Abelard: Dialogus

Aspiciebam in visu noctis et ecce: viri tres diverso tramite venientes coram me astiterunt, quos ego statim iuxta visionis modum, cuius sint professionis vel cur ad me venerint, interrogo.

I was beholding in a vision of the night, and behold: three men, coming by different paths, stood before me, whom I straightway, according to the mode of the vision, question as to what profession they are of or why they have come to me.

"Homines", inquiunt, "sumus diversis fidei sectis innitentes. Unius quippe Dei cultores esse nos omnes pariter profitemur diversa tamen fide et vita ipsi famulantes. Unus quippe nostrum gentilis ex his, quos philosophos appellant, naturali lege contentus est.

“Men,” they say, “we are, relying on diverse sects of faith. For we all alike profess ourselves worshipers of the one God, yet serving him with different faith and life. One of us, indeed, is a Gentile, of those whom they call philosophers, content with the natural law.

Alii vero duo Scripturas habent, quorum alter Iudaeus, alter dicitur Christianus.Diuautem de diversis fidei nostrae sectis invicem conferentes atque contendentes tuo tandem iudicio cessimus."

But the other two have the Scriptures, of whom one is a Jew, the other is called a Christian. For a long time, however, mutually conferring and contending about the diverse sects of our faith, we have at last yielded to your judgment."

Ego super haec itaque vehementer admirans, quis in haec ipsos induxerit vel congregaverit, quaero, et maxime, cur in haec me iudicem elegerint.

I, therefore, marveling greatly at these things, ask who has induced or congregated them into these matters, and most of all why they have chosen me as judge in these.

Respondens autem Philosophus: "Mea", inquit, "opera hoc est inceptum, quoniam id suum est philosophorum, rationibus veritatem investigare et in omnibus non opinionem hominum, sed rationis sequi ducatum. Nostrorum itaque scholis corde intentus et tam ipsorum rationibus quam auctoritatibus eruditus ad moralem tandem me contuli philosophiam, quae omnium finis est disciplinarum, et propter quam cetera omnia praelibanda iudicavi. Hic de summo bono et de summo malo et de his, quae vel beatum hominem vel miserum faciunt, quoad potui, instructus statim apud me diversas etiam fidei sectas, quibus nunc mundus divisus est, studiose scrutatus sum et omnibus inspectis et invicem collatis illud sequi decrevi, quod consentaneum magis sit rationi.

But the Philosopher, answering, said: "Mine," he said, "is the doing of this undertaking, since it is proper to philosophers to investigate the truth by reasons, and in all things to follow not the opinion of men but the guidance of reason. Therefore, intent in heart upon our schools and educated both by their arguments and by their authorities, I at length betook myself to moral philosophy, which is the end of all disciplines, and for the sake of which I judged all the rest to be to be sampled beforehand. Here, concerning the summum bonum and the summum malum and the things which make a man either blessed or wretched, so far as I could, having been instructed, I immediately for myself also studiously scrutinized the diverse sects of faith, by which the world is now divided; and, with all examined and compared with one another, I resolved to follow that which is more consentaneous to reason.

Contuli me igitur ad Iudaeorum quoque et Christianorum doctrinam et utrorumque fidem et leges sive rationes discutiens. Comperi Iudaeos stultos, Christianos insanos, ut cum salva pace tua, qui Christianus diceris, ista loquar.

I therefore betook myself also to the doctrine of the Jews and of the Christians, examining the faith and the laws or reasons of both. I found the Jews foolish, the Christians insane—so that, with your peace preserved, you who are called a Christian, I may speak these things.

Contuli diu cum utrisque et nostrae collationis altercatione nondum finem adepta partium suarum rationes tuo committere decrevimus arbitrio. Te quippe nec philosophicarum rationum vires nec utriusque legis munimenta latere novimus. Christiana namque professio sic propria lege nititur, quam Novum nominant Testamentum, ut respuere tamen non praesumat antiquum et utriusque lectioni maximum impendat studium.

I have conferred long with both, and since the altercation of our conference had not yet reached an end, we have resolved to commit the arguments of their respective parties to your arbitration. For we know that neither the force of philosophical arguments nor the muniments of either law lie hidden from you. For the Christian profession relies thus upon its own law, which they call the New Testament, that it nonetheless does not presume to reject the Old, and it expends the utmost zeal upon the reading of both.

Aliquem nobis iudicem oportebat eligere, ut altercatio nostra finem acciperet, nec quemquam nisi in aliqua harum trium sectarum reperire potuimus."

It was necessary for us to choose some judge, so that our altercation might receive an end, and we were able to find no one except in one of these three sects."

Ac deinde tamquam adulationis oleum vendens et caput meum hoc unguento demulcens statim intulit: "Quanto igitur ingenii te acumine et quarumlibet scientia Scripturarum fama est praeeminere, tanto amplius in hoc iudicio favendo sive defendendo constat valere et cuiuscumque nostrum rebellioni satisfacere posse. Quod vero ingenii tui sit acumen, quantum philosophicis et divinis sententiis memoriae tuae thesaurus abundet, praeter consueta scholarum tuarum studia, quibus in utraque doctrina prae omnibus magistris etiam tuis sive ipsis quoque repertarum scientiarum scriptoribus constat te floruisse, certum se nobis praebuit experimentum opus illud mirabile theologiae, quod nec invidia ferre potuit nec auferre praevaluit, sed gloriosius persequendo effecit."

And then, as though selling the oil of adulation and stroking my head with this unguent, he immediately added: "Therefore, by how much report says that you preeminent in the acumen of wit and in the knowledge of any Scriptures, by so much the more it is clear that you prevail in this judgment by favoring or by defending, and can satisfy the rebellion of whichever of us. As to what the acumen of your wit is, how abundantly the treasury of your memory abounds in philosophical and divine sentences, besides the customary studies of your schools—wherein in both doctrines it is agreed that you have flourished before all masters, even your own, and even the very writers of the sciences discovered—that marvelous work of theology provided us sure proof, which envy could neither bear nor prevail to take away, but by persecuting made more glorious."

Tum ego: "Non ambio" inquam, "huius honoris gratiam, quam mihi reservastis, ut sapientibus scilicet omissis stultum pro iudice statueretis.Namet ego similis vestri vanis huius mundi contentionibus assuetus non grave perferam audire, quibus oblectari consuevi. Tu tamen, philosophe, qui nullam professus legem solis rationibus cedis, non pro magno aestimes, si in hoc congressu praevalere videaris. Tibi quippe ad pugnam duo sunt gladii, alii vero uno tantum in te armantur.

Then I: "I do not court," I say, "the favor of this honor, which you have reserved for me, namely that, the wise of course being omitted, you should appoint a fool as judge.For I too, like you, accustomed to the vain contentions of this world, will not find it hard to endure hearing those things by which I have been wont to be entertained. You, however, philosopher, who, professing no law, yield to reasons alone, do not esteem it a great matter if in this encounter you seem to prevail. For to you for the combat there are two swords, whereas others are armed against you with only one.

Tu in illos tam scripto quam ratione agere potes; illi vero tibi, quia legem non sequeris, de lege nihil obicere possunt, et tanto etiam minus in te rationibus possunt, quanto tu amplius rationibus assuetus philosophicam uberiorem habes armaturam. Quia tamen hoc ex condicto et pari statuistis consensu et de viribus vestris singulos vestrum confidere video, nequaquam ausibus vestris nostra erubescentia inferet repulsam, praesertim cure ex his aliquam percipere me credam doctrinam. Nulla quippe, ut quidam nostrorum meminit, adeo falsa est doctrina, ut non aliqua intermisceat vera, et nullam adeo frivolam esse disputationem arbitror, ut non aliquod habeat documentum.

You can proceed against them as much by writing as by reason; but they, since you do not follow the law, can object nothing to you from the law, and so much the less can they prevail against you by reasons, as you, more accustomed to reasons, have a more abundant philosophical armature. Because, however, you have determined this by compact and equal consent, and I see each of you trusting in your own strengths, by no means shall our modesty inflict a repulse upon your daring, especially since I shall think to receive some doctrine from these proceedings. For no doctrine, as one of ours notes, is so false as not to intermingle some truths, and I judge no disputation to be so frivolous as not to have some document of instruction.

Unde et ille maximus sapientum in ipso statim Proverbiorum suorum exordio lectorem sibi attentum praeparans ait: Audiens sapiens sapientior erit, intelligens gubernaculum possidebit. Et Iacobus apostolus: Sit, inquit, omnis homo velox ad audiendum, tardus autem ad loquendum.

Whence also that greatest of the wise, straightway in the very exordium of his Proverbs, preparing for himself an attentive reader, says: “The wise man, hearing, will be wiser; the man of understanding will possess governance.” And James the apostle: “Let every man be swift to hear, but slow to speak.”

Assentiunt de nostro assensu gratulantes.

They assent, congratulating over our assent.

Philosophus: "Meum est", inquit, "primum ceteros interrogare, qui et naturali lege, quae prima est, contentus sum. Ad hoc vos ipse congregavi, ut de superadditis inquirerem scriptis. Prima, inquam, non solum tempore, verum etiam natura.

Philosopher: "It is mine," he says, "first to question the others, I who am also content with the natural law, which is first. For this purpose I myself have gathered you together, that I might inquire about the superadded writings. First, I say, not only in time, but also by nature.

Omne quippe simplicius naturaliter prius est multipliciori. Lex vero naturalis, id est scientia morum, quam ethicam dicimus, in solis consistit documentis moralibus. Vestrarum autem legum doctrina his quaedam exteriorum signorum addidit praecepta, quae nobis omnino videntur superflua, de quibus etiam suo loco nobis est conferendum." Annuunt utrique philosopho priorem in huius pugnae congressu locum.

"For indeed, whatever is simpler is by nature prior to what is more multiple. The natural law, that is, the science of mores, which we call ethic, consists solely in moral doctrines. But the doctrine of your laws has added to these certain precepts of external signs, which seem to us altogether superfluous, about which also in due place we must confer." Both assent, granting the philosopher the prior place in the encounter of this contest.

Tum ille: "Unum", inquit, "primo vos simul interrogo, quod ad vos pariter attinere video, qui maxime scripto nitimini, utrum videlicet in has fidei sectas ratio vos induxerit aliqua an solam hic hominum opinionem ac generis vestri sectemini amorem. Quorum quidem alterum, si sit, maxime est probandum, sicut alterum penitus improbandum. Quod tamen verum postremum esse nullius hominis discreti conscientiam credo negare.

Then he: "One thing," he says, "first I ask you together, which I see pertains equally to you, who especially rely on writing: whether indeed some reason has led you into these sects of faith, or you follow only the opinion of men and the love of your own kind. Of which two, the one, if it be the case, is most to be approved, just as the other is utterly to be disapproved. Which latter to be true, however, I believe the conscience of no discreet man would deny.

Ita namque singulis hominibus proprii generis et eorum, cum quibus educantur, insitus est amor, ut contra eorum fidem quidquid dicatur, abhorreant; et consuetudinem in naturam vertentes, quidquid didicerunt pueri, obnixe tenent adulti, et antequam ea, quae dicuntur, capere valeant, credere se affirmant, ut enim et poeta meminit: Quo semel est imbuta recens, servabit odorem resta diu.

Thus indeed in individual human beings there is an inborn love of their own kind and of those with whom they are brought up, such that they abhor whatever is said against their faith; and, turning custom into nature, the adults strenuously hold whatever the boys learned, and before they are able to grasp the things that are said, they affirm that they believe; for the poet also makes mention: “What once it has been freshly steeped with, the jar will long keep its scent.”

Quales quidem philosophorum quidam arguit dicens: "Neve, si quid in puerilibus disciplinis acceperint, id sacrosanctum iudicent, quoniam quidem res teneris auribus accommodatas saepe philosophiae senior tractatus eliminat."

Such people indeed a certain philosopher reproves, saying: "Nor, if they have received anything in juvenile disciplines, let them judge it sacrosanct, since indeed matters accommodated to tender ears are often eliminated by the senior tractate of philosophy."

Quod enim mirabile est, cum per aetatum seriem et temporum successionem humana in cunctis rebus ceteris intelligentia crescat, in fide, cuius errori summum periculum imminet, nullus est profectus. Sed aeque minores ut maiores, aeque rustici ut litterati de hac sentire asser untur, et ille firmissimus in fide dicitur, qui communem populi non excedit sensum. Quod profecto inde certum est accidere, quod nemini apud suos, quid sit credendum, licet inquirere nec de his, quae ab omnibus dicuntur, impune dubitare.

For what is indeed marvelous, that while through the series of ages and the succession of times human intelligence grows in all other matters, in faith—at the error of which the highest peril is imminent—there is no progress. But the minors as much as the majors, the rustics as much as the literate, are asserted to feel the same about this; and he is said to be most firm in faith who does not exceed the common sense of the people. Which indeed is surely to happen from this: that to no one among his own is it permitted to inquire what is to be believed, nor to doubt with impunity concerning the things which are said by all.

Pudet namque homines de his se interrogari, de quibus respondere non sufficiunt. Nemo quippe libenter ad conflictum accedit, qui de propriis viribus diffidit, et ultroneus currit ad pugnam, qui victoriae sperat gloriam. Hi etiam in tantam saepe prorumpunt insaniam, ut, quod se non posse intelligere confitentur, credere se profiteri non erubescant, quasi in prolatione verborum potius quam in comprehensione animi fides consistat et oris ipsa sit magis quam cordis.

For indeed men are ashamed to be questioned about those things which they are not sufficient to answer. No one, to be sure, approaches a conflict gladly who distrusts his own powers; and he runs of his own accord to the fight who hopes for the glory of victory. These men also often burst forth into such insanity that they do not blush to profess that they believe what they confess they cannot understand, as though faith consisted in the prolation of words rather than in the comprehension of the mind, and belonged more to the mouth than to the heart.

Qui hinc quoque maxime gloriantur, cumtantacredere videntur, quae nec ore disseri nec mente concipi valeant.

They, who on this account also glory most, since they seem to believe things so great as cannot be discoursed by the mouth nor conceived by the mind.

Quos etiam adeo praesumptuosos et elatos facit propriae sectae singularitas, ut, quoscumque a se viderint in fide divisos, a misericordia Dei iudicent alienos et omnibus aliis condemnatis solos se praedicent beatos.Diuitaque hanc ego generis humani caecitatem arque superbiam considerans ad divinam me contuli misericordiam suppliciter et iugiter eam implorans, ut detantaerrorum voragine et tam miserabili Charybdi me dignetur educere atque ad portam salutis de tantis procellis dirigere. De quo etiam nunc me videtis sollicitum et responsionum vestrarum documentis tamquam discipulum vehementer intentum.

Which singularity of their own sect makes them so presumptuous and exalted, that whomever they have seen divided from themselves in faith, they judge to be alien from the mercy of God, and, with all others condemned, they proclaim themselves alone blessed.And I, considering this blindness and pride of the human race, have betaken myself to the divine mercy, humbly and continually imploring it, that from so great a whirlpool of errors and so miserable a Charybdis it may deign to lead me out and to direct me, from such great tempests, to the gate of salvation. Concerning which matter you even now see me anxious, and, at the evidences of your responses, vehemently intent like a disciple.

Iudaeus: Duos quidem simul interrogasti, sed duos simul respondere non convenit, ne multitudo loquentium praepediat intellectum. Respondebo, si placet, ego primus, quia primi nos in cultum Dei venimus vel primam legis suscepimus disciplinam. Frater vero iste, qui se Christianum profitetur, ubi me deficere vel minus sufficere conspexerit, imperfectioni meae, quod defuerit, supplebit.

Jew: You have indeed questioned two at once, but it is not fitting for two to answer at once, lest the multitude of speakers impede understanding. I will answer, if it pleases, I first, because we first have come into the worship of God and have received the first discipline of the Law. But this brother here, who professes himself a Christian, when he perceives me to fail or to be less sufficient, will supply to my imperfection what has been lacking.

Qui quasi duo cornua in duobus gerens Testamentis, quibus armatus validius hosti resistere poterit et dimicare.

who, as if bearing two horns in the two Testaments, with which, armed, he will be able to resist the enemy more strongly and to contend.

Philosophus: Assentio.

Philosopher: I assent.

Iudaeus: Hoc autem unum ante collationis nostrae conflictum praemonere te volo, ne, si forte simplicitatem meam philosophicarum veritate rationum superare videaris, te nostros ideo vicisse glorieris nec imbecillitatem unius homunculi ad populi totius convertas ignominiam nec ex hominis vitio fidem redarguas nec eam calumnieris erroneam, quod ego eam disserere minus sufficiam.

Jew: But this one thing before the conflict of our collation I wish to forewarn you, lest, if by chance you seem to overcome my simplicity by the truth of philosophical reasons, you boast that you have therefore conquered our people, nor turn the weakness of one little man into the ignominy of the whole people, nor from the fault of a man refute the faith, nor calumniate it as erroneous, because I am less sufficient to discourse upon it.

Philosophus: Et hoc quoque provide satis videtur esse dictum, sed nulla est necessitate praemissum, cum me videlicet ad veritatis inquisitionem, non ad elationis ostentationem laborare non dubitetis nec ut sophistam corrixari, sed ut philosophum rationes scrutari, et (quod est maximum) me salutem animae venari.

Philosopher: And this too seems to have been said providently enough, but it was premised with no necessity, since you do not doubt that I labor for the investigation of truth, not for the ostentation of elation, nor to wrangle as a sophist, but as a philosopher to scrutinize reasons, and (which is greatest) that I hunt for the salvation of my soul.

Iudaeus: Dominus ipse, qui hunc zelum tibi visus est inspirasse, ut pro salute animae tuaetantaeum inquiras sollicitudine, nobis hanc conferat collationem, per quam eum salubriter possis invenire. Nunc me ad interrogata, prout ipse concesserit, superest respondere.

Jew: May the Lord himself, who seems to have inspired this zeal in you, that for the salvation of your soul you should inquire with so great solicitude, grant us this conference, through which you may be able to find him in a salutary way. Now it remains for me to answer the questions, as he himself shall have granted.

Philosophus: Sic profecto convenit iuxta propositi nostri condictum.

Philosopher: Thus indeed it agrees, according to the stipulation of our proposal.

Iudaeus: Omnes quidem homines, dum parvuli sunt nec adhuc discretionis aetate pollent, constat eorum hominum fidem vel consuetudinem sequi, cum quibus conversantur, et eorum maxime, quos amplius diligunt. Postquam vero adulti sunt, ut proprio regi possint arbitrio, non alieno, sed proprio committi iudicio debent, nec tam opinionem sectari quam veritatem scrutari convenit. Haec autem ideo praelibavi, quia fortasse primo ad hanc fidem nos carnalis originis affectus induxerit et consuetudo, quam primo novimus.

Jew: All men indeed, while they are little and do not yet possess the age of discretion, plainly follow the faith or the custom of those with whom they converse, and especially of those whom they love more. But after they are adults, so that they may be ruled by their own choice, they ought to be committed not to another’s but to their own judgment, and it is fitting not so much to follow opinion as to scrutinize the truth. I have premised these things for this reason, because perhaps at the first to this faith the affection of carnal origin and the custom which we first knew have led us.

Sed iam nos hic ratio detinet potius quam opinio.

But now here reason detains us rather than opinion.

Philosophus: Hanc nobis obsecro rationem aperi, et sufficit.

Philosopher: Open this reason to us, I beseech, and it suffices.

Iudaeus: Lex ista, quam sequimur, si, ut credimus, a Deo nobis data sit, arguendi non sumus ei obtemperando, immo de obedientia remunerandi, et qui eam contemnunt, vehementer errant; quod si vos eam cogere non possumus a Deo datam fuisse, nec vos hoc refellere valetis. Ut autem ex humanae consuetudine vitae sumamus exemplum, da mihi, obsecro, consilium!

Jew: That law which we follow—if, as we believe, it has been given to us by God—we are not to be accused for by obeying it; rather we are to be remunerated for obedience, and those who contemn it err vehemently; but if we cannot compel you to concede that it was given by God, neither are you able to refute this. But, that we may take an example from the consuetude of human life, give me, I beseech, counsel!

Servus sum cuiusdam domini, et eum offendere vehementer timeo et multos habeo conservos eodem timore sollicitos. Dicunt illi mihi dominum nostrum quiddam praecepisse omnibus servis suis me absente, quod ego ignoro, quod et illi operantur et ad cooperandum me hortantur.

I am a servant of a certain lord, and I greatly fear to offend him, and I have many fellow-servants anxious with the same fear. They tell me that our lord has enjoined something upon all his servants in my absence, which I do not know, and they themselves are carrying it out and urge me to cooperate.

Quid mihi laudas faciendum esse, si de eo dubitaverim praecepto, cui ego non interfui? Non credo vel te vel alium mihi consulere, ut servorum omnium consilio spreto sensum proprium sequens unum me sequestrem ab eo, quod illi communiter agunt et quod omnes praecepisse dominum testantur, maxime cum tale videatur praeceptum, quod nulla possit ratione refelli. Quid mihi necesse est de periculo dubitare, a quo possum securus existere?

What do you commend me to do, if I have doubted about that precept at which I was not present? I do not believe that either you or anyone else would counsel me, with the counsel of all the servants spurned, following my own sense, to sequester myself alone from that which they are doing in common and which all testify the master has commanded—especially since it seems such a precept as can by no rationale be refuted. What need have I to doubt about a peril from which I am able to be secure?

Si hoc Dominus praeceperit, quod multorum testimonio confirmatur et plurimum habet rationis, inexcusabilis omnino sum, qui non obedio. Si autem consilio vel exhortatione et exemplo conservorum deceptus, quod praeceptum non sit, operor, etsi operandum non fuerit, illis potius quam mihi est imputandum, quem ad hoc reverentia domini traxit.

If the master has commanded this, which is confirmed by the testimony of many and has very much of reason, I am altogether inexcusable for not obeying. But if, deceived by the counsel or exhortation and the example of my fellow-servants, I do what is not a precept—even if it ought not to have been done—it is to be imputed to them rather than to me, whom reverence for the master drew to this.

Philosophus: Certe tu ipse consilium aperuisti, quod requisisti, nemoque contra hoc discretus senserit, sed apta propositae similitudinis exemplum ad hoc, quod tendimus!

Philosopher: Surely you yourself have laid open the counsel which you required, and no discreet man has thought against this, but it is an apt example of the proposed similitude for that to which we tend!

Iudaeus: Multae, sicut ipse nosti, generationes praecesserunt, ex quo populus noster hoc Testamentum, quod sibi datum esse a Deo autumant, oboediendo custodierunt, et omnes pariter de observatione ipsius tam verbo quam exemplo posteros instruxerunt, et fere in hoc universus consentit mundus, quod haec nobis a Deo lex data sit. De qua, si quos forte non possumus incredulos cogere, nemo tamen est, qui hoc, quod credimus, ratione possit aliqua refellere. Pium quippe est sentire et omnino rationi consentaneum et tam divinae bonitati quam humanae congruum saluti Deum in tantum curam hominum gerere, ut eos quoque legis scripto dignaretur instruere et timore saltem poenarum nostram malitiam reprimere.

Jew: Many generations, as you yourself know, have gone before since our people, by obeying, have kept this Testament, which they aver was given to them by God; and all alike have instructed their posterity in the observation of it, both by word and by example; and almost the whole world consents in this, that this law was given to us by God. Concerning which, if there are perhaps some incredulous whom we cannot compel, yet there is no one who can by any reasoning refute this which we believe. For it is pious to think, and altogether consonant with reason, and congruent both to divine benignity and to human salvation, that God bears so great a care for men as to deign also to instruct them by the writing of a law, and to repress our malice at least by fear of punishments.

Si enim salubriter ad hoc saecularium principum leges institutae sunt, quis summum omnium benignissimumque principem contradicat de hoc quoque curam suscepisse? Quomodo enim quis sine lege subiectum populum gubernare poterit, si videlicet quisque suo dimissus arbitrio, quod elegerit, sequatur? Aut quomodo iuste puniendo malos eorum malitiam compescet, nisi prius lex statuta sit, quae mala fieri vetet?

For if the laws of secular princes have been instituted salubriously for this end, who would contradict that the supreme and most benignant ruler of all has undertaken care for this as well? For how will anyone be able to govern a subject people without law, if, namely, each person, left to his own discretion, follows what he has chosen? Or how will he restrain their malice by justly punishing the wicked, unless first a law has been enacted which forbids evils to be done?

Hac ratione liquidum esse credo divinam legem in hominibus praecessisse, ut huius quoque boni mundus exordium et auctoritatem a Deo sumeret, cum aliquarum legum institutione malitiam refrenare vellet? Alioquin facile videri posset Deum res humanas non curare et ipsum mundi statum fortuitu potius agi quam providentia regi. Si qua vero lex a Deo data esse creditur mundo, de qua magis est sentiendum quam de nostra, quae tantam ex vetustate et communi hominum opinione nacta est auctoritatem?

By this reasoning I believe it is clear that the divine law has preceded among men, so that the world too might take the exordium and authority of this good from God, since he wished to restrain malice by the institution of certain laws? Otherwise it could easily seem that God does not care for human affairs, and that the very condition of the world is driven by fortuity rather than governed by providence. But if any law is believed to have been given by God to the world, about which should one think more than about our own, which has obtained such great authority from antiquity and the common opinion of men?

Sit denique dubium mihi sicut et tibi, quod hanc Deus legem instituerit, quod tot tamen testimoniis et ratione confirmatur, cogeris tamen secundum suppositae similitudinis inductionem id mihi consulere, ut ipsi oboediam, maxime cum ad hoc propria me invitet conscientia. Fidem tecum de unius Dei veritate communem habeo, aeque ipsum fortassis, ut tu, diligo et ex operibus, quae tu non habes, id insuper exhibeo. Quid mihi haec opera, si non prosint, officiunt, etiam si non sint praecepta, quia non sunt prohibita?

Let it, finally, be doubtful to me just as to you, that God instituted this law, which yet is confirmed by so many testimonies and by reason; nevertheless you are compelled, according to the induction of the supposed similitude, to advise me this: that I obey it, especially since to this my own conscience invites me. I have with you a faith in common concerning the verity of the one God; I perhaps love him equally, as you do, and by works which you do not have I furthermore exhibit that. What harm do these works do me, if they do not profit, even if they are not precepts, since they are not prohibited?

Quis me etiam arguere possit, si nullo etiam constrictus praecepto amplius pro Domino laboro? Quis hanc arguerit fidem, quae divinam bonitatem maxime, ut dictum est, commendat et plurimum nostram in eum caritatem accendit, qui adeo de nostra sollicitus sit salute, ut nos etiam scripto legis dignetur instruere? Aut igitur aliquid in hac lege argue aut, cur eam sequamur, inquirere desiste!

Who could even arraign me, if, constrained by no precept, I labor further for the Lord? Who would arraign this faith, which, most especially, as has been said, commends divine goodness and in the highest degree inflames our charity toward him, who is so solicitous for our salvation that he even deigns to instruct us by written law? Either, then, bring some charge against this law, or cease inquiring why we should follow it!

Crudelissimum Deum astruit esse, quisquis huius zeli nostri perseverantiamtantasustinentem a mercede vacuam esse censet. Nulla quippe gens umquamtantapro Deo pertulisse noscitur aut etiam creditur, quanta nos iugiter pro ipso sustinemus; nullaque rubigo peccati esse potest, quam non consumere fornacem huius afflictionis concedi debeat.

He asserts God to be most cruel, whoever judges that the perseverance of this our zeal, enduring such great things, is empty of reward. For no nation ever is known, or even believed, to have borne so great things for God as we continually endure for him; and there can be no rust of sin which ought not to be conceded to be consumed by the furnace of this affliction.

Nonne in omnes dispersi nationes soli sine rege vel principe terreno tantis exactionibus gravamur , ut singulis fere diebus vitae nostrae miserae redemptionem exsolvamus intolerabilem? Tanto quippe nos contemptu et odio digni censemur ab omnibus, ut quisquis nobis aliquam inferat iniuriam, id maximam credat iustitiam et summum deo sacrificium oblatum. Non enim tantae captivitatis calamitatem nisi ex summo Dei odio nobis autumant accidisse, et iustae imputant ultioni, quamcumque in nos exercent saevitiam tam gentiles quam Christiani.

Are we not, dispersed into all nations, alone without a king or earthly prince, burdened by such exactions, that on almost each single day we pay out the intolerable redemption of our wretched life? For we are deemed by all worthy of so great contempt and hatred, that whoever inflicts any injury upon us believes that to be the greatest justice and the highest sacrifice offered to God. For they assert that the calamity of so great captivity has befallen us only from the supreme hatred of God, and they impute to just vengeance whatever savagery they exercise against us, both Gentiles and Christians.

Gentiles quidem antiquarum memores oppressionum, quibus eorum primo terram possedimus et diuturnis eos postmodum persecutionibus attrivimus atque delevimus, quidquid nobis ingerunt, debitae imputant ultioni.

The gentiles indeed, mindful of ancient oppressions, by which we first possessed their land and afterwards with long-continued persecutions wore them down and destroyed them, whatever they inflict upon us, they impute to due vengeance.

Christiani vero, quia, ut aiunt, eorum Deum interfecimus, maiorem in nos persecutionis causam habere videntur. Ecce inter quales nostra exsulat peregrinatio et de quorum nobis est patrocinio confidendum! Summis inimicis nostris vitam nostram committimus et infidelium fidei nos credere cogimur.

The Christians, for their part, because, as they say, we killed their God, seem to have a greater cause of persecution against us. Behold among what sort our peregrination is in exile, and upon whose patronage we must place our confidence! To our greatest enemies we entrust our life, and we are compelled to entrust ourselves to the faith of infidels.

Somnus ipse, qui laxatam maxime fovet ac recreat naturam,tantanos inquietat sollicitudine, ut dormientes etiam non nisi de iuguli nostri periculo liceat cogitare. Nusquam nisi ad coelum tutus nobis patet ingressus, quibus ipse etiam habitationis locus est periculosus. Egressuri ad quaelibet proxima loca ipsum, de quo parurn confidimus, conductum non modico pretio conducimus.Principesipsi, qui nobis praesunt et quorum graviter emimus patrocinium, tanto amplius mortem nostram desiderant, quanto licentius ea, quae possidemus, diripiunt.

Sleep itself, which most cherishes and recreates the relaxed nature,so greatly disturbs us with solicitude that even while sleeping it is permitted to think of nothing except the peril of our throat. Nowhere save toward heaven does safe ingress lie open to us, for whom even the very place of habitation is perilous. About to go out to whatever nearby places, the very escort, in whom we have but little confidence, we hire at no modest price. The princes themselves, who are set over us and whose patronage we have grievously bought, so much the more desire our death, the more licentiously they plunder the things which we possess.

Quibus etiam constrictis et oppressis, quasi in nos solos coniurasset mundus, hoc ipsum mirabile est, si vivere licet; nec agros aut vineas aut terrenas aliquas possessiones habere conceditur, quia non est, qui eas nobis ab infestatione manifesta vel occulta protegere possit. Unde nobis praecipue superest lucrum, ut alienigenis faenerantes hinc miseram sustentemus Vitam, quod nos quidem maxime ipsis efficit invidiosos, qui se in hoc plurimum arbitrantur gravatos. De hac autem vitae nostrae miseria summa, et quibus incessanter periculis laboramus, ipse magis status noster omnibus loqui sufficit, quam lingua possit.

With these also bound and oppressed, as if the world had conspired against us alone, it is itself a wonder if we are allowed to live; nor is it conceded to have fields or vineyards or any earthly possessions, because there is no one who can protect them for us from manifest or occult infestation. Whence there chiefly remains to us this profit: that, by lending at interest to aliens, we hence sustain our wretched Life, which indeed makes us most envied—odious—to those very persons, who suppose themselves most heavily burdened in this matter. But concerning this sum of the misery of our life, and the perils under which we incessantly labor, our very condition suffices to speak to all more than the tongue could.

Ipsa quoque legis praecepta, quanta difficultate sint implicita, neminem, qui eam attigerit, latet, ut tam hominum oppressione quam iugo legis intolerabiliter affligamur. Quis non ipsum circumcisionis nostrae sacramentum cum ex erubescentia tum ex poena suscipere non abhorreat aut trepidet? Quae tam tenera humani corporis portio quam illa, cui hanc plagam in ipsis quoque infantulis lex infligit?

Even the very precepts of the law—how entangled they are with difficulty—escape no one who has come into contact with it, so that we are intolerably afflicted both by the oppression of men and by the yoke of the law. Who would not shrink from or tremble to receive the very sacrament of our circumcision, both from shame and from penalty? What portion of the human body is so tender as that to which the law inflicts this wound even upon the little infants themselves?

Quaetantaest agrestium lactucarum amaritudo, quas in condimento paschalis sacrificii sumimus? Quis non videat etiam omnes fere delicatos cibos et eos maxime, qui facile comparari possunt, nobis esse prohibitos? Carnes quaelibet a bestiis praegustatae nobis immundae sunt et quaelibet morticina vel suffocata nobis sunt interdicta.

How great is the bitterness of rustic lettuces, which we take as a seasoning for the Paschal sacrifice? Who does not see that almost all delicate foods, and especially those which can most easily be procured, are forbidden to us? Any meats pre-tasted by beasts are unclean for us, and any carcasses or things strangled are interdicted to us.

Nec de bestiis nobis edere licet, nisi quas nos ipsi mactaverimus et diligenter adipe et venis purgaverimus, quod nos etiam non modice gravat, et tunc maxime, cum integrum pecus emere non sufficimus. Sicut enim nos carnes a gentibus mactatas, sic illi a nobis procuratas abhorrent. Vino quoque ab aliis procurato omnes pariter abstinemus.

Nor is it permitted for us to eat of beasts, except those which we ourselves have slaughtered and have diligently cleansed of fat and veins—a thing which also burdens us not moderately, and most of all when we are not able to purchase a whole animal. For just as we abhor meats slaughtered by the nations, so do they abhor those procured by us. From wine likewise procured by others we all equally abstain.

Ex quo liquidum esse constat, quam difficile inter vos nostra propter Deum vivat peregrinatio. Quis denique legalium poenarum austeritatem non solum sufferre, sed etiam reis inferre non abhorreat? Quis fratri suo dentem pro dente, oculum pro oculo, animam quoque pro anima tollere sustineat, nedum etiam in semetipso haec tolerare consentiat, ne videlicet legi contrarius existat?

From this it is clear how difficult our peregrination for the sake of God lives among you. Who, finally, does not shrink from not only suffering the austerity of legal penalties, but also inflicting them upon the accused? Who would endure to take from his brother a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye, and even a life for a life—much less consent to tolerate these in himself—lest, to wit, he stand contrary to the law?

Ex quibus profecto et innumeris aliis observationibus liquet unumquemque nostrum legi obtemperantem illud Psalmistae Deo recte profiteri: Propter verba labiorum tuorum ego custodivi vias duras.

From which indeed and from innumerable other observations it is clear that each of us, obeying the law, rightly professes to God that of the Psalmist: Because of the words of your lips I have kept hard ways.

Philosophus: Revera zelus hic, quem in Deum habere videmini, multa et magna quacumque intentione sustinet. Sed plurimum refert, utrum haec intentio recta sit an erronea. Nulla quippe est fidei secta, quae se Deo famulari non credat et ea propter ipsum non operetur, quae ipsi placere arbitratur.

Philosopher: Indeed, this zeal, which you seem to have toward God, sustains many and great things, whatever the intention. But it matters very much whether this intention is right or erroneous. For there is no sect of faith which does not believe itself to serve God and, on his account, perform those things which it judges to be pleasing to him.

Non tamen ideo sectas omnium approbatis, qui solam vestram defendere aut longe ceteris nitimini praeferre. Quod tamen, quantum a ratione sit dissonum, volo te perpendere et ex ipso quoque scripto legis, quam sequeris, arguere.

Not, however, on that account do you approve the sects of all, you who strive to defend yours alone or to prefer it far before the others. This, however, how dissonant it is from reason, I want you to weigh, and to argue it from the very writing of the law which you follow.

Iudaeus: Et hoc ego libenter suscipio.

Jew: And this too I gladly undertake.

Philosophus: Constat ante ipsam legis traditionem vel sacramentorum legalium observationes plerosque lege naturali contentos, quae videlicet in dilectione Dei consistit et proximi, iustitiam coluisse et acceptissimos Deo exstitisse, utpote Abel, Henoch, Noe, et filios eius, Abraham quoque,Lotatque Melchisedech, quos lex etiam vestra commemorat et plurimum commendat. Quorum quidem Henoch in tantum Deo placuisse refertur, ut eum Dominus vivum in paradisum intulisse dicatur, sicut et quidam ex vobis his astruit verbis: Henoch placuit Deo et translatus est in paradisum, ut det gentibus poenitentiam.

Philosopher: It is agreed that before the very tradition of the Law itself or the observances of the legal sacraments, many, content with the natural law—which indeed consists in the love of God and of neighbor—cultivated justice and stood as most acceptable to God, as namely Abel, Enoch, Noah and his sons, Abraham also, Lot as well, and Melchizedek, whom even your Law commemorates and very greatly commends. Of whom indeed Enoch is reported to have so pleased God that the Lord is said to have carried him alive into Paradise, just as also a certain one of you affirms with these words: Enoch pleased God and was translated into Paradise, that he might give repentance to the nations.

Sed et Noe, sicut scriptum est, virum iustum atque perfectum in generationibus suis, quantum dilexerit Dominus, manifestis exhibuit factis, cum videlicet universis aliis diluvio submersis ipsum solum et domum eius pro humani generis semine reservavit. His quoque insignes illos patriarchas vestros adiunge, Abraham videlicet, Isaac et Iacob, in quibus et eorum semine omnium gentium benedictio futura promittitur, qui etiam legem praecesserunt, et vide, quam sit excellentior eorum praerogativa quam ceterorum, qui post legem exstiterunt. Unde et specialiter Deus eorum esse dicitur, et ipse legislator Moyses per eorum merita et ad ipsos promissiones lactas iratum populo Dominum conciliat.

But also Noah, as it is written, a just man and perfect in his generations—how much the Lord loved him He showed by manifest deeds, since, with all others submerged by the deluge, Him alone and his household He preserved as the seed of the human race. To these, moreover, add those renowned patriarchs of yours, namely Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in whom and in their seed the blessing of all nations is promised to be in the future—who also preceded the Law—and see how much more excellent their prerogative is than that of the others who arose after the Law. Whence also God is said in a special way to be their God, and the legislator Moses himself, by their merits and by the promises made to them, conciliates the Lord angered against the people.

Scriptum est enim: Moyses autern orabat Dominum dicens: Quiescat ira tua et esto placabilis super nequitiam populi tui. Recordare Abraham, Isaac etIsraelservorum tuorum, quibus iurasti per temetipsum dicens: Multiplicabo semen tuum sicut stellas coeli et universam terram hanc, de qua locutus sum, dabo semini vestro, et possidebitis eam semper. Placatusque est Dominus, ne faceret malum, quod locutus fuerat.

For it is written: Moses, however, was praying to the Lord, saying: Let your wrath rest and be placable over the iniquity of your people. Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, your servants, to whom you swore by your very self, saying: I will multiply your seed like the stars of heaven, and all this land of which I have spoken I will give to your seed, and you shall possess it forever. And the Lord was placated, not to do the evil which he had spoken.

Ex quo liquide colligitur, quam accepta Deo fuerint illa priorum patrum obsequia gratuita, ad quae nondum eos aliqua lex constringebat, in qua nos adhuc ei libertate deservimus. Quod si in Abraham legem quodammodo dicas incepisse propter circumcisionis scilicet sacramentum, nullam profecto reperies eum ex hoc remunerationem apud Deum obtinere, ne qua sit vobis ex lege gloriatio, nec quidquam iustificationis adeptum esse nec de hoc etiam ipsum a Domino commendatum esse. Scriptum quippe est ipsum nondum circumcisum per fidem sicut priores patres iustificari, cum dicitur: Credidit Abraham Deo, et reputatum est illi ad iustitiam.

From this it is clearly gathered how acceptable to God were those free obediences of the earlier fathers, to which no law was yet constraining them, in which liberty we even now render service to Him. But if you should say that in Abraham the Law in a certain manner began, namely on account of the sacrament of circumcision, you will assuredly find that he obtained no remuneration with God from this—lest there be for you any boasting from the Law—nor that he attained anything of justification, nor that he himself was commended by the Lord for this either. For it is written that he himself, not yet circumcised, was justified through faith, just as the former fathers, when it is said: Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned to him for righteousness.

Cuius etiam religio antea promissionem terrae vel multiplicationis futurae tam sibi quam semini suo susceperat. Qui et postea circumcisus, cum audit a Domino in se vel in semine suo gentes omnes benedicendas, non hoc ex circumcisione, sed ex illa meruit oboedientia, qua voluit filium immolare. Denique si universam Testamenti vestri revolvas historiam, nullam reperies circumcisionis remunerationem promissam, sed id tantum a Domino constitutum esse, ut quisquis de semine Abrahae circumcisus non fuerit, in populo suo, id est inter filios Abrahae, non connumeretur.

Whose devotion also had previously received the promise of the land and of future multiplication both for himself and for his seed. And he, afterwards circumcised, when he hears from the Lord that in himself or in his seed all nations are to be blessed, did not merit this from circumcision, but from that obedience by which he willed to immolate his son. Finally, if you turn over the whole history of your Testament, you will find no remuneration of circumcision promised; but only this to have been constituted by the Lord: that whoever of the seed of Abraham shall not have been circumcised is not to be counted among his people—that is, among the sons of Abraham.

Sic quippe scriptum est Domino Abraham dicente: Statuam pactum meum inter me et te, et semen tuum post te, etc. Hoc est pactum, quod observabitis. Circumcidetur ex vobis omne masculinum, infans octo dierum circumcidetur in vobis.

Thus indeed it is written, the Lord saying to Abraham: “I will establish my pact between me and you, and your seed after you, etc. This is the pact which you shall observe. Every male among you shall be circumcised; an infant of eight days shall be circumcised among you.”

Masculus, cuius praeputii caro circumcisa non fuerit, peribit anima illa de populo suo, etc.

The male, whose prepuce’s flesh shall not have been circumcised, that soul shall perish from his people, etc.

Quod quidem perire, si de damnatione quoque animae intelligendum esse dixeritis, tanto minus habet rationis institutio circumcisionis, quanto periculosius est eam non habere, sine qua prius nihil officiebat esse. Quae etiam sententia regnum coelorum praestruit infantibus ante diem octavum morientibus, qui nullam tamen adhuc commiserunt noxam, qua damnari meruerint. Quod etiam diligenter attendas, quam remunerationem observantiae totius legis Dominus promittat ac praefigat.

If indeed you should say that this “perish” is to be understood also of the damnation of the soul, the institution of circumcision has so much the less of rationale, by as much as it is more perilous not to have it—without which previously nothing hindered being. This opinion also blocks up the kingdom of the heavens for infants dying before the eighth day, who nevertheless have as yet committed no harm by which they might have deserved to be damned. Also attend carefully to what remuneration for the observance of the whole law the Lord promises and prefigures.

Nihil utique inde ab eo nisi terrenam prosperitatem potestis exspectare, cum nihil aliud ibi promissum esse videatis. Qui cum n ec ostendat, utrum hanc saltem obtineatis, qui vestro quoque iudicio super omnes mortales affligimini, qua spe in hac legis oboedientia tot ettantasustineatis, non mediocriter est mirandum, cum illo videlicet commodo praecipue frustrati sitis, quod specialiter ex ipso promissionis debito vobis est exspectandum. Aut igitur non impletis legem et per hoc maledictum legis incurritis damnandi, aut qui haec implentibus legem promisit, verax in suis non existit promissis.

Assuredly you can expect nothing from it except earthly prosperity, since you see that nothing else is promised there. And since he does not show whether you at least obtain this—you who, by your own judgment, are afflicted above all mortals—by what hope, in this obedience to the law, you endure so many and such great things is no small matter for wonder, since you are manifestly frustrated above all of that benefit which, from the very debt of the promise, is to be expected by you in particular. Either, therefore, you do not fulfill the law and by this incur the curse of the law unto condemnation, or he who promised these things to those fulfilling the law does not prove veracious in his promises.

Quodcumque autem horum eligatis, nihil de lege video vobis confidendum esse, parum etiam ad beatitudinem mereatur. Quid rogo, exstitit, quod cum ad legis observantiam ex eius remuneratione vos Deus invitatet, quod minimum est, promisit, et quod est maximum, penitus reticuit?

Whatever of these you choose, I see that you have nothing in the Law to put confidence in; it even merits little toward beatitude. What, I ask, has arisen, that, while God invites you to the observance of the Law by its remuneration, he promised what is least, and, as to what is greatest, kept utterly silent?

Non discrete profecto peroravit, si utrumque ad legis oboedientiam sufficere novit, cum id videlicet, quod suasione plurimum valebat, omnino praeteriit. Nihil quippe, ut dictum est, de vera illa et aeterna beatitudine ibi est in remuneratione commemoratum, sed in tantum terrena prosperitas intimatur, ut hoc tantum in causa oboedientiae constituatur; et in tantum commendatur, ut per huius responsionem omni posterorum inquisitioni satisfieri censeatur. Sic quippe scriptum est ipso legislatore Moyse populum instruente adversus quamlibet legis impugnationem atque dicente: Audi, Israel; custodi praecepta Domini, Dei tui, ac testimonia et caeremonias, quae praeceperit, et fac, quod placitum est et bonum in conspectu Domini, ut bene sit tibi et ingressus possideas terram optimam, de qua iuravit patribus tuis, ut deleret omnes inimicos tuos coram te, sicut locutus est.

He certainly did not argue discretely, if he knew both to suffice for obedience to the law, since, indeed, he altogether passed over that which was of greatest avail by suasion. For nothing, as has been said, of that true and eternal beatitude is there mentioned in the remuneration, but to such an extent is earthly prosperity intimated, that this alone is constituted as the consideration for obedience; and to such an extent is it commended, that by this response it is judged that full satisfaction is given to every inquiry of posterity. For thus it is written, with the very legislator Moses instructing the people against whatever impugnation of the law and saying: Hear, Israel; keep the precepts of the Lord, your God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which he shall have commanded, and do what is pleasing and good in the sight of the Lord, that it may be well with you and, upon entering, you may possess the best land, concerning which he swore to your fathers, that he would blot out all your enemies before you, as he has spoken.

Cum interrogaverit te filius tuus cras dicens, quid sibi volunt testimonia haec et caerimoniae atque iudicia, quae praecepit Dominus, Deus noster, nobis, dices ei: Servi eramus Pharaonis in Aegypto, et eduxit nos Dominus de Aegypto in manu forti, fecitque signa, prodigia atque magna et pessima in Aegypto contra Pharaonem et omnem domum illius in conspectu nostro, et eduxit nos inde, ut introductis daret terram, super qua iuravit patribus nostris. Praecepitque nobis Dominus, ut faciamus omnia legitima haec et timeamus Dominum, Deum nostrum, et bene sit nobis cunctis diebus vitae nostrae, sicut est hodie.

When your son asks you tomorrow, saying, ‘What do these testimonies and ceremonies and judgments mean, which the Lord our God has commanded us?’, you shall say to him: ‘We were slaves of Pharaoh in Egypt, and the Lord brought us out of Egypt with a strong hand, and he did signs and prodigies, great and terrible, in Egypt against Pharaoh and his whole house before our eyes, and he brought us out from there, so that, once we had been brought in, he might give us the land over which he swore to our fathers. And the Lord commanded us to do all these statutes and to fear the Lord our God, that it may be well with us all the days of our life, as it is today.’

Item: Te elegit Dominus, Deus tuus, ut sis ei populus peculiaris de cunctis populis, qui sunt supra terram. Custodi ergo praecepta et caeremonias atque iudicia, quae ego mando tibi hodie, ut facias. Si custodieris ea et feceris, custodiet et Dominus, Deus tuus, tibi pactum et misericordiam, quam iuravit patribus tuis, et diliget te ac multiplicabit, benedicetque fructui ventris tui et fructui terrae tuae, frumento atque vindemiae, oleo et armentis, gregibus ovium tuarum super terram, pro qua iuravit patribus tuis, ut daret eam tibi.

Likewise: The Lord, your God, has chosen you, that you may be to him a peculiar people out of all the peoples who are upon the earth. Therefore keep the precepts and the ceremonies and the judgments which I command to you today, that you may do them. If you shall keep them and do them, the Lord, your God, also will keep for you the pact and mercy which he swore to your fathers, and he will love you and will multiply you, and he will bless the fruit of your womb and the fruit of your land, grain and vintage, oil and herds, the flocks of your sheep, upon the land for which he swore to your fathers that he would give it to you.

Benedictus eris inter omnes populos; non erit apud te sterilis utriusque sexus tam in hominibus quam in gregibus tuis. Auferet a te omnem languorem et infirmitates Aegypti pessimas, quas novisti, non inferet tibi, sed cunctis hostibus tuis. Devorabis omnes populos, quos Dominus, Deus tuus, daturus est tibi.

Blessed you will be among all peoples; there will not be among you a sterile one of either sex, both among human beings and in your flocks. He will remove from you every languor and the worst infirmities of Egypt, which you have known; he will not bring them upon you, but upon all your enemies. You will devour all the peoples whom the Lord, your God, is going to give to you.

Et rursum: Dabit pluviam terrae nostrae temporaneam et serotinam, ut colligatis frumenta, vinum et oleum, fenum ex agris ad pascenda iumenta, et ut ipsi comedatis et saturemini. Venientque super te universae benedictiones istae et apprehendent te, si tantum praecepta eius audieris. Benedictus tu in civitate et benedictus in agro.

And again: He will give to our land the early and the late rain, so that you may gather grain, wine, and oil, hay from the fields for feeding the beasts of burden, and so that you yourselves may eat and be satisfied. And all these benedictions will come upon you and will lay hold of you, if only you will hearken to his precepts. Blessed are you in the city and blessed in the field.

Benedictus fructus ventris tui et fructus terrae tuae, fructusque iumentorum tuorum, greges armentorum tuorum, et caulae ovium tuorum. Benedicta horrea tua et benedictae reliquiae. Benedictus eris ingrediens et egrediens.

Blessed shall be the fruit of your womb and the fruit of your land, and the offspring of your beasts of burden, the herds of your cattle, and the folds of your sheep. Blessed shall be your storehouses and blessed shall be your remnants. Blessed shall you be entering and exiting.

Benedicet cuntis operibus manuum tuarum et faenerabis gentibus multis et ipse a nullo faenus accipies.

He will bless all the works of your hands, and you will lend on interest to many nations, and you yourself will receive interest from no one.

Ecce in remuneratione implendae legis sicut hominibus, ira et fructui iumentorum tuorum, gregi armentorum tuorum, et caulis ovium benedictio promittitur, et nulla spiritualis benedictionis animae fit mentio, nec quidquam, quod ad salutem animae vel damnationem attinet, oboedientibus vel transgredientibus promittitur, sed sola commoda vel incommoda terrena memorantur his, quae maxima sunt, omnino praetermissis. Quaero etiam, si nunc quoque post legem nobis datam, sicut et antea, lex naturalis ad salutem aliquibus sufficere possit absque videlicet exterioribus illis et propriis legis operibus. Quod quidem nulla ratione negare potestis, cum legem hanc constet tantum vobis esse datam, non aliis populis, nec circumcisiones nisi Abrahae et semini eius esse iniunctas.

Behold, in recompense for the fulfilling of the law, just as to human beings, so also to the fruit of your beasts of burden, to the herd of your cattle, and to the sheepfold there is a benediction promised, and no mention at all is made of any spiritual benediction of the soul, nor is anything that pertains to the salvation or damnation of the soul promised to the obedient or to the transgressing, but only earthly advantages or disadvantages are recounted, with those things which are greatest altogether passed over. I also inquire whether now likewise, after the law has been given to us, just as before, the natural law may be able to suffice for salvation for some, without, to wit, those exterior and proper works of the law. Which indeed you can by no reason deny, since it is agreed that this law was given to you alone, not to other peoples, nor were circumcisions enjoined except to Abraham and his seed.

Ad cuius quidem semen soli pertinent illi, qui de Isaac nascuntur, Domino ad ipsum dicente: Quia in Isaac vocabitur tibi semen. Qui etiam postea, quam circumcisionis pactum instituisset, inferius adiecit: Pactum vero meum statuam ad Isaac.

To whose seed indeed alone pertain those who are born from Isaac, the Lord saying to him: “For in Isaac your seed shall be called.” Who also afterwards, when he had instituted the pact of circumcision, added further: “But my pact—my covenant—I will establish with Isaac.”

Iob quoque gentilem, quem post Abraham sine lege extitisse non dubitatis, in tantum Dominus commendavit, ut diceret: Quod non sit ei similis in terra, homo simplex et rectus ac timens Deum et recedens a malo. Qui per semetipsum suam nobis exponens iustitiam, quam imitemur, nihil de illis legis operibus commemorat, sed tantum legis naturalis opera, quae unicuique ipsa ratio naturalis persuadet. Si ambulavi, inquit, in vanitate, aut festinavit in dolo pes meus, si negavi, quod volebant, pauperibus et oculos viduae exspectare feci, etc.

Job also, a Gentile, whom you do not doubt existed after Abraham without the Law, the Lord commended to such an extent that he said: That there is none like him on the earth, a simple and upright man and fearing God and receding from evil. He, by himself setting forth to us his own justice so that we may imitate it, makes no mention of those works of the Law, but only of the works of natural law, which the natural reason itself persuades to each. If I have walked, he says, in vanity, or my foot has hastened in guile, if I have denied to the poor what they were wanting, and have made the eyes of the widow to wait, etc.

Quae ipse nobis gentilibus tam verbis quam exemplis tamquam legem instituit. Quod si haec vel ante legem vel etiam nunc aliquibus ad salutem sufficiant, quid necesse fuit iugum legis addere et multiplicatis praeceptis transgressiones augere. Ubi enim non est lex, nec eius praevaricatio accidere potest.

Which he himself for us Gentiles established both by words and by examples as if a law. But if these either before the Law or even now suffice for some unto salvation, what need was there to add the yoke of the Law and, with precepts multiplied, to increase transgressions? For where there is no law, neither can prevarication of it occur.

Quomodo vos peculiarem populum lege data constituit et qua rationeIsraelprimogenitum suum nominat, quemtantasarcina sine causa gravat? Quis etiam vos a maledicto legis excusare possit, qui vestris exigentibus peccatis, sicut ipsi profitemini, terram promissionis amisistis, extra quam implere legem nullatenus valetis? Quibus nec vestras permittitur iustitiarum exercere vindictas nec licet ipsa celebrare sacrificia vel oblationes ad peccatorum purgationem institutas nec ipsa etiam divinarum laudum persolvere cantica.

How did he constitute you a peculiar people by a law given, and by what rationale does he name Israel his firstborn, whom he burdens with so great a load without cause? Who moreover could excuse you from the malediction of the Law, you who, your sins requiring it—as you yourselves profess—have lost the land of promise, outside of which you are in no way able to fulfill the Law? To whom it is permitted neither to exercise the vindications of your judgments, nor is it lawful to celebrate the sacrifices themselves or the offerings instituted for the purgation of sins, nor even to discharge the very songs of divine praises.

Quod quidem et vos ipsi profitemini, dicentes: Quomodo cantabimus canticum Domini in terra aliena? Ex quo tam opera legis quam verba sicut et eius remunerationem constat amisisse, nec iam vos ut uxores vestras hostiis vel oblationibus amissis mundari posse vel Domino consecrari sacerdotio pariter et templo privatos, ut nec terrenae dignitatis solatium habeatis, qui numquam a Domino nisi terrena postulatis, nec nisi in terrenis promissionem remunerationis, ut dictum est, accepistis.

Which indeed you yourselves profess, saying: How shall we sing the canticle of the Lord in an alien land? From which it is evident that you have lost both the works and the words of the law, as also its remuneration; and that now neither you nor your wives can be cleansed, the sacrifices and oblations having been lost, nor be consecrated to the Lord, being deprived alike of priesthood and temple, so that you have not even the solace of earthly dignity—you who never petition from the Lord anything except earthly things, and have received, as was said, a promise of remuneration only in earthly matters.

Iudaeus: Multa continue obiecisti, quae non est facile recordari, ut singulis ordine respondeam. Prout tamen haec mihi occurrerint, respondere conabor.

Jew: You have objected many things in succession, which it is not easy to recall so that I may respond to each in order. Yet, as these occur to me, I shall endeavor to respond.

Etsi concederemus nunc quoque more priorum sanctorum homines salvari posse sola naturali lege absque videlicet circumcisione aut ceteris legis scriptae carnalibus observantiis, non tamen haec superflue adiuncta esse concedendum est, sed plurimum utilitatis habere ad amplificandam vel tutius muniendam religionem et ad malitiam amplius reprimendam. Unde et ex his, quae ipse induxisti, nonnullas accipe rationes! Quamdiu fideles passim infidelibus permixti vixerunt nec adhuc Dominus eis terram concesserat propriam, nulla legis observantia fuerunt ab eis divisi, cum quibus vivere cogebantur, ne videlicet ipsa vitae dissimilitudo pareret inimicitias.

Even if we were to concede that now also, in the manner of the former saints, human beings can be saved by the natural law alone, without, namely, circumcision or the other carnal observances of the written law, yet it must not be conceded that these were added superfluously, but that they have very great utility for enlarging or more safely fortifying religion, and for further repressing malice. Whence also, from those things which you yourself have brought forward, take certain reasons! So long as the faithful lived everywhere mixed together with unbelievers, and the Lord had not yet granted them a land of their own, by no observance of the law were they separated from those with whom they were constrained to live, lest, namely, the very dissimilarity of life should beget enmities.

Postquam vero Dominus Abraham de terra et cognatione sua eduxit, ut ei et semini eius terram in hereditatem daret, per quam a gentibus segregarentur, corporalibus quoque legis operibus eos penitus separare decrevit, ut tantominus fideles ab infidelibus corrumpi possent, quanto amplius ab ipsis tam loco quam corporibus disiungerentur.

After, however, the Lord led Abraham out of his land and kindred, to give to him and to his seed the land in inheritance, by which they might be segregated from the nations, he also decreed to separate them utterly by the corporal works of the law, so that the faithful might so much the less be corrupted by the infidels, by how much the more they were disjoined from them both in place and in their bodies.

Unde bene Abrahae et semini eius facta huius terrae promissione, in qua sibi Dominus populum aggregaret et quasi civitatem propriam sibi constitueret, legem coepit instruere, secundum quam ibi essent victuri, a circumcisione inchoans.

Whence rightly, after the promise of this land had been made to Abraham and his seed, in which the Lord would aggregate to himself a people and, as it were, constitute for himself a city of his own, he began to institute the law, according to which they were to live there, beginning with circumcision.

Sciebat quippe Dominus duram populi nostri cervicem futuram et eum ad idolatriam quoque pravosque gentilium mores facile inclinari, sicut re ipsa poste a probatum est. Unde legalibus observantiis quasi maceria quadam interpositis decrevit eorum ritus ita disiungere, ut nulla conversationis vel familiaritatis coniungerentur societate, immo perpetuas hinc adversus se conciperent inimicitias. Maximam vero inter homines familiaritatem copula matrimonii et communio mensae contrahere solet.

For the Lord indeed knew that the neck of our people would be stiff, and that it would easily be inclined to idolatry and also to the depraved customs of the Gentiles, as in very deed it was afterwards proved. Whence, legal observances, as it were a certain wall, having been interposed, he decreed to disjoin their rites in such a way that they might be conjoined by no fellowship of conversation or of familiarity—nay rather, that from this they might conceive perpetual enmities against one another. Moreover, among human beings the bond of matrimony and the communion of the table are wont to contract the greatest familiarity.

Unde ad haec maxime removenda et circumcisionem instituit Dominus et delicatorum ciborum esum interdixit. Adeo namque circumcisionis signum gentibus abominabile videtur, ut, si nos eorum feminas affectaremus, nullatenus nobis in hoc consentirent. Unde, etsi aliae essent rationes, has in praesenti credo sufficere.

Whence, to remove these things especially, the Lord both instituted circumcision and interdicted the eating of delicacies. For so abominable does the sign of circumcision seem to the Gentiles that, if we were to court their women, they would by no means consent to us in this. Whence, even if there were other reasons, I believe these to suffice for the present.

Quod tamen circumcisionis seu legis meritum evacuare vel extenuare laboras ex ipsa scilicet auctoritate Scripturae, per ipsam credo refelli posse, si ea videlicet, quae de serie Scripturae furatus esse reticendo videris, diligenter attendas, quae tibi ‚ credo ‚ nocitura videbas. Cure enim pactum, quod per circumcisionem cum Domino initur, ipse institueret, dixit Abrahae: Statuam pactum meum inter me et te et semen tuum post te in generationibus suis, foedere sempiterno, ut sim Deus tuus et seminis tui. Cum enim foedere sempiterno ait "ut sim Deus tuus et seminis tui", patenter edocet nos ex circumcisione Deo perenniter esse foederandos et per haec nos eum promereri Deum, ut nec in hac vita scilicet nec in futura disiungamur ab ipso.

But that you strive to evacuate or extenuate the merit of circumcision or of the Law, from the authority of Scripture itself, I believe can be refuted through that very authority, if indeed you carefully attend to those things which you seem to have filched from the sequence of Scripture by keeping silence, which ‚ I believe ‚ you saw would be harmful to you. For when he himself instituted the pact which is entered with the Lord through circumcision, he said to Abraham: "I will set my pact between me and you and your seed after you in their generations, by an eternal covenant, that I may be your God and of your seed." For when with an eternal covenant he says "that I may be your God and of your seed", he plainly instructs us that from circumcision we are perennially to be bound by covenant to God, and through these things we merit him as God, so that neither in this life, namely, nor in the future are we sundered from him.

Quod etiam ipse repetens, ut magis memoriae commendet, adiecit: Eritque pactum meum in carne vestra in foedus aeternum, ut quemadmodum scilicet circumcisio in carne semel facta aboleri iam non potest, sic nequaquam a Deo ulterius disiungi, qui nos specialiter confortans ait: Eritis mihi in populum et ego vobis ero in Deum.

Which also he himself, repeating it to commend it more to memory, added: And my pact shall be in your flesh as an eternal covenant, so that, just as circumcision once done in the flesh can no longer be abolished, thus by no means are we to be further disjoined from God, who, specially strengthening us, says: You shall be to me for a people, and I will be to you for a God.

Unde et Deum specialiter Hebraeorum, non tantum Deum Abraham, Isaac et Iacob se ipse nominat. In tantum vero ex circumcisione Deus Abrahae sive filiorum eius fieri innuitur, qui ante circumcisionem nec horum nec hominum Deus sit appellatus. Congruum autem foederis signum inter se et nos circumcisionis instituit, ut, qui illo membro scilicet generantur, quod specialiter post susceptae circumcisionis oboedientiam consecratur, ex ipso quoque suae generationis instrumento se sanctificari Domino admoneantur, ut sic videlicet interius a vitiis circumcidantur in corde, sicut iam exterius circumcisi sunt in carne; et a praecedente sua Chaldeorum infidelium origine ita moribus se amputent, sicut primam illius membri partem a se removerunt, non tam ab eis cum Abraham corpore quam mente egredientes, sicut David commemorat fidelem animam invitans sic: Obliviscere populum tuum et domum patris tui etc.

Whence also He names Himself specially the God of the Hebrews, not only the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Moreover, to such an extent from circumcision He is intimated to become the God of Abraham and of his sons—He who before circumcision had not been called the God either of these or of men. And He instituted as a congruous sign of the covenant between Himself and us the circumcision, so that those who are generated by that member, which is specially consecrated after the obedience of circumcision has been received, may be admonished that by that very instrument of their generation they are to be sanctified to the Lord; so that thus, namely, inwardly they may be circumcised from vices in heart, just as already outwardly they have been circumcised in flesh; and from their preceding origin of the unbelieving Chaldeans they thus amputate themselves in conduct, just as they removed from themselves the first part of that member, going forth not so much from them with Abraham in body as in mind, as David commemorates, inviting the faithful soul thus: Forget your people and your father’s house, etc.

Unde et Dominus populum vineae comparans electae conqueritur se expectasse, ut faceret uvas, et fecit labruscas. Sicut autem totus eius populus vineae comparatur, sic singuli fideles vitibus et eorum genitalia propaginibus congrue conferuntur. Palmes autem vitis, nisi in se praecidatur, labruscas potius quam uvas affert et incultus remanet.

Whence also the Lord, comparing the people to a chosen vineyard, laments that he expected it to produce grapes, and it produced wild grapes. And just as his whole people is compared to a vineyard, so individual faithful are fittingly compared to vines, and their genitals to offshoots. Moreover, the shoot of a vine, unless it is pruned back upon itself, bears wild grapes rather than grapes and remains uncultivated.

Ad hanc itaque similitudinem divinae circa nos culturae diligentiam praeputium signat amputatum, ex quo nos Deus excolere incipit.

To this likeness, therefore, the foreskin cut off signifies the diligence of the divine cultivation with respect to us, from which God begins to cultivate us.

Quod si etiam humanae culpae in primis parentibus exordia revolvas et Dominicam in mulierem sententiam poenae prolatam, cum ei videlicet dicitur: In dolore paries filios, videbis quoque virum participem peccati in genitali praecipue membro recte fieri poenae consortem, ut in illo videlicet membro recte patiatur, per quod vitae praesentis exsilio filios generat morituros de paradiso se et nos pariter propria transgressione in huius vitae deiciens aerumnas. Nam et mulier in partu laborans recte ex illo, quo concipit et generat, membro patitur, et ipsam concupiscentiae voluptatem, quam habet in conceptu, plectitur in partu, et poenam insuper solvit, quam peccando acquisivit. Quae quoniam prior peccavit et virum postmodum ad peccatum traxit, non incongrue in hac etiam poena ipsa praecessit.

But if you also roll back the beginnings of human fault in the first parents and the Lord’s sentence of punishment pronounced upon the woman, when namely it is said to her: In pain you shall bear children, you will likewise see the man, a participant in the sin, rightly made a consort in the punishment especially in the genital member, so that he rightly may suffer in that very member through which, by the exile of the present life, he begets sons destined to die, having cast down himself and us alike from paradise into the hardships of this life by his own transgression. For the woman too, laboring in childbirth, rightly suffers in that member by which she conceives and generates, and the very pleasure of concupiscence which she has in conception is punished in childbirth, and she pays in addition the penalty which she acquired by sinning. And since she sinned first and afterwards drew the man into sin, not incongruously she also took the lead in this punishment.

Nec tamen Deus omnino virum ipsum punire distulit, cui statim in poena constitutum est et dictum a Domino: Maledicta terra in opere tuo, in laboribus comedes eam cunctis diebus vitae tuae. Spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi, etc. At ubi opulentiam promissae terrae adepti sumus non iam spinas et tribulos germinantis, quod de poena ibi est diminutum, in circumcisione non incongrue est recompensatum.

Nor yet did God at all defer to punish the man himself; rather, he was immediately set under penalty, and it was said by the Lord: “Cursed is the earth in your work; in labors you shall eat of it all the days of your life. Thorns and thistles it will germinate for you,” etc. But when we have attained the opulence of the promised land, no longer germinating thorns and thistles, that which of the penalty has there been diminished has been, not inaptly, recompensed in circumcision.

Quae tamen post ipsius terrae promissionem, antequam ipsa obtineretur, a patriarchis statim est inchoata, ut firmiorem ad posteros auctoritatem transmitteret. Haec de circumcisione in praesentiarum satis arbitror.

Which, however, after the promise of that land itself, before it was itself obtained, was immediately initiated by the patriarchs, so that it might transmit a firmer authority to posterity. These things about circumcision I judge sufficient for the present.

Qui vero ex Scriptura convincere niteris, eam his tantum esse iniunctam, qui ex semine ducuntur Abrahae, non animadvertis, quod ibidem scriptum est de his etiam, qui de hac stirpe non sunt. Cum enim Dominus praemisisset: Infans octo dierum circumcidetur in vobis, omne masculinum in generationibus vestris, tam vernaculus quam emptitius circumcidetur, statim adiecit: Et quicumque non fuerit de stirpe vestra. Quod itaque Isaac solum et semen eius ad circumcisionem pertinere astruis, vide, quantam habeat dissonantiam, et ex ipso quoque Abrahae facto te corrige.

But you, who try to prove from Scripture that it has been enjoined only upon those who are derived from the seed of Abraham, do not notice that in the same place it is written also concerning those who are not of this stock. For when the Lord had premised: “An infant of eight days shall be circumcised among you, every male in your generations, both the homeborn and the purchased shall be circumcised,” he immediately added: “And whoever shall not be of your stock.” Therefore, as you assert that only Isaac and his seed pertain to circumcision, see how great a dissonance this has, and correct yourself also from the very deed of Abraham.

Ipse quoque ex Dominico praecepto Ismaelem quoque secum et omnes viros domus suae tam vernaculos quam emptitios et alienigenas pariter circumcidisse memoratur: Statim, ait Scriptura, in ipso die, sicut praeceperat ei Dominus, antequam adhuc Isaac natus fuisset, ut a vobis eam accepisse sciatis et tanto vobis eam quasi magis naturalem vindicetis. Nunc ergo, si placet, ipsa etiam Scripturae verba ponamus, quae sunt huiusmodi: Tulit autem Abraham Ismaelem filium suum et omnes vernaculos domus suae, et circumcidit carnem praeputii eorum, statim in ipso die, sicut praeceperat ei Dominus. Et iterum: Eadem die circumcisus est Abraham et Ismael filius eius, et omnes viri domus eius tam vernaculi quam emptitii et alienigenae pariter circumcisi sunt.

He himself also, by the Lordly precept, is recorded to have circumcised together Ishmael with himself and all the men of his house, both homeborn and purchased and alien-born alike: Immediately, says Scripture, on that very day, as the Lord had commanded him, before Isaac had yet been born, so that you may know that he received it from you and so claim it as more natural to you. Now therefore, if it please, let us set down the very words of Scripture also, which are of this sort: But Abraham took Ishmael his son and all the homeborn of his house, and he circumcised the flesh of their prepuce, immediately on that very day, as the Lord had commanded him. And again: On the same day Abraham was circumcised and Ishmael his son, and all the men of his house, both homeborn and purchased and alien-born, were circumcised alike.

Quod etiam induxisti: Pactum vero meum statuam ad Isaac, volens hoc tantum de pacto circumcisionis, non terrenae promissionis intelligere, nihil etiam impedit, si annuatur, sicut paulo ante praemissum est, quod dicitur: Constituam pactum meum illi in foedus sempiternum; et semini eius post eum. Etsi enim Ismael quoque ex praecepto Domini circumcisus sit, non in eo Dominus circumcisionem statuit, in cuius posteritate non perseveravit.

What you also adduced: But I will establish my pact with Isaac, wishing this to be understood only of the pact of circumcision, not of the earthly promise, nothing also hinders, if it be granted, as a little before was premised, what is said: I will constitute my pact for him into an everlasting covenant; and for his seed after him. For although Ishmael too was circumcised by the Lord’s precept, the Lord did not establish circumcision in him, in whose posterity it did not persevere.

Quod vero Iob gentilem in exemplum duxisti, cum eum incircumcisum non possis convincere aut post institutionem circumcisionis exstitisse: Sicut enim Ismaelem ab Abraham, sic Esau et Iacob et reprobos quoque filios sicut electos a patriarchis secundum praeceptum Domini constat esse circumcisos, ut hinc etiam ipsorum posteri, si qui Deo adhaererent, circumcisionis exemplum sumerent, sicut et vos ipsi usque hodie servatis, qui Ismaelem patrem vestrum imitantes anno duodecimo circumcisionem accipitis. Scimus et populum nostrum multos ex gentibus ad legem conversos habuisse proselytos, non tam videlicet ex parentum imitatione quam ex cognata virtute. Quod de Iob quoque potuit accidere, quem etiam more nostro accepta Deo sacrificia tam pro filils quam amicis videmus obtulisse.

But as to the fact that you have brought forward Job, a Gentile, as an example, when you cannot prove him to have been uncircumcised, nor that he existed after the institution of circumcision: for just as Abraham circumcised Ishmael, so it is established that Esau and Jacob, and the reprobate sons as well as the elect, were circumcised by the patriarchs according to the precept of the Lord, so that from this their descendants also, if any should adhere to God, might take the example of circumcision—just as you yourselves to this day observe, who, imitating your father Ishmael, receive circumcision in the twelfth year. We also know that our people had many proselytes from the nations converted to the Law, evidently not so much from imitation of parents as from cognate virtue. This could also have happened in the case of Job, whom we see, too, to have offered sacrifices acceptable to God both for his sons and for his friends, after our custom.

Quod etiam obiectum est nec observationi totius legis remunerationem fuisse promissam nisi temporalem atque terrenam nec Dominum ad persuasionem sive commendationem legis provide perorasse, si non legalium praeceptorum impletio vitam mereatur aeternam, facile est refelli, cum ex ipsa quoque circumcisione, quam lex praecepit, Domino in perpetuum foederati sumus, ut dixi. Ad quid etiam nos ex universis gentibus in populum peculiarem sibi elegit et legem, per quam sancti efficeremur, dedit, si praesentis tantum vitae gaudia, quae magis reprobi quam electi possident, ex superaddita legis observantia deberentur? Si sanctitas vobis vel quibuslibet hominibus beatam et immortalem vitam acquirit, constat praecipue et hanc ex lege nobis deberi, si nos eius observantia sanctificat.

What has also been objected—that to the observation of the whole law no remuneration was promised except temporal and earthly, and that the Lord did not, for the persuasion or commendation of the law, perorate providently, if the fulfillment of legal precepts does not merit eternal life—is easy to refute, since from circumcision itself too, which the law prescribed, we have been in perpetual covenant with the Lord, as I said. To what end also did he choose us out of all the nations into a peculiar people for himself and give a law by which we might be made holy, if only the joys of the present life, which the reprobate rather than the elect possess, were to be owed from the superadded observance of the law? If sanctity acquires for you, or for any human beings, a blessed and immortal life, it is clear especially that this too is owed to us from the law, if its observance sanctifies us.

Sanctificat autem profecto, sicut et ipse Dominus nobis per Moysen loquitur dicens: Si ergo audieritis vocem meam et custodieritis pactum meum, eritis mihi in peculium de cunctis populis, mea est enim omnis terra, et eritis vos mihi in regnum sacerdotale et gens sancta. Quomodo igitur nos populum peculiarem et propr ium sibi elegit et per legem sanctificat, si vos vel alios beatiores efficit? Et post aliqua, cum nos ad oboedientiam legis adhortaretur, ait: Ego enim sum Deus tuus faciens misericordiam in milia his, qui diligunt me et custodiunt praecepta mea.

It most assuredly sanctifies, just as the Lord himself speaks to us through Moses, saying: “If therefore you will hear my voice and keep my pact, you shall be to me for a peculium out of all peoples, for all the earth is mine, and you shall be to me a sacerdotal kingdom and a holy nation.” How then did he choose us as a peculiar and proper people for himself and sanctify us through the law, if he makes you or others more blessed? And after some things, when he was exhorting us to obedience to the law, he says: “For I am your God, showing mercy to thousands to those who love me and keep my precepts.”

Quid autem est "faciens misericordiam in milia" nisi faciens misericordiam perfectam atque consummatam, supra quam nulla extendi possit, sicut nulla nova numerorum nomina millenarium excedunt; et alibi: Sancti estote, quia ego sanctus sum, Dominus, Deus vester. Item infra: Sanctificamini et sancti estote, quia ego sum sanctus, Dominus, Deus vester. Custodite praecepta mea et facite ea. Ego Dominus, qui sanctifico vos.

What, moreover, is “showing mercy unto thousands” if not showing mercy perfect and consummate, beyond which nothing can be extended, just as no new names of numbers exceed the millenary; and elsewhere: Be holy, for I am holy, the Lord, your God. Likewise below: Be sanctified and be holy, for I am holy, the Lord, your God. Keep my precepts and do them. I am the Lord, who sanctify you.

Et post aliqua: Eritis sancti mei, quia sum sanctus, Dominus, et separavi vos a ceteris populis, ut essetis mei. Et iterum: Ego Dominus, qui sanctifico vos et eduxi de terra Aegypti, ut essem vobis in Deum. Et rursum: Si in praeceptis meis ambulaveritis, ponam tabernaculum meum in medio vestri, et non abiciet vos anima mea.

And after some things: You shall be my holy ones, because I, the Lord, am holy, and I have separated you from the other peoples, that you might be mine. And again: I am the Lord, who sanctifies you and led you out of the land of Egypt, that I might be your God. And again: If you walk in my precepts, I will place my tabernacle in the midst of you, and my soul will not cast you away.

Et alibi: Quis det, inquit, talem eos habere mentem, ut timeant me et custodiant universa mandata mea in omni tempore, ut bene sit eis, et filiis eorum in sempiternum.

And elsewhere: Who will grant, he says, that they should have such a mind, to fear me and to keep all my commandments at all times, that it may be well with them and with their sons forever.

Ecce aperte Dominus profitetur ex oboedientia legum sempiternam remunerationem, non quae finem habet. Moyses etiam post illam, quam supra meministi, remunerationem terrenam his, qui legem custodiunt, adiunxit misericordiam eis insuper a Deo implendam patenter aliam nobis quam terrenam remunerationem pollicens. Cum enim praemiserit: Et bene sit vobis cunctis diebus vitae vestrae sicut est hodie, statim adnexuit: Eritque nostri misericors, si custodierimus et fecerimus omnia praecepta eius, sicut mandavit nobis.

Behold, the Lord openly declares from obedience to the laws a sempiternal remuneration, not one that has an end. Moses also, in addition to that earthly remuneration which you mentioned above, appended for those who keep the law mercy to be moreover fulfilled for them by God, plainly promising to us a remuneration other than earthly. For when he had prefaced: And it shall be well with you all the days of your life, as it is today, he immediately added: And he will be merciful to us, if we shall have kept and done all his precepts, as he commanded us.

Et quibusdam interpositis, cum dixisset: Te elegit Dominus, ut sis ei populus peculiaris de cunctis populis, adiecit inferius: Et scies, quia Dominus, Deus tuus, ipse est Deus fortis et fidelis custodiens pactum et misericordiam diligentibus se et his, qui custodiunt praecepta eius, in mille generationes.

And with certain things interposed, when he had said: The Lord has chosen you, that you may be to him a peculiar people out of all peoples, he added below: And you shall know that the Lord, your God, he is God, strong and faithful, keeping the pact and mercy for those loving him and for those who keep his precepts, unto a thousand generations.

Quam perfectam autem Dei aut proximi dilectionem, in quibus legem naturalem consistere dicis, lex ipsa praecipiat, non te reor latere. Legem quippe Moyses in novissimo consummans ait: Et nunc, Israel, quid Dominus, Deus tuus, petit a te, nisi ut timeas Dominum, Deum tuum, et ambules in viis eius et diligas eum ac servias Domino, Deo tuo, in toto corde tuo et in tota anima tua, custodiasque mandata Domini et caerimonias eius, quas ego hodie praecipio, ut bene sit tibi? En Domini, Dei tui, caelum est et caelum caeli, terra et omnia, quae in eis sunt, et cum patribus tuis conglutinatus est Dominus et amavit eos, elegitque semen eorum post eos, id est vos de cunctis populis, sicut hodie comprobatur.

How perfect a love of God or of neighbor—in which you say the natural law consists—the Law itself prescribes, I do not think is hidden from you. For Moses, consummating the Law at the last, says: And now, Israel, what does the Lord, your God, ask from you, except that you fear the Lord, your God, and walk in his ways and love him and serve the Lord, your God, with your whole heart and with your whole soul, and keep the mandates of the Lord and his ceremonies, which I command today, that it may be well with you? Behold, to the Lord, your God, belong heaven and the heaven of heavens, the earth and all things that are in them, and the Lord cleaved to your fathers and loved them, and he chose their seed after them, that is, you, out of all peoples, as is proved today.

In tantum vero dilectionem Dei, ut perfecta sit, diligenter lex exprimit atque amplificat, ut Deum diligendum ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota fortitudine nostra praecipiat. Proximum vero tamquam nos diligere iubemur, ut videlicet amor Dei supra nos etiam extensus nulla mensura concludatur. Ipsos quoque advenas apud nos commorantes quasi nosmetipsos amare praecipimur, in tantumque dilectionis sinum lex ipsa laxat, ut nec ipsis inimicis vel iniuriosis desint ipsius beneficia.

To such an extent indeed the love of God, that it may be perfect, the law diligently expresses and amplifies, that it prescribes that God be loved with all our heart and with all our soul and with all our fortitude. As for the neighbor, we are commanded to love him as ourselves, so that plainly the love of God, extended even beyond ourselves, be confined by no measure. We are likewise enjoined to love the very sojourners dwelling among us as our very selves, and the law itself so widens the bosom of love that not even for enemies or the injurious do its benefactions fail.

De quibus nunc aliqua proferamus: Si occurreris bovi inimici tui aut asino erranti, reduc ei. Si videris asinum odientis te iacere sub onere, non pertransibis, sed sublevabis cum eo. Peregrino molestus non eris, et ipsi peregrini fuistis in terra Aegypti. Non quaeras ultionem nec memor eris iniuriae civium tuorum. Si habitaverit advena in terra vestra et moratus fuerit inter vos, ne exprobretis ei, sed sit inter vos quasi indigena et diligetis eum quasi vosmetipsos; fuistis enim et vos advenae in terra Aegypti.

Of which let us now set forth some points: If you should come upon the ox of your enemy or a donkey going astray, bring it back to him. If you see the donkey of one who hates you lying under its burden, you shall not pass by, but you shall help to lift it with him. You shall not be troublesome to the sojourner, for you yourselves were sojourners in the land of Egypt. You shall not seek vengeance, nor remember the injury of your fellow citizens. If an alien dwells in your land and sojourns among you, do not reproach him, but let him be among you as a native, and you shall love him as yourselves; for you too were aliens in the land of Egypt.

Ego, Dominus, Deus vester. Et alibi: Non deerunt pauperes in terra habitationis vestrae, idcirco praecipio tibi, ut aperias manum fratri tuo et egeno et pauperi, qui tecum versantur in terra.

I, the Lord, your God. And elsewhere: The poor will not be lacking in the land of your habitation; therefore I prescribe to you, that you open your hand to your brother and to the needy and to the poor, who dwell with you in the land.

Ex his itaque perpende, obsecro, quantum extendat lex tam ad homines quam ad Deum dilectionis affectum, ut tuam etiam legem, quam naturalem appellas, in nostra oncludi cognoscas, ut, si alia quoque cessarent praecepta, haec, quae perfectae dilectionis sunt, nobis etiam sicut et vobis ad salvationem sufficerent. Quibus et priores patres nostros salvari non denegatis, ut tanto magis nobis salvationis securitas relinquatur, quanto superaddita cetera legis praecepta arctiorem nobis vitam instituerint. Quae quidem additio non tam ad sanctorum morum religionem quam ad eam tutius muniendam mihi pertinere videtur.

From these things, therefore, weigh, I beseech, how far the law extends the affection of dilection both toward men and toward God, so that you may recognize that your law also, which you call natural, is included in ours, so that, if the other precepts too should cease, these, which are of perfect dilection, would suffice for salvation for us also just as for you. By which you do not deny that our earlier fathers were saved, so that all the more a security of salvation is left to us, inasmuch as the other precepts of the law superadded have established for us a more strait life. And this addition indeed seems to me to pertain not so much to the religion of holy morals as to fortifying it more safely.

Ad omnem quippe animi virtutem vera Dei et hominum dilectio sufficit. Et si desint opera, tamen bona ac perfecta voluntas merito nequaquam minuitur.

For every virtue of the soul, the true love of God and of men suffices. And if works be lacking, nevertheless good and perfect will, by merit, is by no means diminished.

Sed sicut loco nos Dominus ab infidelibus separare voluit, ne per ipsos scilicet corrumperemur, ita et operum ritibus, ut dixi, faciendum esse decrevit. Cum ergo dilectionis perfectio ad beatitudinem veram promerendam sufficiat, profecto arctioris vitae superaddita praecepta vel in hac vita saltem aliquid insuper obtinere debuerunt, ut terreni quoque beneficii solatio alacriores et securiores in Deum efficeremur, et cum augerentur erga nos eius dona, cresceret in eum devotio nostra et infidelium populus externus, qui haec videret, commodis nostris ad cultum Dei facilius invitaretur.

But just as the Lord willed to separate us by place from the infidels, lest, to wit, we be corrupted through them, so also by the rites of works, as I said, he decreed that it be done. Since therefore the perfection of love suffices for meriting true beatitude, assuredly the superadded precepts of a stricter life ought to have obtained something over and above at least in this life, so that by the solace of earthly benefit we might be made more eager and more secure toward God, and, as his gifts toward us increased, our devotion toward him might grow, and the external people of the unbelievers, who should see these things, might be more easily invited by our advantages to the worship of God.

Quod vero Dominus in remuneratione legis saepius vel apertius terrena beneficia quam aeterna commemorare videtur, maxime propter carnalem adhuc rebellemque populum, quem de opulentia Aegypti, super qua iugiter murmurabat, ad asperrimam solitudinem educebat, factum esse intelligas. Superfluum quoque quicquam in promissione commemorari videbatur de aeterna scilicet beatitudine, quam etiam sine legis traditione priores antea constabat adeptos esse. Denique, quanta legis sit perfectio, hoc uno collige fine, de quo in novissimis Moyses his scribit verbis: Et nunc,Israel, audi praecepta et iudicia, quae ego doceam te, etc.

But as to the fact that the Lord, in the remuneration of the Law, seems more often or more openly to commemorate terrestrial benefits than eternal ones, you should understand it to have been done chiefly on account of the still carnal and rebellious people, whom he was leading out from the opulence of Egypt—about which he was continually murmuring—into a most harsh wilderness. It also seemed superfluous that anything in the promise should be commemorated concerning eternal beatitude—namely, which even without the tradition of the Law it was agreed that the former ones had previously attained. Finally, how great the perfection of the Law is, gather from this one end, about which Moses writes in his latest words: “And now, Israel, hear the precepts and the judgments which I teach you, etc.”

Non addetis ad verbum, quod loquor vobis, neque auferetis ex eo. Et rursum: Quod praecipio tibi, hoc tantum facito Domino, nec addas quidquam nec minuas.

You shall not add to the word which I speak to you, nor shall you take away from it. And again: What I prescribe to you, this only do for the Lord; neither add anything nor diminish.

Perfectum quippe est, cui nihil addendum est. Aut si quid perfectionis deesset, mala haec esset prohibitio, quae, quod deest, prohibet et beatitudinis iter nobis obstruit. Quid etiam ad purificationem vel emundationem nostram atque indulgentiam peccatorum nostrorum lex aliqua in sacrificiis vel ceteris observationibus fieri iubet, si hoc ad veram beatitudinem nihil attineat?

For it is perfect, to which nothing is to be added. Or if anything of perfection were lacking, this would be an evil prohibition, which forbids what is lacking and obstructs for us the path of beatitude. What, moreover, does any law bid to be done in sacrifices or in the other observances for our purification and emundation and for the indulgence of our sins, if this in no way pertains to true beatitude?

Nihil quippe illos excludit a vera beatitudine, quibus peccata dimittuntur. Alioquin nec vobis illa esset speranda. Cur etiam peccata nobis per legem interdicit, nisi ut nobis illud reservet, quod peccata, si desint, conferunt, si adsint, praepediunt?

Surely nothing excludes from true beatitude those to whom sins are remitted. Otherwise, not even for you would that be to be hoped. Why moreover does he interdict sins to us through the law, unless to reserve for us that which sins, if absent, confer, if present, hinder?

Philosophus: Miror te legis peritum tam inconsiderate loqui, ut adeo circumcisionem extollas, ne mentiri verearis dicendo scilicet post circumcisionem tantum et non antea Deum appellari hominum, et eorum tantum, qui circumcisi iam fuerint, veluti ipse Deus Abraham et Isaac et Iacob appellatur. Unde te aperte ipsa legis Scriptura reprehendit Noe antea longe dicente: Benedictus Dominus, Deus Sem, sit Chanaan servus eius, Ecce ‚ etenim Noe Deum Sem nominat.

Philosopher: I marvel that you, expert in the law, speak so inconsiderately that you so extol circumcision that you do not hesitate to lie by saying, namely, that only after circumcision and not before is God called the God of men, and only of those who have already been circumcised, just as God himself is called the God of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob. Whence the Scripture of the law itself openly reproves you, as Noah long before says: Blessed be the Lord, the God of Shem; let Canaan be his servant. Behold ‚ for indeed Noah names the God of Shem.

Unde et cum dicitur Deus Abraham, Deus Isaac sive Iacob, non incongrue addi solet: et Deus patrum nostrorum.

Whence also, when it is said God of Abraham, God of Isaac or Jacob, it is not incongruous that there be added: and God of our fathers.

Quod si etiam divina beneficia penses, ex quibus vos maxime gloriamini tamquam eius populus peculiaris, vide, quia Enoch in paradisum felicius translatus est, quam vos in terram Chanaan introducti. Et hoc ille meruisse refertur, cum videlicet dicitur: Ambulavitque Enoch cum Deo et non apparuit, quia tulit eum Deus. Vos autem illud obtinuisse meritis omnino Moyses denegat dicens: Ne dicas in corde tuo, cum deleverit eos Dominus: Propter iustitiam meam introduxit me, ut terram hanc possiderem, cum propter impietates suas istae deletae sint nationes, ut compleret verbum suum, quod pollicitus est patribus tuis.

But if you also weigh the divine benefactions, in which you chiefly glory as his peculiar people, see that Enoch was more happily translated into Paradise than you were introduced into the land of Canaan. And he is reported to have merited this, inasmuch as it is said: “And Enoch walked with God, and he did not appear, because God took him.” But Moses absolutely denies that you obtained that by merits, saying: “Do not say in your heart, when the Lord has blotted them out: ‘Because of my righteousness he has introduced me, that I might possess this land,’ since on account of their impieties these nations have been destroyed, that he might complete his word which he promised to your fathers.”

Scito igitur, quod non propter iustitias tuas Deus dederit tibi hanc terram optimam, cum durissimae cervicis sis populus.

Know, therefore, that not on account of your justices has God given to you this best land, since you are a people of a most hard neck (stiff‑necked).

Noe vero propter iustitiam suam universis hominibus praeter domum suam subversis universorum, quae in terra vel in mari sunt, constitutus est dominus, et omnia ei in esum praeter sanguinem concessa sunt, ut iuxta Dei beneficia terrena, quae vos desiderastis, tanto priorum fidelium vita fuerit felicior quanto liberior et universis terrenae habitationis dominans creaturis. Quanto autem illa Noe et suorum vita liberior exstitit quam vestra, nondum videlicet iugo legis vestrae oppressa, tanto et nostra liberior est illa antiquiore vita, quam nullis exterioribus dirae legis operibus constringi potestis convincere.

Noah indeed, on account of his righteousness, with all human beings—apart from his household—overthrown, was constituted lord of all things that are on land or in the sea, and all things were conceded to him for eating except blood; so that, according to the earthly benefits of God which you have desired, by so much the life of the former faithful was happier as it was freer and ruling over all the creatures of earthly habitation. And by how much that life of Noah and his own proved freer than yours—namely, not yet oppressed by the yoke of your law—by so much also our life is freer than that more ancient life, which you are not able to prove to be constrained by any outward works of the dire law.

Quae quidem ab ipso Noe inchoantes, cui de abstinentia sanguinis prior lex instituta est, diligenter consideremus.

These things indeed, beginning from Noah himself, for whom a prior law concerning the abstinence of blood was instituted, let us diligently consider.

Novitamen legis quaedam praecepta usque etiam ad alienigenas extendi, scilicet illos tantum, quos vernaculos vel servos haberetis vel qui intra portas vestras vel in terra vestra vobiscum habitarent. Quos quidem in pluribus locis Scriptura diligenter determinat, et quos tu ipse superius ex ipso legis praecepto tamquam indigenas misericorditer tractandos esse ostendisti. Quos et vobis in pluribus observantiis lex aggregat et a ceteris peregrinis advenis aperte distinguit.

Yet you know that certain precepts of the Law extend even to aliens, namely only those whom you would have as homeborn or as slaves, or who would dwell with you within your gates or in your land. These, indeed, Scripture carefully defines in many places, and these you yourself above, from the very precept of the Law, have shown are to be treated mercifully as indigenes. These the Law also aggregates to you in many observances and openly distinguishes from the other peregrine newcomers.

Unde cum ait quodam loco: Septimo anno facies remissionem, quae hoc ordine celebratur: Cui debetur aliquid ab amico vel proximo ac fratre suo, repetere non poterit, quia annus remissionis est Domini; a peregrino et advena exiges, aperte docet peregrinum et advenam non tam misericorditer tractandum esse sicut indigenam. Hunc quoque peregrinum supra intellexerat, ubi ait: Omne, quod mundum est, comedite; quidquid morticinum est, nemo vescatur ex eo. Peregrino , qui intra portas tuas est, da, ut comedat, aut vende ei, quia tu populus sanctus Domini, Dei tui, es. Longe namque antea in alio libro: Advenam etiam, qui intra vos habitando, non transeundo, peregrinatur sicut ea, quae ibi proxima praemittuntur insinuat a morticino comedendo, sicut vos inhibuit dicens: Anima, quae comederit morticinum vel captum a bestia tam de indigenis quam et de advenis, lavabit vestimenta sua et se ipsum aqua et contaminatus erit usque ad vesperum, et hoc ordine mundus fiet. Quod si non laverit vestimenta sua et corpus, portabit iniquitatem suam.

Whence, when it says in a certain place: In the seventh year you shall make remission, which is celebrated in this order: he to whom something is owed by his friend or neighbor and his brother will not be able to exact it again, because it is the year of the Lord’s remission; from the peregrine and the advena you shall exact it, it openly teaches that the peregrine and the advena are not to be treated so mercifully as the indigenous man. This peregrine also he had understood above, where he says: Everything that is clean, eat; whatever is morticinal, let no one feed on it. To the peregrine , who is within your gates, give it, that he may eat, or sell it to him, because you are a holy people of the Lord your God. Indeed, long before, in another book: the advena also, who peregrinates among you by dwelling, not by passing through, as the things set forth there immediately before intimate, is held back from eating morticinum, just as he forbade you, saying: The soul that shall have eaten what is morticinal or taken by a beast, as well of the indigenous as also of the advenae, shall wash his garments and himself with water, and he shall be contaminated until evening, and in this order he shall be made clean. But if he does not wash his garments and his body, he shall bear his iniquity.

Quem vero uno loco peregrinum et advenam dicit, quandoque alibi nominat alienum; veluti cum dicitur: Non faenerabis fratri tuo ad usuram pecuniam nec fruges nec quamlibet aliam rem, sed alieno.

But the one whom in one place he calls the foreigner and the sojourner, elsewhere at times he names the alien; as when it is said: You shall not lend to your brother for usury money nor fruits nor any other thing, but to an alien.

De his autem advenis, qui peregrinantur inter vos, non vos inter eos, alio loco scriptum est, cum dicitur: Homo quilibet de domoIsraelet de advenis, qui peregrinantur inter vos, si comederit sanguinem, obfirmabo faciem meam contra animam illius, et dispergam eum de populo suo. Nullo quippe legis praecepto alium advenam comprehenderis, nisi qui apud vos habitat, ac per hoc subiacet vestro dominio et disciplinae. Unde divina nobis providente gratia, quae vobis omnino omnem terrae possessionem abstulit, ut nullus videlicet apud vos, sed vos apud omnes peregrinemini, nullis nos legitimis vestris sciatis obnoxios.

Concerning those sojourners, moreover, who peregrinate among you, not you among them, it is written elsewhere, when it is said: “Any man of the house of Israel and of the sojourners who peregrinate among you, if he shall eat blood, I will set my face against that soul, and I will scatter him from his people.” For by no precept of the Law will you include any other sojourner, except the one who dwells among you, and by this is subject to your dominion and discipline. Whence, with divine grace providing for us, which has altogether taken away from you every possession of land—so that, namely, no one peregrinates among you, but you peregrinate among all—know that we are subject to none of your lawful statutes.

Quod vero praecepto circumcisionis et exemplo Abrahae nos ad circumcisionem urgere niteris, ut eos quoque legissacramentoincludas, quibus tamen nullatenus legem esse datam concedis aut etiam promissionem terrae fieri, quae in pacto circumcisionis statuitur, vide, quam sit invalidum, quod obicis. Cum enim praemisisset Dominus: Circumcidetur ex vobis omne masculinum, atque adiecisset: omne masculinum in generationibus vestris, tam vernaculus quam emptitius et quicumque non fuerit de stirpe vestra: prorecto per hoc, quod ait "ex vobis" non tantum Abraham et posteros eius comprehendit, sed insuper eos, quicumque ad familiam et possessionem eorum pertinent, ut eis videlicet imperare possent et ad circumcisionem cogere. Unde etiam postquam dixit "et vobis", et postea subdidit, in generationibus vestris tam vernaculus quam emptitius, et deinde adiecit: et quicumque non fuerit de stirpe vestra, per hoc quod dixit: in generationibus vestris et quicumque non erit de stirpe vestra, diligenter expressit, quod superius comprehenderat, cum dixit "ex vobis", non solum videlicet suorum generationes posteriorum, sed etiam familiam, quam possident alienigenarum.

But as to your trying to press us to circumcision by the precept of circumcision and the example of Abraham, so that you may include in the sacrament of the law even those to whom, however, you concede that in no way the law was given, nor even the promise of the land made—which is established in the pact of circumcision—see how invalid is what you object. For when the Lord had premised: “Every male of you shall be circumcised,” and had added: “every male in your generations, both the homeborn and the purchased, and whoever shall not be of your stock,” surely by this, that he says “of you,” he comprehends not only Abraham and his posterity, but moreover those whoever pertain to their household and possession, so that they might indeed be able to command them and to compel them to circumcision. Whence also, after he said “and to you,” he afterwards subjoined, “in your generations both the homeborn and the purchased,” and then added: “and whoever shall not be of your stock”; by this that he said “in your generations” and “whoever shall not be of your stock,” he carefully expressed what above he had encompassed when he said “of you,” namely, not only their later generations, but also the household of foreigners whom they possess.

Qui etiam sententiam dicendo: Eritque pactum meum in carne vestra, sic dixit generaliter, "in carne vestra", sicut antea dixerat "in vobis".

Who also, by saying the sentence, “And my pact shall be in your flesh,” thus spoke generally, “in your flesh,” just as earlier he had said “in you.”

Alioquin multum incongrue esset promissum, quasi non pactum Dei in carne ipsorum appareret, nisi et advenae sicut et ceteri circumciderentur. Unde et per hoc, quod dicitur, "in carne vestra", ipsos quoque advenas comprehendi constat. Illud quoque, quod novissime additam sententiam consummat: Masculus, cuius praeputii caro circumcisa non fuerit, peribit anima illa de populo suo, quia pactum meum irritum fecit.

Otherwise it would be very incongruous that it was promised, as if the pact of God did not appear in their flesh, unless even the sojourners, just like the rest, were circumcised. Whence also from this which is said, "in your flesh," it is evident that the sojourners themselves also are included. That, too, which most recently consummates the added sentence: "A male whose foreskin’s flesh shall not have been circumcised, that soul shall perish from his people, because he has made my pact void."

Quomodo ad praemissa, quibus et advenae iam sunt comprehensi, refertur, nisi et cum advenis pactum suum sit; saltem cum dicitur: Circumcidetur ex vobis, etc.?

How is it referred to the premises, by which even the sojourners are already comprehended, unless his pact be also with the sojourners; at least when it is said: Circumcidetur ex vobis, etc.?

Quod vero aeternam quoque animarum beatitudinem ex legitimis vestris vobis esse promissam astruere laboras, vilissimae coniecturae esse ex ipsa lege potest ostendi. Per hoc quippe, quod dicitur cum foedere sempiterno vel in foedus aeternum eos, qui ex praecepto Dei circumcidentur, ei in perpetuum ita foederatos intelligis, ut nec in futuro ab eius gratia disiungantur. Unde et Israelem seu Esau vel plerosque reprobos nullatenus ambigendum est esse salvandos.

But that you also labor to establish that the eternal beatitude of souls has been promised to you from your own “legitima,” can be shown from the Law itself to be a most paltry conjecture. For by this, namely that it is said “with an everlasting covenant” or “into an eternal covenant,” you understand that those who are circumcised by the precept of God are in perpetuity thus confederated to him, so that not even in the future are they disjoined from his grace. Whence it is by no means to be doubted, on that reasoning, that Israel, or Esau, or very many reprobates are to be saved.

Miror etiam, quod non attendis aeternum sive sempiternum frequenter in lege sic accipi, ut vitae praesentis perseverantiam non excedat. Unde etiam ipso pacto circumcisionis cum praemittitur: Daboque tibi et semini tuo terram peregrinationis tuae et omnem terram Chanaan in possessionem aeternam, non credo te adeo delirare, ut aeternitatis vocabulo vitae quoque futurae beatitudinem includas, de qua hic superfluum est quidquam praecipere. Saepe etiam, sicut nosti, in ipsis legis operibus, quae in hac tantum vita celebrantur, lex adiungere solet: Legitimum sempiternum erit nobis in cunctis generationibus et habitationibus vestris.

I marvel also that you do not attend that “eternal” or “sempiternal” is frequently in the Law taken in such a way as not to exceed the perseverance of the present life. Whence also, in the very pact of circumcision, when it is prefaced: “And I will give to you and to your seed the land of your peregrination and all the land of Canaan in an eternal possession,” I do not believe you to be so delirious as to include under the word “eternity” even the beatitude of the future life, about which it is superfluous to prescribe anything here. Often also, as you know, in the very works of the Law, which are celebrated only in this life, the Law is accustomed to add: “It shall be a sempiternal statute for us in all your generations and habitations.”

Sic enim, ut ex pluribus aliquid afferamus, exemplum de celebranda festivitate tabernaculorum adiecit. Cum enim praemisisset: Sumetisque vobis die primo fructus arboris pulcherrimae spatulasque palmarum et ramos ligni diversarum frondium et salices detorrente, et laetamini in Domino, Deo vestro, celebrabitisque solemnitatem eius septem diebus per annum; statim adiunxit: legitimum sempiternum erit in generationibus vestris. Qui etiam celebrationem Sabbati septimo die quodam loco instituens ait: Pactum est sempiternum inter me et filiosIsrael, signumque perpetuum.

Thus indeed, to bring something from several, he added an example of celebrating the Feast of Tabernacles. For when he had premised: And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a most beautiful tree, and palm fronds, and branches of a tree of diverse foliage, and willows from the torrent; and rejoice in the Lord, your God, and you shall celebrate its solemnity seven days in the year; he immediately subjoined: it shall be a perpetual statute in your generations. He also, instituting in a certain place the celebration of the Sabbath on the seventh day, said: It is an everlasting pact between me and the sons of Israel, and a perpetual sign.

Sed et cum ait Dominus de Hebraeo servo, qui non vult egredi liber, quod erit servus in saeculum, tempus tantum vitae eius comprehendit. Non enim Hebraei servi secundum legem transmittuntur ad posteros, sicut illi, qui de nationibus assumpti sunt. Unde scriptum est: Servus et ancilla sint vobis de nationibus, qui in circuitu vestro sunt, et de advenis, qui peregrinantur apud vos vel qui ex his nati fuerint in terra vestra, hos habebitis famulos, et haereditario iure transmittetis ad posteros ac possidebitis in aeternum; fratres autem vestros filios Israel ne opprimatis per potentiam.

But also, when the Lord says about the Hebrew slave who does not wish to go out free, that he will be a slave forever, he is comprehending only the span of his life. For Hebrew slaves are not, according to the law, transmitted to posterity, as are those who have been taken from the nations. Whence it is written: A male slave and a maidservant shall be for you from the nations who are around you, and from the sojourners who peregrinate among you, or from those who shall have been born from them in your land—these you shall have as household servants, and by hereditary right you shall transmit them to posterity and possess them in perpetuity; but your brothers, the sons of Israel, do not oppress by power.

Sufficiebat quippe Domino in remuneratione carnalis populi, qui non nisi terrena sciebat, eam ad tempus vitae tantum praesentis accommodare. Quod vero perfectionem legis commendans asseruisti, ea tantum, quae Moyses praecepit, esse facienda, miror, quod oblitus sis te quidem superius astruxisse laudabiliter multa praeceptis ex gratia superaddi. Quod omnibus esse verissimum pater.

For it did suffice to the Lord, in the remuneration of the carnal people, who knew nothing except earthly things, to accommodate it to the time only of the present life. But as to your having asserted, while commending the perfection of the law, that only the things which Moses prescribed are to be done, I marvel that you have forgotten that you indeed above have established laudably that many things are to be superadded to the precepts by grace. Which is most true to all, father.

Unde et vos nonnullas primas traditiones post legem accepistis, quas utilissimas iudicatis, veluti cum exemplo Danielis cibos regios et vinum respuentis, ne in eis scilicet contaminaretur, vos quoque a nostro abstinetis vino. Sed et Rechabitae praecepto Ionadab, patris sui, vino in perpetuum abstinentes tam praecepta Moysis quam omnes patrum vestrorum traditiones supergressi sunt. Ad quos etiam Ieremias a Domino missus, ut vinum biberent, non est ab eis exauditus.

Whence also you have received some primary traditions after the Law, which you judge most useful, as when, by the example of Daniel spurning the royal foods and wine, namely lest he be contaminated by them, you likewise abstain from our wine. But even the Rechabites, by the precept of Jonadab their father, abstaining from wine in perpetuity, have surpassed both the precepts of Moses and all the traditions of your fathers. To whom also Jeremiah, sent by the Lord that they might drink wine, was not heeded by them.

Unde in tantum voce Domini eorum oboedientia commendatur, ut eis promitteret dicens: Pro eo, quod oboedistis praecepto Ionadab, patris vestri, et custodistis omnia mandata eius, no n deficiet vir de stirpe Ionadab, filii Rechab, stans in conspectu meo cunctis diebus.

Whence their obedience is commended by the voice of the Lord to such an extent that He promised to them, saying: Because you have obeyed the precept of Jonadab, your father, and have kept all his mandates, there shall not fail a man from the stock of Jonadab, son of Rechab, standing in my presence all the days.

Numquid et rex Ezechias confringendo serpentem aeneum legis transgressor exstitit videlicet eo laudabiliter destructo sine praecepto, quod utiliter factum fuerat ex praecepto? David etiam cum psalmos ad honorem Dei composuit vel arcam Domini solemniter in Ierusalem adduxit vel Salomon templum Domini construxit atque dedicavit, id profecto egerunt, quod nequaquam Moyses praeceperat. Omnes quoque prophetiae absque praecepto Moysis conscriptae sunt et legis sibi traditae, et innumera post Moysen a sanctis patribus vel ex praecepto Domini vel pro manifesta utilitate sunt acta, quae nequaquam in praeceptis Moysis continentur.

Did King Hezekiah also, by breaking the brazen serpent, become a transgressor of the law, namely with that thing laudably destroyed without a precept, which had been usefully made by a precept? David too, when he composed psalms to the honor of God or solemnly brought the ark of the Lord into Jerusalem, and Solomon when he constructed and dedicated the temple of the Lord, indeed did that which Moses by no means had prescribed. Likewise all the prophecies were written without a precept of Moses and of the law delivered to him, and innumerable things after Moses were done by the holy fathers either by the precept of the Lord or for manifest utility, which are by no means contained in the precepts of Moses.

Non enim in his, quae manifestam habent utilitatem, praecepta Domini sunt exspectanda nec peccatum est facere, quod non est praeceptum, sed facere contra praeceptum. Alioquin nec diem unam praesentis vitae possetis transigere nec domesticam curam uno die peragere, cum multa nos agere opus sit vel emendo vel negotiando vel de hoc loco ad illum transeundo vel denique comedendo sive dormiendo, quae non habentur in praecepto. Praeterea quis non videat, si plus vel minus, quam Moyses praecepit, non sit faciendum, omnes, qui legem custodiunt, aequalis esse meriti nec inter eos alterum altero meliorem existere, quorum merita non possunt inaequalia esse.

For indeed, in those things which have manifest utility, the precepts of the Lord are not to be awaited, nor is it a sin to do what is not commanded, but to do against the precept. Otherwise you could not pass even one day of the present life, nor carry through household care in a single day, since it is needful for us to do many things—either by buying, or negotiating/trading, or passing from this place to that, or finally by eating or sleeping—which are not contained in the precept. Moreover, who does not see that, if more or less than what Moses commanded is not to be done, all who keep the law would be of equal merit, and neither would one among them be better than another, among whom the merits could not be unequal.

Patet igitur ex praemissis, quod nullo modo perfectionem legis per hoc potes commendare, quod intelligis contra legem agi, si quid, quod in ea praeceptum non sit, superaddatur. Nec te satis Dominum excusare agnoscas, quod cum legis oboedientiam suaderet, id, ut dixi, quod maximum est in eius remuneratione, praetermisit, si ad illud etiam promerendum eam sufficere iudicaverit. Quod vero spirituale bonum peccatorum purificatione per sacrificia vel quaelibet legis opera exteriora consequi confiditis, miror, si, ut ipse professus es et manifesta veritas habet, vestra Dei et proximi dilectio ad iustificationem sanctitatis sufficiat.

It is evident, therefore, from the premises that in no way can you commend the perfection of the law by this: that you understand it to be acting against the law if anything which is not commanded in it be superadded. Nor should you acknowledge that you sufficiently excuse the Lord, on the ground that, when he was urging obedience to the law, he passed over that which, as I said, is the greatest in its remuneration, if he judged that that obedience would suffice also for meriting it. But as for your trusting to attain a spiritual good by the purification of sins through sacrifices or any exterior works of the law whatsoever, I marvel that you are confident of this, if—as you yourself have professed and manifest truth holds—your love of God and of neighbor suffices for the justification of sanctity.

Neque enim sine istis quidquam illa proderit, quantum ad animae salutem pertineat, nec dubium est, cum ista quemlibet iustum effecerint, iam non in eo reatu peccati esse, ut spirituali egeat purificatione. Unde et de peccatore poenitente scriptum habetis: Sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus, etc.; et rursum: Dixi: Confitebor adversum me iniustitiam meam Domino, et tu remisisti impietatem peccati mei. Ecce quomodo sacrificium hoc contriti cordis commendat, qui illud exterius omnino alibi reprobat ex persona Domini dicens: Audi, populus, et loquar;Israel, non accipiam de domo tua vitulos neque de gregibus tuis hircos.

For neither will those avail anything without these, so far as it pertains to the soul’s salvation; nor is it doubtful that, when these have made anyone just, he is now no longer in the guilt of sin so as to need spiritual purification. Whence also concerning the penitent sinner you have written: The sacrifice to God is a contrite spirit, etc.; and again: I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord, and you remitted the impiety of my sin. Behold how he commends this sacrifice of a contrite heart, who elsewhere utterly reproves the outward one, speaking in the person of the Lord, saying: Hear, O people, and I will speak;Israel, I will not receive calves from your house nor goats from your flocks.

Si esuriero, non dicam tibi: Meus est enim orbis terrae et plenitudo eius. Numquid manducabo carnes taurorum ac sanguinem hircorum potabo. Immola Deo sacrificium laudis, et redde Altissimo vota tua et invoca me in die tibi, etc., tribulationis, eruam te et honorificabis me.

If I shall be hungry, I will not say to you: Mine is indeed the orb of the earth and its plenitude. Surely I will eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats? Immolate to God a sacrifice of praise, and render to the Most High your vows, and call upon me on the day of tribulation for you, etc., I will rescue you, and you will honor me.

Cordis sacrificium, non animalium esurit Dominus, et illo reficitur, et cum istud invenit, illud non quaerit, et cum istud non invenit, illud omnino superfluit, quantum inquam ad animae iustificationem, non ad legalium poenarum circuitionem, secundum quas tamen peccata vobis condonari dicuntur.

The Lord hungers for the sacrifice of the heart, not of animals, and by that he is refreshed; and when he finds this, he does not seek that, and when he does not find this, that is altogether superfluous, as far, I say, as pertains to the justification of the soul, not to the circuition of legal penalties, according to which, however, sins are said to be condoned to you.

Lex quippe vestra, quae tantum in hac vita vel impletionis vel transgressionis suae persolvit merita et hic solummodo in utroque remunerationem habet, sic ad hanc vitam corporalem accommodat cuncta, ut nihil secundum animare mundum vel immundum censeat nec purificationes aliquas ad immunditiam animarum, quas proprie peccata nominamus, ipsa referat. Unde et similiter cibos mundos vel immundos nominat sicut et homines, lectos etiam, sedes, et totam suppellectilem domus seu etiam vestes et pleraque alia inanimata immunda seu polluta frequenter appellat. Quod si immunditias hominum, quarum purificationes institutae sunt, his, qui inquinantur, peccatis connumeres, numquid feminam post partum per sacrificium mundatam ex hoc ipso, quod peperit, peccatum incurrisse iudicas, cum illam potius maledictam censeatis, quae non reliquerit semen in Israel?

For indeed your Law, which only in this life pays out the merits either of its fulfillment or of its transgression and has here alone in both cases its remuneration, so accommodates all things to this corporal life that it deems nothing clean or unclean according to the soul, nor does it refer any purifications to the immundity of souls, which we properly name sins. Whence likewise it names foods clean or unclean, as also human beings, beds too, seats, and the whole household furniture of the house, or even garments, and very many other inanimate things it frequently calls unclean or polluted. But if you reckon the uncleannesses of human beings, for which purifications have been instituted, among sins for those who are defiled, do you judge that a woman, after childbirth, cleansed by a sacrifice, has by that very fact, that she bore a child, incurred sin, since you rather deem accursed her who has not left seed in Israel?

Quod etiam peccatum vir, qui patitur fluxum seminis, ex hoc contrahit? Quem tamen adeo abominabilera censet lex, ut lectus, in quo dormierit, immundus sit, et ubicumque sederit. Vas etiam fictile, quod contigerit, confringetur, ligneum vero lavetur.

What sin, moreover, does the man who suffers a flux of semen contract from this? Yet the law deems him so abominable that the bed on which he has slept is unclean, and wherever he has sat. Also an earthen vessel which he has touched shall be broken, but a wooden one shall be washed.

Si quis hominum tetigerit lectum eius vel sederit, ubi ille sederat, lavabit vestimenta sua, et ipse etiam lotus aqua immundus erit usque ad vesperare. Mulier quoque, cum naturaliter accidentem menstruorum patitur fluxum, adeo immunda censetur, ut id quoque, in quo dormierit vel sederit, in tantum polluatur, ut suo tactu quaelibet polluat, sicut et de viro patiente fluxum seminis supra dictum est.

If any man shall have touched his bed, or shall have sat where he had sat, he will wash his garments, and he himself also, even washed with water, will be unclean until evening. The woman likewise, when she suffers the naturally occurring flow of menstruation, is deemed so unclean that even the thing on which she has slept or sat is polluted to such an extent that by its own touch it pollutes anything whatsoever, just as has been said above concerning the man suffering a flow of seed (semen).

Quid vero haec, obsecro, ad inquinationem animae, ut lectus videlicet cuiusquam contactu etiam polluatur? Quae sunt istae, oro, immunditiae vel pollutiones? Certe illae, quae et ciborum, ut sicut illi vobis vitandi sunt in esu, sic ista in tactu, et sicut illa immunda, quia non edenda, sic ista immunda vel polluta, quia non tangenda, et qui ea tangunt, etiam si compulsi vel ignorantes id faciunt, immundi similiter decernuntur, quia in familiaritate conversationis vitandi usque ad praefixum purificationis terminum.

But what, I beseech, have these to do with the defilement of the soul, that a bed, namely, should even be defiled by anyone’s contact? What, I pray, are these uncleannesses or pollutions? Surely they are those which are also of foods, so that just as those are to be avoided by you in eating, so these in touch; and just as those are unclean, because not to be eaten, so these are unclean or polluted, because not to be touched; and those who touch them, even if compelled or doing it ignorantly, are likewise decreed unclean, because they are to be avoided in the familiarity of conversation up to the pre-fixed limit of purification.

Quae vero manifesta sunt peccata, sicut homicidium vel adulterium et similia, morte potius multantur, quam sacrificiis expiantur. Nec eis talium purificationum indulgetur remedium, quibus salvari, qui ea commiserunt, valeant. Ex quo magis has purificationes ad quandam vitae praesentis honestatem quam ad animae salutem intelligas accommodari.

But the sins which are manifest, such as homicide or adultery and the like, are punished rather with death than expiated by sacrifices. Nor is the remedy of such purifications granted to them, by which those who have committed them might be able to be saved. Whence you may understand that these purifications are accommodated more to a certain honesty (decorum) of the present life than to the soul’s salvation.

Et cum talium peccata condonari dicuntur, poenas illas corporales, quae pro ipsis institutae sunt, his, qui a conversatione communi separantur, relaxari constat. Numquid enim et aliud intelligendum est peccatum condonari, quam poenam ei debitam relaxari, sive illa sit corporalis sive perpetua? Animae vero reatus, sicut voluntate ipsius committitur, per eius cor contritum ac veram poenitentiae compunctionem statim ita condonatur, ut ulterius pro ipso nullatenus damnetur, sicut dictum est: Dixi: Confitebor adversum me. Postquam enim peccator poenitens apud se constituit se ipsum inde per confessionem accusare, iam in hoc ipso, quod culpa perversae voluntatis, per quam deliquerat, caret reatu, admittit, et poena eius perpetua condonatur, etsi adhuc temporalis ad correctionem servetur, sicut idem alibi commemorat vester Propheta dicens: Castigans castigavit me Dominus, et morti non tradidit me.

And when the sins of such are said to be condoned, it is evident that those corporal penalties, which were instituted on their account, are relaxed for those who are separated from common conversation. For what else is to be understood by “sin is condoned” than that the penalty owed to it is relaxed, whether that be corporal or perpetual? But the guilt of the soul, just as it is committed by its own will, is forthwith in like manner condoned through its contrite heart and the true compunction of penitence, so that henceforward it is in no way condemned for it, as it is said: I said: I will confess against myself. For after the penitent sinner has resolved with himself to accuse himself thereof by confession, already in this very act he admits that, as to the fault of the perverse will by which he had transgressed, he is free of guilt, and his perpetual penalty is condoned, even if the temporal is still kept for correction, just as the same, elsewhere, your Prophet commemorates, saying: The Lord has chastised me with chastisement, and he has not delivered me over to death.

Haec me super animae meae salute inquirendo de fide tua seu fide mea consuluisse te satis arbitror. In qua quidem nostrae consultationis collatione id actum esse perpendo, ut nec auctoritate legis tuae, etsi eam a Deo datam recipias, cognoscere possis ad eius sarcinam me debere submittere, tamquam illi, quam nobis exemplo sui Iob praescribit, legi quidquam necessarium sit addi aut illi morum disciplinae, quam de virtutibus ad beatitudinem sufficientibus posteris philosophi nostri reliquerunt. De quo nunc superest praesentis iudicis sententiam audire vel, quod mihi superest, nostrae inquisitionis operam ad Christianum transferre.

These things—by inquiring about the salvation of my soul concerning your faith or my faith—I reckon that I have sufficiently consulted you. In which, indeed, by the collation of our consultation, I perceive that this has been effected: that neither by the authority of your Law, even if you receive it as given by God, are you able to recognize that I ought to submit to its burden, as though anything necessary should be added to that Law which he prescribes to us by the example of his Job, or to that discipline of morals which our philosophers have left to posterity concerning the virtues sufficient for beatitude. Concerning which there now remains to hear the sentence of the present judge, or, as for what remains to me, to transfer the work of our inquisition to the Christian.

Iudex Asserunt ambo nostri iudicii sententiam excipere. Ego vero cupidus discendi magis quam iudicandi, omnium prius rationes me velle audire respondeo, ut tanto essem discretior in iudicando, quanto sapientior fierem audiendo, iuxta illud, quod supra memini, secundum summi sapientis proverbium: Audiens sapiens sapientior erit et intelligens gubernacula possidebit.

Judge, they both assert that they accept the sentence of our judgment. I, however, eager for learning rather than for judging, reply that I wish first to hear everyone’s reasons, so that I might be the more discriminating in judging, in proportion as I became wiser by hearing, according to that which I recalled above, according to the proverb of the highest sage: The wise man, hearing, will be wiser, and the intelligent will possess the helms.

In quo omnes pariter assenserunt eodem accensi desiderio discendi.

In which all alike assented, enkindled with the same desire of learning.

Philosophus: Te nunc, Christiane, alloquor, ut tu inquisitioni meae secundum propositi nostri conditionem respondeas. Cuius quidem lex tanto debet esse perfectior et remuneratione potior eiusque doctrina rationabilior, quanto ipsa est posterior. Frustra quippe populo priores leges scriberentur, si quid ad doctrinae perfectionem eis non adderetur.

Philosopher: I now address you, Christian, that you may answer my inquisition according to the condition of our proposal. Whose law indeed ought to be so much more perfect and richer in remuneration, and its doctrine more rational, in proportion as it is later. For in vain, indeed, would the prior laws be written for the people, if something were not added to them toward the perfection of doctrine.

Quod quidam nostrorum in secundo Rhetoricae diligenter considerans, cum de contrariis legibus causam formaret, attendendum esse praecepit, utra lex posterior lata sit.Nampostrema quaeque, inquit, gravissima est.

Which a certain one of ours, carefully considering in the second book of the Rhetoric, when he was forming a case concerning contrary laws, prescribed must be attended to: which law was later enacted.For whatever is last, he says, is most weighty.

Christianus: Miror te ab his, quae in exordio professus es, ita impudenter dissonare. Cum enim praemisisses te inquisitionibus tuis reperisse Iudaeos stultos, Christianos insanos, postmodum dixeris te non ad concertationem contendere, sed ad inquirendam veritatem conferre: qua ratione nunc ab his, quos etiam insanos reperisti, tandem veritatis doctrinam exspectes? Numquid iam post inquisitiones tuas eorum insaniam arbitraris cessare, ut iam ad eruditionem tuam possint sufficere?

Christian: I marvel that you so impudently dissonate from the things which you professed in the beginning. For since you had premised that by your inquisitions you had found the Jews foolish, the Christians insane, afterwards you said that you do not strive for contention, but contribute to inquiring into the truth: by what reasoning do you now expect the doctrine of truth from those whom you even found insane? Do you perchance now, after your inquisitions, judge their insanity to cease, so that now they can suffice for your erudition?

Certe si Christianae fidei sectare arbitraris insaniam et eos, qui hanc sectantur, deputas insanos, vide, tu Philosophus, de summis illis Graecorum philosophis quid aestimandum sit, qui illa rudi et inculta virorum simplicium praedicatione, id est apostolorum, omnes ad hanc conversi facti sunt insanissimi. In tantum vero apud Graecos haec nostra, ut dicis, insania radicata est et confirmata, ut ibi tam evangelica quam apostolica doctrina conscripta ac postmodum magna concilia celebrata omnem inde mundum repleverint et universas haereses represserint.

Surely, if you deem the following of the Christian faith to be insanity and reckon as insane those who follow it, see, you Philosopher, what is to be judged of those highest Greek philosophers, who, by that rude and uncultivated preaching of simple men—that is, of the apostles—being all converted to this, were, on your showing, made most insane. Indeed, to such an extent among the Greeks has this our, as you say, insanity been rooted and confirmed, that there both evangelical and apostolic doctrine, having been conscribed, and afterward great councils having been celebrated, have filled the whole world from there and have repressed all heresies.

Philosophus: Nonnumquam conviciis et improperiis facilius homines provocantur, quam supplicationibus et obsecrationibus flectuntur, et qui sic provocantur, studiosius satagunt de pugna, quam qui orantur, moventur ex gratia.

Philosopher: Not infrequently men are more easily provoked by revilings and reproaches than they are bent by supplications and obsecrations, and those who are thus provoked strive more zealously about the fight than those who are besought are moved by favor.

Christianus: Ignoscendum tibi est, si hac intentione hoc egisti. Nunc vero, ne ex diffidentia pugnam hanc differre videar, tam mihi quam tibi orandus est, ut quid tibi quaerendum, quid mihi respondendum sit, ipse Dominus inspirer, qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri et ad cognitionem sui venire. Nunc igitur, si placet, cum ad perfectionem nostrae legis, tam evangelicae scilicet quam apostolicae doctrinae, sis exsors, hanc primum inspiciamus et cum ceteris conferamus omnibus doctrinis, ut, si hanc in illis, quae iustificant, praeceptis vel exhortationibus perfectiorum videris, eam, sicut oportet, magis eligas.

Christian: You are to be pardoned, if you did this with such an intention. Now, however, lest I seem to defer this combat out of diffidence, he must be besought, both for me and for you, that the Lord himself may inspire what you ought to ask and what I ought to answer—he who wills all men to be saved and to come to the cognition of himself. Now therefore, if it pleases, since you are without a share in the perfection of our law, namely of the Evangelic as well as of the Apostolic doctrine, let us first inspect this and compare it with all the other doctrines, so that, if you shall have seen this to be more perfect in those precepts or exhortations that justify—of the more perfect—you may, as is fitting, choose it rather.

Quod et supra memorat rhetor vester de contrariis, ut dixisti, legibus agens consulit dicens: "Si leges duae vel plures servari non possunt, quia discrepant inter se, ea maxime conservanda putetur, quae ad maximas res pertinere videtur."

Which also above your rhetorician mentions; dealing with contrary laws, as you said, he advises, saying: "If two or more laws cannot be observed, because they are discrepant among themselves, that should be considered chiefly to be preserved which seems to pertain to the greatest matters."

Philosophus: Nihil hoc consilio probabilius, et nihil stultius, quam ab antiquis ad novas recedere leges nisi doctrina potiores. Quas videlicet novas leges, qui composuerunt, tanto eas cautius ac perfectius scribere potuerunt, quanto iam priorum legum disciplina et ipsa necessariarum rerum experientia instructi facile, quae deerant, ex proprio addere potuerunt ingenio, sicut etiam in ceteris contingit philosophiae disciplinis. Tum autem de perfectione posteriorum scriptorum maxime est confidendum, si moderni scriptores aequare ingeniis antiquos potuerint.

Philosopher: Nothing is more probable than this counsel, and nothing more foolish than to withdraw from ancient laws to new ones unless they are superior in doctrine. Which new laws, indeed, those who composed them were able to write all the more cautiously and more perfectly, inasmuch as, already instructed by the discipline of the earlier laws and by the experience itself of necessary things, they could easily add, from their own ingenuity, what was lacking, just as also happens in the other disciplines of philosophy. Then moreover one must have the greatest confidence concerning the perfection of later writings, if modern writers have been able to equal the ancients in genius.

Sed quid, si forte ipsos etiam longe transcendant, sperandum est?

But what, if by chance they even far transcend them, is it to be hoped?

Quod profecto de legislatore, videlicet Christo, quem ipsam Dei sapientiam dicitis, nequaquam dubitatis. De quo etiam Iob nostrum antea cecinisse asseritis: Ecce Deus infortitudine sua, et nullus ei similis in legislatoribus. Cuius et Apostolus vester praeferens doctrinam et primae legis imperfectionem manifeste profitens ait: Multifarie multisque modis Deus olim loquens patribus in prophetis novissime diebus istis locutus est nobis in Filio, etc.

Which assuredly you in no way doubt concerning the legislator, namely Christ, whom you say is the very wisdom of God. Concerning whom you also assert that our Job sang before: “Behold God in his strength, and there is none like him among the legislators.” And of whom your Apostle as well, putting forward his doctrine and openly professing the imperfection of the first law, says: “In many parts and in many modes God of old, speaking to the fathers in the prophets, in these last days has spoken to us in the Son,” etc.

Et iterum idem infra de veteris et novae legis discretione iudicans: Reprobatio, inquit, fit praecedentis mandati propter infirmitatem eius et inutilitatem. Nihil enim ad perfectum adduxit lex. Introductio vero melioris spei, per quam proximamus ad Deum.

And again the same man below, judging about the distinction of the Old and the New Law: “Reprobation, he says, is made of the preceding mandate on account of its infirmity and inutility. For the law led nothing to perfection. But an introduction of a better hope, through which we draw near to God.”

Christianus: Certe, ut video, non te ignorantia fidei nostrae, sed magis tuae infidelitatis obstinatio damnat. Qui et nostrae legis perfectionem ex scriptis ipsius didicisti et adhuc, quod sequaris, inquiris, quasi perfectum ibi et omnibus aliis excellentius non habeas documentum virtutum, quas ad beatitudinem sufficere nullatenus dubitas. De qua quidem perfectione, quae deerant, id est veteri suo complente, cum ipse Dominus Novum traderet Testamentum, statim exorsus discipulis ait: Nisi abundaverit iustitia vestra, etc.

Christian: Certainly, as I see, it is not ignorance of our faith that condemns you, but rather the obstinacy of your infidelity. You, who have learned the perfection of our law from his own writings and still inquire what you should follow, as though you did not have there a perfect document of virtues, more excellent than all the rest, which you by no means doubt to suffice for beatitude. Concerning which perfection, supplying the things that were lacking—that is, completing his Old [Testament]—when the Lord himself was handing down the New Testament, immediately, beginning, he said to the disciples: Unless your justice shall abound, etc.

Et statim per singula novae legis abundantiam prosecutus, quae morali deerant perfectioni, diligenter expressit et veram ethicam consummavit. In cuius comparatione, quidquid tam antiquis patribus quam prophetis de disciplina morum ac discretione virtutum traditum fuerat, nihil esse facile convincetur, si diligenter haec conferamus cum prioribus.

And immediately, going through point by point the abundance of the new law, he carefully expressed the things that were lacking to moral perfection, and consummated the true ethic. In comparison with this, whatever had been handed down both to the ancient fathers and to the prophets concerning the discipline of morals and the discernment of virtues will easily be proved to be nothing, if we diligently compare these things with the former.

Philosophus: Harum me, ut nosti, collationum tantummodo desiderium huc adduxit, et hac nos intentione congregati sumus.

Philosopher: The desire only of these collations, as you know, has brought me hither, and with this intention we have been congregated.

Christianus: Nunc prorecto, quantum percipio, ad omnium disciplinarum finem et consummationem proficiscimur. Quam quidem vos ethicam, id est moralem, nos divinitatem nominare consuevimus. Nos illam videlicet ex eo, ad quod comprehendendum tenditur, id est Deum, nuncupantes, vos ex illis, per quae illuc pervenitur, hoc est moribus bonis, quas virtutes vocatis.

Christianus: Now indeed, as far as I perceive, we are setting out to the end and consummation of all disciplines. Which indeed you are accustomed to call ethic, that is moral, we are accustomed to name divinity. We, namely, naming it from that which one strives to comprehend, that is, God; you from those things by which one arrives thither, that is, good morals, which you call virtues.

Philosophus: Assentio, quod clarum est, et novam nuncupationem nominis vestri non mediocriter approbo. Quia enim ad quod pervenitur his, per quae venitur, dignius aestimatis et pervenisse felicius quam venire, hoc vestri nominis insigniorum est nuncupatio ex origine propriae divinationis lectorem plurimum alliciens. Quae, si ita ex documento sicut ex vocabulo praeemineat, nullam ei disciplinam comparandam censeo.

Philosophus: I assent, as is clear, and I not a little approve the new appellation of your name. For since you esteem that that to which one arrives is more worthy than those things by which one comes, and that to have arrived is happier than to be coming, this is a more distinguished naming of your name, from the origin of its own divination, enticing the reader exceedingly. Which, if it stands out thus in proof as in the word, I judge that no discipline is to be compared with it.

Nunc igitur, si placet, praefinire te volumus, in quo verae ethicae summa consistat, et quid ex hac spectandum sit nobis disciplina et quo cum perventum fuerit, eius sit intentio consummata.

Now therefore, if it pleases, we wish you to define beforehand in what the sum of true ethics consists, and what from this discipline ought to be aimed at by us, and at what point, when it has been reached, its intention is consummated.

Christianus: Huius, ut arbitror, disciplinae in hoc tota colligitur summa, ut, quod summum bonum sit et qua illuc via nobis sit perveniendum, aperiat.

Christian: The whole sum of this discipline, as I judge, is gathered into this: that it may lay open what the highest good is and by what way we are to arrive thither.

Philosophus: Placet utique vehementer tam paucis verbis tantae rei summam exprimi et totius ethicae tam diligenter intentionem comprehendi. Quae quidem intentionis verba ista in se statim rapiunt auditorem et huius disciplinae studium commendant, ut in eius comparatione omnium artium vilescant doctrinae. Quo enim summum bonum ceteris omnibus est excellentius, in cuius fruitione vera consistit beatitudo, constat procul dubio eius doctrina ceteris tam utilitate quam dignitate longe praecedere.

Philosopher: It indeed very strongly pleases that in so few words the sum of so great a matter is expressed, and the intention of the whole of ethics is so carefully comprehended. The words of this intention, in fact, straightway seize the hearer and commend zeal for this discipline, so that, in comparison with it, the doctrines of all the arts grow cheap. For inasmuch as the highest good is more excellent than all the rest, in the fruition of which true beatitude consists, it is clear, beyond doubt, that its doctrine far surpasses the others both in utility and in dignity.

Longe quippe aliorum studia infra summum bonum remanent nec beatitudinis contingunt eminentiam, nec ullus in eis fructus apparet, nisi quantum huic summae deserviunt philosophiae tamquam circa dominam occupatae pedissequae. Quid enim ad studium grammaticae vel dialecticae vel ceterarum artium de vera hominis beatitudine vestiganda? Longe omnes inferius ab hac eminentia iacent nec ad tantum se attollere valent fastigium.

By far indeed the studies of others remain beneath the highest good and do not touch the eminence of beatitude, nor does any fruit appear in them, except so far as they serve this supreme philosophy like handmaids occupied about their mistress. For what have the study of grammar or dialectic or the other arts to do with investigating the true beatitude of man? Far below this eminence they all lie, nor are they able to raise themselves to so great a pinnacle.

Sed quaedam genera locutionum tradunt vel rerum aliquas exercent naturas, quasi quosdam gradus ad hanc celsitudinem parantes, cum de ipsa nobis disserendum et aliquas rerum naturas in exemplum vel similitudinem quasi fuerit afferendum, ut per illas quasi quodam pedissequarum ducatu pertingamus ad dominam in illis quidem progressionis nostrae transitum habentes, in hac requiem et nostrae fatigationis finem adepti.

But certain kinds of locutions hand down, or exercise, certain natures of things, as if preparing some steps toward this loftiness, when we must discourse about it itself and certain natures of things must, as it were, be brought forward for example or similitude, so that through them, as by a kind of handmaids’ guidance, we may reach the mistress—having in those the passage of our progression, in this having attained rest and the end of our fatigue.

Christianus: Gaudeo te huius philosophiae excellentiam tam diligenter attigisse et a ceteris distinxisse, ex quo te in eius studio maxime occupatum intelligo.

Christian: I rejoice that you have so diligently touched upon the excellence of this philosophy and distinguished it from the others, from which I understand that you are most occupied in its study.

Philosophus: Recte, inquam, occupatum. Haec quippe sola est naturalis disciplina, quae praeceptis moralibus tanto amplius philosophis congruit, quanto magis eos lege uti et rationibus constat inhaerere, sicut ille vir doctor meminit.

Philosopher: Rightly, I say, occupied. For this alone is the natural discipline, which agrees with philosophers so much more than moral precepts, by as much as it is established that they use law and adhere to reasons, as that learned man—the doctor—reminds.

Namet Iudaei, inquit, signa petunt, et Graeci sapientiam quaerunt. Iudaei quippe tantum, quod animales sunt et sensuales, nulla imbuti philosophia, qua rationes discutere queant, solis exteriorum operum mÏraculis moventur ad fidem, quasi haec facere solius Dei sit et nulla in eis daemonum illusio fieri possit. Quod quam sit stultum recipere, et magi in Aegypto docuerunt et vos Christus praecipue instruxit, qui de pseudophilosophis Antichristi praemonens eos in seductione hominumtantaoperari miracula testatur, Ut in errorem, inquit, ducantur, si fieri potest, etiam electi.

For, “both the Jews,” he says, “seek signs, and the Greeks search for wisdom.” For the Jews, precisely because they are animal and sensual, imbued with no philosophy by which they might be able to discuss reasons, are moved to faith only by the miracles of external works, as though to do these were the part of God alone and no delusion of demons could be wrought in them. How foolish it is to accept this, both the magi in Egypt have taught, and Christ has especially instructed you, who, forewarning about the pseudo-philosophers of Antichrist, bears witness that they will operate miracles so great in the seduction of men, “that, if it can be done, even the elect are led into error.”

Quasi ergo haec signa quaerere stultitia sit, e contrario per adiunctum praedictus meminit Apostolus, cum adiecit, et Graeci sapientiam quaerunt, hoc est rationes a praedicatoribus exigunt, quae sunt certa sapientiae instrumenta. Unde maxime vestra, id est Christiana, praedicatio commendatur. Quod eos ad fidem convertere potuit, qui rationibus plurimum nitebantur et abundabant, omnium videlicet liberalium artium studiis imbuti, rationibus armati.

As if, therefore, to seek these signs were foolishness, on the contrary, by way of an adjunct the aforesaid Apostle made mention, when he added, “and the Greeks seek wisdom,” that is, they demand reasons from the preachers, which are sure instruments of wisdom. Whence your preaching—namely, Christian—is especially commended. For it could convert to the faith those who most relied upon and abounded in reasons, imbued, namely, with the studies of all the liberal arts, armed with reasons.

Quorum quidem ipsi non solum inquisitores, verum etiam inventores exstiterunt et ex eorum fontibus in universum mundum rivuli manaverunt. Ex quo praecipue et nunc de vestra confidimus disciplina, ut, quo iam amplius solidata convaluit, in conflictu rationum plurimum possit.

Of whom indeed they themselves proved not only inquisitors but even inventors, and from their fountains little rivulets have flowed into the whole world. From which especially we now also are confident concerning your discipline, that, inasmuch as it has by now more strengthened, being solidified, it may be most able in the conflict of reasons.

Christianus: Immo post tantorum conversionem philosophorum nec tibi nec posteris de fide nostra ambigere licet, nec iam tali conflictu opus esse videtur, cur in saecularibus disciplinis eorum omnia credatis auctoritati et non eorum exemplis ad fidem moveamini dicentes cum Propheta: Neque meliores sumus quam patres nostri.

Christian: Nay rather, after the conversion of so many philosophers, neither you nor your descendants are permitted to doubt our faith, nor now does there seem to be need of such a conflict; why is it that in secular disciplines you believe everything on their authority and are not moved to faith by their examples, saying with the Prophet: Neither are we better than our fathers.

Philosophus: Nec eorum auctoritati ita concedimus, ut dicta ipsorum ratione non discutiamus, antequam approbemus. Alioquin philosophari desisteremus, si videlicet rationum inquisitione postposita locis auctoritatis, qui inartificiales iudicantur et a re ipsa omnino disiuncti sunt in opinione potius quam in veritate consistentes, plurimum uteremur; nec ipsos maiores nostros ad fidei vestrae confessionem tam ratione ductos quam vi tractos esse crederemus, sicut et vestrae consentiunt historiae. Ante imperatorum quippe vel principum ad fidem vestram per miracula, ut dicitis, conversionem paucos sapientum vel nullos vestra praedicatio acquisivit, quamvis tum facile a patentissimis idolatriae erroribus gentes possent avelli et in quemcumque unius Dei cultum transferri.

Philosopher: Nor do we so concede to their authority that we do not examine their sayings by reason before we approve them. Otherwise we would cease to philosophize, if indeed, the inquisition of reasons having been set aside, we were to make chief use of the places of authority, which are judged inartificial and altogether disjoined from the thing itself, standing rather in opinion than in truth; nor would we believe that our very ancestors were led to the confession of your faith so much by reason as dragged by force, as even your histories agree. For before the conversion of emperors or princes to your faith through miracles, as you say, your preaching acquired few of the wise or none, although then the nations could easily be torn away from the most patent errors of idolatry and transferred into whatever worship of the one God.

Unde et provide Paulus vester invectionis suae in Athenienses occasionem sumens sic exorsus ait: Viri Athenienses, per omnia vos superstitiosos esse video, etc.

Whence also, providently, your Paul, taking the occasion of his invective against the Athenians, thus beginning said: “Men, Athenians, I see that in all things you are superstitious, etc.”

Iam tunc enim legis naturalis et divini cultus scientia evanuerat et errantium multitudo paucitatem sapientum omnino deleverat vel oppresserat, atque ut ex nostra loquamur conscientia et praedicationis Christianae non modicum approbemus fructum, per hanc maxime idolatriam in mundo non ambigimus deletam tunc fuisse.

For already by then, indeed, the knowledge of natural law and of the worship of the divine had vanished, and the multitude of those erring had altogether effaced or oppressed the paucity of the wise; and, that we may speak from our own conscience and approve no small fruit of Christian preaching, we do not doubt that by this especially idolatry in the world was then abolished.

Christianus: Adiunge et quod patet et legem naturalem suscitatam esse et perfectam morum disciplinam, qua vos, ut dicitis, sola nitimini et ad salvandum sufficere creditis, nonnisi ab ipso traditam fuisse, a quo tamquam vera sophia, id est sapientia Dei, quicumque instructi sunt, veri sunt dicendi philosophi.

Christian: Add also what is evident, that the natural law has been revived, and the perfected discipline of morals—on which alone, as you say, you rely, and which you believe to be sufficient for salvation—was handed down by him alone; by whom, as the true sophia, that is, the wisdom of God, whoever have been instructed are to be called true philosophers.

Philosophus: Atque utinam, ut dicis, sic convincere possis, ut ab ipsa, ut dicitis, suprema sapientia, quam Graece logon, Latine Verbum Dei vocatis, vos vere logicos et verborum rationibus exhibeatis esse armatos! Nec illud Gregorii vestri me miserorum commune refugium praetendere praesumatis. "Fides", inquit, "non habet meritum, cui ratio humana praebet experimentum." Quia enim apud vos fidem, quam astruunt, disserere non sufficiunt, statim ad suae imperitiae solatium hoc Gregorianum assumunt.

Philosopher: And would that, as you say, you could so convince, that from that very, as you say, supreme wisdom, which in Greek you call logos, in Latin the Word of God, you might show yourselves to be truly logicians and armed with the rational accounts of words! Nor presume to put before me that common refuge of the wretched from your Gregory. “Faith,” he says, “has no merit to which human reason supplies experiment (proof).” For since among you they are not sufficient to argue the faith which they assert, straightway, for a consolation of their own inexperience, they adopt this Gregorian maxim.

Quod quidem iuxta eorum opinionem quid aliud agit, nisi ut quibuslibet fidei praedicationibus aeque stultis sicut et sanis acquiescamus? Si enim fides ratione minime sit discutienda, ne meritum amittat, nec, quid credi oporteat, animi iudicio sit discutiendum, sed statim his, quae praedicantur, assentiendum, quoscumque errores praedicatio seminet, suscipere nihil refert, quia nihil licet ratione refellere, ubi rationem non licet adhibere. Dicat idolatra de lapide vel ligno vel qualibet creatura: Hic est Deus verus, Creator coeli et terrae; vel quamlibet patentem abominationem praedicet, quis eam valebit refellere, si de fide nihil sit discutiendum ratione?

What, indeed, according to their opinion, does this accomplish, except that we acquiesce equally in whatever predications of faith, the foolish as well as the sound? For if faith is by no means to be discussed by reason, lest it lose merit, nor is what ought to be believed to be examined by the judgment of the mind, but we must at once assent to the things that are preached, it makes no difference to embrace whatever errors the preaching sows, because nothing is permitted to be refuted by reason where it is not permitted to apply reason. Let an idolater say of stone or wood or of any creature: This is the true God, the Creator of heaven and earth; or let him preach any patent abomination—who will be able to refute it, if nothing about faith is to be examined by reason?

Statim arguenti se et maxime Christiano id, quod praemissum est, obiciet: "fides non habet meritum", etc. Statim Christianus ex ipsa sua defensione confundetur dicens eius penitus rationes in talibus audiendas non esse, ubi eas ipse penitus induci prohibet, nec eum aliquem rationibus de fide recte impugnare, qui se impugnare minime permittat.

At once to one arguing against him, and especially to a Christian, he will object what has been premised: “faith has no merit,” etc. Straightway the Christian will be confounded by his very defense, saying that his arguments are not at all to be heard in such matters, where he himself utterly forbids them to be introduced, and that no one rightly impugns him by arguments concerning faith who in no way permits himself to be impugned.

Christianus:Utait ille maximus sapientum: "Sunt viae hominis, quae videntur rectae, novissima autem eius deducunt ad mortem." Sic et plerumque rationes videntur, hoc est rationabiliter et convenienter aliqua dici, cum minime ita sit.

Christian:As that greatest of the wise says: "There are ways of a man which seem right, but its last things lead down to death." So too for the most part reasonings seem so, that is, some things seem to be said rationally and fittingly, when it is by no means so.

Philosophus: Quid et de ipsis, quae pro auctoritatibus habentur? Nonne in ipsis plurimum erratur? Alioquin non essent tot fidei sectae diversae, si eisdem omnes auctoritatibus uterentur.

Philosopher: And what of the very things which are held as authorities? Is there not much error in them? Otherwise there would not be so many diverse sects of faith, if all were using the same authorities.

Sed prout quisque propria ratione deliberat, singuli, quas sectantur auctoritates, eligunt. Alioquin indifferenter omnium Scripturarum sententiae essent suscipiendae, nisi ratio, quae naturaliter prior eis est, de ipsis prius haberet iudicare. Nam et ipsi, qui scripserunt non nisi ex ratione, qua eorum abundare videntur sententiae, auctoritatem, hoc est credendi statim eis meruerunt dignitatem.

But just as each person deliberates by his own reason, individuals choose the authorities which they follow. Otherwise, the opinions of all the Scriptures would have to be received indifferently, unless reason, which is naturally prior to them, had first to judge about them. For even those who wrote, only from reason—by which their opinions seem to abound—straightway merited authority, that is, the dignity of being believed.

Adeo autem ipsorum quoque iudicio auctoritati ratio praeponitur, ut, sicut vester meminit Antonius: "cum humanae rationis sensus inventor fuerit litterarum, cui sensus est incolumis, ei minime necessariae sint litterae." Quae in omni philosophica disputatione ita novissimum aut nullum obtinere censetur locum, ut ea, quae a rei iudicio, id est ab auctoritate ducuntur argumenta, eos omnino inducere pudeat, qui de propriis viribus confidentes alienae opis refugium dedignantur. Unde bene philosophi talium argumentorum locos, cum ad eos orator magis quam Philosophus confugere cogitur, omnino extrinsecos et a re disiunctos et ab omni virtute destitutos iudicaverunt, utpote in opinione potius quam in veritate consistentes et nullo ingenii artificio ad suorum inventionem argumentorum egentes, cum is, qui ea inducit, non suis, sed alienis utatur verbis.

So much moreover even by their own judgment is reason set before authority, that, just as your Antonius notes: "since the sense of human reason has been the inventor of letters, for him whose sense is unimpaired, letters are by no means necessary." Which, in every philosophical disputation, is judged to hold so the last or no place, that it altogether shames them to introduce those arguments which are drawn from the judgment of the matter—that is, from authority—who, confident in their own forces, disdain the refuge of another’s aid. Whence the philosophers rightly judged the loci of such arguments—when to them the orator rather than the Philosopher is compelled to flee for refuge—to be altogether extrinsic and disjoined from the matter and destitute of every virtue, as consisting in opinion rather than in truth, and requiring no artifice of ingenuity for the invention of their arguments, since he who introduces them uses not his own words but another’s.

Unde et Boetius vester tam Themistianam quam Tullianam locorum divisionem in Topicis suis complectens: "A rei iudicio", inquit, "quae sunt argumenta, quasi testimonium praebent, et sunt inartificiales loci atque omnino disiuncti nec rem potius quam opinionem iudiciumque sectantes." Rursus idem de eodem loco secundum Tullium: "Restat locus", ait, "quem extrinsecus dixit assumi. Hic iudicio nititur et auctoritate et totus probabilis est nihil continens necessarium." Et post aliqua: "Hic vero locus extrinsecus dicitur esse constitutus, quoniam non de his, qui praedicati vel subiecti sunt, terminis sumitur, sed ab extrinsecus posito iudicio venit. Hinc etiam inartificialis et expers", ait, "vocatur, quoniam hinc non sibi ipse conficit argumentum orator, sed praeparatis positisque utitur testimoniis." Quod vero dixisti in rationibus quoque discernendis sive cognoscendis nonnumquam errari, verum utique est atque liquidum.

Whence also your Boethius, embracing in his Topics both the Themistian and the Tullian division of loci: “From the judgment of the thing,” he says, “the arguments are such as to furnish, as it were, testimony, and the loci are inartificial and altogether disjunct, following not the thing but rather opinion and judgment.” Again the same, on the same locus according to Tullius: “There remains the locus,” he says, “which he said is assumed from without. This relies on judgment and authority and is wholly probable, containing nothing necessary.” And after some things: “This locus indeed is said to be constituted extrinsically, since it is not taken from those terms which are predicate or subject, but comes from a judgment set from without. Hence also,” he says, “it is called inartificial and devoid, since from here the orator does not make the argument for himself, but uses prepared and posited testimonies.” But what you said, that also in discerning or in knowing the reasons one sometimes errs, is indeed true and manifest.

Sed hoc eis accidit hominibus, qui rationalis peritia philosophiae et argumentorum carent discretione; quales se Iudaei profitentur esse, qui pro argumentis signa requirunt, et quicumque suum in dictis alterius praesidium ponunt; tamquam de auctoritatis vel scripto absentis facilius iudicetur quam de ratione vel sententia praesentis, et sensus illius melius quam istius possit inquiri. Dum vero, quantum valemus, de nostra solliciti salute Deum inquirimus, eius utique supplet gratia, quod nostra non sufficit opera, et volentes adiuvat, ut possint, qui hoc ipsum etiam inspirat, ut velint. Et qui saepe invitos trahit, volentes non reicit et nitenti porrigit dexteram, cuius arguere non potest negligentiam.

But this befalls those men who lack the expertise of rational philosophy and the discretion of arguments; such as the Jews profess themselves to be, who demand signs in place of arguments, and all who place their safeguard in another’s sayings; as though one might judge more easily from the authority or the writing of one absent than from the reason or judgment of one present, and the sense of that man could be inquired into better than of this one. Yet while, so far as we are able, being solicitous for our salvation, we seek God, His grace surely supplies what our own work does not suffice for, and He helps the willing, that they may be able—He who also inspires this very thing, that they may be willing. And He who often draws the unwilling does not reject the willing, and He extends His right hand to the one striving, whose negligence cannot be arraigned.

De quo vos ipsa, quam dicitis, veritas securos Christus efficiens congrua similitudine praemissa subintulit: Petite, et accipietis, quaerite, et invenietis, pulsate, et aperietur vobis. Omnis enim, qui petit, accipit, et qui quaerit, invenit, et pulsanti aperitur. Quae quidem memini praecedentia verba Augustinus exponens quodam suo tractatu De misericordia inquit: "Petite orando, quaerite disputando, pulsate orando." Unde et artem disputandi secundo De ordine libro ceteris praeferens disciplinis, et tamquam ipsa sola sciat vel scientes faciat, eam commendans ait:

Concerning which, Christ, making you secure by the very truth which you name, subjoined, a congruent similitude having been premised: Ask, and you will receive; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you. For everyone who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to the one who knocks it is opened. These preceding words, as I remember, Augustine, expounding in a certain treatise of his On Mercy, says: "Ask by praying, seek by disputing, knock by praying." Whence also, preferring the art of disputation in the second book On Order to the other disciplines, and commending it as though it alone knows or makes men knowing, he says:

"Disciplinam disciplinarum, quam dialecticen vocant. Haec docet docere, haec docet discere. In hac se ipsa ratio demonstrat, quid sit, quid velit, scit sola.

"The discipline of disciplines, which they call dialectic. This teaches to teach, this teaches to learn. In this, reason itself demonstrates itself, what it is, what it intends, it alone knows.

Scientesque facere non solum vult, sed etiam potest." Idem in libro sec undo De Christiana doctrina eam admodum sacrae lectioni necessariam ostendens: "Restant", inquit, "ea, quae non ad corporis sensus, sed ad rationem pertinent, ubi disciplina regnat disputationis et numeri. Sed disputationis disciplina ad omnia genera quaestionum, quae in sacris litteris sunt penetranda, plurimum valet. Tamen ibi cavenda est libido rixandi et puerilis quaedam ostentatio decipiendi adversarium.

"And she not only wills to make people knowing, but also is able." The same man, in the second book of On Christian Doctrine, showing it to be very necessary for sacred reading, says: "There remain," he says, "those things which pertain not to the senses of the body, but to reason, where the discipline of disputation and of number reigns. But the discipline of disputation avails greatly for all kinds of questions which in the sacred letters are to be penetrated. Nevertheless, there must be avoided there a lust for wrangling and a certain boyish ostentation of deceiving the adversary."

Sunt enim multae, quae appellantur sophismata, falsae conclusiones rationum et plerumque veras imitantes, ut non solum tardos, sed etiam ingeniosos minus attentos decipiant. Quod genus captiosarum conclusionum Scriptura, quantum existimo, detestatur illo loco ubi dictum est: Qui sophistice loquitur, odibilis est."

For there are many that are called sophisms, false conclusions of arguments and for the most part imitating true ones, so that they deceive not only the slow, but even the ingenious who are less attentive. This kind of captious conclusions Scripture, so far as I suppose, detests in that place where it has been said: "He who speaks sophistically is odious."

Christianus: Nemo certe nostrum, qui discretus sit, rationibus fidem vestigari ac discuti vetat, nec rationabiliter his, quae dubia fuerint, acquiescitur, nisi cur acquiescendum ratione praemissa. Quae videlicet, cum rei dubiae fidem efficit, prorecto id, quod a vobis argumentum dicitur, ipsa fit. In omni quippe disciplina tam de scripto quam de sententia se ingerit controversia, et in quolibet disputationis conflictu firmior rationis veritas reddita quam auctoritas ostensa.

Christian: Surely none of us who is discreet forbids that faith be investigated and discussed by reasons, nor is acquiescence rationally given to those things which have been doubtful, unless, with the reason first set forth, why one ought to acquiesce. Which indeed, when it effects credence for a doubtful matter, assuredly itself becomes that which is called by you an argument. For in every discipline controversy intrudes itself both about the text and about the sense, and in any conflict of disputation the truth of reason is rendered firmer than the authority displayed.

Neque enim ad fidem astruendam referet, quid sit in rei veritate, sed quid in opinionem possit venire, et de ipsius auctoritatis verbis pleraeque quaestiones emergunt, ut de ipsis prius quam per ipsa iudicandum sit. Post rationem vero redditam etiam, si ratio non sit, sed videatur, nulla quaestio remanet, quia nulla dubitatio superest.

For neither, for buttressing faith, will it pertain what is in the truth of the matter, but what can come into opinion; and from the very words of the authority most questions emerge, so that judgment must be made about the words themselves before by the things themselves. But after a rationale has been rendered, even if it is not reason but only seems so, no question remains, because no doubt is left.

Tecum vero tanto minus ex auctoritate agendum est, quanto amplius rationi inniteris et Scripturae auctoritatem minus agnoscis. Nemo quippe argui nisi ex concessis potest, nec nisi per ea, quae recipit, convincendus est, et aliter tecum, aliter nobiscum ad invicem confligendum est. Quid Gregorius aut ceteri doctores nostri, quid etiam ipse Christus vel Moyses astruat, nondum ad te pertinere novimus, ut ex ipsorum dictis ad fidem cogaris.

With you, indeed, it is so much the less to be dealt with from authority, the more you lean upon reason and the less you acknowledge the authority of Scripture. For no one can be argued against except from conceded points, nor is he to be convinced except by those things which he receives; and one must contend with you in one way, and with us among ourselves in another. What Gregory or the rest of our doctors assert, what even Christ himself or Moses asserts, we know does not yet pertain to you, so that you might be compelled to faith by their sayings.

Inter nos, qui hoc recipimus, habent ista locum et maxime rationibus nonnumquam fidem astruendam esse vel defendendam, de quibus quidem memini contra eos, qui fidem rationibus vestigandam esse denegant, secundus etiam Theologiae Christianae liber tam virtute rationum quam auctoritate scriptorum plenius disserit et rebelles convincit. Nunc ad propositum, si placet, revertamur.

Among us, who accept this, these things have a place, and especially that by reasons the faith is sometimes to be established or defended; about which indeed I recall that, against those who deny that the faith is to be investigated by reasons, the second book of Christian Theology discusses more fully both by the virtue of the reasons and by the authority of the writers, and convinces the rebellious. Now, if it pleases, let us return to the proposed matter.

Philosophus: Immo quia placet et super omnia placere oportet, quoad possumus, adnitamur et verioris ethicae documentis legem poscitare conemur naturalem. Quod recte et ordine consummari credimus, si iuxta comprehensam a te superius ethicae summam, quod sit summum bonum et qua illuc via perveniendum sit, discusserimus, ut sit videlicet in his ethicae nostrae tractatus bipartitus.

Philosopher: Nay rather, since it pleases and above all ought to please, let us, so far as we can, strive and, by the documents of a truer ethics, try to press for the natural law. We believe that this will be consummated rightly and in order, if, in accordance with the Summa of ethics comprehended by you above, we discuss what the summum bonum is and by what way one must arrive thither, so that, namely, in these matters our treatise of ethics may be bipartite.

Christianus: Approbo tecum, quod probas. Sed quia iuxta superioris condictum propositi conferendae sunt nostrae cum vestris sententiae, ut potiora valeamus eligere, et tu ex antiquitate legis naturalis primum tibi locum vindicasti, tuum est, qui priore, ut dicis, lege, hoc est naturali, contentus es et ea tantum uteris, tuas vel tuorum super hoc in medium proferre sententias et postmodum nostrorum, si in aliquo dissentimus, rationes audire.

Christian: I approve with you what you approve. But because, according to the stipulation of the former proposal, our opinions are to be compared with yours, so that we may be able to choose the preferable, and you have claimed for yourself the first place from the antiquity of the natural law, it is yours—you who are, as you say, content with the prior law, that is, the natural one, and use that only—to bring forward into the midst your opinions, or those of your party, on this, and afterward to hear the reasons of our side, if in anything we dissent.

Philosophus: Summum bonum sive finem boni, hoc est consummationem vel perfectionem eius, definierunt, sicut plerique vestrorum meminerunt, quo quisque, cum pervenerit, beatus est, sicut e contrario summum malum, cuius assecutio miserum facit. Quorum utrumque moribus promeremur. Mores autem virtutes vel eis contraria vitia constat appellari.

Philosophus: The supreme good, or the end of the good—that is, its consummation or perfection—they have defined, as most of your party recall, as that which, when anyone has reached it, he is blessed; just as, on the contrary, the supreme evil, the attainment of which makes one wretched. Both of these we merit by mores. Moreover, mores are established to be called virtues, or vices contrary to them.

Quidam tamen nostrum, sicut et in octavo De Civitate Dei meminit Augustinus, virtutem ipsam summum bonum dixerunt, alii voluptatem.

Nevertheless, certain of our number, as Augustine also recalls in the eighth book of On the City of God, said that virtue itself is the supreme good; others, pleasure.

Christianus:Utquid, obsecro, voluptatem intellexerunt?

Christian:What, I beseech, did they understand by “pleasure”?

Philosophus: Non, ut plerique aestimant, carnalium illecebrarum inhonestam et turpem oblectationem, sed quandam interiorem animae tranquillitatem, qua inter adversa et prospera manet quieta et propriis bonis contenta, dum nulla eam peccati mordeat conscientia. Absit enim, ut philosophi, terrenae felicitatis maximi contemptores et praecipui carnis domitores, in huius vitae turpitudinibus summum bonum constituerent, sicut Epicuro et eius sequacibus, id est Epicureis, multi per ignorantiam imponunt non equidem intelligentes, quid illi, ut diximus, voluptatem nominarent. Alioquin, ut diximus, Seneca, ille maximus morum aedificator et continentissimae, sicut et vos ipsi profitemini, vitae, nequaquam Epicuri tamquam magistri sui sententias tam crebro ad instructionem morum induceret, si ita, ut dicitur, sobrietatis atque honestatis tramitem excessisset.

Philosopher: Not, as very many suppose, the dishonorable and base delectation of carnal allurements, but a certain interior tranquillity of the soul, whereby among adversities and prosperities it remains quiet and content with its own goods, while no conscience of sin bites it. Far be it that philosophers, the greatest despisers of earthly felicity and the chief tamers of the flesh, should set the highest good in the turpitudes of this life, as many, through ignorance, impose upon Epicurus and his followers, that is, the Epicureans, not indeed understanding what they, as we have said, named by “pleasure.” Otherwise, as we have said, Seneca, that greatest builder of morals and of most continent life, as you yourselves also profess, would by no means so often bring forward the opinions of Epicurus, as of his master, for the instruction of morals, if he had, as is said, departed from the path of sobriety and honesty.

Christianus: Esto, ut aestimas, sed hoc, quaeso, aperi, utrum hoc modo voluptatem intelligentes ab eis, qui virtutem nominant, sensu etiam sicut et verbis dissident.

Christianus: Be it so, as you estimate; but this, I beg, lay open, whether, understanding pleasure in this way, they dissent from those who name virtue, in sense as well as in words.

Philosophus: Nulla aut parva, quantum ad sententiae summam, est eorum distantia. Hoc ipsum virtutibus polIere est hanc animae tranquillitatem habere et e converso.

Philosopher: As to the sum of the position, their distance is none or small. This very thing—to excel in virtues—is to have this tranquility of soul, and conversely.

Christianus: Una itaque sententia est utrorumque de summo bono, vero nuncupatio diversa; ac sic duae illae, quae videbantur de summo bono, sententiae ad unum sint redactae.

Christian: Therefore there is one opinion of both about the highest good, though the appellation is different; and thus those two opinions which seemed to be about the highest good have been reduced to one.

Philosophus: Sic aestimo.

Philosopher: Thus I judge.

Christianus: Et quam, rogo, viam ad hoc summum bonum, id est virtutem, perveniendi constituebant?

Christian: And what, I ask, way to this highest good, that is, virtue, did they establish?

Philosophus: Ipsum prorecto moralis lectionis studium vel domandae carnis exercitium, ut bona in habitum solidata voluntas virtus dici queat.

Philosophus: The very study, indeed, of moral lection, or the exercise of taming the flesh, so that the good will, solidified into habit, may be able to be called virtue.

Christianus: Et quem esse beatum definiunt?

Christian: And whom do they define to be blessed?

Philosophus: Beatum quasi bene aptum dicunt, hoc est in omnibus bene et facile se agentem, ut idem sit scilicet beatum esse, quod bonis moribus, id est virtutibus, pollere.

Philosophus: They say “blessed” (beatus) as if “well‑apt,” that is, one who in all things conducts himself well and easily, so that to be blessed is, namely, the same as to be endowed with good morals, that is, with virtues.

Christianus: Numquid de immortalitate animae et quadam futurae vitae beatitudine quidquam aestimant et eam pro meriris suis exspectant?

Christianus: Do they perhaps estimate anything about the immortality of the soul and a certain beatitude of the future life, and do they expect it in accordance with their merits?

Philosophus: Ita equidem, sed quid inde?

Philosopher: Yes indeed, but what follows from that?

Christianus: Numquid illius vitae beatitudinem iudicant maiorem, ubi videlicet eos susceptos nullus affiiget passionis dolor, ut ibi potius quam hic summum hominis bonum et veram beatitudinem exspectemus?

Christianus: Do they judge the beatitude of that life greater, namely, where, once they have been received, no pain of passion afflicts them, so that there rather than here we should expect the highest good of man and true beatitude?

Philosophus: Quies quidem illius vitae maxima est ab omni, ut dixisti, passione immunis, sed, cum afflictio cessat, nequaquam augeri beatitudinem dicunt, nisi virtus excrescat; nec quisquare ab eis beatior fieri dicitur, nisi virtute melior efficiatur; hoc ipsum quippe, ut dixi, definiunt beatum esse, quod est virtutibus pollere. Unde et quislibet, dum pro iustitia patitur et patiendo amplius mereri dicitur, aeque beatus in tormentis, ut ante dicitur, quia aeque bonus. Quamvis enim virtus eius nunc magis quam prius appareat, nequaquam tamen ex tormento crevit, sed ex tormento, quanta erat, apparuit.

Philosophus: The rest indeed of that life is very great, immune, as you said, from every passion; but, when affliction ceases, they by no means say that beatitude is increased unless virtue grows; nor is anyone said by them to become more beatified unless he is made better in virtue; for this very thing, as I said, they define to be “to be blessed,” which is to abound in virtues. Whence also anyone, while he suffers for justice and by suffering is said to merit more, is said to be equally blessed in torments as before, because equally good. For although his virtue now appears more than before, yet by no means did it grow from the torment, but from the torment it appeared how great it was.

Absit enim, ut quaecumque ad corporalem vel quietem vel afflictionem pertinent, beatitudinem nostram vel augeant vel minuant, si in eodem proposito virtus mentem custodiat. Ipse quidem Christus vester numquid patiendo suam minuit beatitudinem aut resurgendo auxit? Nequaquam igitur, quia illic cessant corporales istae afflictiones, nos ibi censeas futuros beatiores, si futuri non sumus meliores.

Far be it that whatever pertains to corporal either quiet or affliction should either increase or diminish our beatitude, if in the same purpose virtue guards the mind. Did your Christ himself by suffering lessen his beatitude, or by rising again augment it? By no means, therefore, because there those corporal afflictions cease, should you reckon us going to be more blessed there, if we are not going to be better.

Christianus: Quid, si sumus?

Christian: What, if we are?

Philosophus: Utique beatiores, quia meliores.

Philosopher: Certainly more blessed, because better.

Christianus: Illam, ut dixi, vitam pro meritis tamquam debitam exspectatis, tamquam hic cum vitiis pugna sit, ibi victoriae corona.

Christian: That life, as I said, awaited as due according to merits, as though here there is a fight with vices, there the crown of victory.

Philosophus: Ita omnibus patens est.

Philosopher: So it is open to all.

Christianus: Quo igitur modo ibi merces recipienda est agonum, si felicius ibi non sit vivendum nec illa vita sit praesenti melior ac beatior? Quod si illa, quam haec beatior sit, prorecto et qui ea fruuntur, beatiores quam hic esse videntur.

Christian: In what way, then, is the reward of the contests to be received there, if life is not to be lived more happily there, nor is that life better and more blessed than the present? But if that one, inasmuch as it is more blessed than this, surely those who enjoy it seem to be more blessed than they are here.

Philosophus: Utique beatiores, ut dixi, si meliores.

Philosopher: Assuredly more blessed, as I said, if they are better.

Aliter nequaquam recipimus. Nec enim, qui coronam adeptus est, majore igitur praeditus est virtute, quam antea fuerit in certamine, nec eius fortitudo maior est facta, licet magis numquam prius sit probata vel cognita, immo ex ipso gravamine conflictus fortassis diminuta; nec triumphantis quam pugnantis est vita melior, quamquam suavior.

Otherwise we by no means receive it. For neither is he who has obtained the crown endowed therefore with greater virtue than he was before in the contest, nor has his fortitude been made greater, although more than ever before it has been proved or known, nay rather perhaps diminished by the very burden of the conflict; nor is the life of the triumphant better than that of the fighting, although sweeter.

Christianus: Egestatem, infirmitatem, mortem et ceteras adversitatum vel passionum molestias tam vestri quam nostri doctores et pariter universimalisconnumerant; et propter illa, quae virtutibus contraria sunt, tam a nimae quam corporis multa sunt vitia, quae nihilominus inter mala sunt reputanda, ut claudicatio corporis sive caecitas, hebetudo mentis vel obliviositas. De contrariis quidem Aristoteles in Categoriis suis disserens: "Contrarium", inquit, "bono quidem ex necessitate est malum; hoc autem palam est per singulorum inductionem: ut sanitati languor et iustitiae iniustitia et fortitudini debilitas. Similiter autem et in aliis.

Christian: Indigence, infirmity, death, and the other annoyances of adversities or of passions, both your and our doctors alike and universally reckon; and on account of those things which are contrary to the virtues, there are many faults of both soul and body, which nonetheless are to be accounted among evils, such as lameness of the body or blindness, dullness of mind or obliviousness. Aristotle, indeed, discoursing about contraries in his Categories, says: "The contrary of the good, indeed, is of necessity the evil; and this is evident through the induction of particulars: as to health, languor; to justice, injustice; and to fortitude, debility. And similarly in other things."

Malo autem aliquando quidem bonum est contrarium, aliquando malum. Egestati enim, cum sit malum, superabundantia contraria est, cum sit ipsa malum. Sed in paucis hoc tale quislibet inspiciet.

To an evil, however, sometimes indeed a good is contrary, sometimes an evil. For to destitution, since it is an evil, superabundance is contrary, since it itself is an evil. But in a few cases anyone will observe such a thing.

In pluribus vero semper malum bono contrarium est." Et in Topicis suis Tullius, cum a contrariis locum assignaret: "Si bona est", inquit, "sanitas, mala est aegritudo": Ipse etiam Dominus de pace, quam oboedientibus tribuit, et de persecutionibus, quam rebellibus immittit, per prophetam ait: Ego, Dominus, faciens bonum et creans malum. Et in Evangelio Dominus de terrenis bonis etmalisad divitem ait: Recepisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similiter mala. Ille quoque vester prius et postea noster Augustinus mortem malam astruit.

But in more cases indeed, evil is always contrary to good." And in his Topics, Tullius, when he assigned the locus from contraries, says: "If health is good, sickness is bad." The Lord himself also, concerning the peace which he grants to the obedient, and the persecutions which he sends upon the rebellious, says through the prophet: "I, the Lord, making good and creating evil." And in the Gospel the Lord, concerning earthly goods and evils, says to the rich man: "You received good things in your life, and Lazarus likewise evil things." That Augustine of yours too—formerly yours and afterwards ours—establishes death as an evil.

"Sicut lex", inquit, "non est malum, quoniam auget peccantium concupiscentiam, ita nec mors bonum est, quoniam auget patientium gloriam et efficit martyres. Lex quidem bona est, quia prohibitio est peccati.

"Just as the law," he says, "is not an evil, because it augments the concupiscence of sinners, so neither is death a good, because it augments the glory of those who suffer and effects martyrs. The law indeed is good, because it is a prohibition of sin."

Morsautem mala, quia stipendium peccati. Sed quem ad modum iniusti male etiam utuntur bonis, ita etiam iusti bene utanturmalis. Hinc fit, ut etmalimale lege utantur, quamvis lex sit bonum, et boni bene moriantur, quamvis sit mors malum."

But death, however, is an evil, because it is the wage of sin. But just as the unjust also use good things badly, so too let the just use bad things well. Hence it comes about that the evil use the law badly, although the law is a good, and the good die well, although death is an evil."

Philosophus: Quorsum, obsecro, ista?

Philosopher: To what purpose, I beseech, are these things?

Christianus: Ut eam, inquam, meliorem esse vitam intelligas, quam et ab istismalisomnino constat esse immunem et in tantum a peccato prorsus remotam, ut non solum ibi non peccetur, sed nec peccari possit. Quae nisi melior vita praesente sit aut magis placeat, frustra est in retributione posita. Sin autem magis placet nec melior est, irrationabiliter huic praefertur, et qui eam plus desiderant, indiscrete agunt.

Christian: That you may understand, I say, that that life is better, which both is acknowledged to be altogether immune from those evils and is so far removed from sin that not only is there no sinning there, but neither can it be possible to sin. Unless that life be better than the present or more pleasing, it is set in retribution in vain. But if it pleases more and is not better, it is preferred to this irrationally, and they who desire it more act indiscreetly.

Philosophus: Certe, ut verum fatear, nunc te primum philosophum comperior, nec tam manifestae rationi impudenter convenit adversari. Sed ibi potius quam hic iuxta propositam rationem tuam summum est hominis bonum exspectandum. Et fortassis hoc fuit Epicuri sententia summum bonum voluptatem dicentis, quoniam videlicet tanta est animae tranquillitas, ut nec exterius eam corporalis afflictio nec interius mentem aliqua peccati conscientia inquietet vel vitium obstet, ut optima eius voluntas omnino compleatur.

Philosopher: Certainly, to confess the truth, now for the first time I discover you to be a philosopher, nor is it fitting to oppose so manifest a reason impudently. But there rather than here, according to your proposed reasoning, the highest good of man is to be expected. And perhaps this was Epicurus’s opinion, in saying that the highest good is pleasure, since, namely, so great is the tranquility of the soul that neither outwardly does bodily affliction disturb it nor inwardly does any conscience of sin disquiet the mind or a vice obstruct, so that its best will may be entirely fulfilled.

Quamdiu autem voluntati nostrae aliquid obsistit vel deest, vera beatitudo nequaquam est. Quod utique semper evenit, dum hic vivitur, et anima terreni corporis mole gravata et quasi carcere quodam conclusa vera non fruitur libertate. Quis enim aliquando non desideret calorem, dum nimium friget, vel e converso, aut serenum, dum pluvia gravatur, aut ad esum vel indumentum saepe amplius, quam habeat?

But so long as anything withstands or is lacking to our will, there is by no means true beatitude. And this indeed always occurs while one lives here, and the soul, weighed down by the mass of the earthly body and shut up as it were in a certain prison, does not enjoy true liberty. For who at some time does not desire heat when he is excessively cold, or conversely, clear weather when he is burdened by rain, or for food or clothing often more than he has?

Innumerabilia sunt et alia, quae si manifestae veritati non resistamus, nobis nolentibus ingeruntur vel volentibus denegantur. Si autem, ut se ratio habet, illud vitae futurae bonum nobis summum aestimandum est, puto viam, qua illuc pervenitur, virtutes esse, quibus hic adornamur. De quibus postmodum diligentius nobis conferendum erit.

Innumerable, too, are other things which, if we do not resist manifest truth, are thrust upon us when we are unwilling, or, when we are willing, are denied to us. But if, as reason holds, that good of the future life is to be esteemed our supreme good, I think the way by which one arrives thither to be the virtues, with which here we are adorned. About which thereafter we shall have to confer more diligently.

Christianus: Ecce ad hoc disputatio nostra perducta est, ut summum hominis bonum sive ipsum, ut dictum est, finem boni futurae vitae beatitudinem et, qua illuc pervenitur, viam virtutes ponamus. Sed prius de hoc summo bono nostram, id est Christianam, cum vestris conferre volo disciplinam, ut, quae huius boni doctrinam vel exhortationem habet uberiorem, tamquam perfectior habeatur et ei amplius obtemperetur. De veteri autem lege, qua Iudaei gloriantur, te optime arbitraris monstrasse nullum ibi praemium huius beatitudinis promissum fuisse nec inde aliquam ibi exhortationem adhibitam esse.

Christian: Behold, to this our disputation has been brought, that we set as the highest good of man, or the end itself, as has been said, the blessedness of the good of the future life, and, as the way by which one arrives thither, the virtues. But first I wish to compare, concerning this highest good, our discipline—that is, the Christian—with yours, so that that which has a more copious doctrine or exhortation of this good may be held as more perfect and be obeyed the more. But concerning the Old Law, in which the Jews glory, you think you have most excellently shown that no reward of this blessedness was there promised, nor from it was any exhortation there applied.

Dominus autem Iesus, cum novum traderet testamentum, in ipso statim exordio tale doctrinae suae fundamentum collocavit, quod et ad contemptum mundi et ad huius beatitudinis desiderium pariter incitaret, dicens: Beati pauperes spiritu, quoniam ipsorum est regnum coelorum. Et post aliqua: Beati, qui persecutionem patiuntur propter iustitiam, quoniam ipsorum est regnum coelorum. Et si diligenter attendamus ad haec, universa eius praecepta vel exhortationes adhibentur, ut spe illius supernae et aeternae vitae omnia contemnantur prospera sive tolerentur adversa.

But the Lord Jesus, when he was handing down the new testament, at the very outset placed such a foundation of his doctrine as would at once stir both to contempt of the world and to desire for this beatitude, saying: Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. And after some things: Blessed are those who suffer persecution on account of righteousness, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. And if we attend carefully to these, all his precepts and exhortations are applied so that, by the hope of that supernal and eternal life, all prosperous things may be despised and adverse things endured.

Quod nequaquam arbitror vestros attigisse doctores aut ad hunc finem boni vestros animos aeque invitasse. Quod si tales erant, assigna universa ethicae vestrae percurrens instituta, aut si assignare non possis, tanto doctrinam Christi perfectiorem atque meliorem esse fatearis, quanto nos causa vel spe meliori ad virtutes adhortatur, cum vos potius virtutes vel earum contraria propter se ipsa magis quam propter aliud appeti vel vitari debere censeatis. Unde et illa honesta vel inhonesta vocari haec debere censetis.

I by no means think that your doctors have touched on this, or have equally invited your minds to this end of the good. But if they were such, set forth, as you run through them, all the institutes of your ethics; or, if you cannot set them forth, you must confess that the doctrine of Christ is so much the more perfect and better, by how much it exhorts us to virtues on account of a better cause or hope, whereas you rather deem that virtues, or their contraries, ought to be sought or shunned for their own sake rather than for anything else. Whence also you judge that these should be called honorable or dishonorable.

Honestum quippe dicitis, quod per se ipsum placet et propter se ipsum, non propter aliud est appetendum, sicut e contrario inhonestum, quod ex propria turpitudine est fugiendum. Quae enim propter aliud vel appetenda sunt vel vitanda, ea potius utilia vel inutilia nuncupatis.

Indeed you say that the honorable is that which pleases by itself and is to be desired for its own sake, not for the sake of something else; conversely, the dishonorable is that which, from its own turpitude, is to be fled. For the things which are to be desired or avoided for the sake of something else, those you rather name useful or useless.

Philosophus: Sic profecto nostris visum est maioribus, sicut in secundo Rhetoricae suae M. Tullius plenius exsequitur. Sed profecto cum dicitur: Virtus propter se ipsam, non propter aliud expetenda, non omnino merces meritorum excluditur, sed terrenorum intentio commodorum removetur. Alioquin virtutum finem, id est causam finalem non bene constitueremus beatitudinem, sicut in secundo Topicorum suorum Boetius vester Themistium secutus commemorat.

Philosopher: Thus indeed it seemed to our elders, as Marcus Tullius more fully sets forth in the second of his Rhetoric. But assuredly, when it is said, “Virtue is to be sought for its own sake, not on account of something else,” the recompense of merits is not altogether excluded, but the intention toward earthly commodities is removed. Otherwise we would not rightly constitute the end of the virtues—that is, the final cause—as beatitude, just as in the second of his Topics Boethius, following your Themistius, recounts.

Ibi quippe cum de loco a fine subiceret exemplum: "Si beatum", inquit, "esse bonum est, et iustitia bona est." Hic enim, ait, finis est iustitiae, ut, si quis secundum iustitiam vivat, ad beatitudinem perducatur. "Ecce hic aperte monstrat beatitudinem in retributionem iustae vitae positam esse et nobis intentionem iuste vivendi esse, ut ad illud perveniamus. Quam, ut arbitror, beatitudinem Epicurus voluptatem, Christus vester regnum coelorum nominat.

There, indeed, when he was subjoining an example of the topic from the end: "If being blessed," he says, "is a good, then justice too is good." For here, he says, is the end of justice: that, if someone lives according to justice, he be led through to beatitude. "Behold, here he openly shows that beatitude is placed in the retribution of a just life, and that our intention of living justly is, that we may arrive at that. Which beatitude, as I think, Epicurus calls pleasure, your Christ calls the kingdom of heaven.

Quid autem refert, quo nomine vocetur, dummodo res eadem permaneat nec sit beatitudo diversa nec juste vivendi philosophis quam Christianis intentio praeponatur alia? Ut enim vos sicut et nos hic vivere iuste disponimus, ut illic glorificemur, et contra vitia pugnamus, ut meritis virtutum illic coronemur summum illud scilicet bonum pro mercede adepti.

What, moreover, does it matter by what name it is called, provided that the same reality remains, and that beatitude is not different, nor a different intention of living justly be set before philosophers than before Christians? For just as you, so also we, dispose ourselves to live justly here, that there we may be glorified, and we fight against vices, that by the merits of the virtues we may there be crowned, having obtained that supreme good as our reward.

Christianus: Immo longe, quantum percipio, nostra in hoc et vestra intentio quam merita sunt diversa, et de ipso quoque summo bono non modice dissentimus.

Christian: Rather, by far, so far as I perceive, both our intention in this matter and yours, as well as our merits, are different; and concerning the very summum bonum we likewise disagree not a little.

Philosophus: Id, obsecro, si vales, aperias.

Philosopher: That, I beseech you, if you are able, lay open.

Christianus: Nemo recte summum bonum dicit, quo maius aliquod invenitur. Quod enim inferius vel minus est aliquo, id nullo pacto supremum vel summum dici potest. Omnem vero beatitudinem vel gloriam humanam longe et ineffabiliter a divina transcendi constat.

Christian: No one rightly calls that the highest good, than which some greater is found. For whatever is inferior or less than something cannot by any means be called supreme or highest. But it is clear that all human beatitude or glory is by far and ineffably transcended by the divine.

Nulla igitur praeter illam recte summa nuncupanda est; aut praeter ipsum nihil iure summum bonum dicitur.

Therefore, nothing besides that is rightly to be named the supreme; or, apart from Himself, nothing by right is called the supreme good.

Philosophus: Non hoc loco absolute summum bonum, sed summum hominis bonum intendimus.

Philosopher: We do not here intend the absolute supreme good, but the supreme good of man.

Christianus: Sed nec summum hominis bonum recte dicimus, quo maius aliquod hominis bonum reperitur.

Christian: But neither do we rightly call it the supreme good of man, than which some greater good of man is found.

Philosophus: Ita profecto liquet.

Philosopher: Thus indeed it is clear.

Christianus: Quaero igitur, an in illa beatitudine alius alio beatior sit, sicut hic alterum alio iustiorem vel sanctiorem esse contingit, ut videlicet secundum diversitatem meritorum sit et remuneratio diversa.

Christian: Therefore I ask whether in that beatitude one is more beatified than another, just as here it happens that one is more just or more sanctified than another, so that, namely, according to the diversity of merits the remuneration is also diverse.

Philosophus: Quid si ita est?

Philosopher: What if it is so?

Christianus: Immo, quia ita est, oportet concedas alium ibi hominem alio beatiorem effici nec per hoc eius hominis beatitudinem, quae minor est, nequaquam summum hominis bonum esse nuncupandum. Unde nec illum, qui minus alio beatus est, iam beatum dici convenit. Summum quippe bonum id definisti, quo cum quisque pervenerit beatus est, aut igitur illum, qui alio ibi minor est, summum bonum adeptum esse concesseris, aut eum minime beatum esse concesseris, sed eum tantummodo, quo nemo ibi sit beatior.

Christian: Nay rather, since it is so, you ought to concede that one man there is made more blessed than another; nor on this account is the beatitude of that man, which is lesser, by any means to be named the summum bonum of man. Whence neither is it fitting that him who is less blessed than another should already be called blessed. For you defined the summum bonum as that by attaining which anyone is blessed; either therefore you must concede that he who there is inferior to another has obtained the summum bonum, or you must concede that he is by no means blessed—but only he than whom no one there is more blessed.

Si enim id quod adeptus est, eum beatum efficit, profecto iuxta suprapositam definitionem summum bonum illud dici convenit.

For if that which he has obtained makes him happy, assuredly, according to the above definition, that should be called the highest good.

Philosophus: Sustine paululum, obsecro, et attende, quid nunc interrogationi novissimae subiecerim. Quem etiam maledicta corrigere licet, cum ad inquisitionem veri, non ad ostentationem ingenii, sicut dictum est, conferamus.

Philosopher: Bear a little, I beseech, and attend to what I have now subjoined to the very latest interrogation. It is even permitted to correct him with maledictions, since we are contributing to the inquisition of truth, not to an ostentation of ingenuity, as has been said.

Christianus: Approbo et concedo, quod dicis. Non enim nobis circa inquisitionem veritatis penitus occupatis more puerili vel importunae declamationis corrixari convenit nec, si qua minus provide conceduntur, hinc eum, qui doceri vel docere intendit, erubescentiae inferendae occasionem sumere, ubi etiam argumentandi gratia liceat nonnumquam concedere falsa. Omnem itaque licentiam vel mutandae penitus vel corrigendae sententiae damus.

Christianus: I approve and concede what you say. For it is not fitting for us, being wholly occupied with the inquisition of truth, to brawl after a boyish manner or with importunate declamation, nor, if certain things are conceded less providently, to take from this an occasion of inflicting blush-shame upon him who intends to be taught or to teach, where even for the sake of argument it is sometimes permitted to concede falsehoods. Therefore we grant every license either for utterly changing or for correcting the judgment.

Philosophus: Memento, inquam, quid dixerim, et conditionis appositae recordare, ubi videlicet dictum est: Quid si ita est? Multis namque philosophorum visum est omnibus bonis hominibus omnes simul inesse virtutes nec eum ullatenus bonum censeri, cui virtus aliqua desit, ac per hoc omnium bonorum hominum nec in meritis vitae nec in beatitudinis remuneratione ullam esse distantiam. Quod si forte ita sit, eadem omnibus beatitudo retribuitur, et omnes aequaliter summum bonum adepti pariter fiunt beati.

Philosopher: Remember, I say, what I have said, and recall the appended condition, namely where it was said: What if it is so? For to many of the philosophers it has seemed that all the virtues are present together in all good men, and that he is in no way to be reckoned good to whom some virtue is lacking; and therefore, that among all good men there is no distinction either in the merits of life or in the remuneration of beatitude. But if perchance it is so, the same beatitude is repaid to all, and all, having equally attained the highest good, alike become blessed.

Quam patenter sententiam Tullius in secundo De officiis libro his verbis profitetur: "Iustitia cum sine prudentia satis habeat auctoritatis, prudentia sine iustitia nihil valet ad fidem faciendam. Quo enim quisque versutior et callidior, hoc invidiosior et suspectior detracta opinione probitatis. Quam ob rem intelligentiae iustitia coniuncta, quantum volet, habebit ad faciendam fidem virium.

How openly Tullius in the second book of On Duties professes this opinion in these words: "Justice, since even without prudence it has authority enough; prudence without justice is worth nothing for gaining credence. For the more wily and crafty someone is, the more invidious and the more suspect he is, once the reputation of probity is taken away. Wherefore justice joined to intelligence will have, as much as it wishes, strength for gaining credence."

Iustitia sine prudentia multum poterit, sine iustitia nihil valebit prudentia. Sed, ne quis sit admiratus, cur, cum inter omnes philosophos constet, a meque ipso disputatum saepe sit, qui unam haberet, omnes habere virtutes, nunc ita seiungam, quasi possit quisquam, qui non idem prudens sit, iustus esse: alia est illa, cum veritas ipsa limatur in disputatione, subtilitas, alia, cum ad omnes accommodatur oratio. Quam ob rem, ut vulgus, ita nos hoc loco loquimur, ut alios fortes, alios viros bonos, alios prudentes esse dicamus.

Justice without prudence will be able to do much; without justice, prudence will be worth nothing. But, lest anyone be amazed why—although it is agreed among all the philosophers, and I myself have often disputed, that whoever had one would have all the virtues—I now thus separate them, as if anyone could be just who is not likewise prudent: one kind is that subtlety when truth itself is polished in disputation, another when the oration is accommodated to all. Wherefore, as the common crowd, so we speak in this place, so that we may say that some are brave, others good men, others prudent.

Popularibus enim verbis est agendum et usitatis, cum loquimur." Qui etiam in Paradoxis non solum in virtutibus bonos, verum etiam in peccatis ita aequat malos, ut omnia peccata paria esse astruat.

“For we must proceed with popular and with customary words, when we speak.” He also in the Paradoxes not only sets the good on a level in respect to virtues, but even, in respect to sins, so levels the wicked that he asserts all sins to be equal.

Christianus: Nunc primo te importunum impudenter fieri et corrixari magis quam philosophari video. Quippe ne ad confessionem manifestae veritatis cogi videaris, ad patentissimae falsitatis insaniam te convertis, ut omnes videlicet bonos aequaliter bonos, omnes reos aequaliter reos et omnes pariter eadem gloria vel poena censeas dignos.

Christian: Now for the first time I see you becoming importunate impudently and wrangling rather than philosophizing. For indeed, lest you seem to be compelled to the confession of manifest truth, you turn yourself to the insanity of most patent falsity, namely, that you judge all good men equally good, all guilty equally guilty, and all alike worthy of the same glory or penalty.

Philosophus: Siquidem in re, non in hominum opinione consistit, qui operum effectum magis quam morum qualitatem diiudicant atque remunerant et secundum ea, quae geri exterius videntur, alios iustiores vel fortiores sive meliores vel deteriores aliis iudicant. A qua profecto sententia nec vos longe esse arbitror, si vestram diligenter consideretis disciplinam. Omnes quippe virtutes, ut vester ille maximus astruit Philosophus Augustinus, uno nomine caritas comprehendit, quae sola, ut ipsemet ait, inter filios Dei et filios diaboli discernit.

Philosopher: Since indeed it consists in the thing itself, not in the opinion of men, who adjudge and remunerate the effect of works rather than the quality of morals, and who, according to those things which are seen to be done outwardly, judge some to be more just or braver or better or worse than others. From which judgment I do not think you yourselves are far, if you diligently consider your discipline. For all the virtues, as that greatest Philosopher of yours, Augustine, asserts, charity comprehends under one name; which alone, as he himself says, discerns between the children of God and the children of the devil.

Unde et merito quodata loco meminit: "Ubi est caritas quidem, quod possit deesse? Plenitudo quippe legis est dilectio." Quam ipse, qui hoc dicit, Apostolus plenitudinem prosequens et tam mala inde removens quam ibi bona comprehendens ait: Caritas patiens est, benigna est, caritas non aemulatur, non agit perperam, etc. De qua etiam, cum inter cetera dicatur, quod omnia suffert vel omnia sustinet, utique et mortem; ut autem Christus meminit; Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, ut animam suam quis ponat pro amicis suis.

Whence also rightly he remembers in a certain place: "Where charity is indeed, what can be lacking? For the plenitude of the law is love." Which plenitude the Apostle himself—who says this—pursuing, and both removing evils therefrom and comprehending goods therein, says: Charity is patient, is benign; charity is not emulous, does not act improperly, etc. Of which also, since among other things it is said that it bears all things or endures all things, assuredly even death; as moreover Christ recalls: No one has greater love than this, that someone lay down his life for his friends.

Non ergo alius alio magis in caritate abundat, cum haec omnia caritas in se contineat et secum afferat. Quod si in caritate nemo alium transcendit, utique nec in virtutibus aut meritis, cum omnem, ut dicis, caritas complectatur virtutem.

Therefore, no one abounds in charity more than another, since charity contains all these things in itself and brings them with it. But if in charity no one transcends another, surely neither in virtues nor in merits, since charity, as you say, embraces every virtue.

Christianus: Revera, si proprie virtus intelligatur, quae videlicet meritum apud Deum obtinet, sola caritas virtus appellanda est. Quae quidem pro eo, quod iustum efficit vel fortem seu temperantem, iustitia recte dicitur vel fortitudo sive temperantia. Sed sicut omnes, qui habent caritatem, non aequaliter ea succensi sunt, nec omnes prudentes aequaliter intelligunt, ita nec omnes iusti aequaliter iusti sunt, aut omnes aequaliter fortes vel temperantes.

The Christian: Truly, if virtue be properly understood, which namely obtains merit with God, charity alone is to be called virtue. Which indeed, for the reason that it makes one just or brave or temperate, is rightly called justice or fortitude or temperance. But just as all who have charity are not equally kindled by it, nor do all the prudent understand equally, so neither are all the just equally just, or all equally brave or temperate.

Et quamvis secundum specierum distinctionem omnes virtutes aliquibus inesse concedamus, cum videlicet unusquisque illorum sit iustus et fortis et temperans, non omnino tamen in virtutibus aut meritis eos esse pares annuimus, cum alium alio iustiorem vel fortiorem seu modestiorem esse contingat. Quamvis enim in praedictis speciebus virtutum singulos convenire ponamus, magna tamen est in individuis specierum differentia, cum huius maior quam illius sit iustitia vel fortitudo seu temperantia; sed cum caritas omnia, quae dixisti, conferat, non tamen singulis, quibus inest, omnia largitur. Sicut enim a natura omnia corporis commoda tribuuntur, sed non omnia omnibus, sic et in bonis animae seu virtutibus contingit, ut non omnes omnibus aequaliter ditentur.

And although, according to the distinction of species (kinds), we concede that all the virtues inhere in certain persons, since namely each of them is just and strong and temperate, nevertheless we do not by any means grant that they are equal in virtues or merits, since it happens that one is more just than another, or stronger, or more temperate. For although we suppose that individuals agree in the aforesaid species of virtues, yet there is great difference among the individuals of the species, since this one’s justice or fortitude or temperance is greater than that one’s; and although charity confers all the things you have said, nevertheless it does not lavish all things upon each person in whom it is present. For just as by nature all the advantages of the body are granted, but not all to all, so too in the goods of the soul or virtues it happens that not all are enriched equally with all things.

Unde volo, ut attendas, quam sit illa ratio infirma, immo vilissimum sophisma, quod videlicet ex aliorum opinione in Paradoxa praedictus inducit Philosophus, ut virtutes sicut et vitia pares in omnibus esse convincat, cum videlicet dixerit "bono viro meliorem non esse nec temperante temperantiorem nec forti fortiorem nec sapienti sapientiorem." Etsi enim bono viro non sit aliquis melior, tamen aliquo bono viro melior est. Quid est enim aliud dicere de aliquo, quod sit melior bono, nisi quod sit melior quam bonus vir, quicumque ille sit? Non enim cum Deum homine dicimus meliorem, aliter intelligimus, nisi quod omnes transcendat homines.

Whence I wish you to attend how infirm that reasoning is, nay, a most vile sophism, which, from the opinion of others, the aforesaid Philosopher introduces in the Paradoxes, so as to prove that the virtues, just as the vices, are equal in all, since he said, "there is not one better than a good man, nor more temperate than a temperate man, nor stronger than a strong man, nor wiser than a wise man." For although there is not someone better than a good man, nevertheless someone is better than some good man. For what else is it to say of someone that he is better than a good man, except that he is better than a good man, whoever he may be? For indeed, when we say that God is better than man, we understand nothing else except that he transcends all men.

Sic etiam cum tamen aliquem bonum dicimus virum bono viro meliorem, id est, quam bonus vir sit vel quam sit aliquis vir bonus, non aliter accipiendum videtur, nisi generaliter omnibus bonis viris ille praeponatur. Quod omnino falsum est, cum ipse etiam sit aliquis bonorum virorum. Si enim melior sit quam bonus vel quam sit aliquis bonus vir, consequens videtur, ut neque bonus vir neque aliquis bonus vir sit adeo bonus, sed si quis bonus sit, eo minus sit bonus.

So also, when nevertheless we call some good man better than a good man—that is, than a good man is, or than some man is good—it seems it must be taken in no other way, except that, generally, he is set before all good men. Which is altogether false, since he himself too is someone of the good men. For if he be better than good, or than some good man is, it seems consequent that neither the good man nor any good man is so good; but if anyone be good, by so much he is the less good.

Multum itaque referre videtur, si quis dicatur melior aliquo bono viro, et melior, quam sit aliquis bonus vir. Et hic quidem sophismatis laqueus in omni incidere comparatione potest, ut quemadmodum omnes bonos aequaliter bonos probare conantur, ita quoslibet pulchros, cum videlicet nemo pulcher sit pulchrior pulchro simpliciter scilicet et generaliter, licet sit pulchrior alio pulchro. Quis denique, qui non intelligat, quam insanissimum sit dicere omnia peccata paria esse?

It seems, therefore, to make much difference whether someone is said to be better than some good man, and better than a good man is. And indeed this noose of sophism can fall upon every comparison, so that, just as they try to prove all good men equally good, so too any who are beautiful; since, plainly, no beautiful person is more beautiful than the beautiful, simply, that is, and generally, although he may be more beautiful than another beautiful person. Who, finally, does not understand how most insane it is to say that all sins are equal?

Sive enim peccatum in voluntate sive in operatione constituas, clarum est inmalishominibus alium alio habere nequiorem voluntatem et amplius nocere sive deterius agere. Voluntas quippe ad actum perducit, et cum facultas nocendi datur, amplius hic quam ille nocet vel magis aliquem iustum persequitur, quia plus eum odit et affligere cupit. Similiter nec omnes boni aequaliter prosunt vel prodesse volunt.

For whether you constitute sin in the will or in the operation, it is clear that among evil men one has a more wicked will than another and does more harm or acts worse. For the will, to be sure, leads through to act; and when the faculty of harming is given, this man harms more than that man, or more intensely persecutes some just man, because he hates him more and longs to afflict him. Similarly, not all good men profit equally or will to profit.

Ex quo liquidum est nec bonos pares invicem nec malos existere nec eorum merita aequari debere, ut remuneratio quoque par esse intelligatur. Praeterea si stultorum opinione postposita probatorum philosophorum excellentia de virtutibus dogmata consideres et disertissimi viri Plotini diligenter quaternariam virtutum distinctionem attendas, alias videlicet politicas, alias purgatorias, alias purgati animi, alias exemplares dicentis, ex ipsis statim nominibus et earum descriptionibus confiteri cogeris plurimum in virtutibus homines differe. Quam etiam differentiam ipse, de quo nobis obiecisti, Apostolus non praetermittens, cum de continentia et indulgentia nuptiarum loqueretur, ait: Volo omnes homines esse sicut meipsum.

Whence it is clear that neither the good nor the bad exist equal to one another, nor ought their merits to be equated, so that the remuneration also be understood to be equal. Moreover, if, setting aside the opinion of fools, you consider, in the excellence of approved philosophers, the dogmas concerning the virtues, and carefully attend to the quaternary distinction of virtues of the most eloquent man Plotinus—saying, namely, some political, others purgatorial, others of the purged mind, others exemplary—then from the very names and their descriptions you are forced to confess that men differ very much in virtues. Which difference also the Apostle himself, the one whom you alleged against us, not passing over, when he was speaking about continence and the indulgence of marriages, said: I wish all men to be as myself.

Sed unusquisque proprium habet donum ex Deo, alius quidem sic, alius sic, etc. Qui etiam secundum quali tatem virtutum vel meritorum praemia futurae vitae distinguens, Differt, inquit, stella a stella in claritate, sic erit et resurrectio mortuorum. Et alibi: Qui parce seminat, parce et metet.

But each one has his own proper gift from God, one indeed thus, another thus, etc. He also, distinguishing the rewards of the future life according to the quality of virtues or of merits, says: "Star differs from star in brightness; so also will be the resurrection of the dead." And elsewhere: "He who sows sparingly will also reap sparingly."

Quod vero plenitudinem legis caritatem esse dixit, hoc est per caritatem legem adimpleri, non omnes in caritate pares esse convincit, cum supra mandatum caritas se extendat. Unde et illa est Veritatis adhortatio: Cum feceritis omnia, quae praecepta sunt, dicite: Servi inutiles sumus; quae debuimus facere, fecimus. Hoc est, pro modico reputetis, si hoc solum impleatis, quod ex praecepto debetis, nisi videlicet debito praecepti aliquid ex gratia superaddatis, et hoc est, quod dicit: quod debuimus facere, fecimus.

But that he said the plenitude of the law is charity, that is, that by charity the law is fulfilled, proves that not all are equal in charity, since charity extends itself beyond the commandment. Whence also is that exhortation of Truth: When you shall have done all the things that are commanded, say: We are unprofitable servants; what we were bound to do, we have done. That is, reckon it a small thing, if you fulfill only this which out of precept you owe, unless, to wit, you superadd something from grace to the debt of the precept; and this is what he says: what we were bound to do, we have done.

Ac si videlicet diceret: Quia in expletione praeceptorum debita tantum solvimus et quasi necessaria, non gratuita operamur. Cum vero aliquis ad eminentiam virginitatis transit, praeceptum utique in ea transcendit, ad quam ex praecepto non cogitur. Unde idem meminit Apostolus: De virginibus autem praeceptum Domini non habeo, consilium autem do. Sed in his etiam, qui legem adimpleverint nec transcenderint, impar esse caritas potest, cum in eodem videlicet opere maior huius quam illius sit caritatis affectus.

As if, namely, he were saying: that in the completion of precepts we discharge only what is owed and, as it were, the necessary things; we do not operate gratuitously. But when someone passes over to the eminence of virginity, he surely transcends the precept, to which he is not compelled by precept. Whence the same Apostle remembers: But concerning virgins I have no precept of the Lord, but I give counsel. Yet even among those who have fulfilled the law and not transcended it, charity can be unequal, since in the same work, namely, the affection of charity of this one is greater than that of that one.

Quod etiam obiectum est ex illo Augustini dicto: "Ubi est caritas, quid est, quod possit deesse", etc., nemo est, qui sic eum accepisse hoc aestimet, ut omnes omnibus in virtutibus et meritis unire velit; quod tam Dominum quam Apostolum secutus fere ubique contradicit. Tale est utique, quod ait: quid est, quod possit deesse ad salutem, sed non ad virtutum perfectionem? Nemo quippe cum illa perit, sed non omnes in illa aequantur.

Moreover, as for what has been objected from that dictum of Augustine: "Where charity is, what is there that can be lacking," etc., there is no one who should think that he took it thus, as though he wished to make all equal to all in virtues and merits; which he, following both the Lord and the Apostle, almost everywhere contradicts. Indeed, it is of this sort, what he says: what is there that can be lacking for salvation, but not for the perfection of virtues? For no one perishes with it, but not all are equal in it.

Philosophus: Ne gravet te, oro, multas nos sententias seu opiniones inducere, ut ex omnibus veritatem rationum possimus eligere. Qui enim, quem adhuc ignorant, locum vestigant, multas explorare coguntur vias, ut rectiorem valeant eligere, sicut nunc summum inquirendo bonum facere compellor, dum videlicet maiorum nostrorum sententias vel propriam, a te invitatus, propono.

Philosopher: Let it not burden you, I pray, that we introduce many sentences or opinions, so that from them all we may be able to choose the truth of the reasons. For those who track down a place which they still do not know are compelled to explore many ways, so that they may be able to choose the straighter one, just as now, by inquiring into the highest good, I am compelled to do, while, namely, I set forth the opinions of our elders, or my own, invited by you.

Christianus: Non gravaret, si tale quid pro sententia induceretur, quod si verum non esset, aliquid saltem probabilitatis haberet. Non enim, quod patenter falsum est, aliqua refelli ratione opus est.

Christianus: It would not be burdensome, if something of that sort were introduced as an opinion, which, if it were not true, would at least have some probability. For what is patently false has no need to be refuted by any reasoning.

Philosophus: Quid si summum hominis bonum dicamus statum illum futurae vitae comparatione tantum bonorum praesentis vitae?Namet cum vos nobis duos fines a Deo propositos dicatis, summum videlicet bonum in coelo vel summum malum in inferno, non aliter hoc accipitis, nisi quantum ad vitae praesentis statum bonum vel malum. Sex quippe hominum status nobis ratio suggerit, tres videlicet in hac vita et secundum hos tres similiter alios in futura. Primus quippe hominis status est, in quo nascitur, dum nondum in eo excitata ratione liberum est adeptus arbitrium, ut, secundum quod elegerit, bonus homo vel malus dicendus sit, quamvis ipse bona res vel bona sit substantia sive creatura.

Philosophus: What if we say that man’s highest good is that condition of the future life only by comparison with the goods of the present life? For since you tell us that two ends are set forth by God, namely the highest good in heaven and the highest evil in hell, you do not take this otherwise, except as far as concerns the condition of the present life as good or evil. Reason, indeed, suggests to us six statuses of man: three, namely, in this life, and according to these three likewise others in the future. For the first status of man is that in which he is born, while, reason not yet aroused in him, he has not yet obtained free will—so that, according to what he shall choose, the man is to be called good or evil—although he himself is a good thing or a good substance, that is, a creature.

De hoc quidem priore statu hominis, cum ad discretionis aetatem ipse perductus, scienter se ad bonum sive ad malum inclinaverit, iam bonus ipse homo vel malus effectus bonum hominis statum vel malum ingressus est. Primus quidem homini status quasi indifferens nec bonus videlicet nec malus proprie dicendus est, secundus, si ad virtutes conscenderit, bonus, si ad vitia descenderit, malus. Sic etiam futura vita tres habet status: Unum quidem quasi indifferentem, nec beatum proprie, sed nec miserum, qui videlicet eorum est, quorum etiam in hac vita indifferens, ut diximus, status exstitit omnibus videlicet destitutus virtutibus et meritis nondum excitata hominis ratione, alium vero pro meritis optimum et alium pessimum.

Concerning this earlier state of man: when he himself, having been brought to the age of discretion, has knowingly inclined himself to the good or to the evil, already the man himself, having become good or evil, has entered the good state of man or the evil. The first state for man is, as it were, indifferent—properly to be called neither good nor evil; the second, if he has climbed up to virtues, is good; if he has descended to vices, evil. Thus also the future life has three states: one indeed, as it were, indifferent—properly neither blessed nor miserable—which, namely, is that of those whose state even in this life, as we said, was indifferent, being, namely, destitute of all virtues and merits, with man’s reason not yet awakened; but another, best according to merits, and another, worst.

Hos autem duos comparatione duorum aliorum praesentis vitae, qui eos promerentur, summum bonum et summum malum dici arbitror, eo quod nihil adversi vel prosperi eis sit admixtum, cum alios duos talibus constet esse permixtos, ut nec boni nec mali puritas insit eis.

However, these two, in comparison with the other two of the present life who merit them, I judge to be called the highest good and the highest evil, because nothing adverse or prosperous is admixed to them, whereas the other two are established to be commingled with such things, so that the purity neither of good nor of evil is present in them.

Christianus: Ecce secundum te summum bonum illa supernae vitae quies intelligenda est, sicut e contrario summum malum illa malorum damnatio futura. Quorum utrumque, sicut meministi, ipsi nostris acquirimus meritis, per quae videlicet quasi quibusdam viis illuc pervenitur.

Christianus: Behold, according to you the highest good is to be understood as that rest of the supernal life, just as, on the contrary, the highest evil is that future condemnation of the wicked. Both of which, as you remember, we ourselves acquire by our own merits, through which, as by certain roads, one comes thither.

Philosophus: Ita aestimo, et planum est. Nulla quippe his, qui naturalem amplectantur legem, sententia firmior habetur, quam ut virtus ad beatitudinem sufficiat et, quod solae faciant virtutes beatum, nulla alia quisquam via hoc nomen adipiscitur. Sic e contrario nullum vere miserum, nisi ex vitiis, fieri constat.

Philosopher: So I reckon, and it is plain. Indeed, among those who embrace the natural law, no doctrine is held firmer than that virtue suffices for beatitude, and that, because the virtues alone make one blessed, by no other way does anyone acquire this name. Thus, on the contrary, it is established that no one becomes truly wretched except from vices.

Unde sicut illas ad summum bonum, sic ad summum malum has esse vias constat.

Whence, just as those are the ways to the supreme good, so these are the ways to the supreme evil; this is established.

Christianus: Quoniam nunc aliquantum ad summum hominis bonum sicut et ad summum eius malum accessisse videris et eorum insuper vias attigisti, libet paululum obiectionum vestrarum habenas cursui tuo relaxare, quo facilius ad propositi tui metam pervenias et de consummatione operis verius atque perfectius diiudicari queas. Ostenso itaque, quid tu summum hominis bonum seu summum ipsius malum dicas, superest, ut has quoque eorum, quas dixisti vias, virtutes scilicet ac vitia diligenter definias atque distinguas, ut eo amplius vel appetantur vel vitentur, quo melius cognoscuntur.

Christian: Since now you seem to have approached somewhat both to the highest good of man and likewise to his highest evil, and you have moreover touched upon their ways, I am inclined to slacken a little the reins of your objections upon your course, that you may the more easily reach the goal of your proposed aim, and that the consummation of the work may be judged more truly and more perfectly. Therefore, with it shown what you call the highest good of man or his highest evil, it remains that you also diligently define and distinguish those their ways which you mentioned, namely the virtues and the vices, so that they may be the more desired or avoided, in proportion as they are better known.

Philosophus: "Virtus", inquiunt, "est habitus animi optimus"; sic e contrario vitium arbitror esse habitum animi pessimum; habitum vero hunc dicimus, quem Aristoteles in Categoriis distinxit, cum in habitu et dispositione primam qualitatis speciem comprehendit. Est igitur habitus qualitas rei non naturaliter insita, sed studio ac deliberatione conquisita et difficile mobilis. Unde hanc, quam naturalem in quibusdam castitatem nominant, ex corporis videlicet frigiditate vel aliqua complexione naturae, quae nullam unquam concupiscentiae pugnam sustinet, de qua triumphet, nec meritum obtinet, nequaquam virtutibus connumeramus, vel quaecumque animi qualitates facile sunt mobiles.

Philosopher: "Virtue," they say, "is the best habit of mind"; so on the contrary I judge vice to be the worst habit of mind; and we call that a habit which Aristotle distinguished in the Categories, when under habit and disposition he included the first species of quality. Therefore habit is a quality of a thing not naturally implanted, but acquired by study and deliberation, and difficult to be moved. Whence that chastity which they call natural in certain persons—namely from frigidity of the body or some complexion of nature—which sustains no combat of concupiscence in which it might triumph, nor obtains merit, we by no means count among the virtues; nor whatever qualities of mind are easily movable.

Ubi quippe non est aliqua repugnantiae pugna, non est superantis virtutis corona, iuxta illud etiam magni vestri philosophi: Non coronabitur, qui non legitime certaverit. Hinc et illud ipsius Philosophiae ad Boetium in libro quarto Consolationis suae: "Ex quo etiam virtus vocatur, quod suis viribus nitens non superetur adversis." Hic etiam virtutem omnem difficile mobilem esse asserens, cum in praedicto qualitatis tractatu Aristotelem exponeret scientias et virtutes inter habitus collocantem: "Virtus enim", inquit, "nisi difficile mutabilis non est. Neque enim, qui semel iuste iudicat, iustus est, neque, qui semel adulterium facit, est adulter, sed cum ista voluntas cogitatioque permanserit." Optimus vero est ille animi habitus, qui ad verae beatitudinis meritum nos informat, quales sunt singulae virtutis species, quas alii plures, alii pauciores statuerunt.

Where indeed there is no battle of repugnance, there is no crown of overmastering virtue, according also to that saying of your great philosopher: "He will not be crowned, who has not contended lawfully." Hence too that saying of Philosophy herself to Boethius in the fourth book of his Consolation: "Whence also virtue is so called, because, relying on its own forces, it is not overcome by adversities." Here likewise, asserting that every virtue is difficultly movable, when in the aforesaid tractate on quality he was expounding Aristotle as placing sciences and virtues among habits: "For virtue," he says, "is not, unless difficultly changeable. For neither is he who once judges justly a just man, nor he who once commits adultery an adulterer, but when that will and that thought have persisted." But the best habit of mind is that which informs us unto the merit of true beatitude, such as are the several species of virtue, which some have posited as more, others as fewer.

Socrates quidem, per quem primum vel maxime moralis disciplinae studium convaluit, quattuor virtutis species distinguit: Prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam. Nonnulli vero prudentiae discretionem matrem potius sive originem virtutum quam virtutem nominant. Prudentia quippe est haec ipsa morum scientia, quae, ut tractatus ethicus tradit, rerum bonarum et malarum scientia dicitur, hoc est ipsa bonorum discretio sive malorum, quae videlicet in se ipsis proprie bona dicenda sunt aut mala.

Socrates indeed, through whom first or most especially the study of moral discipline grew strong, distinguishes four species of virtue: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance. Some, however, name Discretion the mother or rather the origin of the virtues, rather than a virtue. For Prudence is this very science of morals, which, as the ethical tractate hands down, is called the knowledge of good things and of bad, that is, the very discrimination of goods or of evils, which namely in themselves are properly to be called good or bad.

Quaedam etenim bona aut mala ex se ipsis proprie et quasi substantialiter dicuntur, utpote virtutes ipsae vel vitia; quaedam vero per accidens et per aliud. Veluti operum nostrorum actiones, cum in se sint indifferentes, ex intentione tamen, ex qua procedunt, bonae dicuntur aut malae. Unde et saepe, cum idem a diversis agitur vel ab eodem in diversis temporibus, pro diversitate tamen intentionum idem opus bonum dicitur atque malum.

For certain goods or evils are said to be from themselves properly and, as it were, substantially, namely the virtues themselves or the vices; while others are said by accident and through another. For instance, the actions of our works, although in themselves they are indifferent, yet from the intention from which they proceed are called good or evil. Whence also often, when the same thing is done by different persons or by the same person at different times, yet on account of the diversity of intentions the same work is called both good and evil.

Quae vero substantialiter et ex propria natura bona dicuntur aut mala, ita impermixta perenniter manent, ut, quod semel bonum est, malum numquam fieri possit, vel e converso. Horum itaque discretio tam bonorum scilicet quam malorum prudentia dicitur. Quae quidem discretio, quia aeque perversis ut bonis inesse potest hominibus nec meritum habet, nequaquam virtus vel optimus animi habitus recte dicitur.

Those things, however, which are said to be good or evil substantially and from their proper nature remain perpetually unmingled, so that what once is good can never become evil, or conversely. The discretion of these—namely of goods as well as of evils—is called prudence. Which discretion, since it can inhere equally in perverse as in good men and has no merit, is by no means rightly called a virtue or the best habit of the soul.

Unde Aristoteles a virtutibus sc ientlas distinguens cum in praedicto qualitatis tractatu De habitu exempla subiceret: "Tales", inquit, "sunt scientiae vel virtutes." Quem quidem locum Boetius exponens ait: "Aristoteles enim virtutes non putat scientias ut Socrates." Sic et ille, ut iam supra memini, prius noster et postmodum vester Augustinus quandoque virtutis nomen usque ad fidem etiam et spem extendit, quandoque ad solam caritatem contrahit, quae videlicet propria et specialis est bonorum, cum ceterae duo tam reprobis quam electis sint communes. Scriptum quippe est: Fides sine operibus otiosa est; et: spes impiorum peribit. Sicut autem fides aut spes sine operibus inutiles aut potius nocivae nobis efficiuntur, ita etiam prudentia.

Whence Aristotle, distinguishing sciences from virtues, when in the aforesaid treatment of quality he set examples under “habit,” says: “Such are sciences or virtues.” This passage Boethius, expounding, says: “For Aristotle does not think that virtues are sciences, as Socrates [does].” Thus also he— as I already recalled above— Augustine, first ours and afterward yours, sometimes extends the name of virtue even to faith and to hope, sometimes contracts it to charity alone, which indeed is proper and special to the good, since the other two are common as much to the reprobate as to the elect. For it is written: Faith without works is idle; and: the hope of the impious will perish. And just as faith or hope without works are made useless to us, or rather harmful, so also prudence.

Magis quippe rei sumus vel dum scienter, quod faciendum est, vitamus, vel, quod non est, agimus, quam si hoc per ignorantiam contingeret, quae videlicet aliquam excusationem praetendere posset. Unde et illud est, quod nostis: Servus sciens et non faciens voluntatem domini sui, vapulabit multis. Et alibi: "Melius esset non nosse viam veritatis, quam post agnitam retrorsum abire." Prudentia itaque sicut fides vel spes, quaemalisaeque ut bonis hominibus conveniunt, non tam virtutes dicendae sunt quam ducatum quendam vel incitamentum ad virtutes praebere.

For we are indeed more culpable either when, knowingly, we avoid what must be done, or when we do what must not be done, than if this happened through ignorance, which, to be sure, could put forward some excuse. Whence also that saying which you know: The servant who knows and does not do the will of his lord will be beaten with many stripes. And elsewhere: "It would be better not to know the way of truth than, after it has been recognized, to go back." Therefore prudence, just like faith or hope, which befit the wicked equally as well as the good, are not so much to be called virtues as to furnish a certain leadership or incitement toward the virtues.

Christianus: Hoc ad praesens de prudentia satis esse arbitror. Nunc ad reliquas, ut Socrati placet, virtutes superest te meare.

The Christian: I reckon this to be enough for the present concerning prudence. Now, as it pleases Socrates, it remains for you to go through the remaining virtues.

Philosophus: Iustitia itaque virtus est communi utilitate servata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem, haec est ea virtus, qua volumus unumquemque habere id, quo dignus est, si hoc commune non inferat damnum. Saepe etenim contingit, ut dum alicui pro meritis sua reddimus, quod singulariter in uno agitur, commune inferat damnum. Ne itaque pars toti, singularitas praeiudicet communitati, adiunctum est "communi utilitate servata". Ad hunc quippe finem omnia, quae gerimus, recte referri convenit, ut in omnibus scilicet non tam proprium quisque bonum quam commune attendat, nec tam rei familiari quam publicae provideat, nec tam sibi quam patriae vivat.

Philosopher: Justice, therefore, is the virtue, with the common utility safeguarded, that assigns to each his due dignity; this is that virtue by which we wish each and every person to have that of which he is worthy, if this does not bring harm to the common. For it often happens that, while we render to someone his own according to merits, what is done singularly in one brings harm to the common. Lest, therefore, the part be prejudicial to the whole, the singularity to the community, the clause “with the common utility safeguarded” has been appended. For to this end it is fitting that all the things we do be rightly referred: namely, that in all things each should attend not so much to his own proper good as to the common, and should provide not so much for private estate as for the public, and should live not so much for himself as for his fatherland.

Unde et ille primus et maximus moralis philosophiae doctor Socrates cuncta in commune redigi et ad commune commodum censuit applicari, ut uxores quoque communes esse institueret, ita scilicet, ut nemo proprios recognosceret liberos; hoc est, non tam sibi eos quam patriae crederent generatos, ut haec videlicet communitas uxorum non in usu carnis, sed in fructu prolis accipiatur. Quod tam verbo quam opere Aulus proprium occidendo filium posterorum memoriae reliquit in exemplum, eum se, inquiens, non Catilinae adversus patriam, sed patriae adversus Catilinam genuisse. Hic vero iustitiae zelo accensus nec in filio filium suum, sed hostem patriae considerans praedictam iustitiae definitionem non tam ore quam manu exhibuit.

Whence also that first and greatest doctor of moral philosophy, Socrates, judged that all things be reduced into the common and be applied to the common commodum, so that he even would institute that wives too be common, namely in such a way that no one would recognize his own children; that is, they would deem them begotten not so much for themselves as for the fatherland, so that this community of wives be taken not in the use of flesh but in the fruit of progeny. Which both by word and by deed Aulus left to the memory of posterity as an example by killing his own son, saying that he had begotten him not for Catiline against the fatherland, but for the fatherland against Catiline. This man indeed, inflamed with zeal for justice, considering in his son not his son but an enemy of the fatherland, exhibited the aforesaid definition of justice not so much by mouth as by hand.

Quisquis igitur in hac constans est voluntate, quam diximus, ut ab ea facile dimoveri non possit, virtute pollet iustitiae etiamsi fortitudine et temperantia nondum sit consummatus. Sed quia, quod difficile amittitur, recedere tamen nonnumquam grandi aliqua interveniente causa cogitur, sicut haec ipsa bona voluntas, quae iustitia dicitur, timore aliquo vel cupiditate evanescit, contra timorem fortitudo, contra cupiditatem temperantia est necessaria. Timor quippe rei, quam nolumus, vel cupiditas eius, quam volumus, si tantae sint, ut rationi praevaleant, facile a bono proposito mentem retrahunt et in contraria ducunt.

Whoever, therefore, is constant in this will, which we have spoken of, so that he cannot be easily removed from it, prevails in the virtue of justice even if he has not yet been consummated in fortitude and temperance. But because that which is difficult to lose is nevertheless sometimes compelled to recede when some great intervening cause occurs, just as this very good will, which is called justice, evanesces through some fear or cupidity, against fear fortitude, against cupidity temperance is necessary. For fear of a thing which we do not will, or cupidity for that which we do will, if they are so great as to prevail over reason, easily draw the mind back from the good purpose and lead it into contraries.

Unde adversus timorem fortitudo clipeum, adversus cupiditatem temperantia sumit frenum, ut, quae scilicet per virtutem iustitiae iam volumus, per has etiam roborati implere potentes simus, quantum in nobis est. Unde utramque harum quandam animi firmitatem et constantiam dicimus, quibus potentes efficimur ad hoc, quod per iustitiam volumus, exsolvendum. Quarum quidem contraria quaedam infirmitates animi et impotentiae vitiis resistendi recte nominantur, ut ignavia sive pusillanimitas, quae remissum hominem reddunt, et intemperantia, quae nos in obscenas voluptates vel turpia desideria resolvit.

Whence, against fear fortitude takes up a shield, against cupidity temperance takes up a bridle, so that, being strengthened by these also, we may be able to accomplish, so far as is in us, the things which, by the virtue of justice, we already will. Whence we call each of these a certain firmness and constancy of mind, by which we are made potent for discharging that which we will through justice. Their contraries, indeed, are rightly named certain infirmitudes of mind and impotencies of resisting vices, such as sloth or pusillanimity, which make a man remiss, and intemperance, which dissolves us into obscene pleasures or base desires.

Est quidem fortitudo considerata, id est rationabilis laborum perpessio et periculorum susceptio. Haec est ea virtus, quae promptos nos efficit ad suscipienda pericula vel tolerandos labores, prout opportunum est; quod maxime pendet de amore iustitiae, quem bonum zelum dicimus in propulsandis videlicet aut vindicandismalis.

Fortitude is indeed deliberate, that is, a rational endurance of labors and an undertaking of perils. This is that virtue which makes us prompt for undertaking dangers or enduring labors, as is opportune; which most of all depends on the love of justice, which we call good zeal, namely in repelling or vindicating evils.

Temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio. Saepe enim modum excedentes, dum nobis temperantes esse videmur, temperantiae terminos transgredimur, ut, dum sobrietati studemus, immoderatis ieiuniis nos affligamus, et dura vitium domare cupimus, ipsam exstinguamus naturam et sic in multis excedendo pro virtutibus finitima ipsis vitia statuimus. Unde merito postquam dictum est "firma", subiunctum est "moderata".

Temperance is the firm and moderate dominion of reason over lust and over other not-right impulses of the mind. For often, exceeding the measure, while we seem to ourselves to be temperate, we transgress the boundaries of temperance, so that, while we strive after sobriety, we afflict ourselves with immoderate fasts, and when we desire to tame a stubborn vice, we extinguish nature itself; and thus, by exceeding in many things, we set up, in place of virtues, the vices bordering upon them. Whence rightly, after "firm" was said, "moderate" was subjoined.

Cui profecto rationi ipsam prudentiae rationem praeesse necesse est, quam virtutum, ut diximus, matrem nominant, hoc est originem ipsarum atque nutricem. Per hanc enim nisi virtutes praenoscamus et eas diligenter non solum a contrariis et manifestis, verum etiam a finitimis vitiis discernere valeamus, nequaquam eis, quas ignoramus, habendis vel conservandis operam damus. Unde quicumque his consummatus est virtutibus, ei prudentia inesse necesse est, per quam videlicet et iustitia, quae merita dispensat, quid cuique debeatur, sciat.

Over this rationale indeed it is necessary that the very rationale of Prudence preside, which, as we have said, they name the mother of the virtues, that is, their origin and nurse. For unless by this we pre-know the virtues and are able diligently to discern them not only from contraries and manifest ones, but also from bordering vices, by no means do we give effort to having or preserving those which we are ignorant of. Whence whoever is consummate in these virtues, to him Prudence must be present, through which, indeed, even Justice, which dispenses merits, knows what is owed to each.

Fortitudo in suscipiendis periculis vel laboribus tolerandis discretionem habeat, temperantia, ut dictum est, in concupiscentils reservandis moderationem. Constat igitur in his tribus, quas diximus, virtutibus, quibus prudentia deesse non potest, hominem consummari et in bonis perfici. Nunc vero ipsarum species seu partes superest distinguere, quo diligentius eas agnoscamus et earum doctrinam per singula prosequendo verius iudicemus.

Let fortitude, in undertaking dangers or in bearing labors, have discretion; let temperance, as has been said, have moderation in restraining concupiscences. It is agreed, therefore, that in these three virtues which we have mentioned, to which prudence cannot be lacking, a man is consummated and perfected in good things. Now indeed it remains to distinguish their species or parts, so that we may recognize them more diligently and, by prosecuting their doctrine point by point, judge more truly.

Christianus: Immo, quia sic placet et placere oportet, id fieri optamus.

Christian: Nay rather, because it thus pleases and ought to please, we desire that it be done.

Philosophus: Ad iustitiam itaque, quod suum est, unicuique servantem, ut succincte dicam, pertinent reverentia, beneficentia, veracitas, vindicatio.

Philosopher: Therefore, to justice, keeping for each what is his own, to speak succinctly, pertain reverence, beneficence, veracity, vindication.

Quid sit reverentia.

What reverence is.

Reverentiam eam partem iustitiae dicimus, per quam omnibus debitam venerationem exhibere spontanei sumus, tam videlicet Deo, quae religio dicitur, quam et hominibus potestate vel aliquo merito dignis, quae observantia vocatur. Hic igitur oboedientiae virtutem constat includi, qua videlicet praeceptis superiorum obtemperando hinc quoque illis honorem deferimus, quod rationabilia eorum instituta nequaquam contemnimus.

We call reverence that part of justice, through which we are spontaneously disposed to exhibit the veneration due to all, namely to God, which is called religion, and also to men worthy by power or by some merit, which is called observance. Here therefore it is agreed that the virtue of obedience is included, whereby, by obeying the precepts of superiors, we likewise defer honor to them, in that we by no means despise their reasonable institutions.

Quid beneficentia.

What is beneficence.

Beneficentia vero est, per quam necessitudinibus hominum opem debitam afferre prompti sumus vel indigentibus scilicet necessaria dando, quae largitas dicitur, cum in superfluis prodigalitas consistat, vel violenter oppressos liberando, quae clementia vocatur.

Beneficence, moreover, is that by which we are prompt to bring due aid to the necessities of human beings, either by giving the necessaries to the indigent—this is called largess, since prodigality consists in superfluities—or by freeing those violently oppressed, which is called clemency.

Misericordiam autem, a miseris ita vocatam, maiores nostri vitium potius et quandam infirmitatem animi quam virtutem dixerunt, per quam videlicet aliis eo tantum, quo affliguntur, naturaliter compatiendo subvenire cupimus. Clementia vero nonnisi rationabili affectu ad subveniendum aliquibus fertur, nec tam, quod affliguntur, quam, quod injuste affliguntur, attendit, ut iniustitiae obviando iustitiae obtemperet. Alioquin iustitiae non sunt opera, quando aliis subvenimus, nisi in hoc sua cuique reddamus.

Mercy, however, so called from the wretched, our ancestors said was rather a vice and a certain infirmity of mind than a virtue, by which indeed we desire to come to the aid of others only in so far as they are afflicted, by naturally sympathizing; but clemency is moved to bring help to some only by a rational affect, and it attends not so much to the fact that they are afflicted as to the fact that they are unjustly afflicted, so that by opposing injustice it obeys justice. Otherwise, the works are not of justice, when we come to the aid of others, unless in this we render to each his own.

Sed et cum virtus habitus sit animi, quem, ut ex superioribus liquet, per applicationem vel studium magis quam per naturam haberi constat, nequaquam talis compassio naturalis ad virtutes referenda est, per quam videlicet ipsis etiam reis in afflictione positis humano quodam vel carnali, non rationabili affectu, subvenire satagimus in hoc potius iustitiae adversantes, ne illis debitae reddantur poenae. Denique, quicquid accidat, dolori animum submittere, infirmitatis potius quam virtutis est et miseriae quam beatitudinis et perturbatae, non quietae mentis. Cum enim nihil sine causa Deo cuncta optime disponente fiat, quid accidit, und iustum tristari vel dolere oporteat et sic optimae dispositioni Dei, quantum in se est, contraire, quasi eam censeat corrigendam esse?

But also, since virtue is a habit of the mind, which, as is clear from what precedes, is held to be had through application or study rather than through nature, by no means is such natural compassion to be referred to the virtues, by which indeed we strive to come to the aid even of the guilty themselves, placed in affliction, with a certain human or carnal, not rational, affect, thereby rather opposing justice, lest the penalties owed to them be rendered. Finally, whatever happens, to submit the mind to grief is a mark of weakness rather than of virtue, of misery rather than of beatitude, and of a disturbed, not a tranquil, mind. For since nothing comes to pass without cause, God disposing all things in the best way, what occurs whence it would be just to be sorrowful or to grieve, and thus to oppose, so far as in one lies, the best disposition of God, as though he deemed it ought to be corrected?

Quid sit veracitas.

What veracity is.

Veracitas est, per quam e a, quorum nos debitores pollicendo efficimur, observare studemus. Non enim si, quod non oportet, promittimus, rei efficimur id non implendo, cuius nos debitores mala promissio nequaquam fecit. Qui enim, quod promittendum non fuit, exsequitur,malioperis geminat effectum, cum perversae scilicet promissioni perversum adiungit factum nec cessando ab opere malam promissionem eligit corrigere.

Veracity is that by which we strive to observe those things, of which we are made debtors by promising. For if we promise what ought not to be promised, we are not made liable by not fulfilling that thing, of which an evil promise by no means made us debtors. For he who carries out what ought not to have been promised doubles the effect of an evil work, since he adds a perverse deed to a perverse promise, and he does not choose to correct the evil promise by ceasing from the deed.

Quid vindicatio.

What is vindication.

Vindicatio est ille constans affectus, per quem illatismalisdebita inferatur poena. In singulis autem his quattuor iustitiae partibus illud, quod in definitione praemisimus, "communi scilicet utilitate servata" subintelligendum esse constat. Hunc enim operum nostrorum, ut supra quoque meminimus, finem esse convenit, ut non tam propria quam communia quaerat quisque commoda nec tare sibi quam omnibus vivat, iuxta illud videlicet, quod in laude Catonis Lucanus decantat:

Vindicatio is that constant disposition, through which for ills inflicted the due penalty is inflicted. In each, moreover, of these four parts of justice it is agreed that that which we set forth beforehand in the definition, “with the common utility, namely, preserved,” is to be understood implicitly. For this, indeed, as we also recalled above, is agreed to be the end of our works: that each should seek not so much private as common advantages, and live not so much for himself as for all, according to that, namely, which Lucan sings in praise of Cato:

Uni quippe vacat studiis odiisque carenti, Humanum lugere genus . . . Item

For to one alone indeed it is open, to one lacking partisanships and hatreds, to mourn the Human race . . . Likewise

. . . Hi mores, haec duri immota Catonis

. . . These the mores, these the immovable tenets of dour Cato

Secta fuit, servare modum finemque tenere

His sect was: to preserve measure and to hold the limit

Naturamque sequi patriaeque impendere vitam

To follow Nature and to expend his life for the fatherland

Nec sibi, sed toti genitum se credere mundo.

Nor to believe himself born for himself, but for the whole world.

Et post aliqua:

And after some time:

. . . Urbi pater est, urbique maritus.

. . . He is father to the City, and husband to the City.

In commune bonus.

Good for the common good.

Quippe quod propriis quis intendit commodis, naturae est infirmae, quod alienis, virtutis egregiae. Et parvi suam aestimare vitam debet, qui unius sui curam gerens propriis contentus est commodis nec aliorum sibi meretur gratiam et laudem. Imitari quisque pro modulo suo Deum debet, qui, cum nullius egeat, sui minime curam, sed omnium agit nec sibi necessaria, sed omnibus ministrat, totius mundanae fabricae tamquam unius magnae rei publicae procurator.

For that one aims at one’s own commodities is of an infirm nature, that (he aims) at others’ is of distinguished virtue. And he ought to value his life as of little account who, carrying the care of only himself, is content with his own advantages and does not merit for himself the favor and praise of others. Each person ought to imitate God according to his own measure, who, since he needs nothing, cares least of all for himself, but has concern for all, and does not seek things necessary for himself, but ministers to all, the procurator of the whole mundane fabric as of one great republic.

Sunt, qui partes iustitiae ampliori numero non rerum, sed nominum distinguentes plerasque a nobis uno comprehensas vocabulo pluribus distinguunt, et quod in toto conclusum est, in partes discernunt, pietatem scilicet erga parentes, amicitiam, id est benevolentiam erga eos, qui nos diligunt, ipsorum causa magis quam sperandi alicuius commodi, cum pari eorum erga nos voluntate, gratiam in remuneratione beneficiorum. Sed tria haec profecto beneficentiae supponi constat, per quam videlicet animus ad quaelibet debita beneficentia impendenda tam parentibus scilicet quam ceteris promptus est.

There are those who, distinguishing the parts of justice by a larger number not of things but of names, distinguish as several those which by us are comprehended under one vocable, and they separate into parts what is enclosed in the whole: namely piety toward parents; friendship, that is, benevolence toward those who love us, for their own sake rather than from hoping for any advantage, with an equal will of theirs toward us; gratitude in the remuneration of benefits. But these three are assuredly understood to be subordinated to beneficence, through which, namely, the spirit is prompt to expend whatever due beneficence both, to wit, toward parents and toward others.

De naturali sive positiva iustitia.

On natural or positive justice.

Oportet autem in his, quae ad iustitiam pertinent, non solum naturalis, verum etiam positivae iustitiae tramitem non excedi. lus quippe aliud naturale, aliud positivum dicitur. Naturale quidem ius est, quod opere complendum esse ipsa, quae omnibus naturaliter inest, ratio persuadet; et idcirco apud omnes permanet, ut Deum colere, parentes amare, perversos punire, et quorumcumque observantia omnibus est necessaria, ut nulla umquam sine illis merita sufficiant.

It is fitting, moreover, in those things that pertain to justice, that one not overstep the track not only of natural but also of positive justice. For law is said to be of one sort natural, of another positive. Natural law indeed is that which reason itself, which is naturally in all, persuades must be fulfilled in deed; and therefore it remains among all: to worship God, to love parents, to punish the perverse, and the observance of whatsoever things is necessary for all, such that without them no merits ever suffice.

Positivae autem iustitiae illud est, quod ab hominibus institutum ad utilitatem scilicet vel honestatem tutius muniendam vel amplificandam aut sola consuetudine aut scripti nititur auctoritate, utpote poenae vindictarum vel in examinandis accusationibus sententiae iudiciorum, cum apud alios ritus sit duellorum vel igniti ferri, apud alios autem omnis controversiae finis sit iuratum et testibus omnis discussio committatur. Unde fit, ut, cum quibuscumque vivendum est, nobis eorum quoque instituta, quae diximus, sicut et naturalia iura teneamus.

But positive justice is that which, instituted by human beings, for the purpose, namely, of more safely fortifying or of amplifying utility or honesty, relies either on custom alone or on the authority of writing: for example, the penalties of retributions or, in the examination of accusations, the sentences of judgments; since among some the rite is that of duels or of the glowing iron, while among others the end of every controversy is the sworn oath, and every inquiry is committed to witnesses. Whence it comes about that, with whatever people we must live, we must hold to their institutions as well—those we have mentioned—just as we hold to natural rights.

Ipsae quoque leges, quas divinas dicitis, Vetus scilicet ac Novum Testamentum, quaedam naturalia tradunt praecepta, quae moralia dicitis, ut diligere Deum vel proximum, non adulterari, non furari, non homicidam fieri; quaedam vero quasi positivae iustitiae sint, quae quibusdam ex tempore sunt accommodata, ut circumcisio Iudaeis et baptismus vobis et pleraque alia, quorum figuralia vocatis praecepta. Romani quoque pontifices vel synodales conventus quotidie nova condunt decreta vel dispensationes aliquas indulgent, quibus licita prius iam illicita vel e converso fieri autumatis, quasi in eorum potestate Deus posuerit, ut praeceptis suis vel permissionibus bona vel mala esse faciant, quae prius non erant, et legi nostrae possit eorum auctoritas praeiudicare. Superest autem nunc, ut post considerationem iustitiae ad reliquas duas virtutis species stilum convertamus.

Even the laws themselves, which you call divine, namely the Old and the New Testament, hand down certain natural precepts, which you call moral, such as to love God and one’s neighbor, not to commit adultery, not to steal, not to commit homicide; but some are, as it were, of positive justice, which are accommodated to certain persons according to the time, such as circumcision for the Jews and baptism for you, and very many others, whose precepts you call figural. The Roman pontiffs also, or synodal assemblies, daily establish new decrees or grant certain dispensations, by which you assert that things previously licit now become illicit, or conversely, as though God had placed it in their power to make, by their precepts or permissions, things be good or evil which previously were not, and that their authority could prejudice our law. It now remains, however, that after the consideration of justice we turn the stylus to the remaining two species of virtue.

De partibus fortitudinis.

On the parts of fortitude.

Fortitudo itaque nobis partibus videtur comprehendi, magnanimitate scilicet et tolerantia.

Fortitude, therefore, seems to us to be comprehended by parts, namely by magnanimity and tolerance.

Quid magnanimitas.

What magnanimity is.

Magnanimitas vero est, qua cure rationabilis subest causa, quaelibet ardua aggredi sumus parati.

Magnanimity indeed is that whereby, when a reasonable cause is present, we are prepared to undertake whatever is arduous.

Quid tolerantia.

What is tolerance.

Tolerantia autem est, qua in huius propositi incepto constanter perseveramus.

Tolerance, however, is that by which we constantly persevere in the inception of this purpose.

De partibus temperantiae.

On the parts of temperance.

Temperantiae vero, quantum mihi videtur, nec vos improbare arbitror, partes hae sunt; humilitas, frugalitas, mansuetudo, castitas, sobrietas.

But of temperance, as far as it seems to me—and I do not think you would disapprove—the parts are these: humility, frugality, mansuetude, chastity, sobriety.

Quid humilitas.

What is humility.

Humilitas est, per quam ab appetitu inanis gloriae ita nos temperamus, ut non supra, quam sumus, videri appetamus.

Humility is that by which, with respect to the appetite for vainglory, we so temper ourselves that we do not strive to seem above what we are.

Quid frugalitas.

What is frugality.

Frugalitas vero est superfluae profusionis frenum, per quam videlicet supra, quam necessarium est, possidere respuimus.

Frugality, indeed, is the bridle of superfluous profusion, through which, namely, we spurn possessing beyond what is necessary.

Sic et mansuetudo frenum est irae et castitas luxuriae et sobrietas gulae.

Thus too mansuetude is a bridle for ire, and chastity for luxury, and sobriety for gluttony.

Et notandum, quod, cum iustitia sit constans animi voluntas, quae unicuique, quod suum est, servat, fortitudo et temperantia potentiae quaedam sunt atque animi robur, quo, ut supra meminimus, bona iustitiae voluntas confirmatur. Quorum et enim contraria impotentiae sunt, ea profecto constat esse potentias. Debilitas vero animi, quae fortitudini contraria est, quaedam eius infirmitas et impotentia est, quam ignaviam seu pusillanimitatem dicere possumus.

And it should be noted that, since justice is a constant will of the mind which keeps for each what is his own, fortitude and temperance are certain powers and a strength of mind, by which, as we recalled above, the good will of justice is confirmed. For the contraries of these are also impotences; therefore it is evident that these are potencies. But weakness of mind, which is contrary to fortitude, is a certain infirmity and impotence of it, which we can call cowardice or pusillanimity.

Intemperantia quoque temperantiae adversa quaedam imbecillitas animi et impotentia est irrationabilium motuum eius impulsibus resistere non valentis, a quibus quasi quibusdam satellitibus in miseram vitiorum captivitatem mens infirma trahitur et, quorum dominari debuit, ancilla fit. Sicut autem iustitia voluntas illa, quam diximus, bona est, ira iniustitia voluntas contraria. Et iustitia quidem bonum hominem, fortitudo vero ac temperantia probum efficiunt, quia, quod ex illa volumus, ex his ad efficiendum validi sumus.

Intemperance also is a certain imbecility of mind and an impotence opposed to temperance, of one not strong to resist the impulses of its irrational motions, by which, as by certain satellites, the feeble mind is dragged into the wretched captivity of vices and becomes a handmaid to those over which it ought to have been lord. And just as justice is that will which, as we said, is good, so injustice is the contrary will. And justice indeed makes a good man, while fortitude and temperance make a man of probity, because what we desire from the former, by means of these we are strong to bring about.

Puto autem me in praesentiarum species seu partes virtutis ira distinxisse, ut in his gradus omnes concludantur, quibus ad beatitudinem pertingitur et summum pro meritis bonum apprehenditur. Nunc si visum sit prudentiae tuae, quid in his probare vel improbare decreveris, vel si quid fortasse ad perfectionem addendum esse censueris, patati sumus excipere.

I think, moreover, that for the present I have thus distinguished the species or parts of virtue, so that in these all the grades are concluded, by which one attains to beatitude and the highest good is apprehended according to merits. Now, if it should seem good to your prudence, whatever you shall have decreed to approve or disapprove in these matters, or if perhaps you have judged that something ought to be added for perfection, we are prepared to receive it.

Christianus: Sic profecto convenit. Sed priusquam ad hos summi boni, quos posuisti, gradus veniamus, ad intermissum, non dimissum de summo bono vel summo malo confiictum redeamus, et, quid simpliciter summum bonum vel summum malum dicatur, et, an aliud summum bonum sit quam summum hominis bonum vel summum malum quam summum hominis malum, determinetur.

Christian: So indeed it is agreed. But before we come to those grades of the supreme good which you have posited, let us return to the conflict about the supreme good or the supreme evil, intermitted, not dismissed, and let it be determined what is simply called the supreme good or the supreme evil, and whether there is any supreme good other than the supreme good of man, or any supreme evil other than the supreme evil of man.

Regressio ad intermissam inquisitionem de summo bono.

Return to the intermitted inquisition about the supreme good.

Philosophus: Summum utique bonum apud omnes recte philosophantes non aliud quam Deum dici constat et credi, cuius scilicet incorporabilis et ineffabilis beatitudo tam principii quam finis ignara nec augeri potest nec minui.

Philosophus: The highest good, indeed, is established and believed among all who philosophize rightly to be called nothing other than God, whose, namely, incorporeal and ineffable beatitude, knowing neither beginning nor end, can be neither augmented nor diminished.

Summum vero malum summam cuiuscumque sit sive hominis sive alterius creaturae miseriam vel poenae cruciatum autumo, hominis autem summum bonum vel summum malum eius, sicut supra iam memini ac determinavi, futurae vitae requiem vel poenam perpetuam intelligo. Hoc itaque inter summum bonum et summum hominis bonum referre arbitror, quod, sicut ex praemissis liquet, summum bonum Deus ipse est vel eius beatitudinis summa tranquillitas, quam tamen non aliud quam ipsum aestimamus, qui ex se ipso, non aliunde, beatus est: summum autem hominis bonum illa est perpetua quies sive laetitia, quam quisque pro meritis post hanc vitam recipit, sive in ipsa visione vel cognitione Dei, ut dicitis, sive quoquo modo aliter contingat. Summum vero malum summa est, ut dixi, cuiuscumque creaturae miseria vel poena pro meritis suscepta.

But the highest evil I assert to be the sum of misery—whether it be a man’s or another creature’s—or the torment of punishment; as for man’s highest good or his highest evil, as I have already recalled and determined above, I understand the rest of the future life or perpetual punishment. Therefore I judge this to be the distinction to be drawn between the highest good and man’s highest good: that, as is clear from the foregoing, the highest good is God himself, or the supreme tranquility of his beatitude, which nevertheless we reckon as nothing other than himself, who is blessed from himself, not from elsewhere; but man’s highest good is that perpetual rest or gladness which each one receives according to merits after this life, whether in the very vision or cognition of God, as you say, or in whatever other way it may otherwise befall. But the highest evil is, as I said, the sum of any creature’s misery or the punishment undertaken according to merits.

Summum autem hominis malum quoscumque hominum ibi cruciatus pro meritis susceptos nuncupamus.

But the supreme evil of man we denominate the torments which whosoever of men have there received according to their merits.

De summo malo.

On the supreme evil.

Christianus: Quantum percipio, tam summum malum quam summum hominis malum non nisi poenas futuri saeculi pro meritis redditas intelligis.

Christian: So far as I perceive, you understand both the supreme evil and the supreme evil of man as nothing but the penalties of the future age rendered according to merits.

Philosophus: Ita utique.

Philosopher: Yes, indeed.

Christianus: At profecto poenae illae pro meritis collatae utique iustae sunt, quia iustum est sic eos punire, qui meruerunt. Quidquid vero iustum est, bonum esse constat. Poenae itaque illae, quas summum malum vel summum hominis malum nuncupas, sine dubio bonae sunt.

Christian: But assuredly those penalties allotted according to merits are surely just, because it is just thus to punish those who have deserved. And whatever is just is established to be good. Therefore those penalties, which you designate the highest evil or the highest evil of man, are, without doubt, good.

Vide ergo, an id, quod bonum est potius quam malum, concedere videaris esse summum malum. Qua enim ratione summum malum vel summum hominis malum dicas, quod nullatenus malum sit, non video.

See then whether you seem to concede that that which is good rather than evil is the highest evil. For by what rationale you call the highest evil, or the highest evil of man, that which is in no way evil, I do not see.

Philosophus: Meminisse te oportet, a te ipso superius tam nostrorum quam vestrorum testimoniis ostensum esse omnem quoque afflictionem malum potius quam bonum esse. Non tamen ideo omnem esse malam concedendum arbitror; frequenter quippe generum permutatio in adiectivis nominibus sensum variat, ut aliud sit dicere poenam esse bonam et aliud dicere poenam esse bonum, id est rem bonam. Sicut aliud est dicere hanc aeream statuam esse perpetuam, quod falsum est, aliud eam esse perpetuum, id est rem aliquam, quae perpetua sit, quod verum est, utpote ipsum aes, cuius perpes et indeficiens est natura.

Philosopher: You ought to remember that by yourself above, by the testimonies both of ours and of yours, it has been shown that every affliction too is evil rather than good. Yet I do not therefore think it must be conceded that every one is evil; for the permutation of genders in adjectival nouns frequently varies the sense, so that it is one thing to say that punishment is good and another to say that punishment is a good, that is, a good thing. Just as it is one thing to say that this bronze statue is perpetual, which is false, and another to say that it is a perpetual thing, that is, some thing which is perpetual, which is true, to wit, the bronze itself, whose nature is everlasting and unfailing.

Sed et cum omnis propositio compositum quoddam sit, non tamen omnem compositam dicimus, sed illam tantum, quae propositiones in partibus habet, hoc est hypotheticam, nec omnem dictionem compositam dicimus, quam esse rem compositam scimus, nec omnem dictionem, quam simplicem vocamus, esse rem simplicem concedemus. Sic igitur et cum poenam aliquam iustam aut bonam esse dicimus, eo scilicet, quod iustum sit aut bonum sic eum affligi, qui torquetur, non tamen ideo eam esse rem iustam aut bonam concedere cogimur. Vos quoque, cum omnem creaturam bonam esse ponatis, eo videlicet, quod nihil ex creatione Dei nisi bonum sit, nec hunc etiam hominem, qui malus est, creaturam esse negetis et per hoc eum, qui malus est, esse rem bonam annuatis, non tamen ideo eum esse hominem bonum recipitis.

But also, although every proposition is a certain composite, nevertheless we do not call every proposition composite, but only that which has propositions in its parts, that is, the hypothetical; nor do we call every diction “composite,” though we know it to be a composite thing, nor will we grant that every diction which we call “simple” is a simple thing. Thus therefore, when we say that a certain punishment is just or good—namely, because it is just or good that he who is tormented be afflicted in this way—we are not thereby compelled to concede that it is a just or good thing. You too, when you posit that every creature is good, namely because nothing from the creation of God is anything but good, and you do not deny that this man also, who is evil, is a creature, and through this you assent that he who is evil is a good thing, nevertheless you do not on that account admit that he is a good man.

Nemo quippe hominum esse bonus dicendus est, nisi qui bonis adornatus est moribus. Bona autem res sive bona creatura dici potest etiam, quae irrationalis est et inanimata. Sed cum omnia Deus creasse bona dicatur et hic parvulus homo vel equus ab eo iam creatus sit, quamvis res bona creatus sit, non tamen bonus homo vel bonus equus iam creatus est, nec ipse Deus hunc parvulum, qui perversus est futurus, aut bonum hominem aut malum hominem creavit, sed bonam rem vel bonae naturae substantiam eum condidit, nec eum equum, qui numquam bonus est futurus, umquam bonum equum creavit, licet nonnullos equorum vitiosos creare videatur, qui videlicet in ipsa creatione sua vitium aliquod contrahere dicuntur, unde postmodum inutiles aut parum utiles fiant.

Indeed, no human ought to be called good, unless he is adorned with good morals. But a good thing or a good creature can also be said of that which is irrational and inanimate. Yet since God is said to have created all things good, and this little human or a horse has already been created by him, although he was created as a good thing, nevertheless he has not already been created a good man or a good horse; nor did God himself create this little one, who will be perverse, either a good man or a bad man, but he fashioned him as a good thing, a substance of a good nature; nor did he ever create that horse, who will never be good, as a good horse, although he seems to create certain vicious horses, who, namely, are said to contract some vice in their very creation, whence afterward they become useless or of little use.

Ipsos quoque homines naturaliter ex elementorum complexione in ipsa sua creatione nonnulla vitia contrahere constat, ut iracundi scilicet vel luxuriosi vel aliis irretiti vitiis naturaliter fiant.

It is established that human beings themselves also, naturally, from the complexion of the elements, in their very creation, contract certain vices, so that, namely, they become naturally irascible or luxurious (i.e., lustful), or are ensnared by other vices.

Sed neque illum fortassis angelum ceteris quasi luciferum praelatum, quem postmodum apostatasse dicitis, bonum angelum vel bonum spiritum condidit, quem numquam in veritate vel in dilectione Dei constitisse dicitis; et plerique vestrum caritatem semel habitam numquam fateantur amitti. Nullus quippe angelus sive spiritus aut etiam homo a dilectione Dei et vera caritate alienus bonus recte dicitur, sicut nec malus, quamdiu peccato caret. Si igitur angelus ille neque cum peccato neque cum caritate Dei creatus est, quomodo bonus adhuc angelus vel malus creatus esse dicendus est?

But neither did He perhaps create that angel preferred above the others, as it were a light-bearer (lucifer), whom you say afterwards apostatized, as a good angel or a good spirit—the one whom you say never stood in the truth or in the dilection (love) of God; and most of you maintain that charity, once possessed, is never lost. For no angel or spirit, or even man, alien from the love of God and true charity, is rightly called good, just as neither is he called evil, so long as he is without sin. If therefore that angel was created neither with sin nor with the charity of God, how is he to be said to have been created as yet a good angel or an evil one?

Sic nec singuli homines, cum creantur nondum rationis compotes, aut boni homines autmalicreatione dicendi sunt, cum videlicet ipsa creatione sua, ut boni homines autmaliessent, non acceperint. Quorum etiam aliqui, cum aegrotativi vel stulti naturaliter fiant et diversis tam animi quam corporis vitiis occupati nascantur et omnes communiter homines creentur mortales, prorecto ex ipsa sua creatione substantia humanae naturae bona multorum particeps fit malorum. Ut enim Aristoteles meminit et manifesta tenet veritas, bono contrarium esse non potest nisi malum.

Thus neither are individual human beings, when they are created not yet rational, to be called either good men or bad by creation, since by their very creation they have not received that they should be good men or bad. Some of them too, while they naturally become sickly or foolish and are born occupied with various defects of both mind and body, and since all men commonly are created mortal, indeed from their very creation the good substance of human nature becomes a participant in many evils. For, as Aristotle recalls and manifest truth holds, nothing can be contrary to the good except evil.

Patet igitur tam mortalitatem quam cetera modo praemissa, cum quibus nascimur,malisesse connumeranda, cum eorum scilicet contraria nemo dubitet esse bona et quaedam vitia seu mala naturaliter ex ipsa creatione quibusdam bonis inesse substantiis, ut mortalitas homini, irrationabilitas equo. Quamvis enim mortalitas non dicatur vitium hominis, cum videlicet secundum eam nemo alio homine deterior sit, qua aequaliter omnes participant, quoddam tamen est vitium naturae in ipso homine, quoniam in hoc humana natura ab ea, quae immortalis est, deterior vel infirmior existit.

It is clear, therefore, that both mortality and the other things just premised, with which we are born, are to be counted among evils, since, namely, no one doubts that their contraries are good, and that certain vices or evils are naturally inherent from creation itself in certain good substances, as mortality in man, irrationality in the horse. Although indeed mortality is not called a vice of man, since according to it no man is worse than another man, in which all equally share, nevertheless it is a certain vice of nature in the man himself, because in this respect human nature exists as worse or weaker than that which is immortal.

Sicut igitur hominem quemlibet, quantiscumque vitils deturpetur, rem bonam esse concedimus, nec tamen ideo bonum hominem esse annuimus, ira e contrario quamlibet poenam rem esse malam profitemur, licet nonnullam esse bonam poenam ponamus. Vide itaque non esse consequens, ut, si bonam et iustam poenam summum hominis malum esse statuamus, ideo quod bonum est, summum eius malum esse concedamus. Etsi enim, ut dictum est, poena illa sit bona, non ideo bonum simpliciter, id est bona res est dicenda.

Thus, just as we concede that any man, however much he be disfigured by vices, is a good thing, yet we do not on that account assent that he is a good man, so on the contrary we profess that any punishment is an evil thing, although we posit that some punishment is good. See, therefore, that it does not follow that, if we establish a good and just punishment to be man’s highest evil, we should therefore concede that what is good is his highest evil. For although, as has been said, that punishment is good, it is not therefore to be called good simply, that is, a good thing.

Christianus: Esto modo, ut dicis, te videlicet ex concessis non posse argui, ut, quod bonum est, concedas summum hominis malum esse, quamvis poenam illam, quae bona est et iusta, summum illud malum esse non abnuas. Sed iterum quaero, cum tam culpa praecedens quam poena inde proveniens malum sit, quod horum deterius ac malus hominis malum dicendum sit: utrum videlicet culpa eius, quae hominem malum efficit, an poena, quae a Deo illata iustum in eo iudicium agit?

Christian: Let it be for now, as you say, namely that from the conceded premises you cannot be argued into granting that what is good is the highest evil of man, although you do not deny that that punishment, which is good and just, is that highest evil. But again I ask, since both the preceding fault and the punishment proceeding thence are evil, which of these should be called the worse and the evil of the evil man: namely, whether his fault, which makes the man evil, or the punishment which, inflicted by God, carries out a just judgment in him?

Philosophus: Certe, ut aestimo, deterius hominis malum est culpa eius quam poena ipsius. Cum enim inter quaelibet mala illud alio maius esse non dubitetur, quod amplius Deo displicet et poena dignum est, quis non dubitet culpam deterius esse quam poenam culpae. Ex culpa quippe homo Deo displicet, unde malus dicitur, non ex poena, quae pro culpa irrogatur.

Philosopher: Certainly, as I estimate, the worse evil of man is his fault rather than his penalty. For since among whatever evils that one is without doubt greater than another which displeases God more and is worthy of penalty, who would not doubt that the fault is worse than the penalty of the fault? From fault, indeed, a man displeases God, whence he is called evil, not from the penalty, which for the fault is imposed.

Illa quippe iniustitia est, haec iustitiae debitus effectus et ex intentione recta proveniens. Patet itaque in homine id deterius esse, quod eum reum constituit, quam quod puniendo iustum in eo iudicium agit.

That, indeed, is injustice; this is a due effect of justice and proceeding from right intention. It is clear, therefore, that in a man that is worse which constitutes him guilty (reus), than that which, by punishing, executes a just judgment in him.

Christianus: Cum igitur culpa hominis maius sit hominis malum quam poena ipsius, quomodo poenam hominis summum eius malum nuncupas, qua, ut dictum est, malus malum est culpa?

Christian: Since therefore a man’s fault is a greater evil of the man than his punishment, how do you name the man’s punishment his supreme evil, when, as has been said, the wicked man is evil by fault?

Philosophus: Placet itaque, si nostram in hoc improbas opinionem, tuam super hoc audire sententiam, quid videlicet summum hominis malum censeas appellandum?

Philosopher: It pleases, therefore, if you disapprove our opinion in this, to hear your sentence on this—what, namely, you judge ought to be called the highest evil of man?

Christianus: Illud utique, quod eum deteriorem efficere potest, sicut e contrario summum eius bonum, per quod eum meliorem effici constat.

Christian: Assuredly, that which can make him worse, just as, on the contrary, his supreme good is that by which it is evident he is made better.

Philosophus: Et quae, obsecro, sunt illa?

Philosopher: And what, I beseech, are those?

Christianus: Summum eius odium vel summa dilectio in Deum, per quae videlicet duo ei, qui simpliciter ac proprie summum bonum dicitur, displicere amplius vel placere nos constat. Quorum profecto utrumque post hanc vitam sequitur. Qui enim perpetuis et maximis cruciantur poenis, quanto se amplius his gravari sentiunt, tanto in eum, cuius puniuntur iudicio, ex ipsa desperatione veniae odio maiori inardescunt.

Christian: His supreme odium or supreme dilection toward God—through which two, namely, it is evident that we either displease more or please him who is simply and properly called the highest good. And indeed each of these follows after this life. For those who are tormented with perpetual and greatest punishments, the more they feel themselves burdened by these, the more they, out of sheer despair of pardon, blaze with greater hatred against him by whose judgment they are punished.

Quem penitus non esse vellent, ut sic saltem a poena liberari possent, et ita longe deteriores ibi sunt odiendo, quam hic exstiterunt contemnendo.

whom they would wish utterly not to exist, that thus at least they might be freed from punishment; and so they are far worse there by hating than they were here by contemning.

Sic e contrario quicumque illa Dei visione fruuntur, de qua dicit Psalmista: Satiabor, cum apparuerit gloria tua. Id est: postquam divinitatis tuae maiestatem per temetipsum mihi manifestaveris, nihil ulterius indigendo requiram; tanto tunc meliores efficiuntur, quanto amplius eum diligunt, quem in semetipso verius intuentur, ut videlicet summa illa dilectio in illa summi boni fruitione, quae vera est beatitudo, summum hominis bonum recte sit dicenda.Tantaquippe est illa divinae maiestatis gloria, ut nemo eam conspicere queat, qui non in ipsa visione eius statim beatus fiat, unde et dicitur: Tollatur impius, ne videat Dei gloriam. Cum igitur fideles eius, qui eum super omnia dilexerunt, tantam conspexerint beatitudinem, quantam nullatenus fide potuerunt aestimare: haec eorum summa exsultatio perpes erit ipsorum beatitudo.

Thus, conversely, whoever enjoy that vision of God, of which the Psalmist says: I shall be satisfied, when your glory shall have appeared. That is: after you have made the majesty of your divinity known to me through your very self, I shall require nothing further, being in need of nothing; they are then made the better, the more they love him, whom they behold more truly in himself, so that that highest love, in that fruition of the highest good, which is true beatitude, should rightly be called the highest good of man.Therefore, so great is that glory of the divine majesty, that no one can behold it who does not immediately become blessed in the very vision of it, whence it is also said: Let the impious be taken away, lest he see the glory of God. When therefore his faithful ones, who loved him above all things, shall have beheld a beatitude as great as they by no means were able to estimate by faith: this, their highest exultation, will be their perpetual beatitude.

Philosophus: Placet itaque summum hominis bonum sive malum illud intelligi, quo melior, ut dicis, vel de terior homo efficitur. Sed si hoc in futura vita contingit, ut videlicet meliores ibi vel deteriores quam hic efficiamur, prorecto et ibi aliquid amplius quam hic promereri videmur. Quo enim meliores efficimur vel deteriores quam prius, maiori poena vel praemio digni iudicamur.

Philosopher: Therefore it pleases that the highest human good or evil be understood as that by which a man, as you say, is made better or worse. But if this happens in the future life, namely that we become there better or worse than here, surely we seem also there to merit something more than here. For by how much we are made better or worse than before, by so much we are judged worthy of a greater penalty or reward.

Quod si ibi quoque meritorum sit profectus, ut, quo amplius Deum cognoscimus, magis eum diligamus et cum ipsa retributione pariter nostra dilectio crescat in Deo, ut semper meliores efficiamur, prorecto in infinitum ita nostrae beatitudinis extenditur augmentum, ut numquam sit perfectum, quia semper recipit incrementum.

But if there too there is a progress of merits, so that, the more we know God, the more we love him, and so that together with the very retribution our love likewise grows in God, so that we are always made better, assuredly to infinity thus the augmentation of our beatitude is extended, so that it is never perfect, because it always receives increment.

Christianus: Nescis, quod in hac vita tantum tempus sit promerendi et in illa retribuendi, hic videlicet seminandi, ibi colligendi. Quamvis igitur ibi meliores efficiamur ex praemio meritorum, quam hic ex meritis fueramus, non tamen necesse est, ut ibi rursus aliquid promereamur. Hoc ipsum quoque, quia ibi meliores quam hic efficimur, meritorum hic habitorum retributio est.

Christian: Do you not know that in this life only is the time for meriting, and in that life for recompensing—here, namely, for sowing, there for reaping? Although therefore there we are made better by the reward of merits than we had been here by merits, nevertheless it is not necessary that there we should again merit anything. This very thing also—that there we are made better than here—is the retribution of the merits had here.

Quae cum meritis reddita nos meliores efficiat, non iterum praemium promeretur, quae in praemium meritorum tantum est constituta, non ad aliquid promerendum rursus habita.Namet apud nos cum quis aliquam amicitiae remunerationem ab amico suscipit et eum ex hac propter hoc diligit, non iterum apud eum ex hac maiori dilectione, quae scilicet venit ex praemio reddito, praemium mereri iudicatur, ut sic in infinitum merita extendantur. Quamvis etenim necessitudinis coactione ex retributione praemii augetur dilectio, ut non tam voluntaria quam necessaria videatur, ita quippe omnibus naturaliter insitus est affectus, ut ipsa praemii retributio quoddam dilectionis secum afferat augmentum et quadam nos necessitare vel amore nostri potius quam virtute vel amore remunerantis in eius dilectionem nos accendat. Si igitur inter homines amicus ab amico praemium ferat et ex ipso praemio amplius diligere cogatur, nec tamen ex hoc dilectionis augmento rursus promereri dicitur, quid mirum, si et in alia vita ex suscepto praemio amplius Deum diligentes nequaquam rursum ipsum praemium convertamus in meritum?

Which, though rendered for merits, makes us better, does not again merit a reward, since it has been established only as a reward of merits, not regarded again for meriting something further. For even among us, when someone receives from a friend some remuneration of friendship and on account of this loves him for this very reason, he is not judged to merit a reward from him again by reason of this greater dilection, which, to be sure, comes from the reward rendered—lest in this way merits be extended to infinity. Although indeed by the compulsion of necessitude, from the retribution of the reward, dilection is increased, so that it seems not so much voluntary as necessary (for such an affection is naturally implanted in all), the very retribution of the reward brings with it a certain augmentation of dilection and, in a certain way, necessitates us, and inflames us into his dilection rather by love of ourselves than by virtue or by love of the remunerator. If therefore among men a friend should receive a reward from a friend and be constrained by the reward itself to love him more, and yet is not said to merit again from this augmentation of dilection, what wonder if also in the other life, loving God more because of the reward received, we by no means again convert that reward itself into merit?

Aut quid denique concedi prohibeat illam divinae maiestatis gloriam tantam esse, ut semper in eius visione profectus noster aliquis possit esse, ut, quo diutius eam conspiciemus et se ipsam nobis amplius innotuerit, beatiores nos efficiat? Plus quippe istud iugae beatitudinis incrementum valet quam maior beatitudo unum tantum modum custodiens et in nullo cremento proficiens.

Or what, finally, forbids conceding that the glory of the divine majesty is so great that, in its vision, there can always be some progress of ours, so that, the longer we behold it and the more it has made itself known to us, it makes us more blessed? For indeed this increment of continuous beatitude prevails more than a greater beatitude guarding only a single mode and advancing in no increment.

Philosophus: Quomodo, quaeso, in illa visione Dei profectus quisquam esse possit vel aliqua inter ipsos videntes differentia, cum videlicet illud omnino summum bonum sit simplex? Nec umquam conspici nisi totum possit nec aliquid conspici ab uno, quod non conspiciatur ab alio.

Philosopher: How, I ask, in that vision of God could any progress be possible, or any difference among the very seers themselves, since manifestly that altogether highest good is simple? Nor can it ever be beheld except as a whole, nor can anything be seen by one which is not seen by another.

Christianus: Non utique in re conspecta, sed in modo conspiciendi est diversitas, ut, quo melius intelligitur Deus, beatitudo nostra in eius visione augeatur.Namet animam vel spiritum quemlibet intelligendo non aequaliter omnes intelligimus, quamvis tales incorporeae naturae partes in suae essentiae quantitate non habere dicantur. Et cum corpus quodlibet vel aliqua pars eius ab aliquibus simul aspicitur, melius tamen ab uno quam ab alio videtur, et iuxta naturam aliquam corporis illius melius ab isto quam ab alio homine ipsum cognoscitur et perfectius intelligitur; et cum eadem res sit intellecta, non tamen aequaliter est intellecta. Sic et divinam essentiam, quae omnino indivisibilis est, licet omnes intelligendo videant, non tamen aequaliter eius naturam percipiunt.

Christian: Not, to be sure, in the thing beheld, but in the mode of beholding there is diversity, so that, the better God is understood, our beatitude in his vision is increased.For both the soul or any spirit whatsoever we do not all understand equally by understanding, although such incorporeal natures are said not to have parts in the quantity of their essence. And when any body or any part of it is looked at at the same time by some, yet it is seen better by one person than by another, and according to some property of that body it is known better by this man than by another man and more perfectly understood; and although the same thing has been understood, yet it has not been understood equally. So too the divine essence, which is altogether indivisible, although all see it by understanding, yet they do not equally perceive its nature.

Sic Deus huic perfectius ac melius quam illi sui notitiam pro meritis impertit ac se amplius manifestat. Potest quippe contingere, ut, cum omnia sciat iste, quae ille, melius tamen ac perfectius singula sciat iste quam ille; et cum tot res ab isto quam ab illo sciantur, non tamen tot de eisdem rebus scientias habet unus quot alter aut non tam bene sciat eadem.

Thus God imparts to this one, more perfectly and better than to that one, a knowledge of himself according to merits, and manifests himself more. For it can indeed happen that, although this one knows all the things that that one knows, nevertheless this one knows each thing better and more perfectly than that one; and although as many things are known by this one as by that one, nevertheless the one does not have as many sciences concerning the same things as the other, or does not know the same things so well.

Philosophus: Numquid illam visionem Dei, in qua beatitudo vera consistit, angeli, quos lapsos dicitis, numquam habuerunt vel saltem ille inter eos praecipuus, qui ceterorum comparatione Lucifero est comparatus?

Philosopher: Did the angels, whom you say are fallen, never have that vision of God in which true beatitude consists, or at least did that preeminent one among them, who by comparison with the rest is compared to Lucifer, have it?

Christianus: Nequaquam utique habuisse credendum est, nec aliquis eorum, qui corruit, nec illi etiam, qui non corruerunt, donec post aliorum lapsum hanc visionem, per quam simul et beati fierent et confirmati, ne amplius cadere possent, in remunerationem suae humilitatis acceperint. Omnes quippe angeli sicut et homines tales creati sunt, ut et bene agere possent et male. Alioquin hi, qui non peccaverunt, de hoc ipso, quod ceteris peccando non consenserunt, meritum non haberent.

Christian: By no means, indeed, is it to be believed that they had it—neither any of those who fell, nor even those who did not fall—until, after the fall of others, they received this vision, by which at once they would be made blessed and confirmed, so that they could no longer fall, in remuneration for their humility. For all the angels, just as also human beings, were created such that they could act both well and ill. Otherwise, those who did not sin would have no merit from this very fact, that they did not consent with the others by sinning.

Quod autem Lucifero cuiusdam excellentiae praerogativa comparata est, non tam ex beatitudine quam ex scientiae perspicacitate factum est, eo videlicet, quod scientiae luce praestantior ceteris ad quaslibet rerum naturas intelligendas subtilior conditus esset. Quod quidem in se considerans ex ipsa scientiae suae magnitudine, qua se ceteris praelatum vidit, inflatus intumuit et maiora, quam possit sperare, praesumpsit, ut videlicet, quia se ceteris praelatum novit, se fieri aequalem Deo aestimaret et ut ipse videlicet sicut Deus regnum obtineret. Unde quo se altius erexit per superbiam, eo deterius corruit per culpam.

But that the prerogative of a certain excellence was assigned to Lucifer happened not so much from beatitude as from the perspicacity of knowledge, namely, because he had been constituted more outstanding than the rest by the light of knowledge, more subtle for understanding any natures of things. Considering this in himself, from the very magnitude of his science, by which he saw himself preferred before the others, he swelled, being inflated, and presumed greater things than he could hope for, namely, that, because he knew himself preferred to the rest, he should reckon himself to be made equal to God, and that he himself, like God, should obtain a kingdom. Whence, the higher he lifted himself up through pride, by so much the worse did he fall through fault.

Philosophus: Illud quoque, obsecro, definias, utrum hoc hominis summum bonum, illam dico videlicet summam Dei dilectionem, quam ex visione Dei homo percipit, accidens hominis dicenda sit, et iterum accidens dici conveniat summum substantiae bonum, tamquam ipsum subiectae substantiae sit praeferendum.

Philosopher: That also, I beseech, define, whether this highest good of man—I mean, namely, that supreme love of God, which man perceives from the vision of God—ought to be called an accident of man; and again, whether it is fitting that the highest good of substance be called an accident, as though it itself ought to be preferred to the subject substance.

Christianus: Cum accidentia eisque subiectas substantias distinguens ad philosophicae verba doctrinae converteris, ea tantum, quae vitae terrenae, non coelestis sunt, metiris: haec quippe disciplina saecularis et terrena his tantum documentis contenta exstitit, quae ad praesentis vitae statum accommodata sunt nec ad illius futurae vitae qualitatem, in qua nec verba ista nec ulla hominum necessaria est doctrina; artium suarum regulas applicaverunt, cum rerum investigaverunt naturas, sed sicut scriptum est: Qui de terra est, de terra loquitur. Si ergo ad illud coelestis vitae fastigium conscendere niteris, quae omnem terrenam longe transcendit disciplinam, ne plurimum innitaris terrenae prophetiae regulis, quibus nec adhuc ad plenum comprehendi ac definiri terrena potuerunt, nedum coelestia.

Christian: When, distinguishing accidents and the substances subjected to them, you turn to the words of philosophical doctrine, you measure only those things which belong to earthly life, not to the celestial: for this secular and earthly discipline has existed content with only those documents which are accommodated to the state of the present life, and not to the quality of that future life, in which neither these words nor any doctrine of men is necessary; they have applied the rules of their arts when they have investigated the natures of things, but, as it is written: He who is of the earth speaks of the earth. If therefore you strive to ascend to that summit of heavenly life, which far transcends every earthly discipline, do not rely overmuch on the rules of earthly prophecy, by which not even earthly things have yet been able to be fully comprehended and defined, much less heavenly things.

Utrum autem dilectio illa, quae in coelesti vita habenda dicitur, accidens sit an qualiscumque qualitas, nihil utilitatis affert definire, quae nisi experimento sui vere cognosci non potest, cum omnem terrenae scientiae sensum longe transcendat. Quid autem ad beatitudinem refert, utrum eam accidens an substantiam sive neutrum esse ponamus, cum quidquid dicamus vel arbitremur, ipsa ideo non mutetur vel beatitudinem nostram minuat? Ac si, quae de accidentibus et substantialibus formis philosophi vestri dixerunt, diligenter consideres, nec substantialem illam nobis videbis, quae non inest omnibus, nec accidentalem, quae, postquam adfuerit, abesse non potest.

But whether that love which is said to be had in the celestial life is an accident or some kind of quality, it brings no utility to define, since it cannot be truly known except by the experience of itself, as it far transcends all the sense of earthly science. And what does it matter for beatitude whether we posit it to be an accident or a substance, or neither, since whatever we may say or suppose, it is not on that account changed, nor does it diminish our beatitude? And if you carefully consider the things which your philosophers have said about accidents and substantial forms, you will see it to be neither substantial for us, which does not inhere in all, nor accidental, which, after it has been present, cannot be absent.

Unde accidens etiam vestra opinio describit, quod adesse potest et abesse. Quid etiam impedit, si illam quoque dilectionem ibi futuram, sicut et praesentem, quam habemus hic, accidens concedamus?

Whence even your opinion describes an accident as that which can be present and can be absent. What also prevents, if we concede that that love too, which will be there, just like the present one which we have here, is an accident?

Quamvis enim nostra substantia quolibet accidenti suo melior censeatur aut dignior, summum tamen hominis bonum id non incongrue dicendum videtur, quod ipsum hominem participatione sui optimum reddit atque dignissimum, atque, ut verius ac probabilius loquamur, ipsum Deum, qui solus proprie et absolute summum bonum dicitur, summum etiam hominis bonum esse constituamus.

Although indeed our substance is judged better or more worthy than any of its accidents, nevertheless it seems not incongruous to say that the highest good of man is that which, by participation in itself, renders the man himself most excellent and most worthy; and, to speak more truly and more plausibly, let us establish that God Himself, who alone is properly and absolutely called the Highest Good, is also the highest good of man.

Cuius videlicet illa, quam diximus, visionis suae participatione, qua fruimur, efficimur vere beati. Ex quo ipso quippe, quem in ipso videmus, ad nos eius illa summa dilectio manat, ideoque rectius ipse, qui ab alio non est et nos ita beatos efficit, summum hominis dicendus est bonum.

By participation in that vision of him, which we have said, the enjoyment of which we have, we are made truly blessed. Indeed, from that very one, whom we behold in himself, that supreme love of his flows forth to us; and therefore, more rightly, he himself—who is from no other and thus makes us blessed—is to be called the highest good of man.

Philosophus: Placet utique illa de summo bono sententia, quae nec philosophiae nostrae est ignota. Sed si haec, ut dicitis, visio Dei, quae beatos efficit, oculis tantum mentis, non corporis pater, quid necesse est sanctis animabus, ut dicitis, corpora sua tandem resumere, quasi per hoc earum gloria vel beatitudo sit auge nda? Cum enim, ut dicitis, mensura, quae hominis, quae et angeli, quid ad beatitudinem vestram resumptio prodest corporum, quae, cum angelis desint, nequaquam tamen eorum praepediunt vel minuunt beatitudinem?

Philosopher: The opinion about the supreme good, to be sure, is pleasing, and it is not unknown to our philosophy either. But if this vision of God, as you say, which makes men blessed, is open to the eyes of the mind only, not of the body, what need is there that the holy souls, as you say, should at length resume their bodies, as if by this their glory or beatitude were to be augmented? For since, as you say, the measure—both that of man and that of an angel—is the same, what does the resumption of bodies profit to your beatitude, which, although they are lacking to angels, by no means hinders or diminishes their beatitude?

Christianus: Omnium, quae Deus agit, non tam ad beatitudinem nostram quam ad gloriam suam convertit, ut illa, quae nonnullis nociva sunt. Unde Salomon: Propter semetipsum omnia creavit Deus, impium quoque ad diem malum.

Christian: He turns all things that God does not so much to our beatitude as to his own glory, such that even those things which are noxious to some are so turned. Whence Solomon: For his own sake God created all things, even the impious man for the evil day.

Ipsa quoque etiam poena impii, qua eius iniquitatem Deus punit, iustitiam Dei commendat et sic eum glorificat. Quamvis itaque poneremus corporum illam resumptionem nihil sanctis animabus beatitudinis conferre, non tamen eam censeamus superfluam, quae ad divinae potentiae laudem plurimum valet. Quo enim illa prius inferiora et passioni cognovimus obnoxia, tanto postmodum magis Deum glorificandum ostendent; et cum sic ea videlicet solidata et indissolubilia videbimus facta, ut nulla ex eis passio nobis provenire, nulla in eis dissolutio possit contingere.

The very punishment of the impious man also, by which God punishes his iniquity, commends the justice of God and thus glorifies him. Although, therefore, we should suppose that that resumption of bodies confers nothing of beatitude upon the holy souls, yet let us not judge it superfluous, since it avails very greatly for the praise of divine potency. For the more we previously knew them to be inferior and liable to passion, by so much the more thereafter will they show that God is to be glorified; and when we shall see them thus, namely solidified and indissoluble, made such that no passion can arise for us from them, and no dissolution can befall in them.

Hinc etiam nonnihil beatitudinis animae videntur contrahere, quia, quo amplius divinae potentiae magnitudinem experientur, amplius eum diligere et beatiores esse non sunt denegandae.

Hence, too, the souls seem to draw to themselves no small measure of beatitude, because, the more they experience the magnitude of divine potency, it is not to be denied that they love him more and are more beatified.

Philosophus: Illud quoque, obsecro, dilucides, utrum illa Dei visio, in qua beatitudo consistit, aliqua loci differentia vel augeri possit vel minui, an ipsa in omnibus locis exhiberi omnibus queat, vel si certus ei aliquis deputatus sit locus, quo scilicet omnes necesse sit pervenire, qui illa fruituri sunt visione?

Philosopher: This also, I beseech, elucidate: whether that vision of God, in which beatitude consists, can by some difference of place be either increased or diminished; or whether it itself can be exhibited in all places to all; or if some certain place is deputed to it, to which, namely, it is necessary that all who are going to enjoy that vision should arrive?

Christianus: Qui Deum ubique per potentiae suae magnitudinem non dubitant esse, sed ita ei omnia loca praesentia credunt, ut in omnibus, quaecumque velit, agere possit et tam ipsa loca quam omnia in illis eius operatione vel gerantur vel disponantur, nequaquam ista quaestione movendi sunt. Ipse quippe est, qui sic nunc quoque sine positione locali sicut ante tempora consistens non tam in loco esse dicendus est, qui nullatenus localis est, quam in se cuncta concludere loca, ipsos etiam, ut scriptum est, coelos palmo suo continens. Qui enim ante omnia sine loco exstitit, nec sibi postmodum, sed nobis loca fabricavit, cuius nec minui nec augeri beatitudo potest nec ullam percipere variationem, nullam prorecto nunc quoque, sicut nec ante, positionem habet localem, cuius omnino simplex et incorporea perseverat aeternitas.

Christian: Those who do not doubt that God is everywhere through the magnitude of his power, but believe all places to be present to him, so that in all of them he can do whatever he wills, and that both the places themselves and all things in them are either carried on or are disposed by his operation, are by no means to be moved by this question. For he is the one who even now, without local position, just as before times, subsisting, is to be said not so much to be in a place—he who is in no way local—as to enclose within himself all places, even the heavens themselves, as it is written, containing them in his palm. For he who before all things existed without place, and afterward made places not for himself but for us—whose beatitude can neither be diminished nor increased nor receive any variation—surely now also, just as before, has no local position, whose eternity remains altogether simple and incorporeal.

Cum igitur nusquam sit localiter, id est positione locali conclusus, ubique tamen, id est tare in omnibus locis quam circa omnia loca per operationis potentiam esse dicitur. Etenim in omnibus locis nulla nisi eo disponente geruntur, et sic ei loca cuncta praesentia sibi vel ipse illis, ut, quodcumque velit, ibi fieri necesse sit, et sic ubique, ut dictum est, per potentiae suae magnitudinem esse dicitur. Unde ipsemet per prophetam loquitur: Coelum et terram ego impleo.

Accordingly, since he is nowhere locally, that is, enclosed by a local position, yet he is everywhere, that is, both in all places and around all places, said to be present by the potency of operation. For in all places nothing is carried on unless by him disposing it, and thus all places are present to him, or he to them, so that whatever he wills must needs be done there; and thus everywhere, as has been said, he is said to be by the magnitude of his power. Whence he himself speaks through the prophet: I fill heaven and earth.

Et Psalmista nusquam irati potentiam se effugere posse considerans dicebat: Quo ibo a spiritu tuo et quo a facie tua fugiam? Si ascendero in coelum, tu illic es, si descendero ad infernum, ades, etc.

And the Psalmist, considering that he could nowhere escape the power of the Angry One, was saying: Where shall I go from your spirit, and where shall I flee from your face? If I shall ascend into heaven, you are there; if I shall descend to hell, you are present, etc.

Sicut autem in omnibus locis vel intra omnia per potentiae suae operationem vel dispositionem dicitur esse, quia videlicet cuncta ibi vel disponi per eum necesse est, sic etiam ipsa loca concludens circa ea nihilominus asseritur esse, hoc est, sic ea in sua potestate habere, ut nihil in eis sine ipso vel eius dispositione fieri possit. Cum itaque per potentiam suam, ut dictum est, tam intra omnia quam extra Deus sit et omnia, quantumcumque solida sint, propria virtute penetret, quis eum locus impediat, ne, ubicumque velit, omnibus aeque suam impertire notitiam possit? Eo quippe modo, quo locis omnibus inesse vel praeesse per potentiam, non per localem positionem dicitur, ubique sui notitiam, quibuscumque voluerit, habet impertire; nec summa et spiritualis virtus, cui omnia sunt pervia loca, quae sunt, aliqua soliditate vel qualitate praepediri potest.

Just as, moreover, he is said to be in all places or within all things through the operation or disposition of his power, since indeed it is necessary that all things there be disposed by him, so also, enclosing the places themselves, he is nonetheless asserted to be around them—that is, to hold them in his power in such a way that nothing in them can be done without him or his disposition. Since therefore by his power, as has been said, God is both within all things and outside, and penetrates all things, however solid they may be, by his own power, what place could impede him, so that, wherever he wills, he should not be able to impart his knowledge equally to all? For in the very way in which he is said to be present in or to preside over all places by power, not by local position, he has to impart everywhere his knowledge to whomever he will; nor can the supreme and spiritual power, for which all places that exist are pervious, be hindered by any solidity or quality.

Quippe cum claritas solis solidissimum vitrum sic penetret, ut per ipsum quoque suam nobis illuminationem infundat, et corpora nostra post resurrectionem tantae subtilitatis fore credamus, ut iam eis quodam modo spiritualibus factis nulla possit obstare materia, unde et Dominicum corpus, quod adhuc mortale clauso utero natum fuerat, post resurrectionem iam immortale et impassibile clausis ianuis ad discipulos intravit. Multo ergo magis summam illam divinae claritatis visionem nullo praepediri posse obstaculo vel loci propinquitate ad illuminandum adiuvari credendum est.

For indeed, just as the brightness of the sun so penetrates the most solid glass that through it also it pours out its illumination to us, and we believe that our bodies after the resurrection will be of such subtlety that, once in a certain way made spiritual, no matter will be able to stand in their way—whence also the Lord’s body, which while still mortal had been born from a closed womb, after the resurrection, now immortal and impassible, with the doors closed entered to the disciples—much more, then, it is to be believed that that supreme vision of divine clarity can be hindered by no obstacle, nor aided by the proximity of place, for illuminating.

Namet ignem, qui ceteris subtilior est elementis, inde non recipere sectionem dicitis, quia nullo interposito corpore partes eius dividi non queant. Multo autem minus spiritualis substantia, quae longe omni corpore subtilior est, corporeo praepeditur obstaculo. Cum vero divinitas tantae subtilitatis sit, ut in eius comparatione quaelibet aliae naturae corporea censeantur et ipsa sola respectu aliarum incorporea iudicetur, quomodo summa eius claritas, quae cuncta cognoscendo considerat, obstaculum habeat?

For indeed you say that fire, which is subtler than the other elements, on that account does not receive section, because with no body interposed its parts cannot be divided. Much less, however, is a spiritual substance, which is far subtler than any body, hindered by a corporeal obstacle. But since divinity is of such subtlety that, in comparison with it, whatever other natures are reckoned corporeal, and it alone, with respect to the others, is judged incorporeal, how would its highest clarity, which considers all things by knowing them, have an obstacle?

Qua etiam, qui fruuntur, cum videntem omnia videant, quidquid eos scire conveniat, quantumcumque remotum non ignorant. Alioquin paradiso fruentes tormenta inferni non conspicerent, ut eo amplius Deum diligant, quo per eius gratiam graviora se evasisse viderint. Quem quidem paradisum in ipsa visione Dei ubique consistere Dominus lesus patenter insinuat, dum ipso die, quo eius anima in carne passa descendit ad inferos, ut inde suos liberaret, latroni eum confesso ait: Amen dico tibi, hodie mecum eris in paradiso.

By which also those who enjoy it, since they behold the One seeing all things, are not ignorant of whatever it is fitting for them to know, however far removed it may be. Otherwise, those enjoying paradise would not behold the torments of hell, so that they may love God the more, in proportion as they have seen that by his grace they have escaped more grievous things. And the Lord Jesus indeed plainly intimates that that paradise consists everywhere in the very vision of God, when, on the very day on which his soul, having suffered in the flesh, descended to the underworld so that he might free his own from there, he said to the thief who confessed him: Amen, I say to you, today you will be with me in paradise.

A quo quidem paradiso ne tunc etiam anima Christi extranea exstitit, cum, ut dictum est, ad inferos descendit. Iuxta itaque hanc fidem nostram et rationem manifestam, quocumque loco fidelis sit anima, quia ubique praesentem, ut dictum est, reperit Deum et quoniam nullo impeditur obstaculo, ubique in sua aeque perseverat beatitudine, quam videlicet ex visione Dei nobis per eum infusa, non ex nostris viribus apprehensa consequimur. Quippe nec ad corporalis solis apprehendendam claritatem conscendimus, sed ipsa se nobis infundit, ut ea fruamur.

From which paradise indeed the soul of Christ was not alien even then, when, as has been said, it descended to the infernal regions. Therefore, according to this our faith and manifest reason, in whatever place the soul of the faithful may be, because, as has been said, it finds God present everywhere, and since it is hindered by no obstacle, it everywhere equally perseveres in its own beatitude, which, to wit, we attain from the vision of God poured into us through him, not apprehended by our own powers. For indeed we do not ascend to apprehend the brightness of the bodily sun, but it itself pours itself into us, that we may enjoy it.

Ita et nos tam Deo quam ipse nobis appropinquat tamquam desuper claritatem suam nobis et amoris sui calorem infundens, ad quem etiam nusquam localiter consistentem, si quo modo propinquare dicimur, non id locis, sed meritis fieri est intelligendum, dum ei videlicet quantum similiores in bono efficimur vel eius amplius voluntati concordamus, sic e contrario ab eo recedere intelligendi sumus. Quod venerabilis doctor Augustinus et doctrinarum quoque vestrarum peritissimus diligenter aperiens: "Deo", inquit, "qui ubique est, non locis, sed moribus aut propinqui aut remoti sumus." Unde cum post resurrectionem tantae facilitatis corpora sanctorum futura sint, ut, ubicumque velint animae, ipsa statim esse credantur, nullus tamen eorum recessus visionem Dei praepediet, quominus animae sint beatae, nec ulla loci qualitas poenalis esse his poterit, in quibus nihil puniendum erit, sicut nec ante peccatum primis hominibus quidquam potuerat esse nocivum. Unde et cum sancti angeli ad nos missi iussa Dei exsequuntur, nequaquam loci aliqua qualitate vel intervallo eius visione, qua beati sunt, privantur seu inaniuntur.

Thus also we both approach God as much as he himself approaches us, as from above infusing into us his own clarity and the warmth of his love; and to him, moreover, who in no place stands locally, if we are said in any way to draw near, it is to be understood that this is done not by places but by merits, inasmuch, namely, as we are made the more similar to him in good or the more we concord with his will; so conversely we are to be understood to recede from him. Which the venerable doctor Augustine, and also most expert in your doctrines, diligently opening up, says: “To God, who is everywhere, we are not near or far by places, but by morals.” Whence, since after the resurrection the bodies of the saints will be of such facility that, wherever the souls wish, they themselves are believed to be immediately present, nevertheless none of their withdrawals will preclude the vision of God so as to prevent the souls from being blessed, nor will any quality of place be able to be penal for those in whom there will be nothing to be punished, just as before sin nothing could be noxious to the first human beings. Whence also, when the holy angels sent to us execute the commands of God, by no quality of place or interval are they deprived of or emptied of his vision, by which they are blessed.

Nec daemones in aere commorantes, unde et volucres coeli dicuntur, quamvis positione loci superiores nobis esse videantur, non ideo tamen ad Deum, qui propriae dignitate naturae cunctis superior est naturis, amplius quam nos appropinquare dicendi sunt.

Nor are the demons dwelling in the air, whence they are also called the birds of heaven, although they seem to be superior to us by the position of place, on that account to be said to approach God—who by the dignity of His own nature is superior to all natures—any more than we.

Unde Satan veniens inter filios Dei et stans in conspectu Domini et ad eum mutuo loquens, sicut in libro Iob conscriptum est, nequaquam hoc adventu suo a sua relaxatur miseria, ut beatior fiat. Qui etiam de coelis ceteris altior corruendo patenter ostendit nihil ad beatitudinem conferre loci dignitatem. Non enim, quia inter filios Dei, hoc est inter sanctos angelos, veniens in conspectu Dei astitit, in eius conspectum Dominus venit, ut ab eo scilicet Dominus conspiciatur, cum ipse a Domino conspicitur, quasi caecus in sole inter videntes assistens, non ab eis positione loci, sed beneficio lucis dissidens.

Whence Satan, coming among the sons of God and standing in the sight of the Lord and conversing with him, as it is written in the book of Job, is by no means, by this coming of his, released from his misery so as to become more beatified. He also, by falling from the heavens, though higher than the others, openly showed that the dignity of place contributes nothing to beatitude. For not because, coming among the sons of God, that is, among the holy angels, he stood in the sight of God, did the Lord come into his sight, namely that the Lord might be beheld by him, when he himself is beheld by the Lord, like a blind man in the sun standing among those who see, differing from them not by the position of place, but by the benefit of light.

Quod enim agit in visione corporalis solis qualitas corporum, hoc in visione spiritualis solis qualitas meritorum; et quemadmod um hic nulla differentia consistit virtutum in qualitate corporum aut locorum, sic nec ibi retributionum; et tanto mirabilior illa divinae gloriae visio, qua beati fiunt, apparet, quanto amplius nulla loci qualitate vel diversitate ad hoc impediri vel iuvari potest, cum in his etiam, qui etiam loco disiuncti non sunt, sic agat, ut alios illuminando beatificet, alios in sua caecitate miseros derelinquat, sicut et in hac vita per impertionem gratiae suae non desistit agere.

For what the quality of bodies effects in the vision of the corporal sun, this the quality of merits effects in the vision of the spiritual sun; and just as here no difference of virtues consists in the quality of bodies or of places, so neither there of retributions; and by so much the more marvelous does that vision of divine glory, whereby they are made blessed, appear, the more it can in no way be hindered or helped toward this by any quality or diversity of place, since even among those who are not even disjoined by place it so acts as to beatify some by illuminating them, and to leave others wretched in their own blindness, just as also in this life it does not cease to act through the impartition of its grace.

Sic quippe Deus ubique per potentiam esse dicitur, ut nihilominus alicubi per gratiam adesse, alicubi dicatur deesse. Quocumque igitur modo vel adesse vel abesse seu advenire vel recedere divinitatis gratia dicatur, non id localiter vel corporaliter fit, sed magis spiritualiter vel per aliquam suae operationis efficaciam contingit. Si enim ubique localiter esset, quo advenire localiter vel unde recedere posset?

Thus indeed God is said to be everywhere by power, so that nonetheless he is said in some place to be present by grace, in some place to be absent. In whatever manner, therefore, the grace of divinity is said either to be present or to be absent, or to come or to withdraw, this does not occur locally or corporally, but rather spiritually or by some efficacy of his operation. For if he were everywhere locally, whither could he come locally, or whence could he withdraw?

Nonnumquam ad nos descendere dicitur vel per aliquod gratiae suae beneficium nobis collatum vel per aliquam ex signo visibili manifestationem sive, dum aliquid insolitum gerit in terra. Sic sol iste descendere ad nos dicitur vel mundum ipsum implere non localiter, sed efficaciter, id est non locali sui positione, sed illuminationis operatione.

Sometimes he is said to descend to us either through some benefit of his grace bestowed upon us, or through some manifestation from a visible sign, or when he performs something unusual on the earth. Thus this sun is said to descend to us or to fill the world itself not locally, but efficaciously, that is, not by a local position of itself, but by the operation of illumination.

Philosophus: Miror te rationibus tuis, quibus me arguere niteris, eas quoque auctoritates ex Scripturis vestris proferre, quibus me non dubitas minime cogendum esse.

Philosopher: I marvel that, with your reasonings by which you strive to argue against me, you also bring forth those authorities from your Scriptures, by which you do not doubt that I am in no way to be compelled.

Christianus: Propositum mihi est, sicut nosti, non me tibi proprias inferre sententias, sed communem maiorum nostrorum tibi fidem seu doctrinam aperire. Quae igitur testimonia de nostris affero, non, ut per hoc cogaris, intendo, sed ut aliorum magis ista intelligas esse quam me ipsum finxisse.

Christian: My purpose is, as you know, not to bring in to you my own proper opinions, but to open to you the common faith or doctrine of our elders. Therefore the testimonies which I bring forward from our own, I do not intend so that by this you be compelled, but that you may understand these things to be rather others’ than things I myself have feigned.

Philosophus: Certe nec istud improbo, si talis processerit intentio. Sed nunc ad reliqua festinemus. Si ergo, ut asseris,tantavirtus est divinae visionis, ut, ubicumque sint animae, participatione sui aeque illas beatas efficere queat, cur, obsecro, regnum coelorum Deo et sanctis animabus specialiter assignatur, ut in coelo scilicet praecipue dicuntur esse, quasi beatius illic habeant esse?

Philosopher: Certainly I do not disapprove this either, if such an intention should proceed. But now let us hasten to the rest. If therefore, as you assert, so great is the power of the divine vision that, wherever souls may be, by participation of itself it can equally make them blessed, why, I beseech you, is the kingdom of the heavens specially assigned to God and to holy souls, so that they are said to be chiefly in heaven, as though they had a more blessed being there?

Quod etiam in tantum Christus vester proprio exhibuit exemplo, ut in conspectu suorum corporaliter coelum ascenderit et illic, ut scriptum est, ad dexteram Patris residens inde ad iudicium venturus promittatur in aera ei obviam occurrentibus. Cur igitur divinae habitationi nulla mundi regio nisi coelum deputetur, si ubique, ut dicitis, Deus existens ubique beatitudine sua aeque fruatur et eius visionis claritas, quibuscumque velit et ubicumque velit, sese, prout vult, pariter infundens aeque illos ubique beatos efficiat nullo adminiculo, nulla loci qualitate vel propinquitate ad hoc indigens, sed ex se penitus sufficiens? Cum, inquam, Dominus ubique per potentiam existens et quasi in uno loco suae maiestatis mansionem concludens dicat: Coelum mihi sedes est, et omnes tam Novi quam Veteris Testamenti scriptores non aliam mundi partem nisi coelum eius habitationi deputent, non immerito videri potest huius superioris loci serenitas ipsis vel nobis non nihil conferre beatitudinis.

Which your Christ also exhibited to such an extent by his own example that, in the sight of his own, he ascended bodily into heaven, and there, as it is written, sitting at the right hand of the Father, he is promised to be about to come thence to judgment, to meet him in the air those who run to him. Why, therefore, is no region of the world assigned to the divine habitation save heaven, if everywhere, as you say, God, existing everywhere, equally enjoys his own beatitude, and the clarity of his vision, pouring itself in alike to whomsoever he wills and wheresoever he wills, as he wills, equally makes them everywhere blessed, needing no aid, no quality of place or propinquity for this, but being wholly sufficient from himself? Since, I say, the Lord, existing everywhere by power and, as it were, in one place enclosing the mansion of his majesty, says: Heaven is my seat; and all the writers both of the New and of the Old Testament assign no other part of the world except heaven to his habitation, it can not without reason seem that the serenity of this higher place confers not nothing of beatitude upon them or upon us.

Unde et per Isaiam ad huius beatitudinis plenitudinem lux lunae sicut lux solis futura et lux solis septempliciter promittitur tunc splendere et nova tam coeli quam terrae creatio, ut ipsa quoque innovatione rerum nostra felicitas augeatur.

Whence also through Isaiah, for the plenitude of this beatitude, it is promised that the light of the moon will be like the light of the sun, and that the light of the sun will then shine sevenfold, and a new creation of both heaven and earth, so that by the very innovation of things our felicity may be augmented.

Christianus: Si prophetizare magis quam iudaizare in littera nosses et, quae de Deo sub specie corporali dicuntur, non corporaliter ad litteram, sed mystice per allegoriam intelligi scires, non ita, ut vulgus, quae dicuntur, acciperes.

Christianus: If you knew how to prophesy rather than to Judaize in the letter, and knew that the things said about God under a corporal appearance are to be understood not corporally, to the letter, but mystically through allegory, you would not receive what is said in the way that the common crowd does.

Cuius profecto si communem sequeris opinionem nec eorum fidem tua transcendat intelligentia, qui nihil nisi corporeum vel admodum rei corporeae mente concipiunt, in tantum utique dilaberis errorem, ut Deum nullatenus nisi rem quandam corpoream et quibusdam partibus consistentem, capite videlicet, manibus ac pedibus seu reliquis membris compositam intelligere queas, maxime cum omnes fere humani corporis partes ei iuxta similitudinem aliquam in Scripturis assignentur. Quis enim illitteratorum aut simplicium hominum te audire sustineat, si Deum praedices nec oculos nec aures habere nec cetera, quae nobis videntur necessaria membra? Statim quippe obiciet eum nequaquam videre posse, qui oculos tales non habeat, similiter nec audire nec operari, cui aures desint et manus.

Of which, indeed, if you follow the common opinion and your intelligence does not transcend the faith of those who conceive nothing except the corporeal, or at most in mind something of a corporeal thing, to such an extent you will surely slip into error that you can in no way understand God except as a certain corporeal thing and consisting of certain parts—namely a head, hands and feet, or composed of the remaining members—especially since almost all the parts of the human body are assigned to him in the Scriptures according to some likeness. For what illiterate or simple men would endure to hear you, if you proclaim that God has neither eyes nor ears nor the rest of the members which seem necessary to us? For at once he will object that he can by no means see who does not have such eyes, and likewise neither hear nor operate, for whom ears and hands are lacking.

Sicut ergo haec omnia, quae corporis sunt, nonnisi parabolice iudicas in Deo intelligenda, sic, quaecumque ad corporalem loci positionem de divinitate dicuntur, non dubites accipienda. Cum itaque Isaiam audis dicentem: Haec dicit Dominus. Coelum sedes mea et terra scabellum pedum meorum.

Therefore, just as you judge that all these things which are of the body are to be understood in God only parabolically, so likewise do not doubt that whatever things are said about the divinity with respect to the corporal position of place are to be received. When, therefore, you hear Isaiah saying: Thus says the Lord. Heaven is my seat, and the earth the footstool of my feet.

Quae est ista domus, quam aedificabitis mihi, et quis est iste locus quietis meae? Omnia haec manus mea fecit, etc.

What is that house which you will build for me, and what is that place of my rest? All these things my hand has made, etc.

Sicut minime eum corporalem intelligis, sic nec eius corporalem sedem coelum nec corporale scabellum pedum eius terram neque ullam eius localem positionem intelligas, qua sedere aestimetur, magis quam cum eius angeli thronus appellantur. Absit enim, ut eius maiestas aliquid infirmitatis habeat, ut sede aliqua vel scabello sustentari egeat! Coeli ergo nomine et terrae hoc loco bonae et malae distinguuntur animae, tamquam ex meritis suis superiores et inferiores.

Just as you in no way understand him to be corporeal, so neither understand heaven as his corporeal seat nor earth as the corporeal footstool of his feet, nor any local position of his by which he might be thought to sit—any more than when his angels are called a throne. Far be it that his majesty should have any infirmity, such that it need to be supported by some seat or footstool! Therefore by the name of “heaven” and of “earth” in this place, good and bad souls are distinguished, as higher and lower according to their merits.

Bonae itaque animae tamquam templum eius seu coelum dicuntur iuxta illud Psalmistae: Dominus in templo sancto suo, Dominus in coelo sedes eius, eo, quod ipsis, qui sunt meritis celsiores, praesideat et quasi in propria domo et templo sibi sanctificato per gratiam inhabitet. Carnales vero animas, quae videlicet terrenis et infimis inhiant desideriis, quasi scabellum pedibus conculcat, quia eos, quos despicit, nec ad se misericorditer attollit, tamquam inferius derelictos premit et conculcando conterit et quasi in pulverem dissolutum redigit. Cum ergo inquit Dominus, qui in manu factis non habitat: ita excellentem in sanctis animabus habitem sedem et tanto despectui carnales et terrenos habeam homines, cur mihi terreni aedificii quasi necessariam construere domum quaeritis et non potius apud vosmetipsos domum mihi spiritualem aedificatis?

Therefore good souls are called his temple or his heaven, according to that of the Psalmist: “The Lord in his holy temple, the Lord—his seat in heaven,” because he presides over those who are loftier by merits, and as if in his own house and in a temple consecrated to himself he indwells by grace. But carnal souls, who, to wit, gape after terrene and lower desires, he, as it were, tramples as a footstool beneath his feet, because those whom he looks down upon he does not mercifully lift up to himself, but, left as the inferior, he presses and by trampling crushes, and reduces, as it were, into dissolved dust. Therefore, when the Lord says—who does not dwell in things made by hand: “Thus I hold so excellent a seat in holy souls and hold carnal and earthly men in such contempt; why do you seek to build for me, as though necessary, a house of earthly construction, and do you not rather build for me within your very selves a spiritual house?”

Alioquin cassa est significatio templi visibilis, si invisibile desit. Cum itaque coelum vel regnum coelorum futuram beatitudinem audis appellari, sublimitatem futurae vitae magis quam corporalem coeli positionem intellige! Quam etiam nonnunquam nomine terrae propter stabilitatem eius sicut et nomine coeli propter ipsius dignitatem constat designari.

Otherwise the signification of the visible temple is void, if the invisible is lacking. Therefore, when you hear “heaven” or “the kingdom of heaven” called the future beatitude, understand the sublimity of the future life rather than a bodily position of heaven! Which also is sometimes designated by the name “earth” on account of its stability, just as by the name “heaven” on account of its dignity.

Unde et Psalmista: Credo videre bona Domini in terra viventium; et per Ezechielem ipse Dominus post resurrectionem electis suis futuram beatitudinem promittens: Ecce ego, inquit, aperiam tumulos vestros et educam vos de sepulturis vestris, populus meus: et inducam vos in terramIsrael, et requiescere vos faciam super humum vestram.

Whence also the Psalmist: I believe I shall see the good things of the Lord in the land of the living; and through Ezekiel the Lord himself, after the resurrection, promising future beatitude to his elect: Behold, I, he says, will open your tombs and will lead you out of your sepulchers, my people; and I will bring you into the land of Israel, and I will cause you to rest upon your own soil.

Quod autem Dominus noster Christus corporales coelos corporaliter et visibiliter ascendit, non eius gloriae, in quo plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter inhabitat, sed fidei nostrae profuit. Qui ergo prius clausis ianuis ad discipulos intrando resuscitandorum corporum subtilitatem, qua videlicet cuncta penetrare queant, ex ipsa sua resurrectione monstraverat, postmodum ipse in ascensione sua tantam ipsorum futuram levitatem exhibuit, ut nulla terrenitatis mole, qua prius gravabantur, sicut scriptum est: Corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, quoquam ulterius praepediantur ascendere, sed, quocumque animae velint, sine ulla difficultate statim eo transferri.

But that our Lord Christ ascended the bodily heavens corporally and visibly profited, not his glory—in which the fullness of divinity dwells corporally—but our faith. He therefore who earlier, by entering to the disciples with the doors shut, had shown from his very resurrection the subtlety of the bodies to be raised, whereby indeed they are able to penetrate all things, afterwards in his own ascension exhibited so great a future lightness of them, that by no mass of earthliness, by which previously they were burdened—as it is written: Corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam—they are any longer hindered from ascending to anywhere, but, whithersoever the souls wish, without any difficulty they are immediately transferred there.

Quod tamen ad dexteram Patris sursum conscendisse memoratur, sicut nec dextra patris intelligitur corporalis, ita nec ista sessio, qua ipse Pater sedeat, est localis positio, sed per hoc pariter cum Patre dominandi potestas et aequalis dignitas exprimitur, cum ei collateraliter a dexteris consedisse dicitur, quod quidem sedere ad dexteram cum corporaliter ad litteram stare non possit, id quoque, quod de corporali eius ascensione praemittitur, quamvis in re ita corporaliter sit factum, quendam tamen eius ascensum in mentibus fidelium meliorem designat. De quo videlicet ascensu ipse ad Mariam iam antea dixerat: Noli me tangere, nondum enim ascendi ad Patrem meum. Tunc enim tamquam in nube ab oculis hominum sustollitur Christu s ad coelum, ut ad dexteram Patris resideat, quando praedicatione sanctorum ab aspectu praesentis et laboriosae vitae subtractus praedicatur ita in gloria sublimatus, ut Patri corregnando pariter universis imperet et tamquam coaequalis substantia vel Filius aeque dominetur omnibus.

Nevertheless, that he is remembered to have ascended upward to the right hand of the Father, just as the right hand of the Father is not understood as bodily, so neither is that session, by which the Father himself sits, a local position; rather, by this are expressed the power of dominion together with the Father and equal dignity, since it is said that he has sat beside him collaterally at the right. And since “to sit at the right” cannot stand, bodily and to the letter, so also that which is premised about his bodily ascension—although in fact it was thus done bodily—yet designates a certain better ascent of his in the minds of the faithful. Of which ascent he himself had already said to Mary before: Do not touch me, for I have not yet ascended to my Father. For then Christ is lifted up to heaven, as if in a cloud, from the eyes of men, that he may sit at the right hand of the Father, when by the preaching of the saints he is proclaimed as withdrawn from the sight of the present toilsome life and thus exalted in glory, so that, co-reigning with the Father, he may together command all, and, as of coequal substance—or as Son—may equally dominate all.

Quod vero de splendore lunae vel solis multiplicando subiecisti, tamquam id corporaliter fieri ad futuram beatitudinem attineat, facile est tam ex auctoritate ipsius prophetae, qui illud dixit, quam ex ratione manifesta refelli. Dominus quippe postmodum per eundem Isaiam ad Hierosolymam loquens et ei futurae vitae claritatem promittens ait: Non erit tibi amplius sol ad lucendum per diem, nec splendor lunae illuminabit te, sed erit Dominus in lucem sempiternam et Deus tuus in gloriam tuam. Non occidet ultra sol tuus et luna tua non minuetur tibi.

But as to what you subjoined about multiplying the splendor of the moon or of the sun, as though that, being done corporally, pertained to future beatitude, it is easy to refute both from the authority of the prophet himself who said it and from manifest reason. For indeed the Lord afterward, speaking through that same Isaiah to Jerusalem and promising to her the clarity of the future life, says: You will no longer have the sun for shining by day, nor will the splendor of the moon illuminate you, but the Lord will be for you as sempiternal light and your God as your glory. Your sun will no longer set, and your moon will not be diminished for you.

Sed Dominus erit tibi in lucem sempiternam et complebuntur dies luctus tui: populus autem tuus omnes iusti hereditabunt terram, etc.

But the Lord will be to you for a sempiternal light, and the days of your mourning will be completed: but your people, all righteous, will inherit the land, etc.

Quae est ista terra ab his, qui in perpetuum iusti sint, hereditanda et praesentia divinae claritatis, tamquam sole, qui numquam occidat, illuminanda nisi illa futurae beatitudinis aeternitas? Quae profecto claritas, cum tanta sit, ut nullo ad illuminandum egeat adiumento, recte sol iste amplius illuminandi officium amittere dicitur, postquam videlicet non iam animales, sed spirituales effecti illud experiemur, quod praemissum est: mensura hominis, quae et angeli. Quis denique ignoret minora luminaria maioribus apposita ex praevalenti luce statim obtenebrari aut vigorem perdere illuminandi?

What is that land to be inherited by those who shall be just in perpetuity, and to be illumined by the presence of divine clarity, as by a sun that never sets, if not that eternity of future beatitude? Which brightness indeed, since it is so great that it needs no aid for illuminating, that sun is rightly said to lose any further office of illuminating, after, namely, we, no longer animal but made spiritual, shall experience that which has been set forth above: the measure of a man, which is also of an angel. Who, finally, does not know that lesser luminaries, when set beside greater ones, by the prevailing light are immediately overshadowed or lose the vigor of illuminating?

Quod igitur officium illuminandi lux ibi corporea possit habere, ubi divinae claritatis praesentia sic illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum, ut ipsa etiam manifester consilia cordium? Videmus nunc, inquit Apostolus, per speculum et in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Nunc cognosco ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam, sicut cognitus sum.

What function, then, of illuminating could bodily light have there, where the presence of divine clarity will so illumine the hidden things of darkness that it will even make manifest the counsels of hearts themselves? We see now, says the Apostle, by a mirror and in an enigma, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know, as I have been known.

Tum quippe perfecte, tunc verissime cuncta cognoscentur a nobis sicut ab angelis per oculos cordis, ubi omnium sensuum, omnium administrationum cessabunt officia, cum erit Deus omnia in omnibus. Eius quippe visio sic omnibus nostris per omnia satisfaciet desideriis, ut ipsa per se omnia nobis conferat, quae verae beatitudini sunt necessaria. Ipsa illa divinae maiestatis visio nobis erit lux indeficiens, sanctitas summa, quies perpetua, pax omnem sensum exsuperans, omne denique bonum, omnis virtus, omne gaudium.

Then indeed perfectly, then most truly all things will be known by us, as by the angels, through the eyes of the heart, where the offices of all the senses, of all administrations, will cease, when God will be all in all. For his vision will thus in every way satisfy all our desires, that it by itself confers upon us all things which are necessary to true beatitude. That very vision of the divine majesty will be for us an unfailing light, highest sanctity, perpetual rest, a peace surpassing all understanding, in fine every good, every virtue, every joy.

Cum itaque Deus erit omnia in omnibus, constat tunc, ut idem Apostolus dicit, omnem evacuari principatum et potestatem, cum iam videlicet sola illa per semetipsam principabitur potestas, quae omnia, ut dictum est, bona per suae visionem praesentiae omnibus electis ministrat. Nullus iam nobis principatus angelicus vel humanus in administratione aliqua, nulla potestas in aliquo regimine praeerit, quia nihil deesse poterit, ubi omnia in omnibus Deus erit, ubi, cum aderit, quod perfectum est, evacuabitur, quod ex parte est. Nihil quippe nunc nobis nisi ex parte aliqua proficit, nihil ad omnia nobis necessaria conferre sufficit.

Accordingly, when God will be all in all, it is clear then, as the same Apostle says, that every principality and power is made void, since already that power alone will by itself bear rule, which, as has been said, administers all good things to all the elect through the vision of His presence. No principality, angelic or human, will any longer preside over us in any administration, no power will be over any regimen, because nothing will be able to be lacking where God will be all in all—where, when what is perfect is present, what is in part is made void. For indeed at present nothing benefits us except in part; nothing suffices to confer all things necessary for us.

Quidquid nobis nunc ad doctrinam vel ad aliquam virtutem vel ad aliquam proficit administrationem, imperfecte agit, quia solus est Deus, qui omnia possit. Cessabunt itaque, quaecumque imperfecte aguntur, cum ille per se suffecerit, qui omnia potest. Quod itaque ibi oculos carnis cum ceteris corporis membris resumpturi sumus, non utique flet propter officia eorum, quibus egeamus, sed ad glorificandum Deum, ut praefati sumus.

Whatever now profits us for doctrine or for some virtue or for some administration acts imperfectly, because God alone is the one who can do all things. Therefore all things that are done imperfectly will cease, when He who can do all things shall have sufficed by Himself. Accordingly, the fact that there we shall resume the eyes of the flesh together with the other members of the body does not, to be sure, occur on account of their offices, which we might need, but for the glorifying of God, as we have said above.

In quibus videlicet eius potentiam tanto amplius experiemur, quanto illa in officiis suis, si opus esset, peragendis validiora esse sentiemus et longe fortiorem ac meliorem consecuta statum esse viderimus.

In which, to wit, we shall experience His power so much the more, in proportion as we shall perceive those to be more robust for the carrying-through of their offices, if there were need, and shall have seen that they have attained a far stronger and better state.

Quod si etiam de luce solis ac lunae multiplicanda corporaliter, non mystice tantum accipiamus, ad gloriam Conditoris potius quam ad officii sui necessitatem referendum est, sicut et universus mundi status in melius est commutandus, quod etiam coelestium luminarium adiumento vel commutatione mundi manifeste Deus nobis innotescet; id, quod ante minus habebant, non ex impotentia Conditoris exstitisse, sed pro vitae suae mortalis et infirmae necessitudine, quae nequaquam talia vel tanta ferre posset nec etiam tantis uti beneficiis digna esset. Mystice tamen intelligi facile est lunam tunc ut solem fulgere, id est Ecclesiam electorum sicut et eius solem Deum indeficientem lucem habere et tamen ipsum eius solem tunc quoque ira lucem ipsius lunae transcendere, ut in ipso solo lucis sit perfectio, quae septenario designatur numero.

But if we should also take the multiplication of the light of the sun and of the moon corporally, not only mystically, it is to be referred to the glory of the Creator rather than to the necessity of their office, just as the entire state of the world is to be changed for the better; by the aid or by the commutation of the celestial luminaries God will also become manifestly known to us in the change of the world—that that which previously they had in lesser degree did not arise from the impotence of the Creator, but on account of the necessity of their mortal and infirm life, which by no means could bear such things or so great, nor even was worthy to use such benefits. Mystically, however, it is easy to understand the moon then to shine as the sun, that is, the Church of the elect, like its sun—God—to have unfailing light, and yet that very sun of it then also to transcend the light of the moon, so that in him alone there may be the perfection of light, which is designated by the number seven.

Philosophus: Quantum video, si haec ita se habent, ut dicitis, multa fidei vestrae Deus videtur debere, cuius in omnibus maxime gloriam praedicatis. Restat autem nunc, ut quid de inferis etiam sit sentiendum, diligenter aperias. Sicut enim summum hominis bonum eo amplius est appetendum, quo magis cognitum; ita e contrario summum malum eo magis erit vitandum, quo minus fuerit ignotum.

Philosopher: Insofar as I see, if these things are as you say, God seems to owe much to your faith, whose glory you proclaim above all in all things. It remains now that you carefully lay open what is also to be thought about the infernal regions. For just as the highest good of man is to be sought the more, the more it is known; so, on the contrary, the highest evil will be to that degree the more to be shunned, the less it is unknown.

Christianus: Hinc quippe apud nos sicut et apud vos diversa olim exstitit opinio. Alii quippe infernum corporalem quendam locum sub terris existimant, qui ex ipsa locali quoque positione, quae inferior sit ceteris mundi partibus, dicatur infernus; alii quoque non tam corporale tormentum quam spirituale arbitrantur infernum, ut quemadmodum nomine coeli, quae superior est pars mundi, summam animarum beatitudinem distinguimus, ita nomine inferni summam miseriam, quae tanto inferius iacere perhibetur, quanto ab illa summa beatitudine amplius distare cognoscitur et ei amplius contraria videtur. Sicut enim, quod melius est, per excellentiam suae dignitatis dicitur altum, ita e contrario, quod peius est, per abiectionem sui dicitur infimum.

Christian: Hence indeed among us, just as among you, there has of old existed a diverse opinion. Some, to be sure, suppose hell to be a certain corporal place under the earth, which from its very local position also, being inferior to the other parts of the world, is called hell; others likewise reckon hell to be not so much a corporal torment as a spiritual one, so that, just as by the name of heaven, which is the superior part of the world, we distinguish the supreme beatitude of souls, so by the name of hell we distinguish the supreme misery, which is reported to lie the lower by so much as it is known to be more distant from that supreme beatitude and to appear the more contrary to it. For just as what is better, by the excellence of its dignity, is called high, so, on the contrary, what is worse, by the abjection of itself, is called lowest.

Multa quippe de poenis inferni tam Vetus quam Novum Testamentum narrat, quae nequaquam ad litteram accipi posse videntur. Quid est enim ad litteram, quod de iustis et impiis Dominus per Isaiam ait: Et egredientur, et videbunt cadavera eorum qui praevaricati sunt in me. Vermis eorum non morietur et ignis eorum non exstinguetur.

Indeed many things about the punishments of hell both the Old and the New Testament narrate, which by no means seem able to be taken to the letter. For what, to the letter, is there in what the Lord through Isaiah says concerning the just and the impious: “And they shall go out, and they shall see the cadavers of those who have transgressed against me. Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be extinguished.”

Quis est sanctorum corporalis egressus, ut poenas impiorum videant, aut qui vermes sunt corporales in corporibus reproborum, quae omnibus integra membris sicut et sanctorum corpora sunt resurrectura? Quae ibi erit corrosio vermium, ubi omnium pariter immortalitas absque ullo defectu erit corporum? Sed et quod Dominus de divite et Lazaro defunctis in Evangelio refert: Quomodo ad litteram stare potest, quippe cum corporalem sepulturam non inferno anima illa divitis habere queat?

What corporal egress of the saints is there, that they may see the penalties of the impious; or what worms are corporal in the bodies of the reprobate, which with all their members intact are to be resurrected just like the bodies of the saints? What corrosion by worms will there be there, where the immortality of all alike will be, without any defect of the bodies? But also that which the Lord relates in the Gospel about the rich man and Lazarus, now deceased: how can it stand to the letter, since that soul of the rich man cannot have corporal sepulture in the inferno?

Aut quis sit ille corporalis Abrahae sinus, quo anima Lazari refertur ab angelis deferri, quam ibi linguam anima divitis habeat, vel quem digitum habeat anima Lazari, aut quae est ibi corporalis aqua, cuius stilla linguae ardentis infusa incendium eius exstinguere possit aut minuere? Unde cum haec iuxta litteram nequaquam in animabus iam exutis carne contingere queant, sicut nec illud, quod alibi dicitur: Ligatis manibus et pedibus mittite eum in tenebras exteriores. Ibi erit fletus et stridor dentium.

Or what is that bodily bosom of Abraham, to which the soul of Lazarus is reported to be borne by the angels; what tongue the soul of the rich man has there, or what digit the soul of Lazarus has; or what is that bodily water there, a drop of which, infused into the burning tongue, could extinguish or diminish its conflagration? Whence, since these things, according to the letter, can by no means befall souls now divested of flesh, so neither that which is said elsewhere: His hands and feet bound, send him into the outer darkness. There will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.

Tam ex Veteri quam ex Novo Testamento innui videtur ea, quae de inferno dixerunt, mystice magis quam corporaliter accipi debere; ut videlicet, sicut ille Abrahae sinus, quo suscepta est anima Lazari, spiritualis est, non corporalis intelligendus, ira et infernus spiritualis ille cruciatus, quo anima divitis sepulta memoratur. Quamdiu enim animae corporibus carent, quo ferri localiter aut moveri vel quasi corporis ambitu coerceri possint, quae nullatenus locales sunt omnique corpore propria natura longe subtiliores existunt, aut quae sit vis elementorum corporea, tam videlicet ignis quam ceterorum, quae ipsas sine corporibus contingere vel cruciare possit, non facile disseri aut intelligi potest. Unde et daemones post lapsum, ut corporaliter etiam pari possint, in quaedam devoluti aeria corpora dicuntur, quae quasi carcerem acceperunt.

As much from the Old as from the New Testament it seems intimated that the things they said about hell ought to be received more mystically than corporally; namely, that just as that bosom of Abraham, into which the soul of Lazarus was received, is to be understood as spiritual, not corporal, so too hell is that spiritual cruciation, in which the soul of the rich man is remembered as entombed. For as long as souls lack bodies—by which they might be borne locally or moved, or constrained as it were by the ambit of a body—being in no way local and by their own nature far more subtle than any body—neither what the corporeal force of the elements is, namely of fire as well as of the others, which could touch or torment them without bodies, can be easily argued or understood. Whence also the demons after the lapse, in order that they might likewise be able to suffer corporally, are said to have been rolled down into certain aerial bodies, which they have received as a kind of prison.

Hinc et aeriae dicti sunt potestates, quod videlicet in illo plurimum possint elemento, cui sint incorporatae, sicut et terrenae potestates vocati sunt homines, qui in terris principantur. Sin autem vermes animarum quandam earum interiorem corrosionem, qua de conscientia sua, desperatione veniae et futurae poenae augmento iam cruciantur, ac postmodum ignem, quo resumptis corporibus cruciabuntur, intellexisse propheta dicatur, facile est tam spirituale quam corporale tormentum definiri infernum, comparatione scilicet aliarum poenarum, his tamquam infimis vel extremis ita vocatis, sive sub terris sive alibi dicantur exerceri.

Hence too the powers are called aerial, for the reason that they can do very much in that element into which they have been incorporated, just as men who rule upon the earth are called earthly powers. But if the prophet is said to have understood by the worms of souls a certain inner corrosion of them, whereby from their own conscience, by despair of pardon and an increase of future punishment, they are already tormented, and afterwards the fire by which, once their bodies are resumed, they will be tormented, it is easy for hell to be defined as both a spiritual and a bodily torment—by comparison, namely, with other punishments—these being thus called as the lowest or the extreme, whether they are said to be carried out under the earth or elsewhere.

Cum enim terras super aquas fundatas esse constat, quomodo sub terris corporeus aliquis ignis esse dicetur, nisi forte "sub terris" intelligatur quaecumque terrae profunditas post hanc, in qua sumus, terrae superficiere? Sed rursum: cum infinitus reproborum numerus et iuxta Veritatis assertionem parvus sit electorum futurus, non facile fortassis recipietur tantum alicubi terrae sinum haberi, qui tot corpora capere possit. Unde si cuidam videatur tantam divini iudicii potentiam esse, ut in omnibus aeque locis, quos voluerit, punire possit nihilque ad poenam sicut nec ad gloriam referre qualitates locorum, non dubito id tanto faciliorem assensum invenire, quanto amplius et divinam potentiam videtur commendare et rationi magis propinquare.

For since it is established that the lands are founded upon the waters, how will any corporeal fire be said to be under the earth, unless perhaps "under the earth" is understood as whatever depth of the earth lies beyond this surface of the earth on which we are? But again: since the number of the reprobate is infinite and, according to the assertion of Truth, the number of the elect will be small, it will perhaps not easily be accepted that there is anywhere so great a bosom of earth as could contain so many bodies. Whence, if it seems to someone that there is such power of divine judgment as to be able to punish in all places equally, wherever it will, and that the qualities of places contribute nothing to punishment, just as neither to glory, I do not doubt that this will find so much the easier assent, inasmuch as it seems both to commend divine power the more and to draw nearer to reason.

Ut enim communem fere omnium sequamur opinionem, qui in eodem igne positos, alios magis, alios minus, pro meritis suis non pro quantitate incendii cruciari dicunt, non video, qualiter eiusdem ignis tanta moderatio per divinam potentiam in poena fieri possit et non potius diversis locis positos diversis affligere queat tormentis, vel quoslibet etiam, ubicumque sint, quibuscumque velit, torquere poenis et omnia eis in quaslibet poenas elementa convertere, sicut scriptum est: Pugnabit pro Deo contra insensatos orbis terrarum.

To follow, indeed, the common opinion of almost all, who say that, placed in the same fire, some are tormented more, others less, according to their merits, not according to the quantity of the burning, I do not see how such a moderation of the same fire can be effected in punishment by divine power, and not rather that, being set in different places, it could afflict them with different torments, or even torture any persons, wherever they may be, with whatever punishments he wills, and convert all the elements for them into whatever punishments, just as it is written: The orb of the earth will fight for God against the insensate.

Namet iuxta eorum existimationem in ipso aethereo coelo, ubi quo purior tanto acutior et vehementior ardet ignis et splendet, absque laesione ulla beatorum corpora communis fides asserit permanere et hoc eis post resurrectionem ad gloriam collatum esse, quod antea nullatenus nostra sustinere infirmitas possit. Sic quippe et sanos oculos lux recreat et infirmos gravat. Quis etiam quotidie tam diversas animalium non experiat naturas, ut, quod aliorum vitam construat, aliorum exstinguat et corporum diversa complexione, quod uni proficiat, alteri obsit, tam animatis scilicet quam inanimatis.

For indeed, according to their estimation, in the very ethereal heaven, where, the purer it is, by so much the sharper and more vehement the fire burns and shines, the common faith asserts that the bodies of the blessed remain without any injury, and that this has been conferred upon them after the resurrection for glory, which previously our weakness could in no way sustain. Thus, to be sure, light refreshes sound eyes and burdens weak ones. Who also does not daily experience such diverse natures of animals, that what builds up the life of some extinguishes that of others, and, by the diverse complexion of bodies, what profits one harms another, both animate, namely, and inanimate.

Homines sub aqua, pisces sub divo moriuntur. Salamandrias in igne vivere constat, qui maturum ceteris animantibus affert interitum. Venenum vita est serpentis, mors hominis, et eadem aliis animantibus gustum praebent necessarium, aliis mortiferum.

Human beings die under water, fishes beneath the open sky. It is established that salamanders live in fire, which brings a timely demise to the other animals. Poison is the life of the serpent, the death of man, and the same affords to some living creatures a necessary taste, to others a deadly one.

Nihil omnino est, quod omnibus possit convenire naturis. Qui ex eodem utero, ex eodem patre geniti processerunt, nequaquam iisdem vivunt moribus nec iisdem pariter rebus oblectantur vel offenduntur nec in eodem aestu vel gelu consistentes pariter cruciantur. Non haec profecto diversitas passionum ex qualitate punientium, sed punitorum provenit.

There is absolutely nothing that can agree with all natures. Those who have come forth, begotten from the same womb, from the same father, by no means live with the same mores, nor are they equally delighted or offended by the same things, nor, standing in the same heat or frost, are they tormented equally. This diversity of passions surely does not arise from the quality of the things that punish, but from that of those who are punished.

Quid itaque mirum, si resuscitata corpora pro meritis cuiusque vel eodem loco vel diversis consistentia sic divinae potentiae iustitia moderetur ad poenam, ut ubicumque omnia illis aeque poenalia sint? Quod utique file diligenter attendebat, qui vindictam Dei nusquam se effugere posse fatebatur, dicens: Quo ibo a spiritu tuo et quo a facie tua fugiam? Si ascendero in coelum, tu illic es; si descendero ad infernum, ades.

What, therefore, is there to marvel at, if the justice of divine potency so moderates to punishment the resuscitated bodies—standing either in the same place or in diverse places according to the merits of each—that wherever they are, all things are equally penal for them? This assuredly that man was diligently attending to, who confessed that he could nowhere escape the vengeance of God, saying: Where shall I go from your spirit, and where shall I flee from your face? If I shall ascend into heaven, you are there; if I shall descend to hell, you are present.

Denique quis malorum hominum animas in inferno plus cruciari censeat quam spirituales nequitias in aere consistentes sua aeque tormenta secum ubicumque circumferentes? Quas utique tanto maiore tormento dignas esse certum est, quanto nequiores esse minime dubitantur; quis eodem modo neget animas impiorum in corporibus resumptis, quocumque loco moveantur, sua secum tormenta gestare, etsi nihil exterius inferatur tormenti? Multas quippe passiones animae adhuc in corpore manenti vel extrinsecus inferri vel intrinsecus ex aliqua perturbatione vel corporis inaequalitate videmus, quae semel habitae nulla possint auferri loci permutatione.

Finally, who would judge that the souls of evil men in hell are more cruciated than the spiritual wickednesses standing in the air, carrying their torments equally with them wherever they go? Which indeed are certainly worthy of so much the greater torment, in proportion as they are by no means doubted to be more nefarious; who, in like manner, would deny that the souls of the impious, with the bodies resumed, wherever they are moved, carry their torments with themselves, even if nothing of torment is brought from without? For we see many passions of the soul, while still remaining in the body, either inflicted from without or arising within from some perturbation or inequality of the body, which, once possessed, can by no permutation of place be taken away.

Ut enim ceteras omittam passiones, quid valet ad remedium poenae, quo loco nunc constituas morientem vel maxima passione laborantem, si minime illa passio lenienda sit ex loco?

For, to omit the other passions, what does it avail for a remedy of the penalty, in what place you now set one dying or laboring under the greatest passion, if by no means is that passion to be alleviated by the place?

Aut cum modo nobis morientibus, ut beatus meminit Augustinus,tantasit in corpore passio mortis, ut propter hanc ipsum relinquere anima compellatur, quis in corporibus resumptis et iam immortalibus factis hanc passionem, qua hic moriendo dissolvimur, si ibi perpetua ruerit, ad damnationem satis esse non censeat, vel si qua forte alia possit esse maior nullo extrinsecus tormento adiuncto?

Or when, as we are now dying, as blessed Augustine remembers, there is such a passion of death in the body that because of it the soul is compelled to leave it, who would not deem that, in bodies resumed and already made immortal, this passion by which here we are dissolved in dying—if there it should be perpetual—would suffice for damnation; or that perhaps some other greater one could exist, with no torment added from without?

Quid enim magis iustitiae convenit, quam quod ipsa praecipue corpora sua resumant animae ad tormentum, quibus maie usae sint ad oblectamentum? Tantam vero in dissolutione mortis passionem esse certum est, ut pro quovis peccato, irrogata quamvis sit brevissima, ad purgationem tamen eius, quod non aeterna damnatione dignum fuerit, sufficere credatur, unde, ut beatus asserit Hieronymus, illa est prophetae sententia: Non iudicabit bis Dominus in id ipsum, et non consurget duplex tribulatio.

For what, indeed, more befits justice than that souls themselves should especially reassume their own bodies for torment, the bodies which they misused for delectation? And it is certain that there is so great a passion in the dissolution of death that, for any sin whatsoever, although it be very brief when inflicted, nevertheless it is believed to suffice for the purgation of that which would not have been worthy of eternal damnation; whence, as blessed Jerome asserts, this is the prophet’s sentence: The Lord will not judge twice upon the same thing, and a double tribulation will not arise.

Legimus et nonnullas defunctorum animas damnatas noluisse reddi vitae praesenti, ut bene operando salvarentur, si eam rursum morte interveniente finire cogerentur. Scriptum esse alibi reperimus quasdam sanctorum morientium animas timore poenae dissolutionis suae tempore ad paratam sibi beatitudinem egredi prorsus refugere, donec eas Dominus iussisset ab angelis suscipi sine dolore. Ex quo liquidum est, quanta sit huius mortis passio, cuius, ut diximus, metu alius ad salutem redire noluit, alius ad beatitudinem egredi trepidavit.

We read also that some souls of the deceased, condemned, were unwilling to be returned to the present life, so that by well working they might be saved, if they were compelled to finish it again with death intervening. We find it written elsewhere that certain souls of saints at the point of dying, for fear of the penalty of their dissolution at its own time, altogether shrank from going out to the beatitude prepared for them, until the Lord had ordered them to be received by the angels without pain. Whence it is clear how great is the passion of this death, at the fear of which, as we said, one would not consent to return to salvation, another trembled to go forth to beatitude.

Et hanc tamen omnino passionem auferre, quibuscumque voluerit, divinae constat esse potentiae, sicut et praedictus asserit doctor dicens Ioannem apostolum tam a dolore mortis quam a corruptione carnis alienum fuisse. Qui ergo in morte passionem mortis sic omnino auferre potest, ubique cuicumque velit, multo facilius et eam, ubicumque velit, conferre posse videtur. Pronior quippe est natura passibilis, ut poenam incurrat, quam careat.

And yet to remove this passion entirely, from whomever he may wish, is acknowledged to belong to divine potency, just as the aforesaid doctor asserts, saying that John the apostle was alien both from the pain of death and from the corruption of the flesh. He therefore who can thus wholly remove in death the passion of death, everywhere and from whomever he wills, would seem much more easily also to be able to confer it, wherever he wills. For the passible nature is readier to incur penalty than to be without it.

Ex quibus omnibus liquere iam arbitror nihil ad poenam damnatorum loci qualitatem referre, sicut nec ad gloriam beatorum, sed hoc sit in inferno cruciari vel perpetuo igni tradi, quod illis summis poenis torqueri; quae inde praecipue igni comparantur, quod huius elementi cruciatus acrior videtur. Id quoque plurimum divinae potentiae gloriam commendare videtur, si in omnibus aeque locis et damnationis poenam et beatitudinis gloriam ipse largiatur, qui ubique per potentiam deesse non dubitatur.

From all these things I now judge it clear that the quality of the place contributes nothing to the penalty of the condemned, just as neither to the glory of the blessed; but that to be tormented in hell or to be handed over to the perpetual fire is this: namely, to be racked by those utmost penalties; which are therefore chiefly compared to fire, because the torment of this element seems the sharper. This also seems greatly to commend the glory of the divine potency, if in all places alike he himself should bestow both the penalty of damnation and the glory of beatitude—he who is not doubted to be lacking nowhere by his power.

Philosophus: Aeque, ut video, poenam damnatorum sicut et gloriam electorum ad divinae potentiae laudem convertere studes, ut in summis etiammalismagna eius bona praedices.

Philosopher: Equally, as I see, you strive to convert the penalty of the damned, just as also the glory of the elect, to the praise of divine power, so that even in the greatest evils you may proclaim his great goods.

Christianus: Et sic certe convenit, quia nulla eius sunt opera nisi magnifica et admiratione plena. Superfluum autem censeo, quibus in locis haec contingant, definire, dummodo haec adipisci possumus aut vitare.

Christian: And thus certainly it is fitting, since none of his works are anything except magnificent and full of admiration. However, I deem it superfluous to define in what places these things occur, provided that we can acquire these things or avoid them.

Philosophus: Et hinc equidem adhuc sermo est, ut tam summo bono nostro quam summo malo, ut tibi visum est, descriptis, iuxta propositum nostrum, quibus ad ea pertingitur viis, non minus diligenter aperias, ut eo melius has tenere vel illas vitare possimus, quo amplius eas noverimus. Sed quia, quid summum bonum sit vel summum malum, nondum videtur satis intellegi posse, ut primo determinatum sit, quid bonum vel malum generaliter sit dicendum, id quoque, si vales, te definire desidero. Multas quippe harum species cognoscimus.

Philosopher: And hence indeed the discourse is still this: that, with both our highest good and our highest evil—just as it has seemed to you—described, you should, according to our purpose, lay open no less diligently by what ways one reaches these, so that we may the better hold these or avoid those, the more we have known them. But since what the highest good is or the highest evil does not yet seem able to be sufficiently understood, so that it may first be determined what is to be said good or evil generally, this too, if you are able, I desire you to define. For we know many species of these.

Sed tamen, in quo bonae vel malae res dicendae sint, non satis intelligere vel disserere sufficimus. Nostri quippe auctores, qui dicunt alia bona, alia mala, alia indifferentia, nullis haec definitionibus distinxerunt, sed quibusdam exemplis ad eorum demonstrationem contenti sunt.

But nevertheless, in respect of what things are to be called good or bad, we do not suffice to understand or to discourse adequately. For our authors, who say that some things are good, others bad, others indifferent, have distinguished these by no definitions, but have been content with certain examples for their demonstration.

Christianus: Quantum aestimo, difficile definiri ea censuerunt, quorum nomina vix umquam in una significatione consistere videntur. Quippe cum dicitur: bonus homo vel bonus faber aut bonus equus et similia, quis nesciat hoc nomen "bonus" ex adiunctis diversum mutuare sensum; hominem quippe bonum ex moribus dicimus, fabrum ex scientia, equum ex viribus et velocitate, vel quae ad usum eius pertinent. Adeo autem ex adiunctis boni significatio variatur, ut etiam cum nominibus vitiorum ipsum iungere non vereamur, dicentes scilicet bonum vel optimum furem, eo quod in hac malitia peragenda sit callidus vel astutus.

Christian: As I reckon, they considered it difficult to define those things whose names hardly ever seem to consist in a single signification. For when one says: good man or good craftsman or good horse and the like, who does not know that this name "good" borrows a different sense from its adjuncts? For we call a man good from morals, a craftsman from knowledge, a horse from strength and speed, or from what pertains to its use. To such a degree, moreover, is the signification of "good" varied by adjuncts, that we do not even hesitate to join it with the names of vices, saying namely a good or best thief, because in the execution of this malice he is clever or astute.

Nec solum ad res ipsas, verum etiam ad ea, quae de rebus dicuntur, hoc est ad ipsa propositionum dicta, sic nonnumquam boni vocabulum applicamus, ut etiam dicamus, quia bonum est malum esse, quamvis minime concedamus bonum malum esse. Aliud quippe est dicere: malum est bonum, quod omnino falsum est, aliud dicere: malum esse bonum est, quod minime negandum est. Quid itaque mirum, si et nos sicut et illi horum significationem, quae ita inconstans est, definire non sufficiamus?

Not only to the things themselves, but also to those things that are said about things, that is, to the very dicta of propositions, we thus sometimes apply the vocable “good,” so that we even say that it is good that evil be, although we by no means concede that good is evil. For it is one thing to say: evil is good, which is altogether false; another to say: that evil be is good, which is by no means to be denied. What, then, is there to wonder at, if we too, just as they, are not sufficient to define the signification of these, which is so inconstant?

Quantum tamen mihi nunc occurrit, bonum simpliciter, id est bonam rem dici arbitror, quae, cum alicui usui sit apta, nullius commodum vel dignitatem per eam impediri necesse est. E contrario malam rem vocari credo, per quam alterum horum conferri necesse est. Indifferens vero, id est rem, quae neque bona est neque mala, illam arbitror, per cuius existentiam nec ulla bona deferri nec impediri necesse est, sicut est fortuita motio digiti vel quaecumque actiones huiusmodi.

However, as far as now occurs to me, I judge that “good” simply, that is, a good thing, is said of that which, while it is apt for some use, it is not necessary that anyone’s advantage or dignity be impeded through it. By contrast, I believe a bad thing is called that through which it is necessary that one of these two be effected. An indifferent thing, indeed, that is, a thing which is neither good nor bad, I reckon to be that, by whose existence it is necessary that neither any goods be conferred nor impeded, as is the fortuitous motion of a finger or whatever actions of this sort.

Non enim actiones bonae vel malae nisi secundum intentionis radicem iudicantur, sed omnes ex se indifferentes sunt; et, si diligenter inspiciamus, nihil ad meritum conferunt, quae nequaquam ex se bonae sunt aut malae, cum ipsae videlicet tam reprobis quam electis aeque conveniant.

For actions are not judged good or evil except according to the root of intention, but all in themselves are indifferent; and, if we look diligently, those which are by no means in themselves good or evil contribute nothing to merit, since they plainly suit equally both the reprobate and the elect.

Philosophus: Hic paululum nobis standum arbitror atque immorandum, si forte, quae dixisti, pro definitionibus stare possint.

Philosopher: Here I think we must stand a little and linger, if perhaps the things you have said can stand for definitions.

Christianus: Difficillimum equidem est omnia propriis definitionibus sic circumscribere, ut ab omnibus aliis ea separari queant, maxime nunc, cum nobis ad definitiones excogitandas mora temporis non concedatur. Pleraque nominum, quibus rebus conveniant, ex rationis usu didicimus. Quae vero sit sententia eorum vel intelligentia, minime assignare sufficimus.

Christianus: It is indeed most difficult to circumscribe everything with proper definitions in such a way that they can be separated from all others, especially now, when no delay of time is granted to us for devising definitions. We have learned from the use of reason to which things most names are congruent. But what their meaning or intellection is, we are by no means sufficient to assign.

Multa etiam reperimus, quorum nec nominationem sicut nec sententias definitione possumus terminare. Etsi enim rerum naturas non ignoremus, earum tamen vocabula in usu non sunt et saepe promptior est mens ad intelligendum, quam lingua sit ad proferendum vel ad ea, quae sentimus, disserendum. Ecce: omnes ex usu quotidiani sermonis cognoscimus, quae res appellantur lapides.

We also discover many things, of which we can terminate by definition neither the nomination nor the senses. For although we are not ignorant of the natures of things, nevertheless their vocables are not in use, and often the mind is readier for understanding than the tongue is for proffering or for disserting about the things we sense. Behold: from the usage of everyday discourse we all recognize what things are called stones.

Quae tamen sunt lapidis propriae differentiae, aut quae sit huius speciei proprietas nullo adhuc, credo, valeamus assignare vocabulo, quo lapidis aliqua distinctio seu descriptio perfici possit. Nec id tibi mirabile videri debet, si me in his deficere videas, ad quae nequaquam magnos illos vestros doctores, quos iactatis philosophos, suffecisse cognoscimus. Quae tamen potero, ad obiectionem tuarum inquisitionum de his, quae promisi, respondere conabor.

Yet what are the proper differentiae of a stone, or what is the property of this species, we are not yet, I think, able to assign by any term, by which some distinction or description of a stone might be perfected. Nor ought this to seem marvelous to you, if you see me fail in these matters, wherein we know by no means that those great doctors of yours, whom you vaunt as philosophers, have sufficed. Nevertheless, whatever I shall be able, I will endeavor to answer to the objection of your inquiries concerning those things which I have promised.

Philosophus: Et ratione satis et probatione, quae nunc dicis, videntur abundare. Sed revera, quae dicuntur, nisi intelligantur, frustra proferuntur, nec docere alios possunt, nisi disseri queant. Nunc, si placet, immo quia et sic consensisti, ipsa, quae dixisti, aliquantulum expedire te volo.

Philosopher: Both in reason and in probation, the things which you now say seem to abound sufficiently. But in truth, the things that are said, unless they be understood, are proffered in vain, nor can they teach others unless they can be discussed. Now, if it pleases, nay rather since you have even thus consented, I wish you to disentangle a little the very things which you have said.

Quare ergo, inquam, cum rem bonam definires, non visum est sufficere, ut diceres, quae alicui apta est usui, hoc est alicui commoda utilitati.

Why therefore, I say, when you were defining a good thing, did it not seem sufficient to say that it is what is apt for use to someone, that is, commodious to someone’s utility?

Christianus: Commune proverbium atque probabile vix aliquod bonum esse, quod non noceat, et malum, quod non prosit. Verbi gratia: Ecce iamdudum aliquis in bonis operibus se adeo exercuit, ut inde saepius laudatus vel de suis confisus virtutibus in superbiam extollatur vel alius invidia hinc accendatur. Sic itaque malum de bono constat provenire et frequentermalietiam bonum causam esse.

Christian: A common and probable proverb [says that] scarcely any good exists that does not harm, and [scarcely any] evil that does not profit. For example: Behold, someone has for a long time exercised himself in good works to such a degree that, being rather often praised from it, or trusting in his own virtues, he is lifted up into pride; or another is kindled with envy from this. Thus therefore it is established that an evil arises from a good, and that often even a good is the cause of an evil.

Quippe vitia nostra vel peccata, quae sunt proprie mala dicenda, nonnisi in anima vel bonis habent consistere creaturis, nec nisi a bono surgere possit corruptio. Quis e contrario non videat saepe homines post magnas peccatorum ruinas fortiores aut meliores per humilitatem vel poenitentiam surgere, quam antea fuerint? Ipsam denique poenitentiam peccati, quia mentis afflictio est nec cum beatitudine perfecta, quia dolorem ingerit, convenire potest, malum esse potius quam bonum constat.

Indeed our vices or sins, which are properly to be called evils, have their standing only in the soul or in good creatures, nor can corruption arise except from good. Who, on the contrary, does not see that often men, after great ruins of sins, rise stronger or better through humility or penitence than they were before? Finally, penitence itself for sin, because it is an affliction of the mind and not compatible with perfect beatitude, since it brings in pain, can be agreed to be rather an evil than a good; it is evident that it is evil rather than good.

Et tamen hanc ad indulgentiam peccatorum nemo necessariam esse dubitat. Quis etiam nesciat summam Dei bonitatem, quae nihil sine causa fieri permittit, adeo mala quoque bene praeordinare et eis etiam optime uti: ut etiam sit bonum malum esse, cum tamen malum nullatenus sit bonum? Sicut enim summa diaboli nequitia ipsis etiam bonis saepe pessime utitur, ut videlicet ea in causas pessimorum effectuum convertat, ac sic perea, quae bona sunt, quaedam pessima operetur, ita e contrario vel e converso Deus agit ex ipsis videlicet malis bona multa faciens provenire et eisdem saepe utens optime, quae file pessime molitur.

And yet no one doubts that this is necessary for the indulgence of sins. Who also does not know the supreme goodness of God, who permits nothing to be done without cause, so to pre-ordain even evils well and even to use them in the best way: so that it is even a good that evil should exist, while nevertheless evil is by no means good? For just as the utmost wickedness of the devil very badly uses even good things themselves, namely to convert them into causes of the worst effects, and thus through things which are good he works certain most evil deeds, so on the contrary, or conversely, God acts—namely, from the very evils making many goods come forth and often using those same things in the best way, which he contrives in the worst way.

Quippe et tyrannus et principes eodem gladio male uti possunt et bene, ille quidem ad violentiam, ille ad vindictam; et nulla, credo, sunt instrumenta, vel quaecumque usibus nostris sunt commodata, quibus pro intentionum qualitate tam male uti non possumus quam bene; ad quod scilicet nihil refert, quid fiat, sed quo animo fiat. Unde et quilibet homo tam bonus quam perversus tam bonarum quam malarum causae sunt rerum, et per eos tam bona quam mala esse contingit. Non enim bonus homo a malo in eo dissidere videtur, quod id, quod bonum sit, facit, sed potius, quod bene facit.

Indeed both a tyrant and princes can use the same sword badly and well—the former for violence, the latter for vindication; and, I believe, there are no instruments, or whatever things are furnished to our uses, with which, according to the quality of intentions, we cannot use just as badly as well; wherein, to be sure, it matters nothing what is done, but with what mind it is done. Whence also any man, as much the good as the perverse, are causes of both good and evil things, and through them it happens that both good and bad come to be. For the good man does not seem to differ from the bad in this, that he does that which is good, but rather, that he does it well.

Etsi enim nunc usus sermonis pro eodem habet bene facere et bonum facere, vis tamen et proprietas locutionis non ita fortassis sonat. Sicut enim "bonum" saepe dicitur, nec tamen "bene", id est bona intentione, ita et bonum fieri posse videtur, cum tamen bene non fiat. Saepe quippe contingit idem adversis fieri, ita ut pro eorum intentione alius bene, alius male illud faciat.

Although indeed now the usage of speech holds “to do well” and “to do the good” as the same, yet the force and propriety of the locution perhaps do not sound thus. For just as “the good” is often said, and yet not “well,” that is, with a good intention, so too it seems that the good can be done, while yet it is not done well. For it often happens that the same thing is done with opposing intentions, so that, according to their intention, one person does that thing well, another badly.

Veluti, si duo aliquem reum suspendant, alter quidem eo solummodo, quod eum odit, alter vero, quia habeat hanc exercere iustitiam; iusta haec suspensio ab isto iuste fit, quia recta intentione, ab illo iniuste, quia non amore iustitiae, sed odii zelo vel irae. Nonnumquam etiammalihomines vel ipse quoque diabolus in eodem facto ita Deo cooperari dicuntur, ut idem tam a Deo quam ab illis fieri asseratur. Ecce: enim a Satan ea, quae Iob possidebat, ablata videmus, et tamen haec a Deo sibi auferri Iob ipse profitetur dicens: Dominus dedit, Dominus abstulit.

For example, if two men hang some defendant, the one indeed for this sole reason, that he hates him, the other, because he must exercise this justice; this just hanging by this one is done justly, because with a right intention, by that one unjustly, because not from love of justice, but from the zeal of hatred or of anger. Sometimes even evil men, or even the devil himself, are said to cooperate with God in the same deed in such a way that the same thing is asserted to be done both by God and by them. Behold: for we see that the things which Job possessed were taken away by Satan, and yet Job himself professes that these things are taken away from him by God, saying: “The Lord gave, the Lord took away.”

Unde autem et ad illud veniamus, quod Christianorum mentes carius amplectuntur, etsi tibi vel tui similibus ridiculum videatur. Traditio Domini Iesu in manus Iudaeorum tam ab ipso Iesu quam a Deo Patre vel a Iuda traditore fieri memoratur; nam et Pater Filium et Filius se ipsum et Iudas eundem tradidisse dicitur, cum tamen in talibus vel diabolus vel Iudas id ipsum fecerit, quod Deus. Et si forte ideo "bonum " aliquod videantur fecisse, non tamen dicendi sunt "bene" fecisse.

Whence, however, let us also come to that which the minds of Christians embrace more dearly, even if it may seem ridiculous to you or to those like you. The Tradition (handing over) of the Lord Jesus into the hands of the Jews is remembered to have been done both by Jesus himself and by God the Father or by Judas the traitor; for both the Father is said to have handed over the Son, and the Son to have handed over himself, and Judas to have handed over the same, although in such matters either the devil or Judas did that very same thing which God did. And if perhaps for that reason they seem to have done some "good ", nevertheless they are not to be said to have done it "well".

Aut si fecerint id vel fieri voluerint, quod vult fieri Deus, vel eandem faciendo aliquid voluntatem habeant, quam Deus habet, numquid ideo bene facere dicendi sunt, quia scilicet faciunt, quod Deus vult fieri; aut ideo bonam habent voluntatem, quia volunt id, quod Deus? Non utique! Etsi enim faciant vel facere velint, quod Deus vult fieri, non tamen id faciunt vel facere volunt, quia credant Deum id velle fieri; nec eadem intentio est in eodem facto illorum quae Dei, et quamquam id velint, quod Deus, eadem illorum et Dei voluntas ideo dici possit, quod idem volunt; mala tamen eorum voluntas est et bona Dei, cum scilicet id diversis de causis velint fieri.

But if they should do that, or should will to be done that, which God wills to be done, or by doing the same should have in some respect the same will which God has, are they therefore to be said to do well, because, namely, they do what God wills to be done; or therefore do they have a good will, because they will that which God wills? Not at all! For even if they do, or wish to do, what God wills to be done, nevertheless they do not do it, nor wish to do it, because they believe that God wills it to be done; nor is the same intention in the same deed of theirs as God’s; and although they will that which God wills, their will and God’s could for that reason be said to be the same, since they will the same thing; yet their will is evil and God’s good, since, to wit, they will that it be done for diverse causes.

Sic et cum eadem sit actio diversorum, quia videlicet idem agunt, pro diversitate tamen intentionis actio huius bona est et illius mala, quia, quamquam idem operentur, tamen bene hic, ille male id ipsum facit.

Thus also, when the action of different persons is the same, since, namely, they do the same thing, yet on account of the diversity of intention the action of this one is good and of that one bad; because, although they perform the same, nevertheless this man does that very thing well, that one ill.

Et (quod dictu mirabile est) nonnumquam etiam bona est voluntas, cum quis vult ab altero malum fieri, quia id videlicet bona intentione vult. Saepe namque Dominus per diabolum vel tyrannum aliquem decrevit eos affligere, qui innocentes sunt vel qui illam afflictionem non meruerunt, ad purgationem scilicet alicuius peccati eorum, qui affliguntur, vel ad augmentum meriti sive ad exemplum aliis dandum vel quacumque causa rationabili, quamvis nobis occulta. Unde et de eo, quod permittente Domino bene diabolus egerat male, Iob meminit dicens: Sicut Domino placuit, ita factum est.

And (which is marvelous to say) sometimes the will is even good when someone wills that an evil be done by another, because, namely, he wills it with a good intention. For often the Lord has decreed, through the devil or through some tyrant, to afflict those who are innocent or who have not merited that affliction, namely for the purgation of some sin of those who are afflicted, or for the augmentation of merit, or for an example to be given to others, or for whatever rational cause, though hidden to us. Whence also about this, that, with the Lord permitting, the devil had done well by doing ill, Job makes mention, saying: As it pleased the Lord, so it was done.

Quod, quam bene a Domino permissum esse non dubitet, referendo ei gratias ostendit, cum addit: Si t nomen Domini benedictum. Liber quoque Regum tertius spiritum mendacem ad decipiendum Achab impium docet a Domino missure fuisse.

Which, that he does not doubt how well it was permitted by the Lord, he shows by rendering thanks to him, when he adds: Let the name of the Lord be blessed. The Third Book of Kings also teaches that a lying (mendacious) spirit was sent by the Lord for the deceiving of impious Ahab.

Cum enim diceret Dominus: Quis decipiet Achab? Egressus spiritus mendax stetit corum Domino, et ait: Ego decipiam illum. Cui locutus est Dominus: In quo?

For when the Lord said: Who will deceive Ahab? A lying spirit went out, stood before the Lord, and said: I will deceive him. To whom the Lord spoke: In what?

Et ille ait: Egrediar et ero spiritus mendax in ore omnium prophetarum eius. Et dixit Dominus: Decipies et praevalebis; egredere et fac ita. Quod quidem Micheas propheta, cum coram ipso Achab exposuisset sibi revelatum fuisse, adiecit: Nunc igitur ecce dedit Dominus spiritum mendacem in ore omnium prophetarum tuorum, qui hic sunt; et Dominus locutus est contra te malum.

And he said: I will go out and I will be a mendacious spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And the Lord said: You will deceive and you will prevail; go out and do thus. Which indeed the prophet Micaiah, when before Ahab himself he had expounded that it had been revealed to him, added: Now therefore, behold, the Lord has given a mendacious spirit in the mouth of all your prophets who are here; and the Lord has spoken evil against you.

Sive autem in sanctos sive in impios Dominus diabolum saevire permitrat, constat profecto nec ipsum nisi bene permittere, quod bonum est permitti, nec illum nisi male facere, quod tamen bonum est fieri, et cur fiat, rationabilem habet causam, licet nobis incognitam. Ut enim ille magnus philosophus vester in Timaeo suo meminit, cum Deum optime cuncta facere probaret: "Omne", inquit, "quod gignitur ex aliqua causa gignitur necessaria. Nihil enim fit, cuius ortum non legitima causa et ratio praecedat." In quo patenter ostenditur, quaecumque a quocumque fiant, quia haec ex optima divinae providentiae dispensatione contingunt, rationabiliter et bene sic ea provenire, sicut eveniunt, quia videlicet rationabilem, cur fiant, habeant causam, quamvis is, qui ea facit, non rationabiliter aut bene ipsa faciat, nec eam in his faciendis, quam Deus, causam attendat.

Whether, however, the Lord permits the devil to rage against the saints or against the impious, it is certainly evident that He Himself permits only well, that which it is good to be permitted; and that he does only ill, which nevertheless it is good to be done; and why it is done has a reasonable cause, though unknown to us. For as that great philosopher of yours in his Timaeus recalls, when he proved that God makes all things in the best way: “Everything,” he says, “that is generated is necessarily generated from some cause. For nothing comes to be whose origin a legitimate cause and ratio do not precede.” In which it is plainly shown that whatever things are done by whomever, since these happen by the most excellent dispensation of divine providence, they come about rationally and well just as they occur, because, namely, they have a reasonable cause why they are done, although he who does them does not do them rationally or well, nor in doing them does he attend to that cause which God does.

Cum itaque nihil nisi Deo permittente fieri constet, nihil quippe eo invito vel resistente fieri possit, certumque insuper sit nequaquam aliquid Deum sine causa permittere nihilque omnino nisi ratiohabiliter facere, ut tam permissio eius quam actio rationabilis sit, profecto cum videat, cur singula, quae fiunt, fieri permittat, cur et ipsa facienda sint, non ignoret, etiamsi mala sint vel male fiant. Non enim bonum esset ea permitti, nisi bonum esset ea fieri, nec perfecte bonus esset, qui, cum posset, non disturbaret id, quod fieri non bonum esset, immo patenter arguendus in eo, quod non sit bonum fieri, consentiendo, ut fiat. Patet itaque, quidquid contingit fieri vel non fieri, cur fiat vel non fiat, rationabilem habere causam.

Since, therefore, it is established that nothing comes to be except with God permitting—indeed nothing can be done with Him unwilling or resisting—and it is furthermore certain that God by no means permits anything without a cause and does absolutely nothing except rationally, so that both His permission and His action are rational, assuredly, since He sees why He permits each single thing that is done to be done, He is not ignorant why those very things ought to be done, even if they are evils or are done evilly. For it would not be good that they be permitted unless it were good that they be done; nor would he be perfectly good who, though able, would not prevent what would not be good to be done—indeed he would be plainly to be accused in this, that by consenting he allows what is not good to be done. It is evident, therefore, that whatever happens to be done or not done has a rational cause why it is done or not done.

Ideoque bonum est illud fieri vel bonum est non fieri, etiam si ab eo, a quo bene non fit, fiat, vel ab eo, a quo non fit, male non fiat, hoc est mala intentione dimittatur fieri. Unde etiam ipsa mala esse vel fieri bonum est, quamvis ipsa mala nequaquam sint bona. Quod et Veritas ipsa patenter profitetur, cum ait: Necesse est enim, ut reniant scandala.

And therefore it is good that that be done, or good that it not be done, even if it be done by him by whom it is not done well, or if it be not done—badly—by him by whom it is not done, that is, it be allowed to be done with an evil intention. Whence even that evils themselves exist or be done is good, although the evils themselves are by no means good. Which Truth herself also manifestly professes, when she says: For it is necessary that scandals come.

Vae autem homini illi, per quem scandalum venit.

But woe to that man, through whom the scandal comes.

Ac si aperte dicat: Opportunum est et humanae congruum saluti, ut quidam ex me offensi vel irati scandalum inde animae suae, id est damnationem incurrant, ut per quorundam scilicet malitiam agatur, per quod omnes salventur, quicumque videlicet sanandi praedestinantur. Sed tamen vae illi, hoc est damnatio erit, cuius consilio vel persuasione hoc scandalum movetur. Malum itaque est scandalum, sed bonum est scandalum esse.

As if he were openly to say: it is opportune and congruent to human salvation that certain persons, offended or enraged at me, incur from it a scandal to their soul, that is, damnation, so that through the malice of certain people, namely, there is effected that by which all are saved, whoever, to wit, are predestined to be healed. But yet woe to that man— that is, there will be damnation— by whose counsel or persuasion this scandal is set in motion. Therefore scandal is an evil, but it is good that there be a scandal.

Sic et bonum est quodlibet malum esse, cum tamen nullum malum sit bonum. Quod et ille magnus veritatis discipulus attendens Augustinus et, quam optime ipsa etiam mala Deus ordinet, considerans ira de eius bonitate et diaboli nequitia loquitur: "Deus sicut naturarum bonarum optimus creator est, ita malarum voluntatum iustissimus ordinator, ut, cum ille male utatur naturis bonis, ipse bene utatur etiam voluntatibusmalis." Item dicit idem de diabolo: "Deus, cum eum creavit et futurae malignitatis eius non erat ignarus et praevidebat, quae bona demaliseius esset facturus." Item post aliqua: "Neque enim Deus ullum non, dico, angelorum vel hominum creasset, quem malum esse praescisset, nisi pariter nosset, quibus eos bonorum usibus commendaret." Item alibi: "Sunt bona singula simul vero universa valde bona, ex omnibus consistit universitatis amabilis pulchritudo." Item: "Illud, quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona, ut magis placeant et laudabilia sint, dum cooperatur bonis. Nec enim Deus omnipotens cum summe bonus sit, ullo modo sineretmalialiquid esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret et de malo." Item: "Nec dubitandum est Deum facere bene etiam sinendo fieri, quaecumque fiunt mala.

Soo too it is good that any evil exist, although no evil is good. Noting this, that great disciple of truth, Augustine, and considering how most excellently God even ordains evils, speaks now of His goodness and the devil’s nequity: “God, just as He is the best creator of good natures, so He is the most just ordainer of evil wills, so that, while he uses good natures badly, He Himself uses even evil wills well.” Likewise the same says about the devil: “God, when He created him and was not ignorant of his future malignity and foresaw what goods He would make from his evils.” Likewise, after some: “For neither would God—nay, I say not of angels nor of men—have created anyone whom He had foreknown would be evil, unless He had at the same time known to what good uses He would commend them.” Likewise elsewhere: “Individual things are good; but together the whole is very good; from all things consists the lovable beauty of the universe.” Likewise: “That which is called evil, well ordered and set in its own place, more eminently commends goods, so that they may be more pleasing and laudable, while it cooperates with goods. For neither would God almighty, since He is supremely good, in any way permit anything evil to be in His works, unless He were so omnipotent and good as to do good even out of evil.” Likewise: “Nor is it to be doubted that God does well even by permitting to be done whatever evils are done.”

Non enim hoc nisi iusto iudicio sinit, et profecto bonum est, quod iustum est. Quamvis ergo ea, quae mala sunt, vel quantum mala sunt, non sunt bona, tamen, ut non solum bona, sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est. Nam nisi esset hoc bonum, ut essent et mala, nullo modo sinerentur ab omnipotente bono, cui procul dubio quam facile est, quod vult, facere, tam facile est, quod non vult, esse non sinere.

For he permits this only by a just judgment, and assuredly what is just is good. Although, therefore, the things which are evil, or insofar as they are evil, are not good, nevertheless, that there be not only good things, but that there also be evils, is good. For unless it were good that there also be evils, in no way would they be permitted by the omnipotent Good, to whom, beyond doubt, as it is easy to do what he wills, so it is easy not to allow to be what he does not will.

Neque enim ob aliud veraciter vocatur omnipotens, nisi quoniam, quidquid vult, potest, nec voluntate cuiusdam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus. " Ecce: audisti aperta ratione monstrari, quia bonum est malum esse, quamvis nequaquam verum sit bonum malum esse. Aliud quippe est dicere, malum esse est bonum, aliud dicere malum esse bonum.

Nor indeed for any other reason is he truly called omnipotent, except because he can do whatever he wills, nor is the effect of the omnipotent will impeded by the will of any creature. " Ecce: you have heard it shown by plain reason that it is good that evil be, although it is by no means true that evil is good. For it is one thing to say, that for evil to be is good, another to say that evil is good.

Ibi enim ad rem malam, hic ad rem malam esse applicatur "bonum", hoc est ibi ad rem, hic ad eventum rei. Rem autem, ut dictum est, eam bonam dicitur, quae cum alicui apta sit usui, nullius rei commodum vel dignitatem per eam impediri aut etiam minui necesse est; quod quidem impediri vel minui tunc eam rem necesse esset, si per eius contrarium vel defectum dignitas illa vel commodum necessario non remaneret. Verbi gratia: vita, immortalitas, laetitia, sanitas, scientia, castitas talia sunt, quae, cum aliquid habeant dignitatis vel commodi, constat illud supervenientibus horum contrariis non remanere.

For there “good” is applied to the bad thing, here to the being of a bad thing; that is, there to the thing, here to the event of the thing. Now a thing, as has been said, is called good when, although it is apt for use to someone, it is necessary that by it the advantage or dignity of no thing be hindered or even diminished; and indeed it would then be necessary for that thing to be hindered or diminished, if through its contrary or defect that dignity or advantage would necessarily not remain. For example: life, immortality, joy, health, science, chastity are such things which, since they have some dignity or advantage, it is clear that that does not remain when the contraries of these supervene.

Sic et quaslibet substantias constat bonas res esse dicendas, quia cum aliquid conferre valeant utilitatis, nihil per eas dignitatis vel commodi necesse est praepediri.Namet perversus homo, qui corruptae vel etiam corrumpentis vitae est ‚ sic esse posset, ut perversus non esset ‚ ideoque per eum nonnihil deteriorari necesse esset. Hoc autem ad praesens ad descriptionem rei bonae satis esse arbitror. Cum vero ad eventus rerum, hoc est ad ea, quae a propositionibus dicuntur et per eas evenire proponuntur, boni vocabulum applicamus, ut videlicet hoc esse vel non esse bonum dicamus, tale est, ac si diceretur ad aliquam Dei optimam dispositionem complendam illud necessarium esse, etsi nos omnino illa lateat dispositio.

Thus also it is established that any substances are to be called good things, since, when they are able to confer some utility, it is not necessary that any dignity or advantage be hindered through them.For even the perverse man, who is of a corrupted or even a corrupting life, could be such as not to be perverse, and therefore through him it would be necessary that something be made worse. But for the present I judge this to be sufficient for the description of a good thing. But when we apply the vocabulary of “good” to the outcomes of things, that is, to those which are said from propositions and are proposed to come about through them, so that we say that this being or not being is good, it is as if it were said that that is necessary for the fulfilling of some best disposition of God, even if that disposition is altogether hidden from us.

Non enim aliquem etiam bene facere bonum est, si hoc eum facere alicui divinae ordinationi non competit, sed potius obsistit, quia nec bene fieri potest, quod rationabilem, cur fiat, causam non habet. Tunc autem rationabilem non habet causam, cur fiat, si quid a Deo dispositum praepediri necesse esset, si illud contingeret. Saepe itaque decepti dicimus, quia bonum est nos hoc vel illud facere, quod faciendum esse ab omnibus censetur.

For it is not good that someone even do well, if his doing this does not befit some divine ordination, but rather opposes it, because that cannot be done well which does not have a rational cause why it should be done. But then it does not have a rational cause why it should be done, if something disposed by God would have to be impeded, were that to happen. Often therefore, deceived, we say that it is good for us to do this or that, which is judged by all to be something to be done.

Sed cum a divina dissentiat ordinatione, per errorem mentimur, sed mendacii rei non sumus ita opinantes, ut dicimus. Qui etiam saepe per errorem multa nobis minime profutura in oratione petimus, quae divina dispositione commodissime nobis a Deo denegantur, qui melius quam nos ipse, quid nobis sit necessarium, agnoscit. Unde praecipuum est illud Veritatis documentum, quo cum oratione semper Deo dicendum est: "Fiat voluntas tua." Haec, nisi fallor, in praesentiarum satis est me dixisse ad ostendendum videlicet, qualiter nomen boni est intelligendum, quando pro re bona simpliciter sumitur, vel quando etiam rerum eventibus, vel quae a propositionibus dicuntur, applicatur.

But when it dissents from the divine ordination, we lie through error; yet we are not guilty of the crime of lying, since we think as we speak. We also, often through error, ask in prayer for many things that will by no means be profitable for us, which by the divine disposition are most fittingly denied us by God, who recognizes better than we ourselves what is necessary for us. Whence that principal instruction of Truth is this, that in prayer it must always be said to God: "Let your will be done." These things, unless I am mistaken, are enough for me to have said for the present, to show, namely, in what manner the name of the good is to be understood, when it is taken simply for a good thing, or when it is also applied to the events of things, or to those things which are said from propositions.

Quod quia ex inquisitione summi boni pendebat, si quid superest, quod de ipso ulterius quaeri censeas, licet te subinferre vel ad reliqua festinare . . .

Since that depended on the inquisition of the highest good, if anything remains which you judge ought further to be inquired concerning it, you are permitted to subjoin yourself or to hasten to the remaining matters . . .