Caesar: COMMENTARIORUM LIBRI VII DE BELLO GALLICO CUM A. HIRTI SUPPLEMENTO

[1] Cum in Italiam proficisceretur Caesar, Ser. Galbam cum legione XII et parte equitatus in Nantuates, Veragros Sedunosque misit, qui a finibus Allobrogum et lacu Lemanno et flumine Rhodano ad summas Alpes pertinent. Causa mittendi fuit quod iter per Alpes, quo magno cum periculo magnisque cum portoriis mercatores ire consuerant, patefieri volebat.

[1] When Caesar was setting out into Italy, he sent Ser. Galba with the 12th legion and part of the cavalry into the Nantuates, the Veragri, and the Seduni, who extend from the borders of the Allobroges and Lake Leman and the river Rhone to the highest Alps. The reason for sending was that he wished the route through the Alps, by which merchants were accustomed to go with great danger and with great customs-duties, to be opened.

Huic permisit, si opus esse arbitraretur, uti in his locis legionem hiemandi causa conlocaret. Galba secundis aliquot proeliis factis castellisque compluribus eorum expugnatis, missis ad eum undique legatis obsidibusque datis et pace facta, constituit cohortes duas in Nantuatibus conlocare et ipse cum reliquis eius legionis cohortibus in vico Veragrorum, qui appellatur Octodurus hiemare; qui vicus positus in valle non magna adiecta planitie altissimis montibus undique continetur. Cum hic in duas partes flumine divideretur, alteram partem eius vici Gallis [ad hiemandum] concessit, alteram vacuam ab his relictam cohortibus attribuit.

To this man he permitted, if he should judge it necessary, to station a legion in these places for the purpose of wintering. Galba, after several favorable battles had been fought and several of their forts stormed, with envoys sent to him from all sides and hostages given and peace concluded, decided to station two cohorts among the Nantuates, and he himself, with the remaining cohorts of that legion, to winter in the village of the Veragri, which is called Octodurus; which village, set in a not-large valley with a plain adjoining, is on all sides hemmed in by very high mountains. Since here it was divided into two parts by a river, he conceded one part of that village to the Gauls for wintering, and he assigned the other, left vacant by them, to the cohorts.

Eum locum vallo fossaque munivit.

He fortified that place with a rampart and a ditch.

[2] Cum dies hibernorum complures transissent frumentumque eo comportari iussisset, subito per exploratores certior factus est ex ea parte vici, quam Gallis concesserat, omnes noctu discessisse montesque qui impenderent a maxima multitudine Sedunorum et Veragrorum teneri. Id aliquot de causis acciderat, ut subito Galli belli renovandi legionisque opprimendae consilium caperent: primum, quod legionem neque eam plenissimam detractis cohortibus duabus et compluribus singillatim, qui commeatus petendi causa missi erant, absentibus propter paucitatem despiciebant; tum etiam, quod propter iniquitatem loci, cum ipsi ex montibus in vallem decurrerent et tela coicerent, ne primum quidem impetum suum posse sustineri existimabant. Accedebat quod suos ab se liberos abstraetos obsidum nomine dolebant, et Romanos non solum itinerum causa sed etiam perpetuae possessionis culmina Alpium occupare conari et ea loca finitimae provinciae adiungere sibi persuasum habebant.

[2] When several days of the wintering had passed and he had ordered grain to be brought there, suddenly he was informed through scouts that from that part of the village which he had granted to the Gauls, all had departed by night, and that the mountains which overhung were being held by a very great multitude of the Seduni and Veragri. This had happened for several reasons, so that the Gauls suddenly adopted the plan of renewing war and crushing the legion: first, because they despised the legion—and not even at its fullest, with two cohorts withdrawn and several individuals absent singly, who had been sent to fetch supplies—on account of its small numbers; then also, because, owing to the unfairness of the ground, since they themselves ran down from the mountains into the valley and hurled missiles, they thought that not even their first onrush could be withstood. There was added the fact that they grieved that their own children had been torn away from them under the name of hostages, and they were persuaded that the Romans were trying to occupy the summits of the Alps not only for the sake of routes but also for perpetual possession, and to annex those places to the neighboring province.

[3] His nuntiis acceptis Galba, cum neque opus hibernorum munitionesque plene essent perfectae neque de frumento reliquoque commeatu satis esset provisum quod deditione facta obsidibusque acceptis nihil de bello timendum existimaverat, consilio celeriter convocato sententias exquirere coepit. Quo in consilio, cum tantum repentini periculi praeter opinionem accidisset ac iam omnia fere superiora loca multitudine armatorum completa conspicerentur neque subsidio veniri neque commeatus supportari interclusis itineribus possent, prope iam desperata salute non nullae eius modi sententiae dicebantur, ut impedimentis relictis eruptione facta isdem itineribus quibus eo pervenissent ad salutem contenderent. Maiori tamen parti placuit, hoc reservato ad extremum casum consilio interim rei eventum experiri et castra defendere.

[3] With these messages received, Galba, since neither the work of the winter-quarters and the fortifications had been fully perfected nor had sufficient provision been made concerning grain and the remaining convoy, because, with surrender effected and hostages received, he had supposed nothing was to be feared of war, with a council quickly convened began to seek opinions. In that council, since so great a sudden peril, contrary to expectation, had occurred, and now almost all the higher places were seen to be filled by a multitude of armed men, and neither could help come nor supplies be brought up, the routes being cut off, with safety now almost despaired of, some opinions of this sort were expressed: that, the baggage left behind, with a breakout made, by the same routes by which they had come thither they should strive toward safety. Nevertheless it pleased the greater part, with this plan reserved for the last extremity, in the meantime to try the outcome of the matter and to defend the camp.

[4] Brevi spatio interiecto, vix ut iis rebus quas constituissent conlocandis atque administrandis tempus daretur, hostes ex omnibus partibus signo dato decurrere, lapides gaesaque in vallum coicere. Nostri primo integris viribus fortiter propugnare neque ullum flustra telum ex loco superiore mittere, et quaecumque pars castrorum nudata defensoribus premi videbatur, eo occurrere et auxilium ferre, sed hoc superari quod diuturnitate pugnae hostes defessi proelio excedebant, alii integris viribus succedebant; quarum rerum a nostris propter paucitatem fieri nihil poterat, ac non modo defesso ex pugna excedendi, sed ne saucio quidem eius loci ubi constiterat relinquendi ac sui recipiendi facultas dabatur.

[4] After a short interval interposed, scarcely so that time was given for arranging and administering those matters which they had decided upon, the enemy, the signal having been given, ran down from all sides and hurled stones and gaesa at the rampart. Our men at first, with unimpaired strength, stoutly defended and sent no weapon to no purpose from the higher ground, and wherever any part of the camp, laid bare of defenders, seemed to be pressed, there they ran and brought aid; but they were overmatched in this respect: by the long duration of the fight the enemy, wearied, would withdraw from the battle, and others with fresh strength would succeed them—of which things nothing could be done by our men on account of their fewness—and not only was leave given to a weary man to withdraw from the fight, but not even to a wounded man to leave the spot where he had stood and to retire himself.

[5] Cum iam amplius horis sex continenter pugnaretur, ac non solum vires sed etiam tela nostros deficerent, atque hostes acrius instarent languidioribusque nostris vallum scindere et fossas complere coepissent, resque esset iam ad extremum perducta casum, P. Sextius Baculus, primi pili centurio, quem Nervico proelio compluribus confectum vulneribus diximus, et item C. Volusenus, tribunus militum, vir et consilii magni et virtutis, ad Galbam accurrunt atque unam esse spem salutis docent, si eruptione facta extremum auxilium experirentur. Itaque convocatis centurionibus celeriter milites certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium ac tantum modo tela missa exciperent seque ex labore reficerent, post dato signo ex castris erumperent, atque omnem spem salutis in virtute ponerent.

[5] When now for more than six hours it had been fought continuously, and not only strength but even missiles were failing our men, and the enemy pressed more sharply and, as our men grew more faint, began to cut the rampart and to fill the ditches, and the situation had already been brought to the utmost crisis, Publius Sextius Baculus, centurion of the first spear, whom we said in the Nervian battle to have been worn out by several wounds, and likewise Gaius Volusenus, a military tribune, a man of great counsel and of valor, run up to Galba and show that there is one hope of safety, if, a sally (eruption) being made, they should try an ultimate aid. And so, the centurions having been called together, he quickly informs the soldiers that they should interrupt the battle for a little while and only catch the missiles that were hurled and refresh themselves from the toil, afterward, the signal having been given, they should burst out from the camp and place all hope of safety in courage.

[6] Quod iussi sunt faciunt, ac subito omnibus portis eruptione facta neque cognoscendi quid fieret neque sui colligendi hostibus facultatem relinquunt. Ita commutata fortuna eos qui in spem potiundorum castrorum venerant undique circumventos intercipiunt, et ex hominum milibus amplius XXX, quem numerum barbarorum ad castra venisse constabat, plus tertia parte interfecta reliquos perterritos in fugam coiciunt ac ne in locis quidem superioribus consistere patiuntur. Sic omnibus hostium copiis fusis armisque exutis se intra munitiones suas recipiunt.

[6] They do what they were ordered, and suddenly, with a breakout made from all the gates, they leave the enemy no opportunity either of recognizing what was happening or of collecting themselves. Thus, with fortune reversed, they intercept those who had come in the hope of getting possession of the camp, surrounded on all sides; and out of more than 30 thousand men— which was the number it was established had come of the barbarians to the camp— with more than a third slain, they hurl the rest, terrified, into flight and do not allow them even to take a stand on the higher ground. Thus, with all the enemy’s forces routed and stripped of their arms, they withdraw within their own fortifications.

Quo proelio facto, quod saepius fortunam temptare Galba nolebat atque alio se in hiberna consilio venisse meminerat, aliis occurrisse rebus videbat, maxime frumenti [commeatusque] inopia permotus postero die omnibus eius vici aedificiis incensis in provinciam reverti contendit, ac nullo hoste prohibente aut iter demorante incolumem legionem in Nantuates, inde in Allobroges perduxit ibique hiemavit.

With this battle having been fought, since Galba was unwilling to tempt fortune more often and remembered that he had come into winter quarters with a different counsel, and saw that other matters had arisen, being especially moved by the scarcity of grain [and of supplies], on the next day, after all the buildings of that village had been set on fire, he strove to return into the Province; and with no enemy either preventing or delaying the march, he led the legion unharmed into the Nantuates, thence into the Allobroges, and there wintered.

[7] His rebus gestis cum omnibus de causis Caesar pacatam Galliam existimaret, [superatis Belgis, expulsis Germanis, victis in Alpibus Sedunis,] atque ita inita hieme in Illyricum profectus esset, quod eas quoque nationes adire et regiones cognoseere volebat, subitum bellum in Gallia coortum est. Eius belli haec fuit causa. P. Crassus adulescens eum legione VII.

[7] With these things done, since Caesar judged Gaul pacified in all respects, [the Belgae overcome, the Germans driven out, the Seduni conquered in the Alps,] and so, winter having begun, he had set out into Illyricum, because he wished to visit those nations also and to become acquainted with the regions, a sudden war broke out in Gaul. The cause of this war was as follows. Publius Crassus, a young man, with the 7th legion.

proximus mare Oceanum in Andibus hiemabat. Is, quod in his locis inopia frumenti erat, praefectos tribunosque militum complures in finitimas civitates frumenti causa dimisit; quo in numero est T. Terrasidius missus in Esuvios, M. Trebius Gallus in Coriosolites, Q. Velanius eum T. Silio in Venetos.

being nearest to the Ocean, he was wintering among the Andi. Because in these places there was a scarcity of grain, he sent several prefects and military tribunes into the neighboring states for the sake of grain; among whom Titus Terrasidius was sent to the Esuvii, Marcus Trebius Gallus to the Coriosolites, Quintus Velanius with Titus Silius to the Veneti.

[8] Huius est civitatis longe amplissima auctoritas omnis orae maritimae regionum earum, quod et naves habent Veneti plurimas, quibus in Britanniam navigare consuerunt, et scientia atque usu rerum nauticarum ceteros antecedunt et in magno impetu maris atque aperto paucis portibus interiectis, quos tenent ipsi, omnes fere qui eo mari uti consuerunt habent vectigales. Ab his fit initium retinendi Silii atque Velanii, quod per eos suos se obsides, quos Crasso dedissent, recuperaturos existimabant. Horum auctoritate finitimi adducti, ut sunt Gallorum subita et repentina consilia, eadem de causa Trebium Terrasidiumque retinent et celeriter missis legatis per suos principes inter se coniurant nihil nisi communi consilio acturos eundemque omnes fortunae exitum esse laturos, reliquasque civitates sollicitant, ut in ea libertate quam a maioribus acceperint permanere quam Romanorum servitutem perferre malint.

[8] The state of the Veneti has by far the most ample authority of the whole maritime shore of those regions, because both the Veneti have very many ships with which they are accustomed to navigate to Britain, and they precede the rest in the science and use of nautical matters, and, the surge of the sea being great and the ocean open, with few harbors interposed, which they themselves hold, they have almost all who are accustomed to use that sea as tribute-paying. From these there is made the beginning of detaining Silius and Velanius, because through them they thought they would recover their own hostages, whom they had given to Crassus. By the authority of these men the neighbors are induced—such, as is the way of the Gauls, are sudden and impromptu counsels—to detain for the same cause Trebius and Terrasidius; and, envoys having been quickly sent by their own chiefs, they conspire among themselves that they will do nothing except by common counsel, and that all will bear the same outcome of fortune, and they solicit the remaining states to prefer to remain in that liberty which they have received from their ancestors rather than to endure the servitude of the Romans.

Omni ora maritima celeriter ad suam sententiam perducta communem legationem ad P. Crassum mittunt, si velit suos recuperare, obsides sibi remittat.

With the entire maritime shore quickly brought over to their own opinion, they send a common legation to P. Crassus, that, if he should wish to recuperate his men, he should remit the hostages to them.

[9] Quibus de rebus Caesar a Crasso certior factus, quod ipse aberat longius, naves interim longas aedificari in flumine Ligeri, quod influit in Oceanum, remiges ex provincia institui, nautas gubernatoresque comparari iubet. His rebus celeriter administratis ipse, cum primum per anni tempus potuit, ad exercitum contendit. Veneti reliquaeque item civitates cognito Caesaris adventu [certiores facti], simul quod quantum in se facinus admisissent intellegebant, [legatos, quod nomen ad omnes nationes sanctum inviolatumque semper fuisset, retentos ab se et in vincula coniectos,] pro magnitudine periculi bellum parare et maxime ea quae ad usum navium pertinent providere instituunt, hoc maiore spe quod multum natura loci confidebant.

[9] Informed by Crassus about these matters, because he himself was farther away, Caesar orders in the meantime long ships to be built on the River Liger, which flows into the Ocean, oarsmen to be enrolled from the province, and sailors and helmsmen to be procured. With these matters quickly set in motion, he himself, as soon as the season of the year allowed, hastened to the army. The Veneti and likewise the remaining states, once Caesar’s arrival was known [having been informed], and at the same time because they understood how great a criminal deed they had committed on their own part, [that envoys—which name had always been sacred and inviolable among all nations—had been detained by them and thrown into chains,] resolve, in proportion to the magnitude of the danger, to prepare for war and especially to provide for those things that pertain to the use of ships, with the greater hope because they trusted much in the nature of their position.

Pedestria esse itinera concisa aestuariis, navigationem impeditam propter inscientiam locorum paucitatemque portuum sciebant, neque nostros exercitus propter inopiam frumenti diutius apud se morari posse confidebant; ac iam ut omnia contra opinionem acciderent, tamen se plurimum navibus posse, [quam] Romanos neque ullam facultatem habere navium, neque eorum locorum ubi bellum gesturi essent vada, portus, insulas novisse; ac longe aliam esse navigationem in concluso mari atque in vastissimo atque apertissimo Oceano perspiciebant. His initis consiliis oppida muniunt, frumenta ex agris in oppida comportant, naves in Venetiam, ubi Caesarem primum bellum gesturum constabat, quam plurimas possunt cogunt. Socios sibi ad id bellum Osismos, Lexovios, Namnetes, Ambiliatos, Morinos, Diablintes, Menapios adsciscunt; auxilia ex Britannia, quae contra eas regiones posita est, arcessunt.

They knew that the pedestrian routes were cut up by tidal estuaries, that navigation was impeded on account of ignorance of the places and the paucity of ports, and they were confident that our armies could not stay among them for a longer time because of a lack of grain; and even now, granted that everything should turn out contrary to expectation, nevertheless they themselves could do very much by means of ships, [whereas] the Romans neither had any capacity for ships, nor knew the shallows, ports, and islands of those places where they were going to wage war; and they clearly perceived that navigation in an enclosed sea was far other than in the most vast and most open Ocean. These counsels having been entered upon, they fortify their towns, carry grain from the fields into the towns, and gather as many ships as they can into Venetia, where it stood established that Caesar would first wage war. They adscisce to themselves as allies for that war the Osismi, the Lexovii, the Namnetes, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, the Menapii; they summon auxiliaries from Britain, which is placed opposite those regions.

[10] Erant hae difficultates belli gerendi quas supra ostendimus, sed tamen multa Caesarem ad id bellum incitabant: iniuria retentorum equitum Romanorum, rebellio facta post deditionem, defectio datis obsidibus, tot civitatum coniuratio, in primis ne hac parte neglecta reliquae nationes sibi idem licere arbitrarentur. Itaque cum intellegeret omnes fere Gallos novis rebus studere et ad bellum mobiliter celeriterque excitari, omnes autem homines natura libertati studere et condicionem servitutis odisse, prius quam plures civitates conspirarent, partiendum sibi ac latius distribuendum exercitum putavit.

[10] These were the difficulties of waging war which we have shown above, but nevertheless many things incited Caesar to that war: the injustice of the detained Roman cavalry, the rebellion made after surrender, the defection with hostages having been given, the conspiracy of so many states, and chiefly lest, with this part neglected, the remaining nations should suppose the same to be permitted to themselves. And so, since he understood that almost all the Gauls are zealous for new things and are roused to war nimbly and swiftly, and that all men by nature are devoted to liberty and hate the condition of servitude, before more states should conspire, he thought the army ought to be divided and distributed more widely.

[11] Itaque T. Labienum legatum in Treveros, qui proximi flumini Rheno sunt, cum equitatu mittit. Huic mandat, Remos reliquosque Belgas adeat atque in officio contineat Germanosque, qui auxilio a Belgis arcessiti dicebantur, si per vim navibus flumen transire conentur, prohibeat. P. Crassum cum cohortibus legionariis XII et magno numero equitatus in Aquitaniam proficisci iubet, ne ex his nationibus auxilia in Galliam mittantur ac tantae nationes coniungantur.

[11] Therefore he sends T. Labienus, legate, to the Treveri, who are nearest to the river Rhine, with the cavalry. To him he commands that he approach the Remi and the remaining Belgae and keep them in allegiance, and that he prohibit the Germans—who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae for aid—if they attempt by force to cross the river with ships. He orders P. Crassus to set out into Aquitania with 12 legionary cohorts and a great number of cavalry, lest from these nations reinforcements be sent into Gaul and such great nations be conjoined.

Q. Titurium Sabinum legatum cum legionibus tribus in Venellos, Coriosolites Lexoviosque mittit, qui eam manum distinendam curet. D. Brutum adulescentem classi Gallicisque navibus, quas ex Pictonibus et Santonis reliquisque pacatis regionibus convenire iusserat, praeficit et, cum primum possit, in Venetos proficisci iubet. Ipse eo pedestribus copiis contendit.

He sends the legate Quintus Titurius Sabinus with three legions against the Venelli, the Coriosolites, and the Lexovii, to see to it that that force is drawn off; he puts the adolescent Decimus Brutus in command of the fleet and the Gallic ships, which he had ordered to assemble from the Pictones and Santones and the other pacified regions, and he orders him, as soon as he can, to set out against the Veneti. He himself hastens thither with the infantry forces.

[12] Erant eius modi fere situs oppidorum ut posita in extremis lingulis promunturiisque neque pedibus aditum haberent, cum ex alto se aestus incitavisset, quod [bis] accidit semper horarum XII spatio, neque navibus, quod rursus minuente aestu naves in vadis adflictarentur. Ita utraque re oppidorum oppugnatio impediebatur. Ac si quando magnitudine operis forte superati, extruso mari aggere ac molibus atque his oppidi moenibus adaequatis, suis fortunis desperare coeperant, magno numero navium adpulso, cuius rei summam facultatem habebant, omnia sua deportabant seque in proxima oppida recipiebant: ibi se rursus isdem oportunitatibus loci defendebant.

[12] The sites of their towns were for the most part such that, placed on the outermost spits and promontories, they had no access on foot when the tide had surged in from the deep—which [twice] always happens in the space of 12 hours—nor by ships, because, as the tide ebbed again, the vessels were stranded in the shallows. Thus in either respect the assault of the towns was impeded. And if ever, overmatched by the magnitude of the work—when by an embankment and breakwaters the sea had been driven back and these had been made level with the town walls—they had begun to despair of their fortunes, then, with a great number of ships brought in (in which matter they had the utmost capacity), they would carry off all their possessions and withdraw into the nearest towns: there they again defended themselves by the same opportunities of the place.

Haec eo facilius magnam partem aestatis faciebant quod nostrae naves tempestatibus detinebantur summaque erat vasto atque aperto mari, magnis aestibus, raris ac prope nullis portibus difficultas navigandi.

These things they did the more easily for a great part of the summer, because our ships were detained by tempests, and on the vast and open sea, with great tides and harbors few and almost none, there was the utmost difficulty of navigating.

[13] Namque ipsorum naves ad hunc modum factae armataeque erant: carinae aliquanto planiores quam nostrarum navium, quo facilius vada ac decessum aestus excipere possent; prorae admodum erectae atque item puppes, ad magnitudinem fluctuum tempestatumque accommodatae; naves totae factae ex robore ad quamvis vim et contumeliam perferendam; transtra ex pedalibus in altitudinem trabibus, confixa clavis ferreis digiti pollicis crassitudine; ancorae pro funibus ferreis catenis revinctae; pelles pro velis alutaeque tenuiter confectae, [hae] sive propter inopiam lini atque eius usus inscientiam, sive eo, quod est magis veri simile, quod tantas tempestates Oceani tantosque impetus ventorum sustineri ac tanta onera navium regi velis non satis commode posse arbitrabantur. Cum his navibus nostrae classi eius modi congressus erat ut una celeritate et pulsu remorum praestaret, reliqua pro loci natura, pro vi tempestatum illis essent aptiora et accommodatiora. Neque enim iis nostrae rostro nocere poterant (tanta in iis erat firmitudo), neque propter altitudinem facile telum adigebatur, et eadem de causa minus commode copulis continebantur.

[13] For their ships had been made and armed in this fashion: the keels somewhat flatter than those of our ships, in order that they might more easily take the shallows and the recession of the tide; the prows very much raised and so too the sterns, accommodated to the magnitude of the waves and storms; the ships made wholly of oak-wood to bear any force and rough contumely; the crossbeams (thwarts) of timbers a foot in vertical thickness, fastened with iron nails of the thickness of a thumb; the anchors bound with iron chains in place of cables; hides for sails and thinly prepared alum-tawed leathers, [these] either on account of scarcity of flax and ignorance of its use, or else, what is more likely, because they judged that the sails could not with sufficient convenience sustain such tempests of the Ocean and such onsets of winds and govern such burdens of ships. With these ships the engagement with our fleet was of such a kind that in a single point—speed and the stroke of the oars—ours excelled, but in the rest, according to the nature of the place and the force of the storms, theirs were more apt and better accommodated. For our ships could not harm them with the rostrum (ram) (so great was the firmness in them), nor, on account of their height, was a missile easily driven home, and for the same reason they were held less conveniently by couplings (grapnels).

Accedebat ut, cum [saevire ventus coepisset et] se vento dedissent, et tempestatem ferrent facilius et in vadis consisterent tutius et ab aestu relictae nihil saxa et cautes timerent; quarum rerum omnium nostris navibus casus erat extimescendus.

There was the added point that, when [the wind had begun to rage and] they had given themselves to the wind, they both bore the tempest more easily and stood more safely in the shallows and, left by the tide, feared rocks and reefs not at all; the chance of all these things was to be greatly feared by our ships.

[14] Compluribus expugnatis oppidis Caesar, ubi intellexit frustra tantum laborem sumi neque hostium fugam captis oppidis reprimi neque iis noceri posse, statuit expectandam classem. Quae ubi convenit ac primum ab hostibus visa est, circiter CCXX naves eorum paratissimae atque omni genere armorum ornatissimae profectae ex portu nostris adversae constiterunt; neque satis Bruto, qui classi praeerat, vel tribunis militum centurionibusque, quibus singulae naves erant attributae, constabat quid agerent aut quam rationem pugnae insisterent. Rostro enim noceri non posse cognoverant; turribus autem excitatis tamen has altitudo puppium ex barbaris navibus superabat, ut neque ex inferiore loco satis commode tela adigi possent et missa a Gallis gravius acciderent.

[14] With several towns having been stormed, Caesar, when he understood that so great a labor was being undertaken in vain, and that neither could the enemy’s flight be checked by towns taken nor could harm be done to them, decided that the fleet must be waited for. When it assembled and was first seen by the enemy, about 220 of their ships—most ready and most adorned with every kind of armament—having put out from port, took their stand opposite our ships; and it was not sufficiently clear to Brutus, who was in command of the fleet, nor to the military tribunes and centurions, to whom individual ships had been assigned, what they should do or what method of battle they should press. For they had learned that harm could not be inflicted by the beak-ram; and even with towers raised, nevertheless the height of the sterns from the barbarian ships overtopped these, with the result that neither could missiles be driven quite conveniently from the lower position, and those sent by the Gauls struck more heavily.

Una erat magno usui res praeparata a nostris, falces praeacutae insertae adfixaeque longuriis, non absimili forma muralium falcium. His cum funes qui antemnas ad malos destinabant comprehensi adductique erant, navigio remis incitato praerumpebantur. Quibus abscisis antemnae necessario concidebant, ut, cum omnis Gallicis navibus spes in velis armamentisque consisteret, his ereptis omnis usus navium uno tempore eriperetur.

One device prepared by our men was of great use: pre-sharpened sickles inserted into and affixed upon long poles, in a shape not unlike the wall-sickles (grappling-hooks). With these, when the ropes which fastened the antennae (yards) to the masts had been seized and drawn taut, the vessel being driven on by oars, they were snapped. These cut, the antennae (yards) necessarily collapsed, so that, since all hope for the Gallic ships stood in the sails and armament (rigging), with these torn away the entire use of the ships was at once stripped away.

Reliquum erat certamen positum in virtute, qua nostri milites facile superabant, atque eo magis quod in conspectu Caesaris atque omnis exercitus res gerebatur, ut nullum paulo fortius factum latere posset; omnes enim colles ac loca superiora, unde erat propinquus despectus in mare, ab exercitu tenebantur.

The remaining contest was placed in valor, in which our soldiers easily outmatched them, and all the more because the affair was being conducted in the sight of Caesar and of the whole army, so that no deed a little more brave could lie hidden; for all the hills and higher places, from which there was a near look-down upon the sea, were held by the army.

[15] Deiectis, ut diximus, antemnis, cum singulas binae ac ternae naves circumsteterant, milites summa vi transcendere in hostium naves contendebant. Quod postquam barbari fieri animadverterunt, expugnatis compluribus navibus, cum ei rei nullum reperiretur auxilium, fuga salutem petere contenderunt. Ac iam conversis in eam partem navibus quo ventus ferebat, tanta subito malacia ac tranquillitas exstitit ut se ex loco movere non possent.

[15] With the yards, as we have said, thrown down, since two and three of our ships had surrounded each single one, the soldiers strove with the utmost force to leap across onto the enemies’ ships. When the barbarians observed that this was being done, with several ships taken by storm, since no aid for this matter was being found, they strove to seek safety by flight. And now, with their ships turned to that quarter whither the wind was bearing them, so great a sudden dead calm and tranquility arose that they could not move from their place.

Quae quidem res ad negotium conficiendum maximae fuit oportunitati: nam singulas nostri consectati expugnaverunt, ut perpaucae ex omni numero noctis interventu ad terram pervenirent, cum ab hora fere IIII usque ad solis occasum pugnaretur.

And indeed this matter was of the greatest opportunity for completing the undertaking: for our men, pursuing them one by one, captured them by storm, so that very few out of the whole number, with the intervention of night, made it to land, since fighting was carried on from about the 4th hour until sunset.

[16] Quo proelio bellum Venetorum totiusque orae maritimae confectum est. Nam cum omnis iuventus, omnes etiam gravioris aetatis in quibus aliquid consilii aut dignitatis fuit eo convenerant, tum navium quod ubique fuerat in unum locum coegerant; quibus amissis reliqui neque quo se reciperent neque quem ad modum oppida defenderent habebant. Itaque se suaque omnia Caesari dediderunt.

[16] By this battle the war of the Veneti and of the whole maritime coast was brought to a conclusion. For when all the youth, and all also of more advanced age in whom there was any counsel or dignity had convened there, then whatever ships there were everywhere they had gathered into one place; with these lost, the rest had neither where to withdraw nor in what manner to defend their towns. And so they surrendered themselves and all their belongings to Caesar.

In quos eo gravius Caesar vindicandum statuit quo diligentius in reliquum tempus a barbaris ius legatorum conservaretur. Itaque omni senatu necato reliquos sub corona vendidit.

Against them Caesar determined that vengeance must be exacted all the more grievously, in order that the right of ambassadors might be more diligently preserved by the barbarians for the future. And so, with the entire senate slain, he sold the rest under the crown (at auction).

[17] Dum haec in Venetis geruntur, Q. Titurius Sabinus cum iis copiis quas a Caesare acceperat in fines Venellorum pervenit. His praeerat Viridovix ac summam imperii tenebat earum omnium civitatum quae defecerant, ex quibus exercitum [magnasque copias] coegerat; atque his paucis diebus Aulerci Eburovices Lexoviique, senatu suo interfecto quod auctores belli esse nolebant, portas clauserunt seque cum Viridovice coniunxerunt; magnaque praeterea multitudo undique ex Gallia perditorum hominum latronumque convenerat, quos spes praedandi studiumque bellandi ab agri cultura et cotidiano labore revocabat. Sabinus idoneo omnibus rebus loco castris sese tenebat, cum Viridovix contra eum duorum milium spatio consedisset cotidieque productis copiis pugnandi potestatem faceret, ut iam non solum hostibus in contemptionem Sabinus veniret, sed etiam nostrorum militum vocibus non nihil carperetur; tantamque opinionem timoris praebuit ut iam ad vallum castrorum hostes accedere auderent.

[17] While these things are being done among the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabinus with those forces which he had received from Caesar arrived into the borders of the Venelli. Over these was presiding Viridovix and he held the highest command of all those states which had defected, from which he had assembled an army [great forces]; and within these few days the Aulerci Eburovices and the Lexovii, their senate having been slain because they were unwilling to be authors of the war, shut their gates and joined themselves with Viridovix; and besides, a great multitude from all sides out of Gaul of desperate men and brigands had come together, whom the hope of plundering and the zeal of warring called back from the cultivation of the fields and daily labor. Sabinus, in a place suitable for all things, kept himself to the camp, while Viridovix had encamped opposite him at a distance of two miles and each day, with his forces drawn out, offered the opportunity of fighting, so that now not only did Sabinus come into contempt with the enemies, but he was also not a little carped at by the voices of our soldiers; and he presented such an appearance of fear that now the enemies dared to approach the rampart of the camp.

Id ea de causa faciebat quod cum tanta multitudine hostium, praesertim eo absente qui summam imperii teneret, nisi aequo loco aut oportunitate aliqua data legato dimicandum non existimabat.

He did this for this reason, that with so great a multitude of enemies, especially with him absent who held the supreme command, he did not judge that the legate should engage unless on equal ground or with some opportunity afforded.

[18] Hac confirmata opinione timoris idoneum quendam hominem et callidum deligit, Gallum, ex iis quos auxilii causa secum habebat. Huic magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque persuadet uti ad hostes transeat, et quid fieri velit edocet. Qui ubi pro perfuga ad eos venit, timorem Romanorum proponit, quibus angustiis ipse Caesar a Venetis prematur docet, eque longius abesse quin proxima nocte Sabinus clam ex castris exercitum educat et ad Caesarem auxilii ferendi causa proficiscatur.

[18] With this opinion of fear confirmed, he chooses a certain apt and crafty man, a Gaul, from those whom he had with him for the sake of auxiliary support. He persuades him with great rewards and promises to pass over to the enemies, and thoroughly instructs him what he wishes to be done. When this man came to them as a deserter, he sets forth the fear of the Romans, shows by what straits Caesar himself is pressed by the Veneti, and that it is not far off but that on the next night Sabinus will secretly lead the army out of the camp and set out to Caesar for the purpose of bringing aid.

Quod ubi auditum est, conclamant omnes occasionem negotii bene gerendi amittendam non esse: ad castra iri oportere. Multae res ad hoc consilium Gallos hortabantur: superiorum dierum Sabini cunctatio, perfugae confirmatio, inopia cibariorum, cui rei parum diligenter ab iis erat provisum, spes Venetici belli, et quod fere libenter homines id quod volunt credunt. His rebus adducti non prius Viridovicem reliquosque duces ex concilio dimittunt quam ab iis sit concessum arma uti capiant et ad castra contendant.

When this was heard, all cry out together that the occasion for managing the business well ought not to be lost: that it is proper to go to the camp. Many things encouraged the Gauls to this counsel: Sabinus’s cunctation of the previous days, the defector’s confirmation, the scarcity of provisions, for which matter too little diligently had been provided by them, the hope of the Venetic war, and that men for the most part gladly believe that which they wish. Led by these things, they do not dismiss Viridovix and the other leaders from the council before it has been conceded by them that they should take up arms and hasten to the camp.

Qua re concessa laeti, ut explorata victoria, sarmentis virgultisque collectis, quibus fossas Romanorum compleant, ad castra pergunt.

With this concession granted, joyful as if victory were ascertained, having collected brushwood and twigs, with which they might fill the Romans’ ditches, they proceed to the camp.

[19] Locus erat castrorum editus et paulatim ab imo acclivis circiter passus mille. Huc magno cursu contenderunt, ut quam minimum spatii ad se colligendos armandosque Romanis daretur, exanimatique pervenerunt. Sabinus suos hortatus cupientibus signum dat.

[19] The site of the camp was elevated and, gradually rising from the bottom, for about one thousand paces. Hither they hastened at great speed, in order that as little time as possible be given to the Romans for gathering and arming themselves, and they arrived breathless. Sabinus, having encouraged his men, gives the signal to the eager.

Impeditis hostibus propter ea quae ferebant onera subito duabus portis eruptionem fieri iubet. Factum est oportunitate loci, hostium inscientia ac defatigatione, virtute militum et superiorum pugnarum exercitatione, ut ne unum quidem nostrorum impetum ferrent ac statim terga verterent. Quos impeditos integris viribus milites nostri consecuti magnum numerum eorum occiderunt; reliquos equites consectati paucos, qui ex fuga evaserant, reliquerunt.

With the enemy hampered because of the burdens they were carrying, he orders a sudden eruption to be made from two gates. It came to pass, by the opportunity of the place, by the enemy’s ignorance and exhaustion, by the valor of the soldiers and the exercise of earlier battles, that they did not bear even a single one of our onsets and at once turned their backs. Our soldiers, with their strength intact, overtook them while they were impeded and killed a great number of them; the cavalry, pursuing the rest, left few who had escaped from the flight.

Sic uno tempore et de navali pugna Sabinus et de Sabini victoria Caesar est certior factus, civitatesque omnes se statim Titurio dediderunt. Nam ut ad bella suscipienda Gallorum alacer ac promptus est animus, sic mollis ac minime resistens ad calamitates ferendas mens eorum est.

Thus at one and the same time both Sabinus was made aware concerning the naval battle, and Caesar was made more certain concerning the victory of Sabinus, and all the communities at once surrendered themselves to Titurius. For just as the spirit of the Gauls is alacritous and prompt for undertaking wars, so soft and least resistant is their mind for bearing calamities.

[20] Eodem fere tempore P. Crassus, cum in Aquitaniam pervenisset, quae [pars], ut ante dictum est, [et regionum latitudine et multitudine hominum] tertia pars Galliae est [aestimanda], cum intellegeret in iis locis sibi bellum gerendum ubi paucis ante annis L. Valerius Praeconinus legatus exercitu pulso interfectus esset atque unde L. Manlius proconsul impedimentis amissis profugisset, non mediocrem sibi diligentiam adhibendam intellegebat. Itaque re frumentaria provisa, auxiliis equitatuque comparato, multis praeterea viris fortibus Tolosa et Carcasone et Narbone, quae sunt civitates Galliae provinciae finitimae, ex his regionibus nominatim evocatis, in Sotiatium fines exercitum introduxit. Cuius adventu cognito Sotiates magnis copiis coactis, equitatuque, quo plurimum valebant, in itinere agmen nostrum adorti primum equestre proelium commiserunt, deinde equitatu suo pulso atque insequentibus nostris subito pedestres copias, quas in convalle in insidiis conlocaverant, ostenderunt.

[20] At about the same time P. Crassus, when he had arrived into Aquitania, which [part], as was said before, [both by the breadth of its regions and by the multitude of men] is to be reckoned as the third part of Gaul [to be estimated], since he understood that in those places he would have to wage war where a few years before L. Valerius Praeconinus, the legate, had been slain with his army routed, and whence L. Manlius the proconsul had fled after losing his baggage, understood that no mediocre diligence must be applied by him. And so, with the grain-supply provided for, with auxiliaries and cavalry assembled, and with many brave men besides, summoned by name from Toulouse and Carcassonne and Narbo, which are cities of the Province of Gaul bordering these regions, he led his army into the borders of the Sotiates. When his arrival was learned, the Sotiates, with great forces gathered and with cavalry, in which they were especially strong, attacked our column on the march and first engaged in a cavalry battle; then, with their cavalry routed and our men pursuing, they suddenly displayed infantry forces which they had stationed in ambush in a valley.

Hi nostros disiectos adorti proelium renovarunt.

These, attacking our men who had been scattered, renewed the battle.

[21] Pugnatum est diu atque acriter, cum Sotiates superioribus victoriis freti in sua virtute totius Aquitaniae salutem positam putarent, nostri autem quid sine imperatore et sine reliquis legionibus adulescentulo duce efficere possent perspici cuperent; tandem confecti vulneribus hostes terga verterunt. Quorum magno numero interfecto Crassus ex itinere oppidum Sotiatium oppugnare coepit. Quibus fortiter resistentibus vineas turresque egit.

[21] The battle was fought for a long time and fiercely, since the Sotiates, relying on prior victories, thought that the safety of all Aquitania was placed in their own virtue, while our men, on the other hand, were eager that it be perceived what they could effect without the commander and without the remaining legions, with a youthful leader; at length the enemy, worn out with wounds, turned their backs. After a great number of them had been slain, Crassus, straightway from the march, began to assault the town of the Sotiates. As they resisted bravely, he drove forward vineae and towers.

Illi alias eruptione temptata, alias cuniculis ad aggerem vineasque actis (cuius rei sunt longe peritissimi Aquitani, propterea quod multis locis apud eos aerariae secturaeque sunt), ubi diligentia nostrorum nihil his rebus profici posse intellexerunt, legatos ad Crassum mittunt seque in deditionem ut recipiat petunt.

They, at one time with an eruption (a sally) attempted, at another with tunnels driven up to the rampart and the vineae (in which matter the Aquitanians are by far most skilled, because in many places among them there are copper mines and cuttings), when they understood by the diligence of our men that nothing could be accomplished by these measures, send envoys to Crassus and ask that he receive them into surrender.

[22] Qua re impetrata arma tradere iussi faciunt. Atque in eam rem omnium nostrorum intentis animis alia ex parte oppidi Adiatunnus, qui summam imperii tenebat, cum DC devotis, quos illi soldurios appellant, quorum haec est condicio, ut omnibus in vita commodis una cum iis fruantur quorum se amicitiae dediderint, si quid his per vim accidat, aut eundem casum una ferant aut sibi mortem consciscant; neque adhuc hominum memoria repertus est quisquam qui, eo interfecto cuius se amicitiae devovisset, mortem recusaret---cum his Adiatunnus eruptionem facere conatus clamore ab ea parte munitionis sublato cum ad arma milites concurrissent vehementerque ibi pugnatum esset, repulsus in oppidum tamen uti eadem deditionis condicione uteretur a Crasso impetravit.

[22] This having been obtained, ordered to hand over their arms they do so. And while on this matter the minds of all our men were intent, from another part of the town Adiatunnus, who held the highest imperium, with 600 devoted men, whom they call soldurii, whose condition is this: that they enjoy together all the conveniences of life with those to whose friendship they have surrendered themselves; if anything by force befalls these, either they bear the same lot together or determine death for themselves; nor up to living memory has anyone been found who, when he by whose friendship he had devoted himself was slain, refused death---with these men Adiatunnus, attempting to make an eruption, with a shout raised from that part of the fortification, when the soldiers had run to arms and fighting there had been vehement, having been repulsed into the town nevertheless obtained from Crassus that he might enjoy the same condition of surrender.

[23] Armis obsidibusque acceptis, Crassus in fines Vocatium et Tarusatium profectus est. Tum vero barbari commoti, quod oppidum et natura loci et manu munitum paucis diebus quibus eo ventum erat expugnatum cognoverant, legatos quoque versum dimittere, coniurare, obsides inter se dare, copias parare coeperunt. Mittuntur etiam ad eas civitates legati quae sunt citerioris Hispaniae finitimae Aquitaniae: inde auxilia ducesque arcessuntur.

[23] After receiving arms and hostages, Crassus set out into the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates. Then indeed the barbarians, stirred because they had learned that a town fortified both by the nature of the place and by hand had been stormed within a few days from the time when arrival there had occurred, began also to send envoys in every direction, to swear together, to give hostages among themselves, to prepare forces. Envoys are sent also to those states of Nearer Spain that are bordering on Aquitania: from there reinforcements and leaders are summoned.

Quorum adventu magna cum auctoritate et magna [cum] hominum multitudine bellum gerere conantur. Duces vero ii deliguntur qui una cum Q. Sertorio omnes annos fuerant summamque scientiam rei militaris habere existimabantur. Hi consuetudine populi Romani loca capere, castra munire, commeatibus nostros intercludere instituunt.

At whose arrival they attempt to wage war with great authority and with a great multitude of men. And those leaders are selected who had been together with Q. Sertorius through all the years and were thought to have the highest science of military affairs. These, after the consuetude of the Roman people, set themselves to seize positions, to fortify camps, and to interclude our men from supplies.

Quod ubi Crassus animadvertit, suas copias propter exiguitatem non facile diduci, hostem et vagari et vias obsidere et castris satis praesidii relinquere, ob eam causam minus commode frumentum commeatumque sibi supportari, in dies hostium numerum augeri, non cunctandum existimavit quin pugna decertaret. Hac re ad consilium delata, ubi omnes idem sentire intellexit, posterum diem pugnae constituit.

When Crassus noticed that his own forces, because of their smallness, could not easily be drawn out in detachments, while the enemy both wandered about and blocked the roads and yet left sufficient guard for their camp; and that for this reason grain and supplies were brought up to him less conveniently, and the number of the enemy was increasing day by day, he judged that there must be no delay in deciding the issue by battle. When this matter was brought before the council, and he understood that all felt the same, he set the following day for the battle.

[24] Prima luce productis omnibus copiis duplici acie instituta, auxiliis in mediam aciem coniectis, quid hostes consilii caperent expectabat. Illi, etsi propter multitudinem et veterem belli gloriam paucitatemque nostrorum se tuto dimicaturos existimabant, tamen tutius esse arbitrabantur obsessis viis commeatu intercluso sine vulnere victoria potiri, et si propter inopiam rei frumentariae Romani se recipere coepissent, impeditos in agmine et sub sarcinis infirmiore animo adoriri cogitabant. Hoc consilio probato ab ducibus, productis Romanorum copiis, sese castris tenebant.

[24] At first light, with all the forces brought forward, a double battle-line set up, and the auxiliaries thrown into the middle line, he was awaiting what plan the enemies would seize upon. They, although on account of their multitude and the ancient glory of war and the fewness of our men they thought they would fight safely, nevertheless judged it safer, with the roads beset and the supply cut off, to obtain victory without a wound; and if, because of scarcity in the grain-supply, the Romans should begin to withdraw, they were thinking to assail them hampered in the column and under their packs, with a more infirm spirit. With this plan approved by the leaders, when the Roman forces were drawn out, they kept themselves to the camp.

Hac re perspecta Crassus, cum sua cunctatione atque opinione timoris hostes nostros milites alacriores ad pugnandum effecissent atque omnium voces audirentur expectari diutius non oportere quin ad castra iretur, cohortatus suos omnibus cupientibus ad hostium castra contendit.

With this matter perceived, Crassus, since by his own hesitation and the opinion of fear the enemies had made our soldiers more eager for fighting, and as the voices of all were heard that it ought not to be waited any longer but that one should go to the camp, having exhorted his men, with everyone desiring it, hastened to the enemies’ camp.

[25] Ibi cum alii fossas complerent, alii multis telis coniectis defensores vallo munitionibusque depellerent, auxiliaresque, quibus ad pugnam non multum Crassus confidebat, lapidibus telisque subministrandis et ad aggerem caespitibus comportandis speciem atque opinionem pugnantium praeberent, cum item ab hostibus constanter ac non timide pugnaretur telaque ex loco superiore missa non frustra acciderent, equites circumitis hostium castris Crasso renuntiaverunt non eadem esse diligentia ab decumana porta castra munita facilemque aditum habere.

[25] There, while some were filling the ditches, others, with many missiles hurled, were driving the defenders from the rampart and fortifications; and the auxiliaries— in whom for fighting Crassus did not place much confidence—by supplying stones and missiles and by carrying turf to the embankment were presenting the semblance and impression of combatants; while likewise on the enemies’ side the fighting was steadfast and not timid, and the missiles sent from the higher ground did not fall in vain, the cavalry, having gone around the enemy’s camp, reported to Crassus that the camp was not fortified with the same diligence at the Decuman gate and had an easy approach.

[26] Crassus equitum praefectos cohortatus, ut magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque suos excitarent, quid fieri vellet ostendit. Illi, ut erat imperatum, eductis iis cohortibus quae praesidio castris relictae intritae ab labore erant, et longiore itinere circumductis, ne ex hostium castris conspici possent, omnium oculis mentibusque ad pugnam intentis celeriter ad eas quas diximus munitiones pervenerunt atque his prorutis prius in hostium castris constiterunt quam plane ab his videri aut quid rei gereretur cognosci posset. Tum vero clamore ab ea parte audito nostri redintegratis viribus, quod plerumque in spe victoriae accidere consuevit, acrius impugnare coeperunt.

[26] Crassus, having encouraged the prefects of cavalry to rouse their men with great rewards and promises, showed what he wished to be done. They, as had been commanded, with those cohorts led out which had been left as a garrison for the camp and were unworn by labor, and having led them around by a longer route, lest they could be seen from the enemy’s camp, while the eyes and minds of all were fixed upon the fight, quickly reached those fortifications which we have mentioned; and, these having been torn down, they took their stand within the enemy’s camp before they could plainly be seen by them or it could be ascertained what was being done. Then indeed, when a shout was heard from that quarter, our men, with their strength renewed (as generally is accustomed to happen in the hope of victory), began to assail more fiercely.

Hostes undique circumventi desperatis omnibus rebus se per munitiones deicere et fuga salutem petere contenderunt. Quos equitatus apertissimis campis consectatus ex milium L numero, quae ex Aquitania Cantabrisque convenisse constabat, vix quarta parte relicta, multa nocte se in castra recepit.

The enemy, surrounded on all sides and despairing of all resources, strove to throw themselves down through the fortifications and to seek safety in flight. Whom the cavalry, having pursued over the most open plains, out of the number of 50,000, which it was established had convened from Aquitania and the Cantabrians, with scarcely a fourth part left, withdrew to the camp late at night.

[27] Hac audita pugna maxima pars Aquitaniae sese Crasso dedidit obsidesque ultro misit; quo in numero fuerunt Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibusates, Cocosates: paucae ultimae nationes anni tempore confisae, quod hiems suberat, id facere neglexerunt.

[27] This battle having been heard of, the greatest part of Aquitania surrendered themselves to Crassus and, of their own accord, sent hostages; in which number were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibusates, Cocosates: a few last nations, trusting in the season of the year, because winter was close at hand, neglected to do this.

[28] Eodem fere tempore Caesar, etsi prope exacta iam aestas erat, tamen, quod omni Gallia pacata Morini Menapiique supererant, qui in armis essent neque ad eum umquam legatos de pace misissent, arbitratus id bellum celeriter confici posse eo exercitum duxit; qui longe alia ratione ac reliqui Galli bellum gerere coeperunt. Nam quod intellegebant maximas nationes, quae proelio contendissent, pulsas superatasque esse, continentesque silvas ac paludes habebant, eo se suaque omnia contulerunt. Ad quarum initium silvarum cum Caesar pervenisset castraque munire instituisset neque hostis interim visus esset, dispersis in opere nostris subito ex omnibus partibus silvae evolaverunt et in nostros impetum fecerunt.

[28] At about the same time Caesar, although summer was now nearly spent, nevertheless, because with all Gaul pacified the Morini and the Menapii remained, who were in arms and had never sent to him legates about peace, thinking that that war could be finished quickly led the army thither; and they began to wage war by a method far different from that of the rest of the Gauls. For, because they understood that the greatest nations which had contended in battle had been routed and overcome, and they had unbroken forests and marshes, they betook themselves and all their belongings there. When Caesar had arrived at the edge of these forests and had begun to fortify a camp, and meanwhile no enemy had been seen, with our men scattered in the work they suddenly flew forth from all parts of the forest and made an attack upon our men.

Nostri celeriter arma ceperunt eosque in silvas repulerunt et compluribus interfectis longius impeditioribus locis secuti paucos ex suis deperdiderunt.

Our men swiftly took up arms and repelled them into the forests, and, after several had been slain, pursuing farther in more impeded places, they lost a few of their own.

[29] Reliquis deinceps diebus Caesar silvas caedere instituit, et ne quis inermibus imprudentibusque militibus ab latere impetus fieri posset, omnem eam materiam quae erat caesa conversam ad hostem conlocabat et pro vallo ad utrumque latus extruebat. Incredibili celeritate magno spatio paucis diebus confecto, cum iam pecus atque extrema impedimenta a nostris tenerentur, ipsi densiores silvas peterent, eius modi sunt tempestates consecutae uti opus necessario intermitteretur et continuatione imbrium diutius sub pellibus milites contineri non possent. Itaque vastatis omnibus eorum agris, vicis aedificiisque incensis, Caesar exercitum reduxit et in Aulercis Lexoviisque, reliquis item civitatibus quae proxime bellum fecerant, in hibernis conlocavit.

[29] In the remaining days in succession Caesar began to cut down the forests, and, lest any attack could be made upon the unarmed and unwary soldiers from the flank, he was placing all that timber which had been cut, turned toward the enemy, and was piling it up as a rampart on either side. With incredible celerity, a great space having been cleared in a few days, when now the herds and the outermost baggage were being held by our men, and they themselves were seeking the denser woods, tempests of such a sort followed that the work had of necessity to be interrupted, and by the continuation of rains the soldiers could not be kept any longer under skins. Therefore, with all their fields laid waste, and the villages and buildings burned, Caesar led the army back and placed it in winter quarters among the Aulerci and the Lexovii, and likewise in the remaining states which had most recently made war.