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[1] Dum haec in Africa atque in Hispania geruntur, Hannibal in agro Sallentino aestatem consumpsit spe per proditionem urbis Tarentinorum potiundae. ipsorum interim Sallentinorum ignobiles urbes ad eum defecerunt. eodem tempore in Bruttiis ex duodecim populis, qui anno priore ad Poenos desciuerant, Consentini et Tauriani in fidem populi Romani redierunt et plures redissent, ni T. Pomponius Ueientanus, praefectus socium, prosperis aliquot populationibus in agro Bruttio iusti ducis speciem nactus, tumultuario exercitu coacto cum Hannone conflixisset.
[1] While these things were being transacted in Africa and in Spain, Hannibal spent the summer in the Sallentine countryside in hope of getting possession of the city of the Tarentines by treachery. Meanwhile the ignoble towns of the Sallentines defected to him. At the same time in Bruttium, of the twelve peoples who in the previous year had defected to the Carthaginians, the Consentini and the Tauriani returned into the faith of the Roman People, and more would have returned, had not T. Pomponius Veientanus, prefect of the allies, after several prosperous raids in the Bruttian territory, having acquired the semblance of a just commander, with a tumultuary army levied, engaged with Hanno.
there a great multitude of men, but a disorderly mob of rustics and slaves, was cut down or captured: the least part of the loss was that the prefect was taken among the rest—a promoter of the rash battle at the time, and formerly a publican, by every evil art both to the commonwealth and to the companies faithless and damaging. Sempronius the consul in Lucania fought many small battles, none worthy of mention, and took by storm several ignoble towns of the Lucanians. the longer the war was dragged out and successes and reverses varied, affecting not so much fortune as the minds of men, so great a religious awe—and that in great part external—fell upon the community that either men or the gods seemed suddenly to have been made other.
Nor now were the Roman rites being abolished only in secret and within walls, but even in public, in the Forum and on the Capitol, there was a crowd of women neither sacrificing nor praying to the gods in the ancestral manner. Sacrificuli and vates had seized men’s minds, and their number was augmented by the rustic plebs, driven into the city by poverty and fear from fields left uncultivated by protracted war and infested; and there was an easy profit from another’s error, which they plied as though by the practice of a conceded art. At first the secret indignations of the good were overheard; then the matter advanced even to the Fathers and to a public complaint.
heavily accused by the senate, the aediles and the capital triumvirs, because they did not prohibit it, when they had tried to remove that multitude from the forum and to tear down the apparatus of the sacred rites, it was not far off that they were subjected to violence. when it appeared that that evil was now more powerful than that it might be quelled by the lesser magistracies, the business was given by the senate to M. Aemilius, the praetor [urb.], that he should free the people from those religions. he both in a public assembly recited the senatorial decree and issued an edict that whoever possessed vaticinal books or prayers or a written art of sacrificing should bring all those books and writings to him before the Kalends of April, and that no one should sacrifice in public or in a sacred place by a new or foreign rite.
[2] Aliquot publici sacerdotes mortui eo anno sunt, L. Cornelius Lentulus pontifex maximus et C. Papirius C. filius Masso pontifex et P. Furius Philus augur et C. Papirius L. filius Masso decemuir sacrorum. in Lentuli locum M. Cornelius Cethegus, in Papiri Cn. Seruilius Caepio pontifices suffecti sunt; augur creatus L. Quinctius Flamininus, decemuir sacrorum L. Cornelius Lentulus. comitiorum consularium iam appetebat tempus; sed quia consules a bello intentos auocare non placebat, Ti. Sempronius consul comitiorum causa dictatorem dixit C. Claudium Centonem.
[2] Several public priests died that year: Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, pontifex maximus; and Gaius Papirius Masso, son of Gaius, pontifex; and Publius Furius Philus, augur; and Gaius Papirius Masso, son of Lucius, decemvir of the sacred rites. In the place of Lentulus, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, in the place of Papirius, Gnaeus Servilius Caepio were appointed pontifices; as augur, Lucius Quinctius Flamininus was elected; as decemvir of the sacred rites, Lucius Cornelius Lentulus. The time of the consular comitia was already approaching; but because it was not pleasing to call away the consuls, intent on the war, Tiberius Sempronius the consul, for the sake of the comitia, named Gaius Claudius Cento dictator.
by him the master of the horse was named Q. Fulvius Flaccus. On the first comitial day the dictator created as consuls Q. Fulvius Flaccus, the master of the horse, and Ap. Claudius Pulcher, to whom Sicily had been the province in his praetorship. Then the praetors were elected Cn. Fulvius Flaccus, <C.> Claudius Nero, M. Iunius Silanus, P. Cornelius Sulla.
With the comitia completed, the dictator resigned his magistracy. The curule aedile that year, along with M. Cornelius Cethegus, was P. Cornelius Scipio, to whom afterwards the cognomen Africanus belonged. When the tribunes of the plebs opposed him as he sought the aedileship, declaring that his candidacy ought not to be considered because he was not yet of the lawful age to seek it, he said: “If all the Quirites wish to make me aedile, I have years enough.” Thereupon with such favor people ran about among the tribes to bring in their votes that the tribunes suddenly desisted from their undertaking.
This was the aedilician largess: the Roman Games, in proportion to the resources of that time, were splendidly performed and were renewed for one day, and a congius of oil was given to each ward. L. Uillius Tappulus and M. Fundanius Fundulus, plebeian aediles, accused several matrons before the people on a charge of infamy; some of these, once condemned, they drove into exile. The Plebeian Games were renewed for two days, and there was the Epulum of Jupiter for the sake of the games.
[3] Q. Fuluius Flaccus tertium, Ap. Claudius consulatum ineunt; et praetores prouincias sortiti sunt, P. Cornelius Sulla urbanam et peregrinam, quae duorum ante sors fuerat, Cn. Fuluius Flaccus Apuliam, C. Claudius Nero Suessulam, M. Iunius Silanus Tuscos. consulibus bellum cum Hannibale et binae legiones decretae; alter a Q. Fabio superioris anni consule, alter a Fuluio Centumalo acciperet; praetorum Fului Flacci quae Luceriae sub Aemilio praetore, Neronis Claudi quae in Piceno sub C. Terentio fuissent legiones essent; supplementum in eas ipsi scriberent sibi; M. Iunio in Tuscos legiones urbanae prioris anni datae. Ti. Sempronio Graccho et P. Sempronio Tuditano imperium prouinciaeque Lucani et Gallia cum suis exercitibus prorogatae; item P. Lentulo qua uetus prouincia in Sicilia esset, M. Marcello Syracusae et qua Hieronis regnum fuisset, T. Otacilio classis, Graecia M. Ualerio, Sardinia Q. Mucio Scaeuolae, Hispaniae P. et Cn. Corneliis.
[3] Q. Fulvius Flaccus, for the third time, and Ap. Claudius enter upon the consulship; and the praetors drew lots for their provinces: P. Cornelius Sulla the urban and the peregrine jurisdiction, which before had been the lot of two; Cn. Fulvius Flaccus Apulia; C. Claudius Nero Suessula; M. Junius Silanus the Tuscans. For the consuls, war with Hannibal and two legions apiece were decreed: one was to receive a legion from Q. Fabius, the consul of the previous year, the other from Fulvius Centumalus; for the praetors, the legions which under the praetor Aemilius had been at Luceria were to be those of Fulvius Flaccus, and the legions which under C. Terentius had been in Picenum were to be those of Claudius Nero; they themselves should enroll for themselves the supplement into those legions; to M. Junius for the Tuscans the urban legions of the previous year were assigned. To Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus, imperium and the provinces of the Lucanians and of Gaul were prolonged along with their own armies; likewise to P. Lentulus, where the old province in Sicily was; to M. Marcellus, Syracuse and where the kingdom of Hiero had been; to T. Otacilius, the fleet; Greece to M. Valerius; Sardinia to Q. Mucius Scaevola; the Spains to P. and Cn. Cornelii.
Dilectum consulum M. Postumii Pyrgensis cum magno prope motu rerum factum impediit. publicanus erat Postumius, qui multis annis parem fraude auaritiaque neminem in ciuitate habuerat praeter T. Pomponium Ueientanum, quem populantem temere agros in Lucanis ductu Hannonis priore anno ceperant Carthaginienses. hi, quia publicum periculum erat a ui tempestatis in iis quae portarentur ad exercitus et ementiti erant falsa naufragia et ea ipsa quae uera renuntiauerant fraude ipsorum facta erant, non casu.
Marcus Postumius of Pyrgi impeded the consuls’ levy, with an almost great commotion of affairs. Postumius was a publican, who for many years had had no equal in fraud and avarice in the state, except T. Pomponius Veientanus, whom the Carthaginians had captured the previous year, while under Hanno’s leadership he was rashly ravaging the fields in Lucania. These men, because there was public peril from the force of the tempest upon the things that were being carried to the armies, had both fabricated false shipwrecks, and even those very ones which they had reported as true had been brought about by their own fraud, not by chance.
onto old and battered ships, with a few things of little value placed aboard, when they had sunk them on the high sea, the sailors having been taken off into prepared skiffs, they were falsely claiming that the cargoes had been manifold. that fraud had been indicated to Marcus Aemilius, praetor, the previous year and through him brought before the senate, yet it was not marked by any senatorial decree, because the Fathers did not wish the order of the publicani to be offended at such a time. the people were a more severe avenger of the fraud; and at last, two tribunes of the plebs, Spurius and Lucius Carvilius, being stirred when they saw the matter odious and infamous, declared a fine of 200,000 asses upon Marcus Postumius.
when the day for contesting it had arrived and so crowded an assembly of the plebs was present that the area of the Capitol could scarcely contain the multitude, with the case fully pleaded, one hope seemed to be, if Gaius Servilius Casca, tribune of the plebs, who was a near kinsman and cognate to Postumius, should intercede before the tribes were called to the vote. with the witnesses presented, the tribunes cleared the people away, and the sitella was brought so that they might draw lots where the Latins should carry their suffrage. meanwhile the publicans pressed Casca to remove the day from the council; the people protested; and by chance Casca was seated first on the wing, in whom at once fear and shame were turning his mind.
Since there was too little protection in that, for the sake of throwing the affair into turmoil the publicans burst in through the open, a space having been cleared by a wedge, brawling at once with the people and the tribunes. The matter was not far from combat when Fulvius the consul said to the tribunes, 'Do you not see that you have been forced into line and that the affair is looking toward sedition, unless you promptly dismiss the assembly of the plebs?'
[4] Plebe dimissa senatus uocatur et consules referunt de concilio plebis turbato ui atque audacia publicanorum: M. Furium Camillum, cuius exsilium ruina urbis secutura fuerit, damnari se ab iratis ciuibus passum esse; decemuiros ante eum, quorum legibus ad eam diem uiuerent, multos postea principes ciuitatis iudicium de se populi passos; Postumium Pyrgensem suffragium populo Romano extorsisse, concilium plebis sustulisse, tribunos in ordinem coegisse, contra populum Romanum aciem instruxisse, locum occupasse ut tribunos a plebe intercluderet, tribus in suffragium uocari prohiberet. nihil aliud a caede ac dimicatione continuisse homines nisi patientiam magistratuum, quod cesserint in praesentia furori atque audaciae paucorum uincique se ac populum Romanum passi sint et comitia, quae reus ui atque armis prohibiturus erat, ne causa quaerentibus dimicationem daretur, uoluntate ipsi sua sustulerint. haec cum ab optimo quoque pro atrocitate rei accepta essent uimque eam contra rem publicam et pernicioso exemplo factam senatus decresset, confestim Caruilii tribuni plebis omissa multae certatione rei capitalis diem Postumio dixerunt ac ni uades daret prendi a uiatore atque in carcerem duci iusserunt.
[4] With the plebs dismissed, the senate is called, and the consuls report concerning the assembly of the plebs disturbed by the force and audacity of the publicani: that M. Furius Camillus, whose exile was followed by the ruin of the city, had allowed himself to be condemned by angry citizens; that the decemvirs before him, by whose laws they lived down to that day, and many later leading men of the civitas, had endured the people’s judgment upon themselves; that Postumius of Pyrgi had extorted a vote from the Roman people, had abolished the assembly of the plebs, had forced the tribunes into line, had drawn up a battle-line against the Roman people, had seized a position so as to cut off the tribunes from the plebs, had forbidden the tribes to be called to the vote. Nothing else had kept men from slaughter and combat except the patience of the magistrates, because they had yielded for the moment to the frenzy and audacity of a few and had allowed themselves and the Roman people to be vanquished, and the comitia, which the defendant was going to prevent by force and arms, they themselves had removed of their own will, lest a pretext be given to those seeking a fight. When these things had been received by every best man in proportion to the atrocity of the affair, and the senate had decreed that that violence had been done against the commonwealth and with a pernicious precedent, immediately the tribunes of the plebs, Carvilius having dropped the dispute about the fine, appointed a day for a capital charge against Postumius, and, unless he should give sureties, they ordered that he be seized by the viator and led into prison.
Postumius, sureties having been given, did not appear. The tribunes asked the plebs, and the plebs thus decreed: that if M. Postumius should not come forward before the Kalends of May, and if, when summoned on that day, he did not answer and was not excused, he was to be deemed to be in exile and his goods to come to sale, and that he himself be interdicted from water and fire. Then, individually, for each of those who had been instigators of disorder and tumult, they began to name a day on a capital charge and to demand sureties.
[5] Hunc fraus publicanorum, deinde fraudem audacia protegens exitum habuit. comitia inde pontifici maximo creando sunt habita; ea comitia nouus pontifex M. Cornelius Cethegus habuit. tres ingenti certamine petierunt, Q. Fuluius Flaccus consul, qui et ante bis consul et censor fuerat, et T. Manlius Torquatus, et ipse duobus consulatibus et censura insignis, et <P.> Licinius Crassus, qui aedilitatem curulem petiturus erat.
[5] The matter had this outcome: the fraud of the publicans—and then audacity protecting the fraud—prevailed. The comitia were then held for electing the pontifex maximus; those comitia were presided over by the new pontifex, M. Cornelius Cethegus. Three sought it with an immense contest: Q. Fulvius Flaccus, consul, who had also previously been twice consul and censor; and T. Manlius Torquatus, himself distinguished by two consulships and a censorship; and <P.> Licinius Crassus, who was about to seek the curule aedileship.
Here a youth defeated old men and men of honor in that contest. Before him, within one hundred and twenty years, no one except P. Cornelius Calussa had been created pontifex maximus who had not sat in the curule chair. When the consuls were with difficulty completing the levy, because the scarcity of young men did not easily suffice for both that new urban legions be enrolled and that a supplement be written in for the old ones, the senate forbade them to desist from the undertaking and ordered two sets of triumvirs to be created: the one to inspect on this side, the other beyond the fiftieth milestone, in the villages, fora, and meeting-places, all the supply of freeborn men; and, if any seemed to have strength enough to bear arms, even if they were not yet of military age, to make them soldiers. The tribunes of the plebs, if it seemed good to them, should bring it to the people that, for those who had taken the oath under seventeen years, the stipends should proceed just as if they had been made soldiers at seventeen years or older.
Eodem tempore ex Sicilia litterae M. Marcelli de postulatis militum qui cum P. Lentulo militabant in senatu recitatae sunt. Cannensis reliquiae cladis hic exercitus erat, relegatus in Siciliam, sicut ante dictum est, ne ante Punici belli finem in Italiam reportarentur.
At the same time letters from Sicily from Marcus Marcellus, concerning the demands of the soldiers who were serving with Publius Lentulus, were read in the senate. This army was the remnant of the Cannae disaster, relegated to Sicily, as was said before, so that they might not be brought back into Italy before the end of the Punic war.
[6] Hi permissu Lentuli primores equitum centurionumque et robora ex legionibus peditum legatos in hiberna ad M. Marcellum miserunt, e quibus unus potestate dicendi facta: 'consulem te, M. Marcelle, in Italia adissemus, cum primum de nobis, etsi non iniquum, certe triste senatus consultum factum est, nisi hoc sperassemus in prouinciam nos morte regum turbatam ad graue bellum aduersus Siculos simul Poenosque mitti, et sanguine nostro uolneribusque nos senatui satisfacturos esse, sicut patrum memoria qui capti a Pyrrho ad Heracleam erant aduersus Pyrrhum ipsum pugnantes satisfecerunt. quamquam quod ob meritum nostrum suscensuistis, patres conscripti, nobis aut suscensetis? ambo mihi consules et uniuersum senatum intueri uideor, cum te, M. Marcelle, intueor, quem si ad Cannas consulem habuissemus, melior et rei publicae et nostra fortuna esset.
[6] These men, with Lentulus’s permission, sent the chiefs of the horse and of the centurions, and the pick of the infantry from the legions, as envoys to Marcus Marcellus in winter quarters; and of them one, when leave to speak had been granted, said: ‘We would have approached you, Marcus Marcellus, as consul in Italy, when first a senatorial decree about us was passed—although not unfair, yet certainly grievous—had we not hoped this: that we would be sent into a province disturbed by the death of kings, to a grave war against the Sicilians and the Phoenicians at once, and that we would satisfy the senate with our blood and wounds, just as, within the memory of our fathers, those who had been captured by Pyrrhus at Heraclea satisfied it by fighting against Pyrrhus himself. And yet, for what desert of ours did you, Conscript Fathers, grow angry, or will you grow angry, with us? I seem to behold both consuls and the whole senate when I behold you, Marcus Marcellus—whom, if we had had as consul at Cannae, the fortune both of the commonwealth and of ourselves would be better.’
Allow, I beg, before I complain about our condition, that we purge the guilt of which we are accused. If we perished at Cannae not by the wrath of the gods nor by fate, by whose law the immutable order of human affairs is woven, but by fault, whose fault then was it? the soldiers’ or the commanders’?
for my part, I, a soldier, will never say anything about my general, especially since I know that thanks were given by the Senate to him because he did not despair of the Republic, and that after the flight at Cannae his imperium was prorogated through all the years. likewise we have heard that the others too from the remnants of that disaster, whom we had as military tribunes, seek and hold honors and obtain provinces. do you, Conscript Fathers, easily pardon yourselves and your sons, and do you rage against these lowly heads?
and was it not shameful for the consul and the other foremost men of the state to flee, when there was no other hope, while you sent soldiers, destined in any case to die, into the battle-line? At the Allia almost the whole army fled; at the Caudine Forks, not even having tried a contest, it handed over its arms to the enemy, to say nothing of other shameful routs of armies; yet it was so far from the case that any ignominy was sought for those armies that both the city of Rome was recovered by means of that army which had fled from the Allia to Veii, and the Caudine legions, who had returned to Rome without arms, when sent back armed into Samnium, sent under the yoke that same enemy who had rejoiced in this his disgrace. But can anyone accuse the army of Cannae of flight or of panic, where more than fifty thousand men fell, whence the consul fled with seventy horsemen, whence no one survives except him whom the enemy, wearied by cutting down, left behind?
when ransom was denied to the captives, people in general praised us because we had reserved ourselves for the Republic, because we had returned to the consul at Venusia and had made the semblance of a regular army; now we are in a worse condition than the captives were in the days of our fathers. For to them only their arms and the order of soldiery and the place in the camp where they pitched were changed; yet these things, once service had been rendered to the Republic and by a single fortunate battle, they recovered. None of them was relegated into exile, to none was the hope of earning out their stipends taken away; finally, an enemy was given, with whom, fighting, they might end either their life at once or their ignominy. We, against whom nothing can be alleged save that we were guilty that any Roman soldier survived from the Cannae battle-line, have been relegated not only far from our fatherland and from Italy but even from the enemy, where we may grow old in exile, lest there be any hope, any occasion of abolishing ignominy, any of appeasing the citizens’ wrath, any, finally, of dying well. We ask neither an end of ignominy nor a reward of virtue; only let it be permitted to test our spirit and to exercise our valor.
we seek labor and peril, that we may perform the duty of men, of soldiers. the war in Sicily is now for a second year being waged with mighty contention; some cities the Carthaginian storms, others the Roman; the battle-lines of foot and of horse clash; at Syracuse the matter is conducted by land and by sea; we overhear the shouting of combatants and the rattle of arms, while we ourselves are inactive and sluggish, as though we had neither hands nor weapons. with legions of slaves the consul Tiberius Sempronius has now so many times fought the enemy in pitched battle; the price of their service is freedom and citizenship.
let us at least be to you in place of slaves bought for this war; let it be permitted to meet the enemy and to seek liberty by fighting. Do you wish at sea, do you wish on land, do you wish in the battle line, do you wish in besieging cities to put virtue to the test? We demand the very harshest tasks for toil and peril, so that what had to be done at Cannae may be done as soon as possible, since whatever we have lived thereafter has all been destined for ignominy.'
[7] Sub haec dicta ad genua Marcelli procubuerunt. Marcellus id nec iuris nec potestatis suae esse dixit; senatui scripturum se omniaque de sententia patrum facturum esse. eae litterae ad nouos consules allatae ac per eos in senatu recitatae sunt; consultusque de iis litteris ita decreuit senatus: militibus, qui ad Cannas commilitones suos pugnantes deseruissent, senatum nihil uidere cur res publica committenda esset.
[7] Under these words they fell prostrate at Marcellus’s knees. Marcellus said that this was neither of his right nor of his power; that he would write to the senate and would do everything according to the judgment of the fathers. Those letters were brought to the new consuls and were read by them in the senate; and, being consulted about those letters, the senate thus decreed: as to the soldiers who at Cannae had deserted their fellow soldiers while they fought, the senate saw no reason why the republic should be entrusted to them.
if it seemed otherwise to M. Claudius, proconsul, let him do what he judged to be for the commonwealth and in accord with his good faith, provided that none of them be exempt from service, nor be presented with a military gift on account of valor, nor be brought back into Italy so long as the enemy was in the land of Italy. Then elections were held by the urban praetor by decree of the senate and enactment of the plebs, in which there were created a board of five for repairing walls and towers, and two boards of three: the one for searching out sacred rites and registering gifts, the other for repairing the temples of Fortuna and Mater Matuta within the Carmental Gate and of Spes outside the gate, which had been consumed by fire the previous year. The storms were foul; on the Alban Mount it rained stones for two continuous days; many things were struck from the sky, two shrines on the Capitol, the rampart in the camp in many places above Suessula, and two watchmen were killed; at Cumae the wall and certain towers were not only struck by thunderbolts but even sheared down.
At Reate a huge rock was seen to fly about, and the sun to redden more than usual and to be like blood. On account of these prodigies there was a one-day supplication, and for several days the consuls devoted themselves to divine rites, and during those same days there was a nine-day sacred rite. Since the defection of the Tarentines had long been both in Hannibal’s hope and in the Romans’ suspicion, a chance cause from outside intervened to hasten it.
Phileas of Tarentum, who had now for a long time been in Rome under the guise of an embassy, a man of a restless spirit and least tolerant of the idleness in which, long-drawn-out as it then was, he seemed to be growing old, found access to the hostages from Thurii and Tarentum. They were being guarded in the Atrium of Liberty with less care, because it was not advantageous either for themselves or for their communities to deceive the Romans. After he had stirred them by frequent conversations, and, two custodians having been bribed, had led them out from custody at the first darkness, he himself, having become a companion of their secret journey, fled.
[8] Huius atrocitas poenae duarum nobilissimarum in Italia Graecarum ciuitatium animos inritauit cum publice, tum etiam singulos priuatim ut quisque tam foede interemptos aut propinquitate aut amicitia contingebat. ex iis tredecim fere nobiles iuuenes Tarentini coniurauerunt, quorum principes Nico et Philemenus erant. hi priusquam aliquid mouerent conloquendum cum Hannibale rati, nocte per speciem uenandi urbe egressi ad eum proficiscuntur; et cum haud procul castris abessent, ceteri silua prope uiam sese occuluerunt, Nico et Philemenus progressi ad stationes comprehensique, ultro id petentes, ad Hannibalem deducti sunt.
[8] The atrocity of this punishment provoked the spirits of two of the most noble Greek cities in Italy, both publicly and also individuals privately, as each one was connected to those so foully slain either by kinship or by friendship. From these, about thirteen noble young men of Tarentum conspired, whose leaders were Nico and Philemenus. These, thinking that they ought to confer with Hannibal before they set anything in motion, by night under the pretext of hunting, having gone out of the city, set out to him; and when they were not far from the camp, the others hid themselves in a wood near the road, while Nico and Philemenus, having advanced to the outposts and been seized, unprompted asking for this very thing, were conducted to Hannibal.
when they had both set forth the reasons for their plan and what they were preparing, they were highly commended and loaded with promises, and are ordered, in order to make good faith with their fellow townsmen, to have gone out of the city for the sake of plundering, to drive toward the city the herds of the Carthaginians which had been driven out to pasture; it was promised that they would do this safely and without contest. once that booty was seen, it was less a marvel to the young men, and they dared to do this again and again. having met with Hannibal again, they sanctioned by pledge that the Tarentines would be free, would have their own laws and all their own things, and would pay no tribute to the Carthaginian nor receive a garrison against their will; that the Carthaginian garrisons would be betrayed.
When these things had come to an agreement, then indeed Philemenus began to make more frequent the custom of going out by night and returning into the city. And he was distinguished for zeal in hunting, and dogs and other apparatus followed him, and regularly bringing back some catch, or something brought from the enemy by prearrangement, he would present it as a gift either to the prefect or to the keepers of the gates; they believed that to go to and fro at night was safest on account of fear of the enemy. When now the matter had been brought to such a pitch of custom that, at whatever time of night he should give the signal with a whistle, the gate would be opened, the time seemed to Hannibal for executing the affair.
[9] Ceterum postquam Tarentum ire constituit, decem milibus peditum atque equitum, quos in expeditionem uelocitate corporum ac leuitate armorum aptissimos esse ratus est, electis, quarta uigilia noctis signa mouit, praemissisque octoginta fere Numidis equitibus praecepit ut discurrerent circa uias perlustrarentque omnia oculis, ne quis agrestium procul spectator agminis falleret; praegressos retraherent, obuios occiderent, ut praedonum magis quam exercitus accolis species esset. ipse raptim agmine acto quindecim ferme milium spatio castra ab Tarento posuit; et ne ibi quidem nuntiato quo pergerent, tantum conuocatos milites monuit uia omnes irent nec deuerti quemquam aut excedere ordine agminis paterentur et in primis intenti ad imperia accipienda essent neu quid nisi ducum iussu facerent; se in tempore editurum quae uellet agi. eadem ferme hora Tarentum fama praeuenerat Numidas equites paucos populari agros terroremque late agrestibus iniecisse.
[9] But after he decided to go to Tarentum, having selected ten thousand infantry and cavalry whom he judged most apt for an expedition by the velocity of their bodies and the lightness of their arms, he moved the standards at the fourth watch of the night; and, having sent ahead about eighty Numidian horsemen, he ordered them to run to and fro around the roads and to survey all things with their eyes, lest any of the countryfolk, a spectator from afar of the column, should elude them; to drag back those who had gone on ahead, to kill those who met them, so that to the neighbors there might be the appearance of brigands rather than of an army. He himself, having driven the column rapidly, pitched camp at a distance of about fifteen miles from Tarentum; and not even there announcing whither they were proceeding, he only, when the soldiers had been called together, warned that all should go by the road and should allow no one to turn aside or to leave the order of the column, and that above all they should be intent on receiving commands and do nothing except by the order of their leaders; that he would in due time publish what he wished to be done. At almost the same hour the report had anticipated them to Tarentum, that a few Numidian horsemen were ravaging the fields and had cast widespread terror upon the countryfolk.
at which news the Roman prefect was moved to nothing further than to order that a part of the cavalry on the next day, at first light go out to ward off the enemy from depredations; in other respects so little care was applied by him that, on the contrary, that sally of the Numidians served as an argument that Hannibal and the army <e> the camp had not moved.
Hannibal concubia nocte mouit. dux Philemenus erat cum solito captae uenationis onere; ceteri proditores ea quae composita erant exspectabant. conuenerat autem ut Philemenus portula adsueta uenationem inferens armatos induceret, parte alia portam Temenitida adiret Hannibal; ea mediterranea regio est orientem spectans; busta aliquantum intra moenia includunt.
Hannibal moved in the dead of night. His guide was Philemenus, with the customary burden of captured game; the other traitors were awaiting the things that had been arranged. It had been agreed, moreover, that Philemenus, bringing the game in through the accustomed postern, would lead in armed men, while on another side Hannibal would approach the Temenitid Gate; that is an inland quarter facing the east; the walls enclose the burial-grounds somewhat within the walls.
As he was approaching the gate, a fire set by prearrangement was raised by Hannibal, and the same signal, returned by Nico, flashed back; then the flames on both sides were extinguished. Hannibal was leading in silence to the gate. Nico, attacking unexpectedly, cuts down the sleeping sentries in their beds and opens the gate.
Hannibal advances with a column of infantry, and he orders the horsemen to halt, so that, as the situation should require, they might be able to meet it on open ground. And Philemenus was approaching the postern on the other side, by which he had been accustomed to pass to and fro. When his known voice and by-now familiar signal had roused the sentry, as he said that the load of a great beast could scarcely be borne, the postern is opened.
following the two youths who were bringing in the boar, he himself, with a lightly-equipped huntsman, transfixes the watchman with a boar-spear, who, rather incautiously, at the marvel of the size, had turned toward those who were carrying it. Then, having entered, about thirty armed men cut down the other watchmen and break open the nearest gate, and the column under the standards immediately burst in. Thence, led in silence into the forum, they joined themselves to Hannibal.
then the Carthaginian sends two thousand Gauls, divided into three parts, through the city; <to them he adds Tarentines as leaders, two apiece>; he orders that the routes most frequented be occupied, that, with a tumult arisen, Romans be cut down everywhere, the townspeople be spared. But in order that this could be done, he instructs the Tarentine youths that, whenever they should see any of their own from afar, they should bid them keep still and be silent and be of good courage.
[10] Iam tumultus erat clamorque qualis esse in capta urbe solet; sed quid rei esset nemo satis pro certo scire. Tarentini Romanos ad diripiendam urbem credere coortos; Romanis seditio aliqua cum fraude uideri ab oppidanis mota. praefectus primo excitatus tumultu in portum effugit; inde acceptus scapha in arcem circumuehitur.
[10] Already there was tumult and a clamor such as is wont to be in a captured city; but what the matter was no one could know sufficiently for certain. The Tarentines believed that the Romans had risen to pillage the city; to the Romans it seemed that some sedition with fraud had been stirred up by the townsmen. The prefect, roused at first by the tumult, fled into the port; thence, taken up into a skiff, he is conveyed around to the citadel.
confusion too was being caused by the trumpet heard from the theater; for it was Roman, prepared by the traitors for this very purpose, and, blown ignorantly by a Greek, it was making uncertain to whom or for which persons it was giving the signal. When it grew light, and for the Romans the Punic and Gallic arms, once recognized, [then] removed doubt, and the Greeks, seeing Romans strewn everywhere by slaughter, perceived that the city had been captured by Hannibal. After the light was more certain and the Romans who had survived the killings had taken refuge in the citadel and the tumult was gradually falling silent, then Hannibal orders the Tarentines to be convened without arms.
All assembled, except those who, pursuing the Romans retreating into the citadel to share at once whatever fortune should be encountered, had followed them. There Hannibal, having addressed the Tarentines kindly and having attested what he had rendered to their citizens whom he had taken at Trasimene or at Cannae, while at the same time inveighing against the proud domination of the Romans, ordered each man to return into his own house and to inscribe his name upon the doors; he for his part would order those houses which were not inscribed, when the signal was given forthwith, to be plundered; if anyone should inscribe his name at the lodging of a Roman citizen—however, they were keeping their houses empty— he would count him as a foe. When the assembly was dismissed, and the doors marked with titles had made a distinction between a house at peace and a hostile one, when the signal was given there was a general rush everywhere to plunder the Roman lodgings; and there was a considerable amount of booty.
[11] Postero die ad oppugnandam arcem ducit; quam cum et <a> mari, quo in paene insulae modum pars maior circumluitur, praealtis rupibus et ab ipsa urbe muro et fossa ingenti saeptam uideret eoque nec ui nec operibus expugnabilem esse, ne aut se ipsum cura tuendi Tarentinos a maioribus rebus moraretur aut in relictos sine ualido praesidio Tarentinos impetum ex arce cum uellent Romani facerent, uallo urbem ab arce intersaepire statuit, non sine illa etiam spe cum prohibentibus opus Romanis manum posse conseri et, si ferocius procucurrissent, magna caede ita attenuari praesidii uires ut facile per se ipsi Tarentini urbem ab iis tueri possent. ubi coeptum opus est, patefacta repente porta impetum in munientes fecerunt Romani pellique se statio passa est quae pro opere erat, ut successu cresceret audacia pluresque et longius pulsos persequerentur. tum signo dato coorti undique Poeni sunt, quos instructos ad hoc Hannibal tenuerat; nec sustinuere impetum Romani; sed ab effusa fuga loci angustiae eos impeditaque alia opere iam coepto, alia apparatu operis morabantur; plurimi in fossam praecipitauere occisique sunt plures in fuga quam in pugna.
[11] On the next day he led up to assault the citadel; and when he saw that it was both on the sea side—where the greater part is washed around in the manner of an almost-island—protected by very sheer cliffs, and on the side of the city itself girded by a wall and a huge ditch, and thus not to be taken either by force or by siege-works, he resolved, lest either he himself be delayed from greater enterprises by the care of guarding the Tarentines, or the Romans should from the citadel, whenever they wished, make an attack upon the Tarentines left without a strong garrison, to fence off the city from the citadel with a rampart, not without that hope also that, with the Romans trying to hinder the work, hand-to-hand combat might be joined, and, if they ran out more fiercely, the strength of the garrison might by great slaughter be so attenuated that the Tarentines themselves, by their own efforts, could easily defend the city from them. When the work was begun, the gate having suddenly been thrown open, the Romans made an attack upon the men fortifying, and the outpost which was before the works allowed itself to be driven, in order that, with success, boldness might grow and they might pursue more of them, driven farther. Then, a signal having been given, the Carthaginians sprang up on every side, whom Hannibal had kept drawn up for this; nor did the Romans withstand the onset; but in their unbridled flight the narrowness of the place hampered them, and other things delayed them—some by the work already begun, others by the apparatus of the work; very many plunged headlong into the ditch, and more were slain in flight than in the fight.
thence also the work began to be done with no one prohibiting. A huge fosse was drawn and a rampart was erected within it, and after a modest interval he even prepares to add a wall in the same region, so that even without a garrison they might be able to defend themselves against the Romans. Nevertheless he left a small garrison, at the same time to aid in completing the wall; he himself, having set out with the rest of the forces to the river Galaesus—five miles from the city—pitched camp.
Ex his statiuis regressus ad inspiciendum quod opus aliquantum opinione eius celerius creuerat, spem cepit etiam arcem expugnari posse. et est non altitudine, ut ceterae, tuta sed loco plano posita et ab urbe muro tantum ac fossa diuisa. cum iam machinationum omni genere et operibus oppugnaretur, missum a Metaponto praesidium Romanis fecit animum ut nocte ex improuiso opera hostium inuaderent.
Having returned from these standing camps to inspect, since the work had grown somewhat more quickly than he had supposed, he conceived the hope that even the citadel could be taken by storm. And it is not protected by height, as the others, but set on level ground and divided from the city only by a wall and a ditch. When now it was being attacked by every kind of engine and by works, a garrison sent from Metapontum put heart into the Romans so that by night, unexpectedly, they might assault the enemy’s works.
they tore some things down, others they spoiled with fire, and that was the end for Hannibal of attacking the citadel on that side. The remaining hope was in a blockade, nor was that sufficiently efficacious, because those holding the citadel—which, set on a peninsula, almost an island, overhangs the mouth of the harbor—had the sea open; the city, by contrast, was shut off from maritime supplies, and the besiegers were nearer to want than the besieged. Hannibal, having called together the Tarentine chiefs, set forth all the present difficulties: that he saw no way of storming a citadel so fortified, nor any hope in a siege until the sea should be gained from the enemy; but if there were ships by which he might prohibit supplies from being carried in, at once the enemy would either withdraw or surrender themselves.
The Tarentines assented; but they judged that he who brought the counsel should also bring aid for carrying it out. For Punic ships, summoned from Sicily, could accomplish that: their own, which were shut within a narrow bay, since the enemy held the harbor’s barriers, how were they to escape from there into the open sea? “They will escape,” said Hannibal.
'many things that are impeded by nature are expedited by counsel. You have a city situated on a plain; level and sufficiently broad roads lie open in all directions. The road which from the harbor, through the middle of the city, has been laid across to the sea—I will convey the ships along it on wagons with no great effort, and the sea, of which the enemies are now in possession, will be ours; and from there by sea, from here by land, we shall sit around and besiege the citadel; nay, shortly we shall take it either abandoned by the enemies or with the enemies themselves.' This speech produced not only hope of achievement but even immense admiration for the leader.
Wagons were immediately gathered from all sides and joined to one another, and machines were brought up for hauling up the ships; and the road was made up, so that the passage might be easier for the wagons and the burden lighter in transit. Then beasts of burden and men were mustered, and the work was begun vigorously; and a few days later the fleet, equipped and prepared, is carried around the citadel and casts anchor right before the very mouth of the harbor. Hannibal leaves this state of affairs at Tarentum, he himself returning to winter quarters.
[12] Romae consules praetoresque usque <ad> ante diem quintum kalendas Maias Latinae tenuerunt; eo die perpetrato sacro in monte in suas quisque prouincias proficiscuntur. religio deinde noua obiecta est ex carminibus Marcianis. uates hic Marcius inlustris fuerat, et cum conquisitio priore anno ex senatus consulto talium librorum fieret, in M. Aemili praetoris [urbem], qui eam rem agebat, manus uenerant; is protinus nouo praetori Sullae tradiderat.
[12] At Rome the consuls and the praetors held the Latin Festival up to the fifth day before the Kalends of May; on that day, with the sacred rite on the Mount accomplished, each set out to his own province. Then a new religious scruple was thrown up from the Marcian verses. This seer Marcius had been illustrious, and when in the previous year, by a decree of the senate, a search for such books was being made, they had come into the hands of M. Aemilius the praetor [of the city], who was conducting that matter; he immediately handed them over to the new praetor, Sulla.
From this Marcus’s two songs, the authority, ascertained by the event, of the one that had been published after the deed was lending credence also to the other, whose time had not yet come. In the earlier song the Cannae disaster had been foretold in nearly these words: “Flee the river Canna, Trojan-born, lest alien-born men compel you to join hands in battle on the plain of Diomedes. But you will not believe me until you shall have filled the plain with blood, and the river will carry many thousands of your slain from the fruit-bearing land into the great sea; to the fishes and birds and wild beasts that inhabit the lands your flesh shall be food; for thus hath Jupiter spoken to me.” And both the Argive fields of Diomedes and the river Canna those who had served as soldiers in those places recognized, just as they recognized the disaster itself.
then the other song was recited, not only the more obscure for this reason—that things future are more uncertain than things past—but also more perplexing in its kind of writing. ‘Romans, if you wish to drive the hostiles from your land, the ulcer that has come from far among the nations, I judge that games must be vowed to Apollo, which every year shall be graciously held for Apollo; when the people shall have given a portion from the public treasury, let private persons likewise contribute on their own behalf and that of their households; for the making of those games let the praetor preside, the one who shall give supreme jurisdiction to the people and to the plebs; let the decemvirs perform the sacred rites with victims according to the Greek rite. If you shall do this rightly, you will rejoice always, and your estate will become better; for that god will extinguish your public enemies (perduelles), he who peacefully feeds your fields.’ For the expiation of that song they took one day; on the next day a senatus consultum was passed that the decemvirs should inspect the Books regarding the games for Apollo and the carrying out of the divine rite.
When these things had been inspected and reported back to the senate, the fathers decreed that games were to be vowed and held to Apollo, and that, when the games had been held, twelve thousand asses should be given to the praetor for the sacred rite and two greater victims. Another decree of the senate was passed that the decemvirs should perform the sacrifice in the Greek rite with these victims: for Apollo, a gilded ox and two white gilded goats; for Latona, a gilded cow. When the praetor was about to hold the games in the Circus Maximus, he proclaimed that the people, during those games, should contribute a contribution to Apollo as much as was convenient.
This is the origin of the Apollinarian Games, for victory, not for health, as most suppose, of vows undertaken and fulfilled. The people, crowned with garlands, watched; the matrons made supplication; commonly, with doors open, they feasted in the open, and the day was thronged with every kind of ceremony.
[13] Cum Hannibal circa Tarentum, consules ambo in Samnio essent sed circumsessuri Capuam uiderentur, quod malum diuturnae obsidionis esse solet, iam famem Campani sentiebant, quia sementem facere prohibuerant eos Romani exercitus. itaque legatos ad Hannibalem miserunt orantes ut priusquam consules in agros suos educerent legiones uiaeque omnes hostium praesidiis insiderentur, frumentum ex propinquis locis conuehi iuberet Capuam. Hannibal Hannonem ex Bruttiis cum exercitu in Campaniam transire et dare operam ut frumenti copia fieret Campanis iussit.
[13] While Hannibal was around Tarentum, and both consuls were in Samnium but seemed about to besiege Capua, the Campanians were already feeling famine—the evil which is wont to attend a long siege—because the Roman armies had prevented them from making the sowing. Therefore they sent envoys to Hannibal, begging that, before the consuls should lead their legions into their fields and all the roads be occupied by enemy garrisons, he order grain to be conveyed to Capua from neighboring places. Hannibal ordered Hanno to cross from the Bruttian country with an army into Campania and to take pains that there be an abundance of grain for the Campanians.
Hanno, having set out from the Bruttii with an army, skirting the enemy’s camp and the consuls who were in Samnium, when he was now approaching Beneventum, pitched camp three miles from the city itself on a raised site; from there he ordered that from the allied peoples round about the grain which had been brought in during the summer be conveyed to the camp, with escorts assigned to accompany those supply convoys. Thence he sent a message to Capua stating on what day they should be present in the camp to receive the grain, with every sort of wagons and beasts of burden gathered from the fields on all sides. This was handled by the Campanians in keeping with their general sloth and negligence: a little more than four hundred wagons were sent, and, besides, few draft animals.
on account of this, when they had been chastised by Hanno because not even hunger, which would kindle mute beasts, could stimulate their concern, another day was proclaimed for seeking grain with greater preparation. all these things, just as they had been done, when they had been announced to the Beneventans, they immediately sent ten envoys to the consuls—the Roman camp was around Bovianum—. and when, on hearing what was being transacted at Capua, they had arranged among themselves that one of them should lead an army into Campania, Fulvius, to whom that province had fallen, having set out, by night entered the walls of Beneventum.
from nearby he learns that Hanno had set out with a part of the army to forage for grain; that grain had been given to the Campanians through the quaestor; that 2,000 wagons, and another disorderly and unarmed crowd, had arrived; that everything was being done amid tumult and trepidation, and that the form of the camp and the military order, with rustics and [those] foreigners intermixed, had been swept away.
His satis compertis, consul militibus edicit, signa tantum armaque in proximam noctem expedirent; castra Punica oppugnanda esse. quarta uigilia profecti sarcinis omnibus impedimentisque Beneuenti relictis, paulo ante lucem cum ad castra peruenissent, tantum pauoris iniecerunt ut, si in plano castra posita essent, haud dubie primo impetu capi potuerint. altitudo loci et munimenta defendere quae nulla ex parte adiri nisi arduo ac difficili adscensu poterant.
With these things sufficiently ascertained, the consul proclaims to the soldiers that they should have only their standards and arms ready for the coming night; the Punic camp was to be assaulted. Setting out at the fourth watch, all the baggage and impedimenta having been left at Beneventum, a little before daybreak, when they had reached the camp, they inspired such panic that, if the camp had been pitched on level ground, without doubt it could have been taken at the first onset. The height of the position and the fortifications defended it, which on no side could be approached except by a steep and difficult ascent.
[14] Vincit tamen omnia pertinax uirtus, et aliquot simul partibus ad uallum ac fossas peruentum est sed cum multis uolneribus ac militum pernicie. itaque conuocatis <legatis> tribunisque militum consul absistendum temerario incepto ait; tutius sibi uideri reduci eo die exercitum Beneuentum, dein postero <castra> castris hostium iungi, ne exire inde Campani neue Hanno regredi posset; id quo facilius obtineatur, collegam quoque et exercitum eius se acciturum totumque eo uersuros bellum. haec consilia ducis, cum iam receptui caneret, clamor militum aspernantium tam segne imperium disiecit.
[14] Nevertheless, pertinacious valor conquers all things, and in several places at once they reached the rampart and the ditches, but with many wounds and with the destruction of soldiers. Therefore, having called together the <legates> and the military tribunes, the consul said that the rash undertaking must be abandoned; it seemed safer to him that the army be led back that day to Beneventum, then on the next that the <camp> be joined to the enemy’s camp, so that the Campanians might not go out from there nor Hanno be able to retreat; that, in order that this might be obtained the more easily, he would also summon his colleague and his army, and they would turn the whole war thither. These counsels of the leader, when he was now sounding the recall, were shattered by the clamor of the soldiers spurning so sluggish a command.
By chance the Paelignian cohort was the nearest [of the enemy], whose prefect Vibius Accaus, having snatched up the standard, hurled it across the enemy’s rampart. Then, having imprecated a curse upon himself and the cohort if the enemy should get possession of that standard, he himself, foremost, burst into the camp through the ditch and rampart. And now the Paelignians were fighting inside the rampart, when on the other side, as Valerius Flaccus, military tribune of the Third Legion, was reproaching the Romans for cowardice in yielding to their allies the honor of the captured camp, T. Pedanius, first centurion of the principes, after he had taken the standard from the signifer, said, ‘now this standard and this centurion will be inside the enemy’s rampart; let those follow who intend to prevent the standard from being taken by the enemy.’ His manipular comrades first followed as he was crossing the ditch; then the whole legion followed.
Now even the consul, at the sight of those crossing the rampart, with counsel changed, turned from recalling them to inciting and exhorting the soldiers, showing in what crisis and peril the bravest cohort of the allies and the legion of the citizens was. Accordingly, each man for himself, all through level and uneven places, while missiles were being hurled from every side and the enemy were opposing both weapons and their very bodies, they force their way through and break in; many, wounded—indeed even those whom strength and blood were deserting—strove to fall within the enemy’s rampart; and thus in a moment of time the camp, as though set on a plain and not thoroughly fortified, was taken. Then there was slaughter, now no longer a fight, with all within the rampart thrown into a mêlée.
over six thousand of the enemy were slain, over seven thousand captives, together with the Campanian foragers and the whole equipment of wagons and draught-animals, were taken; and there was another huge booty which Hanno, as he had gone about plundering everywhere, had dragged out from the fields of the allies of the Roman People. thence, the enemy’s camp having been wiped out, they returned to Beneventum, and there both consuls—for even Ap. Claudius came there after a few days—sold and divided the booty. and those by whose agency the enemy’s camp had been taken were rewarded, foremost among others Accaus the Paelignian and T. Pedanius, chief centurion of the third legion.
[15] Et [legati] Campani, audita sua pariter sociorumque clade legatos ad Hannibalem miserunt qui nuntiarent duos consules ad Beneuentum esse, diei iter a Capua; tantum non ad portas et muros bellum esse; ni propere subueniat, celerius Capuam quam Arpos in potestatem hostium uenturam. ne Tarentum quidem, non modo arcem, tanti debere esse ut Capuam, quam Carthagini aequare sit solitus, desertam indefensamque populo Romano tradat. Hannibal, curae sibi fore rem Campanam pollicitus, in praesentia duo milia equitum cum legatis mittit quo praesidio agros populationibus possent prohibere.
[15] And the Campanians [the envoys], when their own disaster and that of their allies had alike been heard, sent envoys to Hannibal to announce that the two consuls were at Beneventum, a day’s march from Capua; that the war was all but at the gates and walls; unless he should promptly bring succor, Capua would come into the enemy’s power more quickly than Arpi. Not even Tarentum, to say nothing of the citadel, ought to be of such account that he hands over Capua—which he has been accustomed to equate with Carthage—abandoned and undefended, to the Roman People. Hannibal, having promised that the Campanian affair would be a concern to him, for the present sends two thousand horsemen with the envoys, with which protection they could prevent the fields from depredations.
Romanis interim, sicut aliarum rerum, arcis Tarentinae praesidiique quod ibi obsideretur cura est. C. Seruilius legatus, ex auctoritate patrum a P. Cornelio praetore in Etruriam ad frumentum coemendum missus, cum aliquot nauibus onustis in portum Tarentinum inter hostium custodias peruenit. cuius aduentu qui ante in exigua spe uocati saepe ad transitionem ab hostibus per conloquia erant ultro ad transeundum hostes uocabant sollicitabantque.
Meanwhile, as with other matters, the Romans had concern for the Tarentine citadel and the garrison which was being besieged there. C. Servilius, legate, by the authority of the Fathers, sent by the praetor P. Cornelius into Etruria to purchase grain, with several ships laden reached the port of Tarentum amid the enemy’s watches. at whose arrival those who before, in scant hope, had often been called by the enemies through colloquies to a defection, now of their own accord were calling and urging the enemies to cross over.
They were moved not so much by the defection of the Tarentines and of the Metapontines— to whom, likewise originating from Achaia, they were even joined by kinship— as by wrath against the Romans on account of the hostages lately put to death. Their friends and kinsmen sent letters and messengers to Hanno and Mago, who were nearby in Bruttium, that, if they should bring the army up to the walls, they would deliver the city into their power. M. Atinius was in command at Thurii with a modest garrison; him they thought could easily be lured out to an engagement rashly to be entered upon, relying not so much on the soldiers—of whom he had very few—as on the Thurian youth; this he had deliberately organized by centuries and armed for such contingencies.
With their forces divided between them, the Punic leaders, when they had entered the Thurian territory, Hanno proceeds with a column of infantry, standards hostile, to go toward the city, while Mago, with the cavalry, concealed by hills set opposite, suitable to cover ambushes, halts. Atinius, having learned through scouts only of the column of infantry, leads his troops out into battle-line, unaware both of internal fraud and of the enemies’ ambuscades. The engagement was an infantry battle, very sluggish, with few Romans fighting in the front rank, the Thurians awaiting the outcome rather than aiding it; and the Carthaginian battle-line was deliberately falling back, in order to draw the incautious enemy to the rear, to hills occupied by their own cavalry.
When they had come there, the cavalry, rising with a shout, at once turned to flight the nearly ill-ordered mob of the Thurians, standing where it fought with a spirit not sufficiently confident. The Romans, although, being surrounded, on this side the foot and on that the horse pressed them, nevertheless drew out the fight for some time; at last they too turn their backs and flee to the city. There the traitors, massed together, when they had received the column of their fellow-countrymen with the gates standing open, when they saw the Romans, routed, being borne toward the city, shout that the Carthaginian is pressing on and that, the enemies mingled among them, they are about to invade the city unless they quickly close the gates.
thus, with the Romans shut out, they exposed them to the enemy for slaughter; however Atinius, received with a few. thereupon sedition for a little while held sway, when [then] some were of the opinion that one must yield to fortune and the city be handed over to the victors. nevertheless, as most often, fortune and bad counsels prevailed; Atinius with his men having been escorted down to the sea and the ships, rather because they themselves wished consideration to be shown on account of the mild and just command exercised over them than out of regard for the Romans, they admit the Carthaginians into the city.
The consuls lead the legions from Beneventum into the Campanian territory not only to spoil the grain, which was already in the blade, but to besiege Capua, thinking they would make their consulship notable by the destruction of so opulent a city, and at the same time remove a huge disgrace from the imperium, in that the defection of a city so near had for the third year gone unpunished. Moreover, lest Beneventum be without a garrison, and so that, for sudden emergencies of war, if Hannibal—as they did not at all doubt he would do—should come to bring aid to the allies at Capua, they might be able to withstand the force of his cavalry, they order Tiberius Gracchus to come to Beneventum from the Lucanians with cavalry and light-armed troops; he was to set someone over the legions and the standing camps to hold affairs in Lucania.
[16] Graccho, priusquam ex Lucanis moueret, sacrificanti triste prodigium factum est. ad exta sacrificio perpetrato angues duo ex occulto adlapsi adedere iocur conspectique repente ex oculis abierunt. et cum haruspicum monitu sacrificium instauraretur atque intentius exta seruarentur, iterum ac tertium tradunt libato[que] iocinere intactos angues abisse.
[16] For Gracchus, before he moved out from the Lucanians, while sacrificing, a sad portent occurred. When the sacrifice had been completed, two snakes, gliding up from concealment to the entrails, ate the liver and, suddenly seen, vanished from sight. And when, at the admonition of the haruspices, the sacrifice was reinstated and the entrails were watched more intently, they report that a second and a third time, after the liver had been sampled, the snakes departed untouched.
when the haruspices had forewarned that the prodigy pertained to the commander and that he should beware of hidden men and plots, yet by no foresight could the impending fate be moved. Flavus was a Lucanian, head of that party of the Lucanians which stood with the Romans, though a portion had defected to Hannibal; and he was now in his annual magistracy, having been created praetor by those same men. He, his will suddenly changed, seeking a place of favor with the Carthaginian, did not think it enough either to pass over himself or to drag the Lucanians into defection, unless by the betrayed head and blood of the commander—who was also his guest-friend—he should ratify a treaty with the enemies.
to Mago, who was commanding in the Bruttii, he came secretly into a colloquy, and, a pledge having been received from him that, if he had handed over to them the Roman commander, the Lucanians would come into amicitia free and with their own laws, he leads the Carthaginian to a place to which he says he will bring Gracchus with a few men: there Mago was to conceal armed infantry and cavalry—and those hiding places could hold a huge number. With the place sufficiently inspected and scouted on all sides, a day was appointed for carrying out the matter. Flavus came to the Roman commander.
he said that he had begun a great enterprise, for the completing of which the services of Gracchus himself were needed: that he had persuaded the praetors of all the peoples who in that common uprising of Italy had defected to the Carthaginian to return into the friendship of the Romans, since the Roman commonwealth, which had come near to ruin in the disaster of Cannae, was day by day becoming better and more augmented, and Hannibal’s force was growing old and had come almost to nothing: that for the old offense the Romans would not be implacable; that no nation had ever been more exorable and readier to grant pardon; how often had even the rebellions of their forefathers been forgiven? these things had been said by himself to his own; but they would prefer to hear these same things from Gracchus himself and to touch his right hand in person, and to carry with them that pledge of good faith; that he had named for them a place for a conference, removed from sight, not far from the Roman camp; there, with few words, the matter could be transacted so that the whole Lucanian name would be in the faith and alliance of Rome. Gracchus, supposing deceit to be absent both from the speech and from the matter, and seized by the likeness of truth, set out from the camp with his lictors and a troop of horse, and, his host as guide, plunges <in>to the ambush.
the enemy suddenly sprang up; and, so that the betrayal might not be in doubt, Flavus joins himself to them. missiles are hurled from every side at Gracchus and the horsemen. Gracchus leaps down from his horse; he orders the others to do the same and exhorts them to ennoble by valor the one thing which Fortune has left remaining: but what remains for a few, surrounded by a multitude in a valley enclosed by forest and mountains, except death?
that it makes a difference, whether by proffering their bodies like cattle they are slaughtered unavenged, or, all of them, turning from endurance and the awaiting of the event to onset and wrath, acting and daring, drenched with the enemies’ gore, they fall amid the piled-up arms and bodies of dying foes. Let all target the Lucanian traitor and deserter; whoever shall have sent that victim before him to the Underworld will find an outstanding honor, an excellent consolation for his own death. Amid these words, with the paludamentum twisted about his left arm—for they had not even carried shields with them—he made an attack upon the enemies.
A battle is delivered greater than in proportion to the number of men. The bodies of the Romans are especially open to javelins; and, since from all sides from higher places a volley had been hurled into the hollow valley, they are transfixed. The Carthaginians strive to capture Gracchus alive, now stripped of protection; however, having caught sight of the Lucanian guest‑friend among the enemies, he attacked the packed ranks so fiercely that he could not be spared without the destruction of many.
[17] Sunt qui in agro Beneuentano prope Calorem fluuium contendant a castris cum lictoribus ac tribus seruis lauandi causa progressum, cum forte inter salicta innata ripis laterent hostes, nudum atque inermem saxisque quae uoluit amnis propugnantem interfectum. sunt qui haruspicum monitu quingentos passus a castris progressum, uti loco puro ea quae ante dicta prodigia sunt procuraret, ab insidentibus forte locum duabus turmis Numidarum circumuentum scribant. adeo nec locus nec ratio mortis in uiro tam claro et insigni constat.
[17] There are those who maintain that, in the Beneventan countryside near the river Calor, he went out from the camp with his lictors and three slaves for the sake of washing, when by chance enemies were lying hidden among the willows sprung up on the banks, and that, naked and unarmed, defending himself with the stones which the stream rolled, he was killed. There are those who write that, at the monition of the haruspices, he advanced five hundred paces from the camp, in order that, in a pure place, he might procure the expiation of those prodigies which were mentioned before, and that he was surrounded by two troops of Numidians who by chance were occupying the spot. Thus neither the place nor the manner of the death of so famous and distinguished a man is agreed upon.
The report of Gracchus’s funeral too is various. Some say he was buried in the Roman camp by his own men; others—and that is the more widespread report—relate that in the vestibule of the Punic camp a pyre was built, that the armed army performed a parade-run with the triple-steps of the Spaniards and with movements of arms and bodies customary to each nation respectively, Hannibal himself celebrating the obsequies with every honor both of deeds and of words. These things are handed down by those who set the event among the Lucanians.
if you should wish to believe those who report that he was slain at the river Calor, the enemies only got possession of Gracchus’s head; when this had been brought to Hannibal, Carthalo was immediately sent by him to carry it into the Roman camp to Cn. Cornelius, the quaestor; he performed the general’s funeral in the camp, the Beneventans celebrating together with the army.
[18] Consules agrum Campanum ingressi cum passim popularentur, eruptione oppidanorum et Magonis cum equitatu territi et trepidi ad signa milites palatos passim reuocarunt, et uixdum instructa acie fusi supra mille et quingentos milites amiserunt. inde ingens ferocia superbae suopte ingenio genti creuit multisque proeliis lacessebant Romanos; sed intentiores ad cauendum consules una pugna fecerat incaute atque inconsulte inita. restituit tamen his animos et illis minuit audaciam parua una res; sed in bello nihil tam leue est quod non magnae interdum rei momentum faciat.
[18] The consuls, having entered the Campanian territory, while they were ravaging everywhere, were terrified by a sortie of the townsmen and of Mago with the cavalry, and, alarmed, they recalled to the standards the soldiers scattered everywhere, and with the battle line scarcely formed they were routed and lost more than 1,500 soldiers. Thence a huge ferocity grew in a nation proud by its own nature, and they kept provoking the Romans to many battles; but one battle, undertaken incautiously and without counsel, had made the consuls more intent on guarding themselves. Yet one small thing restored courage to these and diminished audacity in those; but in war nothing is so light that it does not sometimes make the turning-point of a great affair.
Badius the Campanian was a guest-friend to T. Quinctius Crispinus, joined by a very-familiar hospitality. The intimacy had grown, because, when ill at Rome, Badius, at Crispinus’s house, before the Campanian defection, had been cared for liberally and courteously. Then Badius, having advanced before the pickets which stood in front of the gate, ordered that Crispinus be called.
When this was reported to Crispinus, thinking that an amicable and familiar colloquy was being sought, with the memory of private right remaining even in the sundering of public treaties, he advanced a little from the others. When they came into sight, Badius said, “I challenge you to combat, Crispinus; let us mount our horses, and with the others withdrawn let us decide which of us is better at war.” To this Crispinus said that neither for himself nor for him were enemies lacking in whom they might display their valor; that he, even if he should encounter him in the battle line, would decline him, lest by a hospitable slaughter he violate the right hand; and turning away he began to go. Thereupon the Campanian more fiercely began to upbraid softness and cowardice and to hurl reproaches worthy of himself at the innocent man, calling his host an enemy and alleging that he was pretending to spare one to whom he knew himself not to be a match.
If he thinks that, with the public treaties broken, private rights too have not at the same time been sufficiently severed, let Badius the Campanian, openly, with the two armies listening, renounce the guest-friendship with T. Quinctius Crispinus the Roman. Nothing associated with him, nothing federated—enemy with enemy—whose fatherland and whose public and private hearths he had come to attack. If he were a man, let him engage.
His troopers compelled Crispinus, long hesitating, not to allow the Campanian to insult with impunity. And so, having delayed only so long as to consult the generals whether they would permit him, out of order, to fight the provoking enemy, by their permission he took up arms and mounted his horse, and, addressing Badius by name, called him out to combat. No delay was made by the Campanian; with hostile horses they charged together.
Crispinus transfixed Badius through the left shoulder above the shield with a spear; and when he had toppled over with the wound, he leapt down from his horse to finish off the man lying there on foot. Badius, before he could be overborne, abandoned his parma and his horse and fled back to his own men; Crispinus, displaying the captured horse and arms and the bloody cusp, distinguished by the spoils, was escorted to the consuls with great praise and the congratulation of the soldiers, and there was magnificently commended and endowed with gifts.
[19] Hannibal ex agro Beneuentano castra ad Capuam cum mouisset, tertio post die quam uenit copias in aciem eduxit, haudquaquam dubius, quod Campanis absente se paucos ante dies secunda fuisset pugna, quin multo minus se suumque totiens uictorem exercitum sustinere Romani possent. ceterum postquam pugnari coeptum est, equitum maxime incursu, cum iaculis obrueretur, laborabat Romana acies, donec signum equitibus datum est ut in hostem admitterent equos. ita equestre proelium erat, cum procul uisus Sempronianus exercitus, cui Cn. Cornelius quaestor praeerat, utrique parti parem metum praebuit ne hostes noui aduentarent.
[19] When Hannibal had shifted his camp from the Beneventan territory to Capua, on the third day after he arrived he led out his forces in battle line, by no means doubtful—because for the Campanians, with himself absent, a few days before the battle had been favorable—that the Romans would be far less able to withstand him and his army so often victorious. But after fighting began, the Roman line was hard pressed, being overwhelmed with javelins, especially by the charge of the horsemen, until the signal was given to the cavalry to let their horses charge into the enemy. Thus it was a cavalry engagement, when, in the distance, the Sempronian army was seen, which Cn. Cornelius, the quaestor, commanded; it offered equal fear to both sides that new enemies were approaching.
as if by pre-arrangement, on both sides the signal for retreat was given, and, withdrawn into camp, they departed with the fight nearly on equal terms; still, more of the Romans fell at the first cavalry charge. then the consuls, to divert Hannibal from Capua, on the following night went off in different directions: Fulvius into the Cuman territory, Claudius into Lucania. on the next day, when it was reported to Hannibal that the Roman camp was empty and that they had gone off in two columns in different directions, uncertain at first which he should follow, he determined to follow Appius.
Hannibali alia in his locis bene gerendae rei fortuna oblata est. M. Centenius fuit cognomine Paenula, insignis inter primi pili centuriones et magnitudine corporis et animo. is, perfunctus militia, per P. Cornelium Sullam praetorem in senatum introductus petit a patribus uti sibi quinque milia militum darentur: se peritum et hostis et regionum breui operae pretium facturum et quibus artibus ad id locorum nostri et duces et exercitus capti forent iis aduersus inuentorem usurum.
To Hannibal, in these localities, fortune offered another opportunity for the affair to be well conducted. There was a M. Centenius, by cognomen Paenula, distinguished among the centurions of the primus pilus both for greatness of body and for spirit. He, having completed his military service, and introduced into the senate by the praetor Publius Cornelius Sulla, petitioned the Fathers that five thousand soldiers be granted to him: that he, experienced in both the enemy and the regions, would soon make the effort worth the price, and that the very arts by which up to that point our own both leaders and armies had been taken he would employ against their inventor.
That was as foolishly promised as it was foolishly believed, as though the military and the command arts were the same. Eight thousand soldiers were given instead of five, half citizens, half allies; and he himself, on the march, mustered a fair number of volunteers from the fields and, with the army nearly doubled, came into Lucania, where Hannibal, having followed Claudius in vain, had halted. The issue was hardly in doubt, since it was between Hannibal, a leader, and a centurion, and the armies: the one veteran in winning, the other wholly new, in great part even tumultuary and half-armed.
when the battle-columns had caught sight of each other and neither side declined the fight, at once the battle-lines were drawn up. nevertheless it was fought ~as in no other equal affair~ for more than two hours, with the Roman line in a frenzy, so long as the leader stood. after he, not only for his old fame but also from fear of future dishonor, if he should survive a disaster contracted by his own temerity, fell, exposing himself to the enemy’s missiles, the Roman battle-line was routed at once; but to such a degree did not even a path for flight lie open, with all the roads occupied by the cavalry, that out of so great a multitude scarcely a thousand escaped, the rest everywhere consumed, some by one, some by another destruction.
[20] Capua a consulibus iterum summa ui obsideri coepta est, quaeque in eam rem opus erant comportabantur parabanturque. Casilinum frumentum conuectum; ad Uolturni ostium, ubi nunc urbs est, castellum communitum, <ibique et Puteolis—iam> ante Fabius Maximus munierat—praesidium impositum ut mare proximum et flumen in potestate essent. in ea duo maritima castella frumentum, quod ex Sardinia nuper missum erat quodque M. Iunius praetor ex Etruria coemerat, ab Ostia conuectum est ut exercitui per hiemem copia esset.
[20] Capua began again to be besieged by the consuls with utmost force, and the things which were needful for that undertaking were being brought together and prepared. Grain was conveyed to Casilinum; at the mouth of the Volturnus, where now there is a city, a fort was strengthened, <and there and at Puteoli—already> before Fabius Maximus had fortified—a garrison was posted, so that the nearby sea and the river might be in their power. Into those two maritime forts the grain which had lately been sent from Sardinia, and which M. Junius the praetor had purchased in Etruria, was carried from Ostia, in order that there might be abundance for the army through the winter.
Hannibal non Capuam neglectam neque in tanto discrimine desertos uolebat socios; sed prospero ex temeritate unius Romani ducis successu in alterius ducis exercitusque opprimendi occasionem imminebat. Cn. Fuluium praetorem Apuli legati nuntiabant primo, dum urbes quasdam Apulorum quae ad Hannibalem desciuissent oppugnaret, intentius rem egisse: postea nimio successu et ipsum et milites praeda impletos in tantam licentiam socordiamque effusos ut nulla disciplina militiae esset. cum saepe alias, tum paucis diebus ante expertus qualis sub inscio duce exercitus esset in Apuliam castra mouit.
Hannibal did not wish Capua to be neglected nor the allies to be deserted in so great a crisis; but, from the prosperous success born of the temerity of one Roman leader, he was bearing down upon the opportunity of another leader and his army to crush.
The envoys of the Apulians were reporting that Cn. Fulvius the praetor at first, while he was besieging certain cities of the Apulians which had defected to Hannibal, had conducted the affair more intently; afterwards, by excessive success, both he himself and the soldiers, filled with booty, had been poured out into such license and sluggishness that there was no military discipline.
Having learned by experience, both often before and a few days earlier, what an army was like under an unaware commander, he moved his camp into Apulia.
[21]Ccirca Herdoneam Romanae legiones et praetor Fuluius erat. quo ubi allatum est hostes aduentare, prope est factum ut iniussu praetoris signis conuolsis in aciem exirent; nec res magis ulla tenuit quam spes haud dubia suo id arbitrio ubi uellent facturos. nocte insequenti Hannibal, cum tumultuatum in castris et plerosque ferociter, signum ut daret, institisse duci ad arma uocantes sciret, haud dubius prosperae pugnae occasionem dari, tria milia expeditorum militum in uillis circa uepribusque et siluis disponit, qui signo dato simul omnes e latebris exsisterent, et Magonem ac duo ferme milia equitum qua fugam inclinaturam credebat omnia itinera insidere iubet.
[21]Around Herdonea were the Roman legions and the praetor Fulvius. When news was brought there that the enemies were approaching, it nearly came to pass that, without the praetor’s order, with the standards torn up, they would go out into the line of battle; nor did anything restrain them more than the no‑doubt hope that they would do this at their own discretion whenever they wished. On the following night Hannibal, since he knew there had been tumult in the camp and that very many, calling to arms, had fiercely pressed the leader to give the signal, not doubting that an occasion for a prosperous battle was being offered, stationed three thousand light‑armed soldiers in the villas around and in the brambles and woods, so that, a signal having been given, they might all at once emerge from their hiding‑places; and he orders Mago and about two thousand horsemen to occupy all the routes where he believed the flight would incline.
With these things prepared by night, at first light he leads his troops into the battle line; nor did Fuluius hesitate, drawn not so much by any hope of his own as by the fortuitous impulse of the soldiers. And so, with the same temerity with which it had advanced into the line of battle, the line itself is arrayed according to the desire of the soldiers, as they happened to run forward and to halt, where their spirit had carried them, then to abandon their place through desire or fear. The first legion and the left wing were drawn up in the front, and the battle line was extended in length.
while the tribunes were shouting that there was nothing of inward strength and force, and that wherever the enemies should make an attack they would break through, he admitted nothing that was salutary, not only to his mind but not even to his ears. and Hannibal, a leader by no means similar, nor with a similar army, nor marshaled in the same way, was present. therefore the Romans did not even withstand their shout and their first onset.
a leader equal to Centenio in stupidity and temerity, by spirit in no wise comparable, when he sees the situation inclining and his men panic‑stricken, snatching up a horse he fled with about two hundred horsemen; the rest, driven from the front, then the line, surrounded from the rear and the wings, was cut down to such an extent that out of 18,000 men scarcely more than 2,000 escaped. the enemy got possession of the camp.
[22] Hae clades, super aliam alia, Romam cum essent nuntiatae, ingens quidem et luctus et pauor ciuitatem cepit; sed tamen quia consules, ubi summa rerum esset, ad id locorum prospere rem gererent, minus his cladibus commouebantur. legatos ad consules mittunt C. Laetorium M. Metilium qui nuntiarent, ut reliquias duorum exercituum cum cura colligerent, darentque operam ne per metum ac desperationem hosti se dederent, id quod post Cannensem accidisset cladem, et ut desertores de exercitu uolonum conquirerent. idem negotii P. Cornelio datum, cui et dilectus mandatus erat; isque per fora conciliabulaque edixit ut conquisitio uolonum fieret iique ad signa reducerentur.
[22] These disasters, one upon another, when they had been announced to Rome, a vast mourning and fear indeed seized the city; but nevertheless, because the consuls, where the supreme command lay, up to that point were conducting the matter prosperously, they were less moved by these calamities. They send legates to the consuls, Gaius Laetorius and Marcus Metilius, to announce that they should with care gather the remnants of the two armies, and give attention that they not surrender themselves to the enemy through fear and despair, a thing which had happened after the disaster at Cannae, and that they should search out deserters from the army of the Volones. The same task was assigned to Publius Cornelius, to whom also the levy had been entrusted; and he, through the fora and meeting-places, proclaimed by edict that a search for the Volones be made and that they be brought back to the standards.
Ap. Claudius consul D. Iunio ad ostium Uolturni, M. Aurelio Cotta Puteolis praeposito qui, ut quaeque naues ex Etruria ac Sardinia accessissent, extemplo in castra mitterent frumentum, ipse ad Capuam regressus Q. Fuluium collegam inuenit Casilino omnia deportantem molientemque ad oppugnandam Capuam. tum ambo circumsederunt urbem et Claudium Neronem praetorem ab Suessula ex Claudianis castris exciuerunt. is quoque modico ibi praesidio ad tenendum locum relicto ceteris omnibus copiis ad Capuam descendit.
Appius Claudius, the consul, with D. Junius at the mouth of the Volturnus, and M. Aurelius Cotta placed in command at Puteoli, who, as each ship from Etruria and Sardinia arrived, was to send grain to the camp at once—he himself, returning to Capua, found his colleague Q. Fulvius at Casilinum transporting everything and preparing to assault Capua. Then both encircled the city and summoned Claudius Nero, the praetor, from Suessula out of the Claudian camp. He also, leaving there a small garrison to hold the place, descended to Capua with all the rest of his forces.
thus three praetorial camps were erected around Capua; three armies, having addressed the work from different quarters, prepare to gird the city with ditch and rampart and raise forts at moderate intervals, and in many places at once they fight with the Campanians who were preventing the works, with this outcome: that at last the Campanian side confined itself to the gates and the wall. yet before these works were continued, envoys were sent to Hannibal to complain that Capua had been deserted by him and almost handed back to the Romans, and to beseech that then at least he should bring help not only to those beset but even to those encompassed by a circumvallation. letters were sent to the consuls by P. Cornelius the praetor, to the effect that, before they should shut in Capua with works, they should give the Campanians the permission that whoever of them wished might go out from Capua and carry their goods with them: they would be free and would hold all their own possessions, who should have gone out before the Ides of March; after that day, both those who should have gone out and those who should have remained there would be in the number of enemies.
When these things were proclaimed to the Campanians, they were so spurned that they even hurled insults and issued threats. Hannibal had led the legions from Herdonea to Tarentum, in the hope of getting possession of the Tarentine citadel by force or by stratagem; when that advanced too little, he turned his march to Brundisium, thinking that town would be betrayed. There too, when he was wasting time in vain, Campanian envoys came to him, both complaining and entreating at once; to them Hannibal replied magnificently that earlier he had raised the siege, and that now the consuls would not tolerate his arrival.
[23] Cum maxime Capua circumuallaretur, Syracusarum oppugnatio ad finem uenit, praeterquam ui ac uirtute ducis exercitusque, intestina etiam proditione adiuta. namque Marcellus initio ueris incertus utrum Agrigentum ad Himilconem et Hippocraten uerteret bellum an obsidione Syracusas premeret, quamquam nec ui capi uidebat posse inexpugnabilem terrestri ac maritimo situ urbem nec fame, ut quam prope liberi a Carthagine commeatus alerent, tamen, ne quid inexpertum relinqueret, transfugas Syracusanos—erant autem apud Romanos aliqui nobilissimi uiri, inter defectionem ab Romanis, quia ab nouis consiliis abhorrebant, pulsi—conloquiis suae partis temptare hominum animos iussit et fidem dare, si traditae forent Syracusae, liberos eos ac suis legibus uicturos esse. non erat conloquii copia, quia multorum animi suspecti omnium curam oculosque eo uerterant ne quid falleret tale admissum.
[23] While Capua was being most closely enclosed by a circumvallation, the siege of Syracuse came to its end, aided not only by the force and valor of the commander and the army, but also by internal treachery. For Marcellus, at the beginning of spring, uncertain whether to turn the war to Agrigentum against Himilco and Hippocrates or to press Syracuse by a siege—although he saw that a city made inexpugnable by its terrestrial and maritime position could be taken neither by force nor by famine, since supplies, well-nigh free from Carthage, sustained it—nevertheless, in order to leave nothing untried, ordered Syracusan deserters—there were, moreover, among the Romans some most noble men, driven out during the defection from the Romans because they abhorred new counsels—to test men’s minds by conferences on behalf of their party and to give assurance that, if Syracuse were handed over, they would live free and under their own laws. There was no opportunity for conference, because the minds of many, being suspicious, had turned the concern and eyes of all that way, lest anything of the sort, if admitted, should elude detection.
a single slave of the exiles, admitted into the city as a defector, with a few having been convened made a beginning of conferring about such a matter. then certain men in a fishing boat, covered with nets and having sailed around, thus placed themselves near the Roman camp and conferred with the defectors, and the same men more often in the same way, and others and yet others; at last they amounted to about eighty. and when now everything had been arranged for betrayal, with information carried to Epicydes through a certain Attalus, indignant that the matter had not been entrusted to himself, they were all killed with torture.
Alia subinde spes, postquam haec uana euaserat, excepit. Damippus quidam Lacedaemonius, missus ab Syracusis ad Philippum regem, captus ab Romanis nauibus erat. huius utique redimendi et Epicydae cura erat ingens, nec abnuit Marcellus iam tum Aetolorum, quibus socii Lacedaemonii erant, amicitiam adfectantibus Romanis.
Another hope presently succeeded, after this had turned out vain. A certain Damippus, a Lacedaemonian, sent from Syracuse to King Philip, had been captured by Roman ships. For ransoming him the concern of Epicydes, in particular, was immense, nor did Marcellus refuse, the Romans by now aiming at the friendship of the Aetolians, to whom the Lacedaemonians were allies.
with envoys sent to a colloquy about his ransom, a place most central and convenient for both parties, at the port of the Trogili near the tower which they call Galeagra, seemed suitable. As they went to and fro there more often, one of the Romans, viewing the wall from close at hand, by counting the stones and estimating with himself what each course presented on the face, measured by conjecture as nearly as he could the height of the wall, and, judging it to be somewhat lower than his former opinion and that of all the rest, and surmountable even with moderate ladders, reports the matter to Marcellus. It did not seem to be scorned; but since the place could not be approached, because for that very reason it was guarded the more intently, an opportunity was sought; which a deserter offered, announcing that the festival day of Diana was being held for three days, and that, because other things are lacking in a siege, the banquets were being celebrated more lavishly with wine, supplied by Epicydes to the entire plebs and distributed through the tribes by the chiefs.
When Marcellus received this, having conferred with a few of the tribunes of the soldiers, and with centurions and soldiers chosen by them as suitable for undertaking and daring so great a matter, and the ladders prepared in secret, he orders a signal to be given to the rest, that they should promptly care for their bodies and give themselves to rest: they were to go on an expedition by night. Then, when it seemed the time at which, after the day’s feasting, there would already be a satiety of wine and the beginning of sleep, he ordered the soldiers of a single standard to carry the ladders; and about a thousand armed men were led thither in a thin column, in silence. When, without noise or tumult, the first men got up onto the wall, others followed in order, since the audacity of the first even gave heart to the doubtful.
[24] Iam mille armatorum <muri> ceperant partem, cum ceterae admotae <sunt copiae> pluribusque scalis in murum euadebant, signo ab Hexapylo dato quo per ingentem solitudinem erat peruentum, quia magna pars in turribus epulati aut sopiti uino erant aut semigraues potabant; paucos tamen eorum oppressos in cubilibus interfecerunt. prope Hexapylon est portula; ea magna ui refringi coepta et e muro ex composito tuba datum signum erat et iam undique non furtim sed ui aperta gerebatur res. quippe ad Epipolas, frequentem custodiis locum, peruentum erat terrendique magis hostes erant quam fallendi, sicut territi sunt.
[24] Already a thousand of the armed men had seized a part
for as soon as the sound of the trumpets was heard and the clamor of those holding the walls, the guards, thinking that everything—and even a part of the city—was being occupied, some fled along the wall, others leapt down from the wall and were cast headlong in a throng of the terror‑stricken. a great part, however, was unaware of so great a calamity, and, with all weighed down by wine and sleep, and in a city of vast magnitude, the perception of the parts did not sufficiently reach to everything. toward dawn, with the Hexapylon broken open, Marcellus, having entered the city with all his forces, roused and turned everyone to the taking up of arms and to bringing whatever aid they could to the city now nearly captured.
Epicydes, from the Island, which they themselves call Nasson, having set out with a hastened column, not doubting that he would be about to drive out a few who, through the negligence of the guards, had crossed the wall, as the frightened were meeting him kept saying that they were magnifying the tumult and bringing reports greater and more terrible than the truth; after he saw everything around the Epipolas filled with arms, with the enemy merely provoked by a few missiles he turned the column back into Achradina, fearing not so much the force and multitude of the enemy as lest some internal treachery should arise by the opportunity and he find the gates of Achradina and of the Island shut amid the tumult. Marcellus, when he had entered within the walls, from the higher places saw the city—almost the fairest of all at that time—lying beneath his eyes; he is said to have wept partly for joy at so great a deed accomplished, partly at the ancient glory of the city. There came to mind the fleets of the Athenians sunk, and two vast armies with two most illustrious leaders destroyed, and so many wars with the Carthaginians waged with such peril, so many opulent tyrants and kings, above the rest Hiero—both a king of most recent memory and, above all, distinguished by the benefits which his valor and his own fortune had enabled him to bestow upon the Roman people.
as all these things came up before his mind, and the cogitation arose that already in the span of an hour those things would be burning and returning to cinders, before he moved the standards up to Achradina, he sends forward Syracusans who, as said before, had been within the Roman garrisons, to entice the enemy by a gentle address to surrender the city.
[25] Tenebant Achradinae portas murosque maxime transfugae, quibus nulla erat per condiciones ueniae spes; ei nec adire muros nec adloqui quemquam passi. itaque Marcellus, postquam id inceptum inritum fuit, ad Euryalum signa referri iussit. tumulus est in extrema parte urbis auersus a mari uiaeque imminens ferenti in agros mediterraneaque insulae, percommode situs ad commeatus excipiendos.
[25] The gates and walls of the Achradina were held chiefly by the deserters, for whom there was no hope of pardon on any terms; and they allowed neither approach to the walls nor speech with anyone. And so Marcellus, after that attempt had proved vain, ordered the standards to be carried back to Euryalus. There is a mound at the farthest part of the city, turned away from the sea and overhanging the road that leads into the fields and the inland parts of the island, very conveniently sited for receiving supplies.
Philodemus the Argive was in command of this citadel, appointed by Epicydes; to him Sosis, one of the slayers of the tyrant, having been sent by Marcellus, after a long talk had was put off by prevarication, and reported back to Marcellus that he had taken time for deliberation. As he deferred from day to day until Hippocrates and Himilco should bring up the camp [the legions], not doubting that, if he admitted them into the citadel, the Roman army, enclosed within walls, could be destroyed, Marcellus, when he saw that Euryalus could neither be surrendered nor taken, pitched camp between Neapolis and Tyche—these are names of parts of the city and are on the scale of cities—fearing that, if he entered thickly frequented places, the soldier eager for booty could not be restrained from running about. Envoys from Tyche and Neapolis came there with fillets and veils, beseeching that he would spare them from slaughters and from burnings.
Considering their prayers rather than their demands, Marcellus, by the counsel of all, proclaimed to the soldiers that no one should violate a free person: the rest would be for booty. The camp was enclosed, with the interposition of walls in place of a rampart; with the gates standing open in the direction of the streets, he disposed outposts and garrisons, lest, in the soldiers’ running to and fro, any assault upon the camp could be made. Then, a signal being given, the soldiers scattered; and when the doors were broken open and everything resounded with terror and tumult, yet there was restraint from slaughters; there was no limit to the plunderings before they carried off all the goods heaped up by long-continued felicity.
Meanwhile, too, Philodemus, since there was no hope of aid, having accepted a pledge that he would return inviolate to Epicydes, with the garrison escorted out handed over the mound to the Romans. While all were turned toward the tumult from the quarter of the captured city, Bomilcar, seizing that night on which, because of the violence of the storm, the Roman fleet could not ride at anchor in the open sea, set out from the Syracusan harbor with thirty-five ships and, on the open sea, set his sails for the deep, leaving fifty-five ships to Epicydes and the Syracusans; and when the Carthaginians had been informed in what great crisis the Syracusan situation stood, he returns after a few days with one hundred ships, being, as report has it, presented with many gifts from Hiero’s treasure by Epicydes.
[26] Marcellus Euryalo recepto praesidioque addito una cura liber erat ne qua ab tergo uis hostium in arcem accepta inclusos impeditosque moenibus suos turbaret. Achradinam inde trinis castris per idonea dispositis loca, spe ad inopiam omnium rerum inclusos redacturum, circumsedit. cum per aliquot dies quietae stationes utrimque fuissent, repente aduentus Hippocratis et Himilconis ut ultro undique oppugnarentur Romani fecit.
[26] With Euryalus recovered and a garrison added, Marcellus was free of every care but one: that no force of the enemy, admitted into the citadel at their rear, might throw his men—shut in and hampered by the walls—into confusion. Then he invested Achradina, with three camps arranged over suitable places, in the hope of reducing those enclosed to a want of all things. When for several days the stations on both sides had been quiet, suddenly the arrival of Hippocrates and Himilco brought it about that the Romans were proactively attacked from every side.
for Hippocrates too, with his camp fortified by the Great Harbor, and a signal having been given to those who were holding Achradina, attacked the old Roman camp, which Crispinus commanded; and Epicydes made a sortie against Marcellus’s stations; and the Punic fleet was brought to the shore which was between the city and the Roman camp, so that no relief could be sent to Crispinus by Marcellus. Yet the enemies offered more tumult than contest; for Crispinus not only repelled Hippocrates from the fortifications but even pursued him as he fled in alarm, and Marcellus drove Epicydes into the city; and it already seemed that sufficient provision had been made even for the future, that there might be no danger from their sudden sallies. To these was added also a pestilence, a common evil, which easily diverted the spirits of both sides from counsels of war.
for in the season of autumn, and in places unhealthy by nature—yet much more outside the city than in the city—an intolerable force of heat swept through both camps and affected almost everyone’s body. And at first, through the defect of the season and the site, they were both sick and dying; afterward the very treatment and the contact of the sick propagated the diseases, so that either those who had fallen into them, neglected and deserted, perished, or those sitting by and tending them, filled with the same force of the disease, were dragged down with them; and daily funerals and death were before their eyes, and on every side lamentations were heard day and night. At last, by habituation to the evil, their spirits had been brutalized, so that they not only did not escort the dead with tears and with due lamentation, but did not even carry them out or bury them; and lifeless bodies lay strewn in the sight of those awaiting a similar death, and the dead wore down the sick, and the sick the strong, both with fear and with corruption and the pestiferous odor of the bodies; and, that they might die rather by iron, some attacked the enemy pickets alone.
Much greater, however, was the force of the pestilence that had affected the Punic camp than the Roman <it had affected; for the Romans> had, by long sitting around Syracuse, become more accustomed to the climate and the waters. From the enemy’s army the Sicilians, as soon as they saw diseases being spread by the unhealthiness of the place, slipped away each into their own nearby cities; but the Carthaginians, for whom there was refuge nowhere, all perished to utter destruction together with their commanders Hippocrates and Himilco. Marcellus, when so great a force of the evil was rushing on, had led his men across into the city, and roofs and shade had refreshed the weakened bodies; many, however, from the Roman army were consumed by the same pestilence.
[27] Deleto terrestri Punico exercitu Siculi, qui Hippocratis milites fuerant, . . . haud magna oppida, ceterum et situ et munimentis tuta; tria milia alterum ab Syracusis, alterum quindecim abest; eo et commeatus e ciuitatibus suis comportabant et auxilia accersebant. interea Bomilcar iterum cum classe profectus Carthaginem, ita exposita fortuna sociorum, ut spem faceret non ipsis modo salutarem opem ferri posse sed Romanos quoque in capta quodam modo urbe capi, perpulit ut onerarias naues quam plurimas omni copia rerum onustas secum mitterent classemque suam augerent. igitur centum triginta nauibus longis, septingentis onerariis profectus a Carthagine satis prosperos uentos ad traiciendum in Siciliam habuit; sed iidem uenti superare eum Pachynum prohibebant.
[27] With the Punic land army destroyed, the Sicilians who had been the soldiers of Hippocrates, . . . towns not great, but otherwise safe both by site and by fortifications; the one is 3 miles from Syracuse, the other 15; to that place they were both carrying supplies from their own cities and summoning auxiliaries. Meanwhile Bomilcar, having again set out with the fleet to Carthage, presented the condition of the allies in such a way as to create the hope that not only could saving aid be brought to them themselves, but that the Romans too might be taken, the city being in a certain manner already taken; he prevailed upon them to send with him as many transport ships as possible, loaded with every abundance of things, and to augment his fleet. Accordingly, with 130 long ships and 700 transports, having set out from Carthage, he had sufficiently favorable winds for crossing into Sicily; but the same winds prevented him from clearing Pachynus.
When the report of Bomilcar’s arrival at first, and then a delay beyond expectation, had in turn offered joy and fear to the Romans and the Syracusans, Epicydes, fearing that if the same winds which then were holding on blowing from the sunrise for several days should persist, the Punic fleet would make back for Africa, after handing over Achradina to the commanders of the mercenary soldiers, sails to Bomilcar. Finding the fleet at its station with prows turned toward Africa and fearing a naval battle—not so much because it was unequal in strength or in the number of ships (indeed it even had more) as because the winds were blowing more apt for the Roman fleet than for his own—he nevertheless prevailed upon Bomilcar to wish to try the fortune of a naval contest. And Marcellus, since he saw both that the Sicel army was being called up from the whole island and that the Punic fleet was approaching with a huge convoy of supplies, lest he be pressed, shut in at once by land and sea by the enemy’s city, although he was unequal in the number of ships, determined to prevent Bomilcar from access to Syracuse.
Two hostile fleets were lying off around the promontory of Pachynus, intending to clash when the first tranquillity of the sea should have carried them out into the deep. And so, with the Eurus now abating, which had raged for several days, Bomilcar moved first; at first his fleet seemed to make for the deep, that it might the more easily round the promontory; however, after he saw the Roman ships bearing down toward him, Bomilcar—alarmed by some sudden cause, it is uncertain what—set his sails for the open sea, and, sending messengers to Heraclea to order the transports to make back to Africa, he himself, having sailed past Sicily, made for Tarentum. Epicydes, suddenly deprived of so great a hope, lest he return into a siege of a city for the most part already taken, sails to Agrigentum, to await the event rather than to set anything in motion from there.
[28] Quae ubi in castra Siculorum sunt nuntiata Epicyden Syracusis excessisse, a Carthaginiensibus relictam insulam et prope iterum traditam Romanis, legatos de condicionibus dedendae urbis explorata prius per conloquia uoluntate eorum qui obsidebantur ad Marcellum mittunt. cum haud ferme discreparet, quin quae ubique regum fuissent Romanorum essent, Siculis cetera cum libertate ac legibus suis seruarentur, euocatis ad conloquium iis quibus ab Epicyde creditae res erant, missos se simul ad Marcellum, simul ad eos ab exercitu Siculorum aiunt, ut una omnium qui obsiderentur quique extra obsidionem fuissent fortuna esset neue alteri proprie sibi paciscerentur quicquam. recepti deinde ab iis, ut necessarios hospitesque adloquerentur, expositis quae pacta iam cum Marcello haberent, oblata spe salutis perpulere eos ut secum praefectos Epicydis Polyclitum et Philistionem et Epicyden, cui Sindon cognomen erat, adgrederentur.
[28] When it was announced in the camp of the Sicilians that Epicydes had departed from Syracuse, that the island had been abandoned by the Carthaginians and almost again handed over to the Romans, they sent envoys to Marcellus about the conditions for surrendering the city, first having explored by conferences the will of those who were being besieged. Since there was scarcely any disagreement that whatever had been the kings’ property anywhere should be Roman, while the rest for the Sicilians should be preserved together with their liberty and their own laws, those to whom affairs had been entrusted by Epicydes having been called to a conference, they say that they were sent both to Marcellus and to them by the army of the Sicilians, to the end that there should be one fortune for all, both for those who were being besieged and for those who had been outside the siege, and that neither party should stipulate anything in particular for itself. Then, received by them so as to address their kinsmen and guest-friends, after setting forth the agreements which they already had with Marcellus, by offering the hope of safety they prevailed upon them to join with them in attacking Epicydes’ prefects—Polyclitus and Philistio—and Epicydes, whose cognomen was Sindon.
With those men slain and the multitude called to an assembly, they lamented their want and the things they themselves had been wont to mutter among themselves in secret; although so many evils pressed, they said that Fortune was not to be accused for that which was in their own power so long as they endured it. The cause the Romans had for attacking Syracuse had been their affection for the Syracusans, not hatred; for when they heard that affairs had been seized by the satellites of Hannibal, then of Hieronymus, Hippocrates and Epicydes, then they stirred war and began to besiege the city, in order to overthrow its cruel tyrants, not to storm the city itself. With Hippocrates indeed slain, Epicydes shut out from Syracuse and his prefects killed, the Carthaginians driven from every possession of Sicily by land and sea, what cause remained for the Romans why they should not wish Syracuse to be unharmed, just as if Hiero himself were alive, the unique cultivator of Roman friendship? And so there was no other danger either to the city or to its people than from themselves, if they should let slip the opportunity of reconciling themselves to the Romans; and that opportunity, such as it was at that very instant of the hour, would thereafter be none, if at the same time it had appeared that they had been set free ~from the unrestrained tyrants~.
[29] Omnium ingenti adsensu audita ea oratio est. praetores tamen prius creari quam legatos nominari placuit; ex ipsorum deinde praetorum numero missi oratores ad Marcellum, quorum princeps 'neque primo' inquit 'Syracusani a uobis defecimus sed Hieronymus, nequaquam tam in uos impius quam in nos, nec postea pacem tyranni caede compositam Syracusanus quisquam sed satellites regii Hippocrates atque Epicydes oppressis nobis hinc metu hinc fraude turbauerunt. nec quisquam dicere potest aliquando nobis libertatis tempus fuisse quod pacis uobiscum non fuerit.
[29] That speech was heard with the great assent of all. Nevertheless, it pleased them that praetors be created before legates be named; then from the number of the praetors themselves ambassadors were sent to Marcellus, whose chief said: 'Not at the first did we Syracusans defect from you, but Hieronymus—by no means so impious toward you as toward us; nor thereafter did any Syracusan disturb the peace settled by the tyrant’s slaying, but the royal satellites Hippocrates and Epicydes, with us oppressed, disturbed it now by fear, now by fraud. Nor can anyone say that ever there was for us a time of liberty which was not a time of peace with you.'
Now certainly, with the slaughter of those who were holding Syracuse oppressed, as soon as we began to be under our own control, we straightway came to handing over our arms, to surrendering ourselves, the city, the walls, to refuse no fortune which might be imposed by you. The gods have given to you, Marcellus, the glory of a city taken, the noblest and most beautiful of the Greek cities. Whatever we have ever done by land and sea worthy of remembrance, that accrues to the title of your triumph.
Would you have it believed on rumor how great a city has been taken by you, rather than have it be a spectacle for posterity as well—so that whoever comes by land, whoever by sea, may now point out our trophies over the Athenians and Carthaginians, and now yours over us—and will you hand over Syracuse intact, to be held under the clientage of your family and the tutelage of the name of the Marcelli? Let not the memory of Hieronymus carry more weight with you than that of Hiero: he was your friend much longer than this man your enemy, and you felt that man’s benefactions in very deed, while this man’s madness availed only to his own ruin.' With the Romans everything was both obtainable and secure; among themselves there was more war and peril.
for the deserters, thinking that they were being handed over to the Romans, drove the auxiliaries also of the mercenary soldiers into the same fear; and, weapons snatched up, they first cut down the praetors, then ran about to the slaughter of the Syracusans, and whomever chance offered, in their wrath they killed, and they plundered everything that was in prompt view. Then, lest they be without leaders, they created six prefects, that by threes they should be in command at Achradina and at Nasus. With the tumult at last calmed, by inquiring from those who were following up what had been transacted with the Romans, it began to grow clear that the case of themselves and of the deserters was different.
[30] In tempore legati a Marcello redierunt, falsa eos suspicione incitatos memorantes nec causam expetendae poenae eorum ullam Romanis esse. erat e tribus Achradinae praefectis Hispanus Moericus nomine. ad eum inter comites legatorum de industria unus ex Hispanorum auxiliaribus est missus, qui sine arbitris Moericum nanctus primum, quo in statu reliquisset Hispaniam—et nuper inde uenerat—exponit: omnia Romanis ibi obtineri armis.
[30] At the right time the legates returned from Marcellus, reporting that they had been incited by a false suspicion and that the Romans had no cause for punishment to be exacted from them. Among the three prefects of Achradina there was a Spaniard, Moericus by name. To him, among the companions of the legates, one of the Spanish auxiliaries was deliberately sent; finding Moericus without witnesses, he first set forth in what condition he had left Spain—and he had lately come from there—: that everything there was held by Roman arms.
that he can, if he make it worth the labor, be the leader of his compatriots, whether it please him to do military service with the Romans or to return to his fatherland: contrariwise, if he should prefer to go on being besieged, what hope is there for one shut in by land and sea? Moved by these things, Moericus, when it had been decided that legates be sent to Marcellus, sends his brother among them, who, conducted to Marcellus by that same Spaniard, apart from the others and in secret, when he had received a pledge of good faith and had arranged the order of the thing to be done, returns to Achradina. Then Moericus, to turn everyone’s minds away from suspicion of treachery, says that it does not please him that legates should go to and fro: that no one is to be received nor sent; and, in order that the watches be kept more strictly, that the suitable posts be divided among the prefects, so that each be responsible for guarding his own sector.
All assented. With the parts being divided, the district from the Arethusa spring up to the mouth of the great harbor fell to himself: this he did in order that the Romans might know it. And so Marcellus by night ordered a cargo-ship with armed men to be drawn by tow-rope by a quadrireme to Achradina, and that the soldiers be disembarked in the region of the gate which is near the Arethusa spring.
When this had been done at the fourth watch, and Moericus had received the soldiers, disembarked at the gate as had been agreed, at first light Marcellus with all his forces assaults the walls of Achradina, in such a way that he not only turned upon himself those who were holding Achradina, but from the Nassus also columns of armed men ran together, having left their posts, to ward off the force and onrush of the Romans. In this tumult the actuariae ships, already equipped beforehand and sailed around to the Nassus, disembark armed men, who, attacking unexpectedly the half-manned stations and the doors of the gate left open—through which a little before the armed men had sallied out—took the Nassus, with no great contest, abandoned in the alarm and flight of the guards. And in none was there less of garrison-value or pertinacity to remain than in the defectors, because, not trusting even their own side enough, they fled out of the midst of the fight.
[31] Suppresso impetu militum, ut iis qui in Achradina erant transfugis spatium locusque fugae datus est, Syracusani tandem liberi metu portis Achradinae apertis oratores ad Marcellum mittunt, nihil petentes aliud quam incolumitatem sibi liberisque suis. Marcellus consilio aduocato et adhibitis etiam Syracusanis qui per seditiones pulsi ab domo intra praesidia Romana fuerant, respondit non plura per annos quinquaginta benefacta Hieronis quam paucis his annis maleficia eorum qui Syracusas tenuerint erga populum Romanum esse; sed pleraque eorum quo debuerint reccidisse foederumque ruptorum ipsos ab se grauiores multo quam populus Romanus uoluerit poenas exegisse. se quidem tertium annum circumsedere Syracusas, non ut populus Romanus seruam ciuitatem haberet sed ne transfugarum duces captam et oppressam tenerent.
[31] With the impetus of the soldiers suppressed, so that to the deserters who were in Achradina space and opportunity for flight was given, the Syracusans, at last free from fear, with the gates of Achradina opened, send envoys to Marcellus, asking nothing other than safety for themselves and their children. Marcellus, the council having been called and even the Syracusans brought in who, driven from home by seditions, had been within the Roman garrisons, replied that the benefactions of Hiero through fifty years were not more than, in these few years, the malefactions of those who had held Syracuse toward the Roman people; but that most of them had recoiled upon those upon whom they ought to have fallen, and that, for ruptured treaties, they themselves had exacted from themselves penalties much heavier than the Roman people would have wished. He, indeed, had besieged Syracuse for a third year, not that the Roman people might have a slave city, but lest the leaders of deserters should hold it captured and oppressed.
what the Syracusans could have done, let those be an example either of the Syracusans who were within the Roman garrisons, or of the Spanish leader Moericus, who handed over the garrison, or, finally, of the Syracusans’ own counsel—late indeed, but sound. that for himself the fruit of all the labors and dangers around the Syracusan walls, by land and sea, so long endured, was by no means so great as that which to take <had fallen to his lot, as compared with if to preserve> Syracuse he could have achieved. then the quaestor was sent with a garrison to Nassus to receive and to guard the royal money.
The city was given over to the soldiers to be plundered, with guards distributed over the houses of those who had been within the Roman garrisons. While many foul examples of wrath and of avarice were being displayed, it has been handed down to memory that Archimedes, in so great a tumult as the running to and fro of plundering soldiers in the <streets> of a captured city could stir up, intent upon the figures which he had drawn in the dust, was slain by a soldier who did not know who he was; that Marcellus took it hard, and that care was taken for his burial, and that, his kinsmen even having been sought out, his name and memory were held in honor and kept under protection. In this principal way Syracuse was taken; in it there was so much booty as would scarcely have been even if Carthage—then contending with it on equal strength—had been captured.
Paucis ante diebus quam Syracusae caperentur T. Otacilius cum quinqueremibus octoginta Uticam ab Lilybaeo transmisit, et cum ante lucem portum intrasset, onerarias frumento onustas cepit, egressusque in terram depopulatus est aliquantum agri circa Uticam praedamque omnis generis retro ad naues egit. Lilybaeum tertio die quam inde profectus erat, cum centum triginta onerariis nauibus frumento praedaque onustis rediit idque frumentum extemplo Syracusas misit, quod ni tam in tempore subuenisset, uictoribus uictisque pariter perniciosa fames instabat.
A few days before Syracuse was captured, T. Otacilius crossed over from Lilybaeum to Utica with eighty quinqueremes, and, when before light he had entered the harbor, he seized cargo-ships laden with grain, and, having gone out onto the land, he devastated some country around Utica and drove booty of every kind back to the ships. He returned to Lilybaeum on the third day after he had set out from there, with one hundred thirty transport ships laden with grain and booty, and he sent that grain immediately to Syracuse; for, if succor had not arrived so in time, a pernicious famine was threatening the victors and the vanquished alike.
[32] Eadem aestate in Hispania, cum biennio ferme nihil admodum memorabile factum esset consiliisque magis quam armis bellum gereretur, Romani imperatores egressi hibernis copias coniunxerunt. ibi consilium aduocatum omniumque in unum congruerunt sententiae, quando ad id locorum id modo actum esset ut Hasdrubalem tendentem in Italiam retinerent, tempus esse id iam agi ut bellum in Hispania finiretur; et satis ad id uirium credebant accessisse uiginti milia Celtiberorum ea hieme ad arma excita. tres exercitus erant.
[32] In the same summer in Spain, since for almost two years nothing very memorable had been done and the war was being conducted more by counsels than by arms, the Roman commanders, having gone out from their winter quarters, joined their forces. There, a council having been called, the opinions of all concurred into one: since up to that point this only had been transacted, that they should hold back Hasdrubal as he was making for Italy, it was time that this now be set on foot, that the war in Spain be brought to an end; and they believed strength sufficient for this had been added by twenty thousand Celtiberians roused to arms in that winter. There were three armies.
Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, and Mago, their camps conjoined, were distant from the Romans by a march of almost five days. Closer was Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar, a veteran imperator in Spain; he had his army at a city by the name Amtorgis. Him the Roman leaders wished to oppress first; and there was hope that there were forces enough and more than enough for that; one concern remained: lest, once he was routed, the other Hasdrubal and Mago, betaking themselves into pathless glens and mountains, should prolong the war.
Therefore, thinking it best, with the forces divided in two, to encompass at once the war of the whole of Spain, they thus divided between themselves: that P. Cornelius should lead two parts of the army of Romans and allies against Mago and Hasdrubal, and that Cn. Cornelius, with the third part of the veteran army, the Celtiberians added, should wage war with Hasdrubal the Barcid. Setting out together, both commanders and the armies, with the Celtiberians going before, at the city of Amtorgim, in sight of the enemy, pitched camp, a river dividing between. There Cn. Scipio halted with the forces mentioned above, P. Scipio set out to the appointed part of the war.
[33] Hasdrubal postquam animaduertit exiguum Romanum exercitum in castris et spem omnem in Celtiberorum auxiliis esse, peritus omnis barbaricae et praecipue omnium earum gentium in quibus per tot annos militabat perfidiae, facili lingua, cum utraque castra plena Hispanorum essent, per occulta conloquia paciscitur magna mercede cum Celtiberorum principibus ut copias inde abducant. nec atrox uisum facinus—non enim ut in Romanos uerterent arma agebatur—, et merces quanta uel pro bello satis esset dabatur ne bellum gererent, et cum quies ipsa, tum reditus domum fructusque uidendi suos suaque grata uolgo erant. itaque non ducibus facilius quam multitudini persuasum est.
[33] Hasdrubal, after he observed that the Roman army in the camp was scant and that all hope lay in the auxiliaries of the Celtiberians, experienced in every kind of barbarian perfidy and especially in that of all the nations among which he had soldiered for so many years, with a facile tongue, since both camps were full of Spaniards, through secret colloquies makes terms for a great price with the princes of the Celtiberians that they should lead their forces away from there. Nor did the deed seem atrocious—for it was not being arranged that they should turn their arms upon the Romans—, and a recompense as great as would be sufficient even for a war was being given that they not wage war; and both repose itself and the return home and the enjoyment of seeing their own people and their own things were pleasing to the common sort. Accordingly, it was not more easily persuaded with the leaders than with the multitude.
at the same time there was not even fear from the Romans, since they were so few, if they should try to restrain them by force. this indeed will always have to be guarded against by Roman leaders, and these examples truly are to be held as documents, lest they so trust in foreign auxiliaries that they do not have more of their own robustness and properly their own forces in their camps. with their standards suddenly raised, the Celtiberians depart, replying to the Romans—who were seeking the reason and imploring them to remain—nothing other than that they were being called away by a domestic war.
Scipio, after he saw that the allies could be restrained neither by prayers nor by force, and that he could neither be equal to the enemy without them nor again rejoin his brother, and that no other salutary counsel was at hand, resolved to cede backward as far as he could, with all care intent on this, lest anywhere he commit himself to the enemy on equal ground, who, having crossed the river, was pressing hard almost on the very footsteps of those departing.
[34] Per eosdem dies P. Scipionem par terror, periculum maius ab nouo hoste urgebat. Masinissa erat iuuenis, eo tempore socius Carthaginiensium, quem deinde clarum potentemque Romana fecit amicitia. is tum cum equitatu Numidarum et aduenienti P. Scipioni occurrit et deinde adsidue dies noctesque infestus aderat, ut non uagos tantum procul a castris lignatum pabulatumque progressos exciperet sed ipsis obequitaret castris inuectusque in medias saepe stationes omnia ingenti tumultu turbaret.
[34] During those same days an equal terror pressed upon P. Scipio, but a greater peril from a new enemy. Masinissa was a youth, at that time an ally of the Carthaginians, whom thereafter Roman friendship made renowned and powerful. He then, with the cavalry of the Numidians, both met P. Scipio as he was arriving and thereafter assiduously was at hand, hostile day and night, so that he not only cut off stragglers who had gone far from the camp to gather wood and fodder, but even rode up to the camp itself and, riding into the very midst of the outposts, often threw everything into enormous tumult.
There was often, even by night, alarm at the gates and rampart from a sudden incursion, nor was there any place or time free from fear and solicitude for the Romans, driven within the rampart with the use of all things taken away. Since it was almost a regular siege and it appeared it would become tighter, if Indibilis—whom report said was approaching with 7,500 Suessetanians—should join himself to the Carthaginians, Scipio, a cautious and provident leader, overcome by necessities, adopts a temerarious plan: to go by night to meet Indibilis and to engage battle wherever he should encounter him. Therefore, leaving a modest garrison in the camp and putting the legate Ti. Fonteius in command, he set out at midnight and, with the enemies he met, joined combat.
columns rather than a battle-line were fighting; nevertheless, as in a tumultuary fight, the Roman was superior. But also the Numidian cavalry suddenly—whom the commander had supposed he had deceived—having poured in from the flanks, brought great terror, <and> with a new combat engaged against the Numidians, a third enemy moreover arrived: the Punic leaders, having come up, assailed from the rear those already fighting; and a two-fronted battle had hemmed in the Romans, who were uncertain against which enemy especially, or into what direction, packed close, they should make a sally. The commander, fighting and exhorting and presenting himself where the greatest toil was, had his right side pierced by a lance; and that wedge of the enemy, which had made an attack upon the massed men around the leader, when it saw Scipio, as if lifeless, slipping from his horse, ran about through the whole line, eager with joy, proclaiming with a shout that the Roman imperator had fallen.
That report, having spread everywhere, brought it about that the enemy were without doubt as victors and the Romans as the vanquished. A flight immediately began from the battle line, their leader having been lost; however, though breaking out through the Numidians and the other light-armed auxiliaries was not difficult, yet to escape from so great a mass of cavalry, and from foot soldiers matching the horses in speed, they could scarcely manage; and nearly more were cut down in flight than in the fight; nor would anyone have survived, had not night intervened with the day already rushing toward evening.
[35] Haud segniter inde duces Poeni fortuna usi confestim e proelio, uix necessaria quiete data militibus ad Hasdrubalem Hamilcaris citatum agmen rapiunt non dubia spe, <si> se coniunxissent, debellari posse. quo ubi est uentum, inter exercitus ducesque uictoria recenti laetos gratulatio ingens facta, imperatore tanto cum omni exercitu deleto et alteram pro haud dubia parem uictoriam exspectantes. ad Romanos nondum quidem fama tantae cladis peruenerat, sed maestum quoddam silentium erat et tacita diuinatio, qualis iam praesagientibus animis imminentis mali esse solet.
[35] Not sluggishly from there, the Carthaginian leaders, having used their fortune, immediately from the battle, with scarcely the necessary repose granted to the soldiers, hurry to the summoned column of Hasdrubal son of Hamilcar, with no doubtful hope that, if they should join forces, the war could be brought to an end. When they came there, a vast congratulation arose among the armies and the leaders, joyful with the recent victory, the Roman commander of such rank having been annihilated with his whole army, and they were expecting another victory equal to the former as beyond doubt. To the Romans the report of so great a calamity had not yet indeed arrived, but there was a certain mournful silence and a tacit divination, such as is wont to be when minds already presage impending evil.
The commander himself, besides feeling that he had been deserted by his allies and that the enemy’s forces had been so greatly augmented, was by conjecture and by reason more inclined to a suspicion of a disaster sustained than to any good hope: for in what way, indeed, could Hasdrubal and Mago have brought up their armies without a struggle, unless they had finished their own war? And how had his brother not opposed them or followed in their rear, so that, if he could not prevent the enemy commanders and armies from uniting into one, he at least would join forces with his brother? Distressed by these anxieties, he believed that the only salutary course for the present was to withdraw from there as far as he could; thereafter, in a single night, the enemy being unaware and for that reason at rest, he covered a considerable distance.
At daybreak, when they perceived that they had set out, the enemy, with the Numidians sent ahead, began to follow with their column as swiftly as they could. Before night the Numidians overtook them and, now attacking from the rear, now making incursions upon the flanks, forced them to halt and to protect the column; nevertheless, so far as they could safely, Scipio kept urging them to fight and to advance at the same time, before the infantry forces should overtake them.
[36] Ceterum nunc agendo, nunc sustinendo agmen cum aliquamdiu haud multum procederetur et nox iam instaret, reuocat e proelio suos Scipio et collectos in tumulum quendam non quidem satis tutum, praesertim agmini perculso, editiorem tamen quam cetera circa erant, subducit. ibi primo impedimentis et equitatu in medium receptis circumdati pedites haud difficulter impetus incursantium Numidarum arcebant; dein, postquam toto agmine tres imperatores cum tribus iustis exercitibus aderant apparebatque, parum armis ad tuendum locum sine munimento ualituros esse, circumspectare atque agitare dux coepit si quo modo posset uallum circumicere. sed erat adeo nudus tumulus et asperi soli, ut nec uirgulta uallo caedendo nec terra caespiti faciendo aut ducendae fossae aliiue ulli operi apta inueniri posset; nec natura quicquam satis arduum aut abscisum erat, quod hosti aditum adscensumue difficilem praeberet; omnia fastigio leni subuexa.
[36] However, now by advancing, now by sustaining the column, when for some time they were making not much progress and night was now imminent, Scipio calls back his men from the battle and, having collected them onto a certain mound, not indeed quite safe—especially with the column panic-struck—yet higher than the things around, he withdraws them. There at first, with the baggage and the cavalry received into the middle, the infantry, encircled, were without much difficulty warding off the charges of the rushing Numidians; then, after it was plain that over against the whole column three commanders were present with three regular armies, and it appeared that by arms alone they would have too little strength to hold the place without a fortification, the leader began to look around and consider whether in any way he could cast a rampart around it. But the mound was so bare and of rough soil that neither brushwood for cutting for a rampart nor earth suitable for making sods, or for drawing a ditch or any other work, could be found; nor was there by nature anything sufficiently steep or sheer to offer the enemy a difficult approach or ascent; all rose with a gentle slope.
Punici exercitus postquam aduenere, in tumulum quidem perfacile agmen erexere; munitionis facies noua primo eos uelut miraculo quodam tenuit, cum duces undique uociferarentur quid starent et non ludibrium illud, uix feminis puerisue morandis satis ualidum, distraherent diriperentque? captum hostem teneri, latentem post sarcinas. haec contemptim duces increpabant; ceterum neque transilire nec moliri onera obiecta nec caedere stipatas clitellas ipsisque obrutas sarcinis facile erat.
After the Punic armies arrived, they did indeed very easily raise their column onto the mound; the new face of a fortification at first held them as by a certain marvel, while the leaders on all sides were shouting why they were standing still and not tearing apart and rending that mockery, scarcely strong enough to delay even women or boys? that the enemy was captured, lurking behind the baggage. These things the leaders were railing at with contempt; but neither was it easy to leap across, nor to heave aside the loads thrown in the way, nor to cut through the packed packsaddles and the packs themselves piled over them.
but when, with poles, they had removed the loads set in their way and had given a path to the armed men, and the same was being done in several places, the camp was already captured on every side. A few, overwhelmed by many, were being cut down everywhere by the victors; a great part, however, of the soldiers, when they had fled into the neighboring woods, took refuge in the camp of P. Scipio, over which Ti. Fonteius, the legate, was in command. Some relate that Cn. Scipio was slain on the mound at the first onset of the enemy; others, that he fled with a few to a tower near the camp: this, surrounded with fire, and thus—when the doors, which by no force had they been able to move, had been burned—was taken, and all within, together with the commander himself, were killed.
In the eighth year after he had come into Spain, Gnaeus Scipio was slain on the twenty-ninth day after his brother’s death. The lamentation for their death was no greater at Rome than throughout all Spain; indeed, among the citizens, a part of the grief was taken up with the loss of the army, the alienated province, and the public calamity; the Spains mourned and longed for the leaders themselves, Gnaeus the more, because he had been over them longer and had earlier won their favor and had first given a specimen of Roman justice and temperance.
[37] Cum deleti exercitus amissaeque Hispaniae uiderentur, uir unus res perditas restituit. erat in exercitu L. Marcius Septimi filius, eques Romanus, impiger iuuenis animique et ingenii aliquanto quam pro fortuna in qua erat natus maioris. ad summam indolem accesserat Cn. Scipionis disciplina, sub qua per tot annos omnes militiae artes edoctus fuerat.
[37] When the armies seemed wiped out and Spain lost, one man restored ruined affairs. There was in the army Lucius Marcius, son of Septimus, a Roman knight (eques), an indefatigable young man, and of spirit and talent somewhat greater than the condition into which he had been born. To his excellent natural endowment there had been added the discipline of Gnaeus Scipio, under whom for so many years he had been taught all the arts of soldiery.
<is> and, with soldiers collected from the rout and certain men led down from the garrisons, he had made an army not to be contemned, and had joined with Ti. Fonteius, the legate of P. Scipio. But the Roman knight so far excelled in authority among the soldiers and in honor, that, with the camp fortified on this side of the Hiberus, when it had pleased that the leader of the army be created by military comitia, as some relieved others for the guard of the rampart and the posts, until the vote went through them all, they all conferred the supreme command upon L. Marcius. All the time thereafter—small though it was—he spent in fortifying the camp and in conveying supplies, and the soldiers executed all orders both energetically and by no means with a cast-down spirit.
But after it was reported that Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, coming to annihilate the remnants of the war, had crossed the Iberus and was drawing near, and when the soldiers saw the battle signal set forth by their new leader, recalling what commanders they had had a little before, and with what leaders and forces relying they had been wont to go out into battle, all of them suddenly began to weep and to beat their heads, and some stretched their hands to heaven, arraigning the gods, others, prostrate on the ground, each called by name upon his own commander. Nor could the lamentation be stilled, though the centurions were rousing their manipular comrades and Marcius himself was both soothing and rebuking them, because they had cast themselves into womanish and unprofitable tears, rather than sharpening their spirits with him to protect themselves and the commonwealth, and not to allow their commanders to lie unavenged; when suddenly a shout and the sound of trumpets—for already the enemy were near the rampart—is clearly heard. Then, their grief suddenly turned into anger, they run to arms, and, as if kindled with rabies, they rush to the gates and charge the enemy, who was coming on carelessly and in disorder.
immediately the unanticipated event strikes fear into the Carthaginians, and, wondering whence so many enemies had suddenly sprung up, with their army nearly destroyed, whence such audacity, such self-confidence in men defeated and routed, who had stood forth as commander with the two Scipios slain, who was in charge of the camp, who had given the signal for battle—at these so many and so unexpected things, at first all, uncertain and amazed, they draw back their step, then, driven by a strong onset, they turn their backs. and either there would have been a foul slaughter of the fugitives or a rash and perilous charge of the pursuers, had not Marcius promptly given the signal for recall, and, standing to oppose at the front standards and himself holding back some, checked the excited battle line. thence he led them back into camp, still eager for slaughter and for blood.
The Carthaginians, driven in trepidation at first from the enemy’s rampart, after they saw no one pursuing—thinking that the others had halted from fear—went back to their camp contemptuously and with a composed pace. There was equal negligence in guarding the camp; for although the enemy was near, yet it kept occurring that he was the remnant of two armies destroyed a few days before. On account of this, since everything had been neglected among the enemy, and after these things were reconnoitred, Marcius inclined his mind to a plan which at first sight seemed more rash than bold: to attack of his own accord the enemy’s camp, thinking it easier to storm Hasdrubal’s single camp than, if the three armies and three commanders should again have united, to defend his own; and at the same time that either, if his undertakings succeeded, he would raise up the shattered state of affairs, or, if he were driven back, nevertheless by taking the offensive he would remove the contempt felt for him.
[38] Ne tamen subita res et nocturnus terror et iam non suae fortunae consilium perturbaret, adloquendos adhortandosque sibi milites ratus, contione aduocata ita disseruit: 'uel mea erga imperatores nostros uiuos mortuosque pietas uel praesens omnium nostrum, milites, fortuna fidem cuiuis facere potest mihi hoc imperium, ut amplum iudicio uestro, ita re ipsa graue ac sollicitum esse. quo enim tempore, nisi metus maerorem obstupefaceret, uix ita compos mei essem ut aliqua solacia inuenire aegro animo possem, cogor uestram omnium uicem, quod difficillimum in luctu est, unus consulere. et ne tum quidem, ubi quonam modo has reliquias duorum exercituum patriae conseruare possim cogitandum est, auertere animum ab adsiduo maerore licet.
[38] Nevertheless, lest the sudden development and the nocturnal terror and a counsel now not suited to his fortune should perturb matters, thinking the soldiers must be addressed and exhorted, with an assembly called he thus discoursed: 'Either my piety toward our commanders, living and dead, or the present fortune of us all, soldiers, can give credence to anyone that this command of mine, as it is ample in your judgment, so in the reality is grave and solicitous. For at a time when, unless fear benumbed grief, I would scarcely be so self‑possessed that I could find some solaces for a sick mind, I am compelled, in the stead of you all—which is the most difficult thing in mourning—to take counsel alone. And not even then, when it must be considered by what means I can preserve for the fatherland these remnants of two armies, is it permitted to turn the mind away from continual grief.'
for present, indeed, is the bitter memory, and the two Scipios by cares and sleeplessness harry me days and nights and often rouse me from sleep, that I should suffer neither themselves, nor their soldiers—unconquered for eight years in these lands—your fellow soldiers, nor the commonwealth, to go unavenged; and they bid me follow their discipline and their institutions, and, as to the commands of the living, no one was more obedient than I, so after their death to deem best that which, in each matter, I most judge they would have been going to do. I would wish you also, soldiers, not to escort them with lamentations and tears as though extinguished—they live and are vigorous in the fame of deeds achieved—but whenever the memory of them occurs, as if you were to see them exhorting and giving the signal, so to enter the battles. Nor, assuredly, was it any other appearance presented yesterday to your eyes and minds that produced that memorable battle, in which you gave the enemies proof that the Roman name was not extinguished with the Scipios, and that the people whose force and valor were not overwhelmed by the disaster of Cannae will assuredly emerge from every savagery of Fortune.
Nunc, quia tantum ausi estis sponte uestra, experiri libet quantum audeatis duce uestro auctore. non enim hesterno die, cum signum receptui dedi sequentibus effuse uobis turbatum hostem, frangere audaciam uestram sed differre in maiorem gloriam atque opportunitatem uolui, ut postmodo praeparati incautos, armati inermes atque etiam sopitos per occasionem adgredi possetis. nec huius occasionis spem, milites, forte temere sed ex re ipsa conceptam habeo.
Now, since you have dared so much of your own accord, I am pleased to test how much you will dare with your leader as author. For yesterday, when I gave the signal for retreat, you, as you were following in a torrent the disordered enemy, I did not wish to break your audacity but to defer it to greater glory and opportunity, so that thereafter, being prepared, you, armed, might be able, by opportunity, to attack the incautious, the unarmed, and even the sleeping. Nor do I, soldiers, have the hope of this opportunity by chance or rashly, but conceived from the matter itself.
And you too, assuredly, if anyone should ask by what manner a few by many, the conquered by the conquerors, have defended the camp, answer nothing else than this very thing: that, by fearing that very thing, you had had everything fortified by works, and that you yourselves had been prepared and arrayed. And thus the matter stands: in regard to that which is not feared, Fortune makes men least safe, because what you have neglected you hold incautious and open.
of all things, the enemies now fear nothing less than that, themselves just now besieged and assaulted, we should attack their camp of our own accord. let us dare what cannot be believed that we would dare; for this very reason, that which seems most difficult will be easier. in the third watch of the night I will lead you in a silent column.
I have ascertained that neither the order of the watches nor the posts are proper. Let a clamor be heard at the gates and let the first onset seize the camp. Then, among men torpid with sleep and panic-stricken at the unanticipated tumult, and unarmed, overpowered in their beds, let that slaughter be dealt out from which, recalled yesterday, you were chafing.
I know the plan seems audacious; but in harsh circumstances and with slender hope, the bravest counsels are the safest, because, if at the moment of opportunity—whose opportuneness flies past—you hesitate even a little, you will soon seek in vain what you have let slip. One army is at hand, two are not far off. Now for those attacking there is some hope,—and you have already tested your own and their strengths: if we put off the day and, with the report of yesterday’s eruption (sally), we cease to be despised, there is a danger lest all the commanders, all the forces may come together.
Accordingly let us await nothing except the opportunity of the next night. Go, with the gods kindly aiding, take care of your bodies, so that, sound and wakeful, you may burst into the enemy camp with the same spirit with which you have defended your own.' Gladly they both heard from the new leader a new plan, and the more audacious it was, the more it pleased. The remainder of the day was consumed with expediting the arms and with the care of their bodies, and the greater part of the night was given to rest.
[39] Erant ultra proxima castra sex milium interuallo distantes aliae copiae Poenorum. uallis caua intererat, condensa arboribus; in huius siluae medio ferme spatio cohors Romana arte Punica abditur et equites. ita medio itinere intercepto ceterae copiae silenti agmine ad proximos hostes ductae et, cum statio nulla pro portis neque in uallo custodiae essent, uelut in sua castra nullo usquam obsistente penetrauere.
[39] Beyond the nearest camp there were other forces of the Punic side, six miles distant. A hollow valley intervened, dense with trees; in about the middle stretch of this wood a Roman cohort and the cavalry were concealed by Punic artifice. Thus, with the middle of the route cut off, the rest of the forces were led in a silent column to the nearest enemies, and, since there was no picket before the gates nor guards on the rampart, they penetrated, as if into their own camp, with no one anywhere opposing.
then they sound the signals and a clamor is raised. some cut down the half-asleep enemies, some cast fire upon the huts roofed with dry straw, some seize the gates to shut off flight. fire, clamor, slaughter, all at once, as if alienated from their senses, allow the enemies neither to hear nor to foresee anything.
They, unarmed, fall in among the companies of armed men. Some rush to the gates; others, with the routes blocked, leap over the rampart; and as each one escaped, he fled straightway to the other camp, where, surrounded and cut down to a man by the cohort and the cavalry charging out from concealment, all were slain; although, even if anyone had escaped that slaughter, so swiftly did the Romans make a dash from the captured nearer camp to the other camp that the messenger of the disaster could not outstrip them. There indeed, both because they were farther from the enemy and because toward daybreak some had slipped away to forage fodder and wood and to plunder, they found everything more neglected and lax: only arms placed at the posts, the soldiers unarmed, either sitting or reclining on the ground, or strolling before the rampart and the gates.
With these so secure and slack, the Romans, still hot from the recent battle and fierce with victory, enter into combat. And so by no means could resistance be made at the gates; within the gates, with a rush from the whole camp at the first shout and tumult, an atrocious battle arises; and it would have lasted long, had not the bloody shields of the Romans, seen as an indication to the Punics of another disaster, thereupon injected panic. This terror turned all to flight, and, streaming out wherever there was a way—except those whom slaughter overtook—they are swept out of the camp.
thus by night and by day two camps of the enemy were assailed under the leadership of L. Marcius. up to thirty-seven thousand of the enemy were cut down—the authority is Claudius, who translated the Annals of Acilius from Greek into Latin speech; up to 1,830 were captured, and immense booty was obtained; among it was a silver shield weighing 137 pounds, with the image of Hasdrubal the Barcine. Valerius Antias reports that one camp of Mago was taken, 7,000 of the enemy slain; in another engagement a sally was fought with Hasdrubal, 10,000 were killed, and 4,330 captured.
Piso writes that five thousand men, when Mago was following our men as they were retreating in headlong fashion, were slain from an ambush. Among all, the name of the leader Marcius is great; and to his true glory they even add marvels: that, while he was addressing the assembly, a flame was poured from his head without his own perception, to the great fear of the soldiers standing around; and that a monument of his victory over the Carthaginians was, down to the burning of the Capitol, a shield in the temple, called the Marcius, with the image of Hasdrubal.—then for some time affairs in Spain were quiet, as both sides, after such great disasters in turn received and inflicted, were hesitating to risk the decisive issue.
[40] Dum haec in Hispania geruntur, Marcellus captis Syracusis, cum cetera in Sicilia tanta fide atque integritate composuisset ut non modo suam gloriam sed etiam maiestatem populi Romani augeret, ornamenta urbis, signa tabulasque quibus abundabant Syracusae, Romam deuexit, hostium quidem illa spolia et parta belli iure; ceterum inde primum initium mirandi Graecarum artium opera licentiaeque hinc sacra profanaque omnia uolgo spoliandi factum est, quae postremo in Romanos deos, templum id ipsum primum quod a Marcello eximie ornatum est, uertit. uisebantur enim ab externis ad portam Capenam dedicata a M. Marcello templa propter excellentia eius generis ornamenta, quorum perexigua pars comparet.
[40] While these things are being done in Spain, Marcellus, with Syracuse captured, when he had settled the rest in Sicily with such good faith and integrity that he increased not only his own glory but even the majesty of the Roman people, conveyed to Rome the ornaments of the city, the statues and paintings with which Syracuse abounded—those indeed the spoils of enemies and won by the right of war; but from that there first arose the beginning of admiring the works of Greek arts, and hence a license of stripping indiscriminately all things sacred and profane, which finally turned upon the Roman gods, that very temple first which was especially adorned by Marcellus. For the temples dedicated by M. Marcellus near the Capena Gate were visited by foreigners because of the outstanding ornaments of that kind, of which a very small part is extant.
Legationes omnium ferme ciuitatium Siciliae ad eum conueniebant. dispar ut causa earum, ita condicio erat. qui ante captas Syracusas aut non desciuerant aut redierant in amicitiam ut socii fideles accepti cultique; quos metus post captas Syracusas dediderat ut uicti a uictore leges acceperunt.
Delegations of nearly all the communities of Sicily were gathering to him. As their cause was diverse, so was their condition. Those who, before Syracuse was captured, had either not defected or had returned into amity were received and honored as faithful allies; those whom fear, after Syracuse was captured, had driven to surrender accepted the laws, as the conquered from the conqueror.
there were, however, not small remnants of war around Agrigentum for the Romans: Epicydes and Hanno, the surviving commanders of the former war, and a third, new, sent by Hannibal in place of Hippocrates, a Hippacritan of Liby-Phoenician stock—the commons called him Muttines—, a tireless man and, under Hannibal as his master, taught in all the arts of war. To him by Epicydes and Hanno Numidians were given as auxiliaries, with whom he so ranged through the enemy’s fields, and so approached the allies, bringing help to each in due time to keep their minds in loyalty, that in a short time he filled all Sicily with his name, and no other greater hope existed among those favoring the affairs of the Carthaginians. And so, shut in until
When this was reported to Marcellus, he at once moved his forces and encamped at an interval of about four miles from the enemy, intending to wait and see what they would do or prepare. But Muttines gave neither place nor time for delay or deliberation, having crossed the river and ridden into the enemy’s outposts with immense terror and tumult. On the following day, in a battle almost pitched, he drove the enemy within their fortifications.
then recalled by a sedition of the Numidians that had arisen in the camp, when about three hundred of them had withdrawn to Heraclea Minoa, having set out to mitigate and recall them he is said to have earnestly warned the commanders not to join battle with the enemy in his absence. this both commanders took ill, Hanno more so, already before anxious at his glory: Muttines to prescribe measure to him, he, a degenerate African, to the Carthaginian commander sent by the senate and people? he prevailed upon the hesitating Epicydes that, after crossing the river, they should go out into the battle-line; for if they were to wait for Muttines and the fortune of the fight turned out favorable, without doubt the glory would be Muttines’s.
[41] Enimuero indignum ratus Marcellus se, qui Hannibalem subnixum uictoria Cannensi ab Nola reppulisset, his terra marique uictis ab se hostibus cedere, arma propere capere milites et efferri signa iubet. instruenti exercitum decem effusis equis aduolant ex hostium acie Numidae nuntiantes populares suos, primum ea seditione motos qua trecenti ex numero suo concesserint Heracleam, dein quod praefectum suum ab obtrectantibus ducibus gloriae eius sub ipsam certaminis diem ablegatum uideant, quieturos in pugna. gens fallax promissi fidem praestitit.
[41] Indeed, Marcellus, thinking it unworthy of himself—he who had driven Hannibal, propped by the victory of Cannae, from Nola—to yield to these enemies, conquered by himself on land and sea, orders the soldiers to take up arms promptly and the standards to be carried out. As he was arraying the army, ten Numidians, with their horses let loose at full gallop, fly up from the enemy’s battle line, announcing that their compatriots—first stirred by that sedition by which three hundred of their number had withdrawn to Heraclea, then because they see their own prefect sent away, on the very day of the contest, by commanders detracting from his glory—would keep quiet in the fight. A treacherous race kept faith with their promise.
and so the spirit grew for the Romans, a swift message having been sent through the ranks that the enemy whom they had most feared was left without cavalry; and the enemy were terrified, besides the fact that they were not being aided by the greatest part of their forces, fear also having been struck in lest they should be attacked by their own cavalry themselves. and so it was not a contest of great moment; the first shout and onset decided the matter. the Numidians, when in the clash they had stood quiet on the wings, when they saw their own men turning their backs, they became companions of flight only for a little while; after they saw all making for Agrigentum in a trembling column, they themselves, for fear of a siege, scattered everywhere into the nearest cities.
Iam ferme in exitu annus erat; itaque senatus Romae decreuit ut P. Cornelius praetor litteras Capuam ad consules mitteret, dum Hannibal procul abesset nec ulla magni discriminis res ad Capuam gereretur, alter eorum, si ita uideretur, ad magistratus subrogandos Romam ueniret. litteris acceptis inter se consules compararunt ut Claudius comitia perficeret, Fuluius ad Capuam maneret. consules Claudius creauit Cn. Fuluium Centumalum et P. Sulpicium Serui filium Galbam, qui nullum antea curulem magistratum gessisset.
By now the year was nearly at its end; and so the senate at Rome decreed that P. Cornelius, the praetor, should send letters to Capua to the consuls, while Hannibal was far away and no matter of great peril was being conducted at Capua, that one of them, if it seemed so, should come to Rome for subrogating magistrates. When the letters were received, the consuls arranged between themselves that Claudius should complete the elections, Fulvius should remain at Capua. As consul Claudius elected Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and P. Sulpicius Galba, son of Servius, who had previously held no curule magistracy.