Gaius: Commentarius Tertius

2. Sui autem heredes existimantur liberi, qui in potestate morientis fuerunt, ueluti filius filiaue, nepos neptisue ex filio, pronepos proneptisue ex nepote filio nato prognatus prognataue. nec interest, utrum naturales sint liberi an adoptiui. ita demum tamen nepos neptisue et pronepos proneptisue suorum heredum numero sunt, si praecedens persona desierit in potestate parentis esse, siue morte id acciderit siue alia ratione, ueluti emancipatione; nam si per id tempus, quo quis moriatur, filius in potestate eius sit, nepos ex eo suus heres esse non potest.

2. But those children are reckoned his own heirs who were in the power of the dying person, namely son or daughter, nepos or neptis (grandson or granddaughter) from a son, pronepos or proneptis (great‑grandson or great‑granddaughter) born of a grandson from a son. Nor does it matter whether the children are natural or adoptive. Yet a nepos or neptis and a pronepos or proneptis are counted among the number of his heirs only if the preceding person has ceased to be in the power of the parent, whether that happened by death or by some other reason, as by emancipation; for if at the time when one dies the son is in his power, the grandson cannot be his heir.

idem et in ceteris deinceps liberorum personis dictum intellegemus.

We shall understand the same to be said likewise in the other subsequent persons of children.

3. Vxor quoque, quae in manu eius, qui moritur, est, ei sua heres est, quia filiae loco est. item nurus, quae in filii manu est, nam et haec neptis loco est. sed ita demum erit sua heres, si filius, cuius in manu fuerit, cum pater moritur, in potestate eius non sit.

3. A wife also, who is in the manus of him who dies, is his heir in her own right, because she is in the place of a daughter. Likewise a daughter-in-law, who is in the manus of the son, for she too is in the place of a granddaughter. But she will be his heir in her own right only if the son, of whom she is in manus, at the time the father dies is not in his potestas.

idemque dicemus et de ea, quae in nepotis manu matrimonii causa sit, quia proneptis loco est.

And the same we will say also of her who is in the hand of the grandson for the sake of marriage, because she is in the place of a great-granddaughter.

4. Postumi quoque, qui si uiuo parente nati essent, in potestate eius futuri forent, sui heredes sunt.

4. Posthumous children likewise, who, if they had been born with the parent living, would have been in his power, are their heirs.

5. Idem iuris est de his, quorum nomine ex lege Aelia Sentia uel ex senatus consulto post mortem patris causa probatur: nam et hi uiuo patre causa probata in potestate eius futuri essent.

5. The same rule applies to those whose status is established in their name by the Aelia Sentia law or by a senatus consultum after the father's death: for these too, if their status had been proved while the father was alive, they would have been in his power.

6. Quod etiam de eo filio, qui ex prima secundaue mancipatione post mortem patris manumittitur, intellegemus.

6. We likewise understand the same of that son who, after the father's death, is manumitted by the first or second mancipation.

7. Igitur cum filius filiaue et ex altero filio nepotes neptesue extant, pariter ad hereditatem uocantur; nec qui gradu proximior est, ulteriorem excludit. aequum enim uidebatur nepotes neptesue in patris sui locum portionemque succedere. pari ratione et si nepos neptisue sit ex filio et ex nepote pronepos proneptisue, simul omnes uocantur ad hereditatem.

7. Therefore, when a son or daughter and, from the other son, grandsons or granddaughters exist, they are equally called to the inheritance; nor does one nearer in degree exclude a more remote one. For it seemed fair that grandsons or granddaughters should succeed to the place and portion of their father. In the same way, if a grandson or granddaughter is from a son and a great‑grandson or great‑granddaughter from a grandson, all are together called to the inheritance.

8. Et quia placebat nepotes neptesue, item pronepotes proneptesue in parentis sui locum succedere, conueniens esse uisum est non in capita, sed in stirpes hereditatem diuidi, ita ut filius partem dimidiam hereditatis ferat et ex altero filio duo pluresue nepotes alteram dimidiam, item si ex duobus filiis nepotes extent et ex altero filio unus forte uel duo, ex altero tres aut quattuor, ad unum aut ad duos dimidia pars pertineat et ad tres aut quattuor altera dimidia.

8. And because it was pleasing that grandchildren and granddaughters, likewise great-grandchildren and great-granddaughters, should succeed in the place of their parent, it was thought fitting that the inheritance be divided not into heads (capita) but into stems/branches (stirpes), so that a son bears one half part of the inheritance, and from the other son two or more grandchildren take the other half; likewise, if there are grandchildren from two sons and from one son one or two, from the other three or four, to one or to two the half part pertains and to three or to four the other half.

9. Si nullus sit suorum heredum, tunc hereditas pertinet ex eadem lege XII tabularum ad adgnatos.

9. If there is no heir of his own, then the inheritance pertains, by the same law of the 12 Tables, to the agnates.

10. Vocantur autem adgnati, qui legitima cognatione iuncti sunt. legitima autem cognatio est ea, quae per uirilis sexus personas coniungitur. itaque eodem patre nati fratres agnati sibi sunt, qui etiam consanguinei uocantur, nec requiritur, an etiam matrem eandem habuerint.

10. Those called agnates are those who are joined by lawful cognation. Lawful cognation is that which is joined through persons of the male sex. Therefore brothers born of the same father are agnates to one another, who are also called consanguineous, and it is not required that they have also the same mother.

item patruus fratris filio et inuicem is illi agnatus est. eodem numero sunt fratres patrueles inter se, id est qui ex duobus fratribus progenerati sunt, quos plerique etiam consobrinos uocant; qua ratione scilicet etiam ad plures gradus agnationis peruenire poterimus.

Likewise the patruus (father’s brother) is agnatus to the brother’s son, and conversely he is agnatus to him. In the same rank are patruel brothers among themselves, that is, those begotten from two brothers, whom many also call consobrinos; by this reasoning, namely, we can likewise reach to more degrees of agnation.

11. Non tamen omnibus simul agnatis dat lex XII tabularum hereditatem, sed his, qui tum, cum certum est aliquem intestatum decessisse, proximo gradu sunt.

11. However the law of the 12 Tables does not at once give the inheritance to all agnates, but to those who at the time when it is certain that someone has died intestate are in the nearest degree.

12. Nec in eo iure successio est. ideoque si agnatus proximus hereditatem omiserit uel, antequam adierit, decesserit, sequentibus nihil iuris ex lege competit.

12. Nor is there succession in that right. Therefore if the nearest agnate has omitted the inheritance, or has died before he took possession, nothing of legal right by law belongs to those following.

13. Ideo autem non mortis tempore quis proximus fuerit, requirimus, sed eo tempore, quo certum fuerit aliquem intestatum decessisse, quia si quis testamento facto decesserit, melius esse uisum est tunc demum requiri proximum, cum certum esse coeperit neminem ex eo testamento fore heredem.

13. Therefore we inquire not who was nearest at the time of death, but at that time when it is certain that someone has died intestate, because if one dies having made a will, it has been thought better that then at last the nearest be sought, when it has begun to be certain that no one under that will will be an heir.

14. Quod ad feminas tamen attinet, in hoc iure aliud in ipsarum hereditatibus capiendis placuit, aliud in ceterorum [bonis] ab his capiendis. nam feminarum hereditates proinde ad nos agnationis iure redeunt atque masculorum, nostrae uero hereditates ad feminas ultra consanguineorum gradum non pertinent. itaque soror fratri sororiue legitima heres est, amita uero et fratris filia legitima heres esse non potest; sororis autem nobis loco est etiam mater aut nouerca, quae per in manum conuentionem apud patrem nostrum iura filiae nancta est.

14. As to women, however, in this law it has been decided one thing for taking in their own inheritances, another for taking from the goods of others which are from them. For the inheritances of women accordingly revert to us by the right of agnation just as those of men do; whereas our inheritances do not pertain to women beyond the degree of consanguinity. Therefore a sister is the legitimate heir to a brother and to a sister, but a paternal aunt and a brother’s daughter cannot be a legitimate heir; moreover in the place of a sister for us is also a mother or a stepmother, who by an in manum convention with our father has acquired the rights of a daughter.

15. Si ei, qui defunctus erit, sit frater et alterius fratris filius, sicut ex superioribus intellegitur, frater prior est, quia gradu praecedit. sed alia facta est iuris interpretatio inter suos heredes.

15. If to him who shall have died there is a brother and also a son of another brother, as is understood from the foregoing, the brother is prior, because he precedes in degree. But a different interpretation of the law has been made among one's own heirs.

16. Quod si defuncti nullus frater extet, sed sint liberi fratrum, ad omnes quidem hereditas pertinet; sed quaesitum est, si dispari forte numero sint nati, uelut ex uno unus uel duo, ex altero tres uel quattuor, utrum in stirpes diuidenda sit hereditas, sicut inter suos heredes iuris est, an potius in capita. iam dudum tamen placuit in capita diuidendam esse hereditatem. itaque quotquot erunt ab utraque parte personae, in tot portiones hereditas diuidetur, ita ut singuli singulas portiones ferant.

16. But if no brother of the deceased survives, yet there are the children of the brothers, the inheritance indeed pertains to all; but the question was raised, if by chance they are born in unequal number, as from one [brother] one or two, from the other three or four, whether the inheritance is to be divided into stirpes, as among one's own heirs is the law, or rather into capita. Yet long ago it was resolved that the inheritance is to be divided into capita. Therefore, however many persons there shall be on each side, the inheritance shall be divided into that many portions, so that each individual bears single portions.

17. Si nullus agnatus sit, eadem lex XII tabularum gentiles ad hereditatem uocat. qui sint autem gentiles, primo commentario rettulimus; et cum illic admonuerimus totum gentilicium ius in desuetudinem abisse, superuacuum est hoc quoque loco de eadem re iterum curiosius tractare.

17. If there be no agnate, the same law of the Twelve Tables calls the gentiles to the inheritance. But who the gentiles are we set forth in the first commentary; and since there we warned that the whole gentilic law has fallen into disuse, it is superfluous here also to treat again more curiously of the same matter.

18. Hactenus lege XII tabularum finitae sunt intestatorum hereditates. quod ius quemadmodum strictum fuerit, palam est intellegere.

18. So far, by the law of the 12 Tables the inheritances of intestates have been brought to an end. How strict that law was is plain to understand.

19. Statim enim emancipati liberi nullum ius in hereditatem parentis ex ea lege habent, cum desierint sui heredes esse.

19. For emancipated children immediately have no right in the inheritance of the parent from that law, since they have ceased to be their heirs.

20. Idem iuris est, si ideo liberi non sint in potestate patris, quia sint cum eo ciuitate Romana donati nec ab imperatore in potestatem redacti fuerint.

20. The same law holds, if for that reason the children are not in the father's power, because they have been granted Roman citizenship with him and have not been reduced into his potestas by the emperor.

21. Item agnati kapite deminuti non admittuntur ex ea lege ad hereditatem, quia nomen agnationis capitis deminutione perimitur.

21. Likewise agnates diminished in caput are not admitted by that law to the inheritance, because the name of agnation is destroyed by the diminution of the caput.

22. Item proximo agnato non adeunte hereditatem nihilo magis sequens iure legitimo admittitur.

22. Likewise, if the nearest agnate does not accept the inheritance, the next in line is no more admitted by legitimate right.

23. Item feminae agnatae, quaecumque consanguineorum gradum excedunt, nihil iuris ex lege habent.

23. Moreover, female agnates, whatever degree of consanguinity they exceed, have no legal right by the law.

24. Similiter non admittuntur cognati, qui per feminini sexus personas necessitudine iunguntur, adeo quidem, ut nec inter matrem et filium filiamue ultro citroque hereditatis capiendae ius conpetat, praeterquam si per in manum conuentionem consanguinitatis iura inter eos constiterint.

24. Similarly, cognates who are joined by relationship through persons of the female sex are not admitted, so much so that neither between mother and son or daughter, on either side, does the right of taking inheritance attach, except if by a convention in manum of consanguinity rights have been established between them.

25. Sed hae iuris iniquitates edicto praetoris emendatae sunt. 26. Nam eos omnes, qui legitimo iure deficiuntur, uocat ad hereditatem, proinde ac si in potestate parentis mortis tempore fuissent, siue soli sint, siue etiam sui heredes, id est qui in potestate patris fuerunt, concurrant.

25. But these injustices of the law were corrected by an edict of the praetor. 26. For he summons to the inheritance all those who are deficient in legitimate right, just as if they had been in the power of the parent at the time of death; whether they be alone, or even their heirs — that is, those who were in the power of the father — let them be admitted to share.

27. Adgnatos autem capite deminutos non secundo gradu post suos heredes uocat, id est, non eo gradu uocat, quo per legem uocarentur, si kapite minuti non essent, sed tertio proximitatis nomine. licet enim capitis deminutione ius legitimum perdiderint, certe cognationis iura retinent. itaque si quis alius sit, qui integrum ius agnationis habebit, is potior erit, etiamsi longiore gradu fuerit.

27. But agnates diminished in capite he does not call in the second degree after his own heirs, that is, he does not call them in that degree in which by law they would be called, if they were not diminished in capite, but in the third by name of proximity. For although by the diminution of the caput they have lost the legitimate right, yet they certainly retain the rights of cognation. Therefore if there be some other person who has the entire right of agnation, he will be preferred, even though he be of a more remote degree.

28. Idem iuris est, ut quidam putant, in eius agnati persona, qui proximo agnato omittente hereditatem nihilo magis iure legitimo admittitur; sed sunt, qui putant hunc eodem gradu a praetore uocari, quo etiam per legem agnatis hereditas datur.

28. It is the same in law, as some think, in the person of that agnatus who, the next agnatus omitting the inheritance, is admitted not any more by lawful right; but there are those who think that he is summoned by the praetor in the same degree in which by law inheritance is given to agnates.

29. Feminae certe agnatae, quae consanguineorum gradum excedunt, tertio gradu uocantur, id est, si neque suus heres neque agnatus ullus erit.

29. Women, certainly agnates, who exceed the degree of consanguinity, are called in the third degree, that is, if neither her own heir nor any agnate exists.

30. Eodem gradu uocantur etiam eae personae, quae per feminini sexus personas copulatae sunt.

30. Also those persons who have been joined through female persons are called in the same degree.

31. Liberi quoque, qui in adoptiua familia sunt, ad naturalium parentum hereditatem hoc eodem gradu uocantur.

31. Children also, who are in an adoptive family, are called to the inheritance of their natural parents in this same degree.

32. Quos autem praetor uocat ad hereditatem, hi heredes ipso quidem iure non fiunt: nam praetor heredes facere non potest; per legem enim tantum uel similem iuris constitutionem heredes fiunt, uelut per senatus consultum et constitutionem principalem: sed cum eis praetor dat bonorum possessionem, loco heredum constituuntur.

32. But those whom the praetor calls to the inheritance do not become heirs by that very right: for the praetor cannot make heirs; for heirs are made only by law or by a similar constitution of law, or as it were by a senatorial decree and a principal constitution: but when the praetor gives to them the possession of goods, they are constituted in the place of heirs.

33. Adhuc autem etiam alios conplures gradus praetor facit in bonorum possessionibus dandis, dum id agit, ne quis sine successore moriatur. de quibus in his commentariis consulto non agimus, quia hoc ius totum propriis commentariis exsecuti sumus. 33a Hoc solum admonuisse sufficit, [. . . . . vv. 3 exceptis frustulis legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ] per in manum conuentionem iura consanguinitatis nacta [. . . . . vv. 29 . . . . . . . ]

33. Moreover the praetor still makes many other stages in giving possessions of goods, while he does this, so that no one die without a successor. Of which in these commentaries we purposely do not treat, because we have pursued this whole law in our own commentaries. 33a Hoc solum admonuisse sufficit, [. . . . . vv. 3 exceptis frustulis legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ] per in manum conuentionem iura consanguinitatis nacta [. . . . vv. 29 . . . . . . . ]

34. Aliquando tamen neque emendandi neque impugnandi ueteris iuris, sed magis confirmandi gratia pollicetur bonorum possessionem. nam illis quoque, qui recte facto testamento heredes instituti sunt, dat secundum tabulas bonorum possessionem: item ab intestato heredes suos et agnatos ad bonorum possessionem uocat. quibus casibus beneficium eius in eo solo uidetur aliquam utilitatem habere, ut is, qui ita bonorum possessionem petit, interdicto, cuius principium est QVORVM BONORVM, uti possit, cuius interdicti quae sit utilitas, suo loco proponemus; alioquin remota quoque bonorum possessione ad eos hereditas pertinet iure ciuili.

34. Sometimes, however, he promises the possession of goods not for the sake of correcting or impugning the old law, but rather for the sake of confirming it. For to those also who, by a properly made testament, have been instituted heirs, he gives possession of the goods according to the tablets: likewise, from intestacy he calls his own heirs and agnates to the possession of the goods. In these cases his beneficium seems to have some utility only in this respect, that he who thus seeks the possession of goods may be able to use the interdict whose beginning is QVORVM BONORVM; of what utility that interdict is we will set forth in its place; otherwise, with the possession of goods removed, the inheritance pertains to them by civil law.

35. Ceterum saepe quibusdam ita datur bonorum possessio, ut is, cui data sit, non optineat hereditatem; quae bonorum possessio dicitur sine re.

35. Moreover, often bonorum possessio is given to some in such a way that he, to whom it is given, does not obtain the inheritance; such bonorum possessio is called sine re.

36. Nam si uerbi gratia iure facto testamento heres institutus creuerit hereditatem, sed bonorum possessionem secundum tabulas testamenti petere noluerit, contentus eo, quod iure ciuili heres sit, nihilo minus ii, qui nullo facto testamento ad intestati bona uocantur, possunt petere bonorum possessionem; sed sine re ad eos [hereditas] pertinet, cum testamento scriptus heres euincere hereditatem possit.

36. For if, for example, by law having been made a will an heir has been appointed and has increased into the inheritance, but will not seek the possession of the goods according to the tables of the will, being content with the fact that he is heir by civil law, nevertheless those who, with no will having been made, are called to intestate goods can seek possession of the goods; but [inheritance] pertains to them without the thing (sine re), since the heir written in the will can vindicate the inheritance.

37. Idem iuris est, si intestato aliquo mortuo suus heres noluerit petere bonorum possessionem, contentus legitimo iure. nam et agnato competit quidem bonorum possessio, sed sine re, quia euinci hereditas a suo herede potest. et illud conuenienter dicetur: si ad agnatum iure ciuili pertinet hereditas et is adierit hereditatem, sed bonorum possessionem petere noluerit, et si quis ex proximis cognatis petierit, sine re habebit bonorum possessionem propter eandem rationem.

37. The same rule of law holds, if upon the death of one intestate his heir will not wish to claim the bonorum possessio, being content with his legitimate right. For the bonorum possessio indeed belongs to the agnate, but without the estate, because the inheritance can be defeated by his own heir. And this will be said fittingly: if by civil law the inheritance pertains to an agnate and he has taken up the inheritance, but will not seek the bonorum possessio, and if any one of the nearest cognates should seek it, he will have the bonorum possessio without the estate for the same reason.

38. Sunt et alii quidam similes casus, quorum aliquos superiore commentario tradidimus.

38. There are also certain other similar cases, some of which we have given in the foregoing commentary.

39. Nunc de libertorum bonis uideamus.

39. Now let us consider the goods of the freedmen.

40. Olim itaque licebat liberto patronum suum impune testamento praeterire. nam ita demum lex XII tabularum ad hereditatem liberti uocabat patronum, si intestatus mortuus esset libertus nullo suo herede relicto. itaque intestato quoque mortuo liberto, si is suum heredem reliquerat, nihil in bonis eius patrono iuris erat; et si quidem ex naturalibus liberis aliquem suum heredem reliquisset, nulla uidebatur esse querella; si uero uel adoptiuus filius filiaue uel uxor, quae in manu esset, suus uel sua heres esset, aperte iniquum erat nihil iuris patrono superesse.

40. Once therefore it was permitted for a freedman to omit his patron with impunity in his testament. For only thus did the law of the Twelve Tables call the patron to the inheritance of the freedman: if the freedman died intestate having left no heir of his own. Therefore even when the freedman died intestate, if he had left his heir, there was no right of the patron upon his goods; and if indeed from his natural children he had left some one as his heir, no complaint seemed to exist; but if an adopted son or daughter, or a wife who was in manus, was his heir, it was openly unjust that no right should remain to the patron.

41. Qua de causa postea praetoris edicto haec iuris iniquitas emendata est. siue enim faciat testamentum libertus, iubetur ita testari, ut patrono suo partem dimidiam bonorum suorum relinquat, et si aut nihil aut minus quam partem dimidiam reliquerit, datur patrono contra tabulas testamenti partis dimidiae bonorum possessio; si uero intestatus moriatur suo herede relicto adoptiuo filio uel uxore, quae in manu ipsius esset, uel nuru, quae in manu filii eius fuerit, datur aeque patrono aduersus hos suos heredes partis dimidiae bonorum possessio. prosunt autem liberto ad excludendum patronum naturales liberi, non solum quos in potestate mortis tempore habet, sed etiam emancipati et in adoptionem dati, si modo aliqua ex parte heredes scripti sint aut praeteriti contra tabulas testamenti bonorum possessionem ex edicto petierint; nam exheredati nullo modo repellunt patronum.

41. For this reason afterwards by the praetor’s edict this inequity of the law was corrected. For if a freedman makes a testament, he is ordered to will in such a way that he leave to his patron one half part of his goods, and if he leaves either nothing or less than one half part, possession of one half of the goods is given to the patron against the provisions of the testament; and if, however, he die intestate leaving his heir, an adopted son, or a wife who is in manu of himself, or a nurus who was in the manu of his son, possession of one half of the goods is likewise given to the patron against these his heirs. Natural children, however, avail the freedman in excluding the patron, not only those whom he has in potestate at the time of death, but also those emancipated and given in adoption, provided only that they have in some part been written heirs or, being passed over against the testament, have sought possession of the goods by edict; for the disinherited in no way repel the patron.

42. Postea lege Papia aucta sunt iura patronorum, quod ad locupletiores libertos pertinet. cautum est enim ea lege, ut ex bonis eius, qui sestertium centum milibus amplius patrimonium reliquerit et pauciores quam tres liberos habebit, siue is testamento facto siue intestato mortuus erit, uirilis pars patrono debeatur; itaque cum unum filium unamue filiam heredem reliquerit libertus, proinde pars dimidia patrono debetur, ac si sine ullo filio filiaue moreretur; cum uero duos duasue heredes reliquerit, tertia pars debetur; si tres relinquat, repellitur patronus.

42. Afterwards by the Papian law the rights of patrons were increased, insofar as it concerns the wealthier freedmen. For it was provided by that law that out of the goods of one who left an estate of more than one hundred thousand sesterces and had fewer than three children, whether he died having made a will or intestate, a virile share is due to the patron; and therefore when the freedman left one son or one daughter as heir, accordingly a half part is owed to the patron, even as if he had died without any son or daughter; but when he left two heirs, two sons or two daughters, a third part is owed; if he leaves three, the patron is repelled.

43. In bonis libertinarum nullam iniuriam antiquo iure patiebantur patroni. cum enim hae in patronorum legitima tutela essent, non aliter scilicet testamentum facere poterant quam patrono auctore; itaque siue auctor ad testamentum faciendum factus erat, aut de se queri debebat, quod heres a liberta relictus non erat, aut ipsum ex testamento, si heres ab ea relictus erat, sequebatur hereditas. si uero auctor ei factus non erat et intestata liberta moriebatur, ad eundem, quia suos heredes femina habere non potest, hereditas pertinebat: nec enim ullus olim alius iure ciuili heres erat, qui posset patronum a bonis libertae intestatae repellere.

43. In the goods of freedwomen the patrons suffered no wrong under the ancient law. For since these women were in the legitimate tutela of their patrons, they could not, of course, make a testament otherwise than with the patron as auctor; and so if the patron had been made auctor for making a will, either he had cause to complain concerning himself, that no heir had been left by the freedwoman, or the inheritance followed him from the testament if an heir had been left by her. But if he had not been made auctor and the freedwoman died intestate, the inheritance pertained to the same patron, because a woman cannot have her own heirs: for formerly there was no other heir in civil law who could dispossess the patron of the goods of the intestate freedwoman.

44. Sed postea lex Papia cum quattuor liberorum iure libertinas tutela patronorum liberaret et eo modo concederet eis etiam sine tutoris auctoritate testamentum facere, prospexit, ut pro numero liberorum, quos liberta mortis tempore habuerit, uirilis pars patrono debeatur; ergo ex bonis eius, quae [. . . . . vv. 2 1/2 legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ] hereditas ad patronum pertinet.

44. But afterwards the Papian law, when it freed freedwomen by the right of four children from the guardianship of patrons and thereby granted them also to make a testament even without the authority of a tutor, provided that, in proportion to the number of children which the freedwoman had at the time of death, the virile portion is owed to the patron; therefore the inheritance from her goods, which [. . . . . vv. 2 1/2 legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ] pertains to the patron.

45. Quae diximus de patrono, eadem intellegemus et de filio patroni, item de nepote ex filio et de pronepote ex nepote filio nato prognato.

45. What we have said about the patron, the same we shall understand concerning the son of the patron, likewise concerning the grandson from the son, and concerning the great‑grandson (pronepote) born of the grandson as a son.

46. Filia uero patroni et neptis ex filio et proneptis ex nepote filio nato prognata olim quidem habebant idem ius, quod lege XII tabularum patrono datum est; praetor autem non nisi uirilis sexus patronorum liberos uocat; filia uero ut contra tabulas testamenti liberti aut ab intestato contra filium adoptiuum uel uxorem nurumue, quae in manu fuerit, bonorum possessionem petat, trium liberorum iure lege Papia consequitur; aliter hoc ius non habet.

46. The daughter of the patron and the granddaughter from a son and the great‑granddaughter born of a grandson once indeed had the same right that was given to the patron by the Law of the Twelve Tables; but the praetor summons only the male‑sex children of patrons; however the daughter, so that against the tables the will of a freedman or in intestacy she may claim possession of the goods against an adopted son or against a wife or daughter‑in‑law who is in manu, obtains by the Lex Papia the right of three children; otherwise she has not this right.

47. Sed ut ex bonis libertae testatae quattuor liberos habentis uirilis pars ei debeatur, ne liberorum quidem iure consequitur, ut quidam putant; sed tamen intestata liberta mortua uerba legis Papiae faciunt, ut ei uirilis pars debeatur; si uero testamento facto mortua sit liberta, tale ius ei datur, quale datum est contra tabulas testamenti liberti, id est, quale et uirilis sexus patronorum liberi contra tabulas testamenti liberti habent, quamuis parum diligenter ea pars legis scripta sit.

47. But insofar as from the estate of a freedwoman who has made a will the virile portion is owed to her when she has four children, she does not obtain it even by the law of children, as some think; yet a freedwoman dying intestate is made by the words of the Papian law to be owed the virile portion; but if the freedwoman has died having made a testament, such a right is given to her as is given against the tables of a freedman’s testament—that is, such as the children of the virile sex of the patrons have against the tables of the freedman’s testament—although that part of the law is written rather carelessly.

48. Ex his apparet extraneos heredes patronorum longe remotos esse ab omni eo iure, quod uel in intestatorum bonis uel contra tabulas testamenti patrono competit.

48. From these things it appears that heirs alien to the patrons are far removed from every right which either in the goods of intestates or against the tables of the patron’s testament belongs to the patron.

49. Patronae olim ante legem Papiam hoc solum ius habebant in bonis libertorum, quod etiam patronis ex lege XII tabularum datum est. nec enim ut contra tabulas testamenti ingrati liberti uel ab intestato contra filium adoptiuum uel uxorem nurumue bonorum possessionem partis dimidiae peterent, praetor similiter ut de patrono liberisque eius curabat.

49. Formerly patronesses, before the Lex Papia, had in the goods of their freedmen only that right which was also given to patrons by the law of the Twelve Tables. Nor did the praetor, in like manner as he provided for the patron and his children, allow them to claim possession of a half‑share of the goods against the tablets of the will of an ungrateful freedman, or against intestacy, or against an adopted son, or against a wife or daughter‑in‑law.

50. Sed lex Papia duobus liberis honoratae ingenuae patronae, libertinae tribus eadem fere iura dedit, quae ex edicto praetoris patroni habent; trium uero liberorum iure honoratae ingenuae patronae ea iura dedit, quae per eandem legem patrono data sunt; libertinae autem patronae non idem iuris praestitit.

50. But the Lex Papia gave to a patroness honored by two freeborn children, and to a freedwoman-patroness with three, almost the same rights which patrons have from the praetor's edict; moreover, by the right of three children the patroness honored as freeborn was given those rights which by the same law were granted to the patron; the freedwoman-patroness, however, did not possess the same legal status.

51. Quod autem ad libertinarum bona pertinet, si quidem intestatae decesserint, nihil noui patronae liberis honoratae lex Papia praestat; itaque si neque ipsa patrona neque liberta kapite deminuta sit, ex lege XII tabularum ad eam hereditas pertinet, et excluduntur libertae liberi; quod iuris est, etiam si liberis honorata non sit patrona; numquam enim, sicut supra diximus, feminae suum heredem habere possunt. si uero uel huius uel illius kapitis deminutio interueniat, rursus liberi libertae excludunt patronam, quia legitimo iure kapitis deminutione perempto euenit, ut liberi libertae cognationis iure potiores habeantur.

51. As for the goods of freedwomen, if they die intestate, the Papian law grants nothing new to the children of a patroness honored with liberty; therefore, if neither the patroness herself nor the freedwoman has suffered capite deminutio, the inheritance by the law of the Twelve Tables belongs to her, and the freedwoman’s children are excluded; which is the rule even if the patroness has not been honored with children; for never, as we said above, can a woman have her own heir. But if either this or that capite deminutio intervenes, again the children of the freedwoman exclude the patroness, because with the legitimate right destroyed by capite deminutio it happens that the freedwoman’s children are held preferable by the right of cognation.

52. Cum autem testamento facto moritur liberta, ea quidem patrona, quae liberis honorata non est, nihil iuris habet contra libertae testamentum; ei uero, quae liberis honorata sit, hoc ius tribuitur per legem Papiam, quod habet ex edicto patronus contra tabulas liberti.

52. When, however, the freedwoman dies having made a will, that patroness who has not been honored with children has no right against the freedwoman’s testament; but to her who has been honored with children this right is granted by the Papian law, the same right which the patron has from the praetor’s edict against the freedman’s tablets.

53. Eadem lex patronae filio liberis honorato . . . patroni iura dedit; sed in huius persona etiam unius filii filiaeue ius sufficit.

53. The same law gave to the patroness, to a son honored with children . . . the rights of the patron; but in the person of such a one the right of even one son or daughter suffices.

54. Hactenus omnia iura quasi per indicem tetigisse satis est. alioquin diligentior interpretatio propriis commentariis exposita est.

54. Thus far it is sufficient that I have touched upon all the rights, as it were by an index. Otherwise a more diligent interpretation is set forth in its own commentaries.

55. Sequitur, ut de bonis Latinorum libertinorum dispiciamus.

55. It follows that we should consider the goods (property) of Latin freedmen.

56. Quae pars iuris ut manifestior fiat, admonendi sumus, id quod alio loco diximus, eos, qui nunc Latini Iuniani dicuntur, olim ex iure Quiritium seruos fuisse, sed auxilio praetoris in libertatis forma seruari solitos; unde etiam res eorum peculii iure ad patronos pertinere solita est. postea uero per legem Iuniam eos omnes, quos praetor in libertate tuebatur, liberos esse coepisse et appellatos esse Latinos Iunianos: Latinos ideo, quia lex eos liberos proinde esse uoluit, atque si essent ciues Romani ingenui, qui ex urbe Roma in Latinas colonias deducti Latini coloniarii esse coeperunt; Iunianos ideo, quia per legem Iuniam liberi facti sunt, etiamsi non essent ciues Romani. legis itaque Iuniae lator cum intellegeret futurum, ut ea fictione res Latinorum defunctorum ad patronos pertinere desinerent, quia scilicet neque ut serui decederent, ut possent iure peculii res eorum ad patronos pertinere, neque liberti Latini hominis bona possent manumissionis iure ad patronos pertinere, necessarium existimauit, ne beneficium istis datum in iniuriam patronorum conuerteretur, cauere [uoluit], ut bona eorum proinde ad manumissores pertinerent, ac si lex lata non esset.

56. To make this part of the law more manifest, we must be reminded of what we said elsewhere: those who are now called Junian Latins were formerly slaves according to the law of the Quirites, but were in the habit of being preserved in the condition of freedom by the aid of the praetor; whence also their things used to pertain to their patrons by the law of peculium. Afterwards, by the Junian law all those whom the praetor protected in liberty began to be free and were called Junian Latins: called Latins because the law willed them to be free in that sense, and even if they were native Roman citizens who, having been led from the city of Rome into Latin colonies, began to be Latin colonials; called Junian because by the Junian law they were made free, even if they were not Roman citizens. And the bearer of the Junian law, when he understood that it would happen that by that fiction the property of deceased Latins would cease to pertain to the patrons—because neither could they depart as slaves so that their things might pertain to patrons by the law of peculium, nor could the goods of a freed Latin man pertain to patrons by the law of manumission—deemed it necessary, lest that benefit given to them turn to the injury of patrons, to take care that their goods should in fact pertain to the manumitters as if no law had been passed.

itaque iure quodam modo peculii bona Latinorum ad manumissores ea lege pertinent.

Therefore, in a certain legal mode, the peculium goods of the Latins pertain to the manumissors by that law.

57. Unde accidit, ut longe differant ea iura, quae in bonis Latinorum ex lege Iunia constituta sunt, ab his, quae in hereditate ciuium Romanorum libertorum obseruantur.

57. Whence it comes about that the rights established by the Junian law in the goods of the Latins differ greatly from those which are observed in the inheritance of the freedmen of Roman citizens.

58. Nam ciuis Romani liberti hereditas ad extraneos heredes patroni nullo modo pertinet; ad filium autem patroni nepotesque ex filio et pronepotes ex nepote filio nato prognatos omni modo pertinet, etiamsi a parente fuerint exheredati; Latinorum autem bona tamquam peculia seruorum etiam ad extraneos heredes pertinent et ad liberos manumissoris exheredatos non pertinent.

58. For the inheritance of a libertus who is a Roman citizen in no way pertains to the patron’s extraneous heirs; but it pertains in every way to the patron’s son, and to grandsons from the son and to great‑grandsons descended from a grandson born of the son, even if they have been disinherited by their parent; whereas the goods of Latins, as peculia of slaves, likewise pertain to extraneous heirs and do not pertain to the liberi of the manumissor who have been disinherited.

59. Item ciuis Romani liberti hereditas ad duos pluresue patronos aequaliter pertinet, licet dispar in eo seruo dominium habuerint; bona uero Latinorum pro ea parte pertinent, pro qua parte quisque eorum dominus fuerit.

59. Likewise the inheritance of the freedmen of a Roman citizen pertains equally to two or more patrons, although they had unequal dominion in that slave; the goods of Latins, however, pertain for that part for which each of them was master.

60. Item in hereditate ciuis Romani liberti patronus alterius patroni filium excludit, et filius patroni alterius patroni nepotem repellit; bona autem Latinorum et ad ipsum patronum et ad alterius patroni heredem simul pertinent, pro qua parte ad ipsum manumissorem pertinerent.

60. Moreover, in the inheritance of a Roman citizen’s freedman the patron excludes the son of another patron, and the son of one patron excludes the grandson of the other patron; but the goods of the Latins pertain both to the patron himself and to the heir of the other patron together, for that part for which they would pertain to the freedman himself.

61. Item si unius patroni tres forte liberi sunt et alterius unus, hereditas ciuis Romani liberti in capita diuiditur, id est tres fratres tres portiones ferunt et unus quartam; bona uero Latinorum pro ea parte ad successores pertinent, pro qua parte ad ipsum manumissorem pertinerent.

61. Also if by chance three children belong to one patron and one to another, the inheritance of the freedman of a Roman citizen is divided per capita, that is, the three brothers bear three portions and the one a fourth; but the goods of the Latins pertain to the successors for that part for which they would pertain to the manumitter himself.

62. Item si alter ex [is] patronis suam partem in hereditate ciuis Romani liberti spernat uel ante moriatur, quam cernat, tota hereditas ad alterum pertinet; bona autem Latini pro parte deficientis patroni caduca fiunt et ad populum pertinent.

62. Also if one of those patrons scorns his part in the inheritance of a Roman citizen's freedman or dies before he takes it, the whole inheritance pertains to the other; but the goods of the Latin for the part of the defaulting patron become forfeited and pertain to the people.

63. Postea Lupo et Largo consulibus senatus censuit, ut bona Latinorum primum ad eum pertinerent, qui eos liberasset; deinde ad liberos eorum non nominatim exheredatos, uti quisque proximus esset; tunc antiquo iure ad heredes eorum, qui liberassent, pertinerent.

63. Thereafter, in the consulship of Lupo and Largo, the senate decreed that the goods of the Latins should first belong to him who had freed them; next to their children not expressly disinherited, according as each was nearest; then, by the old law, to the heirs of those who had freed them.

64. Quo senatus consulto quidam id actum esse putant, ut in bonis Latinorum eodem iure utamur, quo utimur in hereditate ciuium Romanorum libertinorum. idque maxime Pegaso placuit; quae sententia aperte falsa est. nam ciuis Romani liberti hereditas numquam ad extraneos patroni heredes pertinet; bona autem Latinorum etiam ex hoc ipso senatus consulto non obstantibus liberis manumissoris etiam ad extraneos heredes pertinent.

64. By that senatus consultum some think that it was enacted that in the goods of the Latins we should use the same law which we use in the inheritance of freedmen of Roman citizens. And this pleased Pegaso especially; an opinion plainly false. For the inheritance of a Roman citizen’s freedmen never pertains to strangers, to the heirs of the patron; whereas the goods of the Latins, even by that very senatus consultum, notwithstanding the children of the manumitter, do pertain also to strangers’ heirs.

item in hereditate ciuis Romani liberti liberis manumissoris nulla exheredatio nocet, in bonis Latinorum nocere nominatim factam exheredationem ipso senatus consulto significatur. uerius est ergo hoc solum eo senatus consulto actum esse, ut manumissoris liberi, qui nominatim exheredati non sint, praeferantur extraneis heredibus. 65. Itaque emancipatus filius patroni praeteritus, quamuis contra tabulas testamenti parentis sui bonorum possessionem non petierit, tamen extraneis heredibus in bonis Latinorum potior habetur.

Furthermore, in the inheritance of a Roman citizen the disinheritance of a freedman’s children does no harm; in the goods of Latins the disinheritance made by name is shown to do harm by the senatus consultum itself. It is therefore truer that by that senatus consultum only this was enacted, that the freedman’s children, who are not disinherited by name, be preferred to strangers as heirs. 65. Consequently an emancipated son of the patron who is passed over, although he has not sought possession of the goods against the terms of his parent’s testamentary tablets, is nevertheless held superior to strangers as heir in the goods of Latins.

66. Item filia ceterique sui heredes licet iure ciuili inter ceteros exheredati sint et ab omni hereditate patris sui summoueantur, tamen in bonis Latinorum, nisi nominatim a parente fuerint exheredati, potiores erunt extraneis heredibus.

66. Likewise the daughter and the other heirs of the same, although by civil law among the others they be disinherited and removed from all inheritance of their father, nevertheless in the goods of the Latins, unless they have been disinherited by the parent by name, will be preferred to foreign heirs.

67. Item ad liberos, qui ab hereditate parentis se abstinuerunt, nihilo minus tamen bona Latinorum pertinent; scilicet quia exheredati nullo modo dici possunt, non magis quam qui testamento silentio praeteriti sunt.

67. Likewise, to the children who have abstained from the inheritance of their parent, nevertheless the goods of the Latins pertain; namely because they can in no way be said to be exheredati, no more than those who are passed over by silence in a testament.

68. Ex his omnibus satis illud apparet, si is, qui Latinum fecerit, [. . . . . vv. 21 exceptis frustulis legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ]

68. From all these things it is sufficiently apparent that, if he who has made (him) a Latin, [. . . . . vv. 21 exceptis frustulis legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ]

69. Item illud quoque constare uidetur, si solos liberos ex disparibus partibus patronus [. . . . . vv. 1 1/3 legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ] tant, ad eos pertinere, quia nullo interueniente extraneo herede senatus consulto locus non est.

69. Also that likewise seems to be established, that if the patron has only children from disparate parts, [. . . . . vv. 1 1/3 legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ] nonetheless they pertain to him, because, no unrelated heir intervening, by senatus consultum there is no place.

70. Sed si cum liberis suis etiam extraneum heredem patronus reliquerit, Caelius Sabinus ait tota bona pro uirilibus partibus ad liberos defuncti pertinere, quia cum extraneus heres interuenit, non habet lex Iunia locum, sed senatus consultum; Iauolenus autem ait tantum eam partem ex senatus consulto liberos patroni pro uirilibus partibus habituros esse, quam extranei heredes ante senatus consultum lege Iunia habituri essent, reliquas uero partes pro hereditariis partibus ad eos pertinere.

70. But if the patron left an outsider heir together with his children, Caelius Sabinus says that the whole estate, according to the virile shares, belongs to the deceased’s children, because when an outsider heir intervenes the Lex Iunia has no place, but the senatus consultum; Iavolenus, however, says that only that part under the senatus consultum the patron’s children will have according to the virile shares which the outsider heirs would have had before the senatus consultum by the Lex Iunia, while the remaining parts, as hereditary shares, belong to those (outsider heirs).

71. Item quaeritur, an hoc senatus consultum ad eos patroni liberos pertineat, qui ex filia nepteue procreantur, id est, ut nepos meus ex filia potior sit in bonis Latini mei quam extraneus heres; item an ad maternos Latinos hoc senatus consultum pertineat, quaeritur, id est, ut in bonis Latini materni potior sit patronae filius quam heres extraneus matris. Cassio placuit utroque casu locum esse senatus consulto; sed huius sententiam plerique inprobant, quia senatus de his liberis patronorum nihil sentiat, qui aliam familiam sequerentur; idque ex eo adparere, quod nominatim exheredatos summoueat; nam uidetur de his sentire, qui exheredari a parente solent, si heredes non instituantur; neque autem matri filium filiamue neque auo materno nepotem neptemue, si eum eamue heredem non instituat, exheredare necesse est, siue de iure ciuili quaeramus siue de edicto praetoris, quo praeteritis liberis contra tabulas testamenti bonorum possessio promittitur.

71. Again it is asked whether this senatus consultum extends to those children of the patron who are begotten from a daughter or granddaughter, that is, that my grandson by a daughter be preferred in the goods of my Latin status to a stranger heir; likewise whether this senatus consultum pertains to maternal Latins is asked, that is, that in the goods of a maternal Latin the son of the patroness be preferred to the mother’s stranger heir. To Cassius it seemed that in both cases there is place for the senatus consultum; but many reject this opinion, because the senate does not pronounce concerning those children of patrons who would follow another family; and this appears from the fact that it removes those expressly disinherited; for it seems to think of those who are wont to be disinherited by a parent if no heirs are instituted; nor is it necessary that a mother disinherit her son or daughter, nor that a maternal grandfather disinherit a grandson or granddaughter, if he does not appoint him or her heir, whether we inquire about the civil law or about the praetor’s edict, by which possession of goods is promised to children passed over against the provisions of a will.

72. Aliquando tamen ciuis Romanus libertus tamquam Latinus moritur, uelut si Latinus saluo iure patroni ab imperatore ius Quiritium consecutus fuerit. nam, ut diuus Traianus constituit, si Latinus inuito uel ignorante patrono ius Quiritium ab imperatore consecutus sit, [quibus casibus], dum uiuit iste libertus, ceteris ciuibus Romanis libertis similis est et iustos liberos procreat, moritur autem Latini iure, nec ei liberi eius heredes esse possunt; et in hoc tantum habet testamenti factionem, ut patronum heredem instituat eique, si heres esse noluerit, alium substituere possit.

72. Sometimes, however, a Roman citizen freedman dies as if a Latin, namely when a Latin, with the patron's right preserved, has obtained the ius Quiritium from the emperor. For, as the divine Trajan established, if a Latin, with his patron consenting or ignorant, has obtained the ius Quiritium from the emperor, [quibus casibus], while that freedman lives he is like other Roman citizens who are freedmen and begets lawful (iustos) children; yet he dies by the Latin law, and his children cannot be his heirs; and in this alone he has the power of making a testament, namely that he may appoint his patron heir and, if the patron will not be heir, substitute another in his place.

73. Et quia hac constitutione uidebatur effectum, ut ne umquam isti homines tamquam ciues Romani morerentur, quamuis eo iure postea usi essent, quo uel ex lege Aelia Sentia uel ex senatus consulto ciues Romani essent, diuus Hadrianus iniquitate rei motus auctor fuit senatus consulti faciundi, ut qui ignorante uel recusante patrono ab imperatore ius Quiritium consecuti essent, si eo iure postea usi essent, quo ex lege Aelia Sentia uel ex senatus consulto, si Latini mansissent, ciuitatem Romanam consequerentur, proinde ipsi haberentur, ac si lege Aelia Sentia uel senatus consulto ad ciuitatem Romanam peruenissent.

73. And because by this constitution it seemed to follow that these men would never die as Roman citizens, although afterwards they had used that right by which they would be Roman citizens either by the Aelia Sentia law or by senatus consulto, the divine Hadrian, moved by the injustice of the matter, was the author of a senatus consultum to be made, that those who had obtained the ius Quiritium from the emperor with the patron ignorant or refusing, if they afterward used that right by which, by the Aelia Sentia law or by senatus consulto, if they had remained Latins they would have attained Roman citizenship, should henceforth be regarded as if they had attained Roman citizenship by the Aelia Sentia law or by senatus consulto.

74. Eorum autem, quos lex Aelia Sentia dediticiorum numero facit, bona modo quasi ciuium Romanorum libertorum modo quasi Latinorum ad patronos pertinent.

74. The goods, however, of those whom the law Aelia Sentia makes members of the class of dediticii pertain to the patrons only in a manner as if (they were) of Roman citizens' freedmen, and in a manner as if (they were) of Latins.

75. Nam eorum bona, qui si in aliquo uitio non essent, manumissi ciues Romani futuri essent, quasi ciuium Romanorum patronis eadem lege tribuuntur. non tamen hi habent etiam testamenti factionem. nam id plerisque placuit, nec inmerito.

75. For the goods of those who, if they were not in some fault, would, when manumitted, be about to become Roman citizens, are allotted to their patrons by the same law as (the goods) of Roman citizens. Not, however, do these possess also the power of making a testament. For that pleased most people, and not without reason.

nam incredibile uidebatur pessimae condicionis hominibus uoluisse legis latorem testamenti faciundi ius concedere.

for it seemed incredible that the sponsor of the law would have wished to grant the right of making a will to men of the worst condition.

76. Eorum uero bona, qui si non in aliquo uitio essent, manumissi futuri Latini essent, proinde tribuuntur patronis, ac si Latini decessissent. nec me praeterit non satis in ea re legis latorem uoluntatem suam uerbis expressisse.

76. Their goods, however, of those who, if they were not in any fault, would, when manumitted, be Latini, are accordingly assigned to the patrons, just as if the Latins had died. Nor does it escape me that the lawgiver did not sufficiently express his will in this matter in words.

77. Videamus autem et de ea successione, quae nobis ex emptione bonorum competit.

77. Let us also consider that succession which pertains to us from the purchase of goods.

78. Bona autem ueneunt aut uiuorum aut mortuorum: uiuorum, uelut eorum, qui fraudationis causa latitant nec absentes defenduntur; item eorum, qui ex lege Iulia bonis cedunt; item iudicatorum post tempus, quod eis partim lege XII tabularum, partim edicto praetoris ad expediendam pecuniam tribuitur. mortuorum bona ueneunt uelut eorum, quibus certum est neque heredes neque bonorum possessores neque ullum alium iustum successorem existere.

78. Goods, however, are sold either of the living or of the dead: of the living, as of those who conceal themselves for the sake of fraud and are not defended in their absence; likewise of those who yield goods under the Julian law; likewise of judgments after the time which is allotted them partly by the law of the 12 Tables, partly by the praetor’s edict for obtaining the money. The goods of the dead are sold as of those concerning whom it is certain that neither heirs nor possessors of the goods nor any other just successor exists.

79. Et si quidem uiui bona ueneant, iubet ea praetor per dies continuos XXX possideri et proscribi, si uero mortui, per dies XV postea iubet conuenire creditores et ex eo numero magistrum creari, id est eum, per quem bona ueneant. itaque si uiui bona ueneant, in diebus X legem bonorum uendundorum fieri iubet, si mortui, in dimidio. diebus tandem uiui bona XXX, mortui uero XX emptori addici iubet.

79. And if indeed the goods of the living are sold, the praetor orders them to be possessed and proscribed for thirty continuous days; but if of the dead, for fifteen days. Afterwards he orders the creditors to convene and from that number a magistrate to be chosen, that is, the one through whom the goods are to be sold. Therefore if the goods of the living are sold, he orders that within ten days a law for the sale of the goods be made, if of the dead, within half that time. Finally he orders the goods of the living to be added to the buyer in thirty days, but those of the dead in twenty.

quare autem tardius uiuentium bonorum uenditionem compleri iubet, illa ratio est, quia de uiuis curandum erat, ne facile bonorum uenditiones paterentur.

Wherefore moreover he orders the sale of the goods of the living to be completed more slowly; the reason is this: because care had to be taken about the living, lest the sales of goods be easily allowed.

80. Neque autem bonorum possessorum neque bonorum emptorum res pleno iure fiunt, sed in bonis efficiuntur; ex iure Quiritium autem ita demum adquiruntur, si usuceperunt. interdum quidem bonorum emptoribus ne usus quidem capio contingit, uelut si pereos ******* bonorum emptor [. . . . . vv. 2 1/2 legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ]

80. Neither, however, do the affairs of possessors of goods nor of buyers of goods become perfected with full legal title, but they are effected in the goods themselves; from the ius Quiritium, however, they are acquired only when they have usuceperunt (usucapted). Sometimes indeed to buyers of goods not even usucapio is attained, as when pereos ******* bonorum emptor [. . . . . vv. 2 1/2 legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ]

81 Item quae debita sunt ei, cuius fuerunt bona, aut ipse debuit, neque bonorum possessor neque bonorum emptor ipso iure debet aut ipsis debentur, et ideo de omnibus rebus utilibus actionibus et agunt et conueniuntur, quas in sequenti commentario proponemus.

81 Item those debts which are owed to him whose goods they were, or which he himself owed, neither the possessor of the goods nor the buyer of the goods owes by that very right, nor are they owed to them; and therefore concerning all useful matters actions both are brought and are agreed upon, which we shall propose in the following commentary.

82 Sunt autem etiam alterius generis successiones, quae neque lege XII tabularum neque praetoris edicto, sed eo iure, quod tacito consensu receptum est, introductae sunt.

82 There are also successions of another sort, which neither by the Law of the 12 Tables nor by the praetor’s edict, but by that right which has been received by tacit consent, have been introduced.

83. Etenim cum pater familias se in adoptionem dedit mulierue in manum conuenit, omnes eius res incorporales et corporales, quaeque ei debitae sunt, patri adoptiuo coemptionatoriue adquiruntur exceptis his, quae per capitis deminutionem pereunt, quales sunt ususfructus, operarum obligatio libertorum, quae per iusiurandum contracta est, et lites contestatae legitimo iudicio.

83. For when the pater familias gives himself in adoption or a woman comes into the manus, all his incorporeal and corporeal things, and those which are due to him, are acquired by the adoptive father or by the coemptor, with the exception of those which perish by capitis deminutio (diminution of legal status), such as usufructs, the obligation of freedmen for services contracted by oath, and suits joined in a legitimate judgment.

84. Ex diuerso quod is debuit, qui se in adoptionem dedit quaeue in manum conuenit, non transit ad coemptionatorem aut ad patrem adoptiuum, nisi si hereditarium aes alienum fuerit; de eo enim, quia ipse pater adoptiuus aut coemptionator heres fit, directo tenetur iure, is uero, qui se adoptandum dedit, quaeue in manum conuenit, desinit esse heres; de eo uero, quod proprio nomine eae personae debuerint, licet neque pater adoptiuus teneatur neque coemptionator et ne ipse quidem, qui se in adoptionem dedit, uel ipsa, quae in manum conuenit, maneat obligatus obligataue, quia scilicet per capitis diminutionem liberetur, tamen in eum eamue utilis actio datur rescissa capitis deminutione, et, si aduersus hanc actionem non defendantur, quae bona eorum futura fuissent, si se alieno iuri non subiecissent, uniuersa uendere creditoribus praetor permittit.

84. From a different sort is that which is owed by him who has given himself in adoption, and whatever comes into manus does not pass to the coemptionator or to the pater adoptivus, unless it be a hereditary debt; for as to that, because the pater adoptivus or coemptionator becomes heir, he is directly bound by law; but he who gave himself to be adopted ceases to be heir of whatever comes into manus; as for that which in the own name of those persons was owed, although neither the pater adoptivus nor the coemptionator, nor even he who gave himself in adoption, nor she who comes into manus remains obliged, since, to be sure, by capitis deminutio he is freed, nevertheless a useful action is granted to him or to her with the rescission of capitis deminutio, and if they do not defend against this action, the praetor permits creditors to sell all the goods that would have been theirs had they not subjected themselves to alien law.

85. Item si legitimam hereditatem heres, antequam cernat aut pro herede gerat, alii in iure cedat, pleno iure fit ille heres, cui cessa est hereditas, proinde ac si ipse per legem ad hereditatem uocaretur; quod si postea quam heres extiterit, cesserit, adhuc heres manet et ob id creditoribus ipse tenebitur; sed res corporales transferet, proinde ac si singulas in iure cessisset, debita uero pereunt, eoque modo debitores hereditarii lucrum faciunt.

85. Moreover, if an heir cedes a legitimate inheritance to another in the law before he takes possession or acts as heir, the one to whom the inheritance has ceded becomes heir with full right, just as if he himself were by law called to the inheritance; but if he cedes after he has become heir, he still remains heir and on that account will be held to the creditors himself; yet he transfers the corporeal things, just as if he had ceded them individually in law, while the debts perish, and in this way the hereditary debtors make a gain.

86. Idem iuris est, si testamento scriptus heres, postea quam heres extiterit, in iure cesserit hereditatem; ante aditam uero hereditatem cedendo nihil agit.

86. It is the same in law if an heir named in a will, after he has become heir, has ceded the inheritance in court; but before the inheritance has been entered upon, by ceding he does nothing.

87. Suus autem et necessarius heres an aliquid agant in iure cedendo, quaeritur. nostri praeceptores nihil eos agere existimant; diuersae scholae auctores idem eos agere putant, quod ceteri post aditam hereditatem; nihil enim interest, utrum aliquis cernendo aut pro herede gerendo heres fiat an iuris necessitate hereditati adstringatur.

87. Whether a suus and necessarius heir can do anything by ceding in iure is asked. Our praeceptores think that they do nothing; the authors of various scholae hold that they do the same as other heirs do after the hereditas has been adita; for it makes no difference whether one becomes heir by being adjudged or by being bound to the inheritance by legal necessity.

88. Nunc transeamus ad obligationes, quarum summa diuisio in duas species diducitur: omnis enim obligatio uel ex contractu nascitur uel ex delicto.

88. Now let us pass to obligations, the whole division of which is severed into two species: for every obligation either arises from contract or from delict.

89. Et prius uideamus de his, quae ex contractu nascuntur. harum autem quattuor genera sunt: aut enim re contrahitur obligatio aut uerbis aut litteris aut consensu.

89. And first let us consider those things which arise from contract. There are moreover four kinds of these: for an obligation is contracted either by re (a thing) or by words or by letters or by consent.

90. Re contrahitur obligatio uelut mutui datione; mutui autem datio proprie in his fere rebus contingit, quae res pondere, numero, mensura constant, qualis est pecunia numerata, uinum, oleum, frumentum, aes, argentum, aurum; quas res aut numerando aut metiendo aut pendendo in hoc damus, ut accipientium fiant et quandoque nobis non eaedem, sed aliae eiusdem naturae reddantur. unde etiam mutuum appellatum est, quia quod ita tibi a me datum est, ex meo tuum fit.

90. An obligation is contracted by res, as for example by the giving of a loan (mutuum); and the giving of a mutuum properly takes place with those things which are measured by weight, number, or measure, such as coined money, wine, oil, grain, copper, silver, gold; these things we give either by counting, or by measuring, or by weighing, so that they become the recipients’ property and sometimes are returned to us not the same things but others of the same kind. Hence it is likewise called a mutuum, because what has thus been given by me to you becomes yours out of mine.

91. Is quoque, qui non debitum accepit ab eo, qui per errorem soluit, re obligatur; nam proinde ei condici potest SI PARET EVM DARE OPORTERE, ac si mutuum accepisset. unde quidam putant pupillum aut mulierem, cui sine tutoris auctoritate non debitum per errorem datum est, non teneri condictione, non magis quam mutui datione. sed haec species obligationis non uidetur ex contractu consistere, quia is, qui soluendi animo dat, magis distrahere uult negotium quam contrahere.

91. He, too, who has not received the debt from him who pays by mistake, is bound in rem; for accordingly a claim can be made against him IF IT APPEARS THAT HE OUGHT TO GIVE IT, just as if he had taken a mutuum. Whence some think that a minor or a woman, to whom, without the authority of a guardian, something not due has been given by mistake, are not held by the condictio, no more than by a mutuum dation. But this kind of obligation does not seem to consist from contract, because he who gives with the intent of paying wishes rather to undo the business than to make a contract.

92. Verbis obligatio fit ex interrogatione et responsione, uelut DARI SPONDES? SPONDEO, DABIS? DABO, PROMITTIS?

92. An obligation is made by words through question and answer, as “Will you promise to give?” — “I promise.” “Will you give?” — “I will give.” “Do you promise?”

PROMITTO, FIDEPROMITTIS? FIDEPROMITTO, FIDEIVBES? FIDEIVBEO, FACIES?

I promise, do you promise on faith? I promise on faith, do you command on faith? I command on faith, will you do it?

FACIAM. 93. Sed haec quidem uerborum obligatio DARI SPONDES? SPONDEO propria ciuium Romanorum est; ceterae uero iuris gentium sunt, itaque inter omnes homines, siue ciues Romanos siue peregrinos, ualent.

I WILL DO. 93. But this obligation of words DARI SPONDES? SPONDEO is proper to the citizens of the Romans; the others, however, are of the law of nations, and therefore are valid among all men, whether Roman citizens or foreigners.

et quamuis ad Graecam uocem expressae fuerint, uelut hoc modo "dØseis; dØsØ, homologeis; homologØ, pistei keleueis; pistei keleuØ, poi seis; poi sØ", etiam hae tamen inter ciues Romanos ualent, si modo Graeci sermonis intellectum habeant; et e contrario quamuis Latine enuntientur, tamen etiam inter peregrinos ualent, si modo Latini sermonis intellectum habeant. at illa uerborum obligatio DARI SPONDES? SPONDEO adeo propria ciuium Romanorum est, ut ne quidem in Graecum sermonem per interpretationem proprie transferri possit, quamuis dicatur a Graeca uoce figurata esse.

and although they have been expressed into the Greek word, as in this manner "dØseis; dØsØ, homologeis; homologØ, pistei keleueis; pistei keleuØ, poi seis; poi sØ", yet these nevertheless are valid among Roman citizens, if only they have an understanding of the Greek speech; and conversely, although they be uttered in Latin, nevertheless they are also valid among foreigners, if only they have an understanding of the Latin speech. But that obligation of words DARI SPONDES? SPONDEO is so peculiar to Roman citizens that it cannot even be properly transferred into the Greek speech by interpretation, although it is said to be formed from a Greek word.

94. Unde dicitur uno casu hoc uerbo peregrinum quoque obligari posse, uelut si imperator noster principem alicuius peregrini populi de pace ita interroget: PACEM FVTVRAM SPONDES? uel ipse eodem modo interrogetur. quod nimium subtiliter dictum est, quia si quid aduersus pactionem fiat, non ex stipulatu agitur, sed iure belli res uindicatur.

94. Whence it is said that in one case even a foreigner can be bound by this word, as if our emperor should ask the prince of some foreign people concerning peace thus: PACEM FVTVRAM SPONDES? or should himself be asked in the same way. Which has been stated too subtilely, since if anything is done contrary to the compact, the matter is not pursued by stipulatio, but is vindicated by the law of war.

95. Illud dubitari potest, si quis [. . . . . vv. 13 . . . . . . . ]

95. That may be doubted, if anyone [. . . . . vv. 13 . . . . . . . ]

95a. [. . . . . . ] si debitor mulieris iussu eius, dum [. . . . . . . . ] doti dicat quod debet. alius autem obligari eo modo non potest.

95a. [. . . . . . ] if a debtor, by the woman's command, while [. . . . . . . . ] says to the dowry what he owes. But another, however, cannot be bound in that manner.

et ideo si quis alius pro muliere dotem uiro promittat, communi iure obliga [. . . . . . . . . ]. 96. Item uno loquente et sine interrogatione alii promittente contrahitur obligatio, si libertus patrono aut donum aut munus aut operas se daturum esse iurauit, etsi haec sola causa est, ex qua iureiurando contrahitur obligatio. sane ex alia nulla causa iureiurando homines obligantur, utique cum quaeritur de iure Romanorum. nam apud peregrinos quid iuris sit, singularum ciuitatium iura requirentes aliud intellegere poterimus [. . . . . . . . . ].

and therefore if anyone else promises a dowry to the husband for the woman, by the common law he is bound [. . . . . . . . . ]. 96. Likewise, with one speaking and without interrogation and another promising, an obligation is contracted, if a freedman has sworn to his patron that he will give either a gift or a munus or his labors, and although this is the sole cause from which an obligation is contracted by oath. Certainly from no other cause are men bound by oath, especially when the question is of the law of the Romans. For among peregrines what law obtains, when seeking the laws of the several cities, we shall understand otherwise [. . . . . . . . . ].

97. Si id, quod dari stipulamur, tale sit, ut dari non possit, inutilis est stipulatio, uelut si quis hominem liberum, quem seruum esse credebat, aut mortuum, quem uiuum esse credebat, aut locum sacrum uel religiosum, quem putabat humani iuris esse, dari stipuletur.

97. If that which we stipulate to be given is such that it cannot be given, the stipulation is futile; as if one should stipulate that a free man, whom he believed to be a slave, or a dead man, whom he believed to be living, or a sacred or religious place, which he thought to be of human jurisdiction, be given.

97a. Item si quis rem, quae in rerum natura esse non potest, uelut hippocentaurum, stipuletur, aeque inutilis est stipulatio.

97a. Likewise, if anyone stipulates a thing which cannot exist in the nature of things, for example a hippocentaur, the stipulation is equally useless.

98. Item si quis sub ea condicione stipuletur, quae existere non potest, uelut 'si digito caelum tetigerit', inutilis est stipulatio. sed legatum sub inpossibili condicione relictum nostri praeceptores proinde deberi putant, ac si sine condicione relictum esset; diuersae scholae auctores nihilo minus legatum inutile existimant quam stipulationem. et sane uix idonea diuersitatis ratio reddi potest.

98. Likewise if anyone be stipulated under that condition which cannot exist, as 'if he should touch the sky with his finger,' the stipulation is useless. But our predecessors think that a legacy left under an impossible condition ought nevertheless to be due, just as if it had been left without condition; authors of various schools, however, judge the legacy no less useless than the stipulation. And truly scarcely can a satisfactory reason for the divergence be given.

99. Praeterea inutilis est stipulatio, si quis ignorans rem suam esse dari sibi eam stipuletur; quippe quod alicuius est, id ei dari non potest.

99. Moreover a stipulation is useless if one, ignorant that a thing is his, stipulates that it be given to him; for what belongs to someone cannot be given to him.

100. Denique inutilis est talis stipulatio, si quis ita dari stipuletur: POST MORTEM MEAM DARI SPONDES? uel ita: POST MORTEM TVAM DARI SPONDES? ualet autem, si quis ita dari stipuletur: CVM MORIAR, DARI SPONDES?uel ita: CVM MORIERIS, DARI SPONDES?

100. Finally such a stipulation is useless, if someone stipulates that it be given thus: AFTER MY DEATH WILL YOU PROMISE THAT IT BE GIVEN? or thus: AFTER YOUR DEATH WILL YOU PROMISE THAT IT BE GIVEN? But it is valid if someone stipulates thus: WHEN I SHALL DIE, WILL YOU PROMISE THAT IT BE GIVEN? or thus: WHEN YOU SHALL DIE, WILL YOU PROMISE THAT IT BE GIVEN?

id est, ut in nouissimum uitae tempus stipulatoris aut promissoris obligatio conferatur: nam inelegans esse uisum est ab heredis persona incipere obligationem. rursum ita stipulari non possumus: PRIDIE QVAM MORIAR, aut PRIDIE QVAM MORIERIS, DARI SPONDES? quia non potest aliter intellegi 'pridie quam aliquis morietur', quam si mors secuta sit; rursus morte secuta in praeteritum reducitur stipulatio et quodam modo talis est: HEREDI MEO, DARI SPONDES?

that is, that the obligation of the stipulator or promisor be fixed in the final time of life: for it seemed inelegant that the obligation should begin from the person of the heir. Again we cannot stipulate thus: PRIDIE QVAM MORIAR, or PRIDIE QVAM MORIERIS, DARI SPONDES? for 'the day before someone will die' cannot be understood otherwise than if death has occurred; again, with death having occurred the stipulation is reduced into the past and in a certain way becomes: HEREDI MEO, DARI SPONDES?

quae sane inutilis est.

which indeed is useless.

101. Quaecumque de morte diximus, eadem et de capitis diminutione dicta intellegemus.

101. Whatever we have said concerning death, the same things we shall understand to have been said concerning the diminution of status (capitis deminutio).

102. Adhuc inutilis est stipulatio, si quis ad id, quod interrogatus erit, non responderit, uelut si sestertia X a te dari stipuler, et tu nummum sestertium V milia promittas, aut si ego pure stipuler, tu sub condicione promittas.

102. A stipulation is still useless, if someone, concerning that about which he will be asked, does not answer; as, for example, if you stipulate that 10 sestertii be given by you, and you promise 5,000 sestertii in coin, or if I stipulate plainly and you promise under a condition.

103. Praeterea inutilis est stipulatio, si ei dari stipulemur, cuius iuri subiecti non sumus. unde illud quaesitum est, si quis sibi et ei, cuius iuri subiectus non est, dari stipuletur, in quantum ualeat stipulatio. nostri praeceptores putant in uniuersum ualere et proinde ei soli, qui stipulatus sit, solidum deberi, atque si extranei nomen non adiecisset.

103. Moreover a stipulatio is useless if we stipulate that it be given to him to whose jurisdiction we are not subject. Hence the question has been asked, if one stipulates that it be given to himself and to him to whose jurisdiction he is not subject, to what extent the stipulatio is valid. Our teachers hold that it is in general valid, and therefore that the full amount is owed to that one alone who has stipulated, even if he had not added the stranger’s name.

sed diuersae scholae auctores dimidium ei deberi existimant; pro altera uero parte inutilem esse stipulationem.

but authors of diverse schools think that half is due to him; on the other hand they consider the stipulation to be useless.

103a. Alia causa est, [. . . . . . . . . . ] DARI SPONDES [. . . . . . . . . ] solidum deberi et me sol [. . . . . . . . ] etiam [. . . . . . . . ]

103a. Another cause is, [. . . . . . . . . .] DARI SPONDES [. . . . . . . . .] the whole (solidum) ought to be owed and to me alone [. . . . . . . . .] even [. . . . . . . .]

104. Praeterea inutilis est stipulatio, si ab eo stipuler, qui iuri meo subiectus est, item si is a me stipuletur. seruus quidem et qui in mancipio est et filia familias et quae in manu est, non solum ipsi, cuius iuri subiecti subiectaeue sunt, obligari non possunt, sed ne alii quidem ulli.

104. Moreover the stipulation is useless if made by one who is subject to my ius, likewise if it is stipulated by such a one from me. A slave, and one in mancipium, and the daughter of the family, and she who is in manus, not only cannot be obliged to the very person to whose ius they are subject or subjected, but to no other person either.

105. Mutum neque stipulari neque promittere posse palam est. idem etiam in surdo receptum est; quia et is, qui stipulatur, uerba promittentis, et qui promittit, uerba stipulantis exaudire debet.

105. It is manifest that a mute person can neither stipulate nor promise. The same is held concerning a deaf person; for both he who stipulates must hear the words of the promiser, and he who promises must hear the words of the stipulator.

106. Furiosus nullum negotium gerere potest, quia non intellegit, quid agat.

106. A madman can conduct no business, because he does not understand what he is doing.

107. Pupillus omne negotium recte gerit, ut tamen, sicubi tutoris auctoritas necessaria sit, adhibeatur, uelut si ipse obligetur; nam alium sibi obligare etiam sine tutoris auctoritate potest.

107. The pupillus (ward) conducts every business rightly, provided nevertheless that, wherever the tutor’s authority is necessary, it be applied — as, for example, if he himself is to be bound; for he can obligate another to himself even without the tutor’s authority.

108. Idem iuris est in feminis, quae in tutela sunt.

108. The same rule of law applies to women who are under guardianship.

109. Sed quod diximus de pupillo, utique de eo uerum est, qui iam aliquem intellectum habet; nam infans et qui infanti proximus est non multum a furioso differt, quia huius aetatis pupilli nullum intellectum habent. sed in his pupillis propter utilitatem benignior iuris interpretatio facta est.

109. But what we said about the pupil is certainly true of one who already has some understanding; for an infant and one close to infancy does not differ much from a furiosus, since pupils of this age have no understanding. Yet in these pupils, for the sake of utility, a more benign interpretation of the law has been adopted.

110. Possumus tamen ad id, quod stipulamur, alium adhibere, qui idem stipuletur, quem uulgo adstipulatorem uocamus.

110. We can, however, for that which is stipulated, employ another to stipulate the same, whom we commonly call an adstipulator.

111. Et huic proinde actio conpetit proindeque ei recte soluitur ac nobis; sed quidquid consecutus erit, mandati iudicio nobis restituere cogetur.

111. And therefore an action lies for him, and accordingly it is rightly paid to him and to us; but whatever he shall have obtained, he will be compelled, in a suit on the mandate, to restore to us.

112. Ceterum potest etiam aliis uerbis uti adstipulator, quam quibus nos usi sumus. itaque si uerbi gratia ego ita stipulatus sim: DARI SPONDES? ille sic adstipulari potest: IDEM FIDE TVA PROMITTIS?

112. Moreover an adstipulator can also use words other than those which we have used. Therefore if, for example, I have stipulated thus: "DO YOU PLEDGE TO GIVE?" he can adstipulate thus: "DO YOU PROMISE THE SAME BY YOUR FAITH?"

uel: IDEM FIDE IVBES? uel contra.

113. Item minus adstipulari potest, plus non potest. itaque si ego sestertia X stipulatus sim, ille sestertia V stipulari potest; contra uero plus non potest. item si ego pure stipulatus sim, ille sub condicione stipulari potest; contra uero non potest.

113. Moreover one can adstipulate less, one cannot adstipulate more. therefore if I have stipulated ten sestertia, he can stipulate five sestertia; but conversely he cannot stipulate more. likewise if I have stipulated purely, he can stipulate under a condition; but conversely he cannot.

non solum autem in quantitate, sed etiam in tempore minus et plus intellegitur; plus est enim statim aliquid dare, minus est post tempus dare.

Not only, moreover, in quantity, but also in time, "less" and "more" are understood; for "more" is to give something immediately, "less" is to give after a time.

114. In hoc autem iure quaedam singulari iure obseruantur. nam adstipulatoris heres non habet actionem. item seruus adstipulando nihil agit, qui ex ceteris omnibus causis stipulatione domino adquirit.

114. In this law, however, certain things are observed by a peculiar right. For the heir of the adstipulator has no action. Likewise a slave, in adstipulating, does nothing, since he acquires by stipulation for his master from all other causes.

idem de eo, qui in mancipio est, magis placuit; nam et is serui loco est. is autem, qui in potestate patris est, agit aliquid, sed parenti non adquirit, quamuis ex omnibus ceteris causis stipulando ei adquirat; ac ne ipsi quidem aliter actio conpetit, quam si sine kapitis diminutione exierit de potestate parentis, ueluti morte eius aut quod ipse flamen Dialis inauguratus est. eadem de filia familias et quae in manu est, dicta intellegemus.

The same rule was preferred concerning him who is in mancipio; for he is also in the place of a slave. But he who is in the potestas of his father does do something, yet he does not acquire for the parent, although from all other causes he acquires for him by stipulation; and not even for him does an act lie otherwise than if he has gone out of his father’s potestas without capitis diminution, as for example by the father’s death or because he himself has been inaugurated flamen Dialis. The same we shall understand to have been said of the filia familias and of one who is in manu.

115. Pro eo quoque, qui promittit, solent alii obligari, quorum alios sponsores, alios fidepromissores, alios fideiussores appellamus.

115. For him also who promises, others are accustomed to be bound, of whom some we call sponsors, others fide-promissors, others fideiussors.

116. Sponsor ita interrogatur: IDEM DARI SPONDES? fidepromissor ita: IDEM FIDEPROMITTIS? fideiussor ita: IDEM FIDE TVA ESSE IVBES?uidebimus de his autem, quo nomine possint proprie adpellari, qui ita interrogantur: IDEM DABIS?

116. A sponsor is thus asked: "Do you promise that the same be given?" a fidepromissor thus: "Do you promise the same by your faith?" a fideiussor thus: "Do you command that your faith be the same?" We shall consider, however, by what name those may be properly called who are thus interrogated: "Will you give the same?"

IDEM PROMITTIS? IDEM FACIES?

WILL YOU PROMISE THE SAME? WILL YOU DO THE SAME?

117. Sponsores quidem et fidepromissores et fideiussores saepe solemus accipere, dum curamus, ut diligentius nobis cautum sit; adstipulatorem uero fere tunc solum adhibemus, cum ita stipulamur, ut aliquid post mortem nostram detur; quia enim ut ita nobis detur stipulando nihil agimus, adhibetur adstipulator, ut is post mortem nostram agat; qui si quid fuerit consecutus, de restituendo eo mandati iudicio heredi meo tenetur.

117. We indeed are wont to accept sponsors and fide-promissors and fideiussors often, while we take care that it be secured to us more diligently; an adstipulator, however, we almost only call in when we stipulate that something be given after our death; for since by stipulating that it be given to us in that way we accomplish nothing, an adstipulator is employed so that he may act after our death; who, if he shall have obtained anything, is bound by judgment of that mandate to restore it to my heir.

118. Sponsoris uero et fidepromissoris similis condicio est, fideiussoris ualde dissimilis.

118. The condition of a sponsor, however, is similar to that of a fidepromissor, and very dissimilar to that of a fideiussor.

119. Nam illi quidem nullis obligationibus accedere possunt nisi uerborum, quamuis interdum ipse, qui promiserit, non fuerit obligatus, uelut si mulier aut pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate aut quilibet post mortem suam dari promiserit. at illud quaeritur, si seruus aut peregrinus spoponderit, an pro eo sponsor aut fidepromissor obligetur.

119. For those persons indeed can enter into no obligations except by words, although sometimes he himself who has promised may not be bound, as for example if a woman or a pupillus without the authority of a tutor, or anyone, has promised that something be given after his death. But the question is asked whether, if a slave or a foreigner has pledged, a sponsor or fidepromissor is bound for him.

119a. Fideiussor uero omnibus obligationibus, id est siue re siue uerbis siue litteris siue consensu contractae fuerint obligationes, adici potest. at ne illud quidem interest, utrum ciuilis an naturalis obligatio sit, cui adiciatur; adeo quidem, ut pro seruo quoque obligetur, siue extraneus sit, qui a seruo fideiussorem accipiat, siue ipse dominus in id, quod sibi debeatur.

119a. The fideiussor, however, can be added to all obligations, that is, whether the obligations were contracted concerning a thing, or by words, or by writings, or by consent. Nor does it make any difference whether the obligation to which he is added is civil or natural; so much so that he is bound even for a slave, whether it be an outsider who accepts a fideiussor from the slave, or the master himself for that which is owed to him.

120. Praeterea sponsoris et fidepromissoris heres non tenetur, nisi si de peregrino fidepromissore quaeramus et alio iure ciuitas eius utatur; fideiussoris autem etiam heres tenetur.

120. Moreover, the heir of a sponsor and of a fide-promissor is not held liable, unless we inquire concerning a foreign fide-promissor whose citizenship is governed by another law; but the heir of a fideiussor is held liable as well.

121. Item sponsor et fidepromissor per legem Furiam biennio liberantur, et quotquot erunt numero eo tempore, quo pecunia peti potest, in tot partes diducetur inter eos obligatio, et singuli in uiriles partes uocabuntur; fideiussores uero perpetuo tenentur, et quotquot erunt numero, singuli in solidum obligantur. itaque liberum est creditori, a quo uelit, solidum petere. sed nunc ex epistula diui Hadriani compellitur creditor a singulis, qui modo soluendo sint, partes petere.

121. Likewise a sponsor and a fidepromissor are freed for two years by the Lex Furia, and as many as there are in number at the time when money may be demanded, the obligation shall be divided into that many parts among them, and each shall be called to his virile part; fideiussors, however, are held perpetually, and as many as there are in number, each is bound in solido. Therefore it is free to the creditor to demand the whole from whomsoever he wishes; but now, by a letter of the divine Hadrian, the creditor is compelled to seek the parts from each, who are to pay in their proper order.

eo igitur distat haec epistula a lege Furia, quod si quis ex sponsoribus aut fidepromissoribus soluendo non sit, hoc onus ad ceteros non pertinet, si uero ex fideiussoribus, ad ceteros quoque pertinet.

Therefore this epistle differs from the Furia law in that, if any one of the sponsors or fide-promissors is not liable to payment, this burden does not fall upon the others; but if he is one of the fideiussors, it falls upon the others as well.

121a. Sed cum lex Furia tantum in Italia locum habeat, euenit, ut in ceteris prouinciis sponsores quoque et fidepromissores proinde ac fideiussores in perpetuum teneantur et singuli in solidum obligentur, nisi ex epistula diui Hadriani hi quoque adiuuentur in parte.

121a. But since the Furia law has force only in Italy, it happens that in the other provinces sponsors and fide-promissors are likewise held in perpetuity as fide-issuers and each are bound in solidum, unless by the letter of the divine Hadrian these too are aided in part.

122. Praeterea inter sponsores et fidepromissores lex Apuleia quandam societatem introduxit. nam si quis horum plus sua portione soluerit, de eo, quod amplius dederit, aduersus ceteros actiones constituit. quae lex ante legem Furiam lata est, quo tempore in solidum obligabantur.

122. Moreover, between sponsors and fidepromissores the Apuleian law introduced a certain societas. For if any of these shall have paid more than his portion, concerning that which he has given in excess it established actions against the others. This law was passed before the Furia law, at which time they were bound in solidum.

unde quaeritur, an post legem Furiam adhuc legis Apuleiae beneficium supersit; et utique extra Italiam superest. nam lex quidem Furia tantum in Italia ualet, Apuleia uero etiam in ceteris prouinciis. sed an etiam in Italia beneficium legis Apuleiae supersit, ualde quaeritur.

whence it is asked whether, after the lex Furia, the benefit of the lex Apuleia still remains; and certainly outside Italy it remains. for the lex Furia indeed has force only in Italy, whereas the Apuleia also in the other provinces. but whether in Italy the benefit of the lex Apuleia still remains is very much in question.

ad fideiussores autem lex Apuleia non pertinet. itaque si creditor ab uno totum consecutus fuerit, huius solius detrimentum erit, scilicet si is, pro quo fideiussit, soluendo non sit. sed ut ex supra dictis apparet, is, a quo creditor totum petit, poterit ex epistula diui Hadriani desiderare, ut pro parte in se detur actio.

The Apuleian law does not apply to sureties. Therefore, if the creditor has recovered the whole from one person, the loss will fall upon that one alone, namely if the person for whom he stood sure is unable to pay. But, as appears from the foregoing, the person from whom the creditor demands the whole may, by the rescript of the divine Hadrian, request that an action be granted against him for his part.

123. Praeterea lege Cicereia cautum est, ut is, qui sponsores aut fidepromissores accipiat, praedicat palam et declaret, et de qua re satis accipiat et quot sponsores aut fidepromissores in eam obligationem accepturus sit; et nisi praedixerit, permittitur sponsoribus et fidepromissoribus intra diem XXX. praeiudicium postulare, quo quaeratur, an ex ea lege praedictum sit; et si iudicatum fuerit praedictum non esse, liberantur. qua lege fideiussorum mentio nulla fit; sed in usu est, etiam si fideiussores accipiamus, praedicere.

123. Moreover, by the Cicerian law it is provided that he who takes sponsors or fidepromissors shall proclaim openly and declare, and shall take sufficient assurance concerning what matter and how many sponsors or fidepromissors he will accept into that obligation; and if he has not proclaimed, the sponsors and fidepromissors are permitted to demand a praeciudicium within thirty days, whereby it is inquired whether it was prescribed by that law; and if it shall be adjudged that it was not prescribed, they are freed. By which law no mention is made of fideiussors; but it is the usage, even if we accept fideiussors, to proclaim.

124. Sed beneficium legis Corneliae omnibus commune est. qua lege idem pro eodem apud eundem eodem anno uetatur in ampliorem summam obligari creditae pecuniae quam in XX milia; et quamuis sponsores uel fidepromissores in amplam pecuniam, uelut in sestertium C milia se obligauerint, tamen dumtaxat in XX milia tenentur. pecuniam autem creditam dicimus non solum eam, quam credendi causa damus, sed omnem, quam tum, cum contrahitur obligatio, certum est debitum iri, id est, quae sine ulla condicione deducitur in obligationem; itaque et ea pecunia, quam in diem certum dari stipulamur, eodem numero est, quia certum est eam debitum iri, licet post tempus petatur.

124. But the benefit of the Cornelian law is common to all. By that law the same person is forbidden to be bound for a larger sum of loaned money before the same judge in the same year than 20,000; and although sponsors or fide-promisers may have bound themselves for a larger sum, as for example for 100,000 sesterces, nevertheless they are held only for 20,000. By loaned money, however, we mean not only that which we give for the sake of lending, but all that which, at the time the obligation is contracted, is certain to be owing — that is, what without any condition is brought into the obligation; and therefore also that money which we stipulate to be given on a certain day is of the same class, because it is certain that it will be owing, even if it is demanded after the time.

appellatione autem pecuniae omnes res in ea lege significantur; itaque et si uinum uel frumentum aut si fundum uel hominem stipulemur, haec lex obseruanda est.

By the appellation of pecunia all things are signified in that law; therefore even if we stipulate wine or grain, or a farm or a man, this law must be observed.

125. Ex quibusdam tamen causis permittit ea lex in infinitum satis accipere, ueluti si dotis nomine uel eius, quod ex testamento tibi debeatur, aut iussu iudicis satis accipiatur. et adhuc lege uicesima hereditatium cauetur, ut ad eas satisdationes, quae ex ea lege proponuntur, lex Cornelia non pertineat.

125. Yet that law permits satisfactions to be taken to infinity for certain causes, as for example if in the name of a dowry or of that which is owed to you from a testament, or is received by order of a judge. And furthermore it is guarded by the twentieth law of hereditaments, so that the Cornelian law does not pertain to those satisfactions which are sought under that law.

126. In eo quoque iure par condicio est omnium, sponsorum, fidepromissorum, fideiussorum, quod ita obligari non possunt, ut plus debeant, quam debet is, pro quo obligantur. at ex diuerso, ut minus debeant, obligari possunt, sicut in adstipulatoris persona diximus; nam ut adstipulatoris, ita et horum obligatio accessio est principalis obligationis, nec plus in accessione esse potest quam in principali reo.

126. In that same law the position is equal for all — the sponsi, fide-promisers, fideiussors — in that they cannot be bound so as to owe more than he for whom they are bound. But conversely they can be bound to owe less, as we said concerning the person of the adstipulator; for as with the adstipulator, so too the obligation of these is an accession to the principal obligation, nor can there be more in the accession than in the principal debtor.

127. In eo quoque par omnium causa est, quod si quid pro reo soluerint, eius reciperandi causa habent cum eo mandati iudicium; et hoc amplius sponsores ex lege Publilia propriam habent actionem in duplum, quae appellatur depensi.

127. There is likewise equality of cause for all in this, that if they have paid anything for the defendant, they have, for the purpose of recovering it, with him the mandate action (mandati iudicium); and furthermore the sponsors by the Publilian law have a proper action for double, which is called depensi.

128. Litteris obligatio fit ueluti in nominibus transscripticiis. fit autem nomen transscripticium duplici modo, uel a re in personam uel a persona in personam.

128. An obligation is constituted by writings, as it were in transscriptitious names. A transscriptitious name, however, is made in a twofold manner, either from a thing into a person or from a person into a person.

129. A re in personam transscriptio fit, ueluti si id, quod tu ex emptionis causa aut conductionis aut societatis mihi debeas, id expensum tibi tulero.

129. A transference from a thing to a person is made, as when, for example, I say that that which you owe me on account of a sale (emptionis) or of a letting/hire (conductionis) or of a partnership (societatis), I will have borne/paid that expense for you.

130. A persona in personam transscriptio fit, ueluti si id, quod mihi Titius debet, tibi id expensum tulero, id est si Titius te pro se delegauerit mihi.

130. A transscription from person to person is made, for example, if that which Titius owes me I have borne as paid for you, that is, if Titius has delegated you to me on his own behalf.

131. Alia causa est eorum nominum, quae arcaria uocantur. in his enim rei, non litterarum obligatio consistit, quippe non aliter ualent, quam si numerata sit pecunia; numeratio autem pecuniae rei facit obligationem. qua de causa recte dicemus arcaria nomina nullam facere obligationem, sed obligationis factae testimonium praebere.

131. Another cause is of those names which are called arcaria. For in these the obligation consists in the thing, not in the writings, since they are of no more force than if the money had been counted; and the counting of money makes the obligation of the thing. For which reason we rightly say that arcaria names make no obligation, but furnish testimony of an obligation made.

132. Unde non proprie dicitur arcariis nominibus etiam peregrinos obligari, quia non ipso nomine, sed numeratione pecuniae obligantur; quod genus obligationis iuris gentium est.

132. Whence it is not properly said that even foreigners are bound by arcary names, for they are obligated not by the name itself but by the numeration of the money; which kind of obligation is of the law of nations.

133. Transscripticiis uero nominibus an obligentur peregrini, merito quaeritur, quia quodam modo iuris ciuilis est talis obligatio; quod Neruae placuit. Sabino autem et Cassio uisum est, si a re in personam fiat nomen transscripticium, etiam peregrinos obligari; si uero a persona in personam, non obligari.

133. Whether foreigners are bound by transscriptitious names is rightly asked, because in a certain manner such an obligation is of civil law; which pleased Nerva. But Sabinus and Cassius thought that, if the transscriptitious name is made from a thing into a person, foreigners are also bound; whereas if from a person into a person, they are not bound.

134. Praeterea litterarum obligatio fieri uidetur chirografis et syngrafis, id est, si quis debere se aut daturum se scribat, ita scilicet, si eo nomine stipulatio non fiat. quod genus obligationis proprium peregrinorum est.

134. Furthermore, an obligation of letters seems to be made by chirographs and syngraphs, that is, if anyone writes that he owes himself or will give himself, that is to say, provided that no stipulatio be made in that name. Which kind of obligation is proper to foreigners.

135. Consensu fiunt obligationes in emptionibus et uenditionibus, locationibus conductionibus, societatibus, mandatis.

135. By consent obligations arise in emptions and venditions (purchases and sales), locationes and conductiones (leases and hire-contracts), societates (partnerships), and mandates.

136. Ideo autem istis modis consensu dicimus obligationes contrahi, quod neque uerborum neque scripturae ulla proprietas desideratur, sed sufficit eos, qui negotium gerunt, consensisse. unde inter absentes quoque talia negotia contrahuntur, ueluti per epistulam aut per internuntium, cum alioquin uerborum obligatio inter absentes fieri non possit.

136. Therefore we say that obligations are contracted by consent in these modes, because no particular propriety of words or of writing is required, but it suffices that those who conduct the business have consented. Whence even among the absent such transactions are contracted, as by letter or by an internuntius (messenger), since otherwise an obligation of words between absents could not be made.

137. Item in his contractibus alter alteri obligatur de eo, quod alterum alteri ex bono et aequo praestare oportet, cum alioquin in uerborum obligationibus alius stipuletur alius promittat et in nominibus alius expensum ferendo obliget alius obligetur.

137. Likewise in these contracts one party is bound to the other concerning that which it behooves one to render to the other from good and equity, whereas otherwise in verbal obligations one person stipulates, another promises, and in matters of name one obliges another by bearing the expense, another is bound.

138. [sed absenti expensum ferri potest, etsi uerbis obligatio cum absente contrahi non possit.] [De emptione et uenditione.]

138. [but an expense can be borne for one absent, although by words an obligation cannot be contracted with an absent person.] [On purchase and sale.]

139. Emptio et uenditio contrahitur, cum de pretio conuenerit, quamuis nondum pretium numeratum sit ac ne arra quidem data fuerit. nam quod arrae nomine datur, argumentum est emptionis et uenditionis contractae.

139. A contract of purchase and sale is made when they have agreed upon the price, although the price may not yet have been counted nor even an earnest (arra) given. For that which is given under the name of the arra is evidence of the purchase and sale having been contracted.

140. Pretium autem certum esse debet. nam alioquin si ita inter nos conuenerit, ut quanti Titius rem aestimauerit, tanti sit empta, Labeo negauit ullam uim hoc negotium habere; cuius opinionem Cassius probat. Ofilius et eam emptionem et uenditionem esse putauit; cuius opinionem Proculus secutus est.

140. The price, however, must be certain. For otherwise, if it be agreed between us that the thing is to be bought for as much as Titius has appraised it, it would be bought for that amount; Labeo denied that this transaction has any force, an opinion which Cassius approves. Ofilius held that that is both a purchase and a sale; Proculus followed his opinion.

141. Item pretium in numerata pecunia consistere debet. nam in ceteris rebus an pretium esse possit, ueluti homo aut toga aut fundus alterius rei pretium esse possit, ualde quaeritur. nostri praeceptores putant etiam in alia re posse consistere pretium; unde illud est, quod uulgo putant per permutationem rerum emptionem et uenditionem contrahi, eamque speciem emptionis uenditionisque uetustissimam esse; argumentoque utuntur Graeco poeta Homero, qui aliqua parte sic ait:

141. Likewise the price must consist in counted money. For in other things whether there can be a price, as if a man or a toga or a farm could be the price of another thing, is much disputed. Our teachers think that a price can also consist in another thing; whence comes that notion which is commonly held, that by an exchange of things a purchase and sale is contracted, and that form of purchase and sale is most ancient; and they employ as an argument the Greek poet Homer, who in some passage thus says:

"enthen ar' oinizonto kar komoØntes Achaioi, alloi men chalkØi, alloi d' aithØni sid rØi, alloi de rhinois, alloi d' aut isi boessin," alloi d' andrapodessi, (Hom. Il. 7, 472-475) et reliqua. diuersae scholae auctores dissentiunt aliudque esse existimant permutationem rerum, aliud emptionem et uenditionem; alioquin non posse rem expediri permutatis rebus, quae uideatur res uenisse et quae pretii nomine data esse, sed rursus utramque rem uideri et uenisse et utramque pretii nomine datam esse absurdum uideri.

"there the Achaeans were ranged in companies: some in bronze, others in gleaming iron, others in linen, others in skins," (Hom. Il. 7, 472–475) and so forth. Different schools of authors disagree and judge that barter of goods is one thing, and purchase and sale another; for otherwise a matter cannot be settled by goods exchanged without those goods seeming to have been sold and given under the name of price; yet on the other hand it would seem absurd to regard both things as having been sold and both as having been given under the name of price.

sed ait Caelius Sabinus, si rem tibi uenalem habenti, ueluti fundum, [acceperim et] pretii nomine hominem forte dederim, fundum quidem uideri uenisse, hominem autem pretii nomine datum esse, ut fundus acciperetur.

but Caelius Sabinus says, if to you who have a thing for sale, for example a farm, I [I have also received] and have perhaps given a man by the name of price, the farm indeed seems to have been sold, but the man to have been given under the name of price, so that the farm might be received.

142. Locatio autem et conductio similibus regulis constituitur; nisi enim merces certa statuta sit, non uidetur locatio et conductio contrahi.

142. Letting and hiring are constituted by similar rules; for unless the goods are fixed and determined, a letting and hiring does not seem to be contracted.

143. Unde si alieno arbitrio merces permissa sit, uelut quanti Titius aestimauerit, quaeritur, an locatio et conductio contrahatur. qua de causa si fulloni polienda curandaue, sarcinatori sarcienda uestimenta dederim nulla statim mercede constituta, postea tantum daturus, quanti inter nos conuenerit, quaeritur, an locatio et conductio contrahatur.

143. Wherefore if goods have been placed at another’s discretion, as for how much Titius would appraise them, it is asked whether a lease and hiring (locatio et conductio) is thereby contracted. For which reason, if I have given to a fuller garments to be polished or cared for, or to a mender clothes to be repaired, with no wage fixed at once, but intending to give afterward only as much as we shall have agreed between us, it is questioned whether a lease and hiring is contracted.

144. Item si rem tibi utendam dederim et inuicem aliam rem utendam acceperim, quaeritur, an locatio et conductio contrahatur.

144. Likewise, if I have given you a thing to be used and in return have received another thing to be used, the question is whether a locatio et conductio (letting and hiring) is contracted.

145. Adeo autem emptio et uenditio et locatio et conductio familiaritatem aliquam inter se habere uidentur, ut in quibusdam causis quaeri soleat, utrum emptio et uenditio contrahatur an locatio et conductio, ueluti si qua res in perpetuum locata sit. quod euenit in praediis municipum, quae ea lege locantur, ut, quamdiu [id] uectigal praestetur, neque ipsi conductori neque heredi eius praedium auferatur; sed magis placuit locationem conductionemque esse.

145. So indeed purchase and sale and letting and hiring appear to have some affinity with one another, that in certain causes it is customary to ask whether purchase and sale are contracted or letting and hiring, as, for example, if some thing is let in perpetuity. This happens in the estates of the municipia, which are let by that law, namely that, so long as that due tribute is paid, the estate may not be taken from the conductor nor from his heir; but it has been thought preferable that it be a locatio and conductio.

146. Item si gladiatores ea lege tibi tradiderim, ut in singulos, qui integri exierint, pro sudore denarii XX mihi darentur, in eos uero singulos, qui occisi aut debilitati fuerint, denarii mille, quaeritur, utrum emptio et uenditio an locatio et conductio contrahatur. et magis placuit eorum, qui integri exierint, locationem et conductionem contractam uideri, at eorum, qui occisi aut debilitati sunt, emptionem et uenditionem esse; idque ex accidentibus apparet, tamquam sub condicione facta cuiusque uenditione aut locatione. iam enim non dubitatur, quin sub condicione res uenire aut locari possint.

146. Likewise if I have handed over gladiators to you by that agreement, so that for each who comes out intact twenty denarii be given to me for his sweat, but for each one who is killed or disabled a thousand denarii, the question is whether a purchase and sale or a letting and hiring is contracted. And it seemed more fitting that as to those who went out intact a locatio et conductio should be held to have been contracted, but as to those who were killed or disabled a purchase and sale; and this is shown by the accidents, as if each sale or letting had been made under a condition. For now there is no doubt that things may be sold or let under condition.

147. Item quaeritur, si cum aurifice mihi conuenerit, ut is ex auro suo certi ponderis certaeque formae anulos mihi faceret et acciperet uerbi gratia denarios CC, utrum emptio et uenditio an locatio et conductio contrahatur. Cassius ait materiae quidem emptionem uenditionemque contrahi, operarum autem locationem et conductionem; sed plerisque placuit emptionem et uenditionem contrahi. atqui si meum aurum ei dedero mercede pro opera constituta, conuenit locationem conductionem contrahi.

147. It is further asked, if one has agreed with a goldsmith that he should make for me from his gold rings of a certain weight and certain form and should receive, for example, 200 denarii, whether a purchase and sale or a locatio et conductio is contracted. Cassius says that the purchase and sale of the material is indeed contracted, but the locatio and conductio of the labors; yet to most it seemed that a purchase and sale is contracted. But if I give my gold to him for a wage agreed for the work, it is agreed that a locatio and conductio is contracted.

148. Societatem coire solemus aut totorum bonorum aut unius alicuius negotii, ueluti mancipiorum emendorum aut uendendorum.

148. We are accustomed to form a partnership either of all goods or of some one particular business, as for the buying or selling of mancipia (slaves).

149. Magna autem quaestio fuit, an ita coiri possit societas, ut quis maiorem partem lucretur, minorem damni praestet. quod Quintus Mucius contra naturam societatis esse censuit. sed Seruius Sulpicius, cuius etiam praeualuit sententia, adeo ita coiri posse societatem existimauit, ut dixerit illo quoque modo coiri posse, ut quis nihil omnino damni praestet, sed lucri partem capiat, si modo opera eius tam pretiosa uideatur, ut aequum sit eum cum hac pactione in societatem admitti.

149. A great question, however, arose whether a partnership can be formed so that one person gains the greater part while affords the lesser share of loss. Quintus Mucius judged that this was against the nature of partnership. But Servius Sulpicius, whose opinion likewise prevailed, held that a partnership could indeed be formed in such a way, saying that it could even be constituted so that one person should bear no loss at all but take a part of the profit, provided only that his services seemed so valuable that it was fair he be admitted into the partnership with this agreement.

nam et ita posse coiri societatem constat, ut unus pecuniam conferat, alter non conferat et tamen lucrum inter eos commune sit; saepe enim opera alicuius pro pecunia ualet.

for it is likewise established that a partnership can be formed even so, that one person contributes money, another does not contribute, and yet the profit is common between them; for often the work (opera) of someone is worth money.

150. Et illud certum est, si de partibus lucri et damni nihil inter eos conuenerit, tamen aequis ex partibus commodum ut incommodum inter eos commune esse; sed si in altero partes expressae fuerint, uelut in lucro, in altero uero omissae, in eo quoque, quod omissum est, similes partes erunt.

150. And it is certain likewise that, if concerning the parts of profit and of loss nothing has been agreed between them, yet from equal parts advantage as well as disadvantage will be common to them; but if in one the parts have been expressed, as in profit, and in the other omitted, then also in that which is omitted the parts will be similar.

151. Manet autem societas eo usque, donec in eodem sensu perseuerant; at cum aliquis renuntiauerit societati, societas soluitur. sed plane si quis in hoc renuntiauerit societati, ut obueniens aliquod lucrum solus habeat, ueluti si mihi totorum bonorum socius, cum ab aliquo heres esset relictus, in hoc renuntiauerit societati, ut hereditatem solus lucri faciat, cogetur hoc lucrum communicare; si quid uero aliud lucri fecerit, quod non captauerit, ad ipsum solum pertinet. mihi uero, quidquid omnino post renuntiatam societatem adquiritur, soli conceditur.

151. The societas remains, however, so long as they persevere in the same sense; but when anyone has renounced the societas, the societas is dissolved. Yet plainly if anyone renounces the societas in such a way that, upon encountering some profit, he may have it alone — for example, if a partner of all my goods, when an heir had been left by someone, renounces the societas in this respect so that he may make the inheritance a profit for himself alone — he will be compelled to share that profit; but if he makes any other profit which he did not seize, it pertains to him alone. For the renouncer, however, whatever in any wise is acquired after the societas has been renounced is granted to him alone.

152. Soluitur adhuc societas etiam morte socii, quia qui societatem contrahit, certam personam sibi eligit.

152. The society is further dissolved by the death of a partner, because he who contracts the society selects a certain person for himself.

153. Dicitur etiam kapitis deminutione solui societatem, quia ciuili ratione kapitis deminutio morti coaequatur; sed utique si adhuc consentiant in societatem, noua uidetur incipere societas.

153. It is also said that the partnership is dissolved by capitis deminutio, because in civil law capitis deminutio is equated with death; yet certainly if they still consent to the partnership, a new partnership seems to begin.

154. Item si cuius ex sociis bona publice aut priuatim uenierint, soluitur societas. sed ea quidem societas, de qua loquimur, id est, quae nudo consensu contrahitur, iuris gentium est; itaque inter omnes homines naturali ratione consistit.

154. Likewise, if the goods of any of the partners have been sold publicly or privately, the partnership is dissolved. But that partnership, about which we speak, that is, which is contracted by bare consent, is of the law of nations; and therefore it subsists among all men by natural reason.

154a. Est autem aliud genus societatis proprium ciuium Romanorum. olim enim mortuo patre familias inter suos heredes quaedam erat legitima simul et naturalis societas quae appellabatur ercto non cito, id est dominio non diuiso: erctum enim dominium est, unde erus dominus dicitur: ciere autem diuidere est: unde caedere et secare [et diuidere] dicimus.

154a. There is moreover another kind of societas proper to the Roman citizens. For formerly, when the pater familias had died, among his heirs there was a certain lawful and natural societas at once which was called ercto non cito, that is, dominion not divided: erctum indeed is dominion, whence erus, master, is called dominus: ciere however is to divide: whence we say caedere and secare [and dividere].

154b. Alii quoque qui uolebant eandem habere societatem, poterant id consequi apud praetorem certa legis actione. in hac autem societate fratrum ceterorumue, qui ad exemplum fratrum suorum societatem coierint, illud proprium erat, [unus] quod uel unus ex sociis communem seruum manumittendo liberum faciebat et omnibus libertum adquirebat: item unus rem communem mancipando eius faciebat, qui mancipio accipiebat.

154b. Others also who wished to have the same societas could obtain it before the praetor by a certain action of the law. In this societas of brothers or of others, who, following the example of their brothers, had come together into partnership, that feature was peculiar, [unus] namely that either one of the partners, by manumitting a common slave, made him free and thereby acquired freedom for all: likewise one made the common thing by mancipation who received it by mancipatio.

155. Mandatum consistit, siue nostra gratia mandemus siue aliena; itaque siue ut mea negotia geras siue ut alterius, mandauerim, contrahitur mandati obligatio, et inuicem alter alteri tenebimur in id, quod uel me tibi uel te mihi bona fide praestare oportet.

155. A mandate consists, whether we give an order for our own sake or for another’s; therefore whether I have ordered that you manage my affairs or those of another, the obligation of a mandate is contracted, and in turn we are mutually bound to one another for that which, in good faith, it is proper either that I render to you or that you render to me.

156. Nam si tua gratia tibi mandem, superuacuum est mandatum; quod enim tu tua gratia facturus sis, id de tua sententia, non ex meo mandatu facere debes; itaque si otiosam pecuniam domi tuae te habentem hortatus fuerim, ut eam faenerares, quamuis iam ei mutuam dederis, a quo seruare non potueris, non tamen habebis mecum mandati actionem. item si hortatus sim, ut rem aliquam emeres, quamuis non expedierit tibi eam emisse, non tamen tibi mandati tenebor. et adeo haec ita sunt, ut quaeratur, an mandati teneatur, qui mandauit tibi, ut Titio pecuniam faenerares.

156. For if I order you for your own benefit (tua gratia), the mandate is superfluous; for what you are going to do for your own benefit you ought to do from your own judgment, not by my mandate; therefore if I had encouraged you to put idle money in your house to pawn or lend at interest, although you have already given it as a loan to someone whom you could not save it from, nevertheless you will not have an action on the mandate against me. Likewise if I urged you to buy some thing, although it was not advantageous for you to have bought it, I shall not be held by the mandate to you. And so these matters stand thus: it is even asked whether one is bound by mandate who ordered you to pawn money to Titius.

Seruius negauit: non magis hoc casu obligationem consistere putauit, quam si generaliter alicui mandetur, uti pecuniam suam faeneraret. sed sequimur Sabini opinionem contra sentientis, quia non aliter Titio credidisses, quam si tibi mandatum esset.

Servius denied: he thought that an obligation does not arise in this case any more than if, generally, someone were entrusted to lend out his money at interest. But we follow the opinion of Sabinus against the dissenter, because you would not have trusted Titius otherwise than if it had been commanded to you.

157. Illud constat, si quis de ea re mandet, quae contra bonos mores est, non contrahi obligationem, ueluti si tibi mandem, ut Titio furtum aut iniuriam facias.

157. It is clear that if anyone orders concerning that matter which is contrary to good morals, no obligation is contracted; as if I were to order you to commit theft or injury against Titius.

158. Item si quis quid post mortem meam faciendum mihi mandet, inutile mandatum est, quia generaliter placuit ab heredis persona obligationem incipere non posse.

158. Likewise, if anyone enjoins me to do anything to be done after my death, the mandate is useless, because it has been generally agreed that an obligation cannot begin from the person of the heir.

159. Sed recte quoque contractum mandatum, si dum adhuc integra res sit, reuocatum fuerit, euanescit.

159. But a mandate duly contracted, if it has been revoked while the thing is still intact, is extinguished.

160. Item si adhuc integro mandato mors alterutrius alicuius interueniat, id est uel eius, qui mandarit, uel eius, qui mandatum susceperit, soluitur mandatum; sed utilitatis causa receptum est, ut si mortuo eo, qui mihi mandauerit, ignorans eum decessisse exsecutus fuero mandatum, posse me agere mandati actione; alioquin iusta et probabilis ignorantia damnum mihi [non] adferet. et huic simile est, quod plerisque placuit, si debitor meus manumisso dispensatori meo per ignorantiam soluerit, liberari eum, cum alioquin stricta iuris ratione non posset liberari eo, quod alii soluisset, quam cui soluere deberet.

160. Likewise, if, while the mandate is still intact, the death of either party intervenes — that is, either of him who gave the mandate or of him who received the mandate — the mandate is dissolved; but for the sake of equity it has been held that if, after the death of him who commanded me, I, ignorant that he had died, shall have executed the mandate, I may bring action on the mandate; otherwise a just and probable ignorance will [non] bring damage to me. And like this is what most have thought, namely, that if my debtor, through ignorance, has paid my manumitted steward, he is freed, since otherwise by the strict reasoning of law he could not be freed by having paid one other than him to whom he ought to have paid.

161. Cum autem is, cui recte mandauerim, egressus fuerit mandatum, ego quidem eatenus cum eo habeo mandati actionem, quatenus mea interest inplesse eum mandatum, si modo implere potuerit; at ille mecum agere non potest. itaque si mandauerim tibi, ut uerbi gratia fundum mihi sestertiis C emeres, tu sestertiis CL emeris, non habebis mecum mandati actionem, etiamsi tanti uelis mihi dare fundum, quanti emendum tibi mandassem; idque maxime Sabino et Cassio placuit. quod si minoris emeris, habebis mecum scilicet actionem, quia qui mandat, ut C milibus emeretur, is utique mandare intellegitur, uti minoris, si posset, emeretur.

161. When, however, he to whom I have rightly entrusted a mandate has withdrawn from the mandate, I indeed up to that point have with him the action of mandate, insofar as it concerns my interest that he fulfil the mandate, if only he could fulfil it; but he cannot sue me. Therefore if I have ordered you, for example, to buy for me a farm for 100 sesterces, and you buy it for 150 sesterces, you will not have an action of mandate against me, even if you would wish to give me the farm for as much as I had ordered it to be bought; and this view especially pleased Sabinus and Cassius. But if you buy it for a lesser sum, you will of course have an action against me, because he who orders that it be bought for 100,000 is certainly understood to order that, if possible, it be bought for a smaller amount.

162. In summa sciendum est, quotiens faciendum aliquid gratis dederim, quo nomine si mercedem statuissem, locatio et conductio contraheretur, mandati esse actionem, ueluti si fulloni polienda curandaue uestimenta dederim aut sarcinatori sarcienda.

162. In sum it must be known, that whenever I have given something to be done gratis, in a name by which, if I had fixed a merced (a fee), a locatio et conductio (letting and hiring) would have been contracted, there is the action of mandate — as, for example, if I have given to a fullon (fuller) garments to be polished or cared for, or to a sarcinator (packer) to be packed.

163. Expositis generibus obligationum, quae ex contractu nascuntur, admonendi sumus adquiri nobis non solum per nosmet ipsos, sed etiam per eas personas, quae in nostra potestate, manu mancipioue sunt.

163. Having set forth the kinds of obligations which arise from contract, we must be admonished that they are acquired for us not only by ourselves, but also by those persons who are in our power, or in manu mancipio.

164. Per liberos quoque homines et alienos seruos, quos bona fide possidemus, adquiritur nobis; sed tantum ex duabus causis, id est, si quid ex operis suis uel ex re nostra adquirant.

164. Property is likewise acquired for us through free men and alien slaves, whom we possess in good faith; but only from two causes, that is, if they acquire anything from their own labour or from our thing (our property).

165. Per eum quoque seruum, in quo usumfructum habemus, similiter ex duabus istis causis nobis adquiritur.

165. Through that same slave also, in whom we have a usufruct, rights are acquired for us similarly from those two causes.

166. Sed qui nudum ius Quiritium in seruo habet, licet dominus sit, minus tamen iuris in ea re habere intellegitur quam usufructuarius et bonae fidei possessor. nam placet ex nulla causa ei adquiri posse, adeo ut, etsi nominatim ei dari stipulatus fuerit seruus mancipioue nomine eius acceperit, quidam existiment nihil ei adquiri.

166. But he who has the naked ius Quiritium in a slave, although he is the dominus, is nevertheless held to have less of a right in that matter than a usufructuarius and a bonae fidei possessor. For it is thought that nothing can be acquired for him from any cause, so much so that, although a slave may have been stipulated to be given to him by name, or he may have received him in the name of mancipium, some think that nothing is acquired to him.

167. Communem seruum pro dominica parte dominis adquirere certum est, excepto eo, quod uni nominatim stipulando aut mancipio accipiendo illi soli adquirit, uelut cum ita stipuletur: TITIO DOMINO MEO DARI SPONDES? aut cum ita mancipio accipiat: HANC REM EX IVRE QVIRITIVM LVCII TITII DOMINI MEI ESSE AIO, EAQVE EI EMPTA ESTO HOC AERE AENEAQVE LIBRA.

167. It is certain that a common slave is acquired for the dominical share by the masters, except for that case in which by stipulation naming one alone or by receiving by mancipation he is acquired for that one only, as when it is stipulated thus: "DO YOU PROMISE THAT THIS BE GIVEN TO MY MASTER TITUS?" or when he is received by mancipation thus: "I DECLARE THAT THIS THING IS FROM THE IUS QUIRITIUM OF LUCIUS TITUS, MY MASTER, AND THAT IT BE BOUGHT FOR HIM WITH THIS BRONZE OR WITH THE AENEAN POUND."

167a. Illud quaeritur, an quod nomen domini adiectum efficit, idem faciat unius ex dominis iussum intercedens. nostri praeceptores proinde ei, qui iusserit, soli adquiri existimant, atque si nominatim ei soli stipulatus esset seruus mancipioue quid accepisset; diuersae scholae auctores proinde utrisque adquiri putant, ac si nullius iussum interuenisset.

167a. The question is asked whether that which the addition of the master's name effects is likewise effected by the interposition of the order of one of the masters. Our praecursors therefore hold that it is acquired for the one who ordered alone, even if the slave had been stipulated or received in mancipio to that one alone by name; authors of diverse schools, on the other hand, think it is acquired for both, as if no one's order had intervened.

168. Tollitur autem obligatio praecipue solutione eius, quod debeatur. unde quaeritur, si quis consentiente creditore aliud pro alio soluerit, utrum ipso iure liberetur, quod nostris praeceptoribus placuit, an ipso iure maneat obligatus, sed aduersus petentem per exceptionem doli mali defendi debeat, quod diuersae scholae auctoribus uisum est.

168. The obligation, however, is discharged especially by payment of that which is owed. Hence it is asked whether, if one with the creditor's consent pays something else for something, he is freed by the law itself — which pleased our praeceptores — or whether he remains bound by the law itself, yet ought to be defended against the claimant by the exception of dolus malus (bad faith), which seemed to the authors of diverse schools.

169. Item per acceptilationem tollitur obligatio. acceptilatio autem est ueluti imaginaria solutio. nam quod ex uerborum obligatione tibi debeam, id si uelis mihi remittere, poterit sic fieri, ut patiaris haec uerba me dicere: QVOD TIBI EGO PROMISI, HABESNE ACCEPTVM?

169. Likewise by acceptilation the obligation is extinguished. Acceptilation, moreover, is as it were an imaginary solution (payment). For that which I owe you by a verbal obligation, if you wish to remit it to me, it may be effected thus, that you suffer me to say these words: "WHAT I PROMISED YOU, HAVE YOU RECEIVED?"

et tu respondeas: HABEO.

and you answer: I HAVE RECEIVED.

170. Quo genere, ut diximus, tolluntur illae obligationes, quae in uerbis consistunt, non etiam ceterae; consentaneum enim est uisum uerbis factam obligationem posse aliis uerbis dissolui. sed id, quod ex alia causa debeatur, potest in stipulationem deduci et per acceptilationem dissolui.

170. In that manner, as we said, those obligations which consist in words are annulled, not also the others; for it is reasonable that an obligation made by words may be dissolved by other words. But that which is owed from another cause can be reduced into a stipulation and dissolved by acceptilation.

171. Quamuis autem acceptilatio ueluti imaginaria solutio sit, tamen mulier sine tutore auctore acceptilationem facere non potest, cum alioquin solui ei sine tutore auctore possit.

171. Although acceptilation is, as it were, an imaginary discharge, nevertheless a woman without a tutor-auctor cannot make an acceptilation, since otherwise she could be discharged for herself without a tutor-auctor.

172. Item quod debetur, pro parte recte soluitur; an autem in partem acceptilatio fieri possit, quaesitum est.

172. Also, that which is owed is rightly discharged in part; but whether an acceptilation can be made as to a part has been questioned.

173. Est et alia species imaginariae solutionis, per aes et libram; quod et ipsum genus certis ex causis receptum est, ueluti si quid eo nomine debeatur, quod per aes et libram gestum sit, siue quid ex iudicati causa debeatur.

173. There is also another kind of imaginary satisfaction, by aes and libra; and this very form has been adopted for certain reasons, as for example if anything is owed under that name which has been performed by aes and libra, or if anything is owed by reason of a judgment.

174. Adhibentur non minus quam quinque testes et libripens; deinde is, qui liberatur, ita oportet loquatur: QVOD EGO TIBI TOT MILIBVS SESTERTIORVM IVDICATVS uel DAMNATVS SVM EO NOMINE ME A TE SOLVO LIBEROQVE HOC AERE AENEAQVE LIBRA. HANC TIBI LIBRAM PRIMAM POSTREMAMQVE EXPENDO SECVNDVM LEGEM PVBLICAM. deinde asse percutit libram eumque dat ei, a quo liberatur, ueluti soluendi causa.

174. Not fewer than five witnesses and a libripens are brought in; then he who is freed ought to speak thus: "QUOD EGO TIBI TOT MILIBVS SESTERTIORVM IUDICATUS vel DAMNATUS SUM EO NOMINE ME A TE SOLVO LIBEROQUE HOC AERE AENEAQUE LIBRA. HANC TIBI LIBRAM PRIMAM POSTREMAMQUE EXPENDO SECUNDUM LEGEM PUBLICAM." Then he strikes the as with the libra and gives it to him by whom he is freed, as if for the purpose of payment.

175. Similiter legatarius heredem eodem modo liberat de legato, quod per damnationem relictum est, ut tamen scilicet, sicut iudicatus condemnatum se esse significat, ita heres testamento se dare damnatum esse dicat. de eo tamen tantum potest heres eo modo liberari, quod pondere numero constet, et ita, si certum sit. quidam et de eo, quod mensura constat, idem existimant.

175. Similarly the legator frees the heir in the same manner from the legacy which was left by damnation, so that, as the one condemned declares himself condemned, likewise the heir by the testament shall declare himself given up as condemned. Yet the heir can be freed in that way only insofar as it consists of weight and number, and thus, if it is certain. Some think the same of that which consists by measure.

176. Praeterea nouatione tollitur obligatio ueluti si quod tu mihi debeas, a Titio dari stipulatus sim; nam interuentu nouae personae noua nascitur obligatio et prima tollitur translata in posteriorem, adeo ut inter-dum, licet posterior stipulatio inutilis sit, tamen prima nouationis iure tollatur, ueluti si quod mihi debes, a Titio post mortem eius uel a muliere pupilloue sine tutoris auctoritate stipulatus fuero; quo casu rem amitto; nam et prior debitor liberatur, et posterior obligatio nulla est. non idem iuris est, si a seruo stipulatus fuero; nam tunc prior proinde adhuc obligatus tenetur, ac si postea a nullo stipulatus fuissem.

176. Moreover by novation the obligation is taken away, as when that which you owe me is stipulated to be given by Titius; for by the interposition of a new person a new obligation is born and the first is abrogated, transferred to the latter, so that meanwhile, although the subsequent stipulation may be ineffective, yet the first is extinguished by the right of novation, as when that which you owe me I shall have been stipulated to be paid by Titius after his death or by a woman or a ward without the guardian’s authority; in that case I lose the thing; for the prior debtor is freed, and the subsequent obligation is null. It is not the same in law if I am stipulated by a slave; for then the prior remains nevertheless bound, as if afterwards I had been stipulated by no one.

177. Sed si eadem persona sit, a qua postea stipuler, ita demum nouatio fit, si quid in posteriore stipulatione noui sit, forte si condicio uel dies aut sponsor adiciatur aut detrahatur.

177. But if it is the same person from whom I afterwards stipulate, novation is made only then, if anything in the later stipulation is new; for example, if a condition or a day or a sponsor is either added or taken away.

178. Sed quod de sponsore diximus, non constat. nam diuersae scholae auctoribus placuit nihil ad nouationem proficere sponsoris adiectionem aut detractionem.

178. But what we said concerning the sponsor is not certain. For the authors of diverse schools have held that the addition or subtraction of a sponsor contributes nothing to novation.

179. Quod autem diximus, si condicio adiciatur, nouationem fieri, sic intellegi oportet, ut ita dicamus factam nouationem, si condicio extiterit; alioquin si defecerit, durat prior obligatio. sed uideamus, num is, qui eo nomine agat, doli mali aut pacti conuenti exceptione possit summoueri, quia uidetur inter eos id actum, ut ita ea res peteretur, si posterioris stipulationis exstiterit condicio. Seruius tamen Sulpicius existimauit statim et pendente condicione nouationem fieri, et si defecerit condicio, ex neutra causa agi posse et eo modo rem perire; qui consequenter et illud respondit, si quis id, quod sibi L. Titius deberet, a seruo fuerit stipulatus, nouationem fieri et rem perire, quia cum seruo agi non posset.

179. As for what we said, that if a condition is added a novation is made, this must be understood so that we say a novation has been made if the condition has come about; otherwise, if it has failed, the prior obligation remains. But let us see whether he who sues under that name can be defeated by the exception of bad faith or of an agreed pact, since it seems to have been agreed between them that the thing should be sought in that way if the condition of the later stipulation should exist. Servius Sulpicius, however, held that a novation occurs immediately and while the condition is pending, and that if the condition fails no action can be brought on either account and the matter perishes in that manner; who accordingly also replied this: if that which L. Titius ought to owe to him was stipulated by a slave, a novation occurs and the matter perishes, because one could not sue the slave.

sed in utroque casu alio iure utimur. nec magis his casibus nouatio fit, quam si id, quod tu mihi debeas, a peregrino, cum quo sponsus communio non est, SPONDES uerbo stipulatus sim.

but in either case we make use of a different law. Nor is novation any more effected in these cases than if I had stipulated the word SPONDES for that which you owe me from a foreigner, with whom the sponsor has no communion.

180. Tollitur adhuc obligatio litis contestatione, si modo legitimo iudicio fuerit actum. nam tunc obligatio quidem principalis dissoluitur, incipit autem teneri reus litis contestatione. sed si condemnatus sit, sublata litis contestatione incipit ex causa iudicati teneri.

180. The obligation is further extinguished by litis contestatio, provided it has been effected in a legitimate judgment. For then the principal obligation is indeed dissolved, while the defendant begins to be bound by the litis contestatio. But if he has been condemned, when the litis contestatio is removed he begins to be held from the causa iudicati (the cause of the judgment).

et hoc est, quod apud ueteres scriptum est ante litem contestatam dare debitorem oportere, post litem contestatam condemnari oportere, post condemnationem iudicatum facere oportere.

and this is what among the ancients is written: before the suit is contested the debtor ought to give, after the suit is contested he ought to be condemned, after condemnation he ought to make good what has been adjudged.

181. Unde fit, ut si legitimo iudicio debitum petiero, postea de eo ipso iure agere non possim, quia inutiliter intendo DARI MIHI OPORTERE, quia litis contestatione dari oportere desiit, aliter atque si imperio continenti iudicio egerim; tunc enim nihilo minus obligatio durat, et ideo ipso iure postea agere possum, sed debeo per exceptionem rei iudicatae uel in iudicium deductae summoueri. quae autem legitima sint iudicia et quae imperio continentia, sequenti commentario referemus.

181. Wherefore it happens that if by a legitimate judgment I have sought the debt, afterwards I cannot act concerning that same right, because I vainly allege DARI MIHI OPORTERE, since by the litis contestatio it ceased to be required to be given; otherwise than if I had proceeded by a judgment containing imperium; for then nevertheless the obligation endures, and therefore I can afterwards act by the very right, but I must be removed by the exception of rei judicatae or of that which has been brought into judgment. Which judgments, however, are legitimate and which contain imperium, we shall relate in the following commentary.

182. Transeamus nunc ad obligationes, quae ex delicto nascuntur, ueluti si quis furtum fecerit, bona rapuerit, damnum dederit, iniuriam commiserit. quarum omnium rerum uno genere consistit obligatio, cum ex contractu obligationes in IIII genera diducantur, sicut supra exposuimus.

182. Let us now pass to obligations which arise from delict, for example if anyone has committed theft, has plundered goods, has caused damage, has committed an injury. The obligation of all these matters consists in one genus, whereas obligations arising from contract are divided into 4 genera, as we explained above.

183. Furtorum autem genera Ser. Sulpicius et Masurius Sabinus IIII esse dixerunt, manifestum et nec manifestum, conceptum et oblatum; Labeo duo, manifestum et nec manifestum; nam conceptum et oblatum species potius actionis esse furto cohaerentes quam genera furtorum; quod sane uerius uidetur, sicut inferius apparebit.

183. But Ser. Sulpicius and Masurius Sabinus said that there are 4 kinds of thefts: manifest and non-manifest, conceptum and oblatum; Labeo [held] two, manifest and non-manifest; for conceptum and oblatum are rather species of the action adhering to theft than genera of thefts; which certainly seems truer, as will appear below.

184. Manifestum furtum quidam id esse dixerunt, quod dum fit, deprehenditur. alii uero ulterius, quod eo loco deprehenditur, ubi fit, uelut si in oliueto oliuarum, in uineto uuarum furtum factum est, quamdiu in eo oliueto aut uineto fur sit; aut si in domo furtum factum sit, quamdiu in ea domo fur sit. alii adhuc ulterius eo usque **** manifestum furtum esse dixerunt, donec perferret eo, quo perferre fur destinasset.

184. Some have said that manifest theft is that which is seized while it is being done. Others, however, go further: that it is seized in the place where it is done, as if a theft were committed in an olive‑grove of olives, in a vineyard of grapes, so long as the thief is in that olive‑grove or vineyard; or if a theft has been committed in a house, so long as the thief is in that house. Others still carry the notion further to such an extent ****, and have said that it is manifest theft until he has carried it to the place to which the thief had destined to carry it.

alii adhuc ulterius, quandoque eam rem fur tenens uisus fuerit; quae sententia non optinuit. sed et illorum sententia, qui existimauerunt, donec perferret eo, quo fur destinasset, deprehensum furtum manifestum esse, ideo non uidetur probari, quia magnam recipit dubitationem, utrum unius diei an etiam plurium dierum spatio id terminandum sit; quod eo pertinet, quia saepe in aliis ciuitatibus surreptas res in alias ciuitates uel in alias prouincias destinant fures perferre. ex duabus itaque superioribus opinionibus alterutra adprobatur; magis tamen plerique posteriorem probant.

Some others even further, that sometimes the thief had been seen holding that thing; which opinion did not prevail. But the opinion also of those who judged that a theft is manifest when it is caught until he had conveyed it to the place to which the thief had destined it, therefore does not seem to be approved, because it admits a great doubt whether that must be fixed within the space of one day or even of several days; which is relevant, because often thieves intend to carry goods stolen in one city into other cities or into other provinces. From the two foregoing opinions, either may be approved; yet most favor the latter.

185. Nec manifestum furtum quid sit, ex iis, quae diximus, intellegitur. nam quod manifestum non est, id nec manifestum est.

185. Nor is what manifest theft is understood from those things which we have said; for that which is not manifest is not manifest.

186. Conceptum furtum dicitur, cum apud aliquem testibus praesentibus furtiua res quaesita et inuenta est. nam in eum propria actio constituta est, quamuis fur non sit, quae appellatur concepti.

186. A "conceived" theft is said when, at someone's place and with witnesses present, a furtive thing has been sought for and found. For a special action is instituted against that person, although he is not a thief, which is called the action of the conceived.

187. Oblatum furtum dicitur, cum res furtiua tibi ab aliquo oblata sit eaque apud te concepta sit, utique si ea mente data tibi fuerit, ut apud te potius quam apud eum, qui dederit, conciperetur. nam tibi, apud quem concepta est, propria aduersus eum, qui optulit, quamuis fur non sit, constituta est actio, quae appellatur oblati.

187. An oblatum furtum is said to be when a thing stolen has been offered to you by someone and has been received into your possession, certainly if it was given to you with the intent that it should be received by you rather than by him who gave it. For against you, at the place where it was received, there is established a personal action against him who offered it, although he is not a thief, which is called the action of the oblatum.

188. Est etiam prohibiti furti actio aduersus eum, qui furtum quaerere uolentem prohibuerit.

188. There is also an action for prohibited theft against him who has prevented one wishing to attempt theft.

189. Poena manifesti furti ex lege XII tabularum capitalis erat. nam liber uerberatus addicebatur ei, cui furtum fecerat; utrum autem seruus efficeretur ex addictione an adiudicati loco constitueretur, ueteres quaerebant. in seruum aeque uerberatum animaduertebatur.

189. The penalty for manifest theft under the law of the Twelve Tables was capital. For a free man, having been beaten, was adjudged (addicted) to the person to whom he had committed the theft; but whether a slave was made (a slave) by this addiction or was placed in the position of the person adjudged, the ancients disputed. A slave who had been beaten was likewise punished.

sed postea inprobata est asperitas poenae, et tam ex serui persona quam ex liberi quadrupli actio praetoris edicto constituta est.

but afterwards the severity of the punishment was disapproved, and by the praetor’s edict a quadruple action was instituted both from the person of a slave and from a free man.

190. Nec manifesti furti poena per legem XII tabularum dupli inrogatur, eamque etiam praetor conseruat.

190. Nor is the penalty for manifest theft imposed as double by the law of the 12 Tables, and the praetor likewise preserves it.

191. Concepti et oblati poena ex lege XII tabularum tripli est, eaque similiter a praetore seruatur.

191. The penalty for the concealed and the offered is triple under the law of the 12 Tables, and it is likewise preserved by the praetor.

192. Prohibiti actio quadrupli est ex edicto praetoris introducta. lex autem eo nomine nullam poenam constituit; hoc solum praecipit, ut qui quaerere uelit, nudus quaerat, licio cinctus, lancem habens; qui si quid inuenerit, iubet id lex furtum manifestum esse.

192. The actio prohibiti is quadruple, introduced by the praetor’s edict. The law, however, under that name establishes no penalty; it only prescribes that he who wishes to search shall search naked, girded with the lictor’s cord, holding a lance; and if he finds anything, the law orders that that be deemed manifest theft.

193. Quid sit autem licium, quaesitum est; sed uerius est consuti genus esse, quo necessariae partes tegerentur.

193. What, however, licium is has been asked; but it is truer that it is a stitched (sewn) kind of garment, by which the necessary parts were covered.

193a. Quae [res] lex tota ridicula est; nam qui uestitum quaerere prohibet, is et nudum quaerere prohibiturus est, eo magis quod ita quaesita re et inuenta maiori poenae subiciatur. deinde quod lancem siue ideo haberi iubeat, ut manibus occupatis nihil subiciat, siue ideo, ut quod inuenerit, ibi imponat, neutrum eorum procedit, si id, quod quaeratur, eius magnitudinis aut naturae sit, ut neque subici neque ibi inponi possit.

193a. This whole law is ridiculous; for he who forbids seeking a garment will be about to forbid seeking even the naked, all the more because a thing thus sought and found is subjected to a greater penalty. Furthermore, whether it orders that one have a lance either that, with hands occupied, he may not slip anything under, or that he should place what he has found there, neither of these provisions succeeds if that which is sought is of such magnitude or nature that it can be neither slipped under nor placed there.

certe non dubitatur, cuiuscumque materiae sit ea lanx, satis legi fieri.

certainly there is no doubt that, of whatever material that dish is, it is sufficient that it be made according to the law.

194. Propter hoc tamen, quod lex ex ea causa manifestum furtum esse iubet, sunt, qui scribunt furtum manifestum aut lege intellegi aut natura: lege id ipsum, de quo loquimur, natura illud, de quo superius exposuimus. sed uerius est natura tantum manifestum furtum intellegi; neque enim lex facere potest, ut qui manifestus fur non sit, manifestus sit, non magis quam qui omnino fur non sit, fur sit, et qui adulter aut homicida non sit, adulter uel homicida sit; at illud sane lex facere potest, ut proinde aliquis poena teneatur, atque si furtum uel adulterium uel homicidium admisisset, quamuis nihil eorum admiserit.

194. Because of this, however, that the law for that reason orders that theft be manifest, there are those who write that manifest theft is to be understood either by law or by nature: by law that very thing of which we speak, by nature that thing which we set forth above. But more truly it is to be understood that manifest theft is by nature only; for the law cannot make that he who is not a manifest thief be manifest, no more than it can make that one who is not at all a thief be a thief, or that one who is not an adulterer or a murderer be an adulterer or murderer; yet the law can certainly make that a person be held by punishment as if he had committed theft or adultery or murder, although he committed none of those.

195. Furtum autem fit non solum, cum quis intercipiendi causa rem alienam amouet, sed generaliter, cum quis rem alienam inuito domino contrectat.

195. Theft, however, is committed not only when someone removes another's thing for the purpose of interception, but generally when someone handles another's thing against the will of the owner.

196. Itaque si quis re, quae apud eum deposita sit, utatur, furtum committit; et si quis utendam rem acceperit eamque in alium usum transtulerit, furti obligatur, ueluti si quis argentum utendum acceperit, quasi amicos ad cenam inuitaturus, et id peregre secum tulerit, aut si quis equum gestandi gratia commodatum longius aliquo duxerit, quod ueteres scripserunt de eo, qui in aciem perduxisset.

196. Therefore if anyone uses a thing which has been deposited with him, he commits theft; and if anyone has received a thing for use and has transferred it into another’s use, he is liable for theft, as for example if someone received silver to be used, as though about to invite friends to a dinner, and carried it abroad with him, or if someone led away a horse lent for the sake of riding any distance — which the ancients wrote concerning one who had led it into the battle‑line.

197. Placuit tamen eos, qui rebus commodatis aliter uterentur quam utendas accepissent, ita furtum committere, si intellegant id se inuito domino facere eumque, si intellexisset, non permissurum; at si permissurum credant, extra furti crimen uideri, optima sane distinctione, quod furtum sine dolo malo non committitur.

197. It was nevertheless decided that those who use things entrusted to them otherwise than as they had received them for use, do commit theft if they understand that they are doing so against the owner’s will and that he, had he understood, would not have permitted it; but if they believe that he would have permitted it, they are seen to be outside the crime of theft, a very fine distinction indeed, since theft is not committed without malicious intent (dolo malo).

198. Sed et si credat aliquis inuito domino se rem contrectare, domino autem uolente id fiat, dicitur furtum non fieri. unde illud quaesitum [et probatum] est: cum Titius seruum meum sollicitauerit, ut quasdam res mihi subriperet et ad eum perferret, et seruus id ad me pertulerit, ego, dum uolo Titium in ipso delicto deprehendere, permiserim seruo quasdam res ad eum perferre, utrum furti an serui corrupti iudicio teneatur Titius mihi, an neutro? responsum neutro eum teneri, furti ideo, quod non inuito me res contrectarit, serui corrupti ideo, quod deterior seruus factus non sit.

198. But even if someone believes that he is handling a thing against the will of the master, yet it happens with the master’s willing, it is said that theft does not take place. Whence that question [et probatum] arose: when Titius had urged my slave to pilfer certain things from me and carry them to him, and the slave had brought them to me, I, wishing to seize Titius in the very crime, allowed the slave to carry certain things to him — is Titius to be held in judgment for theft or for corrupting a slave, or for neither? The answer: he is held for both; for theft, because he handled the things without my consent, and for corrupting the slave, because the slave was made worse.

199. Interdum autem etiam liberorum hominum furtum fit, uelut si quis liberorum nostrorum, qui in potestate nostra sint, siue etiam uxor, quae in manu nostra sit, siue etiam iudicatus uel auctoratus meus subreptus fuerit.

199. Sometimes also theft of free persons occurs, for example if one of our free persons, who are in our power, or even a wife who is in our hand, or even one adjudged or pledged to me has been carried off.

200. Aliquando etiam suae rei quisque furtum committit, ueluti si debitor rem, quam creditori pignori dedit, subtraxerit, uel si bonae fidei possessori rem meam possidenti subripuerim. unde placuit eum, qui seruum suum, quem alius bona fide possidebat, ad se reuersum celauerit, furtum committere.

200. Sometimes also every man commits theft of his own thing, as for example if a debtor has withdrawn the thing which he gave to a creditor as pledge, or if I have stealthily taken away my thing from a possessor in good faith who was holding it. Whence it was held that he who has concealed his slave, whom another was possessing in good faith, as having brought him back to himself, commits theft.

201. Rursus ex diuerso interdum alienas res occupare et usucapere concessum est nec creditur furtum fieri, uelut res hereditarias, quarum heres non est nactus possessionem, nisi necessarius heres extet; nam necessario herede extante placuit nihil pro herede usucapi posse. item debitor rem, quam fiduciae causa creditori mancipauerit aut in iure cesserit, secundum ea, quae in superiore commentario rettulimus, sine furto possidere et usucapere potest.

201. Again, from a different ground it has sometimes been permitted to seize and usucapt (acquire by long possession) another’s things, and it is not held that theft has been committed, as in the case of hereditary things of which the heir has not obtained possession, unless a necessary heir exists; for with a necessary heir present it was decided that nothing can be usucapted in place of the heir. Likewise a debtor can, without theft, possess and usucapt a thing which he has transferred to the creditor for the sake of fiducia or has yielded in law, according to those matters which we related in the foregoing commentary.

202. Interdum furti tenetur, qui ipse furtum non fecerit, qualis est, cuius ope consilio furtum factum est. in quo numero est, qui nummos tibi excussit, ut eos alius surriperet, uel opstitit tibi, ut alius surriperet, aut oues aut boues tuas fugauit, ut alius eas exciperet. et hoc ueteres scripserunt de eo, qui panno rubro fugauit armentum; sed si quid per lasciuiam et non data opera, ut furtum committeretur, factum sit, uidebimus, an utilis actio dari debeat, cum per legem Aquiliam, quae de damno lata est, etiam culpa puniatur.

202. Sometimes one is held for theft who has not himself committed the theft, as is he by whose aid or counsel the theft was made. In this number is he who caused your coins to fall out so that another might snatch them, or who obstructed you so that another might steal, or who drove off your sheep or oxen so that another might receive them. And the ancients wrote this also of him who drove off the herd with a red cloth; but if anything has been done out of wantonness and without given aid, so that theft was committed, we will consider whether a useful action ought to be granted, since by the Lex Aquilia, which was enacted concerning damage, even fault is punished.

203. Furti autem actio ei conpetit, cuius interest rem saluam esse, licet dominus non sit. itaque nec domino aliter conpetit, quam si eius intersit rem non perire.

203. An action for theft, however, belongs to him in whose interest the thing’s preservation is, even though he is not the owner. And therefore it does not belong to the owner otherwise than if it is to his interest that the thing not perish.

204. Unde constat creditorem de pignore subrepto furti agere posse; adeo quidem, ut quamuis ipse dominus [id est ipse debitor] eam rem subripuerit, nihilo minus creditori conpetat actio furti.

204. Whence it is established that the creditor can bring an action of theft concerning a pledge taken away; so indeed, that although the owner himself [that is, the debtor himself] may have filched that thing, nevertheless the action of theft is no less available to the creditor.

205. Item si fullo polienda curandaue aut sarcinator sarcienda uestimenta mercede certa acceperit eaque furto amiserit, ipse furti habet actionem, non dominus, quia domini nihil interest ea non periisse, cum iudicio locati a fullone aut sarcinatore suum consequi possit, si modo is fullo aut sarcinator rei praestandae sufficiat; nam si soluendo non est, tunc quia ab eo dominus suum consequi non potest, ipsi furti actio conpetit, quia hoc casu ipsius interest rem saluam esse.

205. Likewise, if a fullo (fuller) who has received garments to be washed or cared for, or a sarcinator (packer) who has received garments to be mended, for a fixed hire, loses them by theft, the fullo himself has the action for theft, not the owner, because it is of no concern to the owner that they not have perished, since by the judgment against the hirer (iudicio locati) he can recover his own from the fullo or sarcinator, provided that that fullo or sarcinator is sufficient to answer for the thing to be delivered; for if he is not able to pay, then, because the owner cannot recover his from him, the action for theft belongs to the fullo himself, because in this case it is his interest that the thing be safe.

206. Quae de fullone aut sarcinatore diximus, eadem transferemus et ad eum, cui rem commodauimus. nam ut illi mercedem capiendo custodiam praestant, ita hic quoque utendi commodum percipiendo similiter necesse habet custodiam praestare.

206. The same things which we said concerning the fuller or the packer we shall transfer also to him to whom we have lent the thing. For just as those men, in taking payment, render custody, so this one too, in receiving the benefit of use, likewise must render custody.

207. Sed is, apud quem res deposita est, custodiam non praestat tantumque in eo obnoxius est, si quid ipse dolo malo fecerit; qua de causa si res ei subrepta fuerit, quia restituendae eius nomine depositi non tenetur nec ob id eius interest rem saluam esse, furti [itaque] agere non potest, sed ea actio domino conpetit.

207. But he, with whom the thing has been deposited, does not furnish custody, and is only liable in respect of it if he himself has done anything by malicious deceit; for which cause, if the thing has been snatched away from him, because he is not held as depositor in the name of restoring it nor for that reason is it to his interest that the thing be safe, he therefore cannot bring an action for theft, but that action belongs to the owner.

208. In summa sciendum est quaesitum esse, an impubes rem alienam amouendo furtum faciat. plerisque placet, quia furtum ex adfectu consistit, ita demum obligari eo crimine impuberem, si proximus pubertati sit et ob id intellegat se delinquere.

208. In sum it must be known that the question has been asked whether an impubes (a person not yet of puberty) by taking away another’s thing commits theft. The majority approve, because theft consists in the adfectus (intent), and thus the minor is held by that crime only if he is near to puberty and on that account understands that he is doing wrong.

209. Qui res alienas rapit, tenetur etiam furti. quis enim magis alienam rem inuito domino contrectat quam qui ui rapit? itaque recte dictum est eum improbum furem esse; sed propriam actionem eius delicti nomine praetor introduxit, quae appellatur ui bonorum raptorum, et est intra annum quadrupli [actio], post annum simpli.

209. He who seizes another's things is also liable for theft. For who more handles an alien thing against the owner's will than he who by force seizes it? Therefore it has been rightly said that he is an unprincipled thief; but the praetor introduced a special action under the name of this delict, which is called vi bonorum raptorum, and is, within a year, a quadruple [actio], after a year a single.

quae actio utilis est, etsi quis unam rem licet minimam rapuerit.

Which actio utilis is available, even if someone has carried off a single thing, however small.

210. Damni iniuriae actio constituitur per legem Aquiliam, cuius primo capite cautum est, ut si quis hominem alienum alienamue quadrupedem, quae pecudum numero sit, iniuria occiderit, quanti ea res in eo anno plurimi fuerit, tantum domino dare damnetur.

210. An action for damage and injury is established by the Lex Aquilia, of which in the first chapter it is provided that if any one wrongfully kill another’s man or another’s four‑footed beast, which is among the number of cattle, he shall be condemned to pay to the owner as much as that thing was worth at its highest in that year.

211. Iniuria autem occidere intellegitur, cuius dolo aut culpa id acciderit, nec ulla alia lege damnum, quod sine iniuria datur, reprehenditur; itaque inpunitus est, qui sine culpa et dolo malo casu quodam damnum committit.

211. Wrongful killing, however, is understood to be that which happens by dolo (deceit/malice) or culpa (fault), and no other law reproves the damage which is given without injury; therefore he is unpunished who, without fault and without malicious intent, by some chance causes damage.

212. Nec solum corpus in actione huius legis aestimatur; sed sane si seruo occiso plus dominus capiat damni, quam pretium serui sit, id quoque aestimatur, uelut si seruus meus ab aliquo heres institutus, antequam iussu meo hereditatem cerneret, occisus fuerit; non enim tantum ipsius pretium aestimatur, sed et hereditatis amissae quantitas. item si ex gemellis uel ex comoedis uel ex symphoniacis unus occisus fuerit, non solum occisi fit aestimatio, sed eo amplius id quoque conputatur, quod ceteri, qui supersunt, depretiati sunt. idem iuris est etiam, si ex pari mularum unam uel etiam ex quadrigis equorum unum occiderit.

212. Not only is the body valued in the action of this law; but assuredly if from the killing of a slave the master suffers more loss than the price of the slave, that also is assessed, as when my slave has been appointed heir by someone and is slain before, by my command, he could take the inheritance; for not only is the price of the slave valued, but also the amount of the lost inheritance. Likewise, if of twins, or of comedians, or of symphoniacs one is killed, not only is there an appraisal for the one killed, but moreover that also is reckoned which the others, who survive, have been depreciated. The same rule of law holds also if of an even pair of mules one is killed, or even if of a team of four horses one is killed.

213. Cuius autem seruus occisus est, is liberum arbitrium habet uel capitali crimine reum facere eum, qui occiderit, uel hac lege damnum persequi.

213. The master whose slave has been killed has a free choice, either to make the man who killed him liable for a capital crime, or to pursue damages by this law.

214. Quod autem adiectum est in hac lege 'quanti in eo anno plurimi ea res fuerit', illud efficit, si clodum puta aut luscum seruum occiderit, qui in eo anno integer fuerit, ut non quanti clodus aut luscus, sed quanti integer fuerit, aestimatio fiat; quo fit, ut quis plus interdum consequatur, quam ei damnum datum est.

214. As for what is added in this law, "for how much in that year the thing was greatest," it operates thus: if, for example, he kills a maimed or one‑eyed slave who in that year would have been sound, the valuation is made not according to how much the maimed or one‑eyed was worth, but according to how much he would have been worth when sound; and so it happens that a man sometimes recovers more than the loss that was inflicted on him.

215. Capite secundo aduersus adstipulatorem, qui pecuniam in fraudem stipulatoris acceptam fecerit, quanti ea res est, tanti actio constituitur.

215. In the second head, against an adstipulator who has caused money to be received in fraud of the stipulator, an action is instituted for as much as that thing is worth.

216. Qua et ipsa parte legis damni nomine actionem introduci manifestum est; sed id caueri non fuit necessarium, cum actio mandati ad eam rem sufficeret; nisi quod ea lege aduersus infitiantem in duplum agitur.

216. From which it is manifest that by that very part of the law an action under the name of damnum is introduced; but it was not necessary to provide for that, since the action of mandate would suffice for the matter; except that under that law proceedings are carried out in double against one who denies (infitiantem).

217. Capite tertio de omni cetero damno cauetur. itaque si quis seruum uel eam quadrupedem, quae pecudum numero est, uulnerauerit siue eam quadrupedem, quae pecudum numero non est, uelut canem, aut feram bestiam, uelut ursum, leonem, uulnerauerit uel occiderit, hoc capite actio constituitur. in ceteris quoque animalibus, item in omnibus rebus, quae anima carent, damnum iniuria datum hac parte uindicatur.

217. In the third head provision is made about every other damage. Therefore if anyone wounds or kills a slave, or that quadruped which is counted among cattle, or that quadruped which is not counted among cattle, as for example a dog, or a wild beast, as a bear or lion, this head gives rise to an action. In other animals likewise, and likewise in all things which lack a soul, damage unlawfully done is vindicated in this part.

si quid enim ustum aut ruptum aut fractum fuerit, actio hoc capite constituitur, quamquam potuerit sola rupti appellatio in omnes istas causas sufficere; ruptum enim intellegitur, quod quoquo modo corruptum est; unde non solum usta aut rupta aut fracta, sed etiam scissa et collisa et effusa et quoquo modo uitiata aut perempta atque deteriora facta hoc uerbo continentur.

for if anything has been burnt or ruptured or fractured, an action is established by this chapter, although the single appellation "ruptum" could have sufficed for all those causes; for "ruptum" is understood to mean that which is corrupted in any manner; whence not only burnt or ruptured or fractured, but also torn and crushed and poured out and in any manner vitiated or destroyed and made worse are contained under this word.

218. Hoc tamen capite non quanti in eo anno, sed quanti in diebus XXX proxumis ea res fuerit, damnatur is, qui damnum dederit. ac ne 'plurimi' quidem uerbum adicitur; et ideo quidam putauerunt liberum esse iudici ad id tempus ex diebus XXX aestimationem redigere, quo plurimi res fuit, uel ad id, quo minoris fuit. sed Sabino placuit proinde habendum ac si etiam hac parte 'plurimi' uerbum adiectum esset; nam legis latorem contentum fuisse, quod prima parte eo uerbo usus esset.

218. Yet under this head he is condemned not for how much in that year, but for how much in the preceding 30 days the thing was, he who caused the damage. And not even the word 'plurimi' is added; and therefore some thought it lawful for the judge to reduce the valuation to that time out of the 30 days when it was greatest, or to that when it was least. But Sabinus thought it should therefore be held as if the word 'plurimi' had been added in this part as well; for the drafter of the law was content that he had used that word in the first part.

219. Ceterum etiam placuit ita demum ex ista lege actionem esse, si quis corpore suo damnum dederit, ideoque alio modo damno dato utiles actiones dantur, uelut si quis alienum hominem aut pecudem incluserit et fame necauerit, aut iumentum tam uehementer egerit, ut rumperetur; item si quis alieno seruo persuaserit, ut in arborem ascenderet uel in puteum descenderet, et is ascendendo aut descendendo ceciderit et aut mortuus fuerit aut aliqua parte corporis laesus sit. item contra si quis alienum seruum de ponte aut ripa in flumen proiecerit et is suffocatus fuerit, hic quoque corpore suo damnum dedisse eo, quod proiecerit, non difficiliter intellegi potest.

219. Moreover it was also held that from that law an action lies only when any one has inflicted damage upon the body, and therefore for damage given in another manner useful actions are granted, as for example if any one shut up another man or another's beast and killed him by famine, or drove a beast so violently that it broke; likewise if any one persuaded another's slave to climb a tree or to descend into a well, and that slave in climbing or descending fell and either died or was injured in some part of his body. Likewise, on the other hand, if any one threw another's slave from a bridge or bank into a river and he was drowned, it can also not be hard to understand that he has given damage to the body, by the act of throwing him.

220. Iniuria autem committitur non solum, cum quis pugno puta aut fuste percussus uel etiam uerberatus erit, sed etiam si cui conuicium factum fuerit, siue quis bona alicuius quasi debitoris sciens eum nihil sibi debere proscripserit siue quis ad infamiam alicuius libellum aut carmen scripserit siue quis matrem familias aut praetextatum adsectatus fuerit et denique aliis pluribus modis.

220. But an iniuria is committed not only when someone, for example, is struck with a fist or with a club or even flogged, but also if an affront (convicium) has been offered to someone, or if someone, knowing that another’s goods are not owed to him as to a debtor, publicly proclaims them as if they were, or if someone has written a libel or poem to the infamy of another, or if someone has pursued a matron of the household or a youth in the praetexta, and finally in many other ways.

221. Pati autem iniuriam uidemur non solum per nosmet ipsos, sed etiam per liberos nostros, quos in potestate habemus, item per uxores nostras, quamuis in manu nostra non sint; itaque si ueluti filiae meae, quae Titio nupta est, iniuriam feceris, non solum filiae nomine tecum agi iniuriarum potest, uerum etiam meo quoque et Titii nomine.

221. We are deemed to suffer injury not only through ourselves, but also through our children, whom we hold in our power, likewise through our wives, although they are not in our manus; and so if, for example, you do injury to my daughter, who is married to Titius, not only can an action for injuries be brought against you in the name of the daughter, but also in my name and in the name of Titius.

222. Seruo autem ipsi quidem nulla iniuria intellegitur fieri, sed domino per eum fieri uidetur; non tamen iisdem modis, quibus etiam per liberos nostros uel uxores iniuriam pati uidemur, sed ita, cum quid atrocius commissum fuerit, quod aperte in contumeliam domini fieri uidetur, ueluti si quis alienum seruum uerberauerit, et in hunc casum formula proponitur; at si quis seruo conuicium fecerit uel pugno eum percusserit, non proponitur ulla formula nec temere petenti datur.

222. As for a slave, indeed no injury is understood to be done to him himself, but it is regarded as done to the master through him; not, however, in the same modes in which we are seen to suffer injury through our children or our wives, but thus: when something more atrocious has been committed, which plainly seems to be done to the contumely of the master, as if someone had beaten another's slave, and in this case a formula is proposed; but if someone has insulted a slave or struck him with a fist, no formula is proposed nor is anything granted to one who seeks rashly.

223. Poena autem iniuriarum ex lege XII tabularum propter membrum quidem ruptum talio erat; propter os uero fractum aut conlisum trecentorum assium poena erat, si libero os fractum erat; at si seruo, CL; propter ceteras uero iniurias XXV assium poena erat constituta. et uidebantur illis temporibus in magna paupertate satis idoneae istae pecuniae poenae esse.

223. The punishment for injuries by the law of the Twelve Tables was, for a broken limb, talion; for a broken or bruised mouth the penalty was 300 asses if the mouth belonged to a free man, but if to a slave, 150; for other injuries a penalty of 25 asses was established. And in those times, in great poverty, those sums of money were thought sufficiently adequate as penalties.

224. Sed nunc alio iure utimur. permittitur enim nobis a praetore ipsis iniuriam aestimare, et iudex uel tanti condemnat, quanti nos aestimauerimus, uel minoris, prout illi uisum fuerit; sed cum atrocem iniuriam praetor aestimare soleat, si simul constituerit, quantae pecuniae eo nomine fieri debeat uadimonium, hac ipsa quantitate taxamus formulam, et iudex, qui possit uel minoris damnare, plerumque tamen propter ipsius praetoris auctoritatem non audet minuere condemnationem.

224. But now we make use of another law. For it is permitted to us by the praetor to value the injury itself, and the judge either condemns for as much as we have valued, or for less, as may seem to him; but since the praetor is wont to estimate an atrocious injury, if at the same time he has determined how much money ought to be paid on that account as a vadimonium (security), with that very amount we tax the formula, and the judge, who is able to condemn for less, nevertheless commonly does not dare to lessen the condemnation because of the authority of that praetor.

225. Atrox autem iniuria aestimatur uel ex facto, uelut si quis ab aliquo uulneratus aut uerberatus fustibusue caesus fuerit; uel ex loco, uelut si cui in theatro aut in foro iniuria facta sit; uel ex persona, uelut si magistratus iniuriam passus fuerit, uel senatori ab humili persona facta sit iniuria.

225. An atrocious injury, however, is reckoned either from the act, as when anyone has been wounded by someone or flogged or struck with clubs; or from the place, as when an injury has been done to someone in the theatre or in the forum; or from the person, as when a magistrate has suffered an injury, or an injury has been done to a senator by a humble person.