Justinian•DIGESTA
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HISTORIA RERUM IN PARTIBUS TRANSMARINIS GESTARUM24 sections
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Dig. 10.3.0. Communi dividundo.
10.2.0. Of partitioning the family inheritance.
Dig. 10.3.0. Of dividing common property.
Iudici finium regundorum permittitur, ut, ubi non possit dirimere fines, adiudicatione controversiam dirimat: et si forte amovendae veteris obscuritatis gratia per aliam regionem fines dirigere iudex velit, potest hoc facere per adiudicationem et condemnationem.
It is permitted to the judge for regulating boundaries that, where he cannot separate the boundaries, he may resolve the controversy by adjudication; and if perchance, for the sake of removing an old obscurity, the judge should wish to direct the boundaries through another tract, he can do this by adjudication and condemnation.
Post litem autem contestatam etiam fructus venient in hoc iudicio: nam et culpa et dolus exinde praestantur: sed ante iudicium percepti non omnimodo hoc in iudicium venient: aut enim bona fide percepit, et lucrari eum oportet, si eos consumpsit, aut mala fide, et condici oportet.
After the suit has been contested, the fruits also will come into this action; for thereafter both fault (culpa) and fraud (dolus) are made answerable. But those taken before the action will not in every respect come into this action: for either he collected them in good faith, and he ought to profit if he has consumed them, or in bad faith, and they ought to be recoverable by condictio.
Si alter fundus duorum, alter trium sit, potest iudex uni parti adiudicare locum de quo quaeritur, licet plures dominos habeat, quoniam magis fundo quam personis adiudicari fines intelleguntur: hic autem cum fit adiudicatio pluribus, unusquisque portionem habebit,
If one estate belongs to two, the other to three, the judge can adjudge to one party the place in question, although it has several owners, since boundaries are understood to be adjudged rather to the estate than to persons; however, when adjudication is made here to several, each will have a portion,
Si communem fundum ego et tu habemus et vicinum fundum ego solus, an finium regundorum iudicium accipere possumus? et scribit pomponius non posse nos accipere, quia ego et socius meus in hac actione adversarii esse non possumus, sed unius loco habemur. idem pomponius ne utile quidem iudicium dandum dicit, cum possit, qui proprium habeat, vel communem vel proprium fundum alienare et sic experiri.
If you and I have a common estate, and I alone have the neighboring estate, can we receive an action for regulating boundaries? And Pomponius writes that we cannot receive it, because my partner and I cannot be adversaries in this action, but are held in the place of a single person. The same Pomponius says that not even an “utilis” action should be granted, since the one who has a separate (proper) estate can alienate either the common or the separate estate and thus make trial (sue) in that way.
Hoc iudicium locum habet in confinio praediorum rusticorum: nam in confinio praediorum urbanorum displicuit, neque enim confines hi, sed magis vicini dicuntur et ea communibus parietibus plerumque disterminantur. et ideo et si in agris aedificia iuncta sint, locus huic actioni non erit: et in urbe hortorum latitudo contingere potest, ut etiam finium regundorum agi possit.
This action has place on the confine of rural estates; for on the confine of urban estates it has been disapproved, for these are not called “confinials,” but rather “neighbors,” and they are for the most part demarcated by common walls. And therefore, even if in the fields buildings are joined, there will be no place for this action; and in the city the breadth of gardens can occur, so that even the action for regulating boundaries may be brought.
Si irruptione fluminis fines agri confudit inundatio ideoque usurpandi quibusdam loca, in quibus ius non habent, occasionem praestat, praeses provinciae alieno eos abstinere et domino suum restitui terminosque per mensorem declarari iubet.
If, by the irruption of a river, the inundation has confounded the boundaries of a field, and for that reason affords to certain persons an occasion for usurping places in which they have no right, the governor of the province orders them to abstain from another’s property and that the owner be restored to what is his, and that the boundaries be declared by a surveyor.
In finalibus quaestionibus vetera monumenta census auctoritas ante litem inchoatam ordinati sequenda est, modo si non varietate successionum et arbitrio possessorum fines additis vel detractis agris postea permutatos probetur.
In boundary questions, the authority of the old records of the census—of what was ordered before the suit was initiated—ought to be followed, provided that it is not proved that by the variety of successions and the discretion of possessors the boundaries were afterwards changed by fields being added or subtracted.
Eos terminos, quantum ad dominii quaestionem pertinet, observari oportere fundorum, quos demonstravit is, qui utriusque praedii dominus fuit, cum alterum eorum venderet: non enim termini, qui singulos fundos separabant, observari debent, sed demonstratio adfinium novos fines inter fundos constituere.
Those boundaries, so far as the question of dominion pertains, ought to be observed for the estates which were demonstrated by the one who was owner of both holdings when he sold one of them: for it is not the boundaries which separated the individual estates that must be observed, but the demonstration of the abutters establishes new bounds between the estates.
Sciendum est in actione finium regundorum illud observandum esse, quod ad exemplum quodammodo eius legis scriptum est, quam athenis solonem dicitur tulisse: nam illic ita est: ean tis ahimasian par' allotriw xwriw orugy, ^ orutty^ ton horon my parabainein: ean teixion, poda apoleipein: ean de oikyma, duo podas. ean de tafon y bovron orutty, hoson to bavos y, tosouton apoleipein: ean de frear, orguian. elaian de kai sukyn ennea podas apo tou allotriou futeuein ta de alla dendra pente podas.
It must be known that in the action for regulating boundaries that must be observed which is written, as it were, by way of an exemplar of that law which at Athens Solon is said to have enacted: for there it is thus: “If anyone digs a ditch alongside another’s land, not to overstep the boundary-marker; if a wall, to leave a foot; if a building, two feet. And if he digs a grave or a pit, to leave as much as its depth; and if a well, a fathom. An olive and a fig to be planted nine feet from the neighbor’s property; but the other trees five feet.”
Quae quidem actio nihilo minus ei quoque ipso iure competit, qui suam partem non possidet: sed si is qui possidet neget eum sibi coheredem esse, potest eum excludere per hanc exceptionem " si in ea re, qua de agitur, praeiudicium hereditati non fiat". quod si possideat eam partem, licet negetur esse coheres, non nocet talis exceptio: quo fit, ut eo casu ipse iudex, apud quem hoc iudicium agitur, cognoscat, an coheres sit: nisi enim coheres sit, neque adiudicari quicquam ei oportet neque adversarius ei condemnandus est.
Indeed this action nonetheless belongs by the law itself also to one who does not possess his share; but if the one who possesses denies that he is his coheir, he can exclude him by this exception, " si in ea re, qua de agitur, no prejudice be done to the inheritance." But if he possesses that share, although it is denied that he is a coheir, such an exception does not harm: whence it follows that in that case the judge before whom this proceeding is conducted will ascertain whether he is a coheir; for unless he is a coheir, neither ought anything to be adjudicated to him nor is the adversary to be condemned in his favor.
Per familiae erciscundae actionem dividitur hereditas, sive ex testamento sive ab intestato, sive lege duodecim tabularum sive ex aliqua lege deferatur hereditas vel ex senatus consulto vel etiam constitutione: et generaliter eorum dumtaxat dividi hereditas potest, quorum peti potest hereditas.
By the action for partition of the family estate, the inheritance is divided, whether from a testament or from intestacy, whether the inheritance is devolved by the Law of the Twelve Tables or by some law, or by a senatorial decree or even by an imperial constitution; and, generally, the inheritance can be divided only among those whose inheritance can be claimed.
Plane ad officium iudicis nonnumquam pertinet, ut debita et credita singulis pro solido aliis alia adtribuat, quia saepe et solutio et exactio partium non minima incommoda habet. nec tamen scilicet haec adtributio illud efficit, ut quis solus totum debeat vel totum alicui soli debeatur, sed ut, sive agendum sit, partim suo partim procuratorio nomine agat, sive cum eo agatur, partim suo partim procuratorio nomine conveniatur. nam licet libera potestas esse maneat creditoribus cum singulis experiundi, tamen et his libera potestas est suo loco substituendi eos, in quos onera actionis officio iudicis translata sunt.
Clearly it sometimes pertains to the office of the judge to attribute debts and credits to individuals pro solido, assigning some to some, others to others, because payment and exaction of shares often have not inconsiderable inconveniences. Nor, of course, does this attribution bring it about that someone alone should owe the whole, or that the whole should be owed to someone alone; rather, that, whether action is to be brought, he proceeds partly in his own name and partly in a procuratorial name, or, if action is brought against him, he is convened partly in his own name and partly in a procuratorial name. For although a free power remains to the creditors of proceeding against each singly, nevertheless those against whom suit is brought likewise have a free power, in due course, to substitute those upon whom the burdens of the action have been transferred by the office of the judge.
Mala medicamenta et venena veniunt quidem in iudicium, sed iudex omnino interponere se in his non debet: boni enim et innocentis viri officio eum fungi oportet: tantundem debebit facere et in libris improbatae lectionis, magicis forte vel his similibus. haec enim omnia protinus corrumpenda sunt.
Bad medicaments and poisons do indeed come into court, but the judge ought by no means to interpose himself in these; for it behooves him to discharge the office of a good and innocent man; he ought to do just the same also with books of reprobated reading, perhaps magical or suchlike. For all these things are to be immediately destroyed.
Sed et tabulas testamenti debebit aut apud eum, qui ex maiore parte heres est, iubere manere aut in aede deponi. nam et labeo scribit vendita hereditate tabulas testamenti descriptas deponi oportere: heredem enim exemplum debere dare, tabulas vero authenticas ipsum retinere aut in aede deponere.
But also he ought either to order the tablets of the testament to remain with him who is heir in the greater share, or to be deposited in a temple. For Labeo also writes that, when the inheritance has been sold, the tablets of the testament, copied out, ought to be deposited: for the heir ought to give an exemplar, but the authentic/original tablets he himself should retain or deposit in the temple.
Si quae sunt cautiones hereditariae, eas iudex curare debet ut apud eum maneant, qui maiore ex parte heres sit, ceteri descriptum et recognitum faciant, cautione interposita, ut, cum res exegerit, ipsae exhibeantur. si omnes isdem ex partibus heredes sint nec inter eos conveniat, apud quem potius esse debeant, sortiri eos oportet: aut ex consensu vel suffragio eligendus est amicus, apud quem deponantur: vel in aede sacra deponi debent.
If there are hereditary cautions (security instruments), the judge ought to see to it that they remain with him who is heir in the greater share; the others should have them transcribed and collated (verified), a caution interposed, to the effect that, when the matter requires, the originals themselves be produced. If all are heirs from the same shares and it is not agreed among them with whom they ought rather to be, they must cast lots: or by consent or by vote a friend is to be chosen, with whom they are to be deposited: or they ought to be deposited in a sacred temple.
Si heres unus, cum sub condicione adiectum coheredem aut apud hostes haberet, dixerit se heredem esse et actione expertus vicerit, deinde condicio heredis exstiterit vel postliminio redierit, an victoriae commodum debeat cum eo communicare? nam indubitate iudicati actio ei in solidum competit. et electionem coheredi dandam, id est aut communicandam eam aut experiundi faciendam potestatem huic, qui post victoriam coheredis effectus sit heres aut reversus sit in civitatem.
If there is a single heir, who had a coheir added under a condition or one who was among the enemy, and he declares himself to be heir and, having tried an action, wins, then if the coheir’s condition comes to pass or he returns by postliminium, must he share the profit of the victory with him? For, without doubt, the action on the judgment (iudicati actio) belongs to him for the whole (in solidum). And a choice is to be given to the coheir, that is, either that it be shared, or that the power of making trial be afforded to this man who, after the coheir’s victory, has become heir or has returned into the commonwealth.
Pomponius scribit, si uni ex heredibus praelegatae fuerint rationes, non prius ei tradendas, quam coheredes descripserint. nam et si servus actor, inquit, fuerit legatus, non alias eum tradendum, quam rationes reddiderit. nos videbimus, numquid et cautio sit interponenda, ut, quotiens desideratae fuerint rationes vel actor praelegatus, copia eorum fiat?
Pomponius writes that, if the accounts have been pre-legate to one of the heirs, they are not to be handed over to him before the coheirs have transcribed them. For even if a slave–agent (actor) has been bequeathed, he says, he is not to be delivered otherwise than after he has rendered the accounts. We shall consider whether perhaps a security (cautio) ought also to be interposed, so that, whenever the accounts or the pre-legate agent are desired, provision of them may be made?
Idem pomponius ait columbas, quae emitti solent de columbario, venire in familiae herciscundae iudicium, cum nostrae sint tamdiu, quamdiu consuetudinem habeant ad nos revertendi: quare si quis eas adprehendisset, furti nobis competit actio. idem et in apibus dicitur, quia in patrimonio nostro computantur.
Pomponius likewise says that doves, which are wont to be released from a dovecote, fall under the action for partition of the family estate, since they are ours so long as they have the habit of returning to us: wherefore, if someone were to seize them, an action for theft lies for us. The same is said also with regard to bees, because they are counted in our patrimony.
Sed et si quid de pecoribus nostris a bestia ereptum sit, venire in familiae erciscundae iudicium putat, si feram evaserit: nam magis esse, ut non desinat nostrum esse, inquit, quod a lupo eripitur vel alia bestia, tamdiu, quamdiu ab eo non fuerit consumptum.
But also, if anything of our cattle has been snatched away by a beast, he thinks it comes under the action for partition of the inheritance (familiae erciscundae), if it has escaped the wild animal: for, he says, it is rather the case that what is torn from a wolf or another beast does not cease to be ours, so long as it has not been consumed by it.
Res, quae sub condicione legata est, interim heredum est et ideo venit in familiae erciscundae iudicium et adiudicari potest cum sua scilicet causa, ut existente condicione eximatur ab eo cui adiudicata est aut deficiente condicione ad eos revertatur a quibus relicta est. idem et in statulibero dicitur, qui interim est heredum, existente autem condicione ad libertatem perveniat.
The thing that has been bequeathed under a condition is in the meantime the heirs’ and therefore comes into the action for partition of the family inheritance, and it can be adjudicated, of course subject to its own clause, so that, if the condition comes to pass, it is taken away from the one to whom it was adjudicated; or, if the condition fails, it returns to those by whom it was bequeathed. The same is said of a statuliber, who in the meantime belongs to the heirs, but, the condition existing, attains to liberty.
Sed et si dolo vel culpa quid in usum fructum ab uno ex heredibus factum sit, hoc quoque in iudicium venire pomponius ait: nam et omnia, quae quis in hereditate dolo aut culpa fecit, in iudicium familiae erciscundae veniunt, sic tamen, si quasi heres fecerit. et ideo si vivo testatore unus ex heredibus pecuniam sustulerit, in familiae erciscundae iudicium ea non venit, quia tunc nondum heres erat: ubi autem quasi heres fecit, etsi aliam praeterea quis actionem habeat, tamen teneri eum familiae erciscundae iudicio iulianus scribit.
But also if through fraud or fault something has been done affecting the usufruct by one of the heirs, Pomponius says that this too comes into the action: for indeed all things which someone has done in the inheritance through fraud or fault fall within the familiae erciscundae action, yet only if he did them as an heir. And therefore, if while the testator was alive one of the heirs removed money, that does not come into the familiae erciscundae action, because at that time he was not yet an heir; but where he acted as an heir, even if someone moreover has another action, nevertheless Julian writes that he is held by the familiae erciscundae action.
Item si servus hereditarius propriam rem heredum unius subripuerit, ofilius ait esse familiae erciscundae actionem et communi dividundo furtique actionem cessare. quare agentem familiae erciscundae iudicio consecuturum, ut aut ei servus adiudicetur aut litis aestimatio in simplum offeratur.
Likewise, if a hereditary slave has surreptitiously taken the proper thing of one of the heirs, Ofilius says that there is the action for partition of an inheritance (familiae erciscundae), and that the actions for division of common property (communi dividundo) and for theft cease. Wherefore the one proceeding by the action for partition of an inheritance will obtain by the judgment that either the slave be adjudicated to him or that the assessed value of the suit in single be tendered.
His consequenter iulianus ait: si ex pluribus heredibus uni servus sit generaliter per optionem legatus et heredes stichum tabulas hereditarias interlevisse dicant vel corrupisse et propter hoc renuntiaverint, ne optaretur servus, deinde optatus vindicetur, poterunt, si ab eis vindicetur, doli mali exceptione uti et de servo quaestionem habere.
Consequently, Julian says: if, out of several heirs, a slave has been generally bequeathed by option to one, and the heirs say that Stichus has interlined the hereditary tablets or corrupted them, and on this account have given notice so that the slave not be chosen, then, if after being chosen he is claimed, they will be able, if he is claimed from them, to use the exception of dolus malus and to have an inquiry concerning the slave.
Sed an in familiae erciscundae iudicium de morte testatoris vel de morte uxoris liberorumque suorum habebunt quaestionem heredes, quaeritur: et rectissime pomponius ait haec ad divisionem rerum hereditariarum non pertinere.
But it is asked whether, in the action for partition of an inheritance (familiae erciscundae iudicium), the heirs will have an issue regarding the death of the testator or regarding the death of his wife and his children; and most rightly Pomponius says that these matters do not pertain to the division of hereditary things.
Idem quaerit, si quis testamento caverit, ut servus exportandus veneat, officio familiae erciscundae iudicis contineri, ut voluntas defuncti non intercidat. sed et cum monumentum iussit testator fieri, familiae erciscundae agent, ut fiat. idem tamen temptat, quia heredum interest, quos ius monumenti sequitur, praescriptis verbis posse eos experiri, ut monumentum fiat.
He likewise inquires, if someone has provided by testament that a slave be sold to be exported, that this be contained within the office of the judge in a familiae erciscundae suit, lest the will of the deceased lapse. But also, when the testator ordered that a monument be made, they act by a familiae erciscundae action, that it be made. Nevertheless he also attempts the same: since it is the interest of the heirs—whom the right to the monument follows—they can proceed by a praescriptis verbis action, that the monument be made.
Celsus etiam illud eleganter adicit coheredem et si non solvit habere familiae erciscundae iudicium, ut cogatur coheres solvere, cum alias non sit liberaturus rem creditor, nisi in solidum ei satisfiat.
Celsus also adds elegantly that a coheir, even if he has not paid, has the action for partition of the inheritance (familiae erciscundae iudicium), so that the coheir may be compelled to pay, since otherwise the creditor would not be going to release the property unless he is satisfied in full (in solidum).
Si filius familias patri heres pro parte extitisset et a creditoribus peculiaribus conveniretur, cum paratus sit solvere id omne quod debetur, per doli exceptionem consequetur a creditoribus mandari sibi actiones: sed etiam familiae erciscundae iudicium cum coheredibus haberet ^ habet^.
If a son under paternal power had become heir to his father for a share and were sued by the creditors of his peculium, since he is ready to pay all that is owed, he will, by the exception of fraud (exceptio doli), obtain that the creditors assign the actions to him; but he would have ^ has ^ as well the action for partition of the family inheritance (familiae erciscundae) with his coheirs.
Cum unus ex heredibus legatum exsolvit ei, qui missus fuerat in possessionem legatorum servandorum causa, putat papinianus, et verum est, familiae erciscundae iudicium ei competere adversus coheredes, quia non alias discederet legatarius a possessione, quam vice pignoris erat consecutus, quam si totum ei legatum fuisset exsolutum.
When one of the heirs discharged the legacy to him who had been put into possession for the sake of preserving the legacies, Papinian thinks—and it is true—that the action for partition of the family estate (familiae erciscundae iudicium) lies to him against his coheirs, because the legatee would not otherwise depart from the possession, which he had obtained in the stead of a pledge, unless the whole legacy had been paid out to him.
Item ex diverso similiter prospicere iudex debet, ut quod unus ex heredibus ex re hereditaria percepit stipulatusve est non ad eius solius lucrum pertineat. quae ita scilicet consequetur iudex, si aut reputationes inter eos fecerit aut si curaverit cautiones interponi, quibus inter eos communicentur commoda et incommoda.
Likewise, conversely, the judge ought similarly to provide that what one of the heirs has received from the hereditary estate or has stipulated for not pertain to his profit alone. This, of course, the judge will achieve if either he makes reckonings between them, or if he takes care that cautions (securities) be interposed, by which the benefits and burdens are shared between them.
Si filia nupta, quae dotem conferre debuit, per errorem coheredum ita cavit, ut, quod a marito reciperasset, pro partibus hereditariis solveret, nihilo minus arbitrum familiae erciscundae sic arbitraturum papinianus scribit, ut, etiamsi constante matrimonio ipsa diem suum obierit, conferatur dos: nam imperitia, inquit, coheredum iurisdictionis formam mutare non potuit.
If a married daughter, who ought to confer the dowry, by the error of the coheirs so stipulated that what she had recovered from her husband she would pay toward the hereditary shares, nonetheless Papinian writes that the arbitrator in the familiae erciscundae will so adjudge that, even if, with the marriage continuing, she herself has met her day, the dowry is to be contributed: for, he says, the inexperience of the coheirs could not alter the form of jurisdiction.
Hoc amplius filius familias heres institutus dotem uxoris suae praecipiet, nec immerito, quia ipse onera matrimonii sustinet. integram igitur dotem praecipiet et cavebit defensum iri coheredes, qui ex stipulatu possunt conveniri. idem et si alius dotem dedit et stipulatus est.
Furthermore, a son under paternal power who has been instituted heir will take in advance the dowry of his wife—and not without good reason, because he himself sustains the burdens of matrimony. Therefore he will take the entire dowry in advance, and he will give security that the coheirs—who can be proceeded against on the stipulation—will be defended. The same holds even if another gave the dowry and took a stipulation.
and not only the dowry of his own wife, but also that of his son’s wife, as though this burden of marriage also pertains to him, since he must himself acknowledge the burdens of the son and of the daughter-in-law. moreover, Marcellus writes that the son ought to take in preference not only the dowry given to the father, but even that given to the son himself; but the one given to the son only insofar as his peculium allows or it has been converted into the father’s assets.
Si pater inter filios sine scriptura bona divisit et onera aeris alieni pro modo possessionum distribuit, non videri simplicem donationem, sed potius supremi iudicii divisionem papinianus ait. plane, inquit, si creditores eos pro portionibus hereditariis conveniant et unus placita detrectet, posse cum eo praescriptis verbis agi, quasi certa lege permutationem fecerint, scilicet si omnes res divisae sint.
If a father has divided the goods among his sons without a writing and has distributed the burdens of another’s money (debts) according to the measure of the holdings, Papinian says it is not seen as a simple donation, but rather as a division by his final judgment. Clearly, he says, if creditors bring suit against them according to their hereditary portions and one of them refuses the agreed terms, it is possible to sue him by the action “praescriptis verbis,” as though they had made an exchange under a definite law—namely, if all the things have been divided.
Papinianus ait, si uni ex heredibus onus aeris alieni iniungatur citra speciem legati, officio iudicis familiae erciscundae cognoscentis suscipere eum id oportere, sed non ultra dodrantem portionis suae, ut quadrantem illibatum habeat: indemnes igitur coheredes suos praestare cavebit.
Papinian says that, if the burden of debt is imposed upon one of the heirs without the guise of a legacy, by the duty of the judge hearing the suit for division of the inheritance (familia erciscunda) he ought to assume it, but not beyond three-quarters of his portion, so that he may have a quarter untouched; accordingly, he will give a stipulation to warrant his coheirs harmless.
Idem scribit et si filius in muneribus publicis, in quibus pater ei consentit, reliquatus est et pro parte heres scriptus est, hoc quoque debere praecipere, quia et hoc patris aes alienum fuit: sed si qua munera post mortem patris suscepit, ab his heredes patris soluti sunt.
He likewise writes that, if a son has been left subject to public munera, to which the father consented for him, and has been instituted heir for a share, he ought to take this also in preference, because this too was the father’s debt; but if he undertook any munera after the father’s death, from these the father’s heirs are released.
Neratius autem respondit: eum, qui plures filios haberet, unum ex filiis agwonovesian suscepturum professum esse et priusquam honore fungeretur, mortuum esse omnibus filiis heredibus institutis, et quaesitum esse, an is filius, quod in eam rem impendisset, familiae erciscundae consequatur: eique respondisse nulla actione idem consequi posse. quod merito displicet. debet itaque hoc in familiae erciscundae iudicium venire.
But Neratius answered: that a man who had several sons had declared that one of his sons would undertake the agoranomy, and that before he discharged the honor he died, with all the sons appointed as heirs; and that it was asked whether that son might recover in the family-partition action what he had expended for that matter; and that he had answered that by no action could he obtain the same. Which is rightly disapproved. Therefore this ought to come into the iudicium familiae erciscundae (the action for partition of the family estate).
Item papinianus scribit, si maritus alterum ex heredibus onus dotis solvendae, quae in stipulationem venit, suscipere iussit et mulier adversus utrumque dirigat dotis petitionem, coheredem esse defendendum ab eo, qui suscipere onus iussus est. sed legata, quae ab utroque pro dote data electa dote retinentur, in compendio coheredis esse, qui debito levatur, non oportet, videlicet ut coheres, qui onus aeris alieni suscepit, officio iudicis legatum consequatur. et verum est hoc, nisi aliud testator edixit.
Likewise Papinian writes: if the husband has ordered one of the heirs to assume the burden of paying the dowry, which has come into stipulation, and the woman directs a claim for the dowry against both, the coheir ought to be defended by the one who was ordered to assume the burden. But the legacies which, having been given by both for the sake of the dowry, are retained once the dowry has been chosen, ought not to be to the saving of the coheir who is relieved from the debt; namely, the coheir who has assumed the burden of the debt should, by the judge’s office, obtain the legacy. And this is true, unless the testator declared otherwise.
Familiae erciscundae iudex ita potest pluribus eandem rem adiudicare, si aut pluribus fuerit unius rei praeceptio relicta ( ubi etiam necessitatem facere pomponius scribit, ut pluribus adiudicetur) vel si certam partem unicuique coheredum adsignet: sed potest etiam licitatione admissa uni rem adiudicare:
The judge for the familiae erciscundae can thus adjudge the same thing to several persons, if either a preemption (praeceptio) of a single thing has been left to several (where Pomponius also writes that it creates a necessity that it be adjudged to several), or if he assigns a definite share to each of the coheirs: but he can also, with a licitation admitted, adjudge the thing to one person:
Papinianus de re quae apud hostes est Marcellum reprehendit, quod non putat in praestationes eius rei venire in familiae erciscundae iudicium, quae apud hostes est. quid enim impedimentum est rei praestationem venire, cum et ipsa veniat.
Papinian, concerning a thing that is among the enemy, reprehends Marcellus, because he does not think that the prestations of that thing come within the action for partitioning the family inheritance, when the thing is among the enemy. For what impediment is there that the prestation of the thing should come in, since the thing itself comes in?
Si miles alium castrensium, alium ceterorum bonorum heredem fecerit, non est locus familiae erciscundae iudicio: divisum est enim per constitutiones inter eos patrimonium, quemadmodum cessat familiae erciscundae iudicium, cum nihil in corporibus, sed omnia in nominibus sunt.
If a soldier has made one person heir of the camp-goods and another of the rest of the goods, there is no place for the action for partition of the family inheritance: for the patrimony is divided between them by the constitutions, just as the action for partition of a family inheritance ceases when there is nothing in corporeal things, but everything is in credits (nomina).
Si testator rem communem cum extraneo habebat sive rei suae partem alicui legavit aut heres ante iudicium familiae erciscundae acceptum partem suam alienavit, ad officium iudicis pertinet, ut eam partem, quae testatoris fuit, alicui iubeat tradi.
If the testator had a thing in common with a stranger, or bequeathed to someone a part of his own property, or if the heir, before the iudicium familiae erciscundae was entered, alienated his own share, it pertains to the office of the judge to order that the share which belonged to the testator be delivered to the person.
Idem scribit, cum ego et tu heredes titio extitissemus, si tu partem fundi, quem totum hereditarium dicebas, a sempronio petieris et victus fueris, mox eandem partem a sempronio emero et traditus mihi fuerit, agente te familiae erciscundae iudicio non veniet non solum hoc quod pro herede possidetur, sed nec id quod pro emptore: cum enim per iudicem priorem apparuit totam non esse hereditatis, quemadmodum in familiae erciscundae iudicium veniat?
He likewise writes: when you and I had become heirs to Titius, if you have demanded from Sempronius a part of the farm which you were asserting to be wholly hereditary, and have been defeated, and soon thereafter I purchase that same part from Sempronius and it has been delivered to me, then, when you bring the action for dividing the family estate (familiae erciscundae iudicium), there will come into it not only not that which is possessed in the capacity of heir, but not even that which is possessed as purchaser: for since through the earlier judge it became apparent that it is not wholly of the inheritance, how would it come into the action for dividing the family estate?
An ea stipulatio, qua singuli heredes in solidum habent actionem, veniat in hoc iudicium, dubitatur: veluti si is qui viam iter actus stipulatus erat decesserit, quia talis stipulatio per legem duodecim tabularum non dividitur, quia nec potest. sed verius est non venire eam in iudicium, sed omnibus in solidum competere actionem et, si non praestetur via, pro parte hereditaria condemnationem fieri oportet.
Whether that stipulation, by which the individual heirs have an action in solidum, comes into this action is a matter of doubt: for instance, if the person who had stipulated for a via, iter, and actus has died, since such a stipulation is not divided by the Law of the Twelve Tables, because it cannot be. But the truer view is that it does not come into the action, rather that the action belongs to all in solidum; and, if the way is not provided, condemnation ought to be made according to the hereditary share.
Contra si promissor viae decesserit pluribus heredibus institutis, nec dividitur obligatio nec dubium est quin duret, quoniam viam promittere et is potest, qui fundum non habet. igitur quia singuli in solidum tenentur, officio iudicis cautiones interponi debere, ut, si quis ex his conventus litis aestimationem praestiterit, id pro parte a ceteris consequatur.
Conversely, if the promisor of a right of way has died with several heirs instituted, the obligation is not divided, nor is there any doubt that it endures, since even one who does not have the estate can promise a right of way. Therefore, because each is held in solidum, it is the judge’s duty to require sureties to be interposed, so that, if any one of them, when sued, has paid the valuation of the action, he may recover that amount pro rata from the others.
In illa quoque stipulatione prospiciendum est coheredibus, si testator promiserat " neque per se neque per heredem suum fieri, quo minus ire agere possit", quoniam uno prohibente in solidum committitur stipulatio, ne unius factum ceteris damnosum sit.
In that stipulation also provision must be made for the coheirs, if the testator had promised " that it shall not be done, neither by himself nor by his heir, whereby he may be hindered from going or driving," since with one person prohibiting the stipulation is incurred in solidum, lest the act of one be damaging to the others.
Idem iuris est in pecunia promissa a testatore, si sub poena promissa sit: nam licet haec obligatio dividatur per legem duodecim tabularum, tamen quia nihilum prodest ad poenam evitandam partem suam solvere, sive nondum soluta est pecunia nec dies venit, prospiciendum est per cautionem, ut de indemnitate caveat per quem factum fuerit, ne omnis pecunia solveretur, aut ut caveat se ei qui solidum solverit partem praestaturum: sive etiam solvit unus universam pecuniam quam defunctus promittit, ne poena committeretur, familiae erciscundae iudicio a coheredibus partes recipere poterit.
The same law obtains in the case of money promised by a testator, if it was promised under a penalty: for although this obligation is divided by the Law of the Twelve Tables, nevertheless, because it is of no avail for avoiding the penalty to pay one’s own share, whether the money has not yet been paid and the due day has not arrived, provision must be made by a cautio, that the person whose act would cause all the money to be paid shall give security for indemnity, lest the whole sum be paid, or that he shall give security that he will render to him who shall have paid the solidum his share; or, if one pays the entire sum which the deceased promises, so that the penalty not be incurred, he can by the action for partition of the family estate (iudicium familiae erciscundae) recover the shares from his coheirs.
Si unus ex coheredibus noxali iudicio servum hereditarium defenderit et litis aestimationem optulerit, cum hoc expediret, id pro parte hoc iudicio consequatur. idem est et si unus legatorum nomine caverit, ne in possessionem mitterentur. et omnino quae pro parte expediri non possunt si unus cogente necessitate fecerit, familiae erciscundae iudicio locus est.
If one of the coheirs, in a noxal action, has defended a hereditary slave and has proffered the valuation of the suit, since this was expedient, he obtains that, as to his share, by this judgment. The same holds if one has given security in the name of the legatees, that they not be put into possession. And, in general, if things which cannot be settled for a part have been done by one under the compulsion of necessity, there is room for the action for partition of the family (familiae erciscundae).
Non tantum dolum, sed et culpam in re hereditaria praestare debet coheres, quoniam cum coherede non contrahimus, sed incidimus in eum: non tamen diligentiam praestare debet, qualem diligens pater familias, quoniam hic propter suam partem causam habuit gerendi et ideo negotiorum gestorum ei actio non competit: talem igitur diligentiam praestare debet, qualem in suis rebus. eadem sunt, si duobus res legata sit: nam et hos coniunxit ad societatem non consensus, sed res.
Not only for fraud, but also for fault in an inheritance matter, a co‑heir must answer, since with a co‑heir we do not contract, but we happen upon him: nevertheless he need not render the diligence such as a careful paterfamilias, since he had reason to manage on account of his own share, and therefore the action for business transacted does not lie in his favor: he ought, therefore, to render such diligence as he uses in his own affairs. The same things hold if a thing has been bequeathed to two: for these too were joined into partnership not by consent, but by the thing.
Si incerto homine legato et postea defuncto legatario aliquis ex heredibus legatarii non consentiendo impedierit legatum, is qui impedit hoc iudicio ceteris quanti intersit eorum damnabitur. idem est, si e contrario unus ex heredibus, a quibus generaliter homo legatus est quem ipsi elegerint, noluerit consentire, ut praestetur quem solvi omnibus expediebat, et ideo conventi a legatario iudicio pluris damnati fuerint.
If, an uncertain slave having been bequeathed and afterwards the legatee having died, some one of the heirs of the legatee, by not consenting, has impeded the legacy, he who impedes will, by this action, be condemned to the others for as much as it is in their interest. The same holds if, on the contrary, one of the heirs, by whom a slave has been bequeathed in general terms to be chosen by themselves, has been unwilling to consent that there be furnished the one whose discharge was expedient for all, and for that reason, having been sued by the legatee in an action, they have been condemned to a greater sum.
Si pecunia, quae domi relicta non est, per praeceptionem relicta sit, utrum universa a coheredibus praestanda sit an pro parte hereditaria, quemadmodum si pecunia in hereditate relicta esset, dubitatur. et magis dicendum est, ut id praestandum sit, quod praestaretur, si pecunia esset inventa.
If money, which was not left at home, has been left by way of preemption, it is doubted whether the whole must be furnished by the coheirs or in proportion to the hereditary share, just as if the money had been left in the inheritance. And it is rather to be said that that must be furnished which would be furnished if the money had been found.
In hoc iudicio condemnationes et absolutiones in omnium persona faciendae sunt: et ideo si in alicuius persona omissa sit damnatio, in ceterorum quoque persona quod fecit iudex non valebit, quia non potest ex uno iudicio res iudicata in partem valere, in partem non valere.
In this proceeding, condemnations and absolutions are to be made in the person of all; and therefore, if in the person of any one a condemnation has been omitted, what the judge has done will not be valid in the persons of the others as well, because from one judgment a res judicata cannot be valid in part and not valid in part.
Si pignori res data defuncto sit, dicendum est in familiae erciscundae iudicium venire: sed is cui adiudicabitur in familiae erciscundae iudicio pro parte coheredi erit damnandus nec cavere debet coheredi indemnem eum fore adversus eum qui pignori dederit, quia pro eo erit, ac si hypothecaria vel serviana actione petita litis aestimatio oblata sit, ut et is qui optulerit adversus dominum vindicantem exceptione tuendus sit. contra quoque si is heres, cui pignus adiudicatum est, velit totum reddere, licet debitor nolit, audiendus est. non idem dici potest, si alteram partem creditor emerit: adiudicatio enim necessaria est, emptio voluntaria: nisi si obiciatur creditori, quod animose licitus sit.
If a thing was given in pledge to the deceased, it must be said to fall within the action for dividing the inheritance (familiae erciscundae): but he to whom it shall be adjudicated in the action for dividing the inheritance must be condemned to the coheir for his share, nor ought he to give security to the coheir that he will keep him harmless against the one who gave it in pledge, because the case will be as if, upon a hypothecary or Servian action having been brought, an assessment of the suit (litis aestimatio) had been offered, so that he also who has offered should be protected by an exception against the owner vindicating. Conversely also, if the heir to whom the pledge has been adjudicated wishes to restore the whole, even if the debtor is unwilling, he must be heard. The same cannot be said if the creditor has bought the other share: for adjudication is necessary, purchase voluntary—unless it be objected against the creditor that he bid spiritedly.
Fundus mihi communis est pupillae coheredi: in eo fundo reliquiae sunt conditae, quibus religio ab utriusque patribus debebatur, nam parentes quoque eiusdem pupillae ibi sepulti sunt: sed tutores distrahere fundum volunt: ego non consentio, sed portionem meam possidere malo, cum universitatem emere non possim et velim pro meo arbitrio exsequi ius religionis. quaero, an recte arbitrum communi dividundo ad hunc fundum partiendum petam an etiam is arbiter, qui familiae erciscundae datur, isdem partibus fungi possit, ut hanc possessionem exemptis ceteris corporibus hereditariis pro iure cuique nobis partiatur. herennius modestinus respondit nihil proponi, cur familiae erciscundae iudicio addictus arbiter officium suum etiam in eius fundi de quo agitur divisionem interponere non possit: sed religiosa loca in iudicium non deduci eorumque ius singulis heredibus in solidum competere.
A fund is common to me with a girl-ward as coheir: in that fund relics are interred, to which religio was owed by the fathers of us both, for the parents also of that same ward have been buried there: but the guardians wish to sell off the fund: I do not consent, but I prefer to possess my share, since I cannot buy the entirety and I wish, at my own discretion, to carry out the right of religio. I ask whether I should properly request an arbiter communi dividundo for partitioning this fund, or whether also that arbiter who is given familiae erciscundae could perform the same functions, so that this possession, with the other hereditary corporeal items excepted, be apportioned to each of us according to right. Herennius Modestinus responded that nothing is alleged why an arbiter assigned by the action familiae erciscundae could not insert his office also for the division of the fund in question: but religious places are not brought into judgment, and their right belongs to each heir in solidum.
Quae pater inter filios non divisit post datas actiones vice divisionis, ad singulos pro hereditaria portione pertinent, modo si cetera, quae non divisit, in unum generaliter non contulit vel res datas non sequuntur.
What the father did not divide among the sons, after actions had been granted in lieu of a division, pertains to each individual in proportion to his hereditary portion, provided that the rest, which he did not divide, was not generally conferred upon a single person, or does not follow the things that were given.
Pomponius philadelphus dotis causa praedia filiae quam habebat in potestate tradidit et reditus eorum genero solvi mandavit: an ea praecipua filia retinere possit, cum omnes filios heredes instituisset, quaerebatur. iustam causam retinendae possessionis habere filiam, quoniam pater praedia de quibus quaerebatur dotis esse voluit et matrimonium post mortem quoque patris steterat, respondi: filiam etenim, quae naturaliter agros tenuit, specie dotis cuius capax fuisset defendi.
Pomponius Philadelphus, for the sake of a dowry, delivered the estates to his daughter whom he had in his power and ordered that their revenues be paid to the son-in-law: it was asked whether the daughter could retain them as a praecipuum, since he had instituted all his children as heirs. I answered that the daughter has a just cause for retaining possession, since the father wished the estates in question to be of the dowry and the marriage had stood even after the father’s death: for the daughter, who naturally held the fields, could be defended under the appearance of a dowry, of which she would have been capable.
Cum putarem te coheredem meum esse idque verum non esset, egi tecum familiae erciscundae iudicio et a iudice invicem adiudicationes et condemnationes factae sunt: quaero, rei veritate cognita utrum condictio invicem competat an vindicatio? et an aliud in eo qui heres est, aliud in eo qui heres non sit dicendum est? respondi: qui ex asse heres erat, si, cum putaret se titium coheredem habere, acceperit cum eo familiae erciscundae iudicium et condemnationibus factis solverit pecuniam, quoniam ex causa iudicati solvit, repetere non potest.
Since I thought you were my coheir and that was not true, I proceeded with you by the action for partition of the inheritance (familia erciscunda), and by the judge mutual adjudications and condemnations were made: I ask, once the truth of the matter is known, whether a condictio lies mutually or a vindication; and whether one thing is to be said for him who is an heir, another for him who is not an heir? I replied: he who was heir of the whole (ex asse), if, when he thought he had Titius as coheir, he accepted with him the action for partition of the inheritance and, condemnations having been made, paid the money, since he paid on the ground of a judgment (ex causa iudicati), cannot recover it.
but you seem to be moved by this, that there is no action for partition of the family estate (familiae erciscundae iudicium) unless it is undertaken among coheirs: yet although it is not a proper action, nevertheless it suffices to preclude repetition (recovery) that someone supposed himself condemned. and if neither of them was heir, but they accepted the action for partition of the family estate as though they were heirs, the same must be said about repetition in the case of both as we said in the case of the one. clearly, if they divided the property without a judge, it can also be said that a condiction lies for those things which passed to him whom the one who was heir supposed to be a coheir: for it is not understood that there was a transaction between them, since that man supposed him to be a coheir.
Lucius et titia fratres emancipati a patre adulti curatores acceperunt: hi communes pecunias ex reditibus redactas singulis subministraverunt: postea omne patrimonium diviserunt: et post divisionem titia soror lucio fratri suo coepit quaestionem movere, quasi amplius accepisset quam ipsa acceperat. cum lucius frater eius non amplius sua portione, immo minus quam dimidiam consecutus sit, quaero, an titiae competat adversus fratrem actio. paulus respondit, secundum ea quae proponuntur, si lucius non amplius ex reditu praediorum communium accepit, quam pro hereditaria portione ei competeret, nullam sorori eius adversus eum competere actionem.
lucius and titia, siblings, emancipated by their father, now adult, received curators: these supplied to each the common monies brought in from the revenues: afterwards they divided the whole patrimony: and after the division titia the sister began to raise a question against lucius her brother, as though he had received more than she had received. since lucius her brother has not obtained more than his portion—nay rather, less than half—I ask whether an action lies for titia against her brother. paul answered: according to the things proposed, if lucius did not receive more from the revenue of the common estates than would befit him for his hereditary portion, no action accrues to his sister against him.
Ex parte heres institutus causam de totis bonis, quam omnes heredes patiebantur ob inultam mortem, suscepit et optinuit: coheres ab eo partem suam petebat nec partem sumptuum factorum in litem praestare volebat: quaesitum est, an doli exceptio noceret. respondi, si idcirco amplius erogatum esset, quod ipsius quoque causa defensa esset, habendam rationem sumptuum. sed et si omiserit doli exceptionem, agere potest de recipienda portione sumptuum.
An heir instituted for a share undertook and prevailed in the case concerning the whole estate, which all the heirs were undergoing on account of an unavenged death; a coheir was demanding his own portion from him and was unwilling to furnish a portion of the expenses incurred for the suit: it was asked whether the plea (exceptio) of fraud (dolus) would be effective. I replied that, if more had been disbursed for the reason that his case too had been defended, account must be taken of the expenses. But even if he has omitted the exception of fraud, he can bring an action for the recovery of a share of the expenses.
Intestato moriens codicillis praedia sua omnia et patrimonium inter liberos divisit ita, ut longe amplius filio quam filiae relinqueret: quaesitum est, an soror fratri dotem conferre deberet. respondi secundum ea quae proponerentur, si nihil indivisum reliquisset, rectius dici ex voluntate defuncti collationem dotis cessare.
Dying intestate, by codicils he divided all his landed estates and patrimony among the children in such a way that he left far more to the son than to the daughter: it was asked whether the sister ought to confer her dowry upon the brother. I responded, according to what was proposed, that, if he had left nothing undivided, it is more correct to say that, by the intention of the deceased, the collation of the dowry ceases.
Servo libertatem dedit qui erat annorum quindecim, " cum erit annorum triginta", eidem ex die mortis suae quoad viveret cibariorum nomine denarios denos, vestiarii denarios viginti quinque praestari se velle significavit: quaesitum est, an utile esset cibariorum et vestiariorum legatum, cum stichus ante libertatis tempus decesserit, et an, si non est utile, heres qui praestiterat a coherede repetere possit, apud quem morabatur. respondi non quidem debita fuisse, sed si id, quod datum est, in alimenta consumptum sit, repeti non posse.
He gave liberty to a slave who was fifteen years old, " cum erit annorum triginta", and signified that to the same man, from the day of his own death, so long as he should live, there be provided, under the name of rations, ten denarii, and for clothing twenty-five denarii: it was asked whether the legacy of rations and clothing was operative, since Stichus had died before the time of liberty, and whether, if it was not operative, the heir who had provided could recover from the coheir with whom he was staying. I responded that they had not indeed been due, but that, if what was given was consumed for sustenance, it could not be recovered.
Filius rei publicae debita, quae post mortem patris contraxit, fratri suo pro parte hereditaria reputare non potest, si non in omnibus socii essent, licet hereditatem paternam communem haberent et pater pro altero filio in patria magistratu functus decessit.
A son cannot reckon against his brother, toward the hereditary share, the debts to the commonwealth which he contracted after the father’s death, if they were not partners in all things, although they held the paternal inheritance in common, and the father died having discharged a magistracy in his native country on behalf of the other son.
Duos filios scripsit heredes et certos homines unicuique eorum praelegavit, in quibus uni stephanum cum peculio: is vivo testatore manumissus decessit, deinde pater: quaesitum est, an id, quod in peculio habuit stephanus priusquam manumitteretur, ad utrosque filios pertineat an vero ad eum solum, cui cum peculio praelegatus fuerat. respondi secundum ea quae proponerentur ad utrosque.
He appointed two sons as heirs and pre-legated certain persons to each of them, among whom to one he (pre‑)legated Stephanus together with his peculium: he, while the testator was alive, having been manumitted, died, and then the father (died). It was asked whether that which Stephanus had in his peculium before he was manumitted pertains to both sons, or rather to that one alone to whom he had been pre‑legated together with his peculium. I answered, according to the matters proposed, that it pertains to both.
Pater inter filios divisit bona et eam divisionem testamento confirmavit et cavit, ut aes alienum, quod unusquisque eorum habet sive habebit, solus sustineret: postea unus ex filiis cum pecuniam mutuaretur, intervenit pater eiusque consensu praedia quae filio adsignaverat pignori data sunt: post mortem patris eadem praedia idem filius possedit, usuras solvit: quaero, an familiae erciscundae iudicio, si praedia pignori data distrahat creditor, aliquid ei a coherede praestandum sit. respondi secundum ea quae proponerentur non esse praestandum.
A father divided the goods among his sons and confirmed that division by testament, and provided that the debt (aes alienum) which each of them has or will have he alone should bear. Afterwards, when one of the sons was borrowing money, the father intervened, and by his consent the estates which he had assigned to the son were given in pledge. After the father’s death the same son possessed the same estates and paid the interest. I ask whether, in the familiae erciscundae action, if the creditor sells the estates given in pledge, anything ought to be furnished to him by his coheir. I answered that, according to the matters proposed, nothing is to be furnished.
Quaedam mulier ab iudice appellaverat, quod diceret eum de dividenda hereditate inter se et coheredem non tantum res, sed et libertos divisisse et alimenta, quae dari testator certis libertis iussisset: nullo enim iure id eum fecisse. ex diverso respondebatur consensisse eos divisioni et multis annis alimenta secundum divisionem praestitisse. placuit standum esse alimentorum praestationi: sed et illud adiecit nullam esse libertorum divisionem:
A certain woman had appealed from the judge, on the ground that he, in dividing the inheritance between herself and her coheir, had divided not only the property, but also the freedmen and the alimentary allowances (alimenta) which the testator had ordered to be given to certain freedmen: for by no law had he done this. On the other side it was answered that they had consented to the division and for many years had furnished the alimenta according to the division. It was decided that the prestation of the alimenta was to stand: but he also added this, that there was no division of the freedmen:
Si ita legatum fuerit uni ex heredibus: " quod mihi debet, praecipito", officio iudicis familiae erciscundae continetur, ne ab eo coheredes exigant: nam et si quod alius deberet praecipere unus iussus fuerit, officio iudicis actiones ei praestari debebunt pro portione coheredis.
If a legacy has been left thus to one of the heirs: “what he owes me, I direct to be pre-taken (praecipito),” it falls under the duty of the judge in the action for partition of the family estate (familiae erciscundae) that the coheirs not exact it from him; for even if one has been ordered to pre-take something which another owed, by the duty of the judge the actions ought to be furnished to him in proportion to the coheir’s share.
Qui familiae erciscundae et communi dividundo et finium regundorum agunt, et actores sunt et rei et ideo iurare debent non calumniae causa litem intendere et non calumniae causa ad infitias ire.
Those who prosecute actions for the partition of an inheritance (familia erciscunda), for dividing common property (communi dividundo), and for regulating boundaries (finium regundorum) are both plaintiffs and defendants; and therefore they ought to swear that they are not bringing the suit for the sake of calumny and that they are not going into denial for the sake of calumny.
Quod ex facto suo unus ex coheredibus ex stipulatione hereditaria praestat, a coherede non repetet: veluti si a se heredeque suo dolum malum afuturum defunctus spopondit vel neque per se neque per heredem suum fore, quo minus quis eat agat. immo et si reliqui propter factum unius teneri coeperint, quasi condicio stipulationis hereditariae exstiterit, habebunt familiae erciscundae iudicium cum eo, propter quem commissa sit stipulatio.
What one of the coheirs, on account of his own deed, performs under a hereditary stipulation, he will not reclaim from a coheir: for example, if the deceased promised that dolus malus would be absent on his own part and on the part of his heir, or that neither by himself nor by his heir would there be anything whereby someone would be hindered from going or acting. Indeed, even if the rest have begun to be held liable on account of the act of one, as though the condition of the hereditary stipulation had arisen, they will have the action for partition of the inheritance (familiae erciscundae) against him on account of whom the stipulation was forfeited.
Usu fructu uxori legato donec ei dos solvatur, per arbitrum familiae erciscundae tam id, quod coheredis nomine ex dote solutum sit, reciperare potest, quam ut coheres solvat effici posse cassius ait: et verum est.
With the usufruct bequeathed to the wife until her dowry is paid to her, through the arbiter in a familiae erciscundae (estate-partition) proceeding she can both recover that which has been paid out of the dowry in the name of the coheir, and—Cassius says—it can be effected that the coheir pay; and this is true.
Si maritus sub condicione a patre heres institutus sit, interim uxoris de dote actionem pendere. plane si post mortem soceri divortium factum sit, quamvis pendente condicione institutionis dicendum est praeceptioni dotis locum esse, quia mortuo patre quaedam filios sequuntur etiam antequam fiant heredes, ut matrimonium, ut liberi, ut tutela. igitur et dotem praecipere debet qui onus matrimonii post mortem patris sustinuit: et ita scaevolae quoque nostro visum est.
If a husband has been instituted heir by his father under a condition, in the meantime the wife’s action concerning the dowry is held in abeyance. Clearly, if after the father-in-law’s death a divorce has been effected, although the condition of the institution is pending, it must be said that there is room for the pre-taking (praeception) of the dowry, because, with the father dead, certain things attach to sons even before they become heirs—such as marriage, offspring, and tutelage. Therefore he also ought to pre-take the dowry who has borne the burden of marriage after the father’s death: and thus too it seemed to our Scaevola.
In iudicio familiae erciscundae vel communi dividundo si, dum res in arbitrio sit, de iure praedii controversia sit, placet omnes eos, inter quos arbiter sumptus sit, et agere et opus novum nuntiare pro sua quemque parte posse, et cum adiudicationes ab arbitro fiant, si uni adiudicetur totus fundus, caveri oportet, ut quae ex his actionibus recepta fuerint reddantur aut quae in eas impensae factae fuerint praestentur: et si, cum res in iudicio esset, eo nomine actum non fuerit, eum sequi integram actionem, cui totus fundus adiudicatus fuerit, aut pro quacumque parte adiudicatus erit.
In a suit for partition of an inheritance (familiae erciscundae) or for dividing common property (communi dividundo), if, while the matter is before the arbiter, there is a controversy about a praedial right, it is held that all those among whom an arbiter has been appointed can both bring an action and give notice of a new work (opus novum nuntiare), each for his own share; and when adjudications are made by the arbiter, if the whole fundus is adjudicated to one person, it ought to be provided by stipulation that whatever has been recovered from these actions shall be handed over, or that expenditures made on them shall be reimbursed; and if, while the matter was in court, no action was brought under that head, the complete action follows the one to whom the whole fundus has been adjudicated, or according to whatever share it has been adjudicated.
Si familiae erciscundae vel communi dividundo vel finium regundorum actum sit et unus ex litigatoribus decesserit pluribus heredibus relictis, non potest in partes iudicium scindi, sed aut omnes heredes accipere id debent aut dare unum procuratorem, in quem omnium nomine iudicium agatur.
If an action for partitioning the inheritance (familiae erciscundae) or for dividing common property (communi dividundo) or for regulating boundaries (finium regundorum) has been brought, and one of the litigants has died leaving several heirs, the proceeding cannot be split into parts; rather, either all the heirs ought to take it up, or they must appoint one procurator, by whom, in the name of all, the suit shall be conducted.
Qui erat heres ex parte institutus, testatorem iussus a praetore sepelire servum, cui erat testamento data libertas, ideo distraxit duplamque promisit et ex ea cautione conventus praestitit: quaesitum est, an familiae erciscundae iudicio consequatur, quod ex duplae stipulatione abest. primo videamus, an hic debuerit duplam cavere. et mihi videtur non debuisse: hi enim demum ad duplae cautionem compelluntur, qui sponte sua distrahunt: ceterum si officio distrahentis fungitur, non debet adstringi, non magis quam si quis ad exsequendam sententiam a praetore datus distrahat: nam et hic in ea condicione est, ne cogatur implere quod coguntur hi qui suo arbitrio distrahunt: nam inter officium suscipientis et voluntatem distrahentis multum interest.
He who had been instituted heir to a share, having been ordered by the praetor to bury the testator, therefore sold the slave to whom liberty had been given by the testament, and promised the double, and, being sued on that security, he paid: the question was raised whether, in the action for partition of the family estate (familiae erciscundae), he obtains what is lacking on account of the stipulation for the double. First let us see whether here he ought to have given security for the double. And it seems to me that he ought not: for those, precisely, are compelled to a security for the double who sell of their own accord; but if he is discharging the official duty of a seller, he ought not to be bound, no more than if someone appointed by the praetor for carrying out a judgment were to sell: for he too is in that condition, that he is not forced to fulfill what those are forced [to fulfill] who sell at their own discretion; for between the duty of one undertaking an office and the will of one selling there is much difference.
wherefore, while the matter was still intact (re integra), he ought not to have interposed a stipulation of the double (duplae), but the praetor ought to decree that there is for the buyer an action ex empto against the heir in being, if the thing sold should have been evicted. but if the heir was in error and gave security (cavit), and the slave should attain to liberty, the stipulation will be committed; and if it has been committed, it will be equitable that a useful action (actio utilis) be given to him against his coheir, the direct iudicium familiae erciscundae failing, lest he be detained in loss. for, in order that someone may proceed by the iudicium familiae erciscundae, it is not only necessary that he be an heir, but that he sue or be sued on account of that matter which he transacted and undertook after he became heir; otherwise the actio familiae erciscundae ceases.
and therefore, if before someone knew that he was an heir he has done anything in the inheritance, there will be no place for the action for dividing the inheritance, because he is seen not to have acted with the intention of an heir. wherefore, he who did something before entering upon the inheritance, for instance if he buried the testator, does not have the action for dividing the inheritance; but if he did this after entering upon the inheritance, consistently we will say that by the action for dividing the inheritance he can recover the expense which he incurred for the funeral.
Quae pater filio emancipato studiorum causa peregre agenti subministravit, si non credendi animo pater misisse fuerit comprobatus, sed pietate debita ductus: in rationem portionis, quae ex defuncti bonis ad eundem filium pertinuit, computari aequitas non patitur.
What a father supplied to his emancipated son sojourning abroad for the sake of studies, if the father shall have been proven to have sent it not with the intention of crediting it as a loan, but led by due pietas, equity does not allow to be computed into the reckoning of the portion which, from the deceased’s goods, pertained to the same son.
Fundus, qui dotis nomine socero traditus fuerit, cum socer filium ex aliqua parte heredem instituerit, per arbitrum familiae erciscundae praecipi ita debet, ut ea causa filii sit, in qua futura esset, si dos per praeceptionem legata fuisset. quare fructus post litem contestatam percepti ad eum redigendi sunt habita ratione impensarum: qui vero ante litem contestatam percepti fuerint, aequaliter ad omnes heredes pertinebunt. et impensarum ratio haberi debet, quia nullus casus intervenire potest, qui hoc genus deductionis impediat.
A fundus which has been delivered to a father-in-law in the name of dowry, when the father-in-law has instituted his son heir in some part, ought to be awarded by preemption through the arbiter in a familiae erciscundae proceeding, so that it be in that legal position for the son in which it would be, if the dowry had been bequeathed by preemption. Therefore the fruits collected after litis contestatio are to be turned over to him, account being taken of expenses; but those collected before litis contestatio will belong equally to all the heirs. And account of expenses must be taken, because no contingency can intervene to impede this kind of deduction.
Si ego a te hereditatem petere vellem, tu mecum familiae erciscundae agere, ex causa utrique nostrum mos gerendus est: nam si ego totam hereditatem possideo et te ex parte dimidia heredem esse confiteor, sed a communione discedere volo, impetrare debeo familiae erciscundae iudicium, quia aliter dividi inter nos hereditas non potest. item si tu iustam causam habes, propter quam per hereditatis petitionem potius quam familiae erciscundae iudicium negotium distrahere velis, tibi quoque permittendum erit hereditatem petere: nam quaedam veniunt in hereditatis petitionem, quae in familiae erciscundae iudicio non deducuntur: veluti si ego debitor hereditarius sim, iudicio familiae erciscundae non consequeris id quod defuncto debui, per hereditatis petitionem consequeris.
If I were to seek the inheritance from you, and you to bring an action with me for division of the family estate (familiae erciscundae), then, according to the cause, consideration must be shown to each of us: for if I possess the whole inheritance and confess that you are heir as to a half share, but I wish to depart from the community, I ought to obtain the action for division of the family estate, because otherwise the inheritance cannot be divided between us. Likewise, if you have a just cause on account of which you would prefer to conduct the matter by an inheritance-claim rather than by the action for division of the family estate, you too will be permitted to claim the inheritance: for certain things come into an inheritance-claim which are not brought in the action for division of the family estate; for example, if I am a hereditary debtor, by the action for division of the family estate you will not recover what I owed to the deceased; by an inheritance-claim you will recover it.
Arbiter familiae erciscundae inter me et te sumptus quaedam mihi, quaedam tibi adiudicare volebat, pro his rebus alterum alteri condemnandos esse intellegebat: quaesitum est, an possit pensatione ultro citroque condemnationis facta eum solum, cuius summa excederet, eius dumtaxat summae, quae ita excederet, damnare. et placuit posse id arbitrum facere.
An arbiter for partitioning the inheritance between me and you wished to adjudge certain expenses to me, certain to you; he understood that, for these matters, one should be condemned to the other. It was asked whether, after a to‑and‑fro pensation (set‑off) of the condemnations had been made, he could condemn only the one whose total exceeded, merely for the amount by which it so exceeded. And it was decided that the arbiter can do this.
Ex hereditate lucii titii, quae mihi et tibi communis erat, fundi partem meam alienavi, deinde familiae erciscundae iudicium inter nos acceptum est. neque ea pars quae mea fuit in iudicio veniet, cum alienata de hereditate exierit, neque tua, quia etiamsi remanet in pristino iure hereditariaque est, tamen alienatione meae partis exit de communione. utrum autem unus heres partem suam non alienaverit an plures, nihil interest, si modo aliqua portio alienata ab aliquo ex heredibus hereditaria esse desiit.
From the inheritance of Lucius Titius, which was common to you and me, I alienated my share of a farm; then the action for dividing the inheritance (familiae erciscundae) was instituted between us. Neither will that part which was mine come into the action, since, having been alienated, it has gone out from the inheritance; nor will your part, because even if it remains in its former right and is hereditary, nevertheless by the alienation of my share it ceases to be in common. Whether one heir has not alienated his share or several, it makes no difference, provided only that some portion, alienated by some one of the heirs, has ceased to be hereditary.
Si familiae erciscundae vel communi dividundo iudicium agatur et divisio tam difficilis sit, ut paene impossibilis esse videatur, potest iudex in unius personam totam condemnationem conferre et adiudicare omnes res.
If an action for dividing an inheritance (familiae erciscundae) or for dividing common property (communi dividundo) is brought, and the division is so difficult as to seem almost impossible, the judge can place the entire condemnation upon a single person and adjudicate all the things to that person.
Nihil autem interest, cum societate an sine societate res inter aliquos communis sit: nam utroque casu locus est communi dividundo iudicio. cum societate res communis est veluti inter eos, qui pariter eandem rem emerunt: sine societate communis est veluti inter eos, quibus eadem res testamento legata est.
However, it makes no difference whether a thing is common among certain persons with a partnership or without a partnership: for in either case there is room for the action for dividing common property. With a partnership, a thing is common, as for instance among those who have together purchased the same thing; without a partnership, it is common, as for instance among those to whom the same thing has been bequeathed by testament.
Sicut autem ipsius rei divisio venit in communi dividundo iudicio, ita etiam praestationes veniunt: et ideo si quis impensas fecerit, consequatur. sed si non cum ipso socio agat, sed cum herede socii, labeo recte existimat impensas et fructus a defuncto perceptos venire. plane fructus ante percepti, quam res communis esset, vel sumptus ante facti in communi dividundo iudicium non veniunt.
Just as the division of the thing itself comes within the communi dividundo action, so too do prestations come; and therefore, if anyone has made expenditures, let him recover them. But if he does not proceed against the partner himself, but against the heir of the partner, Labeo rightly thinks that the expenditures and the fruits received by the deceased are included. Clearly, fruits received before the thing was common, or expenses incurred before that, do not come within the communi dividundo action.
Quare et si fundum titius alienaverit, licet hic communi dividundo iudicio locus non sit, quia a communione discessum est, utili tamen locum futurum, quod datur de praestationibus, quotiens communis esse desiit.
Wherefore, even if Titius has alienated the estate, although there is here no place for the action for dividing common property (comuni dividundo), because there has been a departure from the communion, nevertheless there will be room for the utilis action, which is given concerning prestations, whenever it has ceased to be common.
Sive autem locando fundum communem sive colendo de fundo communi quid socius consecutus sit, communi dividundo iudicio tenebitur, et si quidem communi nomine id fecit, neque lucrum neque damnum sentire eum oportet, si vero non communi nomine, sed ut lucretur solus, magis esse oportet, ut damnum ad ipsum respiciat. hoc autem ideo praestat communi dividundo iudicio, quia videtur partem suam non potuisse expedite locare. ceterum non alias communi dividundo iudicio locus erit, ut et papinianus scribit, nisi id demum gessit, sine quo partem suam recte administrare non potuit: alioquin si potuit, habet negotiorum gestorum actionem eaque tenetur.
But whether by leasing the common estate or by cultivating from the common estate a partner has obtained something, he will be liable by the action communi dividundo; and if indeed he did this in the common name, he ought to experience neither profit nor loss, but if not in the common name, rather in order that he alone may profit, it is more proper that the loss should look to him. He is answerable for this by the action communi dividundo, because he seems not to have been able to lease out his own share readily. Moreover, there will otherwise be no place for the action communi dividundo, as Papinian also writes, unless he did only that without which he could not rightly administer his own share; otherwise, if he could, he has the action of negotiorum gestorum and is held by it.
Si quis in communem locum mortuum intulerit, an religiosum fecerit videndum. et sane ius quidem inferendi in sepulchrum unicuique in solidum competit, locum autem purum alter non potest facere religiosum. trebatius autem et labeo quamquam putant non esse locum religiosum factum, tamen putant in factum agendum.
If someone has brought a dead person into a common place, it must be considered whether he has made it religious (consecrated). And indeed the right of carrying into the sepulcher belongs to each in solidum, but one person cannot make a pure (unconsecrated) place religious. However, Trebatius and Labeo, although they think the place has not been made religious, nevertheless think that an action in factum should be brought.
Si fundus communis nobis sit, sed pignori datus a me, venit quidem in communi dividundo iudicio, sed ius pignoris creditori manebit, etiamsi adiudicatus fuerit: nam et si pars socio tradita fuisset, integrum maneret. arbitrum autem communi dividundo hoc minoris partem aestimare debere, quod ex pacto vendere eam rem creditor potest, iulianus ait.
If an estate be common to us, but has been given in pledge by me, it does indeed fall within the suit for division of common property; but the right of pledge will remain to the creditor, even if it has been adjudicated: for even if the share had been delivered to the partner, it would remain intact. Moreover, Julian says that the arbiter in the suit for division of common property ought to appraise the share at a lower value, to this extent, on the ground that by pact the creditor can sell that thing.
Idem iulianus scribit, si is, cum quo servum communem habebam, partem suam mihi pignori dederit et communi dividundo agere coeperit, pigneraticia exceptione eum summoveri debere: sed si exceptione usus non fuero, officium iudicis erit, ut, cum debitori totum hominem adiudicaverit, partis aestimatione eum condemnet. manere enim integrum ius pignoris: quod si adiudicaverit iudex mihi, tanti dumtaxat me condemnet, quanto pluris pignus sit quam pecunia credita, et debitorem a me iubeat liberari.
the same Julian writes that, if the person with whom I had a slave in common has given his share to me as a pledge and has begun to proceed with the action for dividing common property (communi dividundo), he ought to be removed by the pignoratitious exception: but if I shall not have used the exception, it will be the judge’s duty that, when he has adjudged the whole slave to the debtor, he condemn him in the valuation of the share. for the right of pledge remains intact: but if the judge shall have adjudged to me, let him condemn me only to the extent that the pledge is of greater value than the money loaned, and let him order the debtor to be released by me.
Urseius ait, cum in communi aedificio vicinus nuntiavit ne quid operis fieret, si unus ex sociis ex hac causa damnatus fuisset, posse eam poenam a socio pro parte servare: iulianus autem recte notat ita demum hoc verum esse, si interfuit aedium hoc fieri.
Urseius says that, when in a common building a neighbor gave notice that no work be done, if one of the partners had been condemned on this account, he can reserve that penalty from his partner in proportion to his share; however iulianus rightly notes that this is true only if it was to the interest of the premises that this be done.
Iulianus scribit, si alter possessor provocet, alter dicat eum vi possidere, non debere hoc iudicium dari nec post annum quidem, quia placuit etiam post annum in eum qui vi deiecit interdictum reddi. et si precario, inquit, dicat eum possidere, adhuc cessabit hoc iudicium, quia et de precario interdictum datur. sed et si clam dicatur possidere qui provocat, dicendum esse ait cessare hoc iudicium: nam de clandestina possessione competere iudicium inquit.
Julian writes that, if one possessor brings the challenge, and the other says that he possesses by force (vi), this action ought not to be granted, not even after a year, because it has been settled that even after a year an interdict is afforded against him who has ejected by force. And if, he says, he alleges that he possesses by precarium (precario), this action will still fall away, because an interdict is also given concerning precarium. But even if it is said that the one who brings the challenge possesses secretly (clam), he says it must be said that this action ceases: for a judgment lies with respect to clandestine possession.
Cum de usu fructu communi dividundo iudicium agitur, iudex officium suum ita diriget, ut vel regionibus eis uti frui permittat: vel locet usum fructum uni ex illis: vel tertiae personae, ut hi pensiones sine ulla controversia percipiant: vel si res mobiles sint, etiam sic poterit, ut inter eos conveniat caveantque per tempora se usuros et fruituros, hoc est ut apud singulos mutua vice certo tempore sit usus fructus.
When a suit is brought for dividing a common usufruct, the judge will direct his duty thus, either that he permit them to use and enjoy by districts; or that he lease the usufruct to one of them; or to a third person, so that they may receive the rents without any controversy; or, if the things are movables, he can also proceed thus, that it be agreed among them and that they give security to use and enjoy by periods, that is, that the usufruct be with each in reciprocal turn for a fixed time.
Inter eos, qui pignori acceperunt, talis divisio fieri debet, ut non vero pretio aestimetur pars, sed in tantum dumtaxat, quantum pro ea parte debetur, et adsignetur quidem pignus uni ex creditoribus, licentia tamen non denegetur debitori debitum offerre et pignus suum luere. idemque dicitur et si possessor pignoris litis aestimationem pigneraticiam in rem agenti offerat.
Among those who have received a thing in pledge, such a division ought to be made that the portion is valued not at the true price, but only up to the amount that is owed for that portion; and the pledge is to be assigned to one of the creditors, yet permission is not to be denied to the debtor to tender the debt and to redeem his pledge. And the same is said if the possessor of the pledge offers to the in rem plaintiff the pledge-suit valuation of the action (litis aestimatio).
Si debitor communis praedii partem pignori dedit et a domino alterius partis provocatus creditor eius aut ab alio creditore alterius debitoris licendo superavit et debitor eius cui res fuit adiudicata velit partem suam praedii reciperare soluto eo quod ipse debuit: eleganter dicitur non esse audiendum, nisi et eam partem paratus sit reciperare, quam creditor per adiudicationem emit. nam et si partem vendideris rei et prius, quam traderes emptori, communi dividundo iudicio provocatus fueris aliaque pars tibi adiudicata sit, consequenter dicitur ex empto agi non posse, nisi totam rem suscipere fuerit paratus, quia haec pars beneficio alterius venditori accessit: quin immo etiam ex vendito posse conveniri emptorem, ut recipiat totum: solum illud spectandum erit, num forte fraus aliqua venditoris intervenit. sed et si distracta parte cesserit victus licitatione venditor, aeque, pretium ut restituat, ex empto tenebitur.
If a debtor gave as pledge a share of a common estate, and—upon being called by the owner of the other share—either his creditor, or another creditor of the other co-debtor, has prevailed by bidding; and the debtor of the one to whom the thing was adjudicated wishes to recover his own share of the estate upon payment of what he himself owed: it is elegantly said that he is not to be heard, unless he is also prepared to recover that share which the creditor bought through adjudication. For even if you sold a share of a thing and, before you delivered to the buyer, you were called by an action for division of common property and another share was adjudicated to you, it is consistently said that one cannot sue on the purchase (ex empto) unless he is prepared to take on the whole thing, because this share accrued to the seller by the benefit of another; nay rather, even the buyer can be convened on the sale (ex vendito) to receive the whole: only this will have to be inspected, whether perhaps some fraud of the seller intervened. But also, if after a part was sold off the seller, having been defeated, yielded in the licitation, likewise he will be held on the purchase (ex empto) to restore the price.
Si incertum sit, an lex falcidia locum habeat inter legatarium et heredem, communi dividundo agi potest aut incertae partis vindicatio datur. similiter fit et si peculium legatum sit, quia in quantum res peculiares deminuit id quod domino debetur, incertum est.
If it is uncertain whether the Falcidian law applies between the legatee and the heir, an action for division of common property (communi dividundo) can be brought, or a vindication of an uncertain share (incertae partis vindicatio) is granted. similarly, it is done if a peculium has been bequeathed, because the extent to which the peculium-assets diminish what is owed to the master is uncertain.
Sed postquam socius servi communis nomine de peculio in solidum damnatus esset, si apud socium res peculiares intercidant, nihilo minus utile erit iudicium communi dividundo ad reciperandam partem pecuniae: alioquin iniquum fore, si tota ea res ad damnum eius qui iudicium acceperit pertineat, cum utriusque domini periculum in rebus peculiaribus esse debeat. nam et eum, qui mandatu domini defensionem servi suscepit, omne quod bona fide praestiterit servaturum, quamvis peculium postea interciderit. haec ita, si neutrius culpa intervenerit: etenim dominum, cum quo de peculio agitur, si paratus sit rebus peculiaribus petitori cedere, ex causa audiendum putavit, scilicet si sine dolo malo et frustratione id faciat.
But after the partner of a common slave had been condemned in solidum under the title of the peculium, if the peculial assets have perished in the partner’s hands, nonetheless the action communi dividundo will be useful for recovering a share of the money: otherwise it would be inequitable if that whole matter should pertain to the loss of him who accepted the suit, since the risk in peculial things ought to be that of both owners. For even he who, by the mandate of the owner, has undertaken the slave’s defense will be protected as to everything that he has rendered in good faith, although the peculium afterwards has perished. These things are so, if the fault of neither has intervened: for indeed he thought that the owner, with whom suit is brought about the peculium, if he is prepared to cede the peculial assets to the petitioner, ought to be heard for cause—namely, if he does this without dolus malus and without frustration.
Si usus tantum noster sit, qui neque venire neque locari potest, quemadmodum divisio potest fieri in communi dividundo iudicio, videamus. sed praetor interveniet et rem emendabit, ut, si iudex alteri usum adiudicaverit, non videatur alter qui mercedem accipit non uti, quasi plus faciat qui videtur frui, quia hoc propter necessitatem fit.
If our right be only use (usus), which can neither be sold nor leased, let us consider how a division can be effected in the action for dividing common property (communis dividundo). But the praetor will intervene and amend the matter, so that, if the judge adjudges the use to one party, the other, who receives rent, is not regarded as not using, as though the one who seems to enjoy were doing more, since this is done by necessity.
In summa admonendi sumus, quod, si post interitum rei communis is, cui aliquid ex communione praestari oportet, eo nomine agere velit, communi dividundo iudicium utile datur: veluti si actor impensas aliquas in rem communem fecit, sive socius eius solus aliquid ex ea re lucratus est, velut operas servi mercedesve, hoc iudicio eorum omnium ratio habetur.
In sum we must be admonished that, if after the demise of the common thing the person to whom something ought to be furnished from the co-ownership should wish to sue under that head, a useful action communi dividundo is given: for instance, if the plaintiff has incurred certain expenses on the common thing, or his partner alone has profited something from that thing, such as the services of a slave or wages, by this action account is had of all those matters.
Impendia autem, quae dum proprium meum fundum existimo feci, quae scilicet, si vindicaretur fundi pars, per exceptionem doli retinere possem, an etiam, si communi dividundo iudicio mecum agetur, aequitate ipsius iudicii retinere possim, considerandum est. quod quidem magis puto, quia bonae fidei iudicium est communi dividundo: sed hoc ita, si mecum agatur. ceterum si alienavero partem meam, non erit unde retinere possim.
Expenditures, however, which I made while I supposed the farm to be my own—namely those which, if a part of the farm were claimed, I could retain by the defense of fraud (exceptio doli)—whether I can also retain them, if they proceed against me by the action for dividing common property, by the equity of that very action, must be considered. I am more inclined to think so, because the action for dividing common property is an action of good faith; but this is so only if the suit is with me. Otherwise, if I have alienated my share, there will be no source from which I can retain.
but it must be considered whether he who bought from me can retain: for even if a share were vindicated from him, in the name of expenditures which I had made, he could make a retention just as I could; and it is truer that in this instance too the expenses are to be retained. Since these things are so, it is most correct to say that, under the heading of expenditures as well, a useful action ought to be given to me against my partner even while the common ownership of the thing remains. It is different, indeed, when I expend as if upon my own property, which is in fact another’s or common: for in this case, where I expend as if upon my own property, I have only a retention, because I wished to bind no one to me.
but when I suppose a thing to be Titius’s which is Maevius’s, or to be common to me with someone other than the one with whom it is, I act so as to oblige another to me; and just as the action of negotiorum gestorum is given against him whose affairs I have managed, when I thought them to belong to someone else, so also in the case at hand. therefore, even if I have alienated the estate, because the situation was such that an action ought to be given to me, the action of negotiorum gestorum will be given to me, as Julian also writes.
Si inter socios convenisset, ne intra certum tempus societas divideretur, quin vendere liceat ei, qui tali conventione tenetur, non est dubium: quare emptor quoque communi dividundo agendo eadem exceptione summovebitur, qua auctor eius summoveretur.
If among partners it had been agreed that the partnership not be divided within a fixed time, there is no doubt that it is permitted to sell by him who is held by such a convention: wherefore the purchaser also, when proceeding by the action for dividing common property, will be warded off by the same exception by which his auctor (predecessor in title) would be warded off.
Si socius servi communis nomine conventus et condemnatus sit, aget communi dividundo et antequam praestet: nam et si noxali iudicio cum uno actum sit, statim aget cum socio, ut ei pars traderetur, cautionibus interpositis, ut, si non dederit, reddat.
If a partner has been sued on account of a common slave and condemned, he will bring an action for partition of common property (actio communi dividundo) even before he renders payment; for even if it has been proceeded by a noxal judgment against one alone, he will immediately sue his partner, so that a share be handed over to him, cautions being interposed that, if he does not deliver, he shall make restitution.
Arbor quae in confinio nata est, item lapis qui per utrumque fundum extenditur quamdiu cohaeret fundo, e regione cuiusque finium utriusque sunt nec in communi dividundo iudicium veniunt: sed cum aut lapis exemptus aut arbor eruta vel succisa est, communis pro indiviso fiet et veniet in communi dividundo iudicium: nam quod erat finitis partibus, rursus confunditur. qua re duabus massis duorum dominorum conflatis tota massa communis est, etiamsi aliquid ex prima specie separatum maneat: ita arbor et lapis separatus a fundo confundit ius dominii.
A tree that has grown on the boundary, likewise a stone that extends across both estates, so long as it coheres to the fundus, belong to both along the line of each one’s boundaries and do not come under the action for partition of common property; but when either the stone has been removed or the tree has been uprooted or cut down, it will become common pro indiviso and will come under the action for partition of common property: for that which had its parts defined is again confounded. Therefore, when two masses of two owners have been conflated, the whole mass is common, even if something from the first species remains separate: thus a tree and a stone separated from the fundus confound the right of dominium.
Si per eundem locum via nobis debeatur et in eam impensa facta sit, durius ait pomponius communi dividundo vel pro socio agi posse: quae enim communio iuris separatim intellegi potest? sed negotiorum gestorum agendum.
If a right of way is owed to us through the same place and expense has been laid out upon it, Pomponius says, more harshly, that one can proceed by the action communi dividundo or pro socio: for what community of a right can be understood separately? Rather, one should proceed by the action of negotiorum gestorum.
Iudex communi dividundo, item familiae erciscundae de servo qui in fuga est iubere debet liceri eos inter quos iudex est et tunc eum adiudicare, penes quem licitatio remansit: nec erit periculum, ne ex senatus consulto poena legis fabiae committatur.
The judge in an action for division of common property, likewise for partition of an inheritance, ought to order those between whom he is judge to bid by licitation over the slave who is in flight, and then to adjudge him to the one with whom the licitation remained; nor will there be danger that, by a senatorial decree, the penalty of the Lex Fabia be incurred.
Aquarum iter in iudicium communi dividundo non venire labeo ait: nam aut ipsius fundi est et ideo in iudicium non venit, aut separatum a fundo, divisum tamen aut mensura aut temporibus. sed possunt iura interdum et separata a fundo esse et nec mensura nec temporibus divisa, veluti cum is cuius fuerunt plures heredes reliquit: quod cum accidit, consentaneum est et ea in arbitrio familiae erciscundae venire, nec videre inquit pomponius, quare minus in communi dividundo quam familiae erciscundae iudicium veniant. igitur in huiusmodi speciebus etiam in communi dividundo iudicio venit, ut praefata iura aut mensura aut temporibus dividantur.
Labeo says that a water-way does not come into judgment in the action for division of common property: for it is either of the land itself and therefore does not come into judgment, or it is separated from the land, yet divided either by measure or by times. But rights can sometimes be both separated from the land and divided neither by measure nor by times, as when the person to whom they belonged left several heirs: when this happens, it is consistent that these too come within the discretion of the arbitrator in the family-partition action; nor, says Pomponius, does he see why they should come into judgment less in the action for division of common property than in the family-partition action. Therefore, in cases of this kind, it also comes in the action for division of common property, that the aforesaid rights be divided either by measure or by times.
Si is, cum quo fundum communem habes, ad delictum non respondit et ob id motu iudicis villa diruta est aut arbusta succisa sunt, praestabitur tibi detrimentum iudicio communi dividundo: quidquid enim culpa socii amissum est, eo iudicio continetur.
If the one with whom you have a common estate did not answer for the delict, and on that account at the judge’s motion the villa was demolished or the tree-plantings were cut down, the loss will be made good to you by the action for dividing common property: for whatever has been lost through the fault of the associate is contained in that action.
Si convenerit inter te et socium tuum, ut alternis annis fructum perciperetis, et non patiatur te socius tui anni fructum percipere, videndum, utrum ex conducto sit actio an vero communi dividundo. eadem quaestio est et si socius, qui convenerat, ut alternis annis frueretur, pecus immisit et effecit, ut futuri anni fructus, quos socium percipere oportuit, corrumperentur. et puto magis communi dividundo iudicium quam ex conducto locum habere ( quae enim locatio est, cum merces non intercesserit?) aut certe actionem incerti civilem reddendam.
If it has been agreed between you and your partner that you should take the fruits in alternate years, and your partner does not allow you to take the fruits of your year, it must be considered whether the action is on hire (ex conducto) or rather for dividing common property (communi dividundo). The same question arises also if the partner, who had agreed to enjoy in alternate years, let in cattle and brought it about that the fruits of the future year, which it was proper for the partner to take, were spoiled. And I think that rather the judgment for dividing common property than the one on hire has its place (for what leasing is there, since no rent has intervened?), or at any rate a civil action for an uncertain thing should be afforded.
Communis servus si ex re alterius dominorum adquisierit, nihilo minus commune id erit: sed is, ex cuius re adquisitum fuerit, communi dividundo iudicio eam summam percipere potest, quia fidei bonae convenit, ut unusquisque praecipuum habeat, quod ex re eius servus adquisierit.
A common slave, if he acquires from the property of one of his masters, nevertheless that will be common; but he, from whose property it was acquired, can receive that amount by the action communi dividundo, because it accords with good faith that each should have in priority what the slave has acquired from his property.
Si stichus communis meus et tuus servus habuerit pamphilum vicarium aureorum decem et mecum actum de peculio fuerit condemnatusque decem praestitero: quamvis postea pamphilus decesserit, nihilo minus actione communi dividundo vel pro socio quinque milia praestare debebis, quia te hoc aere alieno liberavi. longe magis consequar, si stichus post mortem pamphili alium vicarium adquisierat.
If Stichus, a slave common to me and to you, has had Pamphilus as a vicarius worth ten gold pieces, and an action de peculio has been brought against me and, having been condemned, I have paid the ten: although afterwards Pamphilus has died, nonetheless by the actio communi dividundo or the actio pro socio you will have to render five thousand, because I freed you from this debt. I shall, far more, succeed if, after Pamphilus’s death, Stichus had acquired another vicarius.
Communis servus cum apud alterum esset, crus fregit in opere: quaerebatur, alter dominus quid cum eo, penes quem fuisset, ageret. respondi, si quid culpa illius magis quam casu res communis damni cepisset, per arbitrum communi dividundo posse reciperare.
A common slave, when he was with the other, broke his leg in the course of work: the question was what action the other owner should bring against the one in whose possession he had been. I answered that, if the common property had sustained any loss by his fault rather than by chance, it could be recovered through an arbiter in a proceeding for dividing common property.
Sabinus ait in re communi neminem dominorum iure facere quicquam invito altero posse. unde manifestum est prohibendi ius esse: in re enim pari potiorem causam esse prohibentis constat. sed etsi in communi prohiberi socius a socio ne quid faciat potest, ut tamen factum opus tollat, cogi non potest, si, cum prohibere poterat, hoc praetermisit: et ideo per communi dividundo actionem damnum sarciri poterit.
Sabinus says that, in a thing held in common, none of the owners can do anything by right with the other unwilling. Whence it is evident that there is a right of prohibiting: for in an equal matter the cause of the one prohibiting is the stronger. But although in common property a partner can be prohibited by his partner from doing anything, nevertheless he cannot be compelled to remove the work that has been done, if, when he could have prohibited it, he omitted to do so; and therefore the damage can be made good through the action communi dividundo.
Si quis, cum existimaverit fundum communem sibi cum maevio esse, quem cum titio communem habebat, impendisset, recte dicitur etiam communi dividundo iudicium ei sufficere: hoc enim est, si sciam rem communem esse, ignorem autem cuius socii: neque enim negotia socii gero, sed propriam rem tueor et magis ex re, in quam impenditur, quam ex persona socii actio nascitur. denique ea actione pupillum teneri dicimus, ut impendia restituat officio iudicis. diversa causa est eius, qui putat se in rem propriam impendere, cum sit communis: huic enim nec communi dividundo iudicium competit nec utile dandum est.
If someone, when he has supposed a landed estate to be common to himself with maevio, whereas he had it common with titio, has expended on it, it is rightly said that even the action for partition (the communi dividundo action) suffices for him: for this is the case if I know the thing is common, but am ignorant who the associate is; for I am not managing a partner’s business, but am guarding my own property, and the action arises more from the thing on which the expenditure is laid out than from the person of the partner. Finally, we say that by that action a ward is held, so that he restore the expenditures by the judge’s office. A different case is that of one who thinks he is expending upon his own thing when it is common: for to him neither does the action for partition apply nor should a “useful” action be granted.
Si quis noxali iudicio experiri velit, ad exhibendum ei actio est necessaria: quid enim si dominus quidem paratus sit defendere, actor vero destinare non possit nisi ex praesentibus, quia aut servum non recognoscit aut nomen non tenet? nonne aequum est ei familiam exhiberi, ut noxium servum adgnoscat? quod ex causa debet fieri ad designandum eum, cuius nomine noxali quis agit, recensitione servorum facta.
If anyone should wish to proceed by a noxal judgment, an action ad exhibendum is necessary: for what if the master is indeed prepared to defend, but the plaintiff cannot designate except from those present, because either he does not recognize the slave or does not hold the name? Is it not equitable that the household be exhibited to him, so that he may acknowledge the noxal slave? This ought to be done for cause, for the purpose of designating him in whose name one brings a noxal action, a review of the slaves having been made.
Si quis extra heredem tabulas testamenti vel codicillos vel quid aliud ad testamentum pertinens exhiberi velit, dicendum est per hanc actionem agendum non esse, cum sufficiunt sibi interdicta in hanc rem competentia: et ita pomponius.
If anyone should wish that, from someone other than the heir, the tablets of the testament, or the codicils, or anything else pertaining to the testament be exhibited, it must be said that one is not to proceed by this action, since the interdicts competent to this matter suffice for him; and so Pomponius.
Sciendum est autem non solum eis quos diximus competere ad exhibendum actionem, verum ei quoque, cuius interest exhiberi: iudex igitur summatim debebit cognoscere, an eius intersit, non an eius res sit, et sic iubere vel exhiberi, vel non, quia nihil interest.
It must be known, moreover, that not only for those whom we have mentioned does the action for exhibiting compete, but also for him whose interest it is that it be exhibited: therefore the judge should summarily ascertain whether it is to his interest, not whether the thing is his, and thus order either that it be exhibited, or not, since that makes no difference.
Plus dicit iulianus, etsi vindicationem non habeam, interim posse me agere ad exhibendum, quia mea interest exhiberi: ut puta si mihi servus legatus sit quem titius optasset: agam enim ad exhibendum, quia mea interest exhiberi, ut titius optet et sic vindicem, quamvis exhibitum ego optare non possim.
Julian says more: even if I do not have a vindication, in the meantime I can bring an action ad exhibendum, because it is in my interest that it be exhibited; for instance, if a slave has been bequeathed to me whom Titius would have opted, I shall indeed bring an action ad exhibendum, because it is in my interest that it be exhibited, so that Titius may opt and thus I may vindicate, although, once it has been exhibited, I myself cannot opt.
Si mecum fuerit actum ad exhibendum, ego ob hoc, quod conventus sum ad exhibendum actione, agere ad exhibendum non possum, quamvis videatur interesse mea ob hoc, quod teneor ad restituendum. sed hoc non sufficit: alioquin et qui dolo fecit quo minus possideret poterit ad exhibendum agere, cum neque vindicaturus neque interdicturus sit, et fur vel raptor poterit: quod nequaquam verum est. eleganter igitur definit neratius iudicem ad exhibendum hactenus cognoscere, an iustam et probabilem causam habeat actionis, propter quam exhiberi sibi desideret.
If proceedings have been brought against me for production (ad exhibendum), I, merely because I have been convened by an action for production, cannot bring an action for production myself, although it may seem to be to my interest on this account, that I am bound to restore. But this does not suffice: otherwise even one who by fraud contrived that he should not possess could sue for production, since he would be about neither to vindicate nor to seek an interdict; and a thief or a robber could do so—which is by no means true. Therefore, neratius elegantly defines that the judge in an action for production is to inquire only thus far, whether the plaintiff has a just and probable cause of action, on account of which he desires that the thing be exhibited to him.
Pomponius scribit eiusdem hominis nomine recte plures ad exhibendum agere posse: forte si homo primi sit, secundi in eo usus fructus sit, tertius possessionem suam contendat, quartus pigneratum sibi eum adfirmet: omnibus igitur ad exhibendum actio competit, quia omnium interest exhiberi hominem.
Pomponius writes that, in the name of the same slave, several persons can rightly bring the actio ad exhibendum: for instance, if the slave belongs to the first, the second has a usufruct in him, a third contends that the possession is his, a fourth affirms that he has him pledged to himself; therefore the actio ad exhibendum is competent to all, because it is of interest to all that the slave be exhibited.
Ibidem subiungit iudicem per arbitrium sibi ex hac actione commissum etiam exceptiones aestimare, quas possessor obicit, et si qua tam evidens sit, ut facile repellat agentem, debere possessorem absolvi, si obscurior vel quae habeat altiorem quaestionem, differendam in directum iudicium re exhiberi iussa: de quibusdam tamen exceptionibus omnimodo ipsum debere disceptare, qui ad exhibendum actione iudicat, veluti pacti conventi, doli mali, iurisiurandi reique iudicatae.
In the same place he subjoins that the judge, by the discretion entrusted to him from this action, is also to evaluate the exceptions which the possessor objects; and if any be so evident as easily to repel the plaintiff (the actor), the possessor ought to be absolved; but if it be more obscure, or one that has a deeper question, it should be deferred to the direct judgment, the thing having been ordered to be exhibited: nevertheless, concerning certain exceptions, the very person who judges by the action ad exhibendum must in every way adjudicate—namely, of a pact and covenant (pacti conventi), of malicious fraud (doli mali), of oath (iurisiurandi), and of res judicata (rei iudicatae).
Interdum aequitas exhibitionis efficit, ut, quamvis ad exhibendum agi non possit, in factum tamen actio detur, ut iulianus tractat. servus, inquit, uxoris meae rationes meas conscripsit: hae rationes a te possidentur: desidero eas exhiberi. ait iulianus, si quidem mea charta scriptae sint, locum esse huic actioni, quia et vindicare eas possum: nam cum charta mea sit, et quod scriptum est meum est: sed si charta mea non fuit, quia vindicare non possum, nec ad exhibendum experiri: in factum igitur mihi actionem competere .
Sometimes the equity of exhibition brings it about that, although it is not possible to sue for exhibition, nevertheless an action in factum is granted, as iulianus treats. a slave, he says, of my wife wrote up my accounts: these accounts are possessed by you: I desire that they be exhibited. iulianus says, if indeed they were written on my paper, there is room for this action, because I can also vindicate them: for since the paper is mine, what is written is mine: but if the paper was not mine, because I cannot vindicate, nor proceed for exhibition: therefore an action in factum is competent to me .
Celsus scribit: si quis merces, quas exvehendas conduxit, in horreo posuit, cum conductore ad exhibendum agi potest: item si mortuo conductore heres existat, cum herede agendum: sed si nemo heres sit, cum horreario agendum: nam si a nullo, inquit, possidentur, verum est aut horrearium possidere aut certe ille est, qui possit exhibere. idem ait: quomodo autem possidet qui vehendas conduxit? an quia pignus tenet?
Celsus writes: if someone has placed goods, which he hired to be carried out, in a storehouse, one can sue the conductor by the action for production; likewise, if, the conductor having died, an heir exists, one must proceed against the heir; but if no one is heir, one must proceed against the storehouse-keeper: for if they are possessed by no one, he says, it is true either that the storehouse-keeper possesses or at least he is the one who can exhibit them. He likewise says: but how does he possess who hired them to be carried? Or is it because he holds a pledge?
Iulianus autem ita scribit ad exhibendum actione teneri eum, qui rerum vel legatorum servandorum causa in possessione sit, sed et eum, qui usus fructus nomine rem teneat, quamvis nec hic utique possideat. inde iulianus quaerit, quatenus hos oporteat exhibere: et ait priorem quidem sic, ut actor possessionem habeat, is autem cum quo agetur rei servandae causa sit in possessione: eum vero qui usum fructum habeat sic, ut actor rem possideat, is cum quo agetur utatur fruatur.
Julian, moreover, writes thus: that he is held by the action ad exhibendum who is in possession for the sake of preserving things or legacies, and also he who holds a thing under the name of a usufruct, although he too does not in strictness possess. Thence julian asks to what extent it is proper to require these men to exhibit: and he says of the former, indeed, thus—that the plaintiff should have possession, while the person against whom suit is brought be in possession for the purpose of preserving the thing; but of him who has a usufruct, thus—that the plaintiff possess the thing, while the person against whom suit is brought use it and enjoy the fruits.
Sed et si ratis delata sit vi fluminis in agrum alterius, posse eum conveniri ad exhibendum neratius scribit. unde quaerit neratius, utrum de futuro dumtaxat damno an et de praeterito domino agri cavendum sit, et ait etiam de praeterito caveri oportere.
But also, if a raft has been carried by the force of the river into another’s field, Neratius writes that he can be proceeded against to exhibit (ad exhibendum). Whence Neratius asks whether security must be given to the owner of the field only for future damage or also for past, and he says that security ought also to be given for past damage.
Item si quis facultatem restituendi non habeat, licet possideat, tamen ad exhibendum non tenebitur, ut puta si in fuga servus sit: ad hoc plane solum tenebitur, ut caveat se exhibiturum, si in potestatem eius pervenerit. sed et si non sit in fuga, permiseris autem ei ubi velit morari, idem erit dicendum, aut peregre a te missus sit, vel in praediis tuis agat, ad hoc solum teneberis, ut caveas.
Likewise, if someone does not have the capacity of restoring, although he possesses, nevertheless he will not be held to exhibit, for instance if the slave is in flight: to this, clearly, he will be held only, to give security that he will exhibit, if he comes into his power. But even if he is not in flight, yet you have permitted him to stay wherever he wishes, the same will be said; or if he has been sent abroad by you, or is on your estates, to this alone will you be held, to give security.
Gemma inclusa auro alieno vel sigillum candelabro vindicari non potest, sed ut excludatur, ad exhibendum agi potest: aliter atque in tigno iuncto aedibus, de quo nec ad exhibendum agi potest, quia lex duodecim tabularum solvi vetaret: sed actione de tigno iuncto ex eadem lege in duplum agitur.
A gem set in another’s gold or a signet affixed to a candelabrum cannot be vindicated, but, so that it may be taken out, an action ad exhibendum can be brought; otherwise than in the case of a beam joined to a house, about which not even an action ad exhibendum can be brought, because the Law of the Twelve Tables would forbid it to be loosened: but by the action de tigno iuncto under the same law one proceeds for double (damages).
Si quis, cum iudicii accepti tempore possideret, postea sine dolo malo possidere desierit, absolvi eum oportet: quamvis sit, inquit pomponius, quod ei imputetur, cur non statim restituit, sed passus est secum litem contestari.
If someone, who at the time the action was accepted was in possession, later ceased to possess without malicious deceit (dolus malus), he ought to be absolved: although, says Pomponius, there is something that may be imputed to him—why he did not at once make restitution, but allowed the suit to be contested (litem contestari) with him.
Si ad exhibendum actum est cum eo, qui neque possidebat neque dolo malo fecerat quo minus possideret, deinde eo defuncto heres eius possidet rem, exhibere eam cogendus erit. nam si fundum vel hominem petiero et heres ex eadem causa possidere coeperit, restituere cogitur.
If an action for production (ad exhibendum) has been brought against someone who neither was in possession nor had, by fraud (dolus malus), caused it to be that he was not in possession, then, after his death, if his heir possesses the thing, he will be compelled to exhibit it. For if I claim a tract of land (fundus) or a slave, and the heir has begun to possess from the same cause, he is compelled to restore it.
Iulianus scribit: si quis hominem quem possidebat occiderit sive ad alium transtulerit possessionem sive ita rem corruperit ne haberi possit, ad exhibendum tenebitur, quia dolo fecit quo minus possideret. proinde et si vinum vel oleum vel quid aliud effuderit vel confregerit, ad exhibendum tenebitur.
Julianus writes: if someone has killed the man whom he possessed, or has transferred the possession to another, or has so corrupted the thing that it cannot be had, he will be liable under the action for production, because he acted by fraud so that it might not be possessed. Accordingly, even if he has poured out wine or oil or anything else, or has broken it, he will be liable under the action for production.
Glans ex arbore tua in fundum meum decidit, eam ego immisso pecore depasco: qua actione possum teneri? pomponius scribit competere actionem ad exhibendum, si dolo pecus immissi, ut glandem commederet: nam et si glans extaret nec patieris me tollere, ad exhibendum teneberis, quemadmodum si materiam meam delatam in agrum suum quis auferre non pateretur. et placet nobis pomponii sententia, sive glans extet sive consumpta sit.
An acorn from your tree fell onto my estate, and I graze it down by letting in livestock: by what action can I be held liable? Pomponius writes that the actio ad exhibendum is available, if the herd was introduced with fraudulent intent, so that it might eat the acorn: for also if the acorn were still lying there and you would not allow me to pick it up, you would be held under the actio ad exhibendum, just as if someone would not allow me to remove my timber that had been carried onto his field. And Pomponius’s opinion pleases us, whether the acorn is extant or has been consumed.
Sed si quis in rem deteriorem exhibuerit, aeque ad exhibendum eum teneri sabinus ait. sed hoc ibi utique verum est, si dolo malo in aliud corpus res sit translata, veluti si ex scypho massa facta sit: quamquam enim massam exhibeat, ad exhibendum tenebitur, nam mutata forma prope interemit substantiam rei.
But if anyone should exhibit the thing in a worse condition, Sabinus says he is equally liable on the action ad exhibendum. But this is assuredly true in a case where, by malicious fraud, the thing has been translated into another corpus, as, for instance, if from a goblet an ingot has been made: for although he exhibits the ingot, he will be held on the action ad exhibendum, for the changed form nearly destroys the substance of the thing.
Marcellus scribit, si tibi decem nomismata sint sub condicione legata et mihi decem usus fructus pure, deinde heres pendente condicione non exacta cautione decem fructuario solverit, ad exhibendum eum actione teneri, quasi dolo fecerit quo minus possideret: dolus autem in eo est, quod cautionem exigere supersedit a fructuario effectumque, ut legatum tuum evanesceret, cum iam nummos vindicare non possis. ita demum autem locum habebit ad exhibendum actio, si condicio extiterit legati. potuisti tamen tibi prospicere stipulatione legatorum et, si prospexisti, non erit tibi necessaria ad exhibendum actio.
Marcellus writes: if ten coins have been bequeathed to you under a condition, and to me ten by way of usufruct purely, then if the heir, while the condition is pending, without security having been exacted, pays ten to the usufructuary, he is liable under the action ad exhibendum, as though he had acted by fraud so that he should not possess. The fraud, moreover, lies in this: that he refrained from exacting security from the usufructuary and brought it about that your legacy evaporated, since now you cannot vindicate the coins. The action ad exhibendum will have a place only if the condition of the legacy comes about. You could, however, have provided for yourself by a stipulation concerning legacies, and, if you did provide, the action ad exhibendum will not be necessary for you.
Quantum autem ad hanc actionem attinet, exhibere est in eadem causa praestare, in qua fuit, cum iudicium acciperetur, ut quis copiam rei habens possit exsequi actione quam destinavit in nullo casu quam intendit laesa, quamvis non de restituendo, sed de exhibendo agatur.
As regards this action, however, to exhibit is to furnish it in the same condition in which it was when the judgment was accepted, so that one who has access to the thing may be able to execute by the action which he has designated, in no case with that which he intends prejudiced, although the matter is about exhibiting, not about restoring.
Proinde si post litem contestatam usucaptum exhibeat, non videtur exhibuisse, cum petitor intentionem suam perdiderit, et ideo absolvi eum non oportere, nisi paratus sit repetita die intentionem suscipere, ita ut fructus secundum legem aestimentur.
Accordingly, if after the suit has been joined (litis contestatio) he should produce a thing acquired by usucapion, he is not deemed to have produced it, since the claimant has lost his intentio; and therefore he ought not to be absolved, unless the claimant is ready on a day appointed anew to take up the intentio, such that the fruits are assessed according to the law.
Praeterea utilitates, si quae amissae sunt ob hoc quod non exhibetur vel tardius quid exhibetur, aestimandae a iudice sunt: et ideo neratius ait utilitatem actoris venire in aestimationem, non quanti res sit, quae utilitas, inquit, interdum minoris erit quam res erit.
Moreover, the utilities, if any have been lost on account of this, that something is not produced or something is produced too late, are to be assessed by the judge: and therefore neratius says that the utility of the plaintiff comes into the estimation, not for how much the thing is; which utility, he says, will sometimes be of less value than the thing will be.
Si optione intra certum tempus data iudicium in id tempus extractum est, quo frustra exhibetur, utilitas petitoris conservetur: quod si per heredem non stetit quo minus exhiberet tempore iudicii accipiendi, absolvendus est heres.
If, an option having been granted within a fixed time, the suit has been drawn out into that time in which production is presented in vain, the interest of the petitioner is to be preserved; but if it was not owing to the heir that he failed to produce at the time for accepting the judgment, the heir is to be acquitted.
Quo autem loco exhiberi rem oporteat vel cuius sumptibus, videamus. et labeo ait ibi exhibendum, ubi fuerit cum lis contestaretur, periculo et impendiis actoris perferendam perducendamve eo loci ubi actum sit. pascere plane servum vestire curare possessorem oportere ait.
But as to the place where the thing ought to be exhibited, or at whose expenses, let us consider. And Labeo says it must be exhibited where it was when the suit was joined (lis was contested), to be borne or conveyed, at the peril and expenses of the plaintiff, to that place where the action is conducted. He says plainly that the possessor ought to feed the slave, clothe him, and care for him.
I, however, think that sometimes the plaintiff too ought to acknowledge these things, if perchance the slave himself used to exhibit/maintain himself from his works or his craft, but now is compelled to be idle. Accordingly, even if he has been deposited at the officium to be exhibited, the one who desired the exhibition will owe to acknowledge the rations, if the possessor was not accustomed to feed the slave: for if he was accustomed, just as he feeds, so too he cannot refuse the provisions. Sometimes, nevertheless, he ought to exhibit there at his own expenses, if perchance you propose that, by design, he has transferred the goods into a hidden place, so that the exhibition would be more inconvenient for the plaintiff: for in this case he will have to exhibit at his own expense and risk into that place where the case is being conducted, lest his cleverness profit him.
Saepius ad exhibendum agenti, si ex eadem causa agat, obstaturam exceptionem iulianus ait: novam autem causam intervenire, si is, qui vindicandi gratia egisset, post acceptum iudicium eam ab aliquo accepit, et ideo exceptionem ei non officere. item si ei, qui furti acturus ad exhibendum egisset, iterum furtum factum sit. denique si quis optandi gratia ad exhibendum egisset et post litem contestatam alterius testamento optio data sit, ad exhibendum agere potest.
Julianus says that, for one suing repeatedly by the action for production, if he sues on the same cause, an exception will obstruct; but a new cause intervenes if he who had sued for the sake of vindicating, after obtaining a judgment, received the thing from someone, and therefore the exception does not operate against him. Likewise, if, for one who, being about to bring an action of theft, had proceeded for production, a theft is committed again. Finally, if someone, for the sake of choosing, had proceeded for production, and after issue was joined an option was given by another’s testament, he can bring an action for production.
Si post iudicium acceptum homo mortuus sit, quamvis sine dolo malo et culpa possessoris, tamen interdum tanti damnandus est, quanti actoris interfuit per eum non effectum, quo minus tunc cum iudicium acciperetur homo exhiberetur: tanto magis si apparebit eo casu mortuum esse, qui non incidisset, si tum exhibitus fuisset.
If, after the judgment has been accepted, the man (slave) has died, although without dolus malus or fault of the possessor, nevertheless he is sometimes to be condemned in as much as it was of interest to the actor that, through him, it was not brought about that the man be produced at the time when the judgment was accepted; all the more if it will appear that he died in a circumstance which would not have occurred, if he had been produced then.
Heres non quasi heres, sed suo nomine hac actione uti potest: item heres possessoris suo nomine tenetur: igitur non procedit quaerere, an heredi et in heredem danda sit. plane ex dolo defuncti danda est in heredem actio, si locupletior hereditas eo nomine facta sit, veluti quod pretium rei consecutus sit.
The heir can make use of this action not in the capacity of heir, but in his own name: likewise the heir of the possessor is held liable in his own name: therefore it does not proceed to inquire whether it should be granted to the heir and against the heir. Plainly, an action is to be granted against the heir on account of the fraud of the deceased, if the inheritance has been enriched under that head, as, for instance, that he has obtained the price of the thing.
Thensaurus meus in tuo fundo est nec eum pateris me effodere: cum eum loco non moveris, furti quidem aut ad exhibendum eo nomine agere recte non posse me labeo ait, quia neque possideres eum neque dolo feceris quo minus possideres, utpote cum fieri possit, ut nescias eum thensaurum in tuo fundo esse. non esse autem iniquum iuranti mihi non calumniae causa id postulare vel interdictum vel iudicium ita dari, ut, si per me non stetit, quo minus damni infecti tibi operis nomine caveatur, ne vim facias mihi, quo minus eum thensaurum effodiam tollam exportem. quod si etiam furtivus iste thensaurus est, etiam furti agi potest.
My treasure is on your land, and you do not allow me to dig it out: since you have not moved it from its place, Labeo says that I cannot properly sue under that head either for theft or by the actio ad exhibendum, because you neither possess it nor have you by dolus caused that you should not possess it, inasmuch as it may be that you do not know that the treasure is on your land. However, it is not unjust that—upon my swearing that I seek this not for the sake of calumny—either an interdict or a judgment be granted in such a way that, if it is not through my default that security for damnum infectum is not furnished to you under the title of the works, you are not to use force against me to prevent my digging up, taking, and carrying off that treasure. But if that treasure is also stolen property, an action for theft too can be brought.
Cum servus tenet aliquid, dominus ad exhibendum suo nomine tenetur: si autem servus citra scientiam domini dolo fecit quo minus habeat, vel furti actio vel de dolo malo noxalis servi nomine danda est, ad exhibendum autem utilis nulla constituenda est.
When a slave holds something, the master is held bound ad exhibendum in his own name: but if the slave, without the master’s knowledge, acted by fraud so that he does not have it, either an action of theft or a noxal action de dolo malo is to be granted in the slave’s name, whereas no “useful” action ad exhibendum is to be constituted.
Si quis hominem debilitatum exhibeat vel eluscatum, ad exhibendum quidem absolvi debet: exhibuit enim et nihil impedit directam actionem talis exhibitio, poterit tamen agere actor ex lege aquilia de hoc damno.
If someone produces a person who has been debilitated or made one‑eyed, he ought indeed to be absolved on the ad exhibendum (action for exhibition): for he has exhibited him, and such exhibition in no way impedes the direct action; nevertheless the plaintiff will be able to sue under the Lex Aquilia for this damage.
Ad exhibendum possunt agere omnes quorum interest. sed quidam consuluit, an possit efficere haec actio, ut rationes adversarii sibi exhiberentur, quas exhiberi magni eius interesset. respondit non oportere ius civile calumniari neque verba captari, sed qua mente quid diceretur, animadvertere convenire.
The action for production may be brought by all whose interest is involved. But someone consulted whether this action could effect that the adversary’s accounts be produced to him, the production of which greatly concerned him. He replied that one ought not to calumniate the civil law nor to catch at words, but that it is proper to observe with what intention something is said.