Cicero: PHILOSOPHIA

[1] . . . . quia pertinet ad mores, quodethos illi vocant, nos eam partem philosophiae de moribus appellare solemus, sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare moralem; explicandaque vis est ratioque enuntiationum, quae Graeci axiomata vocant; quae de re futura cum aliquid dicunt deque eo, quod possit fieri aut non possit, quam vim habeant, obscura quaestio est, quam Peri Dynaton philosophi appellant, totaque est Logike, quam rationem disserendi voco. Quod autem in aliis libris feci, qui sunt de natura deorum, itemque in iis, quos de divinatione edidi, ut in utramque partem perpetua explicaretur oratio, quo facilius id a quoque probaretur, quod cuique maxime probabile videretur, id in hac disputatione de fato casus quidam ne facerem inpedivit.

[1] . . . . because it pertains to morals, which they callethos, we are accustomed to call that part of philosophy “concerning morals,” but it befits one augmenting the Latin tongue to name it “moral”; and the force and the rationale of enunciations must be explained, which the Greeks call axiomata; about which, when they say something concerning a future matter and about that which can or cannot come to be, what force they have is an obscure question, which the philosophers call Peri Dynaton, and it is wholly Logike, which I call the method of reasoning. But what I did in other books, which are On the Nature of the Gods, and likewise in those which I published On Divination, namely that in both directions a continuous discourse should be set forth, so that the more easily that might be approved by each which seemed most probable to each, a certain chance prevented me from doing in this disputation On Fate.

[2] Nam cum essem in Puteolano Hirtiusque noster, consul designatus, isdem in locis, vir nobis amicissimus et his studiis, in quibus nos a pueritia viximus, deditus, multum una eramus, maxime nos quidem exquirentes ea consilia, quae ad pacem et ad concordiam civium pertinerent. Cum enim omnes post interitum Caesaris novarum perturbationum causae quaeri viderentur iisque esse occurrendum putaremus, omnis fere nostra in his deliberationibus consumebatur oratio, idque et saepe alias et quodam liberiore, quam solebat, et magis vacuo ab interventoribus die, cum ad me ille venisset, primo ea, quae erant cotidiana et quasi legitima nobis, de pace et de otio.

[2] For when I was in the Puteolan district, and our Hirtius, consul-designate, in the same places—a man most friendly to us and devoted to these studies in which we have lived since boyhood—we were much together, we in particular searching out those counsels which pertained to peace and to the concord of the citizens. For since, after the death of Caesar, causes of new perturbations seemed to be being sought by all, and we thought they had to be met, almost all our discourse was consumed in these deliberations; and both often at other times, and on a certain day freer than usual and more cleared of interrupters, when he had come to me, first we treated those matters which were daily and, as it were, by rule for us—about peace and about repose.

[3] Quibus actis, Quid ergo? inquit ille, quoniam oratorias exercitationes non tu quidem, ut spero, reliquisti, sed certe philosophiam illis anteposuisti, possumne aliquid audire? Tu vero, inquam, vel audire vel dicere; nec enim, id quod recte existimas, oratoria illa studia deserui, quibus etiam te incendi, quamquam flagrantissumum acceperam, nec ea, quae nunc tracto, minuunt, sed augent potius illam facultatem.

[3] With these things done, What then? said he, since oratorical exercises you indeed, as I hope, have not abandoned, but certainly have preferred philosophy to them, may I hear something? Indeed, said I, either to listen or to speak; for I have not, as you rightly suppose, deserted those oratorical studies, by which I even inflamed you, although I had found you already most ardent, nor do the things which I am now handling diminish, but rather augment that faculty.

Nam cum hoc genere philosophiae, quod nos sequimur, magnam habet orator societatem; subtilitatem enim ab Academia mutuatur et ei vicissim reddit ubertatem orationis et ornamenta dicendi. Quam ob rem, inquam, quoniam utriusque studii nostra possessio est, hodie, utro frui malis, optio sit tua. Tum Hirtius: Gratissumum, inquit, et tuorum omnium simile; nihil enim umquam abnuit meo studio voluntas tua.

For the orator has a great society with this kind of philosophy which we follow; for he borrows subtlety from the Academy and in turn renders back to it the abundance of speech and the ornaments of diction. Wherefore, I said, since the possession of both studies is ours, today—whichever of the two you would prefer to enjoy—let the option be yours. Then Hirtius: Most welcome, said he, and similar to all that is yours; for your will has never at any time refused my zeal.

[4] Sed quoniam rhetorica mihi vestra sunt nota teque in eis et audivimus saepe et audiemus atque hanc Academicorum contra propositum disputandi consuetudinem indicant te suscepisse Tusculanae disputationes, ponere aliquid, ad quod audiam, si tibi non est molestum, volo. An mihi, inquam, potest quicquam esse molestum, quod tibi gratum futurum sit? Sed ita audies, ut Romanum hominem, ut timide ingredientem ad hoc genus disputandi, ut longo intervallo haec studia repetentem.

[4] But since your rhetorics are known to me, and we have often heard you in them and shall hear you, and the Tusculan Disputations indicate that you have undertaken this custom of the Academics of disputing against the proposition, I wish you to set forth something, to which I may listen, if it is not troublesome to you. Can anything, said I, be troublesome to me that will be pleasing to you? But you will hear me as a Roman man, as one timidly entering upon this kind of disputation, as one resuming these studies after a long interval.

Ita, inquit, audiam te disputantem, ut ea lego, quae scripsisti. Proinde ordire. Considamus hic.

“Thus,” he said, “I will listen to you disputing, as I read the things which you have written. Therefore, commence. Let us sit down here.”

[5] . . . quorum in aliis, ut in Antipatro poeta, ut in brumali die natis, ut in simul aegrotantibus fratribus, ut in urina, ut in unguibus, ut in reliquis eius modi, naturae contagio valet, quam ego non tollo--vis est nulla fatalis; in aliis autem fortuita quaedam esse possunt, ut in illo naufrago, ut in Icadio, ut in Daphita. Quaedam etiam Posidonius (pace magistri dixerim) comminisci videtur; sunt quidem absurda. Quid enim?

[5] . . . of which, in some cases—as in Antipater the poet, as in those born on the brumal day, as in brothers ailing simultaneously, as in urine, as in nails, as in the rest of that sort—the contagion of nature prevails, which I do not remove—there is no fatal force; but in others certain things can be fortuitous, as in that shipwrecked man, as in Icadius, as in Daphitas. Posidonius also (with the master’s pardon I would say) seems to be contriving some things; they are indeed absurd. Why, indeed?

si Daphitae fatum fuit ex equo cadere atque ita perire, ex hocne equo, qui cum equus non esset, nomen habebat alienum? aut Philippus hasne in capulo quadrigulas vitare monebatur? quasi vero capulo sit occisus.

if it was Daphitas’s fate to fall from a horse and thus perish, was it from this “horse” which, although it was not a horse, bore an alien (borrowed) name? or was Philip being warned to avoid these little four-horse teams on the hilt? as though, forsooth, he were killed by the hilt.

Quid autem magnum aut naufragum illum sine nomine in rivo esse lapsum--quamquam huic quidem hic scribit praedictum in aqua esse pereundum); ne hercule Icadii quidem praedonis video fatum ullum; nihil enim scribit ei praedictum:

But what, moreover, is remarkable, that that nameless shipwrecked man slipped into a brook—although indeed this one here writes that it was foretold to him that he was to perish in water); nor, by Hercules, do I see any fate at all for the robber Icadius; for he writes nothing as having been foretold to him:

[6] quid mirum igitur ex spelunca saxum in crura eius incidisse? puto enim, etiamsi Icadius tum in spelunca non fuisset, saxum tamen illud casurum fuisse. Nam aut nihil omnino est fortuitum, aut hoc ipsum potuit evenire fortuna.

[6] what wonder, then, that a rock from the cave fell upon his legs? For I think that, even if Icadius had not been in the cave at that time, that rock nevertheless would have fallen. For either nothing at all is fortuitous, or this very thing could have happened by Fortune.

Quaero igitur (atque hoc late patebit), si fati omnino nullum nomen, nulla natura, nulla vis esset et forte temere casu aut pleraque fierent aut omnia, num aliter, ac nunc eveniunt, evenirent. Quid ergo adtinet inculcare fatum, cum sine fato ratio omnium rerum ad naturam fortunamve referatur?

I therefore ask (and this will be broadly apparent), if fate had absolutely no name, no nature, no force, and if by chance, at random, by accident either most things or all things were to happen, would they happen otherwise than as they now happen. What, then, is the point of inculcating fate, since without fate the rational account of all things is referred to nature or to fortune?

[7] Sed Posidonium, sicut aequum est, cum bona gratia dimittamus, ad Chrysippi laqueos revertamur. Cui quidem primum de ipsa contagione rerum respondeamus, reliqua postea persequemur. Inter locorum naturas quantum intersit, videmus; alios esse salubris, alios pestilentis, in aliis esse pituitosos et quasi redundantis, in aliis exsiccatos atque aridos; multaque sunt alia, quae inter locum et locum plurimum differant.

[7] But let us, as is equitable, dismiss Posidonius with good grace, and return to the snares of Chrysippus. To him indeed let us first make our reply concerning the very contagion of things; afterward we shall pursue the remaining points. We see how much difference there is among the natures of places: some are healthful, others pestilential; in some there are men phlegmatic and, as it were, overfull, in others dried out and arid; and there are many other things which differ very greatly from place to place.

Athenis tenue caelum, ex quo etiam acutiores putantur Attici, crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani et valentes. Tamen neque illud tenue caelum efficiet, ut aut Zenonem quis aut Arcesilam aut Theophrastum audiat, neque crassum, ut Nemea potius quam Isthmo victoriam petat. Diiunge longius.

At Athens the air is thin, whence even the Attic folk are thought more acute; at Thebes it is thick, and so the Thebans are stout and robust. Yet neither will that thin air effect that someone should listen to Zeno or Arcesilaus or Theophrastus, nor the thick air, that he should seek victory at Nemea rather than at the Isthmus. Disjoin more widely.

[8] Quid enim loci natura adferre potest, ut in porticu Pompeii potius quam in campo ambulemus? tecum quam cum alio? Idibus potius quam Kalendis?

[8] What, indeed, can the nature of the place contribute, that we should walk in Pompey’s portico rather than in the field? with you rather than with another? on the Ides rather than on the Kalends?

Ut igitur ad quasdam res natura loci pertinet aliquid, ad quasdam autem nihil, sic astrorum adfectio valeat, si vis, ad quasdam res, ad omnis certe non valebit. At enim, quoniam in naturis hominum dissimilitudines sunt, ut alios dulcia, alios subamara delectent, alii libidinosi, alii iracundi aut crudeles aut superbi sint, alii a talibus vitiis abhorreant,--quoniam igitur, inquit, tantum natura a natura distat, quid mirum est has dissimilitudines ex differentibus causis esse factas?

Therefore, just as for certain things the nature of the place pertains something, but for certain others nothing, so let the affection/influence of the stars, if you will, avail for certain things; certainly it will not avail for all. But indeed, since in the natures of human beings there are dissimilarities, so that some are delighted by sweet things, others by somewhat-bitter things, some are libidinous, others irascible or cruel or proud, others abhor such vices,--since, therefore, he says, nature differs so much from nature, what wonder is it that these dissimilarities have been made from different causes?

[9] Haec disserens, qua de re agatur, et in quo causa consistat, non videt. Non enim, si alii ad alia propensiores sunt propter causas naturalis et antecedentis, idcirco etiam nostrarum voluntatum atque adpetitionum sunt causae naturales et antecedentes. Nam nihil esset in nostra potestate, si ita se res haberet.

[9] While discussing these things, he does not see what is being dealt with and wherein the cause consists. For it does not follow that, if some are more inclined to some things rather than others on account of natural and antecedent causes, therefore there are also natural and antecedent causes of our volitions and appetitions. For nothing would be in our power, if the matter stood thus.

Nunc vero fatemur, acuti hebetesne, valentes inbecilline simus, non esse id in nobis. Qui autem ex eo cogi putat, ne ut sedeamus quidem aut ambulemus voluntatis esse, is non videt, quae quamque rem res consequatur. Ut enim et ingeniosi et tardi ita nascantur antecedentibus causis itemque valentes et inbecilli, non sequitur tamen, ut etiam sedere eos et ambulare et rem agere aliquam principalibus causis definitum et constitutum sit.

Now indeed we confess that whether we are acute or dull, strong or weak, that is not within us. But whoever thinks from this that not even our sitting or walking is a matter of will does not see what things follow upon each thing. For although both the ingenious and the slow are born thus from antecedent causes, and likewise the strong and the weak, it does not follow, however, that even their sitting and walking and doing some action is defined and constituted by principal causes.

[10] Stilponem, Megaricum philosophum, acutum sane hominem et probatum temporibus illis accepimus. Hunc scribunt ipsius familiares et ebriosum et mulierosum fuisse, neque haec scribunt vituperantes, sed potius ad laudem; vitiosam enim naturam ab eo sic edomitam et conpressam esse doctrina, ut nemo umquam vinulentum illum, nemo in eo libidinis vestigium viderit. Quid?

[10] We have learned that Stilpo, a Megarian philosopher, was a truly acute man and approved in those times. His own intimates write that he was both a drunkard and a womanizer, and they do not write these things in blame, but rather for praise; for his vicious nature was so tamed and compressed by doctrine that no one ever saw him vinolent, no one saw in him a trace of libido. What?

Socraten nonne legimus quem ad modum notarit Zopyrus physiognomon, qui se profitebatur hominum mores naturasque ex corpore, oculis, vultu, fronte pernoscere? stupidum esse Socraten dixit et bardum, quod iugula concava non haberet -obstructas eas partes et obturatas esse dicebat; addidit etiam mulierosum; in quo Alcibiades cachinnum dicitur sustulisse.

Do we not read in what manner Zopyrus the physiognomist marked Socrates, he who professed that he could thoroughly discern men’s manners and natures from the body, the eyes, the visage, the forehead? He said that Socrates was stupid and dull, because he did not have hollow jugular hollows—he said those parts were obstructed and stopped up; he added also “womanish,” that he was given to women; at which Alcibiades is said to have raised a guffaw.

[11] Sed haec ex naturalibus causis vitia nasci possunt, extirpari autem et funditus tolli, ut is ipse, qui ad ea propensus fuerit, a tantis vitiis avocetur, non est id positum in naturalibus causis, sed in voluntate, studio, disciplina. Quae tolluntur omnia, si vis et natura fati ex divinationis ratione firmabitur. Etenim si est divinatio, qualibusnam a perceptis artis proficiscitur?

[11] But these vices can be born from natural causes; yet to have them extirpated and taken away from the very foundations, so that the very man who had been prone to them is diverted from such great vices—that is not set in natural causes, but in will, study, discipline. All of these are removed, if the force and nature of fate shall be made firm from the rationale of divination. For if there is divination, from what sort of perceptions of the art does it proceed?

('percepta' appello, quae dicuntur Graece theoremata)? Non enim credo nullo percepto aut ceteros artifices versari in suo munere, aut eos, qui divinatione utantur, futura praedicere.

('I call them "percepts," which are called in Greek theoremata)? For I do not believe that, with no percept, either the other artificers engage in their own office, or that those who make use of divination predict the future.

[12] Sint igitur astrologorum percepta huius modi: 'Si quis (verbi causa) oriente Canicula natus est, is in mari non morietur.' Vigila, Chrysippe, ne tuam causam, in qua tibi cum Diodoro, valente dialectico, magna luctatio est, deseras. Si enim est verum, quod ita conectitur: 'Si quis oriente Canicula natus est, in mari non morietur', illud quoque verum est: 'Si Fabius oriente Canicula natus est, Fabius in mari non morietur.' Pugnant igitur haec inter se, Fabium oriente Canicula natum esse, et Fabium in mari moriturum; et quoniam certum in Fabio ponitur, natum esse eum Canicula oriente, haec quoque pugnant, et esse Fabium, et in mari esse moriturum. Ergo haec quoque coniunctio est ex repugnantibus: 'Et est Fabius, et in mari Fabius morietur', quod, ut propositum est, ne fieri quidem potest.

[12] Let there be, then, the astrologers’ percepts of this sort: 'If anyone (for the sake of example) is born with the Dog-star rising, he will not die at sea.' Keep watch, Chrysippus, lest you abandon your cause, in which you have a great wrestling-bout with Diodorus, a strong dialectician. For if this is true, which is connected thus: 'If anyone is born with the Dog-star rising, he will not die at sea,' that also is true: 'If Fabius is born with the Dog-star rising, Fabius will not die at sea.' Therefore these are in conflict with one another—that Fabius was born with the Dog-star rising, and that Fabius is going to die at sea; and since in the case of Fabius it is fixed as certain that he was born with the Dog-star rising, these also clash—both that Fabius exists, and that at sea he is going to die. Therefore this conjunction too is out of incompatibles: 'And Fabius exists, and at sea Fabius will die,' which, as has been set forth, cannot even come to be.

Ergo illud: 'Morietur in mari Fabius' ex eo genere est, quod fieri non potest. Omne ergo, quod falsum dicitur in futuro, id fieri non potest.

Therefore that: 'Fabius will die in the sea' is of the kind that cannot come to pass. Therefore everything that is said to be false about the future cannot come to pass.

[13] At hoc, Chrysippe, minime vis, maximeque tibi de hoc ipso cum Diodoro certamen est. Ille enim id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum aut futurum sit verum, et, quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri necesse esse et, quicquid non sit futurum, id negat fieri posse. Tu, et quae non sint futura, posse fieri dicis, ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiamsi id numquam futurum sit, neque necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quamquam id millensimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset.

[13] But this, Chrysippus, you do not want at all, and you have the greatest contest about this very point with Diodorus. For he says that only that can come to pass which either is true or will be true, and that whatever will be, must happen, and that whatever will not be, he denies can happen. You, however, say that even things which are not going to be can happen, as that this gem can be broken, even if that will never be, and that it was not necessary that Cypselus rule at Corinth, although that had been published by Apollo’s oracle a thousand years before.

At si ista conprobabis divina praedicta, et quae falsa in futuris dicentur, in eis habebis ut ea fieri non possint (ut si dicatur Africanum Karthagine non esse potiturum), et si vere dicatur de futuro, idque ita futurum sit, dicas esse necessarium est; quae est tota Diodori vobis inimica sententia.

But if you confirm those divine predictions, then as to those which will be said false in regard to future things, you will hold that they cannot come to pass (as, for instance, if it be said that Africanus is not going to get possession of Carthage); and if something is truly said about the future, and it is going to be so, you must say that it is necessary; which is an entire Diodorean sentence inimical to you.

[14] Etenim si illud vere conectitur: 'Si oriente Canicula natus es, in mari non moriere', primumque quod est in conexo, 'Natus es oriente Canicula', necessarium est (omnia enim vera in praeteritis necessaria sunt, ut Chrysippo placet dissentienti a magistro Cleanthe, quia sunt inmutabilia nec in falsum e vero praeterita possunt convertere)--si igitur, quod primum in conexo est, necessarium est, fit etiam, quod consequitur, necessarium. Quamquam hoc Chrysippo non videtur valere in omnibus; sed tamen, si naturalis est causa, cur in mari Fabius non moriatur, in mari Fabius mori non potest.

[14] For indeed, if that is truly connected: 'If you were born with the Dog-star (Canicula) rising, you will not die at sea,' and the first part that is in the connected conditional (conexum), 'You were born with the Dog-star rising,' is necessary (for all things that are true in the past are necessary, as it pleases Chrysippus, dissenting from his teacher Cleanthes, because they are immutable and past things cannot be converted from true into false)--if therefore what is first in the connected conditional is necessary, what follows also becomes necessary. Although this does not seem to Chrysippus to be valid in all cases; yet nevertheless, if there is a natural cause why Fabius should not die at sea, Fabius cannot die at sea.

[15] Hoc loco Chrysippus aestuans falli sperat Chaldaeos ceterosque divinos, neque eos usuros esse coniunctionibus, ut ita sua percepta pronuntient: 'Si quis natus est oriente Canicula, is in mari non morietur', sed potius ita dicant: 'Non et natus est quis oriente Canicula, et is in mari morietur.' O licentiam iocularem! ne ipse incidat in Diodorum, docet Chaldaeos, quo pacto eos exponere percepta oporteat. Quaero enim, si Chaldaei ita loquantur, ut negationes infinitarum coniunctionum potius quam infinita conexa ponant, cur idem medici, cur geometrae, cur reliqui facere non possint.

[15] At this point Chrysippus, in a heat, hopes that the Chaldeans and the other diviners be deceived, and that they will not use conditionals so as to pronounce their findings thus: 'If anyone was born with the Dog-star rising, he will not die at sea', but rather say this: 'It is not both that someone was born with the Dog-star rising, and that he will die at sea.' O jocular license! Lest he himself fall into Diodorus’s [view], he instructs the Chaldeans by what method they ought to set forth their precepts. For I ask: if the Chaldeans speak thus, so as to posit negations of indefinite conjunctions rather than indefinite conditionals, why cannot physicians do the same, why geometers, why the rest?

Medicus in primis, quod erit ei perspectum in arte, non ita proponet: 'Si cui venae sic moventur, is habet febrim', sed potius illo modo: 'Non et venae sic cui moventur, et is febrim non habet.' Itemque geometres non ita dicet: 'In sphaera maximi orbes medii inter se dividuntur', sed potius illo modo: 'Non et sunt in sphaera maximi orbes, et ei non medii inter se dividuntur.'

The physician, in the first place, as to what will have been ascertained for him in his art, will not put it thus: 'If someone’s veins are moved thus, he has a fever,' but rather in this manner: 'It is not both that someone’s veins are thus moved, and that he does not have a fever.' Likewise the geometrician will not say thus: 'In a sphere the greatest orbs are divided in halves by one another,' but rather in this manner: 'It is not both that there are greatest orbs in a sphere, and that these are not divided in halves by one another.'

[16] Quid est, quod non possit isto modo ex conexo transferri ad coniunctionum negationem? Et quidem aliis modis easdem res efferre possumus. Modo dixi: 'In sphaera maximi orbes medii inter se dividuntur'; possum dicere: 'Si in sphaera maximi orbes erunt', possum dicere: 'Quia in sphaera maximi orbes erunt'. Multa genera sunt enuntiandi nec ullum distortius quam hoc, quo Chrysippus sperat Chaldaeos contentos Stoicorum causa fore.

[16] What is there that cannot in this way be transferred from the conditional to the negation of conjunctions? And indeed we can express the same things in other modes. A moment ago I said: 'On a sphere the greatest circles are divided at their middles with respect to one another'; I can say: 'If on a sphere the greatest circles will be', I can say: 'Since on a sphere the greatest circles will be.' There are many kinds of enunciation, and none more distorted than this, by which Chrysippus hopes the Chaldaeans will be content for the sake of the Stoics.

Illorum tamen nemo ita loquitur; maius est enim has contortiones orationis quam signorum ortus obitusque perdiscere.

Yet none of those men speaks in this way; for it is a greater task to learn thoroughly these contortions of oration than the risings and settings of the signs.

[17] Sed ad illam Diodori contentionem, quam Peri Dynaton appellant revertamur, in qua quid valeat id quod fieri possit anquiritur. Placet igitur Diodoro id solum fieri posse, quod aut verum sit aut verum futurum sit. Qui locus attingit hanc quaestionem, nihil fieri, quod non necesse fuerit, et, quicquid fieri possit, id aut esse iam aut futurum esse, nec magis commutari ex veris in falsa posse ea, quae futura, quam ea, quae facta sunt; sed in factis inmutabilitatem apparere, in futuris quibusdam, quia non apparet, ne inesse quidem videri, ut in eo, qui mortifero morbo urgeatur, verum sit 'Hic morietur hoc morbo', at hoc idem si vere dicatur in eo, in quo vis morbi tanta non appareat, nihilo minus futurum sit.

[17] But let us return to that Diodorean contention, which they call Peri Dynaton, in which it is inquired what weight that has which can come to be. Therefore Diodorus maintains that only that can come to be which either is true or will be true. This position touches upon the question that nothing happens which would not have been necessary, and that whatever can happen either already is or will be, and that things which are going to be can no more be changed from truths into falsities than things which have been done; but in things done the immutability is apparent, whereas in certain future things, because it is not apparent, it even seems not to inhere—just as in the case of one who is pressed by a death-bringing disease, it is true, “This man will die of this disease,” yet if this same thing is truly said of one in whom the force of the disease does not appear so great, nonetheless it will be no less future.

Ita fit, ut commutatio ex vero in falsum ne in futuro quidem ulla fieri possit. Nam 'Morietur Scipio' talem vim habet, ut, quamquam de futuro dicitur, tamen ut id non possit convertere in falsum; de homine enim dicitur, cui necesse est mori.

Thus it comes about that a commutation from true into false cannot be made even in regard to the future. For 'Scipio will die' has such force that, although it is said about the future, nevertheless it cannot be converted into false; for it is said of a man for whom it is necessary to die.

[18] Sic si diceretur, 'Morietur noctu in cubiculo suo vi oppressus Scipio', vere diceretur; id enim fore diceretur, quod esset futurum; futurum autem fuisse ex eo, quia factum est, intellegi debet. Nec magis erat verum 'Morietur Scipio' quam 'Morietur illo modo', nec magis necesse mori Scipioni quam illo modo mori, nec magis inmutabile ex vero in falsum 'Necatus est Scipio' quam 'Necabitur Scipio'; nec, cum haec ita sint, est causa, cur Epicurus fatum extimescat et ab atomis petat praesidium easque de via deducat et uno tempore suscipiat res duas inenodabiles, unam, ut sine causa fiat aliquid--, ex quo existet, ut de nihilo quippiam fiat, quod nec ipsi nec cuiquam physico placet--alteram, ut, cum duo individua per inanitatem ferantur, alterum e regione moveatur, alterum declinet.

[18] Thus, if it were said, 'Scipio will die at night in his bedroom, overpowered by violence,' it would be said truly; for that would be said to be going to be which would be future; moreover, that it was going to be ought to be understood from this, because it has been done. No more was 'Scipio will die' true than 'He will die in that manner,' nor any more was it necessary for Scipio to die than to die in that manner, nor any more immutable from true into false is 'Scipio has been slain' than 'Scipio will be slain'; nor, since these things are so, is there a reason why Epicurus should dread fate and seek a safeguard from the atoms and lead them off their path and at one and the same time undertake two inextricable things, one, that something come to be without a cause--, whence it will follow that something comes to be from nothing, which pleases neither him nor any natural philosopher--the other, that, when two indivisibles are borne through the void, the one move in a straight line, the other decline (swerve).

[19] Licet enim Epicuro concedenti omne enuntiatum aut verum aut falsum esse non vereri, ne omnia fato fieri sit necesse; non enim aeternis causis naturae necessitate manantibus verum est id, quod ita enuntiatur: 'Descendit in Academiam Carneades', nec tamen sine causis, sed interest inter causas fortuito antegressas et inter causas cohibentis in se efficientiam naturalem. Ita et semper verum fuit 'Morietur Epicurus, cum duo et septuaginta annos vixerit, archonte Pytharato', neque tamen erant causae fatales, cur ita accideret, sed, quod ita cecidit, certe casurum sicut cecidit fuit.

[19] For it is permitted to Epicurus, while conceding that every enunciation is either true or false, not to dread that everything must happen by fate; for it is not by eternal causes flowing from the necessity of nature that what is thus enunciated is true: 'Carneades descends into the Academy,' and yet it is not without causes, but there is a difference between causes that have gone before by fortuity and causes that confine within themselves a natural efficiency. Thus too it was always true: 'Epicurus will die, when he has lived 72 years, Pytharatus being archon,' and yet there were not fatal causes why it should so befall, but, because it so fell out, it was certainly going to fall out as it fell out.

[20] Nec ei qui dicunt inmutabilia esse quae futura sint nec posse verum futurum convertere in falsum, fati necessitatem confirmant, sed verborum vim interpretantur. At qui introducunt causarum seriem sempiternam, ei mentem hominis voluntate libera spoliatam necessitate fati devinciunt. Sed haec hactenus; alia videamus.

[20] Nor do those who say that the things which are to be are immutable, and that a future truth cannot be converted into false, thereby confirm the necessity of fate; rather, they interpret the force of words. But those who introduce a sempiternal series of causes—these bind the mind of man, stripped of free will, by the necessity of fate. But so much for these things; let us see other matters.

Concludit enim Chrysippus hoc modo: 'Si est motus sine causa, non omnis enuntiatio (quod axioma dialectici appellant) aut vera aut falsa erit; causas enim efficientis quod non habebit, id nec verum nec falsum erit; omnis autem enuntiatio aut vera aut falsa est; motus ergo sine causa nullus est.

For Chrysippus concludes in this way: 'If there is motion without a cause, not every enunciation (what the dialecticians call an axiom) will be either true or false; for that which will not have an efficient cause will be neither true nor false; but every enunciation is either true or false; therefore, motion without a cause is none.'

[21] Quod si ita est, omnia, quae fiunt, causis fiunt antegressis; id si ita est, fato omnia fiunt; efficitur igitur fato fieri, quaecumque fiant.' Hic primum si mihi libeat adsentiri Epicuro et negare omnem enuntiationem aut veram esse aut falsam, eam plagam potius accipiam quam fato omnia fieri conprobem; illa enim sententia habet aliquid disputationis, haec vero non est tolerabilis. Itaque contendit omnis nervos Chrysippus, ut persuadeat omne axioma aut verum esse aut falsum. Ut enim Epicurus veretur, ne, si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri, quaecumque fiant, (si enim alterum utrum ex aeternitate verum sit, esse id etiam certum et, si certum, etiam necessarium; ita et necessitatem et fatum confirmari putat), sic Chrysippus metuit, ne, si non obtinuerit omne, quod enuntietur, aut verum esse aut falsum, non teneat omnia fato fieri et ex causis aeternis rerum futurarum.

[21] If this is so, all things that come to be come to be from antecedent causes; if that is so, all things come to be by fate; it is brought about, therefore, that whatever things come to be, come to be by fate.' Here, in the first place, if it should please me to assent to Epicurus and to deny that every enunciation is either true or false, I would rather accept that blow than prove that all things are done by fate; for that opinion has something of disputation, but this truly is not tolerable. And so Chrysippus strains every sinew to persuade that every axiom is either true or false. For just as Epicurus fears that, if he concedes this, it must be conceded that whatever things happen happen by fate (for if one or the other has been true from eternity, that is also certain, and, if certain, also necessary; thus he thinks both necessity and fate to be confirmed), so Chrysippus fears that, if he does not make good that everything which is enunciated is either true or false, he will not hold that all things happen by fate and from the eternal causes of things to come.

[22] Sed Epicurus declinatione atomi vitari necessitatem fati putat. Itaque tertius quidam motus oritur extra pondus et plagam, cum declinat atomus intervallo minimo (id appellat elachiston). Quam declinationem sine causa fieri si minus verbis, re cogitur confiteri. Non enim atomus ab atomo pulsa declinat.

[22] But Epicurus thinks that by the declination of the atom the necessity of fate is avoided. And so a certain third motion arises beyond weight and blow, when the atom declines by the least interval (he calls that the elachiston). That this declination occurs without a cause—if not in words, in reality—he is compelled to confess. For the atom does not decline as having been struck by another atom.

Nam qui potest pelli alia ab alia, si gravitate feruntur ad perpendiculum corpora individua rectis lineis, ut Epicuro placet? sequitur autem ut, si alia ab alia numquam depellatur, ne contingat quidem alia aliam; ex quo efficitur, etiamsi sit atomus eaque declinet, declinare sine causa.

For how can one be driven off from another, if the individual bodies are borne by gravity in straight lines toward the perpendicular, as pleases Epicurus? Moreover, it follows that, if one is never driven away from another, one does not even touch another; whence it is brought about that, even if there is an atom and it does decline, it declines without a cause.

[23] Hanc Epicurus rationem induxit ob eam rem, quod veritus est, ne, si semper atomus gravitate ferretur naturali ac necessaria, nihil liberum nobis esset, cum ita moveretur animus, ut atomorum motu cogeretur. Id Democritus, auctor atomorum, accipere maluit, necessitate omnia fieri, quam a corporibus individuis naturalis motus avellere. Acutius Carneades, qui docebat posse Epicureos suam causam sine hac commenticia declinatione defendere.

[23] Epicurus introduced this rationale for this reason: because he feared that, if always the atom were borne by gravity in a natural and necessary way, nothing would be free for us, since the mind would be moved in such a manner that it would be compelled by the motion of atoms. Democritus, the author of the atoms, preferred to accept that all things occur by necessity rather than to tear away the natural motion from the indivisible bodies. More sharply Carneades, who taught that the Epicureans could defend their cause without this commentitious declination.

Nam cum docerent esse posse quendam animi motum voluntarium, id fuit defendi melius quam introducere declinationem, cuius praesertim causam reperire non possent; quo defenso facile Chrysippo possent resistere. Cum enim concessissent motum nullum esse sine causa, non concederent omnia, quae fierent, fieri causis antecedentibus; voluntatis enim nostrae non esse causas externas et antecedentis.

For when they taught that there could be a certain voluntary motion of the mind, that was better to defend than to introduce a declination, especially since they could not find the cause of it; with this defended they could easily resist Chrysippus. For although they had conceded that no motion exists without a cause, they would not concede that all things which happen happen by antecedent causes; for our will does not have external and antecedent causes.

[24] Communi igitur consuetudine sermonis abutimur, cum ita dicimus, velle aliquid quempiam aut nolle sine causa; ita enim dicimus 'sine causa', ut dicamus: sine externa et antecedente causa, non sine aliqua; ut, cum vas inane dicimus, non ita loquimur, ut physici, quibus inane esse nihil placet, sed ita, ut verbi causa sine aqua, sine vino, sine oleo vas esse dicamus, sic, cum sine causa animum dicimus moveri, sine antecedente et externa causa moveri, non omnino sine causa dicimus. De ipsa atomo dici potest, cum per inane moveatur gravitate et pondere, sine causa moveri, quia nulla causa accedat extrinsecus.

[24] Therefore we abuse the common consuetude of speech when we thus say that someone wills something or does not will it “without cause”; for we say “without cause” as we would say: without an external and antecedent cause, not without some cause; just as, when we say an empty vessel, we do not speak as the physicists, to whom it is acceptable that there is no void, but thus, that, for example, the vessel is without water, without wine, without oil; so, when we say that the mind is moved without cause, we say it is moved without an antecedent and external cause, not altogether without cause. About the atom itself it can be said, when it moves through the void by gravity and by weight, that it moves without cause, because no cause is added from without.

[25] Rursus autem, ne omnes a physicis inrideamur si dicamus quicquam fieri sine causa, distinguendum est et ita dicendum, ipsius individui hanc esse naturam, ut pondere et gravitate moveatur, eamque ipsam esse causam, cur ita feratur. Similiter ad animorum motus voluntarios non est requirenda externa causa; motus enim voluntarius eam naturam in se ipse continet, ut sit in nostra potestate nobisque pareat, nec id sine causa; eius rei enim causa ipsa natura est.

[25] Again, however, lest we be laughed at by the physicists if we say that anything happens without a cause, a distinction must be made and thus stated: that this is the nature of the individual itself, that it is moved by weight and gravity, and that this very thing is the cause why it is borne thus. Similarly, for the voluntary motions of souls no external cause is to be required; for a voluntary motion contains in itself such a nature, namely, that it is in our power and obeys us, nor is that without a cause; for the cause of this thing is nature itself.

[26] Quod cum ita sit, quid est, cur non omnis pronuntiatio aut vera aut falsa sit, nisi concesserimus fato fieri, quaecumque fiant? Quia futura vera, inquit, non possunt esse ea, quae causas, cur futura sint, non habent; habeant igitur causas necesse est ea, quae vera sunt; ita, cum evenerint, fato evenerint. Confectum negotium, siquidem concedendum tibi est aut fato omnia fieri, aut quicquam fieri posse sine causa.

[26] Since this is so, what reason is there why every pronouncement should not be either true or false, unless we have conceded that whatever things happen, happen by fate? Because, he says, future truths cannot be those which do not have causes why they will be future; therefore those things which are true must have causes; thus, when they have occurred, they have occurred by fate. The business is concluded, since indeed you must concede either that all things are done by fate, or that anything can come to be without a cause.

[27] An aliter haec enuntiatio vera esse potest, 'Capiet Numantiam Scipio', nisi ex aeternitate causa causam serens hoc erit effectura? An hoc falsum potuisset esse, si esset sescentis saeculis ante dictum? Et si tum non esset vera haec enuntiatio: 'Capiet Numantiam Scipio', ne illa quidem eversa vera est haec enuntiatio: 'Cepit Numantiam Scipio.' Potest igitur quicquam factum esse, quod non verum fuerit futurum esse?

[27] Or can this enunciation be true in any other way, 'Scipio will take Numantia,' unless from eternity, cause linking cause, will have been about to effect this? Or could this have been false, if it had been said six hundred ages earlier? And if then this enunciation would not have been true: 'Scipio will take Numantia,' then not even with it overthrown is this enunciation true: 'Scipio took Numantia.' Can, then, anything have been done which was not true as about to be?

Nam ut praeterita ea vera dicimus, quorum superiore tempore vera fuerit instantia, sic futura, quorum consequenti tempore vera erit instantia, ea vera dicemus.

For as we call those past things true, of which at a prior time the instant was true, so the future things, of which at a subsequent time the instant will be true, we shall call true.

[28] Nec, si omne enuntiatum aut verum aut falsum est, sequitur ilico esse causas inmutabilis, easque aeternas, quae prohibeant quicquam secus cadere, atque casurum sit; fortuitae sunt causae, quae efficiant, ut vere dicantur, quae ita dicentur: 'Veniet in senatum Cato', non inclusae in rerum natura atque mundo; et tamen tam est inmutabile venturum, cum est verum, quam venisse (nec ob eam causam fatum aut necessitas extimescenda est); etenim erit confiteri necesse 'Si hoc enuntiatum, "Veniet in Tusculanum Hortensius," vera non est, sequitur, ut falsa sit.' Quorum isti neutrum volunt; quod fieri non potest. Nec nos impediet illa ignava ratio, quae dicitur; appellatur enim quidam a philosophis Argos Logos, cui si pareamus, nihil omnino agamus in vita. Sic enim interrogant: 'Si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non adhibueris, convalesces;

[28] Nor, if every enunciation is either true or false, does it follow straightway that there are immutable causes, and those eternal, which prevent anything from falling out otherwise than it is going to fall out; there are fortuitous causes, which bring it about that things are truly said which will be said thus: 'Cato will come into the senate,' not enclosed within the nature of things and the world; and yet it is just as immutable that he will come, when it is true, as that he has come (nor on that account are fate or necessity to be dreaded); for it will be necessary to confess: 'If this enunciation, "Hortensius will come to the Tusculanum," is not true, it follows that it is false.' Of which these men want neither; which cannot be. Nor will that so‑called lazy argument impede us; for by some philosophers it is called the Argos Logos, to which, if we were to obey, we would do nothing at all in life. For thus they ask: 'If it is fated for you to convalesce from this disease, whether you employ a physician or do not employ one, you will convalesce;

[29] item, si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo non convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non adhibueris, non convalesces; et alterutrum fatum est; medicum ergo adhibere nihil attinet.' Recte genus hoc interrogationis ignavum atque iners nominatum est, quod eadem ratione omnis e vita tolletur actio. Licet etiam inmutare, ut fati nomen ne adiungas et eandem tamen teneas sententiam, hoc modo: 'Si ex aeternitate verum hoc fuit: "Ex isto morbo convalesces", sive adhibueris medicum sive non adhibueris, convalesces; itemque, si ex aeternitate falsum hoc fuit: "Ex isto morbo convalesces", sive adhibueris medicum sive non adhibueris, non convalesces'; deinde cetera.

[29] likewise, if it is fated for you not to recover from this disease, whether you have employed a physician or have not employed one, you will not recover; and the one or the other is fated; therefore to employ a physician avails nothing.' Rightly has this genus of interrogation been named lazy and inert, because by the same rationale every action would be taken away from life. It is even permitted to alter it, so that you do not adjoin the name of fate and yet you hold the same opinion, in this way: 'If from eternity this was true: "From that disease you will recover," whether you employ a physician or do not employ one, you will recover; and likewise, if from eternity this was false: "From that disease you will recover," whether you employ a physician or do not employ one, you will not recover'; then the rest.

[30] Haec ratio a Chrysippo reprehenditur. Quaedam enim sunt, inquit, in rebus simplicia, quaedam copulata; simplex est: 'Morietur illo die Socrates'; huic, sive quid fecerit sive non fecerit, finitus est moriendi dies. At si ita fatum est: 'Nascetur Oedipus Laio', non poterit dici: 'sive fuerit Laius cum muliere sive non fuerit'; copulata enim res est et confatalis; sic enim appellat, quia ita fatum sit et concubiturum cum uxore Laium et ex ea Oedipum procreaturum, ut, si esset dictum: 'Luctabitur Olympiis Milo' et referret aliquis: 'Ergo, sive habuerit adversarium sive non habuerit, luctabitur', erraret; est enim copulatum 'luctabitur', quia sine adversario nulla luctatio est.

[30] This line of reasoning is reprehended by Chrysippus. For, he says, some things in realities are simple, some coupled; simple is: 'Socrates will die on that day'; for this one, whether he shall have done anything or not, the day of dying is fixed. But if fate is thus: 'Oedipus will be born to Laius,' it cannot be said: 'whether Laius has been with a woman or has not been'; for the matter is coupled and co-fatal—for so he calls it—because it is thus fated both that Laius will have intercourse with his wife and that from her he will procreate Oedipus; just as, if it had been said: 'Milo will wrestle at the Olympics' and someone were to infer: 'Therefore, whether he shall have an adversary or shall not have one, he will wrestle,' he would err; for 'he will wrestle' is coupled, since without an adversary there is no luctation.

Omnes igitur istius generis captiones eodem modo refelluntur. 'Sive tu adhibueris medicum sive non adhibueris, convalesces' captiosum; tam enim est fatale medicum adhibere quam convalescere. Haec, ut dixi, confatalia ille appellat.

Therefore all the captious devices of that kind are refuted in the same way. 'Whether you employ a physician or do not employ one, you will recover' is captious; for it is just as fated to employ a physician as to recover. These, as I said, he calls co-fated.

[31] Carneades genus hoc totum non probabat et nimis inconsiderate concludi hanc rationem putabat. Itaque premebat alio modo nec ullam adhibebat calumniam; cuius erat haec conclusio: 'Si omnia antecedentibus causis fiunt, omnia naturali conligatione conserte contexteque fiunt; quod si ita est, omnia necessitas efficit; id si verum est, nihil est in nostra potestate; est autem aliquid in nostra potestate; at, si omnia fato fiunt, omnia causis antecedentibus fiunt; non igitur fato fiunt, quaecumque fiunt.'

[31] Carneades did not approve this whole kind and thought that this line of reasoning was concluded too inconsiderately. Therefore he pressed it in another way and employed no calumny; whose conclusion was this: 'If all things come to be by antecedent causes, all things come to be by a natural co-ligation, closely fastened and woven together; and if that is so, necessity brings about all things; if that is true, nothing is in our power; yet something is in our power; but, if all things come to be by fate, all things come to be by antecedent causes; therefore, whatever things come to be, do not come to be by fate.'

[32] Haec artius adstringi ratio non potest. Nam si quis velit idem referre atque ita dicere: 'Si omne futurum ex aeternitate verum est, ut ita certe eveniat, quem ad modum sit futurum, omnia necesse est conligatione naturali conserte contexteque fieri', nihil dicat. Multum enim differt, utrum causa naturalis ex aeternitate futura vera efficiat, an etiam sine aeternitate naturali, futura quae sint, ea vera esse possint intellegi.

[32] This line of reasoning cannot be bound more tightly. For if someone should wish to carry back the same point and thus say: 'If every future thing is from eternity true, so that it certainly comes to pass in the manner in which it is going to be, everything must be brought about by a natural conligation, closely bound and interwoven,' he would be saying nothing. For it makes much difference whether a natural cause from eternity brings it about that future things are true, or whether even without natural eternity the things that are going to be can be understood to be true.

Itaque dicebat Carneades ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset.

Therefore Carneades used to say that not even Apollo could speak the things to come, except those whose causes nature so contained that it was necessary for them to come to pass.

[33] Quid enim spectans deus ipse diceret Marcellum eum, qui ter consul fuit, in mari esse periturum? Erat hoc quidem verum ex aeternitate, sed causas id efficientis non habebat. Ita ne praeterita quidem ea, quorum nulla signa tamquam vestigia extarent, Apollini nota esse censebat; quanto minus futura, causis enim efficientibus quamque rem cognitis posse denique sciri quid futurum esset; ergo nec de Oedipode potuisse Apollinem praedicere nullis in rerum natura causis praepositis, cur ab eo patrem interfici necesse esset, nec quicquam eius modi.

[33] For, looking to what would the god himself have said that Marcellus, the man who was consul three times, would perish at sea? This indeed was true from eternity, but it did not have efficient causes bringing it about. Thus he judged that not even past things, of which no signs, as though footprints, stood forth, were known to Apollo; how much less future things—for only with the efficient causes and each thing known could it finally be known what would be going to happen. Therefore not even about Oedipus could Apollo have foretold, with no causes set forth in the nature of things why it was necessary for his father to be slain by him, nor anything of that sort.

Quocirca, si Stoicis, qui omnia fato fieri dicunt, consentaneum est huiusmodi oracula ceteraque, quae ad divinationem pertinent, comprobare, eis autem qui, quae futura sunt ea vera esse ex aeternitate dicunt non idem dicendum est, vide ne non eadem sit illorum causa et Stoicorum; hi enim urguentur angustius, illorum ratio soluta ac libera est.

Wherefore, if it is consistent for the Stoics, who say that all things happen by fate, to approve such oracles and the rest that pertain to divination, yet for those who say that the things which are going to be are true from eternity, the same need not be said; see whether their case is not different from that of the Stoics—for the latter are pressed more narrowly, while the reasoning of the former is unbound and free.

[34] Quodsi concedatur nihil posse evenire nisi causa antecedente, quid proficiatur, si ea causa non ex aeternis causis apta dicatur? Causa autem ea est, quae id efficit, cuius est causa, ut vulnus mortis, cruditas morbi, ignis ardoris. Itaque non sic causa intellegi debet, ut, quod cuique antecedat, id ei causa sit, sed quod cuique efficienter antecedat, nec, quod in campum descenderim, id fuisse causae, cur pila luderem, nec Hecubam causam interitus fuisse Troianis, quod Alexandrum genuerit, nec Tyndareum Agamemnoni, quod Clytaemnestram.

[34] But if it be conceded that nothing can come to pass unless with a preceding cause, what is gained, if that cause is not said to be derived from eternal causes? Now a cause is that which brings about that of which it is the cause, as a wound [is the cause] of death, indigestion of illness, fire of burning. Therefore cause ought not to be understood thus, that whatever precedes anything is its cause, but that which precedes it efficiently; nor, because I went down into the field, was that a cause why I played ball; nor that Hecuba was the cause of destruction for the Trojans, because she bore Alexander; nor Tyndareus for Agamemnon, because he begot Clytemnestra.

Hoc enim modo viator quoque bene vestitus causa grassatori fuisse dicetur, cur ab eo spoliaretur.

For in this way even a well-clad traveler will be said to have been a cause to the highwayman, why he was despoiled by him.

[35] Ex hoc genere illud est Ennii,

[35] From this kind is that of Ennius,

utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus
caesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes!

would that in the Pelian grove the fir-wood beams,
cut down with axes, had not fallen to the earth!

Licuit vel altius: 'Utinam ne in Pelio nata ulla umquam esset arbor!' etiam supra: 'Utinam ne esset mons ullus Pelius!' similiterque superiora repetentem regredi infinite licet.

It was permitted even higher: 'Would that on Pelion no tree had ever been born!' even higher: 'Would that there were no mountain Pelion at all!' and similarly, for one repeating the former things, it is permitted to go back infinitely.

Neve inde navis inchoandi exordium
cepisset.

Nor from there would a ship have taken the exordium
of inchoation.

Quorsum haec praeterita? quia sequitur illud,

To what end the things past? because that follows,

Nam numquam era errans mea domo ecferret pedem
Medea, animo aegra, amore saevo saucia,

For never would my mistress, wandering, bear a foot forth from my house
Medea, ailing in spirit, wounded by savage love,

non erat ut eae res causam adferrent amoris.

it was not the case that those things would bring a cause of love.

[36] Interesse autem aiunt, utrum eius modi quid sit, sine quo effici aliquid non possit, an eius modi, cum quo effici aliquid necesse sit. Nulla igitur earum est causa, quoniam nulla eam rem sua vi efficit, cuius causa dicitur; nec id, sine quo quippiam non fit, causa est, sed id, quod cum accessit, id, cuius est causa, efficit necessario. Nondum enim ulcerato serpentis morsu Philocteta quae causa in rerum natura continebatur, fore ut is in insula Lemno linqueretur?

[36] They say, moreover, that there is a difference whether there is something of such a kind, without which something cannot be effected, or of such a kind, with which it is necessary that something be effected. Therefore none of these is a cause, since none by its own force effects the thing of which it is called the cause; nor is that, without which something does not come to be, a cause, but that which, when it has been added, necessarily effects that of which it is the cause. For, before Philoctetes had been ulcerated by the serpent's bite, what cause was contained in the nature of things that he would be left on the island of Lemnos?

post autem causa fuit propior et cum exitu iunctior.

afterwards, however, the cause was more proximate and more conjoined with the outcome.

[37] Ratio igitur eventus aperuit causam; sed ex aeternitate vera fuit haec enuntiatio: 'Relinquetur in insula Philoctetes', nec hoc ex vero in falsum poterat convertere. Necesse est enim in rebus contrariis duabus--contraria autem hoc loco ea dico, quorum alterum ait quid, alterum negat--ex eis igitur necesse est invito Epicuro alterum verum esse, alterum falsum, ut 'Sauciabitur Philocteta' omnibus ante saeculis verum fuit, 'Non sauciabitur' falsum; nisi forte volumus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales enuntiationes nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt aut, cum id pudet, illud tamen dicunt, quod est inpudentius, veras esse ex contrariis diiunctiones, sed, quae in his enuntiata sint, eorum neutrum esse verum.

[37] Reason, therefore, by the outcome, laid open the cause; but from eternity this enunciation was true: 'Philoctetes will be left on the island,' nor could this be converted from true into false. For it is necessary in two contrary matters—by contraries in this place I call those of which the one affirms something, the other denies—therefore, against Epicurus’s will, it is necessary that of them the one be true, the other false, as 'Philoctetes will be wounded' was true in all the ages before, 'He will not be wounded' false; unless perhaps we wish to follow the opinion of the Epicureans, who say that such enunciations are neither true nor false, or, when that makes them ashamed, they still say—what is more impudent—that the disjunctions from contraries are true, but that of what has been enunciated in them, neither is true.

[38] O admirabilem licentiam et miserabilem inscientiam disserendi! Si enim aliquid in eloquendo nec verum nec falsum est, certe id verum non est; quod autem verum non est, qui potest non falsum esse? aut, quod falsum non est, qui potest non verum esse?

[38] O admirable license and pitiable ignorance of discoursing! For if something in speaking is neither true nor false, certainly that is not true; but what is not true, how can it be not false? or, what is not false, how can it be not true?

tenebitur igitur id, quod a Chrysippo defenditur, omnem enuntiationem aut veram aut falsam esse; ratio ipsa coget et ex aeternitate quaedam esse vera, et ea non esse nexa causis aeternis et a fati necessitate esse libera.

therefore it will be maintained, that which is defended by Chrysippus, that every enunciation is either true or false; reason itself will compel that certain things are true from eternity, and that these are not bound to eternal causes and are free from the necessity of fate.

[39] Ac mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum philosophorum, una eorum, qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri, ut id fatum vim necessitatis adferret, in qua sententia Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aristoteles fuit, altera eorum, quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, Chrysippus tamquam arbiter honorarius medium ferire voluisse--sed applicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus animos liberatos volunt; dum autem verbis utitur suis, delabitur in eas difficultates, ut necessitatem fati confirmet invitus.

[39] And indeed it seems to me, since there were two opinions of the ancient philosophers—one of those who judged that all things happen by fate in such a way that that fate brings the force of necessity, in which opinion were Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aristotle; the other of those to whom the voluntary motions of minds seemed to be without any fate—Chrysippus, as an honorary arbiter, wished to strike the middle--but he attaches himself rather to those who wish minds to be freed from being moved by necessity; yet while he uses his own words, he slips into such difficulties that he, unwilling, confirms the necessity of fate.

[40] Atque hoc, si placet, quale sit videamus in adsensionibus, quas prima oratione tractavi. Eas enim veteres illi, quibus omnia fato fieri videbantur, vi effici et necessitate dicebant. Qui autem ab eis dissentiebant, fato adsensiones liberabant negabantque fato adsensionibus adhibito necessitatem ab his posse removeri, iique ita disserebant: 'Si omnia fato fiunt, omnia fiunt causa antecedente, et, si adpetitus, illa etiam, quae adpetitum sequuntur, ergo etiam adsensiones; at, si causa adpetitus non est sita in nobis, ne ipse quidem adpetitus est in nostra potestate; quod si ita est, ne illa quidem, quae adpetitu efficiuntur, sunt sita in nobis; non sunt igitur neque adsensiones neque actiones in nostra potestate.

[40] And let us, if it pleases, see of what sort this is in assents, which I treated in the first oration. For those ancients to whom it seemed that all things are done by fate said that these are brought about by force and by necessity. But those who dissented freed assents from fate and denied that, with fate applied to assents, necessity could be removed from them; and they argued thus: 'If all things are done by fate, all things are done by an antecedent cause; and, if appetite, then also the things which follow appetite, therefore also assents; but if the cause of appetite is not situated in us, then appetite itself is not in our power; and if this is so, then the things which are effected by appetite are not situated in us; therefore neither assents nor actions are in our power.'

Ex quo efficitur, ut nec laudationes iustae sint nec vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia'. Quod cum vitiosum sit, probabiliter concludi putant non omnia fato fieri, quaecumque fiant.

From which it follows that neither laudations are just nor vituperations nor honors nor punishments.' Since this is vicious, they think it is plausibly concluded that not everything, whatever happens, happens by fate.

[41] Chrysippus autem cum et necessitatem inprobaret et nihil vellet sine praepositis causis evenire, causarum genera distinguit, ut et necessitatem effugiat et retineat fatum. 'Causarum enim', inquit, 'aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae. Quam ob rem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri causis antecedentibus, non hoc intellegi volumus: causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adiuvantibus et proximis'. Itaque illi rationi, quam paulo ante conclusi, sic occurrit: si omnia fato fiant, sequi illud quidem, ut omnia causis fiant antepositis, verum non principalibus causis et perfectis, sed adiuvantibus et proximis.

[41] But Chrysippus, since he both disapproved necessity and wished nothing to occur without preposed causes, distinguishes the kinds of causes, so that he may both escape necessity and retain fate. 'For of causes,' he says, 'some are perfect and principal, others assisting and proximate. Wherefore, when we say that all things are done by fate through antecedent causes, we do not wish this to be understood: through perfect and principal causes, but through assisting and proximate causes.' And so he meets that reasoning which I had concluded a little before as follows: if all things are done by fate, it indeed follows that all things are done by causes set before, yet not by principal and perfect causes, but by assisting and proximate ones.

Quae si ipsae non sunt in nostra potestate, non sequitur, ut ne adpetitus quidem sit in nostra potestate. At hoc sequeretur, si omnia perfectis et principalibus causis fieri diceremus, ut, cum eae causae non essent in nostra potestate, ne ille quidem esset in nostra potestate.

Which, if they themselves are not in our power, it does not follow that not even appetite is in our power. But this would follow, if we were saying that all things happen by perfect and principal causes: namely, since those causes would not be in our power, not even that would be in our power.

[42] Quam ob rem, qui ita fatum introducunt, ut necessitatem adiungant, in eos valebit illa conclusio; qui autem causas antecedentis non dicent perfectas neque principalis, in eos nihil valebit. Quod enim dicantur adsensiones fieri causis antepositis, id quale sit, facile a se explicari putat. Nam quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen, cum id visum proximam causam habeat, non principalem, hanc habet rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam dudum diximus, non ut illa quidem fieri possit nulla vi extrinsecus excitata (necesse est enim adsensionem viso commoveri), sed revertitur ad cylindrum et ad turbinem suum, quae moveri incipere nisi pulsa non possunt.

[42] For which reason, against those who introduce fate in such a way as to adjoin necessity, that conclusion will have force; but against those who will not call the antecedent causes perfect nor principal, it will have no force. For as to the statement that assents are said to occur by antecedent causes, what sort that is he thinks can be easily explained by himself. For although assent cannot come about unless it is stirred by an impression, nevertheless, since that impression has a proximate cause, not a principal one, it has, as Chrysippus wishes, the rationale which we mentioned a little while ago—not that it, indeed, can come to be with no force excited from without (for it is necessary that assent be moved by an impression), but he reverts to the cylinder and to his spinning-top, which cannot begin to be moved unless they have been struck.

Id autem cum accidit, suapte natura, quod superest, et cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem putat.

But when that happens, by its own nature, what remains, he thinks, is for the cylinder to roll and the turbine to turn.

[43] 'Ut igitur', inquit, 'qui protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem non dedit, sic visum obiectum inprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem, sed adsensio nostra erit in potestate, eaque, quem ad modum in cylindro dictum est, extrinsecus pulsa, quod reliquum est, suapte vi et natura movebitur. Quodsi aliqua res efficeretur sine causa antecedente, falsum esset omnia fato fieri; sin omnibus, quaecumque fiunt, veri simile est causam antecedere, quid adferri poterit, cur non omnia fato fieri fatendum sit? modo intellegatur, quae sit causarum distinctio ac dissimilitudo.'

[43] 'As therefore,' he says, 'the one who pushed the cylinder gave it the beginning of motion, but did not give it volubility, so the object presented to sight will indeed imprint and, as it were, stamp its own species upon the mind, but our assent will be in our power; and this, as was said in the case of the cylinder, when struck from without, what remains will be moved by its own force and nature. But if anything were effected without an antecedent cause, it would be false that all things happen by fate; but if for all things whatsoever that come to be it is likely that a cause precedes, what can be adduced why it should not be admitted that all things happen by fate? provided only that one understand what the distinction and dissimilarity of causes is.'

[44] Haec cum ita sint a Chrysippo explicata, si illi, qui negant adsensiones fato fieri, fateantur tamen eas sine viso antecedente fieri, alia ratio est; sed, si concedunt anteire visa, nec tamen fato fieri adsensiones, quod proxima illa et continens causa non moveat adsensionem, vide, ne idem dicant. Neque enim Chrysippus, concedens adsensionis proximam et continentem causam esse in viso positam, eam causam esse ad adsentiendum necessariam concedet, ut, si omnia fato fiant, omnia causis fiant antecedentibus et necessariis; itemque illi, qui ab hoc dissentiunt confitentes non fieri adsensiones sine praecursione visorum, dicent, si omnia fato fierent eius modi, ut nihil fieret nisi praegressione causae, confitendum esse fato fieri omnia; ex quo facile intellectu est, quoniam utrique patefacta atque explicata sententia sua ad eundem exitum veniant, verbis eos, non re dissidere.

[44] Since these matters have been thus explained by Chrysippus, if those who deny that assents happen by fate nevertheless admit that they happen without a preceding appearance, the reasoning is different; but if they concede that appearances go before, and yet that assents do not happen by fate, on the ground that that proximate and containing cause does not move the assent, see that they are not saying the same thing. For neither will Chrysippus, while conceding that the proximate and containing cause of assent is situated in the appearance, concede that that cause is necessary for assenting, with the result that, if all things happen by fate, all things happen by antecedent and necessary causes; and likewise those who dissent from him, confessing that assents do not occur without the forerunning of appearances, will say that, if all things happened by fate of such a sort that nothing happened except with the pregression of a cause, it must be confessed that all things happen by fate; whence it is easy to understand that, since both sides, once their opinion has been laid open and unfolded, come to the same outcome, they differ in words, not in reality.

[45] Omninoque cum haec sit distinctio, ut quibusdam in rebus vere dici possit, cum hae causae antegressae sint, non esse in nostra potestate, quin illa eveniant, quorum causae fuerint, quibusdam autem in rebus causis antegressis in nostra tamen esse potestate, ut illud aliter eveniat, hanc distinctionem utrique adprobant, sed alteri censent, quibus in rebus, cum causae antecesserint, non sit in nostra potestate, ut aliter illa eveniant, eas fato fieri; quae autem in nostra potestate sint, ab eis fatum abesse . . . .

[45] And in general, since this is the distinction—that in certain matters it can truly be said, when these causes have gone before, that it is not in our power but that those things should come to pass of which they have been the causes, but in certain matters, although the causes have preceded, it is nevertheless in our power that the outcome be otherwise—both parties approve this distinction; but the one side judge that in those matters in which, when the causes have preceded, it is not in our power that those things turn out otherwise, these occur by fate; whereas those which are in our power, that fate is absent from them . . . .

[46] Hoc modo hanc causam disceptari oportet, non ab atomis errantibus et de via declinantibus petere praesidium. 'Declinat', inquit, 'atomus'. Primum cur? aliam enim quandam vim motus habebant a Democrito inpulsionis, quam plagam ille appellat, a te, Epicure, gravitatis et ponderis.

[46] In this way this cause ought to be disputed, not to seek a protection from atoms wandering and swerving from the road. 'It swerves,' he says, 'the atom.' First, why? For they had from Democritus a certain other force of motion of impulsion, which he calls a blow, and from you, Epicurus, of gravity and of weight.

Quae ergo nova causa in natura est, quae declinet atomum? aut num sortiuntur inter se, quae declinet, quae non? aut cur minimo declinent intervallo, maiore non?

What, then, is the new cause in nature that makes the atom decline (swerve)? Or do they cast lots among themselves—which shall decline and which not? Or why do they decline by the smallest interval, not by a greater?

aut cur declinent uno minimo, non declinent duobus aut tribus?

or why do they swerve by one minimal unit, not swerve by two or three?

[47] Optare hoc quidem est, non disputare. Nam neque extrinsecus inpulsam atomum loco moveri et declinare dicis, neque in illo inani, per quod feratur atomus, quicquam fuisse causae, cur ea non e regione ferretur, nec in ipsa atomo mutationis aliquid factum est quam ob rem naturalem motum sui ponderis non teneret. Ita cum attulisset nullam causam, quae istam declinationem efficeret, tamen aliquid sibi dicere videtur, cum id dicat, quod omnium mentes aspernentur ac respuant.

[47] This, indeed, is to wish, not to dispute. For you neither say that the atom, impelled from without, is moved from its place and declines, nor that in that void through which the atom is carried there was any cause why it should not be carried in a straight line; nor has anything of mutation been done in the atom itself, on account of which it would not hold to the natural motion of its own weight. Thus, when he has brought forward no cause to effect that declination, nevertheless he seems to himself to be saying something, when he says that which the minds of all spurn and reject.

[48] Nec vero quisquam magis confirmasse mihi videtur non modo fatum, verum etiam necessitatem et vim omnium rerum sustulisseque motus animi voluntarios, quam hic, qui aliter obsistere fato fatetur se non potuisse, nisi ad has commenticias declinationes confugisset. Nam, ut essent atomi, quas quidem esse mihi probari nullo modo potest, tamen declinationes istae numquam explicarentur. Nam si atomis, ut gravitate ferantur, tributum est necessitate naturae, quod omne pondus nulla re inpediente moveatur et feratur necesse est, illud quoque necesse est, declinare, quibusdam atomis vel, si volunt, omnibus naturaliter . . . .

[48] Nor indeed does anyone seem to me to have more confirmed not only fate, but even necessity and the force of all things, and to have taken away voluntary motions of the mind, than this man, who confesses that he could not otherwise withstand fate unless he had taken refuge in these concocted declinations. For, even if there were atoms—which indeed can in no way be made acceptable to me—yet those declinations would never be explained. For if to the atoms it has been assigned by the necessity of nature that they are borne by gravity (because every weight, with nothing hindering, must move and be borne along), that too must be necessary: to decline, for certain atoms, or, if they please, for all, naturally . . . .

Gel. N.A. 7.2.15: Chrysippus aestuans laboransque, quonam <pacto> explicet et fato omnia fieri, et esse aliquid in nobis, intricatur hoc modo.

Gel. N.A. 7.2.15: Chrysippus, seething and toiling, as to <in what manner> he might explain both that all things come to pass by fate and that there is something in us, becomes entangled in this way.

Serv. A. 3.376: Fatum est conexio rerum per aeternitatem se invicem tenens, quae suo ordine et lege variatur, ita tamen, ut ipsa varietas habeat aeternitatem.

Serv. A. 3.376: Fate is the nexus of things, through eternity holding one another, which is varied by its own order and law, yet in such a way that the variety itself has eternity.

August. C.D. 5.8: Tales sunt hominum mentes, quali pater ipse Iuppiter auctiferas lustravit lumine terras.

August. C.D. 5.8: Such are the minds of men, as Father Jupiter himself has lustrated the increase-bearing lands with light.

Macr. Sat. 3.16.3 sq.: Nam cum esset apud se ad Lavernium Scipio unaque Pontius, adlatus est forte Scipioni acupenser, qui admodum raro capitur, sed est piscis, ut ferunt, in primis nobilis.

Macr. Sat. 3.16.3 sq.: For when Scipio was at his place at Lavernium, and Pontius together with him, a sturgeon happened by chance to be brought in to Scipio, which is caught very rarely, but is, as they say, a fish among the foremost in nobility.

Cum autem Scipio unum et alterum ex iis, qui eum salutatum venerant, invitavisset pluresque etiam invitaturus videretur, in aurem Pontius: 'Scipio', inquit, 'vide, quid agas; acupenser iste paucorum hominum est.'

But when Scipio had invited one and another of those who had come to salute him, and seemed about to invite several more as well, Pontius, into his ear: “Scipio,” said he, “see what you are doing; that sturgeon is for only a few men.”