritatis cognitionis; quae, ceterum, cognitio obiectivam attingat veritatem, per illam adaequationem rei et intellectus quam Scholasticae disciplinae doctores appellaverunt.(99) Haec postulatio, fidei plane propria, explicatis verbis in Concilio Oecumenico Vaticano II est rursus inculcata: « Intellegentia enim non ad sola phaenomena coarctatur, sed realitatem intellegibilem cum vera certitudine adipisci valet, etiamsi, ex sequela peccati, ex parte obscuratur et debilitatur ». (100)

82. Moreover, this munus of wisdom cannot be fulfilled by any philosophy which in turn is not true and solid science, which namely is directed not only to the particular and relative elements — whether they touch functions or forms or utilities — of the things themselves, but to the whole and ultimate truth of them, that is, to the very essence of the objects of cognition. Behold therefore the second postulate: that the human capacity be verified for attaining thecognition of truth; which, moreover, cognition may reach objective truth, through that adequation of the thing and the intellect which the doctors of the Scholastic discipline have so called.(99) This postulate, plainly proper to faith, has again been inculcated in explicit words in the Second Ecumenical Vatican Council: «For intelligence is not confined to mere phenomena, but is able to attain intelligible reality with true certitude, although, as a sequel of sin, it is in part obscured and weakened». (100)

Philosophia prorsus phaenomenorum aut rerum aequivocarum haud idonea erit quae hoc suppeditet auxilium divitiis verbi Dei altius perscrutandis. Etenim, pro concesso semper Sacra Sacriptura habet hominem, licet falsitatis sit reus fallaciaeque, cognoscere tamen posse et comprehendere perlucidam semplicemque veritatem. Libris Sacris ac praesertim Novo Testamento, insunt loci et adfirmationes indolis omnino ontologicae.

A philosophy purely of phenomena or of equivocal things will by no means be suitable to supply this help for searching more deeply into the riches of the word of God. For indeed, Sacred Scripture always holds as granted that the human being, although guilty of falsity and fallacy, can nevertheless know and comprehend pellucid and simple truth. In the Sacred Books, and especially in the New Testament, there are passages and affirmations of a wholly ontological character.

Veras enim declarationes potuerunt proferre auctores inspirati, quae nempe res denotarent obiectivas. Dici non potest Traditionem catholicam ullo modo erravisse cum dicta quaedam sancti Ioannis ac sancti Pauli accepit velut sententias de ipsa Christi essentia. Cum his affirmationibus et intelligendis et exponendis dat operam, theologia subsidio proinde indiget alicuius philosophiae quae facultatem cognitionis obiective verae non neget, quantumvis perfici illa possit.

For the inspired authors were able to put forth true declarations, namely such as would denote objective realities. It cannot be said that the Catholic Tradition has in any way erred when it accepted certain dicta of Saint John and Saint Paul as judgments concerning the very essence of Christ himself. With these affirmations both to be understood and to be expounded, theology therefore stands in need of the assistance of some philosophy that does not deny the faculty of objectively true cognition, however perfectible it may be.

Hoc pariter de conscientiae moralis valet iudiciis, quae Sacrae Litterae concedunt esse posse obiective vera.(101)

This likewise holds for the judgments of moral conscience, which the Sacred Letters grant can be objectively true.(101)

83. Priores hae postulationes tertiam secum important: opus est philosophia naturaevere metaphysicae, quae excedere nempe valeat empirica indicia ut, veritatem conquirens, ad aliquid absolutum ultimum, fundamentale pertingat. Haec postulatio iam implicita reperitur in cognitionibus indolis sapientialis tum etiam analyticae; est necessitas praesertim cognitionum de bono morali cuius extremum fundamentum est Bonum supremum, Deus ipse. Nolumus hic loqui de metaphysica re tamquam de peculiari schola aut particulari consuetudine historica.

83. These prior postulations carry with them a third: there is need of a philosophy of nature that istruly metaphysical, which is indeed able to exceed empirical indications so that, seeking out truth, it may reach something absolute, ultimate, fundamental. This postulation is already implicitly found in cognitions of a sapiential character and also of an analytical one; there is a necessity especially for cognitions concerning the moral good, whose ultimate foundation is the Supreme Good, God himself. We do not wish here to speak about metaphysics as though it were a peculiar school or a particular historical custom.

Adfirmare id dumtaxat interest realitatem ac veritatem transcendere facta et elementa empirica; refert etiam defendere hominis potestatem cuius vi hanc rationem transcendentem ac metaphysicam percipiat modo vero certoque, licet imperfecto et analogico. Ita quidem metaphysica disciplina non respicienda est tamquam anthropologiae opposita, quandoquidem metaphysica ipsa sinit solide stabiliri dignitatis personae conceptum ex eius spiritali natura. Persona, nominatim, locum constituit praecipuum ut quis congrediatur cum actu essendi ac, propterea, cum meditatione metaphysica.

It matters only to affirm that reality and truth transcend facts and empirical elements; it also matters to defend the human power, by virtue of which one may perceive this transcendent and metaphysical order in a true and certain way, albeit imperfect and analogical. Thus indeed the metaphysical discipline is not to be regarded as opposed to anthropology, since metaphysics itself permits the concept of the dignity of the person to be solidly established from his spiritual nature. The person, namely, constitutes the principal locus for one’s meeting with the act of being and, therefore, with metaphysical meditation.

Ubicumque praesentem quandam appellationem ad absolutum et transcendens detegit homo, inibi ei aperitur indicatio metaphysicae rerum interpretationis: in veritate ac pulchritudine, in bonis moralibus ac personis ceteris, in esse ac in Deo. Magna manet nos provocatio hoc exeunte millennio, ut nempe transitum facere sciamus tam necessarium quam urgentem a phaenomeno ad fundamentum. Non ideo licet in sola experientia consistere; etiam quotiens haec exprimit et ostendit interiorem hominis naturam eiusque spiritalitatem, necesse est speculativa ponderatio spiritalem substantiam attingat nec non fundamentum cui innititur. Philosophica notio ideo quae omne metaphysicum spatium negaverit ex se prorsus inepta erit nec idonea ut officium congruum expleat mediationis ad Revelationem comprehendendam.

Wherever a human being detects a certain present appeal to the Absolute and the Transcendent, there a pointer is opened to him of a metaphysical interpretation of things: in truth and beauty, in moral goods and in other persons, in being and in God. A great challenge remains for us as this millennium draws to a close, namely that we should know how to make the passage, as necessary as it is urgent, from the phenomenon to the foundation. One may not, therefore, rest in experience alone; even whenever this expresses and shows the inner nature of the human being and his spirituality, speculative consideration must reach the spiritual substance and likewise the foundation on which it rests. Therefore, a philosophical notion that has denied every metaphysical space will be in itself utterly inept and not suitable to fulfill the fitting office of mediation for the comprehension of Revelation.

Perpetuo se verbum Dei ad ea refert quae experientiam praetergrediuntur atque etiam hominum cogitationem; at hoc « mysterium » patefieri non posset neque theologia illud quadamtenus intelligibile efficere valeret, (102) si humana cognitio artis experientiae sensuum limitibus circumscriberetur. Quocirca metaphysica exsistit tamquam quaedam intercessio praestans in theologica inquisitione. Theologia quidem, prospectu metaphysico destituta, ultra experientiae religiosae investigationem progredi non poterit neque permittere ut intellectus fidei congruenter universalem veritatis revelatae transcendentemque vim significet.

The word of God perpetually refers itself to those things which surpass experience and even human cogitation; but this « mysterium » could not be made manifest, nor would theology be able to render it in some measure intelligible, (102) if human knowing were circumscribed within the limits of sensory experience. Wherefore metaphysics exists as a kind of preeminent mediation in theological investigation. Theology indeed, deprived of a metaphysical perspective, will not be able to progress beyond the investigation of religious experience, nor to permit that the intellectus fidei fittingly signify the universal and transcendent force of revealed truth.

Si metaphysicae partes tantopere extollimus, hoc ideo accidit quod persuasum Nobis habemus necessariam hanc esse viam ad statum discriminis superandum, in quo hodie philosophia magna ex parte omnino versatur, et ad quosdam improbos nostra in societate diffusos emendandos mores.

If we extol the role of metaphysics so greatly, this happens because we are convinced that this is the necessary way to overcome the state of crisis in which today philosophy, for the most part, is altogether engaged, and to emend the morals of certain reprobate persons diffused throughout our society.

84. Manifestius etiam elucet metaphysici operis pondus si progressus expenduntur quos hodie scientiae hermeneuticae iam efficiunt nec non variae sermonis humani pervestigationes. Consectaria quae his effluxerunt ex studiis utilissima esse possunt ad fidei intellectum, quatenus structuram cogitationis humanae sermocinationisque patefaciunt atque omnem sensum in sermone inclusum. Verumtamen earundem disciplinarum cultores sunt qui suis inquisitionibus eo dumtaxat adveniunt ut explicent quo pacto intellegatur et quo modo exprimatur rerum universitas, non tamen rationis humanae facultatem probant ut rerum essentia detegatur.

84. The weight of the metaphysical work shines forth even more manifestly if one weighs the advances which the hermeneutical sciences are already achieving today, as well as the various investigations of human speech. The consequences that have flowed from these studies can be most useful for the understanding of faith, insofar as they lay open the structure of human cogitation and of discourse, and every meaning enclosed in speech. Nevertheless, the cultivators of those same disciplines by their inquiries arrive only at explaining in what manner the universe of things is understood and in what way it is expressed; yet they do not vindicate the capacity of human reason to uncover the essence of things.

Quomodo non dispici potest hoc in affectu confirmatio illius discriminis fiduciae, quod aetas nostra patitur, de rationis humanae potestate? Cum vero, ex praemissis quibusdam gratuitis, hae sententiae iam fidei doctrinam obscurant eiusve universalem denegant virtutem, tunc non modo rationem demittunt, verum sese ipsas omnino excludunt. Fides etenim luculenter postulat ut hominum sermo via quadam universali — etiam vocibus analogicis tamen non ideo minus significantibus — realitatem divinam ac transcendentem.

How can one not discern in this attitude a confirmation of that crisis of confidence, which our age suffers, concerning the power of human reason? But when, from certain gratuitous premises, these opinions now obscure the doctrine of faith or deny its universal efficacy, then they not only abase reason, but indeed exclude themselves altogether. For faith clearly demands that human discourse, in a certain universal way — even with analogical words, yet not for that reason less significant — signify the divine and transcendent reality.

(103) Res nisi ita se haberent, Dei verbum, quod semper divinum est licet lingua humana contineatur, nihil de Deo significare posset. Huius Verbi interpretatio non huc illuc ab explicatione alia in aliam explicationem conicere nos potest, ad nullam nos adducens affirmationem simpliciter veram; alioquin nulla esset Dei revelatio, sed tantummodo significatio humanarum notionum de Deo et de iis quae existimatur ille de nobis cogitare.

(103) If matters were not thus, the Word of God, which is always divine, although contained in human language, could signify nothing about God. The interpretation of this Word cannot cast us hither and thither from one explication into another explication, bringing us to no affirmation simply true; otherwise there would be no revelation of God, but only a signification of human notions about God and about those things which he is thought to think concerning us.

85. Probe novimus postulata haec, a philosophia ipsi Dei verbo iniuncta, videri posse ardua multis qui hodiernam investigationis philosophicae experiuntur condicionem. Hanc omnino ob causam, ea omnia Nostra facientes quae iam complures annos Summi Pontifices docere non desistunt quaeque rursus inculcavit Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II, vehementer confitemur Nobis esse persuasum hominem visionem unicam et ordinatam scientiae assequi posse. Hoc unum officiorum est quod christiana cogitatio proximo quidem christianae aetatis millennio in se recipere debebit.

85. We know well that these demands, enjoined upon philosophy by the very word of God, can seem arduous to many who experience the present condition of philosophical investigation. For this very reason, doing all Our part for those things which for many years the Supreme Pontiffs have not ceased to teach and which the Ecumenical Vatican Council 2 again inculcated, we strongly confess that We are persuaded that the human being can attain a single and ordered vision of science. This is one of the duties which Christian thought will indeed have to take upon itself for the next millennium of the Christian age.

Multiplex scientiae humanae partitio, quatenus partim tantum ad veritatem accedere sinit ideoque etiam sensum ipsum perfringit, interiorem hominis hodierni impedit unitatem. Quare de his omnibus non potest sollicitari Ecclesia? Hoc sapientiae munus in eius pastores recta via ex Evangelio defluit neque ipsi se subducere possunt officio illius muneris explendi.

The manifold partition of human science, insofar as it allows only in part an approach to truth and thus even fractures sense itself, hinders the interior unity of modern man. Why, then, can the Church not be solicitous about all these things? This office of wisdom flows directly from the Gospel upon its pastors, nor can they themselves withdraw from the duty of fulfilling that office.

Quotquot hodie veluti philosophi respondere cupiant illis postulationibus quas cogitationi humanae Dei verbum imponit, eos credimus omnino suum debere explicare sermonem secundum easdem postulationes nec non continuam cohaerentiam cum diuturna illa traditione quae, ab antiquis profecta, transit per Ecclesiae Patres atque scholasticae disciplinae magistros, ut tandem ad intellegendos cogitationis recentioris atque huius aequalis temporis praecipuos fructus adveniat. Philosophus si hanc traditionem usurpare noverit seque ex ea dirigere, certe non poterit ipse fidelem se non demonstrare ipsi necessitati autonomiae philosophicarum investigationum.

As many as today, as philosophers, wish to respond to those postulations which the word of God imposes upon human cogitation, we believe that they must altogether unfold their discourse according to those same postulations and moreover in continuous coherence with that long-standing tradition which, having proceeded from the ancients, passes through the Fathers of the Church and the masters of the scholastic discipline, so as at length to arrive at understanding the principal fruits of more recent thought and of this contemporaneous time. If a philosopher should know how to appropriate this tradition and to direct himself by it, surely he will be unable not to show himself faithful to the very necessity of the autonomy of philosophical investigations.

Hoc sensu plurimum id significat, quod nempe quidam philosophi hodiernis in adiunctis se exhibeant fautores iterum detecti pergravis ponderis traditionum ad rectam cognitionis formam. Appellatio enim ad traditionem non sola praeteriti temporis recordatio est; agnoscit potius illa patrimonium culturae quod pertinet omnes ad homines. Par immo est dicere nos ad traditionem pertinere neque licere statuere de ea uti velimus.

In this sense it signifies very much that certain philosophers, in today’s circumstances, exhibit themselves as favorers of the rediscovered, very grave weight of traditions for the right form of cognition. For an appeal to tradition is not merely a recollection of past time; rather, it recognizes that patrimony of culture which pertains to all human beings. It is equally—indeed more—apt to say that we belong to tradition, nor is it licit to determine to use it as we please.

Hinc plane, quod radices in ipsam traditionem aguntur, permittitur nobis hodie ut cogitationem aliquam primam et novam et de futuro tempore providam enuntiemus. Eadem haec appellatio magis etiam pertinet ad theologiam. Non solum quia vivam Ecclesiae Traditionem ipsa possidet tamquam primigenum rerum fontem, (104) verum etiam quod idcirco theologia posse debet tum revocare altam traditionem theologicam quae priora saecula signavit, tum perennem illius philosophiae traditionem quae novit spatii temporisque fines excedere suam ob sapientiam.

Hence plainly, because roots are driven into tradition itself, it is permitted to us today to enunciate some thought that is original and new and forward-looking about the future. This same appeal pertains even more to theology—not only because it itself possesses the living Tradition of the Church as the primordial source of things, (104) but also because for that reason theology ought to be able both to recall the deep theological tradition which stamped the earlier ages, and the perennial tradition of that philosophy which knows, on account of its wisdom, to exceed the bounds of space and time.

86. Inculcata haec necessitas solidi vinculi continuationis deliberationum philosophicarum cum inquisitionibus traditionis christianae illuc spectat ut praevertatur periculo quod quibusdam hodie latius diffusis sententiis subest. Quamquam breviter, opportunum censemus immorari iis in sententiis quarum ostendantur errores indeque pericula philosophicae industriae intenta.

86. This inculcated necessity of a solid bond of the continuation of philosophical deliberations with the inquiries of Christian tradition looks to this: that the peril which underlies certain opinions today more widely diffused may be preempted. Although briefly, we judge it opportune to dwell upon those opinions, that their errors may be shown and, from that, the perils aimed at the philosophical industry.

Eorum quidem primum (periculum) voce eclecticismi nuncupatur, quo nomine illius hominis describitur affectio qui, in investigando, in docendo et in argumentatione theologica, singulas notiones accipere solet diversis perceptas ex philosophiis, nulla earum habita ratione cohaerentiae neque ordinatae coniunctionis nec historicae collocationis. Hoc pacto ita se praebet ut veritatis partem in aliqua notione distinguere ab aliis erratis vel imperfectis rebus nequeat. Extrema eclecticismi dispici potest forma etiam rhetorico in abusu vocabulorum philosophicorum quae aliqui theologi interdum usurpant.

Of these, indeed, the first (danger) is named by the term eclecticism , by which name the disposition of that man is described who, in investigating, in teaching, and in theological argumentation, is accustomed to take individual notions, derived from diverse philosophies, with no regard had to their coherence, nor to an ordered conjunction, nor to historical collocation. In this way he presents himself such that he cannot distinguish the part of truth in some notion from other things that are erroneous or imperfect. An extreme form of eclecticism can be discerned also in the rhetorical abuse of philosophical terms which some theologians sometimes employ.

Non utilis est similis abusus inquisitioni veritatis neque mentem sive theologicam sive philosophicam instituit ut modo serio doctoque argumentetur. Grave et altum doctrinarum philosophicarum studium tum etiam proprii earum sermonis et contextus ex quo sunt enatae, multum adiuvat ut eclecticismi pericula vincantur permittitque aptam in earum argumentationes theologicas ingressionem.

A similar abuse is not useful to the inquisition of truth, nor does it institute the mind, whether theological or philosophical, to argue in a serious and learned mode. A grave and profound study of philosophical doctrines, and likewise of their proper discourse and of the context out of which they have been engendered, greatly helps that the perils of eclecticism be conquered and permits an apt ingression of them into theological argumentations.

87. Error ipsius methodi est eclecticismus, qui tamen in se opinationes etiamhistoricismi contegere potest. Recte ut praeteriti temporis comprehendatur doctrina, ea necesse est sua in historiae atque culturae inseratur adiuncta. Primaria historicismi sententia, ex contrario, ea est ut philosophiae cuiusdam veritas sustineatur natura propria sua ad aliquod certum tempus aptata aut ad definitum historicum munus.

87. The error of the method itself is eclecticism, which nevertheless can contain within itself even the opinions ofhistoricism . In order that the doctrine of a bygone time be rightly comprehended, it must be inserted into the adjunct of its own history and culture. The primary thesis of historicism, on the contrary, is this: that the truth of some philosophy is sustained by its own nature adapted to some definite time or to a defined historical function.

Ita quidem, saltem implicite, perennis veri virtus negatur. Id quod aliqua aetate valebat ut verum, potest cessare id esse alio tempore, uti defendet historicista. Notionum humanarum historia, demum, ad eius iudicium paulo plus est quam archeologicum inventum ex quo haurire licet ut sententiae prioris temporis demonstrentur iam maximam partem praetermissae et in praesentia omni significatione carentes.

Thus indeed, at least implicitly, the virtue of perennial truth is denied. That which at some age prevailed as true can cease to be so at another time, as the historicist will maintain. The history of human notions, finally, in his judgment is a little more than an archaeological find, from which one may draw that the opinions of a prior time are shown for the most part already to have been passed over and, in the present, to be lacking all signification.

Contra, potius reminiscendum est, etiamsi ipsa veritatis formula temporibus quadamtenus et culturae formis vinciatur, veritates vel errores inibi repertos posse nihilominus agnosci et uti tales aestimari, quantumvis spatio temporeve distent.

On the contrary, it ought rather to be remembered that, even if the very formula of truth is to some extent bound by times and by the forms of culture, the verities or errors found therein can nonetheless be recognized and, as such, esteemed, however far they are distant in space or in time.

Intra theologicam meditationem plerumque se praebet historicismus quadam sub ratione « modernismi ». Dum enim quis merito studet sermonem theologicum accommodum et pervium reddere aequalibus suis, affirmationibus et dictionibus philosophicis tantummodo recentioribus utitur, criticis neglectis iudiciis quae ad traditionis lumen tandem aliquando proferenda sunt. Haec modernismi via, quoniam veritatem praesenti pro utilitate permutat, haud idonea reperitur ad veritatis satisfaciendum postulatis quibus respondeat theologia oportet.

Within theological meditation, for the most part historicism presents itself under a certain aspect as « modernism ». For while someone rightly strives to render theological discourse suitable and accessible to his contemporaries, he uses only more recent philosophical affirmations and dictiones, with the critical judgments neglected which must sooner or later be brought forth to the light of tradition. This pathway of modernism, since it exchanges truth for present utility, is found by no means suitable for satisfying the demands of truth to which theology ought to respond.

88. Aliud expendendum est periculum, nempescientismus. Haec philosophiae notio respuit tamquam validas omnes cognitionis formas alienas iis quae sunt scientiarum positivarum propriae atque in provinciam solorum phantasmatum reicit tum religiosam et theologicam cognitionem tum ethicam et aestheticam scientiam. Praeteritis temporibus eadem notio intra positivismum et neo-positivismum declarabatur, qui sensu destitutas iudicabant affirmationes metaphysicae indolis. Censura epistemologica omnem huic sententiae abstulit fidem, sed ecce novo renascitur sub scientismi vestitu.

88. Another danger must be weighed, namelyscientism. This notion of philosophy rejects as valid all forms of cognition that are alien to those proper to the positive sciences, and relegates both religious and theological cognition and ethical and aesthetic knowledge to the province of mere phantasms. In past times the same notion was proclaimed within positivism and neo-positivism, which judged affirmations of a metaphysical kind to be devoid of meaning. Epistemological censure took away all credence from this view, yet behold, it is reborn anew under the garb of scientism.

Hoc sub prospectu, bona ad animi motuum dumtaxat effecta rediguntur atque « essendi » notio praeteritur ut aliquid spatii nudis et simplicibus tribuatur factis. Sese igitur scientia praeparat ut per technologicos progressus omnibus dominetur vitae humanae partibus. Felices qui nullo modo possunt negari successus scientificae investigationes nec non horum temporum technologiae plurimum adiuverunt ut mens scientistica disseminaretur quae nullis iam videtur finibus circumscribi, cum in varias iam intraverit culturae formas et mutationes fundamentales ibi quoque effecerit.

Under this prospect, goods are reduced merely to effects of the motions of the mind, and the notion of « being » is passed over so that some space may be allotted to bare and simple facts. Therefore science prepares itself, through technological progress, to dominate all the parts of human life. Happily, the successes of scientific investigation can in no way be denied, and the technologies of these times have greatly helped to disseminate a scientistic mind-set, which now seems circumscribed by no limits, since it has already entered into various forms of culture and there too has effected fundamental changes.

Pro dolor, quod ad interrogationem pertinet de vitae sensu, notandum est a fautoribus scientismi eandem haberi quaestionem tamquam propriam orbis irrationalis aut omnino ficti. Non minus autem deludit huius mentis tractatio magnis de aliis philosophiae quaesitis quae, si iam non omnino praetermittuntur, aliqua deliberatione agitantur quae similitudinibus apparentibus fulcitur, fundamento carentibus omnino rationali. Hoc humanam rerum ponderationem reddit pauperiorem, cui fundamentales quaestiones illae subtrahuntur quas rationale animal, inde suis ab initiis in terra, perpetuo sibi proposuit.

Alas, as regards the question concerning the meaning of life, it must be noted that by the supporters of scientism this very question is regarded as belonging to the realm of the irrational or as altogether fictive. No less misleading, however, is the treatment by this cast of mind of other great philosophical questions which, if now they are not entirely passed over, are tossed about with a kind of deliberation propped up by apparent analogies, altogether lacking any rational foundation. This renders the human weighing of things poorer, from which those fundamental questions are withdrawn that the rational animal, from its beginnings on earth, has perpetually set before itself.

Postquam, hanc secundum sententiam, criticum iudicium ex ethica aestimatione est omissum, scientistarum doctrina efficere valuit ut plures sibi persuaderent id quod technica ratione fieri possit hanc ipsam ob causam morali ratione accipi posse.

After, according to this opinion, the critical judgment from ethical evaluation had been omitted, the doctrine of the scientistic camp was able to bring it about that many more persuaded themselves that that which can be done by technical reason could for this very reason be accepted on moral grounds.

89. Haud minorum periculorum praenuntius est ipsepragmatismus, qui animi affectus ad eum maxime pertinet qui, suis in electionibus, usum recusat deliberationum theoreticarum vel existimationum ethicis principiis innitentium. Insignia sunt practica consectaria quae ab eiusmodi mentis opinatione profluxerunt. Nominatim vero eo deventum est ut popularis regiminis opinatio proferretur quae nullo modo ad fundamenta ordinis officiorum et debitorum referretur ac propterea immutabilia: honestas vel inhonestas quorundam morum secundum maioris partis suffragia in senatibus statuitur.

89. No less a harbinger of dangers ispragmatism itself, a disposition of mind that pertains especially to the one who, in his choices, refuses the use of theoretical deliberations or of estimations resting on ethical principles. Notable are the practical consequences that have flowed from an opinion of mind of this sort. Specifically, it has come to this: a view of popular government has been advanced which in no way is referred back to the foundations of the order of duties and obligations, and therefore to things immutable: the honesty or dishonesty of certain mores is determined, according to the votes of the greater part, in senates.

(105) Patent autem huiusmodi iudicationis consectaria: praecipuae morales sententiae sive pronuntiationes paulatim disputationibus subduntur quorundam institutorum. Praeterea: ipsa anthropologica disciplina graviter afficitur, proposita una dumtaxat hominis visione, a qua longe absunt ethicae dubitationes nec non vitales explicationes de sensu doloris ac sacrificii, vitae et mortis.

(105) However, the consequences of this kind of judgment are evident: principal moral sentences or pronouncements are gradually subjected to the disputations of certain institutions. Moreover: the anthropological discipline itself is gravely affected, with only a single vision of the human being being proposed, from which ethical dubitations, as well as vital explications of the meaning of suffering and sacrifice, of life and of death, are far absent.

90. Hucusque recensitae opinationes perducunt vicissim ad latiorem quandam notionem quae hodie efficere videtur communem multarum philosophiarum prospectum quae iam a sensu essendi recesserunt. Loquimur enim de interpretatione nihilista quae simul omnis fundamenti repudiationem continet omnisque veritatis obiectivae negationem.Nihilismus est humanitatis hominis ipsius negatio et eius proprietatis, prius quam adversetur postulationibus et doctrinis verbi Dei propriis.

90. The opinions reviewed thus far lead in turn to a somewhat broader notion which today seems to bring about a common outlook of many philosophies that have already receded from the sense of being. For we are speaking of a nihilist interpretation which at once contains the repudiation of every foundation and the negation of all objective truth.Nihilism is the negation of the humanity of man himself and of his proper nature, before it sets itself against the proper postulates and doctrines of the word of God.

Etenim haud oblivisci licet neglectum ipsius « esse » necessario secum etiam longinquitatem adferre ab obiectiva veritate ac, proinde, ab ipso fundamento illo quod hominis sustinet dignitatem. Fieri sic potest ut de vultu hominis illae submoveantur partes et species quae similitudinem Dei patefaciunt, unde paulatim aut ad destructivam potentiae cupiditatem adducitur aut solitudinis ad desperationem. Amota enim semel hominis veritate, omnino quis decipitur se liberum illum facere contendens.

Indeed, one must by no means forget that the neglect of « being » necessarily brings with it also a remoteness from objective truth and, therefore, from that very foundation which sustains the dignity of man. Thus it can come to pass that from the visage of man those features and aspects are removed which make manifest the likeness of God, whence gradually he is led either to a destructive cupidity of power or to the desperation of solitude. For once the truth of man has been removed, one is altogether deceived while contending that he is making himself free.

Nam veritas atque libertas aut coniunguntur simul aut simul misere amittuntur.(106)

For truth and liberty either are joined together at the same time, or at the same time are miserably lost.(106)

91. Explanantes principia sententiarum modo propositarum noluimus integram praebere descriptionem hodiernae philosophiae condicionis: ceterum difficulter redigi illa potest unicam ad aestimationem. Adseverare Nostra potius interest haereditatem scientiae ac sapientiae revera pluribus locupletari in regionibus. Satis memorare est logicam, sermonis philosophiam, epistemologiam, naturae philosophiam, anthropologiam, altiorem investigationem affectuum cognitionis, existentialem accessum ad libertatis explicationem.

91. Explaining the principles of the statements just proposed, we have not wished to provide a complete description of the condition of contemporary philosophy: moreover, that can hardly be reduced to a single assessment. It is rather Our concern to aver that the heritage of science and wisdom is truly being enriched in many regions. It is enough to mention logic, the philosophy of language, epistemology, the philosophy of nature, anthropology, a higher investigation of the affects of cognition, the existential approach to the explication of freedom.

E contrario, principii immanentiae affirmatio, quae veluti media subiacet postulatis rationalistis, iam a priore saeculo responsiones excitavit quibus altissima dubitatio inducta est de aliis postulatis de quibus eo usque disputatum non erat. Enatae ita sunt sententiae irrationales, simulque criticum iudicium aperuit manifesto vacuam omnino postulationem absoluti dominii rationis.

On the contrary, the affirmation of the principle of immanence, which, as it were, lies as a middle beneath the rationalist postulates, already from the prior century has stirred responses by which the loftiest dubitation was introduced concerning other postulates about which up to that point there had been no dispute. Thus irrational sententiae were engendered, and at the same time critical judgment laid open as manifestly altogether empty the postulation of the absolute dominion of reason.

A quibusdam subtilioribus auctoribus aetas nostra uti tempus « post-modernum » est designata. Vocabulum istud, saepius quidem adhibitum de rebus inter se dissidentibus, indicat emergentem quandam elementorum novorum summam quae sua amplitudine et efficacitate graves manentesque perficere potuerunt mutationes. Ita verbum idem primum omnium adhibitum est de notionibus ordinis aesthetici et socialis et technologici.

By certain more subtle authors, our age has been designated as the « post-modern » time. That vocable, indeed more often employed about matters dissident among themselves, indicates a certain emerging aggregate of new elements which by their amplitude and efficacy have been able to effect grave and abiding changes. Thus the same word has before all been applied to notions of the aesthetic, social, and technological order.

In provinciam deinde philosophiae est translatum, at certa semper ambiguitate signatum, tum quia iudicium de iis quae uti « post-moderna » appellantur nunc affirmans nunc negans esse potest, tum quia nulla est consensio in perdifficili quaestione de variarum aetatum historicarum terminis. Verumtamen unum illud extra omnem dubitationem invenitur: rationes et cogitationes quae ad spatium post-modernum referuntur congruam merentur ponderationem. Secundum enim quasdam earum opinationes certitudinum tempus dicitur iam sine remedio transiisse et homini ipsi iam discendum esse in rerum quodam prospectu vivere ubi nullus reperiatur sensus, sub nomine nempe rerum fugientium ac temporariarum.

It was then transferred into the province of philosophy, yet always marked by a certain ambiguity, both because the judgment about those things which are called « post-moderna » can be now affirming, now denying, and because there is no consensus on the very difficult question of the terms of the various historical ages. Nevertheless, this one thing is found beyond all doubt: the reasons and cogitations that are referred to the post-modern space deserve appropriate weighing. For according to certain of their opinions, the time of certitudes is said now to have passed beyond remedy, and that the human being himself must now learn to live in a certain prospect of things where no sense is found, namely under the name of things fugitive and temporary.

Omnem certitudinem iudicio suo delentes, complures auctores, necessariis neglectis distinctionibus, in dubium etiam fidei certitudines deducunt.

Erasing all certainty by their own judgment, many authors, with the necessary distinctions neglected, even lead into doubt the certainties of faith.

Quadamtenus confirmatur hic nihilismus in terrifica malorum experientia quibus aetas nostra est distincta. Ante calamitosum huius experimenti casum, optimismus rationalista, qui in historia deprehendebat victricem rationis progressionem, felicitatis libertatisque fontem, haud restitit ita ut iam ex maximis periculis et minis huius exeuntis saeculi invitatio sit ad desperationem.

To some extent this nihilism is confirmed in the terrifying experience of evils by which our age is distinguished. Before the calamitous downfall of this experiment, the rationalist optimism, which in history discerned the victorious progression of reason, the fount of felicity and liberty, did not stand firm, with the result that now from the greatest dangers and threats of this departing century there is an invitation to desperation.

Verum nihilominus est certam quandam mentem positivistam etiam nunc fidem tribuere deceptioni, cuius vi, propter reperta scientifica et technica, homo veluti demiurgus assequi ex se solo possit sibique obtinere plenum suam in fortunam dominatum.

Yet nonetheless it is true that a certain positivist mindset even now gives faith to the deception, by whose force, on account of scientific and technical discoveries, man, as though a demiurge, could achieve from himself alone and secure for himself full dominion over his own fortune.

Hodierna theologiae officia

Present duties of theology

92. Quatenus est Revelationis intellegentia, variis in historiae aetatibus theologia semper cognovit sibi diversarum culturarum postulationes esse suscipiendas ut intra eas, consentanea cum doctrinae explicatione, fidei elementa tradere posset. Hodie quoque duplex ad eam pertinet munus. Altera ex parte opus explicet illa oportet quod Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II suo tempore ei commisit: suas ut proprias renovaret docendi rationes quo evangelizationi efficacius inserviret.

92. Insofar as it is an understanding of Revelation, in the various ages of history theology has always recognized that the demands of diverse cultures are to be undertaken by it, so that within them, consonant with the explication of doctrine, it might be able to hand on the elements of faith. Today too a twofold task pertains to it. On the one hand, it ought to carry out the work which the 2nd Ecumenical Vatican Council in its time entrusted to it: namely, that it should renew its own proper methods of teaching, in order that it might serve evangelization more efficaciously.

Hac in re quis recordari non potest de verbis a Summo Pontifice Ioanne XXIII prolatis dum aperiret Concilium? Dixit enim tunc: « Oportet ut, quemadmodum cuncti sinceri rei christianae, catholicae, apostolicae fautores vehementer exoptant, eadem doctrina amplius et altius cognoscatur eaque plenius animi imbuantur atque formentur; oportet ut haec doctrina certa et immutabilis, cui fidele obsequium est praestandum, ea ratione pervestigetur et exponatur quam tempora postulant nostra ». (107)

In this matter, who cannot recall the words uttered by the Supreme Pontiff John 23 while he was opening the Council? For he said then: «It is necessary that, just as all sincere supporters of the Christian, Catholic, Apostolic cause most vehemently desire, the same doctrine be known more widely and more deeply, and that minds be more fully imbued and formed by it; it is necessary that this doctrine, certain and immutable, to which faithful obedience is to be rendered, be investigated and expounded in that manner which our times demand». (107)

Ex altera vero parte oculos theologia intendat necesse est ultimam in veritatem quam ei commendat Revelatio ipsa neque sibi satis esse existimet in mediis consistere intervallis. Decet enim reminisci theologum opus suum respondere « ad vim dynamicam, quae in ipsa fide inest » suaeque inquisitionis argumentum id esse: « Veritas, Deus vivus eiusque salutis consilium per Iesum Christum revelatum ». (108) Hoc munus, quod ante omnia afficit theologiam, simul quidem philosophiam provocat. Quaestionum enim multitudo, quae hodie premunt, communem poscit operam etiamsi multiplicibus rationibus illa expletur, ut cognoscatur denuo veritas atque exprimatur.

On the other hand, it is necessary that theology direct its gaze to the ultimate truth which Revelation itself entrusts to it, nor deem it sufficient to remain in intermediate stages. For it befits the theologian to remember that his work responds “to the dynamic force which is inherent in faith itself,” and that the subject of his inquiry is this: “Truth, the living God and his plan of salvation revealed through Jesus Christ.” (108) This task, which before all affects theology, at the same time indeed provokes philosophy. For the multitude of questions which press today demands a common endeavor, even if it is fulfilled by manifold methods, so that truth may be known anew and expressed.

Veritas, quae Christus est, ubique auctoritate universali se imponit quae gubernat, incitat et prosperat tum theologiam tum etiam philosophiam.

Truth, which is Christ, everywhere imposes itself with universal authority, which governs, incites, and makes both theology and even philosophy prosper.

Quod creditur veritatem ubique validam cognosci posse, haud prorsus inde oritur intollerantia; condicio contra necessaria est ad verum sincerumque inter homines dialogum. Hac sola condicione fieri potest ut discidia vincantur et iter ad unam integram veritatem percurratur secundum eas semitas quas solus Domini resuscitati Spiritus cognoscit. (109) Nunc ipsum cupimus explicare quo pacto unitatis necessitas hodie in re conformetur, inspectis praesentibus theologiae officiis.

That it is believed that a universally valid truth can be known everywhere does not at all therefore give rise to intolerance; on the contrary, it is a necessary condition for true and sincere dialogue among human beings. Under this condition alone can dissensions be overcome and the journey to the one integral truth be traversed along those paths which the Spirit of the resurrected Lord alone knows. (109) Now we wish to explain precisely how the necessity of unity may today be realized in practice, after considering the present tasks of theology.

93. Propositum princeps quod explere vult theologia in eo consistit, utRevelationis intellectus praebeatur fideique doctrina. Media propterea ipsius pars ac veluti centrum eius deliberationum erit mysterii ipsius Dei Unius et Trini contemplatio. Huc per mysterii Incarnationis Filii Dei ponderationem acceditur: eo quod ipse factus est homo ac deinde occuccurrit passioni et morti, quod mysterium in gloriosam eius resurrectionem atque ascensionem ad dexteram Patris evasit, unde veritatis Spiritum misit suam ad constituendam et animandam Ecclesiam. Hoc in rerum prospectu principale theologiae munus fit Dei kenosis intellectus, quod magnum humanae menti restat mysterium quae vix credibile opinatur dolorem mortemque posse amorem illum declarare qui nihil vicissim expetens sese dono concedit.

93. The principal purpose which theology wishes to accomplish consists in this: that anunderstanding of Revelation be provided and a doctrine of faith. Therefore the very middle and, as it were, the center of its deliberations will be the contemplation of the mystery of God himself, One and Triune. One approaches this through a pondering of the mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God: in that he himself became man and then encountered the Passion and death, which mystery issued in his glorious Resurrection and Ascension to the right hand of the Father, whence he sent the Spirit of truth to establish and animate the Church. In this outlook the chief task of theology becomes an understanding of God’s kenosis, which remains a great mystery to the human mind, which deems it scarcely credible that pain and death can declare that love which, seeking nothing in return, grants itself as a gift.

Hac autem in re primaria quaedam necessitas iniungitur urgensque simul locorum ipsorum intenta pervestigatio: in primis Sacrarum Litterarum, deinde eorum quibus viva Ecclesiae Traditio profertur. Hic autem hodie nonnullae emergunt quaestiones, ex parte dumtaxat novae, quibus addi non potest solutio neglectis philosophiae officiis.

But in this matter a certain primary necessity is enjoined, and at the same time an urgent, intent investigation of the loci themselves: first of the Sacred Scriptures, then of those by which the living Tradition of the Church is set forth. Here, however, today several questions emerge, partly new to be sure, for which no solution can be supplied if the offices of philosophy are neglected.

94. Respicit prima difficilis quaestio necessitudinem inter significationem et veritatem. Quemadmodum omnibus aliis in textibus accidit, ita etiam fontes, quos interpretatur theologus, ante omnia aliquam transmittunt significationem quae illuminanda est atque explananda. Nunc vero se exhibet haec significatio tamquam de Deo veritatem, quae a Deo ipso sacrum per textum traditur.

94. The first difficult question regards the relationship between signification and truth. Just as happens in all other texts, so too the sources which the theologian interprets, before all else, transmit some signification which must be illumined and explicated. Now indeed this signification presents itself as truth about God, which, as something sacred, is handed down by God himself through the text.

Quocirca hominum in sermone incorporatur Dei sermo, qui suam veritatem communicat, ea admirabili « indulgentia » quae logicam Incarnationis rationem refert. (110) Revelationis ideo interpretans fontes oportet theologus se ipse interroget quae alta et germana sit veritas quam Scripturarum loci aperire volunt etiam intra sermonis limites.

Wherefore in the discourse of human beings the discourse of God is incorporated, which communicates its own truth, by that admirable «indulgence» which recalls the logic of the Incarnation. (110) Therefore, in interpreting the sources of Revelation, the theologian ought to question himself as to what the deep and genuine truth is that the passages of Scripture wish to open up even within the limits of discourse.

Ad Bibliorum quod attinet locos ac praesertim Evangeliorum, minime quidem redigitur eorum veritas in eventuum dumtaxat historicorum narrationem vel in factorum nudorum patefactionem, perinde ac positivismus historicista contendit. (111) Hi ex contrario loci proponunt eventus quorum veritas ponitur ultra simplicem historiae casum: in eorum significatione in et pro salutis historia reperitur. Plene haec explicatur veritas illo ex perenni usu quem Ecclesia fecit illorum textuum saeculorum decursu, pristinam eorundem servando significationem.

As regards the passages of the Scriptures, and especially of the Gospels, their truth is by no means reduced merely to a narration of historical events or to a disclosure of bare facts, as historicist positivism contends. (111) These passages, on the contrary, set forth events whose truth is placed beyond the simple happenstance of history: in their signification it is found in and for the history of salvation. This truth is fully explained by that perennial use which the Church has made of those texts in the course of the centuries, preserving their original signification.

Pernecessarium itaque est ut etiam philosophice de necessitudinis ratione interrogetur quae inter factum eiusque significatum intercedit; haec necessitudo proprium historiae efficit sensum.

It is therefore most necessary that there be inquiry, even philosophically, into the rationale of the nexus that intervenes between the fact and its signification; this nexus produces the proper sense of history.

95. Non uni populo neque aetati uni destinatur Dei verbum. Dogmaticae similiter pronuntiationes, quantumvis temporis illius culturam referant quo eduntur, constantem tamen et decretoriam efferunt veritatem. Hinc ergo quaestio exsistit quomodo inter se concilientur absoluta universalisque veritatis indoles atque inevitabiles historiae culturaeque condiciones earum formularum quibus eadem significatur veritas.

95. Not for one people nor for one age is the word of God destined. Likewise dogmatic pronouncements, however much they may reflect the culture of that time in which they are issued, nevertheless bear forth a constant and decretory truth. Hence, therefore, the question arises how there may be reconciled with each other the character of absolute and universal truth and the inevitable conditions of history and culture of those formulae by which the same truth is signified.

Uti superius iam diximus, historicismi opinationes haud possunt defendi. Usus autem disciplinae hermeneuticae, quae ad metaphysicae scientiae patet postulata, demonstrare valet quo pacto ex adiunctis historicis et incertis, in quibus textus sacri maturuerunt, ad veritatem transitus fiat ibidem patefactam, quae easdem illas praetergreditur condiciones.

As we have already said above, the opinions of historicism cannot be defended. The use, moreover, of the discipline of hermeneutics, which stands open to the postulates of metaphysical science, is able to demonstrate by what manner, from the historical and uncertain adjuncts in which the sacred texts matured, there is a transition to the truth disclosed therein, which oversteps those same conditions.

Suo historico circumscriptoque sermone licet homini veritates expromere quae linguarum transcendunt usum. Etenim numquam potest nec tempore nec aliqua culturae forma coarctari veritas; intra historiam cognoscitur at historiam ipsam egreditur.

By his own historical and circumscribed discourse, a human being is permitted to express truths that transcend the use of languages. For indeed, truth can never be constrained either by time or by any form of culture; it is known within history, yet it goes beyond history itself.

96. Sinit, haec consideratio, nos alterius iam difficultatis providere solutionem: de perpetua agitur auctoritate et vi sermonum conceptuumque adhibitorum in conciliorum definitionibus. Venerabilis iam Noster Decessor Pius XII hanc eandem quaestionem suis Encyclicis LitterisHumani generis pertractavit. (112)

96. This consideration allows us already to foresee the solution of another difficulty: it concerns the perpetual authority and force of the words and concepts employed in the definitions of councils. Our Venerable Predecessor Pius XII treated this same question in his Encyclical LetterHumani generis. (112)

Hoc de argumento non facile disceptatur, quandoquidem serio animo ratio habeatur oportet ipsius significationis quam variis in culturae regionibus temporumque aetatibus verba sibi sumpserunt. Cogitationis humanae historia utcumque luculenter comprobat per progressionem varietatemque culturarum quasdam principales notiones universalem suam adservare cognoscendi vim proindeque veritatem earum affirmationum quam recludunt. (113) Res ita si non sese haberent, philosophia atque scientiae inter se haud quidquam communicare valerent neque percipi apud culturas diversas ab iis a quibus excogitatae sunt et elaboratae.

On this argument it is not easy to dispute, since one must, in earnest spirit, take account of the very signification which words have assumed for themselves in the various regions of culture and in the ages of times. The history of human cogitation in some way clearly corroborates that, through the progression and variety of cultures, certain principal notions preserve their own universal power of knowing and, accordingly, the truth of those affirmations which they disclose. (113) If matters were not thus, philosophy and the sciences would be able to communicate nothing among themselves, nor be perceived within diverse cultures other than those by which they were excogitated and elaborated.

Restat propterea hermeneutica quaestio, at solvi potest. Ceterum multarum notionum vera vis non prohibet quin imperfecta sit earum significatio; qua in re philosophica disceptatio multum efficere potest. Optatur, incirco, ut peculiari studio coniunctio pervestigetur inter sermonem intellectivum et veritatem, atque etiam proponantur apta itinera ad rectam eius intellegentiam.

Therefore the hermeneutical question remains, yet it can be solved. Moreover, the true force of many notions does not preclude that their signification be imperfect; in this matter philosophical disputation can accomplish much. It is desired, therefore, that with particular study the conjunction between intellective discourse and truth be thoroughly investigated, and that apt paths also be proposed toward its right understanding.

97. Si grave theologiae officium est fontium interpretatio, aliud etiam et maioris prudentiae necessitatisque estrevelatae veritatis perceptio sive intellectus fidei explicatio. Sicut iam superius innuimus, intellectus fidei postulat ut philosophia essendi partes quae in primis sinant ut theologia dogmatica consentaneo modo expleat sua munia. Dogmaticus primorum annorum huius saeculi pragmatismus, ad quem fidei veritates nihil aliud quam morum normae esse dicuntur, iam redargutus est atque reiectus; (114) nihilominus semper quis allicitur ut has intellegat veritates modo plane functionali.

97. If the interpretation of the sources is a weighty duty of theology, another task also, and one of greater prudence and necessity, is theperception of revealed truth or the explication of the understanding of faith . As we have already hinted above, the understanding of faith requires that the philosophy of being assume roles which, above all, allow dogmatic theology to fulfill its offices in a consentaneous way. The dogmatic pragmatism of the first years of this century, according to which the truths of faith are said to be nothing other than norms of morals, has already been refuted and rejected; (114) nonetheless one is always enticed to understand these truths in a purely functional mode.

Tunc enim res recidet in rationem quandam prorsus inopportunam, reductivam ac necessaria gravitate speculativa destitutam. Verbi causa, Christologia, quae « de basi » dumtaxat proficiscatur, quemadmodum hodie dicere consueverunt, vel ecclesiologia ad societatis civilis exemplum solummodo composita, talis reductionis periculum declinare non possent.

Then indeed the matter would fall back into a certain approach entirely inopportune, reductive, and deprived of the necessary speculative gravity. For example, a Christology which proceeds only «from the base», as they are accustomed to say today, or an ecclesiology composed solely after the pattern of civil society, would not be able to avoid the danger of such a reduction.

Si traditionis theologicae universos complecti vult intellectus fidei thesauros, ad philosophiam essendi decurrere debet. Haec enim necessario quaestionem essendi rursus proponet secundum postulationes atque totius traditionis philosophicae etiam recentioris utilitates adlatas, omni omissa opportunitate in superatas iam philosophicas rationes futiliter recidendi. Intra metaphysicae christianae traditionis prospectum philosophia essendi est philosophia actuosa seu dynamica quae ipsis in suis ontologicis, causalibus et communicativis structuris praebet veritatem.

If the intellectus fidei wishes to embrace all the treasures of theological tradition, it must resort to the philosophy of being. For this will of necessity propose anew the question of being, according to the postulations and the utilities brought by the whole philosophical tradition, even the more recent, while foregoing every opportunity of relapsing futilely into philosophical reasonings already superseded. Within the prospect of the Christian tradition of metaphysics, the philosophy of being is an active or dynamic philosophy which, in its very ontological, causal, and communicative structures, offers truth.

Impetum suum ac perennem impulsum in eo reperit quod actu ipso « essendi » sustentatur, unde plena et generalis permittitur ad solidam rerum universitatem patefactio, omnibus excessis terminis ut Ille qui rebus omnibus consumationem tribuit attingatur. (115) Ea in theologia, quae sua ex Revelatione desumit principia tamquam a novo cognitionis fonte, haec omnino confirmatur indicandi ratio intimum secundum illud vinculum inter fidem et metaphysicam rationalitatem.

It finds its impetus and perennial impulse in that which is sustained by the very act of « being », whence a full and general opening is permitted to the solid universality of things, with all boundaries surpassed, so that He who bestows consummation upon all things may be reached. (115) In that theology which draws its principles from Revelation as from a new source of cognition, there is wholly confirmed this way of indicating, in accordance with that bond, the intimate relation between faith and metaphysical rationality.

98. Explicari similes possunt deliberationes etiam ratione habitamoralis theologiae. Philosophiae redintegratio postulatur etiam ut intellegatur fides ad credentium vitam actionemque spectans. Ante oculos constitutis provocationibus hodiernis in re sociali, oeconomica, in re politica ac scientifica, ethica hominis conscientia confunditur. In Litteris Encyclicis Veritatis splendor docuimus Nos complures in orbe nostro exsistentes difficultates inde oriri quod est « crisis circa veritatem.

98. Similar deliberations can also be explicated, with account taken ofmoral theology. The reintegration of philosophy is likewise demanded, so that faith may be understood as regarding the life and action of believers. With present-day provocations set before our eyes in the social, economic, political, and scientific sphere, man’s ethical conscience is confounded. In the Encyclical Letter Veritatis splendor We have taught that many difficulties existing in our world arise from what is a « crisis concerning truth.

Amissa notione veritatis universalis de bono quod ab humana mente percipi potest, necessario de conscientia opinio est immutata, quae iam suo in primigenio statu non consideratur, tamquam scilicet actus intellectus personae cuius est adhibere universalem cognitionem boni in peculiari quadam condicione et iudicium facere de honesto eligendo hic et nunc; eo tenditur ut personae conscientiae privilegium tribuatur statuendi autonoma ratione normam boni malique, indeque agendi. Mens haec arte coniungitur cum individualistica ethica, secundum quam quisque cum sua confertur veritate, quae ab aliorum veritate differt ». (116)

With the notion of the universal truth about the good, which can be perceived by the human mind, having been lost, necessarily the opinion about conscience has been altered: it is no longer considered in its primigenial state, namely as an act of the intellect of the person, whose role is to apply the universal cognition of the good in a certain particular condition and to make a judgment about choosing the honorable here and now; rather, there is a tendency to grant to the person’s conscience the privilege of establishing, by autonomous reason, the norm of good and evil, and thence of acting. This mind is closely conjoined with an individualistic ethics, according to which each person is compared with his own truth, which differs from the truth of others ». (116)

Totas per easdem Encyclicas Litteras praecipuas extulimus partes attinentes ad veritatem morali in provincia. Veritas haec de plerisque ethicis quaestionibus, quae magis hodie premunt, a theologia morali intentam ecit meditationem quae eius in Dei verbo radices illuminet. Suum ut expleat hoc munus, debet ideo moralis theologia uti ethica philosophiae disciplina, quae bonorum veritatem respicit; ethica videlicet utatur oportet disciplina quae neque subiectiva sit neque utilitati soli serviat.

Throughout those same Encyclical Letters we highlighted the principal parts pertaining to truth in the moral province. This truth, concerning most of the ethical questions that press more today, has elicited from moral theology a focused meditation to illumine its roots in the word of God. In order to fulfill this office, moral theology must therefore make use of ethics as a discipline of philosophy, which regards the truth of goods; namely, it ought to employ an ethical discipline that is neither subjective nor in service to utility alone.

Haec postulata ethica ratio importat atque ante flagitat philosophicam anthropologiam nec non metaphysicam bonorum tractationem. Hanc unicam rerum iudicationem adhibens, quae cum christiana vitae sanctitate virtutumque humanarum et supernaturalium exercitatione cohaeret, moralis theologia diversas sua in regione quaestiones agitare poterit — cuius generis sunt pax socialisque iustitia, familia, vitae defensio locorumque naturae custodia — multo quidem efficacius et plenius.

These postulates the ethical reason entails and beforehand demands a philosophical anthropology and likewise a metaphysical treatment of goods. Applying this unitary judgment of things, which coheres with the Christian sanctity of life and with the exercise of human and supernatural virtues, moral theology will be able to address the diverse questions in its own province — of which kind are peace and social justice, the family, the defense of life, and the custody of places of nature — much indeed more efficaciously and more fully.

99. Theologicum Ecclesiae opus ad fidem et catechesim in primis nuntiandam deputatur. (117) Nuntiatio sive « kerygma » ad conversionem vocat, Christi proponendo veritatem quae eius consummatur paschali in Mysterio: in Christo, enim, uno veritatis agnosci potest plenitudo quae homines salvat (cfrAct 4,12; 1 Tim 2,4-6).

99. The theological work of the Church is deputed above all to the proclaiming of faith and catechesis. (117) The proclamation, or « kerygma », calls to conversion by proposing the truth of Christ, which is consummated in the Paschal Mystery: in Christ alone, indeed, the fullness of truth can be recognized which saves human beings (cfrAct 4:12; 1 Tim 2:4-6).

Hinc probe pariter intellegitur cur praeter theologiam sibi etiam catechesis adsumat maius quoddam pondus: in se enim haec complectitur philosophica aliqua consectaria fidei sub lumine vestiganda. Doctrina intra catechesim tradita aliquid certe ad instituendam personam humanam confert. Debet catechesis, quae etiam communicatio est facta per verba, Ecclesiae Magisterium tota ex ipsius integritate praebere, (118) coniunctionem illius etiam cum credentium vita demonstrans.

Hence it is likewise well understood why, besides theology, even catechesis should assume for itself a certain greater weight: for this, in itself, embraces certain philosophical consequents of faith to be investigated under its light. The doctrine handed on within catechesis certainly contributes something to the forming of the human person. Catechesis ought, which is also a communication made through words, to offer the Church’s Magisterium whole, in the integrity proper to it, (118) also demonstrating its conjunction with the life of believers.

(119) Unicum ita efficitur doctrinam inter et vitam vinculum quod aliter attingi non potest. Non sane veritatum intellectivarum corpus in catechesi traditur, verum viventis Dei mysterium. (120)

(119) Thus there is effected a single bond between doctrine and life, which cannot be reached otherwise. Surely not a corpus of intellectual truths is handed on in catechesis, but the mystery of the living God. (120)

Plurimum aequabiliter philosophica disputatio confert ad necessitudinem collustrandam inter veritatem et vitam, inter eventum et doctrinalem veritatem ac, praesertim, rationem inter transcendentem veritatem et sermonem qui humanitus intellegi potest. (121) Mutua consociatio inter disciplinas theologicas et exitus variis ex opinationibus philosophicis perceptos exprimet, itaque, veram fecunditatem in fide communicanda altiusque in ea comprehendenda.

Philosophical disputation contributes very greatly and evenly to illumining the connectedness between truth and life, between event and doctrinal truth, and, especially, the relation between transcendent truth and speech that can be understood humanly. (121) A mutual consociation between the theological disciplines and the outcomes perceived from various philosophical opinions will bring these out, and thus, true fecundity in communicating the faith and in comprehending it more deeply.

CONCLUSIO

CONCLUSION

100. Quandoquidem iam transierunt plus quam centum anni cum Leonis XIII Litterae EncyclicaeÆterni Patris prodierunt, quas saepenumero hoc in Nostro scripto commemoravimus, necessarium Nobis visum est de necessitudine inter fidem et philosophiam distinctius sermonem repetere. Omnino manifestum est momentum quod habet philosophica cogitatio in cultura explicanda et in personalibus socialibusque moribus temperandis.

100. Since now more than one hundred years have passed since the Encyclical Letters of Leo 13,Æterni Patris, were issued, which we have repeatedly recalled in this Our writing, it has seemed necessary to Us to take up again, more distinctly, the discourse about the relationship between faith and philosophy. It is altogether manifest what importance philosophical cogitation has in the unfolding of culture and in the tempering of personal and social morals.

Ipsa multum potest, quod haud semper clare percipitur, etiam circa theologiam eiusdemque diversas disciplinas. Has propter causas consentaneum necessariumque esse iudicavimus vim confirmare quam philosophia pro fidei intellectu finibusque habet, quibus ipsa occurrit cum obliviscitur vel Revelationis veritates denegat. Ecclesia enim persuasissimum habet fidem et rationem « opem sibi mutuam » ferre, (122) dum utraque simul iudicium criticum et purificatorium exercet, simul stimulum admovet ad inquisitionem producendam et altius perscrutandas res.

It itself is able to do much, which is not always clearly perceived, even with respect to theology and its diverse disciplines. For these reasons we have judged it fitting and necessary to strengthen the force which philosophy has for the intellect of faith and the limits which it encounters when it forgets or denies the truths of Revelation. For the Church holds with fullest persuasion that faith and reason “offer mutual help” (122), while each at once exercises a critical and purificatory judgment, and at the same time applies a stimulus to carry inquiry forward and to probe things more deeply.

101. Si autem opinationum historiam respicimus, in occidentali potissimum parte, commode percipiuntur divitiae quae ad hominum progressum a philosophiae et theologiae occursu atque ab earum ipsarum acquisitionum permutationibus manarunt. Theologia, quae dono apertionem recepit proprietatemque quarum vi tamquae fidei scientia exsistere valet, rationem certe lacessivit ut radicali novitati pateret, quam Dei revelatio secum fert.

101. But if we look back to the history of opinions, especially in the Western part, the riches are readily perceived which have flowed for the progress of human beings from the encounter of philosophy and theology and from the exchanges of their very acquisitions. Theology, which by a gift has received an openness and a propriety by whose force it is able to exist as the science of faith, has certainly provoked reason to be open to the radical novelty which God’s revelation brings with it.

Hoc sine dubio philosophiae fuit utilitati, quae hoc modo novos prospectus in alias significationes comparere vidit, quae rationi altius sunt perscrutandae.

This, without doubt, was to the utility of philosophy, which in this way saw new prospects appear into other significations, which are to be more deeply scrutinized by reason.

His quidem consideratis rebus, quemadmodum confirmavimus theologiae esse sinceram cum philosophia necessitudinem redintegrare, ita similiter iterare debemus philosophiae pro cogitationis bono et progressu recuperandam esse cum theologia necessitudinem. Reperiet in ea non singulorum hominum cogitationem, quae, quamvis alta locuplesque sit, unius personae tamen limitibus et lineamentis circumscribitur, sed communis cogitationis divitias. Theologia namque in veritate perquirenda, sua natura, nota ecclesialitatis (123) sustentatur itemque Dei Populi traditione cum multiformitate sapientiae et culturarum in fidei unitate.

With these matters indeed considered, just as we have affirmed that it pertains to theology to reintegrate a sincere relationship with philosophy, so likewise we must reiterate that it pertains to philosophy, for the good and progress of thought, to recover a relationship with theology. It will find in it not the thought of individual human beings, which, although lofty and opulent, is nevertheless circumscribed by the limits and lineaments of a single person, but the riches of common thought. For theology, in the pursuit of truth, by its very nature is sustained by the note of ecclesialitatis (123) and by the tradition of the People of God, with the multiformity of wisdom and of cultures in the unity of faith.

102. In momento et philosophicae cogitationis vera magnitudine hoc modo innitens, Ecclesia tum hominis dignitatem tum evangelicum nuntium tuetur. Nihil hodie plus quam haec praeparatio instat, perducendi scilicet homines ad eorum detegendam facultatem cognoscendi verum (124) inveniendique anhelitum versus summam consummatamque exsistentiae significationen.

102. By leaning in this way on both the momentum and the true magnitude of philosophical thought, the Church safeguards both the dignity of the human being and the evangelical message. Nothing today is more urgent than this preparation, namely, to lead human beings to uncover their capacity for knowing the true (124) and to discover the aspiration toward the highest and consummate meaning of existence.

Harum altarum rationum in prospectu, quas Deus in hominum natura inscripsit, liquidius humana apparet significatio Dei verbi, quod humaniores reddit homines. Philosophiae beneficio, quae etiam vera facta est sapientia, huius temporis homo sic agnoscet se tanto esse humaniorem quanto plus, Evangelio confidendo, Christo pateat.

In the prospect of these higher considerations, which God has inscribed in the nature of human beings, the human signification of the Word of God, which renders human beings more human, appears more clearly. By the benefit of philosophy, which has also become true wisdom, the person of this time will thus recognize himself to be the more human, the more, by confiding in the Gospel, he lies open to Christ.

103. Philosophia, praeterea, est tamquam speculum in quod populorum cultus repercutitur. Philosophia, quae, theologicis necessitatibus impellentibus, una cum fide concorditer progreditur, particeps est illius « culturae evangelizationis », quam Paulus VI inter praecipua evengelizationis proposita annumeravit. (125)

103. Philosophy, moreover, is as a mirror in which the culture of peoples is reflected. Philosophy which, with theological necessities impelling, advances concordantly together with faith, is a participant in that « culture of evangelization », which Paul 6 counted among the principal aims of evangelization. (125)

Dum autem novae evangelizationis necessitatem iterare numquam intermittimus, philosophos compellamus, qui altius veri, boni et pulchri granditatem vestigent, quibus Dei verbum aditum patere sinit. Id magis instat, si provocationes expenduntur, quas novum millennium secum ferre videtur: ipsae peculiari ratione regiones antiquaeque traditionis christianae culturas afficiunt. Haec quoque consideratio veluti praecipuum originaleque ad novam evangelizationem persequendam habendum est adiumentum.

While, moreover, we never cease to reiterate the necessity of the new evangelization, let us urge philosophers, who investigate more deeply the grandeur of the true, the good, and the beautiful, for whom the word of God allows access to stand open. This presses more urgently if the challenges are weighed which the new millennium seems to bring with it: they themselves, in a particular manner, affect the regions and the cultures of ancient Christian tradition. This consideration too is to be held as a principal and original aid for pursuing the new evangelization.

104. Philosophica in disciplina saepe solummodo invenitur consensus et dialogus instituitur cum illis qui nostram fidem haud communicant. Hodiernus philosophicus motus postulat ut philosophi attente periteque fideles agant partes facultatibusque polleant ea percipiendi quae hodiernis temporibus exspectantur, recluduntur et agitantur.

104. In the philosophical discipline there is often found only consensus, and dialogue is instituted with those who do not share our faith. The contemporary philosophical movement demands that philosophers play their parts attentively and expertly, and be endowed with the faculties for perceiving those things which in our times are expected, opened up, and debated.

Dum secundum rationem eiusque regulas argumentatur, christianus philosophus, qui illo semper intellectu dirigitur quem Dei verbum subministrat, quandam ratiocinationem agere potest quae etiam ab illis, qui nondum omnem veritatem capiunt quam divina Revelatio ostendit, intellegi et sensu percipi potest. Provincia haec in qua consensus ac dialogus reperiuntur eo plus habet momenti propterea quod quaestiones quae impensius humanitati opponuntur — puta quaestionem oecologicam, pacis quaestionem vel convictum stirpium et culturarum — communi opera eaque perspicua et sincera Christianorum et asseclarum aliarum religionum expediri possunt necnon illorum quibus, quamvis nullius sint religionis, cordi est hominum renovatio. Id quidem confirmavit Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II: « Desiderium talis colloquii, quod sola caritate erga veritatem ducatur, servata utique congrua prudentia, ex nostra parte neminem excludit, neque illos qui praeclara animi humani bona colunt, eorum vero Auctorem nondum agnoscunt, neque illos qui Ecclesiae opponuntur eamque variis modis persequuntur ». (126) Philosophia illa, in qua aliquid Christi veritatis splendet, qui est humanarum quaestionum una ac postrema responsio, (127) fulcimentum erit illius ethicae verae simulque omnem orbem complectentis, qua hodiernus homo indiget.

While he argues according to reason and its rules, the Christian philosopher, who is always directed by that intellect which the Word of God supplies, can conduct a certain ratiocination which can be understood and grasped in meaning even by those who do not yet grasp the whole truth which divine Revelation shows. This province, in which consensus and dialogue are found, has so much the more moment for the reason that the questions which more pressingly confront humanity — for instance the ecological question, the question of peace, or the cohabitation of races and cultures — can be untangled by the common work, clear and sincere, of Christians and of adherents of other religions, and also of those to whom, although they belong to no religion, the renewal of humankind is dear to the heart. This indeed was confirmed by the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council (Vatican 2): “The desire for such a colloquy, which is led solely by charity toward the truth, with due prudence of course observed, excludes no one on our part, neither those who cultivate the excellent goods of the human spirit yet do not as yet acknowledge their Author, nor those who oppose the Church and persecute her in various ways.” (126) That philosophy, in which something of the truth of Christ shines — he who is the one and ultimate answer to human questions (127) — will be a support for that ethics, true and at the same time all-embracing of the whole world, which modern man needs.

105. His Litteris encyclicis finem imponentibus, Nobis placet cumprimis adtheologos mentem Nostram postremo convertere, qui peculiari animi intentione philosophicas Dei verbi implicationes observent ac cogitationes in illa re defigant, unde speculativa ac practica scientiae theologicae granditas emergat. De ecclesiali opera iis gratias agere cupio.

105. As these Encyclical Letters draw to a close, it pleases Us, above all, in conclusion, to turn Our mind to thetheologians, who, with a particular intention of spirit, observe the philosophical implications of the Word of God and fix their thoughts upon that matter, whence the speculative and practical grandeur of theological science emerges. I wish to offer them thanks for their ecclesial work.

Artus inter sapientiam philosophicam et theologicam disciplinam nexus in singularissimis christianae traditionis divitiis de revelata veritate vestiganda ponitur. Quapropter eosdem cohortamur ut recipiant et veritatis metaphysicam rationem clarius extollant ad criticum et impellentem dialogum instituendum sive cum nostrae aetatis philosophia sive cum omni philosophica traditione, quae cum Dei verbo concinat aut dissonet. Ob oculos continenter habeant sententiam praeclari cogitationis spiritalitatisque magistri, sancti Bonaventurae scilicet, qui legentem suum in Itinerarium mentis in Deum introducens, eundem monet « ne forte credat, quod sibi sufficiat lectio sine unctione, speculatio sine devotione, investigatio sine admiratione, circumspectio sine exultatione, industria sine pietate, scientia sine caritate, intelligentia sine humilitate, studium absque divina gratia, speculum absque sapientia divinitus inspirata ». (128)

The close bond between philosophical sapience and the theological discipline is set within the most singular riches of the Christian tradition for tracking out the revealed truth. Wherefore we exhort the same to receive and to extol more clearly the metaphysical rationale of truth, for instituting a critical and impelling dialogue both with the philosophy of our age and with every philosophical tradition which either harmonizes with or is dissonant from the Word of God. Let them keep continually before their eyes the judgment of the illustrious master of thought and spirituality, namely Saint Bonaventure, who, introducing his reader into the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, admonishes him “lest perchance he believe that reading without unction, speculation without devotion, investigation without admiration, circumspection without exultation, industry without piety, science without charity, understanding without humility, study without divine grace, a mirror without wisdom divinely inspired, suffices for him.” (128)

Mens quoque Nostra ad eos dirigitur quorum est sacerdotibus institutionem tradere, tam academicam quam pastoralem, ut peculiari studio philosophicam praeparationem curent illorum qui hodiernis hominibus Evangelium enuntiare debebunt, ac magis illorum qui theologiae perquirendae et docendae operam dabunt. Ad Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II praescripta (129) et subsequentia praecepta operari contendant, ex quibus instans officium oritur, quod a nemine posthaberi potest, quodque nos omnes alligat, ut opem sincere profundeque feramus ad fidei veritatem communicandam. Grave porro officium non est obliviscendum magistrorum antea convenienterque instituendorum, qui in Seminariis et ecclesiasticis Institutis philosophiam tradant.

Our Mind is likewise directed to those whose task it is to hand on the formation of priests, both academic and pastoral, that with particular diligence they take care for the philosophical preparation of those who will have to proclaim the Gospel to contemporary men, and even more of those who will devote their efforts to the researching and teaching of theology. Let them strive to act according to the prescriptions of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council (2) (129) and the subsequent precepts, from which there arises a pressing duty, which can be set aside by no one, and which binds us all, that we may bring help sincerely and profoundly for the communicating of the truth of the faith. Moreover, the grave duty is not to be forgotten of teachers who are to be previously and suitably formed, who in Seminaries and ecclesiastical Institutes hand on philosophy.

(130) Necesse est hoc docendi opus congruentem scientificam institutionem secum ferat, ordinatam rationem exhibeat, magnum traditionis christianae suppeditando patrimonium efficiaturque denique debito iudicio, hodiernis spectatis Ecclesiae mundique necessitatibus.

(130) It is necessary that this work of teaching carry with it congruent scientific instruction, exhibit an ordered method, be effected by supplying the great patrimony of Christian tradition, and finally be carried out with due judgment, with the needs of the Church and of the world of today kept in view.

106. Adphilosophos praeterea Nos convertimus et eos qui philosophiam docent, ut, ob oculos philosophica traditione usque probabili habita, animose repetant sincerae sapientiae veritatisque, metaphysicae etiam, philosophicae disciplinae rationes. Se illis interrogari patiantur postulationibus, quae e Dei verbo effluunt ac strenue suam ratiocinationem et argumentationem agant ut ei interrogationi respondeatur.

106. Tophilosophers moreover We turn, and to those who teach philosophy, that, with the philosophical tradition, held as ever credible, before their eyes, they boldly take up anew the rational grounds of genuine wisdom and truth, even metaphysical, of the philosophical discipline. Let them allow themselves to be questioned by those demands which flow from the word of God, and vigorously conduct their own ratiocination and argumentation so that a response may be given to that questioning.

Ad veritatem usque tendant atque ad bonum quod verum continet sint intenti. Hoc modo sinceram illam ethicam effingere poterunt, qua homines, his potissimum annis, omnino indigent. Ecclesia attente et amabiliter eorum inquisitiones spectat; pro certo ideo habeant eam iustam eorum scientiae autonomiam colere.

Let them strive all the way toward truth and be intent upon the good which contains the true. In this way they will be able to shape that sincere ethic, of which human beings, especially in these years, are altogether in need. The Church attentively and kindly regards their inquiries; let them therefore hold for certain that it honors the rightful autonomy of their science.

Credentibus praesertim animum addere volumus, qui in philosophica provincia agunt, ut varios ambitus humanae industriae per rationem illam collustrent quae securior acriorque fit propter adiumentum quod fides ministrat.

We especially wish to give heart to believers, who act in the philosophical province, that they may illuminate the various ambits of human industry by that reason which becomes more secure and keener thanks to the aid which faith ministers.

Facere denique non possumus quin scientiae peritos alloquamur, qui suis inquisitionibus de mundo in universum plus plusque cognitionum praebent deque incredibili varietate ipsius elementorum, tum animalium tum inanimorum, quae multiplices structuras atomicas et moleculares exhibent. Hoc potissimum saeculo ii tam progressi sunt ac tales attigerunt metas, ut admiratione nos subinde afficiamur. Dum admiramur ac simul incitamus hos scientificae inquisitionis vestigatores principes, quibus multum praesentis prosperitatis debet humanitas, eos cohortemur oportet ut suos labores usque persequantur, semper in illa sapientiae provincia manentes, in qua cum scientiae technicaeque artis fructibus bona philosophica et ethica coniunguntur, quibus peculiariter et artissimo vinculo persona humana significatur.

Finally we cannot do otherwise than address the experts of science, who by their investigations about the world in general provide more and more items of knowledge, and about the incredible variety of its elements, both animate and inanimate, which exhibit multiple atomic and molecular structures. In this century above all they have advanced so far and have reached such goals that we are again and again moved with admiration. While we admire and at the same time incite these leading investigators of scientific inquiry, to whom humanity owes much of its present prosperity, we ought to exhort them to keep on pursuing their labors, always remaining in that province of wisdom, in which the philosophical and ethical goods are conjoined with the fruits of science and of technical art, by which the human person is particularly, and by the tightest bond, signified.

Scientiae cultor prorsus sibi est conscius veritatis vestigationem numquam desinere, etiam cum ad quandam finitam mundi hominisve partem spectat; ad quiddam reicit enim quod locatur supra proxima studiorum obiecta, ad interrogationes scilicet quae Mysterii aditum recludunt. (131)

The cultivator of science is thoroughly conscious that the investigation of truth never ceases, even when it looks to some finite part of the world or of man; for it refers to a certain something that is situated above the nearest objects of study, namely to the questions which unlock the entrance of the Mystery. (131)

107. Omnes rogamus ut penetralia contueantur hominis, quem Christus suo in amoris mysterio servavit, quique usque veritatem sensumque perquirit. Complures philosophicae scholae, eum fallentes, ei persuaserunt ipsum absolutum esse sui dominum, qui de fortuna sua deque eventura sorte per se decernere possit, sibimet ipsi suisque dumtaxat fidens viribus.

107. We ask all to behold the inner sanctuaries of the human being, whom Christ has saved in his mystery of love, and who continuously seeks truth and sense. Many philosophical schools, deceiving him, have persuaded him that he is the absolute master of himself, who can by himself decide about his fortune and about the lot that is to come, trusting in himself alone and only in his own powers.

Numqua haec erit hominis praestantia. Illud tantum eum efficiet quod in veritatem se inseri eligit, sub Sapientiae umbra suum struens domicilium ibique inhabitans. Hoc solummodo in veritatis prospectu intelleget plane exprimi suam libertatem ac suam ad dilectionem Deique congnitionem vocationem, veluti summam sui explicationem.

Never will this be man’s preeminence. Only this will constitute him: that he chooses to insert himself into truth, building his dwelling under the shadow of Wisdom and inhabiting there. Only in the prospect of truth will he understand his freedom and his vocation to love and to the cognition of God to be plainly expressed, as the sum of his self-explication.

108. Postremam Nostram cogitationem ad Eam convertimus, quae Ecclesiae deprecationeSedes Sapientiae invocatur. Ipsius vita vera est parabola quae collustrare poterit quae antea a Nobis dicta sunt.

108. We turn Our final thought to Her who, by the Church’s supplication, is invoked as theSeat of Wisdom. Her life is a true parable that can shed light upon what has previously been said by Us.

Etenim inter vocationem Beatae Virginis et verae philosophiae strictam consonantiam prospicere licet. Quemadmodum namque ad suam humanitatem et femininam naturam tradendam ipsa vocata est, unde Dei Verbum carnem sumere posset fieretque unus ex nobis, sic ad operam sustinendam, rationalem videlicet et criticam, vocatur philosophia, ut theologia, veluti fidei intellectio, fecunda sit et efficax. Atque sicut Maria, Gabrielis nuntio assentiendo, nihil suae verae humanitatis ac libertatis amisit, sic philosophica disciplina, in his accipiendis quae Evangelii veritas suppeditat, nihil suae autonomiae amittit, sed omnes suas inquisitiones ad summam perfectionem propelli experitur.

Indeed, it is permitted to foresee a strict consonance between the vocation of the Blessed Virgin and true philosophy. For just as she herself was called to hand over her humanity and feminine nature, whence the Word of God could take flesh and become one of us, so philosophy is called to sustain the work—namely rational and critical—so that theology, as the intellection of faith, may be fecund and efficacious. And just as Mary, by assenting to Gabriel’s message, lost nothing of her true humanity and liberty, so the philosophical discipline, in accepting those things which the truth of the Gospel supplies, loses nothing of its autonomy, but experiences all its inquiries to be propelled to the highest perfection.

Hanc quidem veritatem plane intellexerunt sancti antiquitatis christianae monachi, a quibus Maria « fidei mensa intellectualis » (132) appellabatur. Ipsam congruentem verae philosophiae effigiem respiciebant sibique erant conscii se debere cum Maria philosophari.

This truth indeed was clearly understood by the holy monks of Christian antiquity, by whom Mary was called « the intellectual table of faith » (132). They regarded her as the effigy congruent with true philosophy and were conscious to themselves that they ought to philosophize with Mary.

Sedes Sapientiae iis qui sapientiae vestigandae dependunt vitam portus sit tutus. Ad sapientiam iter, quod est postremum sincerumque omnis scientiae propositum, ab omnibus impedimentis expediat intercedendo Ea quae, Veritatem parturiens eandemque in corde servans, in sempiternum tota cum humanitate ipsam communicavit.

May the Seat of Wisdom be, for those who stake their life on the investigation of wisdom, a safe harbor of life. May she who, bringing forth Truth and keeping the same in her heart, shared it with humanity as a whole forever, by her interceding expedite, from all impediments, the journey to wisdom, which is the ultimate and sincere purpose of all science.

Datum Romae, apud S. Petrum, die XIV mensis Septembris, in festo Exaltationis Sanctae Crucis, anno MCMXCVIII, Pontificatus Nostri vicesimo.

Given at Rome, at St. Peter’s, on the 14th day of the month of September, on the feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross, in the year 1998, in the twentieth year of Our Pontificate.

(1) Iam primis Nostris in Litteris Encyclicis Redemptor hominis inscriptis ediximus: « Inde huius muneris Christi, prophetae, participes facti sumus et ex eodem munere cum eo servimus veritati divinae in Ecclesia. Officium circa hanc veritatem assumptum etiam idem valet atque eam amare et curare, quo penitius cognoscatur, ita ut ad eam, cum tota vi salvifica, qua pollet, cum splendore, quo nitet, cum profunditate simul et simplicitate, quibus distinguitur, propius accedamus ». N. 19: AAS 71 (1979), 306.

(1) Already in Our first Encyclical Letters entitled Redemptor hominis we declared: « Hence of this munus of Christ the Prophet we have been made participants, and from that same munus we serve together with him the divine truth in the Church. The office undertaken concerning this truth also amounts to the same as to love it and to care for it, that it may be more profoundly known, so that we may approach it more closely with all the salvific force which it wields, with the splendor with which it shines, with the profundity and at the same time the simplicity by which it is distinguished ». N. 19: AAS 71 (1979), 306.

(2) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(2) Cf. Ecumenical Council Vat.

II, Const. past. de Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis Gaudium et spes, 16.

2, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the modern world Joy and Hope, 16.

(3) Const. dogm. de Ecclesia Lumen gentium, 25.

(3) Dogm. Const. on the Church Lumen gentium, 25.

(4) N. 4: AAS 85 (1993), 1136.

(4) No. 4: AAS 85 (1993), 1136.

(5) Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(5) Ecumenical Council of the Vatican

II, Const. dogm. de divina Revelatione Dei Verbum, 2.

2, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, 2.

(6) Cfr Const. dogm. de fide catholica Dei Filius, III: DS 3008.

(6) Cf. Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic faith Dei Filius, 3: DS 3008.

(7) Ibid., IV: DS 3015; memoratum etiam in Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(7) Ibid., 4: DS 3015; also mentioned in the Vatican Ecumenical Council.

II, Const. past. de Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis Gaudium et spes, 59.

2, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the world of this time Gaudium et spes, 59.

(8) Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(8) Ecumenical Council of the Vatican

II, Const. dogm. de divina Revelatione Dei Verbum, 2.

2, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, 2.

(9) Litt. Ap. Tertio millennio adveniente (10 Novembris 1994), 10: AAS 87 (1995), 11.

(9) Apostolic Letter Tertio millennio adveniente (10 November 1994), 10: AAS 87 (1995), 11.

(10) N. 4.

(10) No. 4.

(11) N. 8.

(11) No. 8.

(12) N. 22.

(12) No. 22.

(13) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(13) Cf. Ecumenical Council, Vatican

II, Const. dogm. de divina Revelatione Dei Verbum, 4.

2, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, 4.

(14) Ibid., 5.

(15) Concilium Vaticanum I, ad quod superior haec prolata refertur sententia, docet fidei oboeditionem opus postulare tum intellectus tum voluntatis: « Cum homo a Deo tamquam creatore et Domino suo totus dependeat et ratio creata increatae Veritati penitus subiecta sit, plenum revelanti Deo intellectus et voluntatis obsequium fide praestare tenemur » (Constitutio dogm. de fide catholica Dei Filius, III; DS 3008).

(15) Vatican Council 1, to which the above-cited statement refers, teaches that the obedience of faith requires an act both of the intellect and of the will: «Since man depends wholly upon God as his Creator and Lord, and created reason is entirely subject to uncreated Truth, we are bound by faith to render to God revealing a full submission of intellect and will» (Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith Dei Filius, 3; DS 3008).

(16) Sequentia in sollemnitate Sanctissimi Corporis et Sanguinis Domini.

(16) Sequentia on the solemnity of the Most Holy Body and Blood of the Lord.

(17) Pensées, 789 (ed. L. Brunschvicg).

(17) Thoughts, 789 (ed. L. Brunschvicg).

(18) Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(18) Ecumenical Council, Vatican.

II, Const. past. de Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis Gaudium et spes, 22.

2, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the World of This Time Gaudium et spes, 22.

(19) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(19) Cf. Ecumenical Council, Vatican.

II, Const. dogm. de divina Revelatione Dei Verbum, 2.

2, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, 2.

(20) Prooemium et nn. 1. 15: PL 158, 223-224.226; 235.

(20) Proemium and nos. 1. 15: PL 158, 223-224.226; 235.

(21) De vera religione, XXXIX, 72: CCL 32, 234.

(21) On True Religion, 39, 72: CCL 32, 234.

(22) « Ut te desiderando quaererent et inveniendo quiescerent »: Missale Romanum.

(22) « That by desiring you they might seek you, and by finding you they might come to rest »: Roman Missal.

(23) Aristoteles, Metaphysica, I, 1.

(23) Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1, 1.

(24) Confessiones, X, 23, 33: CCL 27, 173.

(24) Confessions, 10, 23, 33: CCL 27, 173.

(25) N. 34: AAS 85 (1993), 1160-1161.

(25) No. 34: AAS 85 (1993), 1160-1161.

(26) Cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Litt. Ap. Salvifici doloris (11 Februarii 1984), 9: AAS 76 (1984), 209-210.

(26) Cf. John Paul 2, Apost. Lett. Salvifici doloris (11 February 1984), 9: AAS 76 (1984), 209-210.

(27) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(27) Cf. Ecumenical Vatican Council

II, Declaratio de Ecclesiae habitudine ad religiones non-christianas Nostra aetate, 2.

2, Declaration on the Church’s relationship to non-Christian religions Nostra aetate, 2.

(28) Haec est ratiocinatio cui iam dudum studemus quamque saepius exprimimus: « Quid est homo, quis defectus, et quae est utilitas illius? Et quid est bonum, aut quid nequam illius? » (Eccli 18, 7). [...] Queste domande sono nel cuore di ogni uomo, come ben dimostra il genio poetico di ogni tempo e di ogni popolo, che, quasi profezia dell'umanità, ripropone continuamente la domanda seria che rende l'uomo veramente tale.

(28) This is the ratiocination to which we have long applied ourselves and which we have more often expressed: « What is man, what deficiency, and what is his utility? And what is good, or what is his wickedness? » (Eccli 18, 7). [...] These questions are in the heart of every man, as the poetic genius of every time and of every people clearly shows, which, as if a prophecy of humanity, continually re-proposes the serious question that makes man truly such.

Esse esprimono l'urgenza di trovare un perché all'esistenza, ad ogni istante, alle sue tappe salienti e decisive così come ai suoi momenti più comuni. In tali questioni è testimoniata la ragionevolezza profonda dell'esistere umano, poiché l'intelligenza e la volontà dell'uomo vi sono sollecitate a cercare liberamente la soluzione capace di offrire un senso pieno alla vita. Questi interrogativi, pertanto, costituiscono l'espressione più alta della natura dell'uomo; di conseguenza la risposta ad esse misura la profondità del suo impegno con la propria esistenza.

They express the urgency of finding a “why” for existence, at every instant, for its salient and decisive stages as well as for its most common moments. In such questions the profound reasonableness of human existence is borne witness to, since the intelligence and the will of man are solicited therein to seek freely the solution capable of offering a full meaning to life. These interrogatives, therefore, constitute the highest expression of the nature of man; consequently the answer to them measures the depth of his commitment to his own existence.

In particolare quando il perché delle cose viene indagato con integralità alla ricerca della risposta ultima e più esauriente, allora la ragione umana tocca il suo vertice e si apre alla religiosità. In effetti, la religiosità rappresenta l'espressione più elevata della persona umana, perché è il culmine della sua natura razionale. Essa sgorga dall'aspirazione profonda dell'uomo alla verità ed è alla base della ricerca libera e personale che egli compie del divino »: Udienza Generale, 19 ottobre 1983, 1-2: Insegnamenti VI, 2 (1983), 814-815.

In particular, when the why of things is investigated with integrality in the search for the ultimate and most exhaustive answer, then human reason touches its summit and opens to religiosity. Indeed, religiosity represents the most elevated expression of the human person, because it is the culmination of his rational nature. It springs from man’s deep aspiration to truth and is at the basis of the free and personal search which he undertakes of the divine »: General Audience, 19 October 1983, 1-2: Teachings 6, 2 (1983), 814-815.

(29) « [Galilée] a declaré explicitement que les deux vérités, de foi et de science, ne peuvent jamais se contredire, "L'Ecriture sainte et la nature procédant également du Verbe divin, la première comme dictée par l'Esprit Saint, la seconde comme exécutrice très fidèle des ordres de Dieu", comme il l'a écrit dans sa lettre au Père Benedetto Castelli le 21 décembre 1613. Le Concile Vatican II ne s'exprime pas autrement; il reprend même des expressions semblables lorsqu'il enseigne: "Ideo inquisitio methodica in omnibus disciplinis, si... iuxta normas morales procedit, numquam fidei revera adversabitur, quia res profanae et res fidei ab eodem Deo originem ducunt" (Gaudium et spes, n. 36). Galilée ressent dans sa recherche scientifique la présence du Créateur qui le stimule, qui prévient et aide ses intuitions, en agissant au plus profond de son esprit ». Ioannes Paulus II, Discorso alla Pontificia Accademia delle Scienze, 10 Novembris 1979: Insegnamenti, II, 2 (1979), 1111-1112.

(29) « [Galileo] explicitly declared that the two truths, of faith and of science, can never contradict one another, "Sacred Scripture and nature proceeding equally from the Divine Word, the former as dictated by the Holy Spirit, the latter as the most faithful executor of the orders of God," as he wrote in his letter to Father Benedetto Castelli on 21 December 1613. Vatican Council 2 does not express itself otherwise; it even takes up similar expressions when it teaches: "Therefore methodical inquiry in all disciplines, if... it proceeds according to moral norms, will never really be opposed to faith, because secular matters and matters of faith derive their origin from the same God" (Gaudium et spes, no. 36). Galileo feels in his scientific research the presence of the Creator who stimulates him, who anticipates and helps his intuitions, acting in the deepest part of his mind ». John Paul 2, Address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, 10 November 1979: Insegnamenti, 2, 2 (1979), 1111-1112.

(30) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(30) Cf. Ecumenical Vatican Council.

II, Const. dogm. de divina Revelatione Dei Verbum, 4.

2, Dogm. Const. on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, 4.

(31) Origenes, Contra Celsum, 3, 55: SC 136, 130.

(31) Origen, Against Celsus, 3, 55: SC 136, 130.

(32) Dialogus cum Tryphone Iudaeo, 8, 1: PG 6, 492.

(32) Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, 8, 1: PG 6, 492.

(33) Stromata I, 18, 90, 1: SC 30, 115.

(33) Stromata 1, 18, 90, 1: SC 30, 115.

(34) Cfr ibid. I, 16, 80, 5: SC 30, 108.

(34) Cf. ibid. 1, 16, 80, 5: SC 30, 108.

(35) Cfr ibid. I, 5, 28, 1: SC 30, 65.

(35) Cf. ibid. 1, 5, 28, 1: SC 30, 65.

(36) Ibid. VI, 7, 55, 1-2: PG 9, 277.

(36) Ibid. 6, 7, 55, 1-2: PG 9, 277.

(37) Ibid. I, 20, 100, 1: SC 30, 124.

(37) Ibid. 1, 20, 100, 1: SC 30, 124.

(38) S. Augustinus, Confessiones VI, 5, 7: CCL 27, 77-78.

(38) St. Augustine, Confessions 6, 5, 7: CCL 27, 77-78.

(39) Cfr ibid., VII, 9, 13-14: CCL 27, 101-102.

(39) Cf. ibid., 7, 9, 13-14: CCL 27, 101-102.

(40) De praescriptione haereticorum, VII, 9: SC 46, 98.

(40) On the Prescription of Heretics, 7, 9: SC 46, 98.

(41) Cfr Congregatio de Institutione Catholica, Instructio de Patrum Ecclesiae studio in sacerdotali institutione (10 Novembris 1989), 25: AAS 82 (1990), 617-618.

(41) Cf. Congregation for Catholic Education, Instruction on the study of the Fathers of the Church in priestly formation (10 November 1989), 25: AAS 82 (1990), 617-618.

(42) S. Anselmus, Proslogion, 1: PL 158, 226.

(42) St. Anselm, Proslogion, 1: PL 158, 226.

(43) Id., Monologion, 64: PL 158, 210.

(43) The same, Monologion, 64: PL 158, 210.

(44) Cfr Summa contra Gentiles I, VII.

(44) Cf. Summa against the Gentiles 1, 7.

(45) Cfr Summa Theologiae, I, 1, 8 ad 2: « cum enim gratia non tollat naturam sed perficiat ».

(45) Cf. Summa Theologiae, 1, 1, 8 ad 2: « for grace does not take away nature but perfects it ».

(46) Cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Allocutio ad participes IX Congressus Thomistici Internationalis (29 Septembris 1990): Insegnamenti, XIII, 2 (1990), 770-771.

(46) Cf. John Paul II, Address to the participants of the 9th International Thomistic Congress (29 September 1990): Insegnamenti, 13, 2 (1990), 770-771.

(47) Litt. Ap. Lumen Ecclesiae (20 Novembris 1974), 8: AAS 66 (1974), 680.

(47) Apostolic Letter Lumen Ecclesiae (20 November 1974), 8: AAS 66 (1974), 680.

(48) Cfr ibid., I, 1, 6: « Praeterea, haec doctrina per studium acquiritur. Sapientia autem per infusionem habetur, unde inter septem dona Spiritus Sancti connumeratur ».

(48) Cf. ibid., 1, 1, 6: « Moreover, this doctrine is acquired through study. Wisdom, however, is had by infusion, whence it is enumerated among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit ».

(49) Ibid., II, II, 45, 1 ad 2; cfr etiam II, II, 45, 2.

(49) Ibid., 2, 2, 45, 1 to 2; cf. also 2, 2, 45, 2.

(50) Ibid. I, II, 109, 1 ad 1 ubi notam Ambrosiastri In 1 Cor 12, 3 dictionem resumit: PL 17, 258.

(50) Ibid. 1, 2, 109, 1 to 1 where he resumes the diction of Ambrosiaster’s note On 1 Cor 12, 3: PL 17, 258.

(51) Leo XIII, Litt. Encycl. Æterni Patris (4 Augusti 1879): ASS 11 (1878-1879), 109.

(51) Leo 13, Encyclical Lett. Æterni Patris (4 August 1879): ASS 11 (1878-1879), 109.

(52) Paulus VI, Litt. Ap. Lumen Ecclesiae (20 Novembris 1974), 8: AAS 66 (1974), 683.

(52) Paul 6, Ap. Lett. Lumen Ecclesiae (20 November 1974), 8: AAS 66 (1974), 683.

(53) Litt. Encycl. Redemptor hominis (4 Martii 1979), 15: AAS 71 (1979), 286.

(53) Encyclical Letter Redemptor hominis (4 March 1979), 15: AAS 71 (1979), 286.

(54) Cfr Pius XII, Litt. Encycl. Humani generis (12 Augusti 1950): ASS 42 (1950), 566.

(54) Cf. Pius 12, Encyclical Letter Humani generis (12 August 1950): ASS 42 (1950), 566.

(55) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(55) Cf. Ecum. Council, Vat.

I, Const. dogm. de Ecclesia Christi Pastor aeternus: DS 3070; Conc.

1, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ Pastor aeternus: DS 3070; Council.

Oecum. Vat. II, Const.

Ecumen. Vat. 2, Const.

dogm. de Ecclesia Lumen gentium, 25 c.

dogmatic constitution on the Church, Lumen gentium, chapter 25.

(56) Cfr Synodus Constantinopolitana, DS 403.

(56) Cf. Synod of Constantinople, DS 403.

(57) Cfr Concilium Toletanum I, DS 205; Concilium Bracarense I, DS 459-460; Xystus V, Bulla Coeli et terrae Creator (5 Ianuarii 1586); Bullarium Romanum 4/4, Romae 1747, 176-179; Urbanus VIII, Inscrutabilis iudiciorum (1 Aprilis 1631): Bullarium Romanum, 6/1, Romae 1758, 268-270.

(57) Cf. Council of Toledo 1, DS 205; Council of Braga 1, DS 459-460; Sixtus 5, Bull Creator of Heaven and Earth (5 January 1586); Roman Bullarium 4/4, Rome 1747, 176-179; Urban 8, The Inscrutable Judgments (1 April 1631): Roman Bullarium, 6/1, Rome 1758, 268-270.

(58) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Viennense, Decr.

(58) Cf. Ecumenical Council of Vienne, Decr.

Fidei catholicae, DS 902; Conc. Oecum. Laternanese V, Bulla Apostolici regiminis, DS1440.

Of the Catholic Faith, DS 902; Ecumenical Council, Lateran 5, Bull Of Apostolic Governance, DS1440.

(59) Cfr Theses a Ludovico Eugenio Bautain iussu sui Episcopi subscriptae (8 Septembris 1840), DS, 2751-2756; Theses a Ludovico Eugenio Bautain ex mandato S. Congr. Episcoporum et Religiosorum subscriptae (26 Aprilis 1884), DS 2765-2769.

(59) Cf. Theses signed by Louis Eugène Bautain by order of his Bishop (8 September 1840), DS, 2751-2756; Theses signed by Louis Eugène Bautain by mandate of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars (26 April 1884), DS 2765-2769.

(60) Cfr S. Congr. Indicis, Decr. Theses contra traditionalismum Augustini Bonnetty (11 Iunii 1855), DS 2811-2814.

(60) Cf. Sacred Congregation of the Index, Decree, Theses against the Traditionalism of Augustin Bonnetty (11 June 1855), DS 2811-2814.

(61) Cfr Pius IX, Breve Eximiam tuam (15 Iunii 1857), DS 2828-2831; Breve Gravissimas inter (11 Decembris 1862) DS 2850-2861.

(61) Cf. Pius 9, Brief Eximiam tuam (15 June 1857), DS 2828-2831; Brief Gravissimas inter (11 December 1862) DS 2850-2861.

(62) Cfr S. Congr. S. Officii, Decr. Errores ontologistarum (18 Septembris 1861), DS 2841-2847.

(62) Cf. Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, Decree Errors of the Ontologists (18 September 1861), DS 2841-2847.

(63) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(63) Cf. Ecumenical Vatican Council.

I, Cost. dogm. de fide catholica Dei Filius, II: DS 3004; et can.

1, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith Dei Filius, 2: DS 3004; and can.

2,1: DS 3026.

(64) Ibid., IV: DS 3015, memoratum in Conc. Vat. II, Const.

(64) Ibid., 4: DS 3015, mentioned in the Vatican Council 2, Const.

past. de Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis Gaudium et spes, 59.

pastoral constitution on the Church in the modern world Gaudium et spes, 59.

(65) Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(65) Vatican Ecumenical Council

I, Const. dogm. de fide catholica Dei Filius, IV: DS 3017.

I, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith Dei Filius, 4: DS 3017.

(66) Cfr Litt. Encycl. Pascendi dominici gregis (8 Septembris 1907): ASS 40 (1907), 596-597.

(66) Cf. Encyclical Letter Pascendi dominici gregis (8 September 1907): ASS 40 (1907), 596-597.

(67) Cfr Pius XI, Litt. Encycl. Divini Redemptoris (19 Martii 1937): AAS 29 (1937), 65-106.

(67) Cf. Pius 11, Encyclical Letter Divini Redemptoris (19 March 1937): AAS 29 (1937), 65-106.

(68) Litt. Encycl. Humani generis (12 Augusti 1950): AAS 42 (1950), 562-563.

(68) Encyclical Letter Humani generis (12 August 1950): AAS 42 (1950), 562-563.

(69) Ibid., l.m., 563-564.

(70) Cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Const. Ap. Pastor Bonus (28 Iunii 1988), artt. 48-49: AAS 80 (1988), 873: Congr.

(70) Cf. John Paul 2, Apostolic Constitution Pastor Bonus (28 June 1988), arts. 48-49: AAS 80 (1988), 873: Congr.

de Doctrina Fidei, Istructio de ecclesiali theologi vocatione Donum veritatis (24 Maii 1990), 18: AAS 82 (1990), 1558.

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the ecclesial vocation of the theologian Donum veritatis (24 May 1990), 18: AAS 82 (1990), 1558.

(71) Cfr Instr. de quibusdam aspectibus « theologiae liberationis » Libertatis nuntius (6 Augusti 1984), VII-X: AAS 76 (1984), 890-903.

(71) Cf. Instr. on certain aspects of « liberation theology » Libertatis nuntius (6 August 1984), 7-10: AAS 76 (1984), 890-903.

(72) Concilium Vaticanum I claris iam verbis et auctoritate hunc errorem iam condemnavit « Hanc vero fidem [...] Ecclesia catholica profitetur, virtutem esse supernaturalem, qua, Dei aspirante et adiuvante gratia, ab ea revelata esse credimus, non propter intrinsecam rerum veritatem naturali rationis lumine perspectam, sed propter auctoritatem ipsius Dei revelantis, qui nec falli nec fallere potest »: Const. dogm. Dei Filius, III: DS 3008, et can.

(72) Vatican Council 1 has already condemned this error with clear words and authority: «This faith indeed [...] the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue, by which, with God’s grace inspiring and aiding, we believe the things revealed by him, not on account of the intrinsic truth of the matters perceived by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive»: Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius, 3: DS 3008, and can.

3.2:DS 3032. Ceterum idem Concilium sic iudicat: « ratio numquam idonea redditur ad ea percipienda instar veritatum, quae proprium ipsius obiectum constituunt »:ibid., IV: DS 3016. Sic haec conclusio: « Quapropter omnes christiani fideles huiusmodi opiniones, quae fidei doctrinae contrariae esse cognoscuntur, maxime si ab Ecclesia reprobatae fuerint, non solum prohibentur tamquam legitimas scientiae conclusiones defendere, sed pro erroribus potius, qui fallacem veritatis speciem prae se ferant, habere tenentur omnino »:ibid., IV: DS 3018.

3.2:DS 3032. Moreover, the same Council judges thus: « reason is never rendered adequate for perceiving, as in the manner of truths, those things which constitute its own proper object »:ibid., 4: DS 3016. Thus this conclusion: « Wherefore all Christian faithful are not only prohibited from defending as legitimate conclusions of science those opinions of this kind which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of the faith, especially if they have been reprobated by the Church, but are altogether bound rather to hold them as errors, which bear before them a deceitful appearance of truth »:ibid., 4: DS 3018.

(73) Cfr nn. 9-10.

(73) Cf. nn. 9-10.

(74) Ibid., 10.

(75) Ibid., 21.

(76) Cfr ibid., 10.

(76) Cf. ibid., 10.

(77) Cfr Litt. Encycl. Humani generis (12 Augusti 1950): AAS 42 (1950), 565-567: 571-573.

(77) Cf. Encyclical Letter Humani generis (12 August 1950): AAS 42 (1950), 565-567: 571-573.

(78) Cfr Leo XIII, Litt. Encycl. Æterni Patris (4 Augusti 1879): ASS 11 (1878-1879), 97-115.

(78) Cf. Leo 13, Encyclical Letter Æterni Patris (4 August 1879): ASS 11 (1878-1879), 97-115.

(79) Ibid., l.m. 109.

(80) Cfr nn. 14-15.

(80) Cf. nn. 14-15.

(81) Cfr ibid., 20-21.

(81) Cf. ibid., 20-21.

(82) Ibid., 22; cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Litt. Encycl. Redemptor hominis (4 Martii 1979), 8: AAS 71 (1979), 271-272.

(82) Ibid., 22; cf. John Paul 2, Encyclical Letter Redemptor hominis (4 March 1979), 8: AAS 71 (1979), 271-272.

(83) Decr. de institutione sacerdotali Optatam totius, 15.

(83) Decree on Priestly Formation Optatam totius, 15.

(84) Cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Const. Ap. Sapientia christiana (15 Aprilis 1979), art. 79-80: AAS 71 (1979), 495-496; Adhort.

(84) Cf. John Paul 2, Ap. Const. Sapientia christiana (15 April 1979), arts. 79-80: AAS 71 (1979), 495-496; Exhort.

Ap. postsynodalis Pastores dabo vobis (25 Martii 1992), 52: AAS 84 (1979), 750-751. Cfr quoque quaedam S. Thomae de philosophia commenta: Discorso al Pontificio Ateneo Internazionale Angelicum (17 Novembris 1979): Insegnamenti II, 2 (1979), 1177-1189; Discorso ai partecipanti dell'VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale (13 Septembris 1980): Insegnamenti III, 2 (1980), 604-615); Discorso ai partecipanti al Congresso Internazionale della Società « San Tommaso » sulla dottrina dell'anima in S. Tommaso (4 Ianuarii 1986): Insegnamenti IX, 1 (1986), 18-24. Praeterea S. Congr. pro Educatione Catholica, Ratio fundamentalis institutionis sacerdotalis (6 Ianuarii 1970), 70-75: ASS 62 (1970), 366-368; Decr.

Post-synodal Apostolic Exhortation Pastores dabo vobis (25 March 1992), 52: AAS 84 (1979), 750-751. Cf. also certain comments on the philosophy of St. Thomas: Discourse at the Pontifical International Angelicum Athenaeum (17 November 1979): Insegnamenti 2, 2 (1979), 1177-1189; Discourse to the participants of the 8th International Thomistic Congress (13 September 1980): Insegnamenti 3, 2 (1980), 604-615); Discourse to the participants in the International Congress of the Society « St. Thomas » on the doctrine of the soul in St. Thomas (4 January 1986): Insegnamenti 9, 1 (1986), 18-24. Moreover, Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, Fundamental Ratio of Priestly Formation (6 January 1970), 70-75: ASS 62 (1970), 366-368; Decree.

Sacra Theologia (20 Ianuarii 1972): AAS 64 (1972), 583-586.

Sacred Theology (20 January 1972): AAS 64 (1972), 583-586.

(85) Cfr Const. past. de Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis Gaudium et spes, 57; 62.

(85) Cf. Pastoral Const. on the Church in the modern world Gaudium et spes, 57; 62.

(86) Cfr ibid., 44.

(86) Cf. ibid., 44.

(87) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Lateranense V, Bulla Apostolici regiminis sollicitudo, Sessio VIII: Conc.

(87) Cf. Fifth Lateran Ecumenical Council, Bull Apostolici regiminis sollicitudo, Session 8: Conc.

Oecum. Decreta, 1991, 605-606.

Ecumenical Councils. Decrees, 1991, 605-606.

(88) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(88) Cf. Ecumenical Council, Vatican.

II, Const. dogm. de Divina Revelatione Dei Verbum, 10.

2, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation The Word of God, 10.

(89) S. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, 5, 3 ad 2.

(89) St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa of Theology 2-2, 5, 3 to 2.

(90) « Eo quod condiciones perquiruntur in quibus homo per se ipse praecipuas quaestiones de vitae sensu, de fine ad eam tribuendo atque de ea re quae post mortem erit, interrogat, id pro theologia fundamentali constituit necessarium exordium, ut hodiernis quoque temporibus fides plene iter ipsi rationi ostendat, quae sincere veritatem requirit ». Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Lettera ai partecipanti al Congresso internazionale di Teologia Fondamentale a 125 anni dalla « Dei Filius » (30 Septembris 1995), 4: L'Osservatore Romano (3 Octobris 1995), p. 8.

(90) « In that the conditions are inquired into in which a man, by himself, asks the principal questions about the sense of life, about the end to be attributed to it, and about the matter which will be after death, this constitutes for fundamental theology a necessary beginning, so that even in our times faith may fully show the path to reason itself, which sincerely seeks the truth ». John Paul II, Pope, Letter to the Participants in the International Congress of Fundamental Theology on the 125th Anniversary of « Dei Filius » (30 September 1995), 4: L'Osservatore Romano (3 October 1995), p. 8.

(91) Ibid.

(92) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(92) Cf. Ecum. Counc. Vat.

II, Const. past. de Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis Gaudium et spes, 15; Decr.

2, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the world of this time Gaudium et spes, 15; Decree.

de activitate missionali Ecclesiae Ad gentes, 22.

on the missionary activity of the Church Ad gentes, 22.

(93) S. Thomas Aquinas, De Caelo, 1, 22.

(93) St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Heavens, 1, 22.

(94) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(94) Cf. Oecumenical Vatican Council

II, Const. past. de Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis Gaudium et spes, 53-59.

2, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the world of this time Gaudium et spes, 53-59.

(95) S. Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum, 2, 5: PL 44, 963.

(95) St. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, 2, 5: PL 44, 963.

(96) Id., De fide, spe et caritate, 7: CCL 46, 61.

(96) The same, On Faith, Hope, and Charity, 7: CCL 46, 61.

(97) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Chalcedonense, Symbolum, Definitio: DS 302.

(97) Cf. Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon, Symbol, Definition: DS 302.

(98) Cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Litt. Encycl. Redemptor hominis (4 Martii 1979), 15: AAS 71 (1979), 286-289.

(98) Cf. John Paul 2, Encycl. Letter Redeemer of Man (4 March 1979), 15: AAS 71 (1979), 286-289.

(99) Cfr verbi causa S. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 16,1; S. Bonaventura, Coll. in Hex., 3,8,1.

(99) Cf., for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1, 16,1; St. Bonaventure, Coll. in Hex., 3,8,1.

(100) Const. past. de Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis Gaudium et spes, 15.

(100) Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et spes, 15.

(101) Cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Litt. Encycl. Veritatis splendor (6 Augusti 1993), 57-61: AAS 85 (1993), 1179-1182.

(101) Cf. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Veritatis splendor (6 August 1993), 57-61: AAS 85 (1993), 1179-1182.

(102) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(102) Cf. the Vatican Ecumenical Council

I, Const. dogm. de fide catholica Dei Filius, IV: DS 3016.

1, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith Dei Filius, 4: DS 3016.

(103) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Lateranense IV, De errore abbatis Ioachim, II: DS 806.

(103) Cf. Ecumenical Council, Lateran 4, On the error of Abbot Joachim, 2: DS 806.

(104) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(104) Cf. Ecumenical Council, Vatican

II, Const. dogm. de divina Revelatione Dei Verbum, 24; Decr.

2, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, 24; Decree.

de institutione sacerdotali Optatam totius, 16.

on priestly formation Optatam totius, 16.

(105) Cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Litt. Encycl. Evangelium vitae (25 Martii 1995), 69: AAS 87 (1995), 481.

(105) Cf John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Evangelium vitae (25 March 1995), 69: AAS 87 (1995), 481.

(106) Eandem in sententiam primis Nostris in Litteris Encyclicis, cum Evangelii sancti Ioannis exponeremus dictionem « cognoscetis veritatem, et veritas liberabit vos » (8,32), sic elocuti sumus: «Haec verba principalem in se necessitatem continent simulque admonitionem: necessitatem videlicet animi honesti erga veritatem uti condicionis verae libertatis; admonitionem pariter, ut declinetur quaevis simulata tantum libertas, quaelibet levis unique tantum parti favens libertas, omnis demum libertas, quae totam veritatem de homine ac mundo non permeet. Etiam hodie, duobus annorum milibus post, Christus nobis comparet tamquam ille, qui homini libertatem in veritate innixam affert, ille, qui hominem ab omnibus liberat, quae istam libertatem coarctant, minuunt et quasi perfringunt ipsis in eius radicibus, nempe in hominis anima, corde, conscientia»: Litt. Encycl.

(106) In the same sense, in Our first Encyclical Letter, when we were expounding the saying of the holy Gospel of John, «you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free» (8,32), we spoke thus: «These words contain within themselves a principal necessity and at the same time a warning: namely, the necessity of an honest mind toward the truth as the condition of true liberty; likewise a warning that every merely simulated freedom be shunned, any light freedom favoring only a single party, and finally every freedom that does not permeate the whole truth about man and the world. Even today, two thousand years later, Christ appears to us as the one who brings to man a freedom founded upon truth, the one who frees man from all the things that constrict, diminish, and as it were break this freedom at its very roots, namely in the human soul, heart, conscience»: Encyclical Letter.

Redemptor hominis (4 Martii 1979), 12: AAS 71 (1979), 280-281.

Redeemer of man (4 March 1979), 12: AAS 71 (1979), 280-281.

(107) Allocutio qua Concilium est inchoatum (11 Octobris 1962): AAS 54 (1962), 792.

(107) Address by which the Council was opened (11 October 1962): AAS 54 (1962), 792.

(108) Congr. pro Doctrina Fidei, Instr. de vocatione ecclesiali theologi Donum veritatis (24 Maii 1990), 7-8: AAS 82 (1990), 1552-1553.

(108) Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the ecclesial vocation of the theologian Donum veritatis (24 May 1990), 7-8: AAS 82 (1990), 1552-1553.

(109) In Litteris Encyclicis Dominum et vivificantem explicantes locum Io 16,12-13 scripsimus: « Iesus Paraclitum, Spiritum veritatis, exhibet ut eum qui "docebit et suggeret", ut eum qui ei "testimonium perhibebit"; nunc vero ait "deducet vos in omnem veritatem". Locutio "deducet vos in omnem veritatem", prout ad ea refertur, quae Apostoli "non possunt portare modo", imprimis necessario coniungitur cum exinanitione Christi, passione et Cruce peracta, quae eo tempore, quo has protulit voces, iam impendebat. Postea tamen patefit illud "deducere in omnem veritatem" necti non solum cum scandalo Crucis, sed etiam cum iis omnibus, quae Christus «fecit et docuit» (Act 1,1). Re enim vera mysterium Christi, ut totum, postulat fidem, cum haec hominem in mysterii revelati "realitatem" opportune inducat. Illud ergo "deducere in omnem veritatem" in fide et per fidem ad effectum adducitur: quod Spiritus veritatis operatur, idque ex eius actione in homine promanat.

(109) In the Encyclical Letter Dominum et vivificantem, explaining the passage John 16:12-13, we wrote: «Jesus presents the Paraclete, the Spirit of truth, as the one who "will teach and bring to remembrance," as the one who will "bear witness" to him; but now he says "he will lead you into all the truth." The expression "he will lead you into all the truth," insofar as it refers to those things which the Apostles "cannot bear now," is in the first place necessarily conjoined with the kenosis of Christ, with the Passion and the Cross accomplished, which at the time when he uttered these words was already impending. Later, however, it becomes evident that that "leading into all the truth" is connected not only with the scandal of the Cross, but also with all the things which Christ "did and taught" (Acts 1:1). For in very truth the mystery of Christ, as a whole, demands faith, since this suitably leads the human being into the "reality" of the revealed mystery. Therefore that "leading into all the truth" is brought to effect in faith and through faith: this the Spirit of truth accomplishes, and it flows forth from his action in the human being.

Hac in re Spiritus Sanctus est hominis summus magister, est lux spiritus humani », n. 6: AAS 78 (1986), 815-816.

In this matter the Holy Spirit is man’s supreme teacher, he is the light of the human spirit », no. 6: AAS 78 (1986), 815-816.

(110) Cfr Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(110) Cf. the Vatican Ecumenical Council

II, Const. dogm. de divina Revelatione Dei Verbum, 13.

2, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, 13.

(111) Cfr Pontificia Commissio Biblica, Instr. de historica Evangeliorum veritate (21 Aprilis 1964): AAS 56 (1964), 713.

(111) Cf. Pontifical Biblical Commission, Instruction on the historical truth of the Gospels (21 April 1964): AAS 56 (1964), 713.

(112) « Liquet etiam Ecclesiam non cuilibet systemati philosophico, brevi temporis spatio vigenti, devinciri posse: sed ea quae communi consensu a catholicis doctoribus composita per plura saecula fuere ad aliquam dogmatis intellegentiam attingendam, tam caduco fundamento procul dubio non nituntur. Nituntur enim principiis ac notionibus ex vera rerum creatarum cognitione deductis; in quibus quidem deducendis cognitionibus humanae menti veritas divinitus revelata, quasi stella, per Ecclesiam illuxit. Quare mirum non est aliquas huiusmodi notiones a Conciliis Oecumenicis non solum adhibitas, sed etiam sancitas esse, ita ut ab eis discedere nefas sit »: Litt.

(112) « It is likewise clear that the Church cannot be bound to just any philosophical system, flourishing for a brief span of time; but those things which by common consensus were composed by Catholic doctors through many centuries for attaining some intelligence of dogma, without doubt do not rest upon so perishable a foundation. For they rest upon principles and notions deduced from the true cognition of created things; and in the deducing of these cognitions the truth divinely revealed has shone, as a star, upon the human mind through the Church. Wherefore it is no wonder that some notions of this kind have been not only employed but also sanctioned by Ecumenical Councils, such that to depart from them is unlawful »: Litt.

Encycl. Humani generis (12 Augusti 1950): AAS 42 (1950), 566-567; cfr Commissio Theologica Internationalis, docum. Interpretationis problema (Octobre 1989): Ench.

Encyc. Humani generis (12 August 1950): AAS 42 (1950), 566-567; cf. International Theological Commission, doc. The Problem of Interpretation (October 1989): Ench.

Vat. 11, nn. 2717-2811.

Vat. 11, nos. 2717-2811.

(113) « Ipse autem sensus formularum dogmaticarum semper verus ac secum constans in Ecclesia manet, etiam cum magis dilucidatur et plenius intellegitur. Christifideles ergo se avertant oportet ab opinione secundum quam [...] formulae dogmaticae (aut quaedam earum genera) non possint significare determinate veritatem, sed tantum eius commutabiles approximationes, ipsam quodammodo deformantes seu alterantes ». S. Congr. Pro Doctrina Fidei, Decl.

(113) « The very sensus of dogmatic formulas remains always true and self-consistent in the Church, even when it is more elucidated and more fully understood. Therefore the Christian faithful ought to turn themselves away from the opinion according to which [...] dogmatic formulas (or certain kinds of them) cannot signify the truth determinately, but only its changeable approximations, in some way deforming or altering it ». Sacred Congr. for the Doctrine of the Faith, Decl.

circa Catholicam Doctrinam de Ecclesia contra nonnullos errores hodiernos tuendam Mysterium Ecclesiae (24 Iunii 1973), 5: AAS 65 (1973), 403.

concerning the Catholic Doctrine about the Church to be safeguarded against some modern errors Mysterium Ecclesiae (24 June 1973), 5: AAS 65 (1973), 403.

(114) Cfr Congr. S. Officii, Decr. Lamentabili (3 Iulii 1907), 26: ASS 40 (1907), 473.

(114) Cf. Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, Decr. Lamentabili (3 July 1907), 26: ASS 40 (1907), 473.

(115) Cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Allocutio apud Pontificium Athenaeum « Angelicum » (17 Novembris 1979), 6: Insegnamenti, II, 2 (1979), 1183-1185.

(115) Cf. John Paul 2, Address at the Pontifical Athenaeum « Angelicum » (17 November 1979), 6: Insegnamenti, 2, 2 (1979), 1183-1185.

(116) N. 32: AAS 85 (1993), 1159-1160.

(116) No. 32: AAS 85 (1993), 1159-1160.

(117) Cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Adhort. Ap. Catechesi tradendae (16 Octobris 1979), 30: AAS 71 (1979), 1302-1303; Congr. pro Doctrina Fidei, Instr.

(117) Cf. John Paul 2, Apost. Exhort. Catechesi tradendae (16 October 1979), 30: AAS 71 (1979), 1302-1303; Cong. for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instr.

de vocatione ecclesiali theologi Donum veritatis (24 Maii 1990), 7: AAS 82 (1990), 1552-1553.

on the ecclesial vocation of the theologian Donum veritatis (24 May 1990), 7: AAS 82 (1990), 1552-1553.

(118) Cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Adhort. Ap. Catechesi tradendae (16 Octobris 1979), 30: AAS 71 (1979), 1302-1303.

(118) Cf. John Paul 2, Apostolic Exhortation Catechesi tradendae (16 October 1979), 30: AAS 71 (1979), 1302-1303.

(119) Cfr ibid., 22, l.m., 1295-1296.

(119) Cf. ibid., 22, l.m., 1295-1296.

(120) Cfr ibid., 7, l.m., 1282.

(120) Cf. ibid., 7, l.m., 1282.

(121) Cfr ibid., 59, l.m., 1325.

(121) Cf ibid., 59, l.m., 1325.

(122) Conc. Oecum. Vat.

(122) Vatican Ecumenical Council

I, Const. dogm. de fide catholica Dei Filius, IV: DS 3019.

I, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith Dei Filius, 4: DS3019.

(123) « Nemini idcirco licet theologiam tractare, quasi de quibusdam agatur notionum eius collectaneis: sed quivis sciat oportet se arcte coniunctum esse debere cum hoc munere docendi, cum hoc munere veritatem docendi, quod Ecclesiae ipsi incumbat ». Ioannes Paulus II, Litt. Encycl. Redemptor hominis (4 Martii 1979), 19: AAS 71 (1979), 308.

(123) « Therefore no one is permitted to handle theology, as though it were a matter of certain collections of its notions; rather, each person ought to know that he must be closely conjoined with this office of teaching, with this office of teaching the truth, which devolves upon the Church herself ». John Paul 2, Encyclical Letter Redemptor hominis (4 March 1979), 19: AAS 71 (1979), 308.

(124) Cfr. Conc. Oecum.

(124) Cf. Ecum. Council.

Vat. II, Declaratio de libertate religiosa Dignitatis humanae, 1-3.

Vat. 2, Declaration on religious liberty Of Human Dignity, 1-3.

(125) Cfr Adhort. Ap. Evangelii nuntiandi (8 Decembris 1975), 20: AAS 68 (1976), 18-19.

(125) Cf. Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii nuntiandi (8 December 1975), 20: AAS 68 (1976), 18-19.

(126) Const. past. de Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis Gaudium et spes, 92.

(126) Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et spes, 92.

(127) Cfr ibid., 10.

(127) Cf. ibid., 10.

(128) Prologus, 4: Opera omnia, Firenze 1891, t. V, 296.

(128) Prologue, 4: Complete Works, Florence 1891, vol. 5, 296.

(129) Cfr Decr. de institutione sacerdotali Optatum totius, 15.

(129) Cf. Decree on priestly formation Optatum totius, 15.

(130) Cfr Ioannes Paulus II, Const. Ap. Sapientia christiana (15 Aprilis 1979), artt. 67-68: AAS 71 (1979), 491-492.

(130) Cf. John Paul 2, Apostolic Constitution Sapientia christiana (15 April 1979), arts. 67-68: AAS 71 (1979), 491-492.

(131) Ioannes Paulus II, Discorso all'Università di Cracovia per 600o anniversario dell'Alma Mater Jagellonica (8 Iunii 1997), 4: L'Osservatore Romano, 9-10 Iunii 1997, p. 12.

(131) John Paul II, Address at the University of Cracow for the 600th anniversary of the Alma Mater Jagiellonica (June 8, 1997), 4: L'Osservatore Romano, June 9-10, 1997, p. 12.

(132) «he noerà tés písteos trápeza»: S.P.N. EPHIFANIUS, Homilia in laudes Sanctae Mariae Deiparae: PG 43, 493.

(132) «the noetic table of faith»: S.P.N. EPHIFANIUS, Homily in Praises of Saint Mary the God-bearer: PG 43, 493.