Augustine: DE TRINITATE

[I 1] In libro superiore huius operis duodecimo satis egimus discernere rationalis mentis officium in temporalibus rebus, ubi non solum cognitio uerum et actio nostra uersatur, ab excellentiore eiusdem mentis officio quod contemplandis aeternis rebus impenditur ac sola cognitione finitur. Commodius autem fieri puto ut de scripturis sanctis aliquid interseram quo facilius possit utrumque dinosci.

[I 1] In the preceding book of this work, the twelfth, we have sufficiently labored to discern the office of the rational mind in temporal things—where not only cognition, but indeed our action as well, is engaged—from the more excellent office of the same mind which is devoted to contemplating eternal things and is brought to an end by cognition alone. I judge, however, that it would be more convenient to insert something from the holy Scriptures, whereby both may more easily be recognized.

[2] Euangelium suum Iohannes euangelista sic orsus est: In principio erat uerbum, et uerbum erat apud deum, et deus erat uerbum; hoc erat in principio apud deum. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod factum est in ipso uita erat, et uita erat lux hominum, et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt.

[2] The Evangelist John thus began his Gospel: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God; this was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made. What was made in him was life, and the life was the light of men, and the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it.

Fuit homo missus a deo cui nomen erat Iohannes; hic uenit in testimonium ut testimonium perheberet de lumine ut omnes crederent per illum. Non erat ille lux sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Erat lux uera quae inluminat omnem hominem uenientem in hunc mundum.

There was a man sent from God, whose name was John; he came for testimony, that he might bear testimony concerning the light, so that all might believe through him. He was not the light, but that he might bear testimony concerning the light. There was the true light which illumines every human coming into this world.

In mundo erat, et mundus per ipsum; actus est, et mundus eum non cognouit. In propria uenit, et sui eum non receperunt. Quotquot autem receperunt eum dedit eis potestatem filios dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine eius; qui non ex sanguinibus neque ex uoluntate carnis neque ex uoluntate uiri, sed ex deo nati sunt.

He was in the world, and the world through him was made; and the world did not recognize him. He came to his own, and his own did not receive him. But as many as received him, he gave to them the power to become sons of God, to those who believe in his name; who were born not of bloods nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of a man, but of God.

Et uerbum caro factum; est et habitauit in nobis. Et uidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et ueritatis.

And the Word was made flesh; and dwelt among us. And we saw his glory, glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth.

Hoc totum quod ex euangelio posui in praecedentibus suis partibus habet quod immutabile ac sempiternum est, cuius contemplatio nos beatos facit; in consequentibus uero permixta cum temporalibus commemorantur aeterna. Ac per hoc aliqua ibi ad scientiam pertinent, aliqua ad sapientiam sicut in libro duodecimo praecessit nostra distinctio. Nam, In principio erat uerbum, et uerbum erat apud deum, et deus erat uerbum; hoc erat in principio apud deum.

This whole passage which I have set forth from the Gospel, in its preceding parts, has that which is immutable and sempiternal, the contemplation of which makes us blessed; but in the subsequent parts the eternal things are commemorated, mixed with temporal things. And therefore some things there pertain to science, some to wisdom, just as in Book Twelve our distinction has preceded. For, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word; this was in the beginning with God."

Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod factum est in ipso uita erat, et uita erat lux hominum, et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt, contemplatiuam uitam requirit et intellectuali mente cernendum est. Qua in re quanto magis quisque profecerit tanto fiet sine dubitatione sapientior.

All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made. What was made in him was life, and the life was the light of men, and the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it, which requires a contemplative life and is to be discerned by an intellectual mind. In which matter, the more each person has progressed, by so much he will without doubt become wiser.

Sed propter id quod ait, lux lucet in tenebris, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt, fide utique opus erat qua crederetur quod non uidetur. Tenebras quippe intellegi uoluit auersa ab huiusmodi luce eamque minus idonea contueri corda mortalium, propter quod adiungit et dicit: Fuit homo missus a deo cui nomen erat Iohannes; hic uenit in testimonium ut testimonium perheberet de lumine ut omnes crederent per illum. Hoc iam temporaliter gestum est et ad scientiam pertinet quae cognitione historica continetur.

But on account of that which he says, “the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it,” there was indeed need of faith by which that which is not seen might be believed. For he wished “darkness” to be understood as the hearts of mortals turned away from light of this sort and less fit to behold it, on which account he subjoins and says: “There was a man sent from God whose name was John; this man came for testimony, to bear testimony about the light, so that all might believe through him.” This already was enacted in time and pertains to science, which is contained by historical cognition.

Hominem autem Iohannem in phantasia cogitamus quae de humanae naturae notitia impressa est nostrae memoriae. Et hoc eodem modo cogitant siue qui ista non credunt siue qui credunt. Vtrisque enim notum est quid sit homo cuius exteriorem partem, id est corpus, per corporis lumina didicerunt; interiorem uero, id est animam, in se ipsis quia et ipsi homines sunt et per humanam conuersationem cognitam tenent, ut possint cogitare quod dicitur, Fuit homo cui nomen erat Iohannes, quia et nomina sciunt loquendo et audiendo.

But the man John we conceive in phantasy, which from the knowledge of human nature has been impressed upon our memory. And in this same way think both those who do not believe these things and those who do believe. For to both it is known what a human is: whose exterior part, that is, the body, they have learned through the lights of the body; but the interior, that is, the soul, they hold as known in themselves, since they too are humans, and through human conversation, so that they can think what is said, There was a man whose name was John, because they also know names by speaking and by hearing.

Quod autem ibi est, missus a deo, fide tenent qui tenent, et qui fide non tenent aut dubitatione ambigunt aut infidelitate derident. Vtrique tamen, si non sunt ex numero nimis insipientium qui dicunt in corde suo: non est deus, haec audientes uerba utrumque cogitant, et quid sit deus et quid sit mitti a deo, et si non sicut res se habent, at certe sicut ualent.

But as for that which is there, “sent by God,” those who hold it hold by faith, and those who do not hold by faith either waver in dubitation or deride in infidelity. Yet both, if they are not of the number of the too-foolish who say in their heart, “there is no God,” on hearing these words consider both what God is and what it is to be sent by God; and if not as the things themselves are, at least surely as they are able.

[3] Fidem porro ipsam quam uidet quisque in corde suo esse si credit, uel non esse si non credit, aliter nouimus; non sicut corpora quae uidemus oculis corporis et per ipsorum imagines quas memoria tenemus etiam absentia cogitamus; nec sicut ea quae non uidimus et ex his quae uidimus cogitatione utcumque formamus et memoriae commendamus quo recurramus cum uoluerimus ut illic ea, uel potius qualescumque imagines eorum quas ibi fiximus, similiter recordatione cernamus; nec sicut hominem uiuum cuius animam etiamsi non uidemus ex nostra conicimus, et ex motibus corporalibus hominem uiuum sicut uidendo didicimus intuemur etiam cogitando. Non sic uidetur fides in corde in quo est ab eo cuius est, sed eam tenet certissima scientia clamatque conscientia. Cum itaque propterea credere iubeamur quia id quod credere iubemur uidere non possumus, ipsam tamen fidem quando inest in nobis uidemus in nobis quia et rerum absentium praesens est fides, et rerum quae foris sunt intus est fides, et rerum quae non uidentur uidetur fides, et ipsa tamen temporaliter fit in cordibus hominum; et si ex fidelibus infideles fiunt, perit ab eis.

[3] Furthermore, the faith itself which each one sees to be in his own heart if he believes, or not to be if he does not believe, we know in a different way; not as bodies which we see with the eyes of the body and, by means of their images which memory holds, even when absent we think upon; nor as things which we have not seen and from those which we have seen we somehow shape by thought and commend to memory, to which we may recur when we will, so that there we may likewise discern them by recollection, or rather whatever images of them we have fixed there; nor as a living man, whose soul, even if we do not see it, we infer from our own, and from bodily motions we regard the living man, as by seeing we have learned, even by thinking. Not thus is faith seen in the heart in which it is by him whose it is, but the most certain knowledge holds it fast and conscience cries out. Since therefore we are commanded to believe for this reason, because that which we are commanded to believe we cannot see, yet we do see faith itself, when it is in us, in us: because the faith of absent things is present, and of things which are outside, faith is inside, and of things which are not seen, faith is seen; and yet it comes to be temporally in the hearts of men; and if from faithful ones men become unfaithful, it perishes from them.

Aliquando autem et rebus falsis adcommodatur fides; loquimur enim sic ut dicamus: 'Habita est ei fides, et decepit.' Qualis fides, si tamen et ipsa dicenda est fides, non culpabiliter de cordibus perit quando eam inuenta ueritas pellit. Optabiliter autem rerum uerarum in easdem res fides transit; non enim dicendum est: 'Perit,' quando ea quae credebantur uidentur. Numquid enim adhuc fides dicenda est cum definita sit in epistula ad hebraeos fides dictumque sit eam esse conuictionem rerum quae non uidentur?

Sometimes, however, faith is accommodated even to false things; for we speak thus so as to say: 'Credit was given to him, and he deceived.' Such a faith—if indeed that too is to be called faith—does not culpably perish from hearts when discovered truth drives it out. Desirably, however, in the case of true things faith passes over into those same things; for it is not to be said: 'It perishes,' when the things that were believed are seen. For is it to be called faith any longer, since in the Epistle to the Hebrews faith has been defined and it has been said to be the conviction of things that are not seen?

[4] Deinde quod sequitur, hic uenit in testimonium ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine ut omnes crederent per illum, actio, ut diximus, temporalis est. Temporaliter enim testimonium perhibetur etiam de re sempiterna quod est intellegibile lumen. De quo ut testimonium perheberet uenit Iohannes qui non erat lux sed ut testimonium perheberet de lumine.

[4] Then what follows, “he came for testimony, that he might bear testimony about the light, that all might believe through him,” is, as we said, a temporal action. For testimony is borne temporally even concerning a sempiternal thing, which is the intelligible light. For this John came, that he might bear testimony about it, who was not the light but that he might bear testimony about the light.

Adiungit enim: Erat lux uera quae inluminat omnem hominem uenientem in hunc mundum. In mundo erat, et mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognouit. In propria uenit, et sui eum non receperunt.

He adds: There was the true light which illuminates every man coming into this world. He was in the world, and the world was made through him, and the world did not recognize him. He came to his own, and his own did not receive him.

Haec uerbo omnia qui latinam linguam sciunt ex rebus intellegunt quas nouerunt. Quarum aliquae nobis innotuerunt per corporis sensus sicut homo, sicut ipse mundus cuius tam euidentem magnitudinem cernimus, sicut eorumdem uerborum soni; nam et auditus sensus est corporis. Aliquae autem per animi rationem sicut id quod dictum est, sui eum non receperunt; intellegitur enim, 'non in eum crediderunt,' quod quid sit nullo corporis sensu sed animi ratione cognouimus.

In a word, those who know the Latin language understand all these things from the realities which they have known. Some of these have become known to us through the senses of the body—such as “human being,” such as the world itself, whose so evident magnitude we discern, such as the sounds of those same words; for hearing too is a sense of the body. But some through the mind’s reason—such as that which was said, “his own did not receive him”; for it is understood, “they did not believe in him,” which what it is we have come to know not by any bodily sense but by the mind’s reason.

Ipsorum etiam uerborum non sonos sed significationes partim per corporis sensum, partim per animi rationem didicimus. Nec ea uerba nunc primum audiuimus, sed quae iam audieramus et non solum ipsa uerum etiam quae significarent cognita memoria tenebamus et hic agnouimus. Hoc enim nomen disyllabum cum dicitur mundus, quoniam sonus est, res utique corporalis per corpus innotuit, id est per aurem; sed etiam quod significat per corpus innotuit, id est per oculos carnis.

Even of the words themselves we learned not the sounds but the significations partly through the sense of the body, partly through the reason of the mind. Nor did we hear those words now for the first time, but those which we had already heard, and we kept them in memory as known, not only the words themselves but also what they signified, and here we recognized them. For this disyllabic name, when “mundus” is spoken, since it is a sound—a thing indeed corporeal—became known through the body, that is, through the ear; but also what it signifies became known through the body, that is, through the eyes of the flesh.

Mundus quippe in quantum notus est uidentibus notus est. At hoc uerbum quattuor syllabarum quod est 'crediderunt,' sono suo quoniam corpus est per aurem carnis inlabitur; quod autem significat nullo corporis sensu sed animi ratione cognoscitur. Nisi enim quid sit 'crediderunt' per animum nossemus, non intellegeremus quid non fecerint illi de quibus dictum est, et sui eum non receperunt.

For the world, exactly to the extent that it is known, is known to those who see. But this four‑syllable word which is ‘crediderunt,’ by its sound—since it is a body—glides in through the ear of flesh; whereas what it signifies is known by no sense of the body but by the reason of the mind. For unless we had known by the mind what ‘crediderunt’ is, we would not understand what those did not do of whom it is said, “and his own did not receive him.”

Sonus ergo uerbi forinsecus instrepit auribus corporis et attingit sensum qui uocatur auditus. Species quoque hominis et in nobis ipsis nobis nota est et forinsecus in aliis adest corporis sensibus, oculis cum uidetur, auribus cum auditur, tactui cum tenetur et tangitur. Habet etiam in memoria nostra imaginem suam, incorporalem quidem sed corpori similem.

Therefore the sound of the word from without resounds in the ears of the body and touches the sense which is called hearing. The appearance of the human being is known to us in our very selves, and from without it is present in others to the senses of the body: to the eyes when it is seen, to the ears when it is heard, to touch when it is held and touched. It also has in our memory its own image, incorporeal indeed but similar to the body.

Mundi denique ipsius mirabilis pulchritudo forinsecus praesto est et aspectibus nostris et ei sensui qui dicitur tactus si quid eius attingimus. Habet etiam ipse intus in memoria nostra imaginem suam ad quam recurrimus cum eum uel septi parietibus uel etiam in tenebris cogitamus. Sed de his imaginibus rerum corporalium incorporalibus quidem, habentibus tamen similitudines corporum et ad uitam exterioris hominis pertinentibus, iam satis in undecimo libro locuti sumus.

Finally, the wondrous pulchritude of the world itself is present from without both to our view and to that sense which is called touch, if we touch anything of it. It also has within, in our memory, its own image, to which we recur when we think of it, whether it is enclosed by walls or even in darkness. But about these images of corporeal things—incorporeal indeed, yet having likenesses of bodies and pertaining to the life of the exterior man—we have already spoken sufficiently in the eleventh book.

Nunc autem agimus de homine interiore et eius ea scientia, quae rerum est temporalium et mutabilium. In cuius intentionem cum assumitur aliquid etiam de rebus ad exteriorem hominem pertinentibus, ad hoc assumendum est ut aliquid inde doceatur quod rationalem adiuuet scientiam, ac per hoc rerum quas communes cum animantibus inrationabilibus habemus rationalis usus ad interiorem hominem pertinet, nec recte dici potest cum inrationalibus animantibus eum nobis esse communem.

Now, however, we are dealing with the interior man and with that science of his which is of things temporal and mutable. With a view to this, when something is assumed even from things that pertain to the exterior man, it is to be assumed to this end: that something from it be taught which may aid rational science; and thus the rational use of the things which we have in common with irrational animate beings pertains to the interior man, nor can it rightly be said that this is common to us with irrational animate beings.

[II 5] Fides uero de qua in hoc libro aliquanto diutius disputare certa dispositionis nostrae ratione compellimur, quam qui habent fideles uocantur, et qui non habent infideles sicut hi qui uenientem in propria dei filium non receperunt, quamuis ex auditu in nobis facta sit, non tamen ad eum sensum corporis pertinet qui appellatur auditus quoniam non est sonus, nec ad oculos huius carnis quoniam non est color aut corporis forma, nec ad eum qui dicitur tactus quoniam corpulentiae nihil habet, nec ad ullum omnino sensum corporis quoniam cordis est res ista non corporis, nec foris est a nobis sed in intimis nobis, nec eam quisquam hominum uidet in alio sed unusquisque in semetipso, denique potest et simulatione confingi et putari esse in quo non est. Suam quisque igitur fidem apud se ipsum uidet; in altero autem credit eam esse, non uidet, et tanto firmius credit quanto fructus eius magis nouit quos operari solet fides per dilectionem.

[2 5] Faith indeed, about which in this book we are compelled by a certain rationale of our disposition to dispute somewhat longer, which those who have are called faithful, and those who do not have are called unfaithful, like those who did not receive the Son of God coming unto his own, although it has been made in us from hearing, yet does not pertain to that sense of the body which is called hearing, since it is not a sound, nor to the eyes of this flesh, since it is not a color or a form of the body, nor to that which is called touch, since it has nothing of corpulence, nor to any sense at all of the body, since this thing is of the heart, not of the body, nor is it outside us but in our inmost parts, nor does any human being see it in another, but each one in himself; finally, it can also be feigned by simulation and be thought to be in one in whom it is not. Each one therefore sees his own faith with himself; but in another he believes it to be, he does not see it, and he believes so much the more firmly the more he knows its fruits, which faith is wont to work through love.

Quamobrem omnibus de quibus euangelista subiungit et dicit: Quotquot autem receperunt eum dedit eis potestatem filio dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine eius, qui non ex sanguinibus neque ex uoluntate carnis neque ex uoluntate uiri, sed ex deo nati sunt, fides ista communis est, non sicut aliqua corporis forma communis est ad uidendum omnium oculis quibus praesto est (ex ipsa quippe una omnium cernentium quodam modo informatur aspectus), sed sicut dici potest omnibus hominibus esse facies humana communis. Nam hoc ita dicitur ut tamen singuli suas habeant. Ex una sane doctrina impressam fidem credentium cordibus singulorum qui hoc idem credunt uerissime dicimus, sed aliud sunt ea quae creduntur, aliud fides qua creduntur.

Wherefore to all those about whom the evangelist subjoins and says: But as many as received him, he gave them power to become sons of God, to those who believe in his name, who were born not of bloods nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of a man, but of God, this faith is common—not as some bodily form is common for seeing to the eyes of all to whom it is present (for from that one form itself the sight of all the beholders is in a certain manner informed), but as it can be said that the human face is common to all human beings. For this is so said that nevertheless individuals have their own. From one single doctrine, indeed, we most truly say the faith impressed upon the hearts of individual believers who believe this same thing; but the things which are believed are one thing, the faith by which they are believed is another.

Illa quippe in rebus sunt quae uel esse uel fuisse uel futura esse dicuntur; haec autem in animo credentis est, ei tantum conspicua cuius est, quamuis sit et in aliis, non ipsa sed similis. Non enim numero est una sed genere; propter similitudinem tamen et nullam diuersitatem magis unam dicimus esse quam multas. Nam et duos homines simillimos cum uidemus, unam faciem dicimus et miramur amborum.

Those indeed are in things which are said to be, or to have been, or to be going to be in the future; but this is in the mind of the believer, visible only to the one whose it is, although it is also in others—not itself the very same, but similar. For it is not one in number but in kind; because of the similitude, however, and no diversity, we say that it is rather one than many. For even when we see two men most similar, we say “one face” and we marvel at both.

Facilius itaque dicitur multas animas fuisse singulas utique singulorum de quibus legimus in actibus apostolorum quod eis fuerit anima una, quam ubi dixit apostolus, una fides, tot eas audet quisquam dicere quot fideles. Et tamen qui dicit: O mulier, magna est fides tua, et alteri: Modicae fidei, quare dubitasti?, suam cuique esse significat. Sed ita dicitur eadem credentium fides una quemadmodum eadem uolentium uoluntas una cum et in ipsis qui hoc idem uolunt sua uoluntas sit cuique conspicua, alterius autem lateat quamuis idem uelit, et si aliquibus signis sese indicet, creditur potius quam uidetur.

Accordingly, it is more easily said that there were many souls—each, to be sure, the soul of each individual—of those about whom we read in the Acts of the Apostles that “they had one soul,” than that, where the apostle said “one faith,” anyone should dare to say there are as many of them as there are faithful. And yet he who says: “O woman, great is your faith,” and to another: “O you of little faith, why did you doubt?” signifies that each one’s own faith is his or her own. But the same faith of believers is called one just as the will of those willing the same thing is one, since even in those who will this same thing, one’s own will is apparent to oneself, whereas another’s is hidden although he wills the same; and if it shows itself by some signs, it is believed rather than seen.

Vnusquisque autem sui animi conscius non credit utique hanc esse suam sed plane peruidet uoluntatem.

Each one, however, conscious of his own mind, does not, to be sure, believe this to be his own, but plainly perceives his will.

[III 6] Est quaedam sane eiusdem naturae uiuentis et ratione utentis tanta conspiratio ut cum lateat alterum quid alter uelit, nonnullae sint tamen uoluntatem omnium etiam singulis notae, et cum quisque homo nesciat quid homo alius unus uelit, in quibusdam rebus possit scire quid omnes uelint. Vnde illa cuiusdam mimi facetissima praedicatur urbanitas qui cum se promisisset in theatro quid in animo haberent et quid uellent omnes aliis ludis esse dicturum, atque ad diem constitutum ingenti exspectatione maior multitudo conflueret suspensis et silentibus omnibus, dixisse perhebetur:

[3 6] There is, to be sure, a certain so-great conspiracy of the same nature of a living and reason-using being, that although what one wills lies hidden from another, nonetheless there are some things such that the will of all is known even to individuals; and although each human does not know what one other human wills, in certain matters he can know what all will. Whence that most facetious urbanity of a certain mime is proclaimed, who, when he had promised in the theater that at other games he would declare what all had in mind and what they willed, and on the appointed day a greater multitude had flowed together in vast expectation, with all in suspense and silent, is reported to have said:

Vili uultis emere et caro uendere. In quo dicto leuissimi scenici omnes tamen conscientias inuenerunt suas, eique uera ante oculos omnium constituta et tamen improuisa dicenti admirabili fauore plauserunt. Cur autem tam magna exspectatio facta est illo promittente omnium uoluntatem se esse dicturum nisi quia latent hominem aliorum hominum uoluntates?

You wish to buy cheap and sell dear. In this saying the most frivolous stage-players nevertheless found their own consciences, and they applauded him with admirable favor as he was speaking truths set before the eyes of all and yet unforeseen. But why was so great an expectation raised when he promised that he would declare everyone’s will, unless because the wills of other men lie hidden from a man?

Sed numquid latuit ista istum? Numquid quemquam latet? Qua tandem causa nisi quia sunt quaedam quae non inconuenienter in aliis de se quisque coniciat compatiente uel conspirante uitio seu natura?

But did this escape him? Does it escape anyone? What, then, is the reason, unless that there are certain things which each person may, not inappropriately, conjecture in others from himself, with vice or nature sympathizing or conspiring?

Sed aliud est uidere uoluntatem suam, aliud quamuis certissima coniectura conicere alienam. Nam conditam Romam tam certum habeo in rebus humanis quam Constantinopolim, cum Romam uiderim oculis meis, de illo uero nihil nouerim nisi quod aliis testibus credidi.

But it is one thing to see one’s own will, another to infer another’s, however by a most certain conjecture. For I hold the fact that Rome was founded to be as certain among human things as Constantinople, since I have seen Rome with my own eyes, whereas about the latter I know nothing except what I have believed on the testimony of others.

Et mimus quidem ille uel se ipsum intuendo uel alios quoque experiendo uili uelle emere et caro uendere omnibus id credidit esse commune. Sed quoniam reuera uitium est, potest quisque adipisci eiusmodi iustitiam uel alicuius alterius uitii quod huic contrarium est incurrere pestilentiam qua huic resistat et uincat. Nam scio ipse hominem cum uenalis codex ei fuisset oblatus pretiique eius ignarum et ideo quiddam exiguum poscentem cerneret uenditorem, iustum pretium quod multo amplius erat nec opinanti dedisse.

And that mime, indeed, either by looking upon himself or also by experiencing others, believed that to wish to buy cheap and to sell dear is common to all. But since in truth it is a vice, anyone can either acquire a justice of this sort, or incur the pestilence of some other vice which is contrary to this, by which he may resist and conquer it. For I myself know a man who, when a codex for sale had been offered to him and he saw the seller ignorant of its price and therefore asking some small amount, gave to the unsuspecting one the just price, which was much greater.

Quid si etiam sit quisquam tanta nequitia possessus ut uili uendat quae dimiserunt parentes et caro emat quae consumant libidines? Non est, ut opinor, incredibilis ista luxuries, et si quaerantur tales reperiantur, aut etiam non quaesiti fortassis occurrant qui nequitia maiore quam theatrica propositione uel pronuntiationi theatricae insultent magno pretio stupra emendo, paruo autem rura uendendo. Largitionis etiam gratia nouimus quosdam emisse frumenta carius et uilius uendidisse suis ciuibus.

What if there should even be someone possessed by such great nequity that he sells cheaply the things which his parents have left, and buys dear the things which lusts consume? That extravagance, as I suppose, is not incredible; and if such men are sought, they will be found, or perhaps even, though not sought, they will encounter us—who, with a wickedness greater than a theatrical presentation or than theatrical delivery, insult them, buying debaucheries at a great price, but selling farmlands for a small one. Also for the sake of largess we know certain men to have bought grains more dearly and to have sold them more cheaply to their fellow-citizens.

Illud etiam quod uetus poeta dixit Ennius:

Also that which the ancient poet Ennius said:

Omnes mortales sese laudarier optant, profecto et de se ipso et de his quos expertus fuerat coniecit in aliis, et uidetur pronuntiasse hominum omnium uoluntatem. Denique si et mimus ille dixisset: 'Laudari omnes uultis; nemo uestrum uult uituperari,' similiter quod esset omnium uoluntatis dixisse uideretur. Sunt tamen qui uitia sua oderint et in quibus sibi displicent ipsi nec ab aliis se laudari uelint, gratiasque agant obiurgantium beneuolentiae cum ideo uituperantur ut corrigantur.

All mortals desire to be praised; surely he both from himself and from those whom he had experienced inferred the same of others, and he seems to have pronounced the will of all men. Finally, if that mime too had said: 'You all want to be praised; none of you wants to be vituperated,' he would likewise seem to have said what is the will of all. There are, however, those who hate their own vices and, in the respects in which they are displeasing to themselves, do not wish to be praised by others, and they give thanks for the benevolence of those who objurgate them, when they are blamed for this very purpose, that they may be corrected.

At si dixisset: 'Omnes beati esse uultis; miseri esse non uultis,' dixisset aliquid quod nullus in sua non agnosceret uoluntate. Quidquid enim aliud quisquam latenter uelit, ab hac uoluntate quae omnibus et in omnibus satis nota est non recedit.

But if he had said: 'You all wish to be blessed; you do not wish to be miserable,' he would have said something that no one would fail to recognize in his own will. For whatever else anyone may will latently, he does not depart from this will which is sufficiently known to all and in all.

[IV 7] Mirum est autem cum capessendae atque retinendae beatitudinis uoluntas una sit omnium, unde tanta exsistat de ipsa beatitudine rursus uarietas et diuersitas uoluntatum, non quod aliquis eam nolit, sed quod non omnes eam norint. Si enim omnes eam nossent, non ab aliis putaretur esse in uirtute animi, aliis in corporis uoluptate, aliis in utraque, et aliis atque aliis, alibi atque alibi. Vt enim eos quaeque res maxime delectauit ita in ea constituerunt uitam beatam.

[4 7] It is a wonder, however, since the will for grasping and for retaining beatitude is one and the same for all, whence there again arises concerning beatitude itself such a variety and diversity of wills—not because anyone does not will it, but because not all know it. For if all knew it, it would not be thought by some to be in the virtue of the mind, by others in the pleasure of the body, by others in both, and by still others and others, in one place and another. For just as whatever thing most delighted them, so in that they have established the blessed life.

Quomodo igitur feruentissime amant omnes quod non omnes sciunt? Quis potest amare quod nescit, sicut iam de hac re in libris superioribus disputaui? Cur ergo beatitudo amatur ab omnibus nec tamen scitur ab omnibus?

How, then, do all love most fervently what not all know? Who can love what he does not know, as I have already argued about this matter in the preceding books? Why, therefore, is beatitude loved by all and yet not known by all?

An forte sciunt omnes ipsa quae sit, sed non omnes sciunt ubi sit et inde contentio est? Quasi uero de aliquo mundi huius agatur loco ubi debeat quisque uelle uiuere qui uult beate uiuere, ac non ita quaeratur ubi sit beatitudo sicut quaeritur quae sit. Nam utique si in corporis uoluptate est, ille beatus est qui fruitur corporis uoluptate; si in uirtute animi, ille qui hac fruitur; si in utraque, ille qui fruitur utraque.

Or perhaps all know what it itself is, but not all know where it is, and from this there is contention? As though it were a question about some place in this world where each person who wishes to live blessedly ought to wish to live, and not that the “where blessedness is” be sought in the same way as the “what it is” is sought. For surely, if it is in the pleasure of the body, he is blessed who enjoys the pleasure of the body; if in the virtue of the mind, he who enjoys this; if in both, he who enjoys both.

Cum itaque alius dicit: 'Beate uiuere est uoluptate corporis frui,' alius autem: 'Beate uiuere est uirtute animi frui,' nonne aut ambo nesciunt quae sit beata uita aut non ambo sciunt? Quomodo ergo ambo amant eam si nemo potest amare quod nescit? An forte falsum est quod pro uerissimo certissimoque posuimus, beate uiuere omnes homines uelle?

Accordingly, when one says: 'To live blessedly is to enjoy the pleasure of the body,' but another: 'To live blessedly is to enjoy the virtue of the mind,' is it not the case that either both do not know what the blessed life is, or at least not both know it? How then do both love it, if no one can love what he does not know? Or is what we have posited as most true and most certain perhaps false, that all human beings wish to live blessedly?

Si enim beate uiuere est uerbi gratia secundum animi uirtutem uiuere, quomodo beate uiuere uult qui hoc non uultl? Nonne uerius dixerimus: 'Homo iste non uult beate uiuere quia non uult secundum uirtutem uiuere, quod solum est beate uiuere'? Non igitur omnes beate uiuere uolunt, immo pauci hoc uolunt si non est beate uiuere nisi secundum uirtutem animi uiuere, quod multi nolunt.

If indeed, for example, to live blessedly is to live according to the virtue of the mind, how does he who does not want this want to live blessedly? Shall we not more truly say: 'This man does not want to live blessedly because he does not want to live according to virtue, which alone is to live blessedly'? Not, therefore, do all want to live blessedly; rather, few want this, if to live blessedly is nothing other than to live according to the virtue of the mind, which many are unwilling to do.

Itane falsum erit unde nec ipse, cum academicis omnia dubia sint, academicus Cicero dubitauit qui cum uellet in Hortensio dialogo ab aliqua re certa de qua nullus ambigeret sumere suae disputationis exordium, Beati certe, inquit, omnes esse uolumus? Absit ut hoc falsum esse dicamus. Quid igitur?

Will it then be false—something about which not even Cicero himself, an Academic (since for the Academics all things are doubtful), doubted—who, when he wished in the dialogue Hortensius to take the exordium of his disputation from some certain matter about which no one would disagree, said, “Surely, we all wish to be happy”? Far be it that we should say this is false. What then?

An dicendum est etiamsi nihil sit aliud beate uiuere quam secundum uirtutem animi uiuere, tamen et qui hoc non uult beate uult uiuere? Nimis quidem hoc uidetur absurdum. Tale est enim ac si dicamus: 'Et qui non uult beate uiuere beate uult uiuere.' Istam repugnantiam quis audiat, quis ferat?

Or must it be said that, even if to live happily is nothing else than to live according to the virtue of the mind, nevertheless even he who does not will this wills to live happily? This indeed seems excessively absurd. For it is such as if we were to say: ‘Even he who does not will to live happily wills to live happily.’ Who would hear that repugnancy, who would bear it?

Et tamen ad hanc contrudit necessitas si et omnes beate uelle uiuere uerum est, et non omnes sic uolunt uiuere quomodo solum uiuitur beate.

And yet necessity drives us to this, if both it is true that all want to live happily, and not all want to live in the way in which alone one lives happily.

[V 8] An forte illud est quod nos ab his angustiis possit eruere, ut quoniam diximus ibi quosque posuisse beatam uitam quod eos maxime delectauit (ut uoluptas Epicurum, uirtus Zenonem, sic alium aliquid aliud), nihil dicamus esse beate uiuere nisi uiuere secundum delectationem suam, et ideo falsum; non esse quod omnes beate uiuere uelint quia omnes ita uolunt ut quemque delectat? Nam et hoc populo si pronuntiatum esset in theatro, omnes id in suis uoluntatibus inuenirent. Sed hoc quoque Cicero cum sibi ex aduerso proposuisset, ita redarguit ut qui hoc sentiunt erubescant.

[5 8] Or perhaps this is what could extricate us from these straits: that, since we said there that each has placed the blessed life in that which most delighted him (as pleasure for Epicurus, virtue for Zeno, thus another in some other thing), we should say that to live blessedly is nothing other than to live according to one’s own delectation, and therefore it is false; that it is not the case that all wish to live blessedly, because all wish in such a way as each is delighted? For even if this were proclaimed to the people in the theater, everyone would find that in his own wills. But when Cicero also set this before himself from the opposing side, he refuted it in such a way that those who hold this blush.

Ait enim: Ecce autem non philosophi quidem sed prompti tamen ad disputandum omnes aiunt esse beatos qui uiuant ut ipsi uelint (hoc est quod nos diximus, ut quosque delectat). Sed mox ille subiecit: Falsum id quidem. Velle enim quod non deceat id est ipsum miserrimum, nec tam miserum est non adipisci quod uelis quam adipisci uelle quod non oporteat. Praeclarissime omnino atque uerissime.

For he says: Behold, not philosophers indeed, but yet prompt for disputation, all say that they are happy who live as they themselves will (this is what we said: as each is delighted). But soon he subjoined: That is false indeed. For to will what is not decent—that is the very most miserable thing; nor is it so miserable not to obtain what you wish as to wish to obtain what you ought not. Most excellently altogether, and most truly.

Quis namque ita sit mente caecus et ab omni luce decoris alienus ac tenebris dedecoris inuolutus ut eum qui nequiter uiuit ac turpiter et nullo prohibente, nullo ulciscente, nullo saltem reprehendere audente, insuper et laudantibus plurimis quoniam sicut ait scriptura diuina: laudatur peccator in desideriis animae suae, et qui iniqua gerit benedicetur, implet omnes suas facinorosissimas et flagitiosissimas uoluntates, ideo beatum dicat quia uiuit ut uult cum profecto, quamuis et sic miser esset, minus tamen esset si nihil eorum quae perperam uoluisset habere potuisset? Etiam mala enim uoluntate uel sola quisque miser efficitur, sed miserior potestate qua desiderium malae uoluntatis impletur. Quapropter quoniam uerum est quod omnes homines esse beati uelint idque unum ardentissimo amore appetant et propter hoc cetera quaecumque appetunt, nec quisquam potest amare quod omnino quid uel quale sit nescit, nec potest nescire quid sit quod uelle se scit, sequitur ut omnes beatam uitam sciant.

For who would be so blind in mind, and alien from all light of beauty and wrapped in the darkness of disgrace, as to call him blessed who lives wickedly and shamefully and, with no one forbidding, no one avenging, no one even daring to reprove, and with very many even praising him—since, as divine Scripture says, “the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and he who does iniquities will be blessed”—fulfills all his most facinorous and flagitious desires, and therefore say he is blessed because he lives as he wills; when indeed, although even so he would be wretched, yet he would be less so if he had been able to have none of the things which he had wrongly willed? For by an evil will alone each person is made wretched, but more wretched by the power whereby the desire of the evil will is fulfilled. Wherefore, since it is true that all men wish to be blessed, and with most ardent love seek this one thing, and on account of this seek whatever other things they seek; and since no one can love what he wholly does not know what it is or of what sort it is, nor can he not know what that is which he knows himself to will, it follows that all know the blessed life.

Omnes autem beati habent quod uolunt, quamuis non omnes qui habent quod uolunt continuo sint beati; continuo autem miseri qui uel non habent quod uolunt uel id habent quod non recte uolunt. Beatus igitur non est nisi qui et habet omnia quae uult et nihil uult male.

All, however, who are happy have what they want, although not all who have what they want are forthwith happy; but forthwith miserable are those who either do not have what they want or have that which they do not rightly want. Therefore, no one is happy except the one who both has all the things he wants and wants nothing badly.

[VI 9] Cum ergo ex his duobus beata uita constet atque omnibus nota, omnibus cara sit, quid putamus esse causae cur horum duorum quando utrumque non possunt, magis eligant homines ut omnia quae uolunt habeant quam ut omnia bene uelint etiamsi non habeant? An ipsa est prauitas generis humani ut cum eos non lateat nec illum beatum esse qui quod uult non habet nec illum qui quod male uult habet, sed illum qui et habet quaecumque uult bona et nulla uult male, ex his duobus quibus beata uita perficitur quando utrumque non datur, id eligatur potius unde magis a beata uita receditur (longius quippe ab illa est quicumque adipiscitur male concupita quam qui non adipiscitur concupita), cum potius eligi debuerit uoluntas bona atque praeponi etiam non adepta quae appetit? Propinquat enim beato qui bene uult quaecumque uult, et quae adeptus cum fuerit beatus erit.

[6 9] Since therefore from these two the blessed life is constituted and is known to all and dear to all, what do we think is the cause why, of these two, when they cannot have both, humans choose rather that they have all the things they will than that they will all things well even if they do not have them? Or is it the very pravity of the human race, that although it does not escape them that neither is he blessed who does not have what he wills nor he who has what he wills badly, but rather he who both has whatever he wills as good things and wills nothing badly, yet of these two by which the blessed life is perfected, when both are not given, that is chosen rather whereby one withdraws further from the blessed life (for farther from it is whoever attains things ill‑desired than he who does not attain the things desired), whereas rather a good will ought to have been chosen and to have been set before even the not‑yet‑obtained things which it appetites? For he draws near to the blessed one who wills well whatever he wills, and, when he shall have obtained the things he seeks, he will be blessed.

Et utique non mala sed bona beatum faciunt quando faciunt. Quorum bonorum habet aliquid iam idque non parui aestimandum, eam ipsam scilicet uoluntatem bonam, qui de bonis quorum capax est humana natura, non de ullius mali perpetratione uel adeptione gaudere desiderat, et bona qualia et in hac misera uita esse possunt prudenti, temperanti, forti, et iusta mente sectatur et quantum datur assequitur ut etiam in malis sit bonus, et finitis malis omnibus atque impletis bonis omnibus sit beatus.

And assuredly it is not evils but goods that make one blessed, when they do make. Of which goods he already has something—and that not to be esteemed of little worth—namely that very good will, who desires to rejoice in the goods of which human nature is capable, not in the perpetration or acquisition of any evil; and he follows the goods such as can exist even in this wretched life with a prudent, temperate, brave, and just mind, and, so far as it is given, attains this: that he be good even amid evils, and, when all evils are finished and all goods fulfilled, he be blessed.

[VII 10] Ac per hoc in ista mortali uita erroribus aerumnisque plenissima praecipue fides est necessaria qua in deum creditur. Non enim quaecumque bona maximeque illa quibus quisque fit bonus et illa quibus fiet beatus, unde nisi a deo in hominem ueniant et homini accedant inueniri potest. Cum autem ex hac uita ab eo qui in his miseriis fidelis et bonus est uentum fuerit ad beatam, tunc erit uere quod nunc esse nullo modo potest ut sic homo uiuat quomodo uult.

[7 10] And therefore in this mortal life, most full of errors and afflictions, faith is especially necessary by which one believes in God. For as to whatever goods—and most of all those by which each person becomes good, and those by which he will become blessed—from where can it be found that they come into a human being and accrue to a human, except from God? But when from this life one who is faithful and good amid these miseries shall have come to the blessed life, then there will truly be what now can in no way be: that a human lives in the manner that he wills.

Non enim uolet male uiuere in illa felicitate aut uolet aliquid quod deerit aut deerit quod uoluerit. Quidquid amabitur aderit, nec desiderabitur quod non aderit. Omne quod ibi erit bonum erit, et summus deus summum bonum erit atque ad fruendum amantibus praesto erit, et quod est omnino beatissimum ita semper fore certum erit.

For in that felicity he will not will to live badly, nor will he will anything that will be lacking, nor will what he has willed be lacking. Whatever will be loved will be present, nor will there be desire for what will not be present. Everything that will be there will be good, and the highest God will be the highest good and will be at hand for lovers to enjoy; and—what is altogether most blessed—it will be certain that it will always be so.

Nunc uero fecerunt quidem sibi philosophi sicut eorum cuique placuit uitas beatas suas ut quasi propria uirtute possent quod communi mortalium conditione non poterant, sic scilicet uiuere ut uellent. Sentiebant enim aliter beatum esse neminem posse nisi habendo quod uellet et nihil patiendo quod nollet. Quis autem non qualemcumque uitam qua delectatur et ideo beatam uocat uellet sic esse in sua potestate ut eam posset habere perpetuam?

Now indeed the philosophers made for themselves, each as it pleased him, their blessed lives, so that, as if by their own proper virtue, they might be able to do what by the common condition of mortals they could not—namely, to live as they wished. For they perceived that otherwise no one could be blessed except by having what he wished and suffering nothing that he did not wish. But who would not wish that whatever life he is delighted by, and therefore calls blessed, should be so in his own power that he could have it perpetual?

Et tamen quis ita est? Quis uult pati molestias quas fortiter toleret, quamuis eas uelit possitque tolerare si patitur? Quis uelit in tormentis uiuere etiam qui potest in eis per patientiam tenendo iustitiam laudabiliter uiuere?

And yet who is so? Who wants to suffer molestations which he would endure bravely, although he would be willing and able to endure them if he does suffer them? Who would wish to live in torments, even he who can in them, through patience by holding to justice, live laudably?

Transitura cogitauerunt haec mala qui ea pertulerunt uel cupiendo habere uel timendo amittere quod amabant, siue nequiter siue laudabiliter. Nam multi per transitoria mala ad permansura bona fortiter tetenderunt. Qui profecto spe beati sunt etiam cum sunt in transitoriis malis per quae ad bona non transitura perueniunt.

Those who endured these evils, whether by desiring to have or by fearing to lose what they loved—whether wickedly or laudably—considered these evils to be transitory. For many, through transitory evils, have bravely striven toward abiding goods. And indeed, they are blessed in hope even when they are in transitory evils, through which they attain to goods that do not pass away.

Sed qui spe beatus est nondum beatus est. Exspectat namque per patientiam beatitudinem quam nondum tenet. Qui uero sine ulla spe tali, sine ulla tali mercede cruciatur quantamlibet adhibeat tolerantiam, non est beatus ueraciter sed miser fortiter.

But he who is blessed in hope is not yet blessed. For he awaits through patience the beatitude which he does not yet hold. But he who, without any such hope, without any such reward, is tormented, however much tolerance he applies, is not truly blessed but bravely wretched.

Neque enim propterea miser non est quia miserior esset si et impatienter miseriam sustineret. Porro si ista non patitur quae nollet pati in suo corpore, ne tunc quidem beatus habendus est quoniam non uiuit ut uult. Vt enim alia omittam quae corpore inlaeso ad animi pertinent offensiones sine quibus uiuere uellemus et sunt innumerabilia, uellet utique si posset ita saluum atque incolume habere corpus et nullas ex eo pati molestias, ut id haberet in potestate aut in ipsius incorruptione corporis; quod quia non habet ac pendet incerto, profecto non uiuit ut uult.

Nor, indeed, for that reason is he not miserable, just because he would be more miserable if he also were to bear his misery impatiently. Moreover, even if he does not suffer in his body those things which he would not wish to suffer, not even then is he to be accounted blessed, since he does not live as he wills. For, to omit other matters which, with the body unhurt, pertain to the offenses of the mind—without which we would wish to live, and they are innumerable—assuredly he would, if he could, have his body safe and intact and suffer no troubles from it, so as to have that either in his power or in the very incorruption of the body; and since he does not have this and it hangs in uncertainty, he certainly does not live as he wills.

Quamuis enim per fortitudinem sit paratus excipere et aequo ferre animo quidquid aduersitatis acciderit, mauult tamen ut non accidat et si possit facit; atque ita paratus est in utrumque ut quantum in ipso est alterum optet, alterum uitet, et si quod uitat incurrerit, ideo uolens ferat quia fieri non potuit quod uolebat. Ne opprimatur ergo sustinet, sed premi nollet. Quomodo ergo uiuit ut uult?

Although indeed by fortitude he is prepared to receive and to bear with an equable mind whatever adversity may occur, yet he prefers that it not occur and, if he can, he brings it about; and thus he is prepared for both, so that, as far as it is in him, he opts for the one and avoids the other, and if he incurs that which he avoids, he therefore bears it willingly because what he willed could not be brought to pass. Therefore he endures lest he be crushed, but he would not wish to be pressed. How, then, does he live as he wills?

An quia ulens fortis est ad ferenda quae nollet inlata? Ideo igitur id uult quod potest quoniam quod uult non potest. Haec est tota, utrum ridenda an potius miseranda, superborum beatitudo mortalium gloriantium se uiuere ut uolunt quia uolentes patienter ferunt quae accidere sibi nolunt.

Or is it because, being willing, he is brave for bearing things inflicted which he would not have wanted? Therefore he wills what he can, since what he wills he cannot. This, entire—whether to be laughed at or rather to be pitied—is the beatitude of proud mortals, glorying that they live as they wish because, while willing, they patiently bear the things which they do not wish to befall them.

Hoc est enim aiunt quod sapienter dixit Terentius: Quoniam non potest id fieri quod uis, Id uelis quod possis. Commode hoc dictum esse quis negat? Sed consilium est datum misero ne esset miserior.

For this, they say, is what Terence said wisely: “Since that which you wish cannot be done, wish that which you can.” Who denies that this was said aptly? But counsel was given to a wretch, lest he be more wretched.

Beato autem quales se esse omnes uolunt non recte nec uere dicitur, non potest fieri quod uis. Si enim beatus est, quidquid uult fieri potest quia non uult quod fieri non potest. Sed non est mortalitatis huius haec uita, nec erit nisi quando et immortalitas erit.

But of the blessed—the sort all wish themselves to be—it is not rightly nor truly said, “what you wish cannot be done.” For if he is blessed, whatever he wills can be brought to pass, because he does not will what cannot be brought to pass. But such a life is not of this mortality, nor will it be, except when immortality shall also be.

Quae si nullo modo dari homini posset, frustra etiam beatitudo quaereretur quia sine immortalitate non potest esse.

If this could in no way be given to man, beatitude too would be sought in vain, because without immortality it cannot exist.

[VIII 11] Cum ergo beati esse omnes homines uolunt si uerum uolunt, profecto esse et immortales uolunt; aliter enim beati esse non possunt. Denique et de immortalitate interrogati sicut de beatitudine omnes eam se uelle respondent. Sed qualiscumque beatitudo quae potius uocetur quam sit in hac uita quaeritur, immo uero fingitur, dum immortalitas desperatur sine qua uera beatitudo esse non potest.

[8 11] When therefore all men wish to be blessed, if they wish truly, assuredly they also wish to be immortal; for otherwise they cannot be blessed. And in fact, when questioned about immortality, just as about beatitude, all reply that they wish it for themselves. But whatever sort of beatitude is sought in this life—which is rather called than is, nay indeed is feigned—while immortality is despaired of, without which true beatitude cannot exist.

Ille quippe beate uiuit, quod iam superius diximus et astruendo satis fiximus, qui uiuit ut uult nec male aliquid uult. Nemo autem male uult immortalitatem si eius humana capax est deo donante natura; cuius si capax non est, nec beatitudinis capax est. Vt enim homo beate uiuat oportet ut uiuat.

That one indeed lives blessedly—as we have already said above and have sufficiently established by proving—who lives as he wills and wills nothing evil. Moreover, no one wills immortality badly, if human nature, God granting, is capable of it; but if it is not capable of it, neither is it capable of beatitude. For in order that a man may live blessedly, it is necessary that he live.

Quem porro morientem uita ipsa deserit beata uita cum illo manere qui potest? Cum autem deserit, aut nolentem procul dubio deserit aut uolentem aut neutrum. Si nolentem, quomodo est beata uita quae ita est in uoluntate ut non sit in potestate?

And with whom, moreover, when life itself deserts the dying man, can the blessed life remain? But when it deserts, it deserts without doubt either one unwilling, or willing, or neither. If the unwilling, how is it a blessed life which is in the will in such a way as not to be in the power?

Cumque beatus nemo sit aliquid uolendo nec habendo, quanto minus beatus est qui non honore, non possessione, non qualibet alia re, sed ipsa beata uita nolens deseritur quando ei nulla uita erit? Vnde etsi nullus sensus relinquitur quo sit misera (propterea enim beata uita discedit quoniam tota uita discedit), miser est tamen quamdiu sentit quia scit se nolente consumi propter quod cetera et quod prae ceteris diligit. Non igitur potest uita et beata esse et nolentem deserere quia beatus nemo nolens fit, ac per hoc quanto magis nolentem deserendo miserum facit quae si nolenti praesto esset miserum faceret?

And since no one is blessed either by willing anything or by having it, how much less blessed is he who is deserted, not by honor, not by possession, not by any other thing, but by blessed life itself, being unwilling, when there will be no life for him? Whence even if no sense is left by which it would be wretched (for blessed life departs for this reason, because the whole life departs), nevertheless he is miserable as long as he feels, because he knows that, he being unwilling, he is being consumed in respect of that for the sake of which he loves the rest, and which before the rest he loves. Therefore life cannot both be blessed and desert one who is unwilling, because no one becomes blessed unwilling; and through this, by so much the more does that make a man miserable by deserting him when unwilling, which, if it were at hand to one unwilling, would make him miserable.

Si autem uolentem deserit, etiam sic quomodo beata erat quam perire uoluit qui habebat? Restat ut dicant neutrum esse in animo beati, id est eum deseri a beata uita, cum per mortem deserit tota uita, nec nolle nec uelle, ad utrumque enim parato et aequo corde consistere. Sed nec ista beata est uita quae talis est ut quem beatum facit amore eius indigna sit.

But if it deserts one who is willing, even so, how was that life blessed which the one who had it willed to perish? It remains for them to say that neither is in the mind of the blessed man—namely, that when through death the whole life deserts, he, being deserted by the blessed life, is neither unwilling nor willing; for he stands prepared for either with an even heart. But not even that is a blessed life which is such that it is unworthy of the love of him whom it makes blessed.

Quomodo enim est beata uita quam non amat beatus? Aut quomodo amatur quod utrum uigeat an pereat indifferenter accipitur? Nisi forte uirtutes quas propter solam beatitudinem sic amamus persuadere nobis audent ut ipsam beatitudinem non amemus.

For how, indeed, is that a blessed life which the blessed person does not love? Or how is that loved which is taken indifferently whether it thrive or perish? Unless perhaps the virtues—which we thus love for the sake of beatitude alone—dare to persuade us that we should not love beatitude itself.

Quod si faciunt, etiam ipsas utique amare desistimus quando illam propter quam solam istas amauimus non amamus.

But if they do this, we assuredly even cease to love them themselves, when we do not love that on account of which alone we loved these.

Deinde quomodo erit uera illa tam perspecta, tam examinata, tam eliquata, tam certa sententia, beatos esse omnes homines uelle, si ipsi qui iam beati sunt beati esse nec nolunt nec uolunt? Aut si uolunt ut ueritas clamat, ut natura compellit cui summe bonus et immutabiliter beatus creator hoc indidit, si uolunt, inquam, beati esse qui beati sunt, beati non esse utique nolunt. Si autem beati non esse nolunt, procul dubio nolunt consumi et perire quod beati sunt.

Then how will that judgment be true—so well seen-through, so examined, so eliquated, so certain—that all human beings will to be happy, if those who are already happy neither are unwilling nor willing to be happy? Or if they do will it, as truth cries out, as nature compels—into which the supremely good and immutably happy Creator has implanted this—if, I say, those who are happy do will to be happy, they assuredly do not will not to be happy. But if they are unwilling not to be happy, without doubt they are unwilling that their being-happy be consumed and perish.

Nec nisi uiuentes beati esse possunt; nolunt igitur perire quod uiuunt. Immortales ergo esse uolunt quicumque uere beati uel sunt uel esse cupiunt. Non autem uiuit beate cui non adest quod uult; nullo modo igitur esse poterit uita ueraciter beata nisi fuerit sempiterna.

Nor can any be blessed except the living; therefore they do not wish the life they live to perish. Consequently, all who truly are blessed or desire to be wish to be immortal. Moreover, one does not live blessedly for whom that which he wills is not present; therefore life will in no wise be veraciously blessed unless it shall be sempiternal.

[12] Hanc utrum capiat humana natura quam tamen desiderabilem confitetur non parua quaestio est. Sed si fides adsit quae inest eis quibus dedit potestatem Iesus filios dei fieri, nulla quaestio est.

[12] Whether human nature can apprehend this—which, however, it confesses to be desirable—is no small question. But if faith be present, which is in those to whom Jesus gave the power to become sons of God, there is no question.

[IX] Humanis quippe argumentationibus haec inuenire conantes uix pauci magno praediti ingenio abundantes otio doctrinisque subtilissimis eruditi ad indagandam solius animae immortalitatem peruenire potuerunt. Cui tamen animae beatam uitam non inuenerunt stabilem, id est ueram. Ad miserias eam quippe uitae huius etiam post beatitudinem redire dixerunt.

[9] Indeed, attempting to discover these things by human argumentations, scarcely a few, endowed with great talent, abounding in leisure, and erudite in most subtle doctrines, were able to arrive at the investigation of the immortality of the soul alone. Yet for that soul they did not find the blessed life stable, that is, true. For they said that it returns to the miseries of this life even after beatitude.

Et qui eorum de hac erubuerunt sententia et animam purgatam in sempiterna beatitudine sine corpore conlocandam putarunt talia de mundi retrorsus aeternitate sentiunt ut hanc de anima sententiam suam ipsi redarguant, quod hic longum est demonstrare sed in libro duodecimo de ciuitate dei satis a nobis est quantum arbitror explicatum.

And those among them who have been ashamed of this opinion and have thought that the soul, once purged, is to be placed in sempiternal beatitude without the body, hold such views about the world’s retrorsus eternity—that is, its eternity running backward—that they thereby refute this their own opinion about the soul; which it would be long to demonstrate here, but in Book Twelve of the City of God it has, as I judge, been sufficiently explained by us.

Fides autem ista totum hominem immortalem futurum, qui utique constat ex anima et corpore, et ob hoc uere beatum non argumentatione humana sed diuina auctoritate promittit. Et ideo cum dictum esset in euangelio quod Iesus dederit potestatem filios dei fieri his qui receperunt eum, et quid sit recepisse eum breuiter fuisset expositum dicendo credentibus in nomine eius, quoque modo filii dei fierent esset adiunctum, quia non ex sanguinibus neque ex uoluntate carnis neque ex uoluntate uiri, sed ex deo nati sunt, ne ista hominum quam uidemus et gestamus infirmitas tantam excellentiam desperaret ilico annexum est, Et uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in nobis, ut a contrario suaderetur quod incredibile uidebatur. Si enim natura dei filius propter filios hominum misericordia factus est hominis filius (hoc est enim, uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in hominibus), quanto est credibilius natura filios hominis gratia dei fieri dei filios et habitare in deo in quo solo et de quo solo esse possint beati participes immortalitatis eius effecti, propter quod persuadendum dei filius particeps nostrae mortalitatis effectus est?

But this faith promises by divine authority, not by human argumentation, that the whole human being—who assuredly consists of soul and body—and on that account truly blessed, will be immortal. And therefore, when it had been said in the Gospel that Jesus gave the power to become sons of God to those who received him, and what it is to have received him had been briefly expounded by saying “to those believing in his name,” the manner also in which they would become sons of God was added: because not from bloods nor from the will of the flesh nor from the will of a man, but from God they have been born; lest this infirmity of men which we see and bear should despair of so great an excellency, straightway it was annexed, “And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us,” so that by the contrary that which seemed incredible might be persuaded. For if the Son of God by nature, on account of the sons of men, by mercy was made the son of man (for this is, “the Word was made flesh and dwelt among men”), how much more credible is it that those who are sons of man by nature should by the grace of God be made sons of God and dwell in God, in whom alone and from whom alone they can be blessed, having been made participants of his immortality—for the persuading of which the Son of God was made a participant of our mortality?

[X 13] Eos itaque qui dicunt: 'Itane defuit deo modus alius quo liberaret homines a miseria mortalitatis huius ut unigenitum filium deum sibi coaeternum hominem fieri uellet induendo humanam animam et carnem mortalemque factum mortem perpeti?,' parum est sic refellere ut istum modum quo nos per mediatorem dei et hominum hominem Christum Iesum deus liberare dignatur asseramus bonum et diuinae congruum dignitati; uerum etiam ut ostendamus non alium modum possibilem deo defuisse cuius potestati cuncta aequaliter subiacent, sed sanandae nostrae miseriae conuenientiorem modum alium non fuisse nec esse oportuisse. Quid enim tam necessarium fuit ad erigendam spem nostram mentesque mortalium conditione ipsius mortalitatis abiectas ab immortalitatis desperatione liberandas quam ut demonstraretur nobis quanti nos penderet deus quantumque diligeret? Quid uero huius rei tanto isto indicio manifestius atque praeclarius quam ut dei filius immutabiliter bonus in se manens quod erat et a nobis pro nobis accipiens quod non erat praeter suae naturae detrimentum nostrae dignatus inire consortium prius sine ullo malo suo merito mala nostra perferret, ac sic iam credentibus quantum nos diligat deus et quod desperabamus iam sperantibus dona in nos sua sine ullis bonis meritis nostris, immo praecedentibus et malis meritis nostris, indebita largitate conferret?

[10 13] Those, therefore, who say: 'Was there lacking to God some other mode by which he would liberate human beings from the misery of this mortality, such that he would will his Only-begotten Son, God coeternal with himself, to become a man by putting on a human soul and flesh, and, made mortal, to undergo death?,' it is too little to refute thus by asserting that this mode by which God deigns to free us through the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, is good and congruent to divine dignity; rather, we must also show not that another possible mode was lacking to God, to whose power all things lie equally subject, but that for the healing of our misery there was not, nor ought there to have been, any other mode more suitable. For what was so necessary for the raising up of our hope, and for delivering the minds of mortals—cast down by the condition of mortality itself—from despair of immortality, as that it should be demonstrated to us how much God values us and how greatly he loves us? And what of this could be more manifest and more preeminent an indication than that the Son of God, remaining in himself immutably good what he was, and from us, for us, receiving what he was not, without detriment to his own nature, deigned to enter into fellowship with ours, first, without any ill deserved by himself, to bear our evils, and thus, for those now believing how much God loves us and now hoping for what we had despaired of, to confer his gifts upon us without any good merits of ours—nay, with our evil merits going before—by an unowed largess?

[14] Quia et ea quae dicuntur merita nostra dona sunt eius. Vt enim fides per dilectionem operetur, caritas dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis. Tunc est autem datus quando est Iesus resurrectione clarificatus; tunc enim eum se missurum esse promisit et misit quia tunc sicut de illo scriptum est et ante praedictum: Abscendit in altum, captiuauit captiuitatem, dedit dona hominibus.

[14] Because even those things which are called our merits are his gifts. For in order that faith might operate through love, the charity of God has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who was given to us. But he was given then when Jesus was glorified by the resurrection; for then he promised that he would send him and he sent him, because then, as it is written of him and foretold before: He ascended on high, led captivity captive, gave gifts to men.

Haec dona sunt merita nostra quibus ad summum bonum immortalis beatitudinis peruenimus. Commendat autem, inquit, apostolus, caritatem suam deus in nobis quoniam cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius salui erimus ab ira per ipsum.

These gifts are our merits by which we arrive at the highest good of immortal beatitude. But, says the Apostle, God commends his own charity in us, since while we were still sinners, Christ died for us. Much more, now justified in his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him.

Adhuc addit et dicit: Si enim cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus deo per mortem filii eius, multo magis reconciliati salui erimus in uita ipsius.

He still adds and says: For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, having been reconciled, we shall be saved in his life.

Quos peccatores dixit prius, hos posterius inimicos dei; et quos prius iustificatos in sanguine Iesu Christi, eos posterius reconciliatos per mortem filii dei; et quos prius saluos ab ira per ipsum, eos postea saluos in uita ipsius. Non ergo ante istam gratiam quoquo modo peccatores, sed in talibus peccatis fuimus ut inimici essemus dei. Superius autem idem apostolus nos peccatores et inimicos dei duobus identidem nominibus appellauit, uno uelut mitissimo, alio plane atrocissimo dicens: Si enim Christus cum infirmi essemus adhuc iuxta tempus pro impiis mortuus est.

Those whom he said earlier were sinners, these later he called enemies of God; and those whom earlier he said were justified in the blood of Jesus Christ, these later he said were reconciled through the death of the Son of God; and those whom earlier he said were saved from wrath through him, these afterward he said were saved in his life. Not, therefore, before this grace were we sinners in just any way, but we were in such sins as to be enemies of God. Moreover, above, the same apostle called us sinners and enemies of God by two names again and again, one as it were most mild, the other plainly most atrocious, saying: For if Christ, while we were still weak, at the due time died for the impious.

Quos infirmos eosdem impios nuncupauit. Leue aliquid uidetur infirmitas, sed aliquando talis est ut impietas nominetur. Nisi tamen infirmitas esset, medicum necessarium non haberet, qui est hebraice Iesus, graece *soter, nostra autem locutione saluator.

He named those infirm the same impious. Infirmity seems a light thing, but sometimes it is such that it is called impiety. Yet unless it were infirmity, it would not have a necessary physician—who is, in Hebrew, Jesus, in Greek, *soter, and in our mode of speech, savior.

Quod uerbum latina lingua antea non habebat, sed habere poterat sicut potuit quando uoluit. Haec autem apostoli sententia praecedens ubi ait: Adhuc cum infirmi essemus iuxta tempus pro impiis mortuus est, cohaeret his duabus sequentibus quarum in una dixit peccatores, in alia inimicos dei, tamquam illis singulis reddiderit singula, peccatores ad infirmos, inimicos dei referens ad impios.

That word the Latin language previously did not have, but it could have had it, just as it could when it wished. Moreover, this preceding sentence of the apostle, where he says: “While we were still infirm, at the appointed time he died for the impious,” coheres with the two following, in one of which he said “sinners,” in the other “enemies of God,” as though to each of those he had rendered its respective counterpart, referring “sinners” to “infirm,” “enemies of God” to “impious.”

[XI 15] Sed quid est iustificati in sanguine ipsius? Quae uis est huius sanguinis obsecro ut in eo iustificentur credentes? Et quid est reconciliati per mortem filii eius?

[11 15] But what is it to be justified in his blood? What is the power of this blood, I beseech, such that believers are justified in it? And what is it to be reconciled through the death of his son?

Itane uero cum irasceretur nobis deus pater uidit mortem filii sui pro nobis et placatus est nobis? Numquid ergo filius eius usque adeo nobis iam placatus erat ut pro nobis etiam dignaretur mori, pater uero usque adeo adhuc irascebatur ut nisi filius pro nobis moreretur non placaretur? Et quid est quod alio loco idem ipse doctor gentium: Quid ergo, inquit, dicemus ad haec?

Is it then really thus, that when God the Father was angry with us he saw the death of his Son on our behalf and was placated toward us? Was therefore his Son to such a degree already placated toward us that he even deigned to die for us, while the Father was still to such a degree angry that unless the Son died for us he would not be placated? And what is the meaning of this, that in another place that very same doctor of the nations says: “What then,” he says, “shall we say to these things?”

Si deus pro nobis, quis contra nos? Qui filio proprio non pepercit sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum, quomodo non et cum illo omnia nobis donauit? Numquid nisi iam placatus esset pater proprio filio non parcens pro nobis eum traderet?

If God is for us, who is against us? He who did not spare his own Son but handed him over for all of us, how has he not also with him graciously donated all things to us? Would the Father, unless he were already appeased, not sparing his own Son, hand him over for us?

Nonne uidetur haec illi uelut aduersa esse sententia? In illa moritur pro nobis filius, et reconciliatur nobis pater per eius mortem; in hac autem tamquam prior nos dilexerit pater, ipse propter nos filio non parcit, ipse pro nobis eum tradit ad mortem. Sed uideo quod et antea pater dilexit nos non solum antequam pro nobis filius moreretur, sed antequam conderet mundum ipso teste apostolo qui dicit: Sicut elegit nos in ipso ante constitutionem mundi.

Does not this seem to him, as it were, to be an adverse opinion? In that one, the Son dies for us, and the Father is reconciled to us through his death; but in this one, as though the Father had loved us prior, he himself on our account does not spare the Son, he himself for us hands him over to death. But I see that even before, the Father loved us—not only before the Son died for us, but before he founded the world—the Apostle himself bearing witness, who says: “Just as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world.”

Nec filius patre sibi non parcente pro nobis uelut inuitus est traditus quia et de ipso dictum est: Qui me dilexit et tradidit se ipsum pro me. Omnia ergo simul et pater et filius et amborum spiritus pariter et concorditer operantur. Tamen iustificati sumus in Christi sanguine et reconciliati sumus deo per mortem filii eius, et quomodo id factum sit ut potero etiam hic quantum satis uidebitur explicabo.

Nor was the Son handed over as if unwilling, with the Father not sparing him for us, because it has also been said of him: 'Who loved me and gave himself for me.' Therefore the Father and the Son and the Spirit of both work all things together, equally and in concord. Nevertheless we have been justified in the blood of Christ and reconciled to God through the death of his Son; and how that was done, as I shall be able, I will also explain here, to the extent that shall seem sufficient.

[XII 16] Quadam iustitia dei in potestatem diaboli traditum est genus humanum peccato primi hominis in omnes utriusque sexus commixtione nascentes originaliter transeunte et parentum primorum debito uniuersos posteros obligante. Haec traditio prius in genesi significata est ubi cum serpenti dictum esset: Terram manducabis, homini dictum est: Terra es et in terram ibis. Eo quod dictum est in terram ibis, mors corporis praenuntiata est quia nec ipsam fuerat experturus si permansisset ut factus est rectus; quod uero uiuenti ait, Terra es, ostendit totum hominem in deterius commutatum.

[12 16] By a certain justice of God the human race was handed over into the power of the devil, with the sin of the first man, passing over as original, into all who are born by the commixture of both sexes, and with the debt of the first parents obliging all their posterity. This handing-over was earlier signified in Genesis, where, when it had been said to the serpent: You will eat earth, it was said to the man: You are earth and into earth you will go. By that which was said, into earth you will go, the death of the body was pre-announced, because he would not even have experienced it if he had remained as he was made, upright; but in that he says to one living, You are earth, he shows the whole man changed for the worse.

Tale est enim, Terra es, quale illud, Non permanebit spiritus meus in hominibus istis quoniam caro sunt. Tunc ergo demonstrauit ei traditum cui dictum fuerat: Terram manducabis. Apostolus autem apertius hoc praedicat ubi dicit: Et uos cum essetis mortui delictis et peccatis uestris in quibus aliquando ambulastis secundum saeculum mundi huius, secundum principem potestatis aeris, spiritus eius qui nunc operatur in filiis diffidentiae in quibus et nos omnes aliquando conuersati sumus in desideriis carnis nostrae facientes uoluntates carnis et affectionum, et eramus natura filli irae sicut et ceteri.

For such is, You are earth, as that other, My Spirit will not remain in these men, since they are flesh. Then therefore he showed him as handed over to the one to whom it had been said: You shall eat earth. But the Apostle more openly proclaims this where he says: And you, when you were dead in your trespasses and sins, in which once you walked according to the age of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, of the spirit that now works in the sons of disobedience, among whom also we all once lived in the desires of our flesh, doing the wills of the flesh and of the affections, and we were by nature children of wrath like the rest.

Filii diffidentiae sunt infideles, et quis hoc non est antequam fidelis fiat? Quocirca omnes homines ab origine sub principe sunt potestatis aeris qui operatur in filiis diffidentiae. Et quod dixit, 'ab origine,' hoc est quod dicit apostolus, natura, et se fuisse sicut et ceteros, natura scilicet ut est deprauata peccato non ut recta creata est ab initio.

The sons of diffidence are infidels, and who is not this before he becomes faithful? Wherefore all men from origin are under the prince of the power of the air, who works in the sons of diffidence. And what he said, 'from origin,' this is what the apostle says, 'by nature,' and that he himself had been as also the rest—by nature, namely, as it is depraved by sin, not as it was created right from the beginning.

Modus autem iste quo traditus est homo in diaboli potestatem non ita debet intellegi tamquam hoc deus fecerit aut fieri iusserit, sed quod tantum permiserit, iuste tamen. Illo enim deserente peccantem peccati auctor ilico inuasit. Nec ita sane deus deseruit creaturam suam ut non se illi exhiberet deum creantem et uiuificantem et inter poenalia mala etiam bona malis multa praestantem; non enim continuit in ira sua miserationes suas.

But this manner in which man was delivered into the devil’s power ought not to be understood as though God did this or ordered it to be done, but that He only permitted it—yet justly. For with Him abandoning the sinner, the author of sin immediately invaded. Nor did God indeed so forsake His creature that He did not present Himself to it as God creating and vivifying, and, among penal evils, also bestowing many goods upon the wicked; for He did not withhold His compassions in His wrath.

Nec hominem a lege suae potestatis amisit quando in diaboli potestate esse permisit quia nec ipse diabolus a potestate omnipotentis alienus est sicut neque a bonitate. Nam et maligni angeli unde qualicumque subsisterent uita nisi per eum qui uiuificat omnia? Si ergo commissio peccatorum per iram dei iustam hominem subdidit diabolo, profecto remissio peccatorum per reconciliationem dei benignam eruit hominem a diabolo.

Nor did He lose man from the law of His own power when He permitted him to be in the devil’s power, since not even the devil himself is alien from the power of the Omnipotent, just as neither from goodness. For whence would even the malign angels subsist by any life at all, except through Him who vivifies all things? If therefore the commission of sins, through the just wrath of God, subjected man to the devil, assuredly the remission of sins, through the benign reconciliation of God, draws man out from the devil.

[XIII 17] Non autem diabolus potentia dei sed iustitia superandus fuit. Nam quid omnipotente potentius, aut cuius creaturae potestas potestati creatoris comparari potest? Sed cum diabolus uitio peruersitatis suae factus sit amator potentiae et desertor oppugnatorque iustitiae (sic enim et homines eum tanto magis imitantur quanto magis neglecta uel etiam perosa iustitia potentiae student eiusque uel adeptione laetantur uel inflammantur cupiditate), placuit deo ut propter eruendum hominem de diaboli potestate non potentia diabolus sed iustitia uinceretur, atque ita et homines imitantes Christum iustitia quaererent diabolum uincere non potentia.

[13 17] But the devil had to be overcome not by the power of God but by justice. For what is more powerful than the Omnipotent, or whose creature’s power can be compared to the Creator’s power? But since the devil, by the vice of his perversity, has been made a lover of power and a deserter and assailant of justice (thus indeed men also imitate him all the more, the more, with justice neglected or even hated, they strive after power and either rejoice at its acquisition or are inflamed with cupidity for it), it pleased God that, for the sake of rescuing man from the devil’s power, the devil should be conquered not by power but by justice; and thus also that men, imitating Christ, should seek to vanquish the devil by justice, not by power.

Non quod potentia quasi mali aliquid fugienda sit, sed ordo seruandus est quo prior est iustitia. Nam quanta potentia potest esse mortalium? Teneant ergo mortales iustitiam; potentia immortalibus dabitur.

Not that power is to be shunned as if it were some evil, but the order is to be preserved in which justice is prior. For how great a power can there be of mortals? Let mortals, therefore, hold to justice; power will be given to immortals.

Cui comparata quantalibet eorum hominum qui potentes uocantur in terra ridicula infirmitas inuenitur, et ibi foditur peccatori fouea ubi uidentur mali plurimum posse. Cantat autem iustus et dicit: Beatus homo quem tu erudieris, domine, et ex lege tua docueris eum ut mitiges eum a diebus malignis donec fodiatur peccatori fouea. Quoniam non repellet dominus plebem suam et haereditatem suam non derelinquet quoadusque iustitia conuertatur in iudicium, et qui habent eam omnes recto sunt corde.

Compared with it, the laughable infirmity of however great those men who are called powerful on the earth is discovered, and there a pit is dug for the sinner where the wicked seem to be most able. But the righteous man sings and says: Blessed is the man whom you shall instruct, O Lord, and out of your law you shall teach him, that you may mitigate the evil days for him until a pit be dug for the sinner. For the Lord will not repel his people, and his inheritance he will not abandon, until justice be converted into judgment, and all who have it are upright in heart.

Hoc igitur tempore quo differtur potentia populi dei non repellet dominus plebem suam et haereditatem suam non derelinquet quantalibet acerba et indigna ipsa humilis atque infirma patiatur quoadusque iustitia quam nunc habet infirmitas piorum conuertatur in iudicium, hoc est iudicandi accipiat potestatem, quod iustis in finem seruatur cum praecedentem iustitiam ordine suo fuerit potentia subsecuta. Potentia quippe adiuncta iustitiae uel iustitia accedente potentiae iudiciariam potestatem facit. Pertinet autem iustitia ad uoluntatem bonam, unde dictum est ab angelis nato Christo: gloria in excelsis deo et in terra pax hominibus bonae uoluntatis.

Therefore at this time, in which the power of the people of God is deferred, the Lord will not repel his people and will not abandon his inheritance, however bitter and unworthy things the same, humble and weak, may suffer, until the justice which the weakness of the pious now has is converted into judgment—that is, receives the power of judging—which is reserved for the just unto the end, when power, in its own order, shall have followed the justice that precedes. For power joined to justice, or justice coming to power, makes judicial power. Moreover, justice pertains to good will, whence it was said by the angels at the birth of Christ: glory in the highest to God, and on earth peace to men of good will.

Potentia uero sequi debet iustitiam non praeire, ideo et in rebus secundis ponitur, id est prosperis; 'secundae' autem a 'sequendo' sunt dictae. Cum enim beatum faciant sicut superius disputauimus duae res, bene uelle et posse quod uelis, non debet esse illa peruersitas quae in eadem disputatione notata est ut ex duabus rebus quae faciunt beatum posse quod uelit homo eligat et uelle quod oportet negligat cum prius debeat habere uoluntatem bonam, magnam uero postea potestatem. Bona porro uoluntas purganda est a uitiis a quibus si uincitur homo, ad hoc uincitur ut male uelit, et bona iam uoluntas eius quomodo erit?

Power, however, ought to follow Justice, not go before; therefore it is also placed among favorable things, that is, prosperous ones; and “favorable” (secundae) are said from “following” (sequendo). For since, as we argued above, two things make a man blessed: to will well and to be able to do what you will, there ought not to be that perversity which was noted in the same disputation, that out of the two things which make one blessed a man should choose being able to do what he wills and neglect willing what is fitting, when he ought first to have a good will, and afterwards a great power. Moreover, a good will must be purged from vices, by which, if a man is conquered, he is conquered to this end, that he may will badly; and then how will his will already be good?

Optandum est itaque ut potestas nunc detur sed contra uitia propter quae uincenda potentes esse nolunt homines et uolunt propter uincendos homines. Vtquid hoc nisi ut uere uicti falso uincant, nec sint ueritate sed opinione uictores? Velit homo prudens esse, uelit fortis, uelit temperans, uelit iustus, atque ut haec ueraciter possit potentiam plane optet, atque appetat ut potens sit in se ipso et miro modo aduersum se ipsum pro se ipso.

It is therefore to be desired that power be given now—but against vices, for the conquering of which human beings are unwilling to be powerful, while they want it for the conquering of human beings. To what end is this, except that, truly conquered, they may conquer falsely, and be victors not by truth but by opinion? Let a man will to be prudent, let him will to be brave, let him will to be temperate, let him will to be just; and, that he may be able to have these truly, let him plainly opt for power, and let him aspire to be powerful in himself and, in a wondrous manner, against himself for himself.

Cetera uero quae bene uult et tamen non potest sicuti est immortalitas et uera ac plena felicitas desiderare non cesset et patienter exspectet.

The rest, however, which he wills well and yet cannot—such as immortality and true and full felicity—let him not cease to desire, and let him await them patiently.

[XIV 18] Quae est igitur iustitia qua uictus est diabolus? Quae nisi iustitia Iesu Christi? Et quomodo uictus est?

[14 18] What, then, is the justice by which the devil was vanquished? What but the justice of Jesus Christ? And how was he vanquished?

Quia cum in eo nihil morte dignum inueniret, occidit eum tamen. Et utique iustum est ut debitores quos tenebat liberi dimittantur in eum credentes quem sine ullo debito occidit. Hoc est quod iustificari dicimur in Christi sanguine.

Because although he found in him nothing worthy of death, yet he killed him. And surely it is just that the debtors whom he was holding should be set free, who believe in him whom he killed without any debt. This is what is meant by our being justified in the blood of Christ.

Sic quippe in remissionem peccatorum nostrorum innocens ille sanguis effusus est. Vnde se dicit in psalmis in mortuis liberum; solus enim a debito mortis liber est mortuus. Hinc et in alio psalmo dicit: Quae non rapui tunc exsoluebam, rapinam uolens intellegi peccatum quia usurpatum est contra licitum.

Thus indeed for the remission of our sins that innocent blood was poured out. Whence he says of himself in the psalms, “free among the dead”; for he alone is dead, free from the debt of death. Hence also in another psalm he says: “What I did not seize by rapine, then I paid back,” wishing “rapine” to be understood as sin, since it has been usurped against what is lawful.

Vnde per os etiam carnis suae sicut in euangelio legitur dicit: Ecce uenit princeps huius mundi et in me nihil inuenit, id est nullum peccatum, sed ut sciant omnes, inquit, quia uoluntatem patris mei facio, surgite, eamus hinc. Et pergit inde ad passionem ut pro debitoribus nobis quod ipse non debebat exsolueret.

Whence through the mouth also of his flesh, as is read in the gospel, he says: Behold, the prince of this world comes, and he found nothing in me, that is, no sin; but that all may know, he says, that I do the will of my Father, arise, let us go hence. And from there he goes on to the Passion, that for us debtors he might discharge what he himself did not owe.

Numquid isto iure aequissimo diabolus uinceretur si potentia Christus cum illo agere non iustitia uoluisset? Sed postposuit quod potuit ut prius ageret quod oportuit; ideo autem illum esse opus erat et hominem et deum. Nisi enim homo esset, non posset occidi; nisi et deus esset, non crederetur noluisse quod potuit sed non potuisse quod uoluit, nec ab eo potentiae praelatam fuisse iustitiam sed ei defuisse potentiam putaremus.

Would the devil have been conquered by this most equitable right if Christ had wished to deal with him by power and not by justice? But he postposed what he could, in order first to do what was proper; and for that reason it was necessary that he be both man and God. For unless he were man, he could not be put to death; unless he were also God, it would not be believed that he had been unwilling to do what he could, but that he had not been able to do what he willed; and we would think not that justice had been preferred by him to power, but that power had been lacking to him.

Nunc uero humana pro nobis passus est quia homo erat; sed si noluisset, etiam hoc non pati potuisset quia et deus erat. Ideo gratior facta est in humilitate iustitia quia posset si noluisset humilitatem non perpeti tanta in diuinitate potentia, ac sic a moriente tam potente nobis mortalibus impotentibus et commendata est iustitia et promissa potentia. Horum enim duorum unum fecit moriendo, alterum resurgendo.

Now indeed he suffered human things for us because he was a man; but if he had not willed, he could also not have suffered this, because he was also God. Therefore justice was made more gracious in humility, because, with such power in divinity, he could, if he had not willed, not endure humility; and thus by one dying so potent, for us mortal and impotent, both justice was commended and power was promised. For of these two he accomplished the one by dying, the other by rising again.

Quid enim iustius quam usque ad mortem crucis pro iustitia peruenire? Et quid potentius quam resurgere a mortuis et in caelum cum ipsa carne in qua est occisus ascendere? Et iustitia ergo prius et potentia postea diabolum uicit, iustitia scilicet quia nullum peccatum habuit et ab illo est iniustissime occisus, potentia uero quia reuixit mortuus numquam postea moriturus.

What indeed is more just than to reach even unto the death of the cross for justice? And what more powerful than to rise again from the dead and to ascend into heaven with the very flesh in which he was slain? And thus justice first and power afterwards conquered the devil—justice, namely, because he had no sin and by him was most unjustly slain; power, however, because, once dead, he revived, never thereafter to die.

Sed potentia diabolum uicisset etiamsi ab illo non potuisset occidi, quamuis maioris sit potentiae etiam ipsam mortem uincere resurgendo quam uitare uiuendo. Sed aliud est propter quod iustificamur in Christi sanguine cum per remissionem peccatorum eruimur de diaboli potestate; hoc ad id pertinet quod a Christo iustitia diabolus uincitur non potentia. Ex infirmitate quippe quam suscepit in carne mortali non ex immortali potentia crucifixus est Christus, de qua tamen infirmitate ait apostolus: Quod infirmum est dei fortius est hominibus.

But power would have conquered the devil even if he had not been able to be killed by him, although it is of greater potency even to conquer death itself by rising again than to avoid it by living. But it is a different thing on account of which we are justified in the blood of Christ, when through the remission of sins we are rescued from the power of the devil; this pertains to that by which the devil is conquered by Christ by justice, not by power. For from the infirmity which he assumed in mortal flesh, not from immortal power, Christ was crucified, of which infirmity, however, the apostle says: “What is weak of God is stronger than men.”

[XV 19] Non est itaque difficile uidere diabolum uictum quando qui ab illo occisus est resurrexit. Illud est maius et ad intellegendum profundius, uidere diabolum uictum quando sibi uicisse uidebatur, id est quando Christus occisus est. Tunc enim sanguis ille, quoniam eius erat qui nullum habuit omnino peccatum, ad remissionem nostrorum fusus est peccatorum ut quia eos diabolus merito tenebat quos peccati reos conditione mortis obstrinxit, hos per eum merito dimitteret quem nullius peccati reum immerito poena mortis affecit.

[15 19] It is therefore not difficult to see the devil conquered when he who was slain by him rose again. That is greater and deeper for understanding: to see the devil conquered when he seemed to himself to have conquered, that is, when Christ was slain. For then that blood, since it was his who had absolutely no sin, was poured out for the remission of our sins, so that, because the devil rightly held those whom he had bound, as guilty of sin, by the condition of death, he might rightly release these on account of him whom, being guilty of no sin, he unjustly afflicted with the penalty of death.

Hac iustitia uictus et hoc uinculo uinctus est fortis ut uasa eius eriperentur quae apud eum cum ipso et angelis eius fuerant uasa irae et in uasa misericordiae uerterentur.

By this justice he was vanquished, and by this bond the strong man was bound, so that his vessels might be snatched away, which with him—along with himself and his angels—had been vessels of wrath, and be converted into vessels of mercy.

Haec quippe uerba ipsius domini Iesu Christi de caelo ad se facta cum primum uocatus est, narrat apostolus Paulus. Nam inter cetera quae audiuit etiam hoc sibi dictum sic loquitur: Ad hoc enim tibi apparui ut constituam te ministrum et testem eorum quae a me uides, quibus etiam praeeo tibi liberans te de populo et de gentibus in quas ego mitto te aperire oculos caecorum ut auertantur a tenebris et potestate satanae ad deum ut accipiant remissionem peccatorum et sortem quae in sanctis et fidem quae in me est. Vnde et exhortans idem apostolus credentes ad gratiarum actionem deo patri: Qui eruit nos, inquit, de potestate tenebrarum et transtulit in regnum filii caritatis suae, in quo habemus redemptionem in remissionem peccatorum.

Haec indeed the apostle Paul recounts as the very words of the Lord Jesus Christ himself, spoken from heaven to him when he was first called. For among the other things that he heard, that this too was said to him, he speaks thus: For to this I have appeared to you, that I may constitute you a minister and a witness of the things which you see from me, in which also I go before you, delivering you from the people and from the nations to whom I am sending you, to open the eyes of the blind, that they may be turned away from darkness and from the power of Satan to God, that they may receive the remission of sins and the lot which is among the saints, and the faith which is in me. Whence also the same apostle, exhorting believers to thanksgiving to God the Father: Who has extricated us, he says, from the power of darkness and has translated us into the kingdom of the Son of his charity, in whom we have redemption unto the remission of sins.

In hac redemptione tamquam pretium pro nobis datus est sanguis Christi, quo accepto diabolus non ditatus est sed ligatus, ut nos ab eius nexibus solueremur, nec quemquam secum eorum quos Christus ab omni debito liber indebite fuso suo sanguine redemisset peccatorum retibus inuolutum traheret ad secundae ac sempiternae mortis exitium, sed hactenus morerentur ad Christi gratiam pertinentes, praecogniti et praedestinati et electi ante constitutionem mundi quatenus pro illis ipse mortuus est Christus carnis tantum morte non spiritus.

In this redemption the blood of Christ was given as a price on our behalf, and when it was received the devil was not enriched but bound, so that we might be loosed from his bonds, and that he should not drag along with himself anyone of those whom Christ—free from all debt, his own blood poured out without obligation—had redeemed, entangled in the nets of sins, into the destruction of the second and sempiternal death; but rather that they should die only thus far, as pertaining to the grace of Christ, preknown and predestined and elect before the constitution of the world, inasmuch as for them Christ himself died with the death of the flesh only, not of the spirit.

[XVI 20] Quamuis enim et ipsa mors carnis de peccato primi hominis originaliter uenerit, tamen bonus eius usus gloriosissimos martyres fecit. Et ideo non solum ipsa sed omnia saeculi huius mala, dolores laboresque hominum, quamquam de peccatorum et maxime de peccati originalis meritis ueniant unde facta est et ipsa uita uinculo mortis obstricta, tamen et remissis peccatis remanere debuerunt cum quibus homo pro ueritate certaret et unde exerceretur uirtus fidelium ut nouus homo per testamentum nouum inter mala huius saeculi nouo saeculo praepararetur, miseriam quam meruit uita ista damnata sapienter tolerans, et quia finietur prudenter gratulans, beatitudinem uero quam liberata uita futura sine fine habitura est fideliter et patienter exspectans. Diabolus enim a dominatu et a cordibus fidelium foras missus in quorum damnatione atque infidelitate licet damnatus etiam ipse regnabat, tantum pro conditione mortalitatis huius aduersari sinitur quantum eis expedire nouit de quo sacrae litterae personant per os apostolicum: Fidelis deus qui non permittat uos temptari supra id quod potestis, sed faciet cum temptatione etiam exitum ut possitis sustinere.

[16 20] Although even the very death of the flesh originally came from the sin of the first man, nevertheless its good use has made the most glorious martyrs. And therefore not only it itself but all the evils of this age, the pains and labors of men—although they come from the deserts of sins, and especially of original sin, whence also life itself has been bound by the bond of death—yet, even with sins remitted, ought to have remained: with these a man might contend for the truth, and by these the virtue of the faithful might be exercised, so that the new man, through the New Testament, might be prepared amid the evils of this age for a new age, wisely enduring the misery which this condemned life has merited, prudently rejoicing that it will have an end, and faithfully and patiently awaiting the beatitude which the future liberated life will have without end. For the Devil, having been cast out from dominion and from the hearts of the faithful—in whose damnation and infidelity, though condemned, he too used to reign—is permitted to be an adversary only so far, given the condition of this mortality, as he knows to be expedient for them; concerning which the sacred letters resound through the apostolic mouth: God is faithful, who will not permit you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but will also make with the temptation an exit, that you may be able to endure.

Prosunt autem ista mala quae fideles pie perferunt uel ad emendanda peccata uel ad exercendam probandamque iustitiam uel ad demonstrandam uitae huius miseriam ut illa ubi erit beatitudo uera atque perpetua et desideretur ardentius et instantius inquiratur. Sed circa eos ista seruantur de quibus apostolus dicit: Scimus quoniam diligentibus deum omnia cooperatur in bonum, his qui secundum propositum uocati sunt. Quoniam quos ante praesciuit, et praedestinauit conformes imagines filii eius ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus.

But these evils which the faithful piously endure are profitable either for emending sins, or for exercising and proving justice, or for demonstrating the misery of this life, so that that life, where there will be true and perpetual beatitude, may be desired more ardently and be sought more urgently. But with respect to those of whom the Apostle says: We know that for those loving God all things co-operate for good, for those who have been called according to purpose. For those whom he foreknew beforehand, he also predestined [to be] conformed to the image of his Son, that he himself might be the firstborn among many brothers.

Quos autem praedestinauit, illos et uocauit; et quos uocauit, ipsos et iustificauit; quos autem iustificauit, ipsos et glorificauit. Horum praedestinatorum nemo cum diabolo perit; nemo usque ad mortem sub diaboli potestate remanebit. Deinde sequitur quod iam supra commemoraui: Quid ergo dicemus ad haec?

But those whom he predestined, he also called; and those whom he called, these he also justified; and those whom he justified, these he also glorified. Of these predestined ones no one perishes with the devil; no one will remain under the devil’s power unto death. Then follows what I have already mentioned above: What then shall we say to these things?

Si deus pro nobis, quis contra nos? Qui filio proprio non pepercit sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum, quomodo non et cum illo omnia nobis donauit?

If God is for us, who is against us? He who did not spare his own Son but delivered him up for us all, how will he not also with him freely grant us all things?

[21] Cur ergo non fieret mors Christi? Immo cur non praetermissis aliis innumerabilibus modis quibus ad nos liberandos uti posset omnipotens ipsa potissimum eligeretur ut fieret ubi nec de diuinitate eius aliquid imminutum est aut mutatum, et de humanitate suscepta tantum beneficii conlatum est hominibus ut a dei filio sempiterno eodemque hominis filio mors temporalis indebita redderetur qua eos a sempiterna morte debita liberaret? Peccata nostra diabolus tenebat et per illa nos merito figebat in morte.

[21] Why then should not the death of Christ take place? Nay rather, why should not this very means, with other innumerable ways—by which the Omnipotent might use for liberating us—passed over, be chosen most of all to be done, where nothing of his divinity was diminished or changed, and from the humanity assumed so great a benefit was conferred upon men, that by the eternal Son of God and likewise the Son of Man a temporal death not owed would be rendered, whereby he might free them from the sempiternal death owed? Our sins the devil was holding, and through them he was deservedly fastening us in death.

Dimisit ea ille qui sua non habebat, et ab illo immerito est perductus ad mortem. Tanti ualuit sanguis ille ut neminem Christo indutum in aeterna morte debita detinere debuerit qui Christum morte indebita uel ad tempus occidit. Commendat ergo caritatem suam deus in nobis quoniam cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est.

He released those things, he who did not have them as his own, and by him Christ was undeservedly led to death. So potent was that blood, that the one who killed Christ with an undue death, even for a time, had no right to detain anyone clothed with Christ in the due eternal death. Therefore God commends his charity toward us, since while we were still sinners, Christ died for us.

Multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius salui erimus ab ira per ipsum. Iustificati, inquit, in sanguine ipsius, iustificati plane in eo quod a peccatis omnibus liberati, liberati autem a peccatis omnibus quoniam pro nobis est dei filius qui nullum habebat occisus. Salui ergo erimus ab ira per ipsum, ab ira utique dei quae nihil est aliud quam iusta uindicta.

Much more, now justified in his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him. “Justified,” he says, “in his blood”—justified plainly in this, that we have been freed from all sins; and freed, moreover, from all sins because for us the Son of God, who had none, was slain. Therefore we shall be saved from wrath through him, from the wrath, to be sure, of God, which is nothing else than just vengeance.

Non enim sicut hominis animi perturbatio est ira dei, sed illius ira est cui dicit alio loco sancta scriptura: Tu autem dominus uirtutum cum tranquillitate iudicas. Si ergo iusta diuina uindicta tale nomen accepit, etiam reconciliatio dei quae recte intellegitur nisi cum talis ira finitur? Nec inimici eramus deo nisi quemadmodum iustitiae sunt inimica peccata, quibus remissis tales inimicitiae finiuntur et reconciliantur iusto quos ipse iustificat.

For the wrath of God is not, as the perturbation of a human mind, but His wrath is that of whom Holy Scripture says elsewhere: But you, O Lord of hosts, judge with tranquility. If therefore just divine vindication has received such a name, is not even the reconciliation of God rightly understood only when such wrath is brought to an end? Nor were we enemies to God except in the way sins are enemies to justice; with these remitted, such enmities are ended, and those whom He Himself justifies are reconciled to the Just One.

Quos tamen etiam inimicos utique dilexit quandoquidem filio proprio non pepercit sed pro nobis omnibus, cum adhuc inimici essemus, tradidit eum. Recte ergo apostolus secutus adiunxit: Si enim cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus deo per mortem filii eius, per quam facta est illa remissio peccatorum, multo magis reconciliati salui erimus in uita ipsius, in uita salui qui per mortem reconciliati. Quis enim dubitet daturum amicis uitam suam pro quibus inimicis dedit mortem suam?

Yet those whom, even as enemies, he certainly loved, since he did not spare his own Son but delivered him up for us all, when we were still enemies. Therefore the apostle, following on, rightly added: For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, through which that remission of sins was effected, much more, having been reconciled, we shall be saved in his life—saved in life, we who were reconciled through death. For who would doubt that he will give his life to his friends, for whom, when they were enemies, he gave his death?

Non solum autem, inquit, sed et gloriamur in deo per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum per quem nunc reconciliationem accepimus. Non solum, ait, salui erimus, sed et gloriamur; nec in nobis sed in deo; nec per nos sed per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum per quem nunc reconciliationem accepimus secundum ea quae superius disputata sunt. Deinde subiungit apostolus: Propter hoc sicut per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intrauit et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines pertransiit in quo omnes peccauerunt, et cetera, in quibus prolixius de duobus hominibus disputat; uno eodemque primo Adam per cuius peccatum et mortem tamquam haereditariis malis posteri eius obligati sumus; altero autem secundo Adam qui non homo tantum sed etiam deus est quo pro nobis soluente quod non debebat a debitis et paternis et propriis liberati sumus.

Not only, however, he says, but we also glory in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom now we have received reconciliation. Not only, he says, shall we be safe/saved, but we also glory; and not in ourselves but in God; and not through ourselves but through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom now we have received reconciliation, according to the things that have been argued above. Then the Apostle subjoins: For this reason, just as through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death, and so it passed through to all men, in whom all sinned, and the rest—where he argues more at length about two men: the one and same first Adam, through whose sin and death we his descendants have been bound as by hereditary evils; but the other, the second Adam, who is not only man but also God, by whom, paying on our behalf what he did not owe, we have been freed from debts both paternal and our own.

Proinde quoniam propter unum illum tenebat diabolus omnes per eius uitiatam carnalem concupiscentiam generatos, iustum est ut propter hunc unum dimittat omnes per ipsius immaculatam gratiam spiritalem regeneratos.

Accordingly, since on account of that one the devil held all who were generated through his vitiated carnal concupiscence, it is just that on account of this one he release all who have been regenerated through his immaculate spiritual grace.

[XVII 22] Sunt et alia multa quae in Christi incarnatione, quae superbis displicet, salubriter intuenda atque cogitanda sunt. Quorum est unum quod demonstratum est homini quem locum haberet in rebus quas deus condidit quandoquidem sic deo coniungi potuit humana natura ut ex duabus substantiis fieret una persona ac per hoc iam ex tribus, deo, anima et carne, ut superbi illi maligni spiritus qui se ad decipiendum quasi ad adiuuandum medios interponunt non ideo se audeant homini praeponere quia non habent carnem maxime quia et mori in eadem carne dignatus est ne ideo illi tamquam deos se coli persuadeant quia uidentur esse immortales. Deinde ut gratia dei nobis sine ullis praecedentibus meritis in homine Christo commendaretur quia nec ipse ut tanta unitate uero deo coniunctus una cum illo persona filius dei fieret ullis est praecedentibus meritis assecutus, sed ex quo esse homo coepit, ex illo est et deus, unde dictum est: Verbum caro factus est.

[17 22] There are also many other things which, in the incarnation of Christ—which displeases the proud—are salubriously to be looked upon and thought upon. Of which one is this: that it has been shown to man what place he would have among the things which God created, since human nature could be so joined to God that out of two substances there was made one person, and thereby now out of three—God, soul, and flesh—so that those proud malignant spirits who insert themselves as intermediaries for deceiving as if for helping do not on that account dare to set themselves before man because they do not have flesh, especially because he deigned also to die in that same flesh, lest they on that account persuade that they themselves be worshiped as gods because they seem to be immortal. Next, in order that the grace of God might be commended to us without any preceding merits in the man Christ, because he himself did not by any preceding merits attain that, being joined to the true God with so great a unity, he should become the Son of God, one person with him; but from the time he began to be man, from that time he is also God, whence it was said: The Word was made flesh.

Est etiam illud ut superbia hominis quae maximo impedimento est ne inhaereatur deo per tantam dei humilitatem redargui posset atque sanari. Discit quoque homo quam longe recesserit a deo, quod illi ualeat ad medicinalem dolorem, quando per talem mediatorem redit qui hominibus et deus diuinitate subuenit et homo infirmitate conuenit. Quod autem maius obedientiae nobis praeberetur exemplum qui per inobedientiam perieramus quam deo patri deus filius obediens usque ad mortem crucis?

There is also this: that the superbia of man, which is the greatest impediment lest he adhere to God, might through so great a humility of God be refuted and healed. Man also learns how far he has receded from God—something that may avail him unto medicinal pain—when he returns through such a mediator, who, as God, by his divinity comes to the aid of human beings, and, as man, by weakness meets with them. And what greater example of obedience could be presented to us, who had perished through disobedience, than that God the Son was obedient to God the Father even unto the death of the cross?

Quid praemium ipsius obedientiae ubi ostenderetur melius quam in carne tanti mediatoris quae ad uitam resurrexit aeternam? Pertinebat etiam ad iustitiam bonitatemque creatoris ut per eandem rationalem creaturam superarretur diabolus quam se superasse gaudebat, et de ipso genere uenientem quod genus origine uitiata per unum tenebat uniuersum.

What reward of obedience itself could be shown better than in the flesh of so great a Mediator, which rose again to eternal life? It also pertained to the justice and goodness of the Creator that the devil should be overcome by the same rational creature which he rejoiced to have overcome, and by one coming from that very race which, vitiated in its origin, he held entire through one.

[XVIII 23] Poterat enim utique deus hominem aliunde suscipere in quo esset mediator dei et hominum, non de genere illius Adam qui peccato suo genus obligauit humanum, sicut ipsum quem primum creauit non de genere creauit alicuius. Poterat ergo uel sic uel alio quo uellet modo creare unum alium de quo uinceretur uictor prioris, sed melius iudicauit et de ipso quod uictum fuerat genere assumere hominem deus per quem generis humani uinceret inimicum, et tamen ex uirgine cuius conceptum spiritus non caro, fides non libido praeuenit. Nec interfuit carnis concupiscentia per quam seminantur et concipiuntur ceteri qui trahunt originale peccatum, sed ea penitus remotissima credendo non concumbendo sancta est fecundata uirginitas ut illud quod nascebatur ex propagine primi hominis tantummodo generis non et criminis originem duceret.

[18 23] For indeed God could certainly take up a man from elsewhere in whom there would be a mediator of God and of men, not from the stock of that Adam who by his sin bound the human race, just as the very one whom he first created he did not create from anyone’s stock. He could, therefore, either thus or in some other way he wished create another one by whom the victor of the former would be conquered; but he judged it better that even from the very race which had been conquered God should assume a man, through whom he would conquer the enemy of the human race—and yet from a virgin, whose conception the Spirit, not the flesh, whose conception faith, not libido, anticipated. Nor did the concupiscence of the flesh have a part, through which the rest are sown and conceived who draw original sin; but with that utterly removed, by believing, not by lying together, holy virginity was fecundated, so that that which was being born from the progeny of the first man might derive origin of the race only, not also of the guilt.

Nascebatur namque non transgressionis contagione uitiata natura sed omnium talium uitiorum sola medicina. Nascebatur, inquam, homo nullum habens, nullum habiturus omnino peccatum, per quem renascerentur liberandi a peccato qui nasci non possent sine peccato. Quamuis enim carnali concupiscentia quae inest genitalibus membris bene utatur castitas coniugalis, habet tamen motus non uoluntarios quibus ostendit uel nullam se in paradiso ante peccatum esse potuisse uel non talem fuisse si fuit ut aliquando resisteret uoluntati.

For what was being born was not a nature vitiated by the contagion of transgression, but the sole medicine of all such vices. He was being born, I say, a man having no sin, and destined to have absolutely no sin, by whom those who could not be born without sin would be reborn to be freed from sin. For although conjugal chastity makes good use of carnal concupiscence which inheres in the genital members, nevertheless it has involuntary motions, whereby it shows either that it could not have existed at all in Paradise before sin, or that, if it did exist, it was not such as at any time to resist the will.

Nunc autem illam talem esse sentimus ut repugnans legi mentis etiam si nulla est causa generandi stimulos ingerat coeundi, ubi si ei ceditur, peccando satietur; si non ceditur, dissentiendo frenetur, quae duo aliena fuisse a paradiso ante peccatum, dubitare quis possit? Nam neque illa honestas faciebat aliquid indecorum neque illa felicitas patiebatur aliquid impacatum. Oportebat itaque ut ista carnalis concupiscentia nulla ibi esset omnino quando concipiebatur uirginis partus in quo nihil morte dignum fuerat inuenturus, et eum tamen occisurus auctor mortis auctoris uitae morte uincendus.

Now, however, we sense it to be such that, resisting the law of the mind, even if there is no cause of generating, it injects the stimuli of coupling; where, if it is yielded to, it is sated by sinning; if it is not yielded to, it is curbed by dissent—who could doubt that these two were alien to Paradise before sin? For neither did that decency do anything indecorous, nor did that felicity suffer anything unpeaceful. It was therefore meet that this carnal concupiscence should not be there at all when the Virgin’s offspring was being conceived, in whom nothing worthy of death would be found, and yet the author of death, about to slay him, would be conquered by the death of the Author of life.

Victor primi Adam et tenens genus humanum uictus a secundo Adam et amittens genus christianum liberatum ex humano genere ab humano crimine per eum qui non erat in crimine, quamuis esset ex genere, ut deceptor ille ab eo uinceretur genere quod uicerat crimine. Et hoc ita gestum est ut homo non extollatur, sed qui gloriatur in domino glorietur. Qui enim uictus est homo tantum erat, et ideo uictus est quia superbe deus esse cupiebat; qui autem uicit et homo et deus erat, et ideo sic uicit natus ex uirgine quia deus humiliter, non quomodo alios sanctos regebat illum hominem, sed gerebat.

The victor over the first Adam and holder of the human race was conquered by the second Adam and lost the Christian race, liberated out of the human race from human crime through him who was not in crime, although he was of the race, so that that deceiver might be conquered by him in the race which he had conquered by crime. And this was thus enacted that man be not exalted, but he who glories may glory in the Lord. For the one who was conquered was only a man, and therefore he was conquered because he proudly desired to be a god; but the one who conquered was both man and God, and therefore he thus conquered, born of a virgin, because, as God, he did so humbly—not as he used to rule other holy men was he ruling that man, but he was bearing him.

Haec tanta dei dona et si qua alia sunt quae de hac re nobis et quaerere nunc et disserere longum est nisi uerbum caro fieret, nulla essent.

These so great gifts of God, and whatever others there are—which, on this matter, it would now be lengthy for us both to inquire into and to discourse upon—would be nothing, unless the Word were made flesh.

[XIX 24] Haec autem omnia quae pro nobis uerbum caro factum temporaliter et localiter fecit et pertulit secundum quam demonstrare suscepimus ad scientiam pertinent non ad sapientiam. Quod autem uerbum est sine tempore et sine loco est patri coaeternum et ubique totum, de quo si quisquam potest quantum potest ueracem proferre sermonem, sermo erit ille sapientiae; ac per hoc uerbum caro factum, quod est Christus Iesus et sapientiae thesauros habet et scientiae. Nam scribens apostolus ad colossenses: Volo enim uos scire, inquit, quantum certamen habeam pro uobis et pro his qui Laodiciae sunt et quicumque non uiderunt faciem meam in carne ut consolentur corda eorum copulati in caritate et in omnibus diuitiis plenitudinis intellectus ad cognoscendum mysterium dei quod est Christus in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi.

[19 24] But all these things which, for our sake, the Word made flesh did and endured temporally and locally, according to the part which we have undertaken to demonstrate, pertain to knowledge, not to wisdom. But the Word, which is without time and without place, is coeternal with the Father and whole everywhere; and if anyone can, as much as he can, bring forth a truthful discourse about it, that discourse will be one of wisdom; and through this the Word made flesh, which is Christ Jesus, holds the treasures both of wisdom and of knowledge. For, writing to the Colossians, the Apostle says: I want you to know, he says, how great a contest I have for you and for those who are at Laodicea, and for as many as have not seen my face in the flesh, that their hearts may be consoled, knit together in charity, and in all the riches of the fullness of understanding, unto the knowing of the mystery of God, which is Christ, in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge hidden.

Quatenus nouerat apostolus thesauros istos, quantum eorum penetrauerat et in eis ad quanta peruenerat, quis potest nosse? Ego tamen secundum id quod scriptum est: Vnicuique autem nostrum datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem; alii quidem datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum, si ita inter se distant haec duo ut sapientia diuinis, scientia humanis attributa sit rebus, utrumque agnosco in Christo et mecum omnis eius fidelis. Et cum lego uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in nobis, in uerbo intellego uerum dei filium, in carne agnosco uerum hominis filium, et utrumque simul in unam personam dei et hominis ineffabili gratiae largitate coniunctum.

To what extent the apostle knew those treasures, how much of them he had penetrated, and to what reaches he had attained in them, who can know? I, however, according to that which is written: “Moreover to each of us is given the manifestation of the Spirit for utility; to one indeed is given through the Spirit a word of wisdom, to another a word of science according to the same Spirit,”—if these two differ from each other in such a way that wisdom is attributed to divine things, science to human things, I acknowledge both in Christ, and with me does every faithful one of his. And when I read “the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us,” in the Word I understand the true Son of God, in the flesh I recognize the true son of man, and both together united into one person of God and man by the largess of ineffable grace.

Propter quod sequitur ac dicit: Et uidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et ueritatis. Si gratiam referamus ad scientiam, ueritatem ad sapientiam, puta nos ab illo duarum istarum rerum distinctione quam commendauimus non abhorrere.

Wherefore it follows and says: And we have seen his glory, glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth. If we refer grace to science (knowledge), truth to wisdom, suppose that we do not abhor that distinction of these two things which we have commended.

In rebus enim per tempus ortis illa summa gratia est quod homo in unitatem personae coniunctus est deo; in rebus uero aeternis summa ueritas recte tribuitur dei uerbo. Quod uero idem ipse est unigenitus a patre plenus gratiae et ueritatis, id actum est ut idem ipse sit in rebus pro nobis temporaliter gestis cui per eandem fidem mundamur ut eum stabiliter contemplemur in rebus aeternis. Illi autem praecipui gentium philosophi qui inuisibilia dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspicere potuerunt, tamen quia sine mediatore, id est sine homine Christo philosophati sunt, quem nec uenturum prophetis nec uenisse apostolis crediderunt, ueritatem detinuerunt sicut de illis dictum est in iniquitate.

In things that have arisen through time, that is the highest grace: that Man has been joined to God in the unity of person; but in eternal things the highest truth is rightly attributed to the Word of God. And that this very same one is the Only-begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth, was brought about in order that the same one should be in the things temporally enacted on our behalf—by whom through the same faith we are cleansed—so that we may steadfastly contemplate him in eternal things. But those preeminent philosophers of the nations, who were able to behold the invisible things of God, understood through the things that have been made, nevertheless, because they philosophized without a Mediator, that is, without the man Christ—whom they believed neither was to come according to the prophets nor had come according to the apostles—detained the truth, as it has been said of them, in iniquity.

Non potuerunt enim in his rebus infirmis constituti nisi quaerere aliqua media per quae ad illa quae intellexerant sublimia peruenirent, atque ita in deceptores daemones inciderunt per quos factum est ut immutarent gloriam incorruptibilis dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et uolucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium. In talibus enim formis etiam idola instituerunt siue coluerunt. Scientia ergo nostra Christus est, sapientia quoque nostra idem Christus est.

For, being set in these infirm matters, they could do nothing but seek some media by which they might arrive at those sublime things they had understood, and thus they fell in with deceiver-demons, through whom it came about that they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man and of birds and of quadrupeds and of serpents. For in such forms they even instituted idols or worshiped them. Therefore our science is Christ; our wisdom likewise is the same Christ.

Ipse nobis fidem de rebus temporalibus inserit; ipse de sempiternis exhibet ueritatem. Per ipsum pergimus ad ipsum, tendimus per scientiam ad sapientiam; ab uno tamen eodemque Christo non recedimus in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. Sed nunc de scientia loquimur, post de sapientia quantum ipse donauerit locuturi.

He himself inserts in us faith about temporal things; he himself exhibits truth about sempiternal things. Through him we proceed to him; we tend through science to wisdom; yet we do not recede from the one and the same Christ in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and science hidden. But now we speak about science, afterwards about wisdom we shall speak, as much as he himself will have granted.

Nec ista duo sic accipiamus quasi non liceat dicere uel istam sapientiam quae in rebus humanis est uel illam scientiam quae in diuinis. Loquendi enim latiore consuetudine utraque sapientia, utraque scientia dici potest. Nullo modo tamen scriptum esset apud apostolum, alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae, nisi et proprie singulis nominibus haec singula uocarentur, de quorum distinctione nunc agimus.

Nor should we take these two in such a way as if it were not permitted to call either that wisdom which is in human affairs or that knowledge which is in divine things. For by the broader custom of speaking, each can be called wisdom, each can be called knowledge. In no way, however, would it have been written with the apostle, “to one a word of wisdom is given, to another a word of knowledge,” unless these several things were also properly called by their several names, whose distinction we are now treating.

[XX 25] Iam itaque uideamus quid sermo iste prolixus effecerit, quid collegerit, quo peruenerit.

[20 25] Now therefore let us see what this prolix discourse has effected, what it has collected, whither it has arrived.

Beatos esse se uelle omnium hominum est, nec tamen omnium est fides qua cor mundante ad beatitudinem peruenitur. Ita fit ut per istam quam non omnes uolunt ad illam tendendum sit quam no potest esse qui nolit. Beatos esse se uelle omnes in corde suo uident, tantaque est in hac re naturae humanae conspiratio ut non fallatur homo qui hoc ex animo suo de animo conicit alieno; denique omnes id uelle nos nouimus.

To wish themselves to be blessed is common to all human beings, and yet not all have the faith by which, cleansing the heart, one arrives at beatitude. Thus it comes about that through this, which not all are willing, one must tend toward that, which cannot be for one who is unwilling. All see in their heart that they wish to be blessed, and so great in this matter is the conspiracy of human nature that the man is not deceived who infers this from his own spirit about another’s spirit; finally, we know that all wish this.

Multi uero immortales se esse posse desperant, cum id quod omnes uolunt, id est beatus, nullus esse aliter possit; uolunt tamen etiam immortales esse si possint, sed non credendo quod possint non ita uiuunt ut possint. Necessaria est ergo fides ut beatitudinem consequamur omnibus humanae naturae bonis, id est et animi et corporis. Haec autem fidem in Christo esse definitam qui in carne resurrexit a mortuis non moriturus ulterius, nec nisi per illum quemquam liberari a diaboli dominatu per remissionem peccatorum, in cuius diaboli partibus necesse est esse miseram uitam eandemque perpetuam, quae mors potius est dicenda quam uita, eadem fides habet.

Many indeed despair that they can be immortal, since that which all will—that is, to be blessed—no one can be in any other way; yet they also will to be immortal if they can, but by not believing that they can, they do not live in such a way as to be able. Therefore faith is necessary that we may attain beatitude with all the goods of human nature, that is, both of soul and of body. Moreover, this same faith holds that faith is defined as being in Christ, who in the flesh rose from the dead, no longer to die; and that no one is freed from the dominion of the devil except through Him by the remission of sins—on whose, the devil’s, side it is necessary that life be wretched and yet perpetual, which ought rather to be called death than life—the same faith maintains.

De qua et in hoc libro sicut potui pro spatio temporis disputaui, cum iam et in quarto libro huius operis multa de hac dixerim, sed ibi propter aliud, hic propter aliud; ibi scilicet ut ostenderem cur et quomodo Christus in plenitudine temporis a patre sit missus propter eos qui dicunt eum qui misit et eum qui missus est aequales natura esse non posse; hic autem ad distinguendam actiuam scientiam a contemplatiua sapientia.

Concerning which I have also disputed in this book, as I was able within the space of time, since already also in the fourth book of this work I have said many things about this—yet there for one reason, here for another; there, namely, that I might show why and how Christ in the fullness of time was sent by the Father, for the sake of those who say that the one who sends and the one who is sent cannot be equal in nature; but here, for distinguishing active knowledge from contemplative sapience.

[26] Placuit quippe uelut gradatim ascendentibus in utraque requirere apud interiorem hominem quandam sui cuiusque generis trinitatem sicut prius apud exteriorem quaesiuimus ut ad illam trinitatem quae deus est pro nostro modulo, si tamen uel hoc possumus, saltem in aenigmate et per speculum contuendam exercitatiore in his inferioribus rebus mente ueniamus. Huius igitur uerba fidei quisquis in solis uocibus memoriae commendauerit nesciens quid significent (sicut solent qui graece nesciunt uerba graeca tenere memoriter, uel latina similiter uel cuiusque alterius linguae, qui eius ignari sunt), nonne habent quandam in suo animo trinitatem quia et in memoria sunt illi uerborum soni etiam quando inde non cogitat, et inde formatur acies recordationis eius quando de his cogitat, et uoluntas recordantis atque cogitantis utrumque coniungit? Nullo modo tamen dixerimus istum cum hoc agit secundum trinitatem interioris hominis agere sed potius exterioris quia id solum meminit et quando uult quantum uult intuetur quod ad sensum corporis pertinet qui uocatur auditus, nec aliud quam corporalium rerum, id est sonorum, tali cogitatione imagines uersat.

[26] For it has seemed good, as to people ascending step by step, to inquire in both, to wit, to seek in the inner man a certain trinity of its own kind just as previously we sought in the outer man, so that to that Trinity which is God, according to our small measure—if indeed we can even this—at least to be beheld in an enigma and through a mirror, we may come with a mind made more exercised by these lower things. Therefore whoever has committed to memory the words of this faith in mere vocal sounds, not knowing what they signify (as those are wont who do not know Greek to hold Greek words by memory, or Latin similarly, or of any other language, of which they are ignorant), do they not have a certain trinity in their soul, because both the sounds of the words are in the memory even when he does not think of them, and from there the keenness of his recollection is formed when he does think of them, and the will of the one recalling and thinking conjoins both? In no way, however, would we say that when he does this he is acting according to the trinity of the inner man, but rather of the outer, because he only remembers that and, when he wills and as much as he wills, beholds that which pertains to the sense of the body which is called hearing, nor does he in such thinking turn over images other than of corporeal things, that is, of sounds.

Si autem quod uerba illa significant teneat et recolat, iam quidem aliquid interioris hominis agit, sed nondum dicendus uel putandus est uiuere secundum interioris hominis trinitatem si ea non diligit quae ibi praedicantur, praecipiuntur, promittuntur. Potest enim etiam ad hoc tenere atque cogitare ut falsa esse existimans conetur etiam redarguere. Voluntas ergo illa quae ibi coniungit ea quae memoria tenebantur et ea quae inde in acie cogitationis impressa sunt implet quidem aliquam trinitatem cum ipsa sit tertia, sed non secundum eam uiuitur quando illa quae cogitantur uelut falsa non placent.

But if he hold and recollect what those words signify, he already indeed does something of the inner man; yet he is not yet to be said or thought to live according to the trinity of the inner man if he does not love the things which are there preached, prescribed, promised. For he can also hold and think on this to the end that, supposing them to be false, he even tries to refute them. Therefore that will which there conjoins the things that were being held in memory and the things that from there have been impressed in the focus of thought does indeed complete a certain trinity, since it itself is the third; but one does not live according to it when the things that are thought do not please, being regarded as false.

Cum autem uera esse creduntur et quae ibi diligenda sunt diliguntur, iam secundum trinitatem interioris hominis uiuitur; secundum hoc enim uiuit quisque quod diligit. Quomodo autem diligantur quae nesciuntur sed tantum creduntur? Iam quaestio ista tractata est in superioribus libris, et inuentum neminem diligere quod penitus ignorat; ex his autem quae nota sunt diligi quando diligi dicuntur ignota.

But when the things there are believed to be true and the things there to be loved are loved, already one lives according to the trinity of the inner man; for each person lives according to that which he loves. But how are things loved which are not known but only believed? This question has already been treated in the preceding books, and it has been found that no one loves what he is utterly ignorant of; rather, from those things which are known, the unknown are loved when the unknown are said to be loved.

Nunc librum istum ita claudimus ut admoneamus quod iustus ex fide uiuit, quae fides per dilectionem operatur ita ut uirtutem quoque ipsae quibus prudenter, fortiter, temperanter, iusteque uiuitur omnes ad eandem referantur fidem; non enim aliter uerae poterunt esse uirtutes. Quae tamen in hac uita non ualent tantum ut aliquando non sit hic necessaria qualiumcumque remissio peccatorum, quae non fit nisi per eum qui sanguine suo uicit principem peccatorum. Ex hac fide et tali uita quaecumque notiones sunt in animo fidelis hominis cum memoria continentur et recordatione inspiciuntur et uoluntati placent, reddunt quandam sui generis trinitatem.

Now we close this book in such a way as to admonish that the just man lives by faith, which faith operates through love, so that even the virtues themselves by which one lives prudently, bravely, temperately, and justly are all referred to the same faith; for otherwise they will not be able to be true virtues. Which, however, in this life do not avail so much that there should not at some time be needed here a remission of sins of whatever kind—which does not take place except through him who by his blood conquered the prince of sins. From this faith and such a life, whatever notions there are in the mind of a faithful man, when they are contained with memory and inspected by recollection and are pleasing to the will, render a certain trinity of their own kind.

Sed imago dei de qua in eius adiutorio post loquemur nondum in ipsa est, quod tunc melius apparebit cum demonstratum fuerit ubi sit, quod in futuro uolumine lector exspectet.

But the image of God, about which, with his aid, we shall speak afterward, is not yet in it; this will then appear more clearly when it has been shown where it is—something for the reader to await in the forthcoming volume.