Seneca: EPISTULAE MORALES AD LUCILIUM

[1] Itinera ista quae segnitiam mihi excutiunt et valetudini meae prodesse iudico et studiis. Quare valetudinem adiuvent vides: cum pigrum me et neglegentem corporis litterarum amor faciat, aliena opera exerceor. Studio quare prosint indicabo: a lectionibus recessi.

[1] I judge that these journeys, which shake sloth off me, are of benefit both to my health and to my studies. Why they aid my health you see: since love of letters makes me lazy and neglectful of the body, I am exercised by another’s labor. Why they profit my study I shall indicate: I have not withdrawn from my readings.

Sunt autem, ut existimo, necessariae, primum ne sim me uno contentus, deinde ut, cum ab aliis quaesita cognovero, tum et de inventis iudicem et cogitem de inveniendis. Alit lectio ingenium et studio fatigatum, non sine studio tamen, reficit.

They are, however, as I suppose, necessary: first, that I not be content with myself alone; next, that, when I have come to know things sought out by others, then I may both judge of the inventions and think about things yet to be invented. Reading nourishes the ingenium and, though wearied by study, nevertheless refreshes it—yet not without study.

[2] Nec scribere tantum nec tantum legere debemus: altera res contristabit vires et exhauriet (de stilo dico), altera solvet ac diluet. Invicem hoc et illo commeandum est et alterum altero temperandum, ut quidquid lectione collectum est stilus redigat in corpus.

[2] We ought neither to write only nor only to read: the one will depress the forces and drain them (I speak of the stylus), the other will loosen and dilute. In turn we must go back and forth to this and to that, and the one must be tempered by the other, so that whatever has been collected by reading the stylus may reduce into a corpus.

[3] Apes, ut aiunt, debemus imitari, quae vagantur et flores ad mel faciendum idoneos carpunt, deinde quidquid attulere disponunt ac per favos digerunt et, ut Vergilius noster ait,

[3] We ought to imitate the bees, as they say, which wander and pluck the flowers suitable for making honey; then they arrange whatever they have brought and digest it through the honeycombs, and, as our Vergil says,

liquentia mella
stipant et dulci distendunt nectare cellas.

they pack the liquid honeys
and with sweet nectar distend the cells.

[4] De illis non satis constat utrum sucum ex floribus ducant qui protinus mel sit, an quae collegerunt in hunc saporem mixtura quadam et proprietate spiritus sui mutent. Quibusdam enim placet non faciendi mellis scientiam esse illis sed colligendi. Aiunt inveniri apud Indos mel in arundinum foliis, quod aut ros illius caeli aut ipsius arundinis umor dulcis et pinguior gignat; in nostris quoque herbis vim eandem sed minus manifestam et notabilem poni, quam persequatur et contrahat animal huic rei genitum.

[4] About them it is not sufficiently agreed whether they draw a juice from flowers which is forthwith honey, or whether they change what they have gathered into this savor by a certain mixture and by the property of their own spirit. For it pleases some to think that their science is not of making honey but of collecting it. They say that among the Indians honey is found on the leaves of reeds, which either the dew of that sky or the moisture of the reed itself, sweet and rather richer, begets; in our own herbs likewise the same force is set, but less manifest and notable, which the animal born for this business pursues and contracts.

Quidam existimant conditura et dispositione in hanc qualitatem verti quae ex tenerrimis virentium florentiumque decerpserint, non sine quodam, ut ita dicam, fermento, quo in unum diversa coalescunt.

Some think that, by seasoning and disposition, into this quality is turned what they have plucked from the most tender things of those greening and flowering, not without a certain, so to speak, ferment, by which diverse things coalesce into one.

[5] Sed ne ad aliud quam de quo agitur abducar, nos quoquehas apes debemus imitari et quaecumque ex diversa lectione congessimus separare (melius enim distincta servantur), deinde adhibita ingenii nostri cura et facultate in unum saporem varia illa libamenta confundere, ut etiam si apparuerit unde sumptum sit, aliud tamen esse quam unde sumptum est appareat. Quod in corpore nostro videmus sine ulla opera nostra facere naturam

[5] But lest I be drawn aside to anything other than what is being dealt with, we too ought to imitate these bees and separate whatever we have collected from diverse reading (for things kept distinct are better preserved), then, with the care and faculty of our own intellect applied, to confound into one savor those various libations, so that even if it becomes apparent whence it was taken, yet it may appear to be something other than that from which it was taken. This we see nature do in our body without any work of ours.

[6] (alimenta quae accepimus, quamdiu in sua qualitate perdurant et solida innatant stomacho, onera sunt; at cum ex eo quod erant mutata sunt, tunc demum in vires et in sanguinem transeunt), idem in his quibus aluntur ingenia praestemus, ut quaecumque hausimus non patiamur integra esse, ne aliena sint.

[6] (the aliments which we have received, so long as they endure in their own quality and, being solid, float in the stomach, are burdens; but when they have been changed from what they were, then at last they pass into strength and into blood), let us provide the same in those things by which our talents are nourished, so that whatever we have imbibed we do not allow to remain intact, lest they be alien.

[7] Concoquamus illa; alioqui in memoriam ibunt, non in ingenium. Adsentiamur illis fideliter et nostra faciamus, ut unum quiddam fiat ex multis, sicut unus numerus fit ex singulis cum minores summas et dissidentes conputatio una conprendit. Hoc faciat animus noster: omnia quibus est adiutus abscondat, ipsum tantum ostendat quod effecit.

[7] Let us digest those things; otherwise they will go into memory, not into our native ingenium. Let us assent to them faithfully and make them ours, so that out of many there may be made one something, just as one number is made out of individual units when one computation comprehends the lesser sums and the dissenting ones. Let our mind do this: let it hide all the things by which it has been aided, and show only what it has effected.

[8] Etiam si cuius in te comparebit similitudo quem admiratio tibi altius fixerit, similem esse te volo quomodo filium, non quomodo imaginem: imago res mortua est. 'Quid ergo? non intellegetur cuius imiteris orationem?

[8] Even if a likeness of someone will appear in you whom admiration has fixed more deeply for you, I wish you to be like him as a son, not as an image: an image is a dead thing. 'What then? Will it not be understood whose oration you imitate?

cuius argumentationem? cuius sententias?' Puto aliquando ne intellegi quidem posse, si magni vir ingenii omnibus quae ex quo voluit exemplari traxit formam suam inpressit, ut in unitatem illa conpetant.

'Whose argumentation? Whose sentences?' I think that sometimes it may not even be understood, if a man of great talent has impressed his own form upon all the things which he has drawn from whatever exemplar he wished, so that those things cohere into a unity.

[9] Non vides quam multorum vocibus chorus constet? unus tamen ex omnibus redditur. Aliqua illic acuta est, aliqua gravis, aliqua media; accedunt viris feminae, interponuntur tibiae: singulorum illic latent voces, omnium apparent.

[9] Do you not see how a chorus is constituted by the voices of many? yet out of all one is rendered. Some there are acute, some grave, some middle; to the men women are added, pipes are interposed: there the voices of individuals lie hidden, the voices of all appear.

[10] De choro dico quem veteres philosophi noverant: in commissionibus nostris plus cantorum est quam in theatris olim spectatorum fuit. Cum omnes vias ordo canentium implevit et cavea aeneatoribus cincta est et ex pulpito omne tibiarum genus organorumque consonuit, fit concentus ex dissonis. Talem animum esse nostrum volo: multae in illo artes, multa praecepta sint, multarum aetatum exempla, sed in unum conspirata.

[10] I speak of the chorus which the ancient philosophers knew: at our drinking-parties there are more singers than once there were spectators in the theaters. When an order of singers has filled all the streets and the auditorium is girded with brass-players and from the stage every kind of pipes and of organs has sounded together, a concert is made out of dissonances. Such I wish our mind to be: let there be in it many arts, many precepts, examples of many ages, but conspired into one.

[11] 'Quomodo' inquis 'hoc effici poterit?' Adsidua intentione:si nihil egerimus nisi ratione suadente, nihil vitaverimus nisi ratione suadente. Hanc si audire volueris, dicet tibi: relinque ista iamdudum ad quae discurritur; relinque divitias, aut periculum possidentium aut onus; relinque corporis atque animi voluptates, molliunt et enervant; relinque ambitum, tumida res est, vana, ventosa, nullum habet terminum, tam sollicita est ne quem ante se videat quam ne secum, laborat invidia et quidem duplici. Vides autem quam miser sit si is cui invidetur et invidet.

[11] 'How,' you ask, 'will this be able to be brought about?' By assiduous intention:if we do nothing unless Reason persuades, avoid nothing unless Reason persuades. If you are willing to hear her, she will say to you: leave behind those things long since run after; leave behind riches—either a peril to their possessors or a burden; leave behind the pleasures of body and mind—they soften and enervate; leave behind ambition—an inflated thing, vain, windy; it has no terminus, and it is as anxious lest it see anyone before itself as lest it see anyone at its side; it toils under envy, and indeed a double one. And you see how miserable he is, if the one who is envied also envies.

[12] Intueris illas potentium domos, illa tumultuosa rixa salutantium limina? multum habent contumeliarum ut intres, plus cum intraveris. Praeteri istos gradus divitum et magno adgestu suspensa vestibula: non in praerupto tantum istic stabis sed in lubrico.

[12] Do you look upon those houses of the potent, those thresholds tumultuous with the brawl of the saluting? they have many contumelies for you just to enter, more once you have entered. Pass by those steps of the rich and vestibules raised up by great aggest, for there you will stand not only on a precipice but on the slippery.

Huc potius te ad sapientiam derige, tranquillissimasque res eius et simul amplissimas pete.

Direct yourself rather this way toward wisdom, and seek her most tranquil goods and at the same time the most ample.

[13] Quaecumque videntur eminere in rebus humanis, quamvis pusilla sint et comparatione humillimorum exstent, per difficiles tamen et arduos tramites adeuntur. Confragosa in fastigium dignitatis via est; at si conscendere hunc verticem libet, cui se fortuna summisit, omnia quidem sub te quae pro excelsissimis habentur aspicies, sed tamen venies ad summa per planum. Vale.

[13] Whatever things seem to be eminent in human affairs, although they are petty and stand out only by comparison with the very humblest, are nevertheless approached by difficult and arduous paths. The way to the pinnacle of dignity is rugged; but if it pleases you to climb this summit, to which Fortune has submitted herself, you will indeed behold beneath you all the things that are held as most exalted, yet you will come to the highest things over level ground. Farewell.

LXXXV. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

85. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] Peperceram tibi et quidquid nodosi adhuc supererat praeterieram, contentus quasi gustum tibi dare eorum quae a nostris dicuntur ut probetur virtus ad explendam beatam vitam sola satis efficax. Iubes me quidquid est interrogationum aut nostrarum aut ad traductionem nostram excogitatarum conprendere: quod si facere voluero, non erit epistula sed liber. Illud totiens testor, hoc me argumentorum genere non delectari; pudet in aciem descendere pro dis hominibusque susceptam subula armatum.

[1] I had spared you, and had passed over whatever knotty matter still remained, content to give you, as it were, a taste of the things said by our people, so that it may be proved that virtue alone is sufficiently efficacious to fulfill the blessed life. You bid me comprehend whatever there is of interrogations—either ours or devised for the traduction (mockery) of our doctrine; but if I should wish to do this, it will not be an epistle but a book. This I attest again and again: I do not take delight in this genus of arguments; it shames me to descend into the battle-line, undertaken on behalf of gods and men, armed with an awl.

[2] 'Qui prudens est et temperans est; qui temperans est, et constans; qui constans est inperturbatus est; qui inperturbatus est sine tristitia est; qui sine tristitia est beatus est; ergo prudens beatus est, et prudentia ad beatam vitam satis est.'

[2] 'He who is prudent is temperate; he who is temperate is constant; he who is constant is imperturbable; he who is imperturbable is without sadness; he who is without sadness is blessed; therefore the prudent man is blessed, and prudence is sufficient for a blessed life.'

[3] Huic collectioni hoc modo Peripatetici quidam respondent, ut inperturbatum et constantem et sine tristitia sic interpretentur tamquam inperturbatus dicatur qui raro perturbatur et modice, non qui numquam. Item sine tristitia eum dici aiunt qui non est obnoxius tristitiae nec frequens nimiusve in hoc vitio; illud enim humanam naturam negare, alicuius animum inmunem esse tristitia; sapientem non vinci maerore, ceterum tangi; et cetera in hunc modum sectae suae respondentia. Non his tollunt adfectus sed temperant.

[3] To this collection certain Peripatetics respond in this way: they interpret “unperturbed” and “constant” and “without sadness” thus, as if “unperturbed” is said of one who is seldom and moderately perturbed, not one who is never so. Likewise they say that “without sadness” is said of him who is not liable to sadness nor frequent or excessive in this fault; for that would be to deny human nature, that anyone’s mind is immune from sadness; the wise man is not overcome by grief, yet is touched; and the rest in this manner, answering in accordance with their sect. By these they do not remove the affections but temper them.

[4] Quantulum autem sapienti damus, si inbecillissimis fortior est et maestissimis laetior et effrenatissimis moderatior et humillimis maior! Quid si miretur velocitatem suam Ladas ad claudos debilesque respiciens?

[4] How little, however, do we grant to the wise man, if he is stronger than the most infirm, more joyful than the most mournful, more moderate than the most unbridled, and greater than the most lowly! What—would Ladas marvel at his own speed, looking back at the lame and the debilitated?

Illa vel intactae segetis per summa volaret
gramina nec cursu teneras laesisset aristas,
vel mare per medium fluctu suspensa tumenti
ferret iter, celeres nec tingueret aequore plantas.

She would either fly over the very tops of the grasses of an intact standing grain,
nor in her running would she have harmed the tender ears,
or she would carry her course through the middle of the sea, suspended on the tumid wave,
nor would she tinge her swift soles in the water.

Haec est pernicitas per se aestimata, non quae tardissimorum conlatione laudatur. Quid si sanum voces leviter febricitantem? non est bona valetudo mediocritas morbi.

This is swiftness assessed in itself, not that which is lauded by comparison with the very slowest. What if you call sound one who is lightly feverish? A mediocrity of disease is not good health.

[5] 'Sic' inquit 'sapiens inperturbatus dicitur quomodo apyrina dicuntur non quibus nulla inest duritia granorum sed quibus minor.' Falsum est. Non enim deminutionem malorum in bono viro intellego sed vacationem; nulla debent esse, non parva; nam si ulla sunt, crescent et interim inpedient. Quomodo oculos maior et perfecta suffusio excaecat, sic modica turbat.

[5] 'Thus,' he says, 'the wise man is called unperturbed in the way that pears are called apyrine—not those in which there is no hardness of the granules, but those in which it is less.' It is false. For I do not understand a diminution of evils in a good man, but a freedom from them; they ought to be none, not small; for if there are any, they will grow and meanwhile hinder. Just as a greater and perfect suffusion blinds the eyes, so a moderate one disturbs.

[6] Si das aliquos adfectus sapienti, inpar illis erit ratio et velut torrente quodam auferetur, praesertim cum illi non unum adfectum des cum quo conluctetur sed omnis. Plus potest quamvis mediocrium turba quam posset unius magni violentia.

[6] If you grant some affections (affects) to the wise man, reason will be unequal to them and will be carried off as if by a certain torrent, especially since you give to him not one affection with which he may wrestle but all. A crowd of even middling ones can do more than the violence of a single great one.

[7] Habet pecuniae cupiditatem, sed modicam; habet ambitionem, sed non concitatam; habet iracundiam, sed placabilem; habet inconstantiam, sed minus vagam ac mobilem; habet libidinem, sed non insanam. Melius cum illo ageretur qui unum vitium integrum haberet quam cum eo qui leviora quidem, sed omnia.

[7] He has a cupidity for money, but moderate; he has ambition, but not incited; he has irascibility, but placable; he has inconstancy, but less wandering and mobile; he has libido, but not insane. One would fare better with that man who had one vice entire than with him who has lighter ones indeed, but all of them.

[8] Deinde nihil interest quam magnus sit adfectus: quantuscumque est, parere nescit, consilium non accipit. Quemadmodum rationi nullum animal optemperat, non ferum, non domesticum et mite (natura enim illorum est surda suadenti), sic non sequuntur, non audiunt adfectus, quantulicumque sunt. Tigres leonesque numquam feritatem exuunt, aliquando summittunt, et cum minime expectaveris exasperatur torvitas mitigata.

[8] Then it makes no difference how great the affect is: however great it is, it does not know how to obey, it does not accept counsel. Just as no animal obeys reason, neither the feral nor the domestic and gentle (for their nature is deaf to one persuading), so the affects, however small they are, do not follow, do not hear. Tigers and lions never put off their ferocity; sometimes they lower it, and when you have least expected it the grimness, once softened, grows rough again.

Numquam bona fide vitia mansuescunt.

Vices never grow tame in good faith.

[9] Deinde, si ratio proficit, ne incipient quidem adfectus; si invita ratione coeperint, invita perseverabunt. Facilius est enim initia illorum prohibere quam impetum regere.

[9] Then, if reason makes progress, the affections (passions) will not even begin; if they have begun with reason unwilling, unwilling they will persist. For it is easier to prohibit their beginnings than to rule their onrush.

Falsa est itaque ista mediocritas et inutilis, eodem loco habenda quo si quis diceret modice insaniendum, modiceaegrotandum.

False, therefore, is this mediocrity and useless, to be held in the same place as if someone were to say that one must be moderately insane, moderately sick.

[10] Sola virtus habet, non recipiunt animi mala temperamentum; facilius sustuleris illa quam rexeris. Numquid dubium est quin vitia mentis humanae inveterata et dura, quae morbos vocamus, inmoderata sint, ut avaritia, ut crudelitas, ut inpotentia [impietas]? Ergo inmoderati sunt et adfectus; ab his enim ad illa transitur.

[10] Only virtue has it; the evils of the mind do not admit of tempering; you will more easily remove those than rule them. Is it at all doubtful that the vices of the human mind, inveterate and hard, which we call diseases, are immoderate—such as avarice, such as cruelty, such as impotence (lack of self-control), [impiety]? Therefore the affects too are immoderate; for from these one passes to those.

[11] Deinde, si das aliquid iuris tristitiae, timori, cupiditati, ceteris motibus pravis, non erunt in nostra potestate. Quare? quia extra nos sunt quibus inritantur; itaque crescent prout magnas habuerint minoresve causas quibus concitentur.

[11] Then, if you grant any right to sadness, to fear, to cupidity, to the other perverse motions, they will not be in our power. Why? Because the things by which they are irritated are outside us; and so they will grow according as they have greater or lesser causes by which they are incited.

Maior erit timor, si plus quo exterreatur aut propius aspexerit, acrior cupiditas quo illam amplioris rei spes evocaverit.

Fear will be greater, if there is more by which it may be terrified or if it has looked on more closely; cupidity will be keener, the more the hope of a greater thing has called it forth.

[12] Si in nostra potestate non est an sint adfectus, ne illud quidem est, quanti sint: si ipsis permisisti incipere, cum causis suis crescent tantique erunt quanti fient. Adice nunc quod ista, quamvis exigua sint, in maius excedunt; numquam perniciosa servant modum; quamvis levia initia morborum serpunt et aegra corpora minima interdum mergit accessio.

[12] If it is not in our power whether affections exist, then not even this is [in our power], how great they are: if you have permitted them themselves to begin, they will grow with their causes, and will be as great as they become. Add now that these, although small, pass over into something greater; pernicious things never keep a measure; however slight, the beginnings of diseases creep on, and sometimes the smallest accession overwhelms sick bodies.

[13] Illud vero cuius dementiae est, credere quarum rerum extra nostrum arbitrium posita principia sunt, earum nostri esse arbitri terminos! Quomodo ad id finiendum satis valeo ad quod prohibendum parum valui, cum facilius sit excludere quam admissa conprimere?

[13] But really, of what madness is it to believe that the beginnings of things are set outside our control, yet that of their termini we are the arbiters! How am I strong enough to bring to an end what I was too weak to forbid, since it is easier to exclude than to compress once admitted?

[14] Quidam ita distinxerunt ut dicerent, 'temperans ac prudens positione quidem mentis et habitu tranquillus est, eventu non est. Nam, quantum ad habitum mentis suae, non perturbatur nec contristatur nec timet, sed multae extrinsecus causae incidunt quae illi perturbationem adferant.'

[14] Certain have thus distinguished as to say, 'the temperate and prudent man is indeed tranquil by the position of his mind and by habit, by event he is not. For, as far as concerns the habit of his mind, he is not perturbed nor saddened nor does he fear, but many causes from without befall which bring perturbation to him.'

[15] Tale est quod volunt dicere: iracundum quidem illum non esse, irasci tamen aliquando; et timidum quidem non esse, timere tamen aliquando, id est vitio timoris carere, adfectu non carere. Quod si recipitur, usu frequenti timor transibit in vitium, et ira in animum admissa habitum illum ira carentis animi retexet.

[15] Such is what they wish to say: that he is indeed not irascible, yet sometimes grows angry; and that he is indeed not timid, yet sometimes fears—that is, he lacks the vice of fear, yet does not lack the affect. But if this is admitted, then by frequent use fear will pass over into vice, and anger, once admitted into the mind, will unweave that habit of a mind that is without anger.

[16] Praeterea si non contemnit venientes extrinsecus causas et aliquid timet, cum fortiter eundum erit adversus tela, ignes, pro patria, legibus, libertate, cunctanter exibit et animo recedente. Non cadit autem in sapientem haec diversitas mentis.

[16] Moreover, if he does not contemn the causes coming from outside and fears something, then when it will be necessary to go bravely against weapons and fires, for the fatherland, the laws, and liberty, he will go forth hesitatingly, with his spirit receding. But such a diversity of mind does not fall to a wise man.

[17] Illud praeterea iudico observandum, ne duo quae separatim probanda sunt misceamus; per se enim colligitur unum bonum esse quod honestum, per se rursus ad vitam beatam satis esse virtutem. Si unum bonum est quod honestum, omnes concedunt ad beate vivendum sufficere virtutem; e contrario non remittetur, si beatum sola virtus facit, unum bonum esse quod honestum est.

[17] Moreover I judge this to be observed, that we not mix two things which must be proved separately; for, per se, it is concluded that the one good is what is honorable, and, per se in turn, that virtue is sufficient for the happy life. If the one good is what is honorable, all concede that virtue suffices for living happily; conversely, the point will not be given up, that, if virtue alone makes one happy, the one good is what is honorable.

[18] Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse quod honestum est. Epicurus quoque iudicat, cum virtutem habeat, beatum esse, sed ipsam virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia beatum efficiat voluptas quae ex virtute est, non ipsa virtus. Inepta distinctio: idem enim negat umquam virtutem esse sine voluptate.

[18] Xenocrates and Speusippus think that one can become blessed even by virtue alone, yet not that the one good is what is honest. Epicurus likewise judges that, when one has virtue, one is blessed, but that virtue itself is not sufficient for the blessed life, because it is pleasure which is from virtue, not virtue itself, that makes one blessed. An inept distinction: for the same man denies that virtue is ever without pleasure.

Ita si ei iuncta semper est atque inseparabilis, et sola satis est; habet enim secum voluptatem, sine qua non est etiam cum sola est.

Thus, if it is always joined to it and inseparable, then it alone is sufficient; for it has pleasure with it, without which it is not, even when it is alone.

[19] Illud autem absurdum est, quod dicitur beatum quidem futurum vel sola virtute, non futurum autem perfecte beatum; quod quemadmodum fieri possit non reperio. Beata enim vita bonum in se perfectum habet, inexsuperabile; quod si est, perfecte beata est. Si deorum vita nihil habet maius aut melius, beata autem vita divina est, nihil habet in quod amplius possit attolli.

[19] But that is absurd, namely the claim that one will indeed be blessed even by virtue alone, yet will not be perfectly blessed; how that could be I do not discover. For the blessed life has within itself a good that is perfect, insuperable; and if that is so, it is perfectly blessed. If the life of the gods has nothing greater or better, and the blessed life is divine, it has nothing into which it can be lifted any further.

[20] Praeterea, si beata vita nullius est indigens, omnis beata vita perfecta est eademque est et beata et beatissima. Numquid dubitas quin beata vita summum bonum sit? ergo si summum bonum habet, summe beata est.

[20] Moreover, if the blessed life is indigent of nothing, every blessed life is perfect and is the same, both blessed and most blessed. Do you at all doubt that the blessed life is the highest good? therefore, if it has the highest good, it is supremely blessed.

Quemadmodum summum bonum adiectionem non recipit (quid enim supra summum erit?), ita ne beata quidem vita, quae sine summo bono non est. Quod si aliquem 'magis' beatum induxeris, induces et 'multo magis'; innumerabilia discrimina summi boni facies, cum summum bonum intellegam quod supra se gradum non habet.

Just as the highest good does not admit addition (for what will be above the highest?), so neither does the blessed life, which does not exist without the highest good. But if you introduce someone as 'more' blessed, you will also introduce 'much more'; you will make innumerable discriminations of the highest good, since I understand the highest good to be that which has no step above itself.

[21] Si est aliquis minus beatus quam alius, sequitur ut hic alterius vitam beatioris magis concupiscat quam suam; beatus autem nihil suae praefert. Utrumlibet ex his incredibile est, aut aliquid beato restare quod esse quam quod est malit, aut id illum non malle quod illo melius est. Utique enim quo prudentior est, hoc magis se ad id quod est optimum extendet et id omni modo consequi cupiet.

[21] If there is someone less blessed than another, it follows that he would covet another’s more blessed life rather than his own; but the blessed man prefers nothing to his own. Either of these is incredible: either that there remains to the blessed man something which he would prefer to be rather than what he is, or that he would not prefer that which is better than that. For assuredly, the more prudent he is, the more he will extend himself toward that which is optimum, and will desire to attain it in every way.

Quomodo autem beatus est qui cupere etiamnunc potest, immo qui debet?

However, how is he blessed who can even now desire, nay rather who ought to do so?

[22] Dicam quid sit ex quo veniat hic error: nesciunt beatam vitam unam esse. In optimo illam statu ponit qualitas sua, non magnitudo; itaque in aequo est longa et brevis, diffusa et angustior, in multa loca multasque partes distributa et in unum coacta. Qui illam numero aestimat et mensura et partibus, id illi quod habet eximium eripit.

[22] I will say what it is whence this error comes: they do not know that the blessed life is one. Its own quality, not magnitude, sets it in the optimal state; and thus it is on equal footing whether long or short, diffused or narrower, distributed into many places and many parts or compressed into one. He who estimates it by number and measure and parts robs it of that which it has as exceptional.

Quid autem est in beata vita eximium? quod plena est.

What, moreover, is exceptional in the blessed life? That it is full.

[23] Finis, ut puto, edendi bibendique satietas est. Hic plus edit, ille minus: quid refert? uterque iam satur est.

[23] The end, as I suppose, of eating and drinking is satiety. This one eats more, that one less: what does it matter? both are already sated.

Hic plus bibit, ille minus: quid refert? uterque non sitit. Hic pluribus annis vixit, hic paucioribus: nihil interest si tam illum multi anni beatum fecerunt quam hunc pauci.

This one drinks more, that one less: what does it matter? Neither is thirsty. This one has lived for more years, this one for fewer: it makes no difference if many years made that man as blessed as few made this one.

Ille quem tu minus beatum vocas non est beatus: non potest hoc nomen inminui.

He whom you call less blessed is not blessed: this name cannot be diminished.

[24] 'Qui fortis est sine timore est; qui sine timore est sine tristitia est; qui sine tristitia est beatus est.'

[24] 'He who is brave is without fear; he who is without fear is without sadness; he who is without sadness is blessed.'

Nostrorum haec interrogatio est. Adversus hanc sic respondere conantur: falsam nos rem et controversiosam pro confessa vindicare, eum qui fortis est sine timore esse. 'Quid ergo?' inquit 'fortis inminentia mala non timebit?

This is our interrogation. Against this they try to respond thus: that we vindicate, as confessed, a matter false and controversial, namely that he who is brave is without fear. 'What then?' he says, 'will the brave man not fear evils that are impending?

istuc dementis alienatique, non fortis est. Ille vero' inquit 'moderatissime timet, sed in totum extra metum non est.'

that is of a madman and an alienated man, not of a brave man. ‘He, indeed,’ he says, ‘fears most moderately, but he is not entirely outside fear.’

[25] Qui hoc dicunt rursus in idem revolvuntur, ut illis virtutum loco sint minora vitia; nam qui timet quidem, sed rarius et minus, non caret malitia, sed leviore vexatur. 'At enim dementem puto qui mala inminentia non extimescit.' Verum est quod dicis, si mala sunt; sed si scit mala illa non esse et unam tantum turpitudinem malum iudicat, debebit secure pericula aspicere et aliis timenda contemnere. Aut si stulti et amentis est mala non timere, quo quis prudentior est, hoc timebit magis.

[25] Those who say this roll back again into the same thing, namely, that for them lesser vices stand in the place of virtues; for he who does fear, but more rarely and less, is not free from malice, but is vexed by a lighter one. 'But indeed I reckon him demented who does not dread impending evils.' What you say is true, if they are evils; but if he knows that those are not evils and judges only turpitude to be an evil, he ought to look upon dangers securely and to contemn what is to be feared by others. Or if it is the mark of a fool and a madman not to fear evils, the more prudent anyone is, the more he will fear.

[26] 'Ut vobis' inquit 'videtur, praebebit se periculis fortis.' Minime: non timebit illa sed vitabit; cautio illum decet, timor non decet. 'Quid ergo?' inquit 'mortem, vincula, ignes, alia tela fortunae non timebit?' Non; scit enim illa non esse mala sed videri; omnia ista humanae vitae formidines putat.

[26] 'As it seems to you,' he says, 'the brave man will offer himself to perils.' By no means: he will not fear them but will avoid them; caution befits him, fear does not befit him. 'What then?' he says, 'will he not fear death, bonds, fires, the other weapons of Fortune?' No; for he knows that those are not evils but seem so; he considers all these to be the terrors of human life.

[27] Describe captivitatem, verbera, catenas, egestatem et membrorum lacerationes vel per morbum vel per iniuriam et quidquid aliud adtuleris: inter lymphatos metus numerat. Ista timidis timenda sunt. An id existimas malum ad quod aliquando nobis nostra sponte veniendum est?

[27] Describe captivity, beatings, chains, indigence, and lacerations of the limbs either through disease or through injury, and whatever else you may bring up: he numbers them among the fears of the frenzied. Those things are to be feared by the timid. Or do you suppose that an evil, to which at some time we must come of our own accord?

[28] Quaeris quid sit malum?cedere iis quae mala vocantur et illis libertatem suam dedere, pro qua cuncta patienda sunt: perit libertas nisi illa contemnimus quae nobis iugum inponunt. Non dubitarent quid conveniret forti viro si scirent quid esset fortitudo. Non est enim inconsulta temeritas nec periculorum amor nec formidabilium adpetitio: scientia est distinguendi quid sit malum et quid non sit.

[28] You ask what evil is?to yield to those things which are called evils and to hand over to them one’s liberty, for the sake of which all things are to be endured: liberty perishes unless we contemn those things which impose the yoke upon us. They would not hesitate what were fitting for a brave man if they knew what fortitude was. For it is not unadvised temerity nor love of perils nor an appetition of things to be feared: it is the science of distinguishing what is evil and what is not.

Diligentissima in tutela sui fortitudo est et eadem patientissima eorum quibus falsa species malorum est.

Fortitude is most diligent in the guardianship of itself, and the same is most patient of those things which have a false semblance of evils.

[29] 'Quid ergo? si ferrum intentatur cervicibus viri fortis, si pars subinde alia atque alia suffoditur, si viscera sua in sinu suo vidit, si ex intervallo, quo magis tormenta sentiat, repetitur et per adsiccata vulnera recens demittitur sanguis, non timet? istum tu dices nec dolere?' Iste vero dolet (sensum enim hominis nulla exuit virtus), sed non timet: invictus ex alto dolores suos spectat.

[29] 'What then? if steel is aimed at the neck of the brave man, if now this part and now that is again and again gouged, if he has seen his own viscera in his own lap, if after an interval—so that he may feel the torments the more—the torture is resumed and through dried-up wounds fresh blood is let down, does he not fear? will you say that this man does not even feel pain?' He indeed does feel pain (for no virtue strips a human being of sensation), but he does not fear: unconquered, from a height he looks upon his pains.

Quaeris quis tunc animus illi sit? qui aegrum amicum adhortantibus.

You ask what spirit he has then? That of one encouraging a sick friend.

[30] 'Quod malum est nocet; quod nocet deteriorem facit; dolor et paupertas deteriorem non faciunt; ergo mala non sunt.'

[30] 'What is evil harms; what harms makes one worse; pain and poverty do not make one worse; therefore they are not evils.'

'Falsum est' inquit 'quod proponitis; non enim, si quid nocet, etiam deteriorem facit. Tempestas et procella nocet gubernatori, non tamen illum deteriorem facit.'

'It is false,' he says, 'what you propose; for it is not the case that, if something harms, it also makes one worse. A tempest and a squall harm the helmsman, yet they do not make him worse.'

[31] Quidam e Stoicis ita adversus hoc respondent: deteriorem fieri gubernatorem tempestate ac procella, quia non possit id quod proposuit efficere nec tenere cursum suum; deteriorem illum in arte sua non fieri, in opere fieri. Quibus Peripateticus 'ergo' inquit 'et sapientem deteriorem faciet paupertas, dolor, et quidquid aliud tale fuerit; virtutem enim illi non eripiet, sed opera eius inpediet'.

[31] Certain of the Stoics reply thus against this: that the helmsman becomes worse by a tempest and a squall, because he cannot accomplish what he has proposed nor hold his course; that he is not made worse in his art, but in his work. To which the Peripatetic says, 'therefore poverty, pain, and whatever else of such a kind there shall be, will make even the wise man worse; for it will not tear virtue away from him, but it will impede his works'.

[32] Hoc recte diceretur nisi dissimilis esset gubernatoris condicio et sapientis. Huic enim propositum est in vita agenda non utique quod temptat efficere, sed omnia recte facere: gubernatori propositum est utique navem in portum perducere. Artes ministrae sunt, praestare debent quod promittunt, sapientia domina rectrixque est; artes serviunt vitae, sapientia imperat.

[32] This would be said rightly, were not the condition of the helmsman and of the wise man dissimilar. For to the latter the purpose is, in the conduct of life, not necessarily to effect what he attempts, but to do all things rightly; to the helmsman the purpose is, certainly, to bring the ship into harbor. The arts are handmaids, they ought to perform what they promise; wisdom is mistress and rectrix; the arts serve life, wisdom commands.

[33] Ego aliter respondendum iudico: nec artem gubernatoris deteriorem ulla tempestate fieri nec ipsam administrationem artis. Gubernator tibi non felicitatem promisit sed utilem operam et navis regendae scientiam; haec eo magis apparet quo illi magis aliqua fortuita vis obstitit. Qui hoc potuit dicere, 'Neptune, numquam hanc navem nisi rectam', arti satis fecit: tempestas non opus gubernatoris inpedit sed successum.

[33] I judge that it must be answered otherwise: neither is the art of the helmsman made worse by any storm, nor the very administration of the art. The helmsman promised you not felicity but useful service and the knowledge of governing a ship; these appear all the more, the more some fortuitous force has opposed him. He who could say this, 'Neptune, never this ship except straight,' has satisfied the art: the storm does not impede the work of the helmsman but the success.

[34] 'Quid ergo?' inquit 'non nocet gubernatori ea res quae illum tenere portum vetat, quae conatus eius inritos efficit, quae aut refert illum aut detinet et exarmat?' Non tamquam gubernatori, sed tamquam naviganti nocet: alioqui Gubernatoris artem adeo non inpedit ut ostendat; tranquillo enim, ut aiunt, quilibet gubernator est. Navigio ista obsunt, non rectori eius, qua rector est.

[34] 'What then?' he says, 'does not that thing harm the helmsman which forbids him to hold the harbor, which makes his efforts ineffectual, which either drives him back or detains and disarms him?' It harms him not as helmsman, but as a sailor; otherwise So far from impeding the helmsman’s art, it displays it; for, as they say, in a calm anyone is a helmsman. These things are detrimental to the ship, not to its ruler, insofar as he is ruler.

[35] Duas personas habet gubernator, alteram communem cum omnibus qui eandem conscenderunt navem: ipse quoque vector est; alteram propriam: gubernator est. Tempestas tamquam vectori nocet, non tamquam gubernatori.

[35] The helmsman has two personae, one common with all who have boarded the same ship: he too is a passenger; the other his own: he is the helmsman. The storm harms him as a passenger, not as a helmsman.

[36] Deinde gubernatoris ars alienum bonum est: ad eos quos vehit pertinet, quomodo medici ad eos quos curat: commune bonum est: et eorum cum quibus vivit et proprium ipsius. Itaque gubernatori fortasse noceatur cuius ministerium aliis promissum tempestate inpeditur:

[36] Then the helmsman’s art is another’s good: it pertains to those whom he conveys, just as the physician’s to those whom he cures: is a common good: both of those with whom he lives and proper to himself. And so perhaps harm is done to the helmsman, whose service promised to others is impeded by a storm:

[37] sapienti non nocetur a paupertate, non a dolore, non ab aliis tempestatibus vitae. Non enim prohibentur opera eius omnia, sed tantum ad alios pertinentia: ipse semper in actu est, in effectu tunc maximus cum illi fortuna se opposuit; tunc enim ipsius sapientiae negotium agit, quam diximus et alienum bonum esse et suum.

[37] The wise man is not harmed by poverty, not by pain, not by other tempests of life. For not all his operations are prohibited, but only those pertaining to others: he himself is always in act, in effect then greatest when Fortune has set herself against him; for then he conducts the very business of his wisdom, which we have said is both another’s good and his own.

[38] Praeterea ne aliis quidem tunc prodesse prohibetur cum illum aliquae necessitates premunt. Propter paupertatem prohibetur docere quemadmodum tractanda res publica sit, at illud docet, quemadmodum sit tractanda paupertas. Per totam vitam opus eius extenditur.

[38] Moreover, not even then is he prohibited from benefiting others when some necessities press him. On account of poverty he is prohibited from teaching how the republic ought to be handled, but this he teaches: how poverty ought to be handled. Through his whole life his work extends.

Ita nulla fortuna, nulla res actus sapientis excludit; id enim ipsum agit quo alia agere prohibetur. Ad utrosque casus aptatus est: bonorum rector est, malorum victor.

Thus no fortune, no thing excludes the wise man’s activity; for he does that very work by which he is prohibited from doing other things. He is adapted to both contingencies: a ruler of good things, a victor over bad.

[39] Sic, inquam, se exercuit ut virtutem tam in secundis quam in adversis exhiberet nec materiam eius sed ipsam intueretur; itaque nec paupertas illum nec dolor nec quidquid aliud inperitos avertit et praecipites agit prohibet.

[39] Thus, I say, he exercised himself so as to exhibit virtue both in favorable and in adverse circumstances, and to regard not its material but the thing itself; and so neither poverty nor pain nor whatever else averts the inexperienced and drives them headlong prevents him.

[40] Tu illum premi putas malis? utitur. Non ex ebore tantum Phidias sciebat facere simulacra; faciebat ex aere.

[40] Do you think him to be pressed by evils? He makes use of them. Phidias knew how to fashion simulacra not only from ivory; he fashioned them from bronze.

Si marmor illi, si adhuc viliorem materiam obtulisses, fecisset quale ex illa fieri optimum posset. Sic sapiens virtutem, si licebit, in divitiis explicabit, si minus, in paupertate; si poterit, in patria, si minus, in exilio; si poterit, imperator, si minus, miles; si poterit, integer, si minus, debilis. Quamcumque fortunam acceperit, aliquid ex illa memorabile efficiet.

If you had offered him marble, or even a cheaper material, he would have fashioned from it what best could be made from it. So the wise man will display virtue, if it is permitted, in riches; if not, in poverty; if he can, in his fatherland, if not, in exile; if he can, as commander, if not, as soldier; if he can, sound, if not, debilitated. Whatever fortune he shall have received, he will make something memorable out of it.

[41] Certi sunt domitores ferarum qui saevissima animalia et ad occursum expavescenda hominem pati subigunt nec asperitatem excussisse contenti usque in contubernium mitigant: leonis faucibus magister manum insertat, osculatur tigrim suus custos, elephantum minimus Aethiops iubet subsidere in genua et ambulare per funem. Sic sapiens artifex est domandi mala: dolor, egestas, ignominia, carcer, exilium ubique horrenda, cum ad hunc pervenere, mansueta sunt. Vale.

[41] There are certain tamers of wild beasts who subdue even the most savage animals, to be dreaded at an encounter, to endure a human being, and, not content with having shaken off their fierceness, they soften them even into companionship: the trainer inserts his hand into the lion’s jaws, its keeper kisses the tiger, the tiniest Ethiopian bids the elephant sink down upon its knees and walk along a rope. Thus the wise man is an artificer of taming evils: pain, poverty, ignominy, prison, exile—things dreadful everywhere—when they have come to him, are tame. Farewell.

LXXXVI. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

86. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] In ipsa Scipionis Africani villa iacens haec tibi scribo, adoratis manibus eius et ara, quam sepulchrum esse tanti viri suspicor. Animum quidem eius in caelum ex quo erat redisse persuadeo mihi, non quia magnos exercitus duxit (hos enim et Cambyses furiosus ac furore feliciter usus habuit), sed ob egregiam moderationem pietatemque, quam magis in illo admirabilem iudico cum reliquit patriam quam cum defendit. Aut Scipio Romae esse debebat aut Roma in libertate.

[1] Lying in the very villa of Scipio Africanus, I write these things to you, after having adored his Manes and the altar, which I suspect to be the tomb of so great a man. I persuade myself that his spirit returned to the heaven whence it came, not because he led great armies (for even the furious Cambyses both had these and, being fortunate in his fury, used them), but on account of his outstanding moderation and piety, which I judge more admirable in him when he left his fatherland than when he defended it. Either Scipio ought to have been at Rome, or Rome in liberty.

[2] 'Nihil' inquit 'volo derogare legibus, nihil institutis; aequum inter omnes cives ius sit. Utere sine me beneficio meo, patria. Causa tibi libertatis fui, ero et argumentum: exeo, si plus quam tibi expedit crevi.'

[2] 'Nothing,' he said, 'do I wish to derogate from the laws, nothing from the institutions; let there be an equal right among all citizens. Use without me my benefit, fatherland. I have been for you the cause of liberty, and I shall be an argument as well: I depart, if I have grown more than is expedient for you.'

[3] Quidni ego admirer hanc magnitudinem animi, qua in exilium voluntarium secessit et civitatem exoneravit? Eo perducta res erat ut aut libertas Scipioni aut Scipio libertati faceret iniuriam. Neutrum fas erat; itaque locum dedit legibus et se Liternum recepit tam suum exilium rei publicae inputaturus quam Hannibalis.

[3] Why should I not admire this greatness of spirit, whereby he withdrew into voluntary exile and unburdened the commonwealth? The matter had been brought to the point that either liberty would do an injury to Scipio or Scipio to liberty. Neither was permissible; and so he gave place to the laws and betook himself to Liternum, intending to charge his own exile to the Republic’s account no less than Hannibal’s.

[4] Vidi villam extructam lapide quadrato, murum circumdatum silvae, turres quoque in propugnaculum villae utrimque subrectas, cisternam aedificiis ac viridibus subditam quae sufficere in usum vel exercitus posset, balneolum angustum, tenebricosum ex consuetudine antiqua: non videbatur maioribus nostris caldum nisi obscurum.

[4] I saw a villa built of squared stone, a wall encompassed around the woodland, and towers too raised on either side as a bulwark of the villa, a cistern set beneath the edifices and the greenery, which could suffice for the use even of an army, a narrow, tenebrous little bath, in accordance with ancient custom: to our elders a hot bath did not seem hot unless it was obscure.

[5] Magna ergo me voluptas subiit contemplantem mores Scipionis ac nostros: in hoc angulo ille 'Carthaginis horror', cui Roma debet quod tantum semel capta est, abluebat corpus laboribus rusticis fessum. Exercebat enim opere se terramque (ut mos fuit priscis) ipse subigebat. Sub hoc ille tecto tam sordido stetit, hoc illum pavimentum tam vile sustinuit: at nunc quis est qui sic lavari sustineat?

[5] A great pleasure therefore came over me as I was contemplating the manners of Scipio and our own: in this corner that “terror of Carthage,” to whom Rome owes that it was taken only once, was washing off his body wearied by rustic labors. For he exercised himself with work and the land (as was the custom for the ancients) he himself subdued. Beneath this roof so sordid he stood, this floor so cheap supported him: but now who is there who would endure to be washed thus?

[6] Pauper sibi videtur ac sordidus nisi parietes magnis et pretiosis orbibus refulserunt, nisi Alexandrina marmora Numidicis crustis distincta sunt, nisi illis undique operosa et in picturae modum variata circumlitio praetexitur, nisi vitro absconditur camera, nisi Thasius lapis, quondam rarum in aliquo spectaculum templo, piscinas nostras circumdedit, in quas multa sudatione corpora exsaniata demittimus, nisi aquam argentea epitonia fuderunt.

[6] He seems poor and filthy to himself unless the walls have flashed with great and precious disks, unless Alexandrian marbles have been distinguished with Numidian crusts, unless an elaborate stucco-work, everywhere and varied in the mode of painting, is woven in front of them, unless the vault is hidden with glass, unless Thasian stone, once a rare spectacle in some temple, has surrounded our pools, into which we send down bodies exsanguinated by much sweating, unless silver taps have poured the water.

[7] Et adhuc plebeias fistulas loquor: quid cum ad balnea libertinorum pervenero? Quantum statuarum, quantum columnarum est nihil sustinentium sed in ornamentum positarum impensae causa! quantum aquarum per gradus cum fragore labentium!

[7] And I am still speaking of plebeian pipes: what then when I come to the baths of the freedmen? How many statues, how many columns there are—sustaining nothing, but set up for ornament for the sake of expenditure! how much water, pouring down the steps with a roar!

Eo deliciarum pervenimus ut nisi gemmas calcare nolimus.

We have arrived at such a pitch of delights that we are unwilling to tread on anything unless upon gems.

[8] In hoc balneo Scipionis minimae sunt rimae magis quam fenestrae muro lapideo exsectae, ut sine iniuria munimenti lumen admitterent; at nunc blattaria vocant balnea, si qua non ita aptata sunt ut totius diei solem fenestris amplissimis recipiant, nisi et lavantur simul et colorantur, nisi ex solio agros ac maria prospiciunt. Itaque quae concursum et admirationem habuerant cum dedicarentur, ea in antiquorum numerum reiciuntur cum aliquid novi luxuria commenta est quo ipsa se obrueret.

[8] In this bath of Scipio there are very small slits rather than windows, cut out in the stone wall, so that they might admit light without injury to the fortification; but now they call baths “cockroach-places” (blattaria) if any are not fitted so as to receive the sun of the whole day through very ample windows, unless people both bathe and are colored at the same time, unless from the couch they look out over fields and seas. And so those which had had a rush and admiration when they were dedicated are cast into the number of the ancients whenever Luxury has devised something new with which to bury itself.

[9] At olim et pauca erant balnea nec ullo cultu exornata: cur enim exornaretur res quadrantaria et in usum, non in oblectamentum reperta? Non suffundebatur aqua nec recens semper velut ex calido fonte currebat, nec referre credebant in quam perlucida sordes deponerent.

[9] But formerly baths were few and not embellished with any refinement: for why should a thing costing a quadrans be adorned, discovered for use, not for oblectation? Water was not poured over one, nor did it always run fresh as if from a hot spring, nor did they believe it mattered in how pellucid a water they set down their filth.

[10] Sed, di boni, quam iuvat illa balinea intrare obscura et gregali tectorio inducta, quae scires Catonem tibi aedilem aut Fabium Maximum aut ex Corneliis aliquem manu sua temperasse! Nam hoc quoque nobilissimi aediles fungebantur officio intrandi ea loca quae populum receptabant exigendique munditias et utilem ac salubrem temperaturam, non hanc quae nuper inventa est similis incendio, adeo quidem ut convictum in aliquo scelere servum vivum lavari oporteat. Nihil mihi videtur iam interesse, ardeat balineum an caleat.

[10] But, good gods, how it delights to enter those bathhouses, dark and overlaid with common plaster, which you would know that Cato as your aedile, or Fabius Maximus, or someone of the Cornelii, had tempered with his own hand! For even this office the most noble aediles discharged: to enter those places which received the people and to exact cleanliness and a useful and salubrious temperature—not this sort which has been lately invented, similar to a conflagration, indeed to such a degree that a slave convicted in some crime ought to be washed alive. It now seems to me to make no difference whether the bath blazes or is merely hot.

[11] Quantae nunc aliqui rusticitatis damnant Scipionem quod non in caldarium suum latis specularibus diem admiserat, quod non in multa luce decoquebatur et expectabat ut in balneo concoqueret! O hominem calamitosum! nesciit vivere.

[11] How many nowadays condemn Scipio for rusticity, because he had not admitted day into his caldarium with broad specular panes, because he was not being boiled down in abundant light, nor did he wait to digest in the bath! O calamitous man! he did not know how to live.

Non saccata aqua lavabatur sed saepe turbida et, cum plueret vehementius, paene lutulenta. Nec multum eius intererat an sic lavaretur; veniebat enim ut sudorem illic ablueret, non ut unguentum.

He did not bathe in sack-strained water but often in turbid water and, when it rained more vehemently, almost muddy. Nor did it matter much to him whether he were washed thus; for he came there to wash off sweat, not unguent.

[12] Quas nunc quorundam voces futuras credis? 'Non invideo Scipioni: vere in exilio vixit qui sic lavabatur.' Immo, si scias, non cotidie lavabatur; nam, ut aiunt qui priscos mores urbis tradiderunt, brachia et crura cotidie abluebant, quae scilicet sordes opere collegerant, ceterum toti nundinis lavabantur. Hoc loco dicet aliquis: 'liquet mihi inmundissimos fuisse'. Quid putas illos oluisse?

[12] What sayings of certain persons do you think will be forthcoming now? 'I do not envy Scipio: truly he lived in exile who was bathed thus.' Nay rather, if you should know, he did not bathe every day; for, as those who have transmitted the ancient customs of the city say, they washed their arms and legs daily, which of course had collected filth by work, but otherwise they bathed the whole body on the nundinae (market-days). At this point someone will say: 'it is clear to me that they were most unclean.' What do you think they smelled of?

militiam, laborem, virum. Postquam munda balnea inventa sunt, spurciores sunt.

military service, labor, the man. After clean bathhouses were invented, they are filthier.

[13] Descripturus infamem et nimiis notabilem deliciis Horatius Flaccus quid ait?

[13] Intending to describe one infamous and notable for excessive luxuries, what does Horace Flaccus say?

Pastillos Buccillus olet.

Buccillus smells of pastilles.

Dares nunc Buccillum: proinde esset ac si hircum oleret, Gargonii loco esset, quem idem Horatius Buccillo opposuit. Parum est sumere unguentum nisi bis die terque renovatur, ne evanescat in corpore. Quid quod hoc odore tamquam suo gloriantur?

You would now bring up Buccillus; accordingly it would be as if he smelled of a he-goat, he would be in the place of Gargonius, whom the same Horace set over against Buccillus. It is too little to take unguent unless it is renewed twice or even thrice a day, lest it evanesce upon the body. What of the fact that they boast in this odor as though it were their own?

[14] Haec si tibi nimium tristia videbuntur, villae inputabis, in qua didici ab Aegialo, diligentissimo patre familiae (is enim nunc huius agri possessor est) quamvis vetus arbustum posse transferri. Hoc nobis senibus discere necessarium est, quorum nemo non olivetum alteri ponit, ~quod vidi illud arborum trimum et quadrimum fastidiendi fructus aut deponere.~

[14] If these things will seem to you too gloomy, you will impute it to the villa, in which I learned from Aegialus, a most diligent paterfamilias (for he is now the possessor of this field), that even an old arbustum can be transplanted. This it is necessary for us old men to learn, each of whom plants an olive-grove for another, ~which I saw, that practice for trees of the third and fourth year, of spurning the fruits or removing them.~

[15] Te quoque proteget illa quae

[15] It too will protect you, that which

tarda venit seris factura nepotibus umbram,

tardy it comes, destined to make shade for late-born grandchildren,

ut ait Vergilius noster, qui non quid verissime sed quid decentissime diceretur aspexit, nec agricolas docere voluit sed legentes delectare.

as our Vergil says, who regarded not what would be said most truly but what would be said most decently, nor did he wish to instruct farmers but to delight readers.

[16] Nam, ut alia omnia transeam, hoc quod mihi hodie necesse fuit deprehendere, adscribam:

[16] For, to pass over all other things, I will set down this which it was necessary for me today to apprehend:

vere fabis satio est; tunc te quoque, Medica, putres
accipiunt sulci, et milio venit annua cura.

in spring the sowing is for beans; then you too, Medick, the mellowed
furrows receive, and for millet the annual care comes.

An uno tempore ista ponenda sint et an utriusque verna sit satio, hinc aestimes licet: Iunius mensis est quo tibi scribo, iam proclivis in Iulium: eodem die vidi fabam metentes, milium serentes.

Whether these should be planted at one time and whether the vernal sowing belongs to each, from this you may estimate: it is the month of June in which I write to you, already inclining toward July: on the same day I saw beans being reaped, millet being sown.

[17] Ad olivetum revertar, quod vidi duobus modis positum: magnarum arborum truncos circumcisis ramis et ad unum redactis pedem cum rapo suo transtulit, amputatis radicibus, relicto tantum capite ipso ex quo illae pependerant. Hoc fimo tinctum in scrobem demisit, deinde terram non adgessit tantum, sed calcavit et pressit.

[17] I will return to the olive-grove, which I have seen set up in two ways: he transferred the trunks of great trees, the branches cut off and reduced to one, moving the foot together with its root-knob (rapum), the roots amputated, with only the very head left from which they had hung. This, smeared with manure, he lowered into a pit; then he not only heaped earth upon it, but trod it and pressed it.

[18] Negat quicquam esse hac, ut ait, pisatione efficacius. Videlicet frigus excludit et ventum; minus praeterea movetur et ob hoc nascentes radices prodire patitur ac solum adprendere, quas necesse est cereas adhuc et precario haerentes levis quoque revellat agitatio. Rapum autem arboris antequam obruat radit; ex omni enim materia quae nudata est, ut ait, radices exeunt novae.

[18] He says that nothing is more efficacious than this, as he puts it, pisation. Evidently it shuts out cold and wind; besides, it is moved less and on this account it allows the nascent roots to come forth and to take hold of the soil, which, being still waxen and adhering precariously, even a slight agitation would tear away. Moreover, before he buries it, he scrapes the tree’s root-bulb (rapum); for from every part of the material that has been laid bare, as he says, new roots issue.

Non plures autem super terram eminere debet truncus quam tres aut quattuor pedes; statim enim ab imo vestietur nec magna pars eius quemadmodum in olivetis veteribus arida et retorrida erit.

Moreover, the trunk ought not to project above the ground more than three or four feet; for straightway it will be clothed from the base, nor will a large part of it, as in old olive-groves, be arid and torrid.

[19] Alter ponendi modus hic fuit: ramos fortes nec corticis duri, quales esse novellarum arborum solent, eodem genere deposuit. Hi paulo tardius surgunt, sed cum tamquam a planta processerint, nihil habent in se abhorridum aut triste.

[19] Another method of planting was this: he deposited strong branches not of hard bark, such as are wont to be of young trees, in the same manner. These arise a little more slowly, but when they have proceeded as if from a planted stock, they have nothing in them harsh or grim.

[20] Illud etiamnunc vidi, vitem ex arbusto suo annosam transferri; huius capillamenta quoque, si fieri potest, colligenda sunt, deinde liberalius sternenda vitis, ut etiam ex corpore radicescat. Et vidi non tantum mense Februario positas sed etiam Martio exacto; tenent et conplexae sunt non suas ulmos.

[20] I have even now seen an aged vine transferred from its own arbustum; its capillary rootlets too, if it can be done, should be gathered, then the vine should be laid down more liberally, so that it may put out roots even from its very body. And I have seen them set not only in the month of February but even with March elapsed; they take hold and have embraced elms not their own.

[21] Omnes autem istas arbores quae, ut ita dicam, grandiscapiae sunt, ait aqua adiuvandas cisternina; quae si prodest, habemus pluviam in nostra potestate.

[21] But all those trees which, so to speak, are large-stemmed, he says, are to be aided by cistern water; if this profits, we have rain in our power.

Plura te docere non cogito, ne quemadmodum Aegialus me sibi adversarium paravit, sic ego parem te mihi. Vale.

I do not intend to teach you more, lest, just as Aegialus prepared me as an adversary for himself, so I prepare you as a match for me. Farewell.

LXXXVII. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

87. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] Naufragium antequam navem ascenderem feci: quomodo acciderit non adicio, ne et hoc putes inter Stoica paradoxa ponendum, quorum nullum esse falsum nec tam mirabile quam prima facie videtur, cum volueris, adprobabo, immo etiam si nolueris.

[1] I made a shipwreck before I boarded the ship: how it befell I do not add, lest you think this too is to be put among the Stoic paradoxes, of which none is false nor so marvelous as at prima facie it seems; when you wish, I will prove it—nay, even if you do not wish.

Interim hoc me iter docuit quam multa haberemus supervacua et quam facile iudicio possemus deponere quae, si quando necessitas abstulit, non sentimus ablata.

Meanwhile this journey taught me how many superfluous things we had, and how easily by judgment we could put down those which, if ever necessity carried them off, we do not feel as removed.

[2] Cum paucissimis servis, quos unum capere vehiculum potuit, sine ullis rebus nisi quae corpore nostro continebantur, ego et Maximus meus biduum iam beatissimum agimus. Culcita in terra iacet, ego in culcita; ex duabus paenulis altera stragulum, altera opertorium facta est.

[2] With very few servants, whom a single vehicle could take in, without any things except those that were contained on our body, I and my Maximus are now spending a most blessed two days. A mattress lies on the ground, I on the mattress; out of two paenulas one has been made a bedspread, the other a coverlet.

[3] De prandio nihil detrahi potuit; paratum fuit ~non magis hora~, nusquam sine caricis, numquam sine pugillaribus; illae, si panem habeo, pro pulmentario sunt, si non habeo, pro pane. Cotidie mihi annum novum faciunt, quem ego faustum et felicem reddo bonis cogitationibus et animi magnitudine, qui numquam maior est quam ubi aliena seposuit et fecit sibi pacem nihil timendo, fecit sibi divitias nihil concupiscendo.

[3] Nothing could be deducted from the luncheon; it was prepared ~not more by the hour~, nowhere without dried figs, never without writing tablets; those—if I have bread—serve as a relish; if I do not have, as bread. Every day they make for me a New Year, which I render auspicious and felicitous by good cogitations and by greatness of spirit, which is never greater than when it has set aside what is others’ (externals) and has made peace for itself by fearing nothing, has made riches for itself by coveting nothing.

[4] Vehiculum in quod inpositus sum rusticum est; mulae vivere se ambulando testantur; mulio excalceatus, non propter aestatem. Vix a me obtineo ut hoc vehiculum velim videri meum: durat adhuc perversa recti verecundia, et quotiens in aliquem comitatum lautiorem incidimus invitus erubesco, quod argumentum est ista quae probo, quae laudo, nondum habere certam sedem et immobilem. Qui sordido vehiculo erubescit pretioso gloriabitur.

[4] The vehicle in which I have been set is rustic; the mules testify that they are alive by walking; the muleteer is unshod, not on account of the summer. I scarcely prevail upon myself to wish this vehicle to seem mine: the perverse bashfulness of rectitude still endures, and whenever we fall in with some more elegant entourage I blush against my will, which is evidence that the things which I approve, which I praise, do not yet have a fixed and immovable seat. He who blushes at a sordid vehicle will boast of a precious one.

[5] Parum adhuc profeci: nondum audeo frugalitatem palam ferre; etiamnunc curo opiniones viatorum.

[5] I have made too little progress thus far: I do not yet dare to bear frugality openly; even now I care about the opinions of travelers.

Contra totius generis humani opiniones mittenda vox erat: 'insanitis, erratis, stupetis ad supervacua, neminem aestimatis suo. Cum ad patrimonium ventum est, diligentissimi conputatores sic rationem ponitis singulorum quibus aut pecuniam credituri estis aut beneficia (nam haec quoque iam expensa fertis):

Against the opinions of the whole human race a voice had to be sent forth: 'you are insane, you err, you are stupefied at superfluous things, you value no one by his own worth. When it comes to patrimony, as most diligent calculators you thus set the account of individuals to whom you are either about to credit money or to extend benefits (for you now also carry these too as expenses):

[6] late possidet, sed multum debet; habet domum formosam, sed alienis nummis paratam; familiam nemo cito speciosiorem producet, sed nominibus non respondet; si creditoribus solverit, nihil illi supererit. Idem in reliquis quoque facere debebitis et excutere quantum proprii quisque habeat.'

[6] he possesses widely, but he owes much; he has a beautiful house, but prepared with others’ coin; no one will readily produce a more specious household, but it does not correspond to the names in the account-books; if he pays his creditors, nothing will remain to him. You ought to do the same in the other cases as well, and examine how much of his own each person has.'

[7] Divitem illum putas quia aurea supellex etiam in via sequitur, quia in omnibus provinciis arat, quia magnus kalendari liber volvitur, quia tantum suburbani agri possidet quantum invidiose in desertis Apuliae possideret: cum omnia dixeris, pauper est. Quare? quia debet.

[7] You think him rich because golden furnishings even follow him on the road, because he ploughs in all the provinces, because a great Kalends-ledger is turned, because he possesses as much suburban land as he would possess—provoking envy—in the deserts of Apulia: when you have said it all, he is poor. Why? Because he is in debt.

'Quantum?' inquis. Omnia; nisi forte iudicas interesse utrum aliquis ab homine an a fortuna mutuum sumpserit.

'How much?' you ask. Everything; unless perhaps you judge it makes a difference whether someone has taken a loan from a man or from Fortune.

[8] Quid ad rem pertinent mulae saginatae unius omnes coloris? quid ista vehicula caelata?

[8] What have fattened mules, all of one color, to do with the matter? What about those engraved vehicles?

Instratos ostro alipedes pictisque tapetis:
aurea pectoribus demissa monilia pendent,
tecti auro fulvum mandunt sub dentibus aurum.

Strewn with purple and painted tapestries the wing-footed:
golden necklaces, let down upon their breasts, hang,
covered with gold, they chew tawny gold beneath their teeth.

Ista nec dominum meliorem possunt facere nec mulam.

These things can make neither the master nor the mule better.

[9] M. Cato Censorius, quem tam e re publica fuit nasci quam Scipionem (alter enim cum hostibus nostris bellum, alter cum moribus gessit), cantherio vehebatur et hippoperis quidem inpositis, ut secum utilia portaret. O quam cuperem illi nunc occurrere aliquem ex his trossulis, in via divitibus, cursores et Numidas et multum ante se pulveris agentem! Hic sine dubio cultior comitatiorque quam M. Cato videretur, hic qui inter illos apparatus delicatos cum maxime dubitat utrum se ad gladium locet an ad cultrum.

[9] M. Cato the Censor, whose being born was as much in the interest of the commonwealth as Scipio’s (for the one waged war with our enemies, the other with morals), rode a gelding, and indeed with hippoperas set on, so that he might carry useful things with him. O how I would like some one of these “trossuli” to meet him now, one of the rich men on the road, driving before him runners and Numidians and a great cloud of dust! This fellow would, without doubt, seem more groomed and more accompanied than M. Cato, this man who, amid those dainty equipages, is just now debating most of all whether to hire himself out to the sword or to the knife.

[10] O quantum erat saeculi decus, imperatorem, triumphalem, censorium, quod super omnia haec est, Catonem, uno caballo esse contentum et ne toto quidem; partem enim sarcinae ab utroque latere dependentes occupabant. Ita non omnibus obesis mannis et asturconibus et tolutariis praeferres unicum illum equum ab ipso Catone defrictum?

[10] O how great was the ornament of the age, that Cato— a commander, a triumphal, a censorial, and, which is above all these, Cato— was content with one horse, and not even the whole of it; for part of the baggage, hanging down from either side, occupied it. Thus would you not prefer that single horse, rubbed down by Cato himself, to all the plump ponies and Asturcones and tolutarii?

[11] Video non futurum finem in ista materia ullum nisi quem ipse mihi fecero. Hic itaque conticiscam, quantum ad ista quae sine dubio talia divinavit futura qualia nunc sunt qui primus appellavit 'inpedimenta'. Nunc volo paucissimas adhuc interrogationes nostrorum tibi reddere ad virtutem pertinentes, quam satisfacere vitae beatae contendimus.

[11] I see there will be no end in that subject except the one I shall make for myself. Here therefore I will fall silent, so far as concerns those things which, without a doubt, he who first called them 'impediments' divined would be such as they now are. Now I wish to put to you, for the present, a very few of our questions pertaining to virtue, which we contend to make suffice for the blessed life.

[12] 'Quod bonum est bonos facit (nam et in arte musica quod bonum est facit musicum); fortuita bonum non faciunt; ergo non sunt bona.'

[12] 'What is good makes good men (for even in the musical art, what is good makes a musician); fortuitous things do not make one good; therefore they are not good.'

Adversus hoc sic respondent Peripatetici ut quod primum proponimus falsum esse dicant. 'Ab eo' inquiunt 'quod est bonum non utique fiunt boni. In musica est aliquid bonum tamquam tibia aut chorda aut organum aliquod aptatum ad usus canendi; nihil tamen horum facit musicum.'

Against this the Peripatetics respond thus, that what we first propose they say to be false. 'From that,' they say, 'which is good, people are not necessarily made good. In music there is something good, such as a pipe or a string or some organ fitted for the uses of playing; yet none of these makes a musician.'

[13] His respondebimus, 'non intellegitis quomodo posuerimus quod bonum est in musica. Non enim id dicimus quod instruit musicum, sed quod facit: tu ad supellectilem artis, non ad artem venis. Si quid autem in ipsa arte musica bonum est, id utique musicum faciet.'

[13] We will answer them, 'you do not understand how we have posited what is good in music. For we are not saying what instructs the musician, but what makes him: you are coming to the equipment of the art, not to the art. But if there is anything good in the very art of music itself, that assuredly will make a musician.'

[14] Etiamnunc facere istuc planius volo. Bonum in arte musica duobus modis dicitur, alterum quo effectus musici adiuvatur, alterum quo ars: ad effectum pertinent instrumenta, tibiae et organa et chordae, ad artem ipsam non pertinent. Est enim artifex etiam sine istis: uti forsitan non potest arte.

[14] Even now I want to make that more plain. The good in the musical art is said in two ways, one by which the musical effect is aided, the other by which the art is; to the effect pertain the instruments, pipes and organs and strings, to the art itself they do not pertain. For the artificer exists even without these: perhaps he cannot use the art.

Hoc non est aeque duplex in homine; idem enim est bonum et hominis et vitae.

This is not equally twofold in man; for the same thing is the good both of the man and of life.

[15] 'Quod contemptissimo cuique contingere ac turpissimo potest bonum non est; opes autem et lenoni et lanistae contingunt; ergo non sunt bona.'

[15] 'That which can befall anyone, even the most contemptible and the most base, is not a good; but riches do befall both the pimp and the gladiator-trainer; therefore they are not goods.'

'Falsum est' inquiunt 'quod proponitis; nam et in grammatice et in arte medendi aut gubernandi videmus bona humillimis quibusque contingere.'

'It is false,' they say, 'what you propose; for both in grammar and in the art of healing or of governing we see goods befall the very lowliest of people.'

[16] Sed istae artes non sunt magnitudinem animi professae, non consurgunt in altum nec fortuita fastidiunt: virtus extollit hominem et super cara mortalibus conlocat; nec ea quae bona nec ea quae mala vocantur aut cupit nimis aut expavescit. Chelidon, unus ex Cleopatrae mollibus, atrimonium grande possedit. Nuper Natalis, tam inprobae linguae quam inpurae, in cuius ore feminae purgabantur, et multorum heres fuit et multos habuit heredes.

[16] But those arts have not professed magnitude of mind, they do not rise up on high nor disdain fortuitous things: virtue extols a man and places him above what is dear to mortals; and it neither too much desires those things which are called good nor is it terror-stricken at those which are called bad. Chelidon, one of Cleopatra’s soft favorites, possessed a great patrimony. Lately Natalis, of a tongue as shameless as it was impure, in whose mouth women were “purified,” was both the heir of many and had many heirs.

Quid ergo? utrum illum pecunia inpurum effecit an ipse pecuniam inspurcavit? quae sic in quosdam homines quomodo denarius in cloacam cadit.

What then? Did money make him impure, or did he himself defile the money? which in just this way falls into the hands of certain men, as a denarius falls into a sewer.

[17] Virtus super ista consistit; suo aere censetur; nihil ex istis quolibet incurrentibus bonum iudicat. Medicina et gubernatio non interdicit sibi ac suis admiratione talium rerum; qui non est vir bonus potest nihilominus medicus esse, potest gubernator, potest grammaticus tam mehercules quam cocus. Cui contingit habere rem non quamlibet, hunc non quemlibet dixeris; qualia quisque habet, talis est.

[17] Virtue stands above those things; it is assessed by its own coinage; it judges nothing among these, however they may come upon one, to be good. Medicine and navigation do not debar either themselves or their own by admiration of such things; one who is not a good man can nonetheless be a physician, can be a pilot, can be a grammarian, by Hercules, just as well as a cook. He to whom it happens to have a thing not of just any sort, this man you would call not just anyone; as the kinds of things each person has, such he is.

[18] Fiscus tanti est quantum habet; immo in accessionem eius venit quod habet. Quis pleno sacculo ullum pretium ponit nisi quod pecuniae in eo conditae numerus effecit? Idem evenit magnorum dominis patrimoniorum: accessiones illorum et appendices sunt.

[18] The fisc is worth as much as it has; nay rather, what it has goes into its accession. Who sets any price on a full purse except what the number of money deposited in it has effected? The same befalls the masters of great patrimonies: they are the accessions and appendices of those.

Quare ergo sapiens magnus est? quia magnum animum habet. Verum est ergo quod contemptissimo cuique contingit bonum non esse.

Why, then, is the wise man great? Because he has a great spirit. Is it true, then, that what befalls each most contemptible person is not to be good?

[19] Itaque indolentiam numquam bonum dicam:habet illam cicada, habet pulex. Ne quietem quidem et molestia vacare bonum dicam: quid est otiosius verme? Quaeris quae res sapientem faciat?

[19] And so I will never call indolence a good:the cicada has it, the flea has it. Nor will I call even quiet and being free from trouble a good: what is more idle than a worm? Do you ask what makes a wise man?

quae deum. Des oportet illi divinum aliquid, caeleste, magnificum: non in omnes bonum cadit nec quemlibet possessorem patitur.

that which makes a god. You ought to give to it something divine, celestial, magnificent: the good does not fall upon all, nor does it permit just any possessor.

[20] Vide

[20] See

et quid quaeque ferat regio et quid quaeque recuset:
hic segetes, illic veniunt felicius uvae,
arborei fetus alibi atque iniussa virescunt
gramina. Nonne vides, croceos ut Tmolus odores,
India mittit ebur, molles sua tura Sabaei,
at Chalybes nudi ferrum?

and what each region bears and what each refuses:
here the grain, there grapes come more felicitously,
elsewhere arboreal fruits, and grasses green unbidden.
do you not see, how Tmolus sends saffron-hued odors,
India sends ivory, the soft Sabaeans their own incense,
but the naked Chalybes, iron?

[21] Ista in regiones discripta sunt, ut necessarium mortalibus esset inter ipsos commercium, si invicem alius aliquid ab alio peteret. Summum illud bonum habet et ipsum suam sedem; non nascitur ubi ebur, nec ubi ferrum. Quis sit summi boni locus quaeris?

[21] Those things have been apportioned into regions, so that commerce might be necessary for mortals among themselves, if in turn one should seek something from another. That supreme good too has its own seat; it is not born where ivory is, nor where iron is. You ask what is the place of the supreme good?

animus. Hic nisi purus ac sanctus est, deum non capit.

the mind. Unless this is pure and holy, it does not receive God.

[22] 'Bonum ex malo non fit; divitiae [autem fiunt] fiunt autem ex avaritia; divitiae ergo non sunt bonum.' 'Non est' inquit 'verum, bonum ex malo non nasci; ex sacrilegio enim et furto pecunia nascitur. Itaque malum quidem est sacrilegium et furtum, sed ideo quia plura mala facit quam bona; dat enim lucrum, sed cum metu, sollicitudine, tormentis et animi et corporis.'

[22] 'A good does not come from an evil; riches [however come to be] come to be, however, from avarice; therefore riches are not a good.' 'It is not,' he says, 'true, that good is not born from evil; for from sacrilege and theft money is born. And so sacrilege and theft are indeed an evil, but for this reason: because it makes more evils than goods; for it gives lucre, but with fear, solicitude, and torments both of mind and of body.'

[23] Quisquis hoc dicit, necesse est recipiat sacrilegium, sicut malum sit quia multa mala facit, ita bonum quoque ex aliqua parte esse, quia aliquid boni facit: quo quid fieri portentuosius potest? Quamquam sacrilegium, furtum, adulterium inter bona haberi prorsus persuasimus. Quam multi furto non erubescunt, quam multi adulterio gloriantur!

[23] Whoever says this must needs admit sacrilege: that, just as it is an evil because it does many evils, so also it is in some part a good, because it does something of good—what could be more portentous than this? And yet we have altogether persuaded people that sacrilege, theft, and adultery are to be reckoned among goods. How many do not blush at theft, how many glory in adultery!

nam sacrilegia minuta puniuntur, magna in triumphis feruntur.

for small sacrileges are punished, great ones are borne in triumphs.

[24] Adice nunc quod sacrilegium, si omnino ex aliqua parte bonum est, etiam honestum erit et recte factum vocabitur, ~nostra enim actio est~ quod nullius mortalium cogitatio recipit. Ergo bona nasci ex malo non possunt. Nam si, ut dicitis, ob hoc unum sacrilegium malum est, quia multum mali adfert, si remiseris illi supplicia, si securitatem spoponderis, ex toto bonum erit.

[24] Add now this: that sacrilege, if in any respect at all it is good, will also be honest and will be called a right act, ~for it is our action~ which no mortal’s cogitation admits. Therefore good things cannot be born from evil. For if, as you say, for this one reason sacrilege is evil, because it brings much evil, if you remit to it the punishments, if you pledge security, it will be altogether good.

Atqui maximum scelerum supplicium in ipsis est.

And yet the greatest punishment of crimes is in themselves.

[25] Erras, inquam, si illa ad carnificem aut carcerem differs: statim puniuntur cum facta sunt, immo dum fiunt. Non nascitur itaque ex malo bonum, non magis quam ficus ex olea: ad semen nata respondent, bona degenerare non possunt. Quemadmodum ex turpi honestum non nascitur, ita ne ex malo quidem bonum; nam idem est honestum et bonum.

[25] You err, I say, if you defer those things to the executioner or the prison: they are punished immediately when they have been done—indeed, while they are being done. Therefore good is not born from evil, no more than a fig from an olive: things born correspond to their seed, good things cannot degenerate. Just as the honorable does not arise from the base, so neither does the good from evil; for the honorable and the good are the same.

[26] Quidam ex nostris adversus hoc sic respondent: 'putemus pecuniam bonum esse undecumque sumptam; non tamen ideo ex sacrilegio pecunia est, etiam si ex sacrilegio sumitur. Hoc sic intellege. In eadem urna et aurum est et vipera: si aurum ex urna sustuleris, non ideo sustuleris quia illic et vipera est; non ideo, inquam, mihi urna aurum dat quia viperam habet, sed aurum dat, cum et viperam habeat.

[26] Some of ours answer against this thus: 'let us suppose money to be a good, from wherever taken; nevertheless it is not for that reason money from sacrilege, even if it is taken from sacrilege. Understand this thus. In the same urn there are both gold and a viper: if you take the gold out of the urn, you have not for that reason taken it out because there is a viper there too; not for that reason, I say, does the urn give me gold because it has a viper, but it gives gold, while also having a viper.

Eodem modo ex sacrilegio lucrum fit, non quia turpe et sceleratum est sacrilegium, sed quia et lucrum habet. Quemadmodum in illa urna vipera malum est, non aurum quod cum vipera iacet, sic in sacrilegio malum est scelus, non lucrum.'

In the same way, lucre comes from sacrilege, not because sacrilege is base and criminal, but because it also has lucre. Just as in that urn the viper is the evil, not the gold which lies with the viper, so in sacrilege the evil is the crime, not the lucre.'

[27] A quibus ; dissimillima enim utriusquerei condicio est. Illic aurum possum sine vipera tollere, hic lucrum sine sacrilegio facere non possum; lucrum istud non est adpositum sceleri sed inmixtum.

[27] From whom ; for the condition of each matter is most dissimilar. There I can take the gold without the viper; here I cannot make lucre without sacrilege; that lucre is not added to the crime but intermixed with it.

[28] 'Quod dum consequi volumus in multa mala incidimus, id bonum non est; dum divitias autem consequi volumus, in multa mala incidimus; ergo divitiae bonum non sunt.'

[28] 'That which, while we wish to attain it, we fall into many evils— that is not a good; while, however, we wish to attain riches, we fall into many evils; therefore riches are not a good.'

'Duas' inquit 'significationes habet propositio vestra: unam, dum divitias consequi volumus, in multa nos mala incidere. In multa autem mala incidimus et dum virtutem consequi volumus: aliquis dum navigat studii causa, naufragium fecit, aliquis captus est.

'Two,' he says, 'significations your proposition has: one, that, while we wish to acquire riches, we fall into many evils. Into many evils, moreover, we fall also while we wish to acquire virtue: someone, while he sails for the sake of study, suffered shipwreck; someone was captured.

[29] Altera significatio talis est: per quod in mala incidimus bonum non est. Huic propositioni non erit consequens per divitias nos aut per voluptates in mala incidere; aut si per divitias in multa mala incidimus, non tantum bonum non sunt divitiae sed malum sunt; vos autem illas dicitis tantum bonum non esse. Praeterea' inquit 'conceditis divitias habere aliquid usus: inter commoda illas numeratis.

[29] The other signification is such: that by which we fall into evils is not a good. To this proposition it will not be a consequent that through riches or through pleasures we fall into evils; or if through riches we fall into many evils, riches are not only not a good but are an evil; Moreover' he says 'you concede that riches have some use: you number them among advantages.

Atqui eadem ratione <ne> commodum quidem erunt; per illas enim multa nobis incommoda eveniunt.'

And yet by the same reasoning <ne> they will not even be an advantage; for through them many inconveniences befall us.'

[30] His quidam hoc respondent: 'erratis, qui incommoda divitis inputatis. Illae neminem laedunt: aut sua nocet cuique stultitia aut aliena nequitia, sic quemadmodum gladius neminem occidit: occidentis telum est. Non ideo divitiae tibi nocent si propter divitias tibi nocetur.'

[30] To these some reply thus: 'you err, you who impute the inconveniences to riches. They injure no one: either each person is harmed by his own folly or by another’s wickedness, just as a sword kills no one: it is the weapon of the slayer. Not for that reason do riches harm you, if on account of riches harm is done to you.'

[31] Posidonius, ut ego existimo, melius, qui ait divitias esse causam malorum, non quia ipsae faciunt aliquid, sed quia facturos inritant. Alia est enim causa efficiens, quae protinus necessest noceat, alia praecedens. Hanc praecedentem causam divitiae habent: inflant animos, superbiam pariunt, invidiam contrahunt, et usque eo mentem alienant ut fama pecuniae nos etiam nocitura delectet.

[31] Posidonius, as I reckon, speaks better, who says that riches are the cause of evils, not because they themselves do anything, but because they incite those who are going to do harm. For the efficient cause is one thing, which must immediately harm, the preceding cause another. Riches have this preceding cause: they inflate spirits, beget pride, contract envy, and estrange the mind to such a degree that even the fame of money, about to harm us, delights us.

[32] Bona autem omnia carere culpa decet; pura sunt, non corrumpunt animos, non sollicitant; extollunt quidem et dilatant, sed sine tumore. Quae bona sunt fiduciam faciunt, divitiae audaciam; quae bona sunt magnitudinem animi dant, divitiae insolentiam. Nihil autem aliud est insolentia quam species magnitudinis falsa.

[32] But all good things ought to be without fault; they are pure, they do not corrupt minds, they do not agitate; they indeed exalt and expand, but without swelling. The things that are good create confidence, riches audacity; the things that are good give magnanimity, riches insolence. Moreover, insolence is nothing other than a false semblance of greatness.

[33] 'Isto modo' inquit 'etiam malum sunt divitiae, non tantum bonum non sunt.' Essent malum si ipsae nocerent, si, ut dixi, haberent efficientem causam: nunc praecedentem habent et quidem non inritantem tantum animos sed adtrahentem; speciem enim boni offundunt veri similem ac plerisque credibilem.

[33] 'In this way,' he says, 'riches are even an evil, not only are they not a good.' They would be an evil if they themselves harmed, if, as I said, they had an efficient cause: as it is, they have a preceding one, and indeed one not only irritating the minds but attracting them; for they overlay an appearance of good, similar to the true and credible to the majority.

[34] Habet virtus quoque praecedentem causam ad invidiam; multis enim propter sapientiam, multis propter iustitiam invidetur. Sed nec ex se hanc causam habet nec veri similem; contra enim veri similior illa species hominum animis obicitur a virtute, quae illos in amorem et admirationem vocet.

[34] Virtue too has a preceding cause for envy; for it is envied by many on account of wisdom, by many on account of justice. But it has this cause neither from itself nor a verisimilar one; on the contrary, that appearance more like the true is set before the minds of men by virtue, which calls them into love and admiration.

[35] Posidonius sic interrogandum ait: 'quae neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem non sunt bona; divitiae autem et bona valetudo et similia his nihil horum faciunt; ergo non sunt bona'. Hanc interrogationem magis etiamnunc hoc modo intendit: 'quae neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, contra autem insolentiam, tumorem, arrogantiam creant, mala sunt; a fortuitis autem in haec inpellimur; ergo non sunt bona'.

[35] Posidonius says that one must ask thus: 'things which give neither greatness to the soul nor confidence nor security are not goods; but riches and good health and things similar to these do none of these; therefore they are not goods.' He tightens the questioning yet more in this fashion: 'things which give neither greatness to the soul nor confidence nor security, but on the contrary create insolence, swelling, arrogance, are evils; but by fortuitous things we are impelled into these; therefore they are not goods.'

[36] 'Hac' inquit 'ratione ne commoda quidem ista erunt.' Alia est commodorum condicio, alia bonorum: commodum est quod plus usus habet quam molestiae; bonum sincerum esse debet et ab omni parte innoxium. Non est id bonum quod plus prodest, sed quod tantum prodest.

[36] 'By this,' he says, 'reasoning, not even those conveniences will be conveniences.' There is one condition of conveniences, another of goods: a convenience is that which has more use than annoyance; a good ought to be sincere and innocuous from every side. That is not a good which profits more, but that which profits only.

[37] Praeterea commodumet ad animalia pertinet et ad inperfectos homines et ad stultos. Itaque potest ei esse incommodum mixtum, sed commodum dicitur a maiore sui parte aestimatum: bonum ad unum sapientem pertinet; inviolatum esse oportet.

[37] Furthermore, the commodity pertains to animals and to imperfect men and to fools. And so an incommodity can be mixed with it, but a commodity is so called as assessed by the greater part of itself: the good pertains to the one wise man; it ought to be inviolate.

[38] Bonum animum habe: unus tibi nodus, sed Herculaneus restat: 'ex malis bonum non fit; ex multis paupertatibus divitiae fiunt; ergo divitiae bonum non sunt'.

[38] Have good spirit: one knot remains for you, but a Herculean one: 'from evils a good is not made; from many poverties riches are made; therefore riches are not a good'.

Hanc interrogationem nostri non agnoscunt, Peripatetici et fingunt illam et solvunt. Ait autem Posidonius hoc sophisma, per omnes dialecticorum scholas iactatum, sic ab Antipatro refelli:

This interrogation our people do not recognize; the Peripatetics both feign it and solve it. Posidonius, however, says that this sophism, bandied about through all the schools of the dialecticians, is thus refuted by Antipater:

[39] 'paupertas non per possessionem dicitur, sed per detractionem' (vel, ut antiqui dixerunt, orbationem; Graeci kata steresin dicunt); 'non quod habeat dicit, sed quod non habeat. Itaque ex multis inanibus nihil impleri potest: divitias multae res faciunt, non multae inopiae. Aliter' inquit 'quam debes paupertatem intellegis.

[39] 'poverty is not said by possession, but by privation' (or, as the ancients said, orbation; the Greeks say kata steresin); 'it does not say what it has, but what it does not have. Therefore from many empty things nothing can be filled: riches many things make, not many scarcities. 'Otherwise,' he says, 'than you ought you understand poverty.

Paupertas enim est non quae pauca possidet, sed quae multa non possidet; ita non ab eo dicitur quod habet, sed ab eo quod ei deest.'

‘For poverty is not that which possesses few things, but that which does not possess many; thus it is not said from that which it has, but from that which it lacks.'

[40] Facilius quod volo exprimerem, si Latinum verbum esset quo anuparxia significaretur. Hanc paupertati Antipater adsignat: ego non video quid aliud sit paupertas quam parvi possessio. De isto videbimus, si quando valde vacabit, quae sit divitiarum, quae paupertatis substantia; sed tunc quoque considerabimus numquid satius sit paupertatem permulcere, divitiis demere supercilium quam litigare de verbis, quasi iam de rebus iudicatum sit.

[40] I would more easily express what I want, if there were a Latin word by which anuparxia would be signified. Antipater assigns this to poverty; I do not see what poverty is other than the possession of little. We will look into this, if ever there is ample leisure, what is the substance of riches, what of poverty; but then too we shall consider whether it is preferable to soothe poverty, to remove the superciliousness from riches, rather than to litigate about words, as if judgment had already been rendered about the matters.

[41] Putemus nos ad contionem vocatos: lex de abolendis divitis fertur. His interrogationibus suasuri aut dissuasuri sumus? his effecturi ut populus Romanus paupertatem, fundamentum et causam imperii sui, requirat ac laudet, divitias autem suas timeat, ut cogitet has se apud victos repperisse, hinc ambitum et largitiones et tumultus in urbem sanctissimam temperatissimam inrupisse, nimis luxuriose ostentari gentium spolia, quod unus populus eripuerit omnibus facilius ab omnibus uni eripi posse?

[41] Let us suppose we have been called to an assembly: a law is being proposed about abolishing riches. With these interrogations are we to persuade or to dissuade? By these are we to bring it about that the Roman People should seek and praise poverty—the foundation and cause of its empire—and fear its riches; that it consider that it found these among the conquered; that from this source ambition, largesses, and tumults have burst into the most holy, most temperate city; that the spoils of the nations are displayed too luxuriously; that what one people has snatched from all can more easily be snatched by all from one?

Haec satius est suadere, et expugnare adfectus, non circumscribere. Si possumus, fortius loquamur; si minus, apertius. Vale.

It is better to persuade these things, and to storm the affections, not to circumscribe them. If we can, let us speak more strongly; if not, more openly. Farewell.

LXXXVIII. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

88. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] De liberalibus studiis quid sentiam scire desideras: nullum suspicio, nullum in bonis numero quod ad aes exit. Meritoria artificia sunt, hactenus utilia si praeparant ingenium, non detinent. Tamdiu enim istis inmorandum est quamdiu nihil animus agere maius potest; rudimenta sunt nostra, non opera.

[1] You desire to know what I think about liberal studies: I look up to none; I count among goods nothing that comes down to coin. They are mercenary crafts, useful thus far—if they prepare the ingenium, not detain it. For we should linger over these only so long as the mind can do nothing greater; they are our rudiments, not our works.

[2] Quare liberalia studia dicta sint vides: quia homine libero digna sunt. Ceterum unum studium vere liberale est quod liberum facit, hoc est sapientiae, sublime, forte, magnanimum: cetera pusilla et puerilia sunt. An tu quicquam in istis esse credis boni quorum professores turpissimos omnium ac flagitiosissimos cernis?

[2] Wherefore you see why the liberal studies are so called: because they are worthy of a free man. Moreover, one study is truly liberal, that which makes one free—namely, that of wisdom—sublime, strong, magnanimous; the rest are petty and puerile. Or do you believe there is anything of good in these, whose professors you behold to be the most shameful and most flagitious of all?

Non discere debemus ista, sed didicisse.

We ought not to learn these things, but to have learned them.

Quidam illud de liberalibus studiis quaerendum iudicaverunt, an virum bonum facerent: ne promittunt quidem nec huius rei scientiam adfectant.

Certain people judged that this should be inquired about liberal studies, whether they make a good man: they do not even promise it, nor do they aspire to the science of this matter.

[3] Grammatice circa curam sermonis versatur et, si latius evagari vult, circa historias, iam ut longissime fines suos proferat, circa carmina. Quid horum ad virtutem viam sternit? Syllabarum enarratio et verborum diligentia et fabularum memoria et versuum lex ac modificatio -- quid ex his metum demit, cupiditatem eximit, libidinem frenat?

[3] Grammar is engaged around the care of discourse and, if it wants to wander more broadly, around histories, and, to extend its own boundaries as far as possible, around poems. Which of these paves the way to virtue? The expounding of syllables and the diligence about words and the memory of fables and the law and modulation of verses -- which of these takes away fear, removes cupidity, reins in lust?

[4] Ad geometriam transeamus et ad musicen: nihil apud illas invenies quod vetet timere, vetet cupere. Quae quisquis ignorat, alia frustra scit.

[4] Let us pass over to geometry and to music: you will find nothing among those that forbids fearing, forbids desiring. Which things whoever is ignorant of, he knows other things in vain.

* * * utrum doceant isti virtutem an non: si non docent, ne tradunt quidem; si docent, philosophi sunt. Vis scire quam non ad docendam virtutem consederint? aspice quam dissimilia inter se omnium studia sint: atqui similitudo esset idem docentium.

* * * whether those people teach virtue or not: if they do not teach, they do not even hand it down; if they do teach, they are philosophers. Do you wish to know that they have not assembled for teaching virtue? look how dissimilar the studies of all are among themselves: and yet there would be similarity among those teaching the same thing.

[5] Nisi forte tibi Homerum philosophum fuisse persuadent, cum his ipsis quibus colligunt negent; nam modo Stoicum illum faciunt, virtutem solam probantem et voluptates refugientem et ab honesto ne inmortalitatis quidem pretio recedentem, modo Epicureum, laudantem statum quietae civitatis et inter convivia cantusque vitam exigentis, modo Peripateticum, tria bonorum genera inducentem, modo Academicum, omnia incerta dicentem. Apparet nihil horum esse in illo, quia omnia sunt; ista enim inter se dissident. Demus illis Homerum philosophum fuisse: nempe sapiens factus est antequam carmina ulla cognosceret; ergo illa discamus quae Homerum fecere sapientem.

[5] Unless perhaps they persuade you that Homer was a philosopher—while with these very points by which they piece it together they also deny it; for now they make him a Stoic, approving virtue alone and shunning pleasures and not departing from the honorable not even at the price of immortality; now an Epicurean, praising the condition of a quiet city and passing life amid banquets and songs; now a Peripatetic, introducing three kinds of goods; now an Academic, declaring all things uncertain. It is apparent that none of these is in him, because all are; for these schools conflict among themselves. Let us grant them that Homer was a philosopher: surely he became wise before he came to know any poems at all; therefore let us learn those things which made Homer wise.

[6] Hoc quidem me quaerere, uter maioraetate fuerit, Homerus an Hesiodus, non magis ad rem pertinet quam scire, cum minor Hecuba fuerit quam Helena, quare tam male tulerit aetatem. Quid, inquam, annos Patrocli et Achillis inquirere ad rem existimas pertinere?

[6] That I am inquiring which of the two was older in age, Homer or Hesiod, pertains no more to the point than to know, although Hecuba was younger than Helen, why she bore age so badly. What, I ask, do you esteem inquiring into the years of Patroclus and Achilles to pertain to the matter?

[7] Quaeris Ulixes ubi erraverit potius quam efficias ne nos semper erremus? Non vacat audire utrum inter Italiam et Siciliam iactatus sit an extra notum nobis orbem (neque enim potuit in tam angusto error esse tam longus): tempestates nos animi cotidie iactant et nequitia in omnia Ulixis mala inpellit. Non deest forma quae sollicitet oculos, non hostis; hinc monstra effera et humano cruore gaudentia, hinc insidiosa blandimenta aurium, hinc naufragia et tot varietates malorum.

[7] You ask where Ulysses wandered rather than bring it about that we ourselves do not always err? There is no leisure to listen whether he was tossed between Italy and Sicily or outside the world known to us (for in so narrow a space the errancy could not have been so long): the tempests of our mind toss us every day, and knavery drives us into all Ulysses’s evils. There is no lack of beauty to solicit the eyes, nor of an enemy; on this side savage monsters rejoicing in human gore, on this side the insidious blandishments of the ears, on this side shipwrecks and so many varieties of evils.

Hoc me doce, quomodo patriam amem, quomodo uxorem, quomodo patrem, quomodo ad haec tam honesta vel naufragus navigem.

Teach me this, how I may love my fatherland, how my wife, how my father, how I may navigate to these so honorable things even shipwrecked.

[8] Quid inquiris an Penelopa inpudica fuerit, an verba saeculo suo dederit? an Ulixem illum esse quem videbat, antequam sciret, suspicata sit? Doce me quid sit pudicitia et quantum in ea bonum, in corpore an in animo posita sit.

[8] Why do you inquire whether Penelope was unchaste, whether she gave words to her age? whether she suspected that the man she saw was Ulysses, before she knew? Teach me what pudicity is and how much good there is in it, whether it is situated in the body or in the mind.

[9] Ad musicum transeo. Doces me quomodo inter se acutae ac graves consonent, quomodo nervorum disparem reddentium sonum fiat concordia: fac potius quomodo animus secum meus consonet nec consilia mea discrepent. Monstras mihi qui sint modi flebiles: monstra potius quomodo inter adversa non emittam flebilem vocem.

[9] I pass over to the musician. You teach me how the high and the low notes consonate with each other, how from strings rendering unequal sound concord is made: rather bring it about that my mind may consonate with itself and that my counsels be not discrepant. You show me which modes are plaintive: show rather how, amid adversities, I may not emit a plaintive voice.

[10] Metiri me geometres docet latifundia potius quam doceat quomodo metiar quantum homini satis sit; numerare docet me et avaritiae commodat digitos potius quam doceat nihil ad rem pertinere istas conputationes, non esse feliciorem cuius patrimonium tabularios lassat, immo quam supervacua possideat qui infelicissimus futurus est si quantum habeat per se conputare cogetur.

[10] The geometer teaches me to measure latifundia rather than teach how I may measure how much is enough for a man; he teaches me to number and lends his fingers to avarice rather than teach that those computations pertain nothing to the matter—that he is not happier whose patrimony wearies the record-keepers, nay rather, how many superfluities he possesses who will be most unhappy if he is forced to compute by himself how much he has.

[11] Quid mihi prodest scire agellum in partes dividere, si nescio cum fratre dividere? Quid prodest colligere subtiliter pedes iugeri et conprendere etiam si quid decempedam effugit, si tristem me facit vicinus inpotens et aliquid ex meo abradens? Docet quomodo nihil perdam ex finibus meis: at ego discere volo quomodo totos hilaris amittam.

[11] What does it profit me to know how to divide a little field into parts, if I do not know how to divide with my brother? What does it profit to reckon minutely the feet of a iugerum and to take in even whatever escapes the ten‑foot rod, if an overbearing neighbor makes me sorrowful and is scraping something off from what is mine? He teaches how I may lose nothing from my boundaries; but I wish to learn how to lose the whole cheerfully.

'Paterno agro et avito' inquit 'expellor.'

'From my paternal and ancestral land,' he says, 'I am being expelled.'

[12] Quid? ante avum tuum quis istum agrum tenuit? cuius, non dico hominis, sed populi fuerit potes expedire?

[12] What? Before your grandfather, who held that field? Can you set forth whose it was—I do not say of what man, but of what people?

Non dominus isto, sed colonus intrasti. Cuius colonus es? si bene tecum agitur, heredis. Negant iurisconsulti quicquam usu capi publicum: hoc quod tenes, quod tuum dicis, publicum est et quidem generis humani.

Not as lord of that, but as a tenant you entered. Whose tenant are you? if it goes well for you, of the heir. The jurisconsults deny that anything public can be acquired by usucaption: this which you hold, which you call yours, is public, and indeed of the human race.

[13] O egregiam artem! scis rotunda metiri, in quadratum redigis quamcumque acceperis formam, intervalla siderum dicis, nihil est quod in mensuram tuam non cadat: si artifex es, metire hominis animum, dic quam magnus sit, dic quam pusillus sit. Scis quae recta sit linea: quid tibi prodest, si quid in vita rectum sit ignoras?

[13] O distinguished art! you know how to measure the round, you reduce into a square whatever form you have received, you declare the intervals of the stars; there is nothing that does not fall within your measure: if you are an artificer, measure the mind of a man; say how great it is, say how small it is. You know what line is straight: what does it profit you, if you are ignorant of what in life is straight?

[14] Venio nunc ad illum qui caelestium notitia gloriatur:

[14] I come now to him who glories in knowledge of the celestial:

frigida Saturni sese quo stella receptet,
quos ignis caeli Cyllenius erret in orbes.

where the cold star of Saturn withdraws itself,
into which orbits the Cyllenian fire of heaven wanders.

Hoc scire quid proderit? ut sollicitus sim cum Saturnus et Mars ex contrario stabunt aut cum Mercurius vespertinum faciet occasum vidente Saturno, potius quam hoc discam, ubicumque sunt ista, propitia esse nec posse mutari?

What will it profit to know this? That I should be anxious when Saturn and Mars will stand in opposition, or when Mercury will make a vespertine setting with Saturn looking on, rather than that I learn this: that, wherever those things are, they are propitious and cannot be changed?

[15] Agit illa continuus ordo fatorum et inevitabilis cursus; per statas vices remeant et effectus rerum omnium aut movent aut notant. Sed sive quidquid evenit faciunt, quid inmutabilis rei notitia proficiet? sive significant, quid refert providere quod effugere non possis?

[15] That continuous order of the fates and the inevitable course drives it; through fixed vicissitudes they return, and the effects of all things they either set in motion or denote. But whether they make whatever happens, what will the knowledge of an immutable thing profit? Or if they signify, what does it matter to foresee what you cannot escape?

Scias ista, nescias: fient.

Know these things, or not: they will come to pass.

[16] Si vero solem ad rapidum stellasque sequentes
ordine respicies, numquam te crastina fallet
hora, nec insidiis noctis capiere serenae.

[16] If indeed you look, in order, to the rapid sun and the stars that follow,
never will the morrow’s hour deceive you,
nor will you be caught by the ambushes of the serene night.

Satis abundeque provisum est ut ab insidiis tutus essem.

It has been provided sufficiently and abundantly that I might be safe from ambushes.

[17] 'Numquid me crastina non fallit hora? fallit enim quod nescienti evenit.' Ego quid futurum sit nescio: quid fieri possit scio. Ex hoc nihil deprecabor, totum expecto: si quid remittitur, boni consulo.

[17] 'Does the morrow’s hour not deceive me? It does deceive, for what befalls the unknowing deceives.' I do not know what will be; I know what can be. From this I will deprecate nothing; I expect the whole: if anything is remitted, I take it as good.

Fallit me hora si parcit, sed ne sic quidem fallit. Nam quemadmodum scio omnia accidere posse, sic scio et non utique casura; itaque secunda expecto, malis paratus sum.

It deceives me, the hour, if it spares, yet not even thus does it deceive. For just as I know that all things can happen, so I also know that they will not by all means occur; and so I expect the favorable, I am prepared for evils.

[18] In illo feras me necesse est non per praescriptum euntem; non enim adducor ut in numerum liberalium artium pictores recipiam, non magis quam statuarios aut marmorarios aut ceteros luxuriae ministros. Aeque luctatores et totam oleo ac luto constantem scientiam expello ex his studiis liberalibus; aut et unguentarios recipiam et cocos et ceteros voluptatibus nostris ingenia accommodantes sua.

[18] In that matter you must bear with me as not going by the prescribed rule; for I am not induced to receive painters into the number of the liberal arts, no more than statuaries or marble-workers or the other ministers of luxury. Likewise I expel wrestlers and the whole science consisting of oil and mud from these liberal studies; or else I would also receive perfumers and cooks and the rest who accommodate their ingenia to our pleasures.

[19] Quid enim, oro te, liberale habent isti ieiuni vomitores, quorum corpora in sagina, animi in macie et veterno sunt? An liberale studium istuc esse iuventuti nostrae credimus, quam maiores nostri rectam exercuerunt hastilia iacere, sudem torquere, equum agitare, arma tractare? Nihil liberos suos docebant quod discendum esset iacentibus.

[19] For what, I pray you, do those fasting vomiters have that is liberal, whose bodies are in stuffing, while their spirits are in leanness and torpor? Or do we believe that to be a liberal study for our youth, whom our forefathers exercised aright to cast javelins, to whirl the pike, to manage a horse, to handle arms? They taught their children nothing that had to be learned lying down.

Sed nec hae nec illae docent aluntve virtutem; quid enim prodest equum regere et cursum eius freno temperare, adfectibus effrenatissimis abstrahi? quid prodest multos vincere luctatione vel caestu, ab iracundia vinci?

But neither these nor those teach or nourish virtue; for what does it profit to govern a horse and temper its course with the bridle, to be dragged away by the most unbridled affections? what does it profit to conquer many in wrestling or with the cestus, to be conquered by anger?

[20] 'Quid ergo? nihil nobis liberalia conferunt studia?' Ad alia multum, ad virtutem nihil; nam et hae viles ex professo artes quae manu constant ad instrumenta vitae plurimum conferunt, tamen ad virtutem non pertinent. 'Quare ergo liberalibus studiis filios erudimus?' Non quia virtutem dare possunt, sed quia animum ad accipiendam virtutem praeparant.

[20] 'What then? Do liberal studies contribute nothing to us?' To other things much, to virtue nothing; for even those lowly, professed arts which consist in manual work contribute very greatly to the instruments of life, yet they do not pertain to virtue. 'Why then do we educate our sons in the liberal studies?' Not because they can give virtue, but because they prepare the mind to receive virtue.

Quemadmodum prima illa, ut antiqui vocabant, litteratura, per quam pueris elementa traduntur, non docet liberales artes sed mox percipiendis locum parat, sic liberales artes non perducunt animum ad virtutem sed expediunt.

Just as that first ‘litteratura,’ as the ancients called it, through which the elements are handed over to boys, does not teach the liberal arts but soon prepares a place for their being grasped, so the liberal arts do not lead the mind through to virtue but expedite it.

[21] Quattuor ait esse artium Posidonius genera: sunt vulgares et sordidae, sunt ludicrae, sunt pueriles, sunt liberales. Vulgares opificum, quae manu constant et ad instruendam vitam occupatae sunt, in quibus nulla decoris, nulla honesti simulatio est.

[21] Posidonius says there are four genera of arts: there are vulgar and sordid, there are ludic, there are puerile, there are liberal. The vulgar are those of craftsmen, which are manual and are occupied with equipping life, in which there is no semblance of decorum, no semblance of the honorable.

[22] Ludicrae sunt quae ad voluptatem oculorum atque aurium tendunt; his adnumeres licet machinatores qui pegmata per se surgentia excogitant et tabulata tacite in sublime crescentia et alias ex inopinato varietates, aut dehiscentibus quae cohaerebant aut his quae distabant sua sponte coeuntibus aut his quae eminebant paulatim in se residentibus. His inperitorum feriuntur oculi, omnia subita quia causas non novere mirantium.

[22] Ludic are those which aim at the pleasure of the eyes and ears; to these you may add the machinators who devise pegmata rising by themselves and platforms quietly growing upward on high, and other unexpected varieties—either with the things that were cohering yawning apart, or with those that were standing apart coalescing of their own accord, or with those that were projecting gradually settling back into themselves. By these the eyes of the inexpert are struck, admiring all sudden things because they do not know the causes.

[23] Pueriles sunt et aliquid habentes liberalibus simile hae artes quas egkuklious Graeci, nostri autem liberales vocant. Solae autem liberales sunt, immo, ut dicam verius, liberae, quibus curae virtus est.

[23] Boyish are—though having something akin to the liberal—those arts which the Greeks call “egkuklious,” but which our people call liberal. Yet only those are truly liberal, or rather, to speak more truly, free, whose concern is virtue.

[24] 'Quemadmodum' inquit 'est aliqua pars philosophiae naturalis, est aliqua moralis, est aliqua rationalis, sic et haec quoque liberalium artium turba locum sibi in philosophia vindicat. Cum ventum est ad naturales quaestiones, geometriae testimonio statur; ergo eius quam adiuvat pars est.'

[24] 'Just as,' he says, 'there is some part of philosophy that is natural, some that is moral, some that is rational, so too this crowd of the liberal arts likewise claims a place for itself in philosophy. When it comes to natural questions, judgment stands on the testimony of geometry; therefore it is a part of that which it aids.'

[25] Multa adiuvant nos nec ideo partes nostri sunt; immo si partes essent, non adiuvarent. Cibus adiutorium corporis nec tamen pars est. Aliquod nobis praestat geometria ministerium: sic philosophiae necessaria est quomodo ipsi faber, sed nec hic geometriae pars est nec illa philosophiae.

[25] Many things aid us and not on that account are they parts of us; indeed, if they were parts, they would not aid. Food is an aid of the body and yet is not a part. Geometry renders us some service: thus it is necessary to philosophy in the same way as the craftsman is to it; but neither is this a part of geometry, nor that a part of philosophy.

[26] Praeterea utraque fines suos habet; sapiens enim causas naturalium et quaerit et novit, quorum numeros mensurasque geometres persequitur et supputat. Qua ratione constent caelestia, quae illis sit vis quaeve natura sapiens scit: cursus et recursus et quasdam obversationes per quas descendunt et adlevantur ac speciem interdum stantium praebent, cum caelestibus stare non liceat, colligit mathematicus.

[26] Moreover, each has its own bounds; for the wise man both seeks and knows the causes of natural things, whose numbers and measures the geometer pursues and computes. By what rationale the celestials consist, what force they have and what nature, the wise man knows: the mathematician collects the courses and recourses and certain observations by which they descend and are lifted up and sometimes present the appearance of standing still, although for celestial things it is not permitted to stand.

[27] Quae causa in speculo imagines exprimat sciet sapiens: illud tibi geometres potest dicere, quantum abesse debeat corpus ab imagine et qualis forma speculi quales imagines reddat. Magnum esse solem philosophus probabit, quantus sit mathematicus, qui usu quodam et exercitatione procedit. Sed ut procedat, inpetranda illi quaedam principia sunt; non est autem ars sui iuris cui precarium fundamentum est.

[27] What cause in a mirror expresses images the wise man will know: this the geometer can tell you, how far the body ought to be from the image and what kind of form of mirror renders what kinds of images. The philosopher will prove the sun to be great, how great it is the mathematician, who proceeds by a certain use and exercise. But in order that he may proceed, certain principles must be obtained for him; moreover, that art is not of its own right whose foundation is precarious.

[28] Philosophia nil ab alio petit, totum opus a solo excitat: mathematice, ut ita dicam, superficiaria est, in alieno aedificat; accipit prima, quorum beneficio ad ulteriora perveniat. Si per se iret ad verum, si totius mundi naturam posset conprendere, dicerem multum conlaturam mentibus nostris, quae tractatu caelestium crescunt trahuntque aliquid ex alto.

[28] Philosophy seeks nothing from another; it raises the whole work from its own ground: mathematics, so to speak, is superficial; it builds on alien ground; it accepts first principles, by the benefit of which it may reach to further things. If it went to the truth by itself, if it could comprehend the nature of the whole world, I would say it would confer much upon our minds, which grow by the study (tractation) of celestial things and draw something from on high.

Una re consummatur animus, scientia bonorum ac malorum inmutabili; nihil autem ulla ars alia de bonis ac malis quaerit. Singulas lubet circumire virtutes.

By one thing the mind is consummated, by an immutable science of goods and evils; but no other art inquires about goods and evils. I am minded to go around the several virtues.

[29] Fortitudo contemptrix timendorum est; terribilia et sub iugum libertatem nostram mittentia despicit, provocat, frangit: numquid ergo hanc liberalia studia corroborant? Fides sanctissimum humani pectoris bonum est, nulla necessitate ad fallendum cogitur, nullo corrumpitur praemio: 'ure', inquit 'caede, occide: non prodam, sed quo magis secreta quaeret dolor, hoc illa altius condam'. Numquid liberalia studia hos animos facere possunt? Temperantia voluptatibus imperat, alias odit atque abigit, alias dispensat et ad sanum modum redigit nec umquam ad illas propter ipsas venit; scit optimum esse modum cupitorum non quantum velis, sed quantum debeas sumere.

[29] Fortitude is a contemner of things to be feared; it looks down on the terribles and on those that send our liberty under the yoke, it provokes them, it breaks them: do liberal studies, then, corroborate this? Faith is the most holy good of the human breast, compelled by no necessity to deceive, corrupted by no reward: “burn,” it says, “cut, kill: I will not betray; rather, the more pain seeks out the secrets, the deeper will I bury them.” Can liberal studies make such spirits? Temperance commands pleasures: some it hates and drives away, others it dispenses and brings back to a sound measure, nor does it ever come to them for their own sake; it knows that the best measure of desires is not how much you wish, but how much you ought to take.

[30] Humanitas vetat superbum esse adversus socios, vetat amarum; verbis, rebus, adfectibus comem se facilemque omnibus praestat; nullum alienum malum putat, bonum autem suum ideo maxime quod alicui bono futurum est amat. Numquid liberalia studia hos mores praecipiunt? non magis quam simplicitatem, quam modestiam ac moderationem, non magis quam frugalitatem ac parsimoniam, non magis quam clementiam, quae alieno sanguini tamquam suo parcit et scit homini non esse homine prodige utendum.

[30] Humanity forbids being proud toward companions, forbids being bitter; in words, in deeds, in affections it presents itself as affable and easy to all; it thinks no misfortune of another to be alien, and it loves its own good chiefly for this reason, that it will be for someone else’s good. Do liberal studies prescribe these manners? no more than simplicity, than modesty and moderation, no more than frugality and parsimony, no more than clemency, which spares another’s blood as if its own and knows that man is not to be used prodigally by man.

[31] 'Cum dicatis' inquit 'sine liberalibus studiis ad virtutem non perveniri, quemadmodum negatis illa nihil conferre virtuti?' Quia nec sine cibo ad virtutem pervenitur, cibus tamen ad virtutem non pertinet; ligna navi nihil conferunt, quamvis non fiat navis nisi ex lignis: non est, inquam, cur aliquid putes eius adiutorio fieri sine quo non potest fieri.

[31] 'Since you say,' he says, 'that without liberal studies one does not arrive at virtue, how do you deny that they confer nothing upon virtue?' Because neither without food does one come to virtue, yet food does not pertain to virtue; timbers confer nothing upon a ship, although a ship is not made except from timbers: there is not, I say, any reason for you to think that anything is effected by the aid of that without which it cannot be effected.

[32] Potest quidem etiam illud dici, sine liberalibus studiis veniri ad sapientiam posse; quamvis enim virtus discenda sit, tamen non per haec discitur. Quid est autem quare existimem non futurum sapientem eum qui litteras nescit, cum sapientia non sit in litteris? Res tradit, non verba, et nescio an certior memoria sit quae nullum extra se subsidium habet.

[32] It can indeed also be said that, without liberal studies, one can come to wisdom; for although virtue must be learned, yet it is not learned through these. What, moreover, is there why I should suppose that he who does not know letters will not become wise, since wisdom is not in letters? It delivers realities, not words, and perhaps the memory is more certain which has no support outside itself.

[33] Magna et spatiosa res est sapientia; vacuo illi loco opus est; de divinis humanisque discendum est, de praeteritis de futuris, de caducis de aeternis, de tempore. De quo uno vide quam multa quaerantur: primum an per se sit aliquid; deinde an aliquid ante tempus sit sine tempore; cum mundo coeperit an etiam ante mundum quia fuerit aliquid, fuerit et tempus.

[33] Wisdom is a great and spacious thing; it needs an empty place; one must be taught about divine and human matters, about past and future, about perishable and eternal things, about time. About this one thing see how many questions are asked: first, whether anything exists per se; then, whether anything before time exists without time; whether it began with the world, or even before the world—since, if anything existed, time existed as well.

[34] Innumerabiles quaestiones sunt de animo tantum: unde sit, qualis sit, quando esse incipiat, quamdiu sit, aliunde alio transeat et domicilia mutet in alias animalium formas aliasque coniectus, an non amplius quam semel serviat et emissus vagetur in toto; utrum corpus sit an non sit; quid sit facturus cum per nos aliquid facere desierit, quomodo libertate sua usurus cum ex hac effugerit cavea; an obliviscatur priorum et illinc nosse se incipiat unde corpori abductus in sublime secessit.

[34] Innumerable questions concern the soul alone: whence it is, of what quality it is, when it begins to be, how long it is, whether it passes from elsewhere to elsewhere and changes domiciles into other forms of animals and other embodiments, whether it serves not more than once and, released, wanders in the Whole; whether it is a body or is not; what it will do when it has ceased to do anything through us, how it will use its liberty when it has escaped from this cage; whether it forgets former things and from there begins to know itself, from where, abducted from the body, it has retired on high.

[35] Quamcumque partem rerum humanarum divinarumque conprenderis, ingenti copia quaerendorum ac discendorum fatigaberis. Haec tam multa, tam magna ut habere possint liberum hospitium, supervacua ex animo tollenda sunt. Non dabit se in has angustias virtus; laxum spatium res magna desiderat.

[35] Whatever part of human and divine affairs you may have grasped, you will be wearied by an immense abundance of things to be inquired and learned. In order that these, so many, so great, may have free lodging, the superfluities must be removed from the mind. Virtue will not give itself into these straits; a great matter desires ample space.

Expellantur omnia, totum pectus illi vacet.

Let all things be expelled; let the whole heart stand vacant for her.

[36] 'At enim delectat artium notitia multarum.' Tantum itaque ex illis retineamus quantum necessarium est. An tu existimas reprendendum qui supervacua usibus comparat et pretiosarum rerum pompam in domo explicat, non putas eum qui occupatus est in supervacua litterarum supellectile? Plus scire velle quam sit satis intemperantiae genus est.

[36] 'But indeed the knowledge of many arts delights.' Therefore let us retain from them only as much as is necessary. Do you think the man who acquires things superfluous for use and displays in his house the pomp of precious goods is to be reproved, and do you not think him so who is occupied with a superfluous furniture of letters? To wish to know more than is enough is a kind of intemperance.

[37] Quid quod ista liberalium artium consectatio molestos, verbosos, intempestivos, sibi placentes facit et ideo non discentes necessaria quia supervacua didicerunt? Quattuor milia librorum Didymus grammaticus scripsit: misererer si tam multa supervacua legisset. In his libris de patria Homeri quaeritur, in his de Aeneae matre vera, in his libidinosior Anacreon an ebriosior vixerit, in his an Sappho publica fuerit, et alia quae erant dediscenda si scires.

[37] What of the fact that this pursuit of the liberal arts makes men troublesome, verbose, untimely, self-pleasing—and therefore not learning the necessary because they have learned the superfluous? Didymus the grammarian wrote four thousand books: I would pity him if he had read so many superfluous things. In these books inquiry is made about Homer’s fatherland, in these about the true mother of Aeneas, in these whether Anacreon lived more lustful or more drunken, in these whether Sappho was a public woman (a prostitute), and other things which were to be unlearned, if you knew them.

I nunc et longam esse vitam nega!

Go now and deny that life is long!

[38] Sed ad nostros quoque cum perveneris, ostendam multa securibus recidenda. Magno inpendio temporum, magna alienarum aurium molestia laudatio haec constat: 'o hominem litteratum!' Simus hoc titulo rusticiore contenti: 'o virum bonum!'

[38] But when you come even to our own people, I will point out many things that must be cut back with axes. At great expenditure of time, with great annoyance to others’ ears, this laudation amounts to: ‘o a lettered man!’ Let us be content with this more rustic title: ‘o good man!’

[39] Itane est? annales evolvam omnium gentium et quis primus carmina scripserit quaeram? quantum temporis inter Orphea intersit et Homerum, cum fastos non habeam, conputabo?

[39] Is it so? Shall I unroll the annals of all nations and ask who first composed songs? Shall I compute how much time intervenes between Orpheus and Homer, since I do not have the fasti?

et Aristarchi notas quibus aliena carmina conpunxit recognoscam, et aetatem in syllabis conteram? Itane in geometriae pulvere haerebo? adeo mihi praeceptum illud salutare excidit: 'tempori parce'? Haec sciam?

and shall I recognize the signs of Aristarchus, by which he punctuated the poems of others, and wear down a lifetime on syllables? Is it thus that I shall stick fast in the dust of geometry? Has that salutary precept so slipped from me: 'spare time'? Are these the things I am to know?

et quid ignorem?

and what am I ignorant of?

[40] Apion grammaticus, qui sub C. Caesare tota circulatus est Graecia et in nomen Homeri ab omnibus civitatibus adoptatus, aiebat Homerum utraque materia consummata, et Odyssia et Iliade, principium adiecisse operi suo quo bellum Troianum conplexus est. Huius rei argumentum adferebat quod duas litteras in primo versu posuisset ex industria librorum suorum numerum continentes.

[40] Apion the grammarian, who under Gaius Caesar circulated through all Greece and was adopted into the name of Homer by all the cities, used to say that Homer, with each material consummated, both the Odyssey and the Iliad, added a beginning to his work in which he encompassed the Trojan War. He offered as an argument for this that he had placed two letters in the first verse by design, containing the number of his books.

[41] Talia sciat oportet qui multa vult scire. Non vis cogitare quantum temporis tibi auferat mala valetudo, quantum occupatio publica, quantum occupatio privata, quantum occupatio cotidiana, quantum somnus? Metire aetatem tuam: tam multa non capit.

[41] Such things must be known by one who wishes to know many things. Do you not wish to consider how much time ill health takes from you, how much public occupation, how much private occupation, how much quotidian occupation, how much sleep? Measure your lifetime: it does not hold so many things.

[42] De liberalibus studiis loquor: philosophi quantum habent supervacui, quantum ab usu recedentis! Ipsi quoque ad syllabarum distinctiones et coniunctionum ac praepositionum proprietates descenderunt et invidere grammaticis, invidere geometris; quidquid in illorum artibus supervacuum erat transtulere in suam. Sic effectum est ut diligentius loqui scirent quam vivere.

[42] I speak about the liberal studies: philosophers—how much they have of the superfluous, how much that recedes from use! They too have descended to the distinctions of syllables and to the properties of conjunctions and prepositions, and they have envied the grammarians, envied the geometers; whatever in those arts was superfluous they transferred into their own. Thus it came about that they knew how to speak more diligently than to live.

[43] Audi quantum mali faciat nimia subtilitas et quam infesta veritati sit. Protagoras ait de omni re in utramque partem disputari posse ex aequo et de hac ipsa, an omnis res in utramque partem disputabilis sit. Nausiphanes ait ex his quae videntur esse nihil magis esse quam non esse.

[43] Hear how much harm excessive subtlety does and how hostile it is to truth. Protagoras says that concerning every matter it is possible to dispute on both sides equally, and concerning this very thing, whether every matter is disputable on both sides. Nausiphanes says that, of those things which seem to be, nothing is more to be than not to be.

[44] Parmenides ait ex his quae videntur nihil esse ~universo~. Zenon Eleates omnia negotia de negotio deiecit: ait nihil esse. Circa eadem fere Pyrrhonei versantur et Megarici et Eretrici et Academici, qui novam induxerunt scientiam, nihil scire.

[44] Parmenides says that of the things which seem, nothing exists ~in the universe~. Zeno the Eleatic cast all affairs out of affair: he says that nothing exists. About nearly the same matters the Pyrrhonists and the Megarics and the Eretrics and the Academics revolve, who introduced a new science: to know nothing.

[45] Haec omnia in illum supervacuum studiorum liberalium gregem coice; illi mihi non profuturam scientiam tradunt, hi spem omnis scientiae eripiunt. Satius est supervacua scire quam nihil. Illi non praeferunt lumen per quod acies derigatur ad verum, hi oculos mihi effodiunt.

[45] Cast all these into that superfluous herd of the liberal studies; those hand down to me a science that will not be profitable, these snatch away the hope of all science. It is better to know superfluities than nothing. Those do not bear forth the light by which acuity is directed to the truth, these gouge out my eyes.

Si Protagorae credo, nihil in rerum natura est nisi dubium; si Nausiphani, hoc unum certum est, nihil esse certi; si Parmenidi, nihil est praeter unum; si Zenoni, ne unum quidem.

If I trust Protagoras, nothing in the nature of things exists except the doubtful; if I trust Nausiphanes, this one thing is certain: that there is nothing certain; if I trust Parmenides, nothing exists besides the One; if I trust Zeno, not even the One.

[46] Quid ergo nos sumus? quid ista quae nos circumstant, alunt, sustinent? Tota rerum natura umbra est aut inanis aut fallax.

[46] What then are we? what are those things which surround us, nourish us, sustain us? The whole nature of things is a shadow, either empty or deceptive.

Non facile dixerim utris magis irascar, illis qui nos nihil scire voluerunt, an illis qui ne hoc quidem nobis reliquerunt, nihil scire. Vale.

I would not easily say which I am more angry at, those who wished us to know nothing, or those who have not even left us this, to know nothing. Farewell.