Justinian: INSTITVTIONES

I:I  De iustitia et iure
I:II  De iure naturali, gentium et civili
I:III  De iure personarum
I:IV  De ingenuis
I:V  De libertinis
I:VI  Qui quibus ex causis manumittere non possunt
I:VII  De lege Furia Caninia sublata
I:VIII  De his qui sui vel alieni iuris sunt
I:IX  De patria potestate
I:X  De nuptiis
I:XI  De adoptionibus
I:XII  Quibus modis ius potestatis solvitur
I:XIII  De tutelis

I:XIV  Qui dari tutores testamento possunt
I:XV  De legitima adgnatorum tutela
I:XVI  De capitis minutione
I:XVII  De legitima patronorum tutela
I:XVIII  De legitima parentum tutela
I:XIX  De fiduciaria tutela
I:XX  De Atiliano tutore vel eo qui ex lege Iulia et Titia dabatur
I:XXI  De auctoritate tutorum
I:XXII  Quibus modis tutela finitur
I:XXIII  De curatoribus
I:XXIV  De satisdatione tutorum vel curatorum
I:XXV  De excusationibus tutorum vel curatorum
I:XXVI  De suspectis tutoribus et curatoribus

1:1  On justice and law
1:2  On natural law, the law of nations, and civil law
1:3  On the law of persons
1:4  On the freeborn
1:5  On freedmen
1:6  Who cannot manumit, and for what causes
1:7  On the Lex Furia Caninia abolished
1:8  On those who are of their own right or of another’s right
1:9  On paternal power
1:10  On marriage
1:11  On adoptions
1:12  In what ways the right of power is dissolved
1:13  On guardianships

1:14  Who can be given as tutors by will
1:15  On the legitimate guardianship of agnates
1:16  On diminution of status (capitis deminutio)
1:17  On the legitimate guardianship of patrons
1:18  On the legitimate guardianship of parents
1:19  On fiduciary guardianship
1:20  On the Atilian tutor, or the one who was given under the Lex Julia and Titia
1:21  On the authority of tutors
1:22  In what ways guardianship ends
1:23  On curators
1:24  On the furnishing of security by tutors or curators
1:25  On the excuses of tutors or curators
1:26  On suspected tutors and curators

LIB. I, TIT. I.
DE IUSTITIA ET IURE.

BOOK 1, TITLE 1.
ON JUSTICE AND LAW.

Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens. Iurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia.

Justice is the constant and perpetual will rendering to each his own right. Jurisprudence is the knowledge of divine and human affairs, the science of the just and the unjust.

His generaliter cognitis et incipientibus nobis exponere iura populi Romani ita maxime videntur posse tradi commodissime, si primo levi ac simplici, post deinde diligentissima atque exactissima interpretatione singula tradantur. alioquin si statim ab initio rudem adhuc et infirmum animum studiosi multitudine ac varietate rerum oneraverimus, duorum alterum aut desertorem studiorum efficiemus aut cum magno labore eius, saepe etiam cum diffidentia, quae plerumque iuvenes avertit, serius ad id perducemus ad quod leniore via ductus sine magno labore et sine ulla diffidentia maturius perduci potuisset.

With these things generally known, and as we begin to expound the laws of the Roman people, they seem able to be handed down most conveniently in this way: if at first each point is delivered with a light and simple interpretation, then afterwards with a most diligent and most exact interpretation. alioquin if straightway from the beginning we burden the mind of the student, still raw and infirm, with the multitude and variety of matters, we shall bring about one of two outcomes: either we shall make him a deserter of studies, or, with great labor on his part—often also with diffidence, which for the most part turns young men away—we shall lead him later to that end to which, led by a gentler way, he could have been brought sooner, without great labor and without any diffidence.

Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere. Huius studii duae sunt positiones, publicum et privatum. publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem pertinet.

The precepts of law are these: to live honorably, to harm no other, to render to each his own. Of this study there are two positions: public and private. Public law is that which has regard to the state of the Roman commonwealth; private, that which pertains to the utility of individuals.

dicendum est igitur de iure privato, quod tripertitum est; collectum est enim ex naturalibus praeceptis aut gentium aut civilibus.

Therefore we must speak of private law, which is tripartite; for it is collected from natural precepts, or from those of the law of nations, or from civil precepts.

LIB. I, TIT. II.
DE IURE NATURALI, GENTIUM ET CIVILI.

BOOK 1, TITLE 2.
ON THE LAW OF NATURE, OF NATIONS, AND CIVIL LAW.

Ius naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit. nam ius istud non humani generis proprium est, sed omnium animalium, quae in caelo, quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur. hinc descendit maris atque feminae coniugatio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio et educatio: videmus etenim cetera quoque animalia istius iuris peritia censeri.

Natural law is what nature has taught all animals. For that law is not proper to the human race, but to all animals which are born in the sky, on the earth, and in the sea. From this descends the conjugal union of male and female, which we call matrimony; from this, the procreation and education of children: for we see that the other animals too are considered to possess expertise in that law.

Ius autem civile vel gentium ita dividitur: omnes populi qui legibus et moribus reguntur partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur: nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium ipsius civitatis: quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur. et populus itaque Romanus partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utitur. quae singula qualia sunt, suis locis proponemos.

Now the civil law or the law of nations is thus divided: all peoples who are governed by laws and mores make use partly of their own proper law, partly of the common law of all human beings: for that which each people establishes for itself is proper to that city and is called civil law, as if the proper law of that very city: but that which natural reason establishes among all human beings is equally kept among all peoples and is called the law of nations, as if the law which all peoples use. And thus the Roman people make use partly of their own proper law, partly of the common law of all human beings. What each of these is like, we shall set forth in their proper places.

Sed ius quidem civile ex unaquaque civitate appellatur, veluti Atheniensium: nam si quis velit Solonis vel Draconis leges appellare ius civile Atheniensium, non erraverit. sic enim et ius quo populus Romanus utitur ius civile Romanorum appellamus, vel ius Quiritium, quo Quirites utuntur; Romani enim a Quirino Quirites appellantur. sed quotiens non addimus, cuius sit civitatis, nostrum ius significamus: sicuti cum poetam dicimus nec addimus nomen, subauditur apud Graecos egregius Homerus, apud nos Vergilius.

But indeed the civil law is named from each and every city, as, for instance, that of the Athenians: for if someone should wish to call the laws of Solon or of Draco the civil law of the Athenians, he would not err. Thus too the law which the Roman people uses we call the civil law of the Romans, or the law of the Quirites, which the Quirites use; for the Romans, from Quirinus, are called Quirites. But whenever we do not add of which city it is, we indicate our law: just as when we say “the poet” and do not add the name, among the Greeks the distinguished Homer is understood, among us Vergil.

Ius autem gentium omni humano generi commune est. nam usu exigente et humanis necessitatibus gentes humanae quaedam sibi constituerunt: bella etenim orta sunt et captivitates secutae et servitutes, quae sunt iuri naturali contrariae (iure enim naturali ab initio omnes homines liberi nascebantur); ex hoc iure gentium et omnes paene contractus introducti sunt, ut emptio venditio, locatio conductio, societas, depositum, mutuum, et alii innumerabiles.

The law of nations, however, is common to the whole human race. For, with use demanding it and human necessities, human peoples established certain things for themselves: for wars arose and captivities followed, and servitudes, which are contrary to natural law (for by natural law from the beginning all human beings were born free); from this law of nations also almost all contracts were introduced, such as purchase and sale, lease and hire, partnership, deposit, loan, and innumerable others.

Constat autem ius nostrum aut ex scripto aut ex non scripto, ut apud Graecos: t«n nÒmvn oþ m°n ¶ggrafoi, oþ d¢ ênrafoi..

However, our law consists either of what is written or of what is unwritten, as among the Greeks: “of the laws some are written, others unwritten.”.

Scriptum ius est lex, plebiscita, senatusconsulta, principum placita, magistratuum edicta, responsa prudentium. Lex est quod populus Romanus senatorio magistratu interrogante, veluti consule, constituebat. plebiscitum est, quod plebs plebeio magistratu interrogante, veluti tribuno, constituebat.

Written law is the lex, plebiscites, senatus-consults, the princes’ placita, the edicts of magistrates, the responsa of the prudentes. A lex is what the Roman People constituted when a senatorial magistrate put the question, as for example a consul. A plebiscite is what the plebs constituted when a plebeian magistrate put the question, as for example a tribune.

plebs autem a populo eo differt quo species a genere: nam appellatione populi universi cives significantur, connumeratis etiam patriciis et senatoribus: plebis autem appellatione sine patriciis et senatoribus ceteri cives significantur. sed et plebiscita, lege Hortensia lata, non minus valere quam leges coeperunt. Senatusconsultum est quod senatus iubet atque constituit.

but the plebs differs from the people as a species from a genus: for by the appellation “people” all citizens are signified, the patricians and senators being counted as well: but by the appellation “plebs” the other citizens, without the patricians and senators, are signified. and also plebiscites, with the Lex Hortensia having been enacted, began to be no less valid than laws. a senatusconsultum is what the senate orders and establishes.

nam cum auctus est populus Romanus in eum modum ut difficile sit in unum eum convocari legis sanciendae causa, aequum visum est senatum vice populi consuli. Sed et quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem, cum lege regia, quae de imperio eius lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem concessit. quodcumque igitur imperator per epistulam constituit vel cognoscens decrevit vel edicto praecepit, legem esse constat: hae sunt quae constitutiones appellantur.

for when the Roman people were augmented in such a way that it is difficult to convene them as one for the purpose of sanctioning a law, it seemed equitable that the senate be consulted in the stead (vice) of the people. But also what has pleased the princeps has the vigor of law, since by the royal law (lex regia), which was passed concerning his imperium, the people granted to him and upon him all their imperium and power. Whatever, therefore, the emperor established by letter (epistle), or, while taking cognizance, decreed, or by edict commanded, is agreed to be law: these are what are called constitutions.

plane ex his quaedam sunt personales, quae nec ad exemplum trahuntur, quoniam non hoc princeps vult: nam quod alicui ob merita indulsit, vel si cui poenam irrogavit, vel si cui sine exemplo subvenit, personam non egreditur. aliae autem, cum generales sunt, omnes procul dubio tenent. Praetorum quoque edicta non modicam iuris optinent auctoritatem.

plainly among these some are personal, which are not drawn into precedent, since the emperor does not wish this: for what he has indulged to someone on account of merits, or if he has imposed a penalty on someone, or if he has aided someone without precedent, does not go beyond the person. Others, however, when they are general, bind all beyond doubt. The edicts of the Praetors likewise obtain no small authority in law.

haec etiam ius honorarium solemus appellare, quod qui honorem gerunt, id est magistratus, auctoritatem huic iuri dederunt. proponebant et aediles curules edictum de quibusdam casibus, quod edictum iuris honorarii portio est. Responsa prudentium sunt sententiae et opiniones eorum quibus permissum erat iura condere.

we are also accustomed to call this the honorary law, because those who bear honor, that is, the magistrates, gave authority to this law. The curule aediles likewise published an edict concerning certain cases, which edict is a portion of the honorary law. The responses of the jurists are the judgments and opinions of those to whom it was permitted to establish laws.

nam antiquitus institutum erat ut essent qui iura publice interpretarentur, quibus a Caesare ius respondendi datum est, qui iurisconsulti appellabantur. quorum omnium sententiae et opiniones eam auctoritatem tenebant ut iudici recedere a responso eorum non liceret, ut est constitutum.

for in antiquity it had been instituted that there be those who publicly interpret the law, to whom the right of responding was given by Caesar, who were called jurisconsults. the sentences and opinions of all of these held such authority that it was not permitted for the judge to depart from their response, as has been established.

Ex non scripto ius venit quod usus comprobavit. nam diuturni mores consensu utentium comprobati legem imitantur.

From the unwritten, law comes which usage has approved. For long-continued customs, approved by the consensus of users, imitate a law.

Et non ineleganter in duas species ius civile distributum videtur. nam origo eius ab institutis duarum civitatium, Athenarum scilicet et Lacedaemonis, fluxisse videtur: in his enim civitatibus ita agi solitum erat, ut Lacedaemonii quidem magis ea quae pro legibus observarent memoriae mandarent, Athenienses vero ea quae in legibus scripta reprehendissent custodirent.

And not inelegantly the civil law seems to have been distributed into two species. For its origin seems to have flowed from the institutions of two cities, namely Athens and Lacedaemon: for in these cities it was the custom to proceed thus: the Lacedaemonians indeed rather consigned to memory those things which they observed in place of laws, whereas the Athenians preserved those things which, as written in the laws, they had subjected to criticism.

Sed naturalia quidem iura, quae apud omnes gentes peraeque servantur, divina quadam providentia constituta, semper firma atque immutabilia permanent: ea vero quae ipsa sibi quaeque civitas constituit, saepe mutari solent vel tacito consensu populi vel alia postea lege lata.

But the natural rights, which are observed equally among all peoples, established by a certain divine providence, remain always firm and immutable: whereas those which each commonwealth establishes for itself are often wont to be changed either by the tacit consent of the people or by another law later enacted.

Omne autem ius quo utimur vel ad personas pertinet vel ad res vel ad actiones. ac prius de personis videamus. nam parum est ius nosse, si personae, quarum causa statutum est, ignorentur.

All law, moreover, which we use pertains either to persons or to things or to actions. And first let us consider persons. For it is too little to know the law if the persons, for whose sake it has been established, are unknown.

LIB. I, TIT. III.

BOOK 1, TITLE 3.

DE IURE PERSONARUM.

ON THE LAW OF PERSONS.

Summa itaque divisio de iure personarum haec est, quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi. Et libertas quidem est, ex qua etiam liberi vocantur, naturalis facultas eius quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quid aut vi aut iure prohibetur. Servitus autem est constitutio iuris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subicitur.

Therefore the highest division concerning the law of persons is this: that all human beings are either free or slaves. And liberty indeed is, whence also the free are so called, the natural faculty of doing that which it pleases each to do, unless something is prohibited either by force or by law. But servitude is an institution of the law of nations, by which someone is subjected to another’s dominion, contrary to nature.

Servi autem ex eo appellati sunt, quod imperatores captivos vendere iubent ac per hoc servare nec occidere solent: qui etiam mancipia dicti sunt, quod ab hostibus manu capiuntur. Servi autem aut nascuntur aut fiunt. nascuntur ex ancillis nostris: fiunt aut iure gentium, id est ex captivitate, aut iure civili, veluti cum homo liber maior viginti annis ad pretium participandum sese venumdari passus est.

Slaves, moreover, are so named from this: that emperors order captives to be sold and thereby are accustomed to preserve rather than kill them: who are also called mancipia, because they are taken by hand from enemies. Slaves, moreover, are either born or made. they are born from our maidservants: they are made either by the ius gentium, that is, from captivity, or by civil law, as when a free person over 20 years has allowed himself to be sold for the sake of sharing in the price.

In servorum condicione nulla differentia est. in liberis multae differentiae sunt: aut enim ingenui sunt aut libertini.

In the condition of slaves there is no difference. among the free there are many differences: for they are either freeborn or freedmen.

LIB. I, TIT. IV.
DE INGENUIS.

BOOK 1, TITLE 4.
ON THE FREEBORN.

Ingenuus is est qui statim ut natus est liber est, sive ex duobus ingenuis matrimonio editus, sive ex libertinis, sive ex altero libertino, altero ingenuo. sed et si quis ex matre libera nascatur, patre servo, ingenuus nihilo minus nascitur: quemadmodum qui ex matre libera et incerto patre natus est, quoniam vulgo conceptus est. sufficit autem liberam fuisse matrem eo tempore quo nascitur, licet ancilla conceperit.

A freeborn person is he who, immediately upon being born, is free, whether born in marriage from two freeborn, or from freedmen, or from one a freedman and the other freeborn. But also, if someone is born from a free mother, with the father a slave, he is nonetheless born freeborn: just as one who is born from a free mother with the father uncertain, since he was vulgarly conceived. It suffices, however, that the mother was free at the time when he is born, although she conceived as a female slave.

et ex contrario si libera conceperit, deinde ancilla facta pariat, placuit eum qui nascitur liberum nasci, quia non debet calamitas matris ei nocere qui in utero est. ex his et illud quaesitum est, si ancilla praegnans manumissa sit, deinde ancilla postea facta peperit, liberum an servum pariat? et Marcellus probat, liberum nasci: sufficit enim ei qui in ventre est liberam matrem vel medio tempore habuisse: quod et verum est. Cum autem ingenuus aliquis natus sit, non officit illi in servitute fuisse et postea manumissum esse: saepissime enim constitutum est, natalibus non officere manumissionem.

and conversely, if a free woman has conceived, then, after becoming a slave-girl, gives birth, it has been decided that he who is born is born free, because the mother’s calamity ought not to harm him who is in the womb. From these points this too was asked, if a slave-girl, pregnant, was manumitted, then, having afterwards become a slave-girl, gave birth, does she bear a free person or a slave? And Marcellus approves that he is born free: for it suffices for him who is in the womb to have had a free mother even for an intermediate time: which also is true. But when someone has been born freeborn (ingenuus), it does not prejudice him to have been in servitude and afterwards to have been manumitted: for it has been very often established that manumission does not prejudice one’s natal status.

LIB. I, TIT. V.
DE LIBERTINIS.

BOOK 1, TITLE 5.
ON FREEDMEN.

Libertini sunt qui ex iusta servitute manumissi sunt. manumissio autem est datio libertatis: nam quamdiu quis in servitute est, manui et potestati suppositus est, et manumissus liberatur potestate. quae res a iure gentium originem sumpsit, utpote cum iure naturali omnes liberi nascerentur nec esset nota manumissio, cum servitus esset incognita: sed posteaquam iure gentium servitus invasit, secutum est beneficium manumissionis.

Freedmen are those who have been manumitted from lawful servitude. Manumission, moreover, is the granting of liberty: for as long as someone is in servitude, he is subjected to the hand and to the power, and once manumitted he is freed from the power. This matter took its origin from the law of nations, since by natural law all were born free and manumission was not known, since slavery was unknown: but after slavery entered under the law of nations, the benefit of manumission followed.

et cum uno naturali nomine homines appellaremur, iure gentium tria genera hominum esse coeperunt, liberi et his contrarium servi et tertium genus libertini, qui desierant esse servi. Multis autem modis manumissio procedit: aut enim ex sacris constitutionibus in sacrosanctis ecclesiis aut vindicta aut inter amicos aut per epistulam aut per testamentum aut aliam quamlibet ultimam voluntatem. sed et aliis multis modis libertas servo competere potest, qui tam ex veteribus quam nostris constitutionibus introducti sunt.

and whereas with one natural name we were called human beings, by the law of nations three genera of human beings began to exist: the free, and, contrary to these, the slaves, and a third genus, the freedmen, who had ceased to be slaves. Moreover, manumission proceeds in many ways: either by sacred constitutions in sacrosanct churches, or by the rod (vindicta), or among friends, or by letter, or by testament, or by any other last will whatsoever. But also in many other ways freedom can accrue to a slave, which have been introduced both by the ancient and by our constitutions.

Servi vero a dominis semper manumitti solent, adeo ut vel in transitu manumittantur, veluti cum praetor aut proconsul aut praeses in balneum vel in theatrum eat.

Slaves, indeed, are always wont to be manumitted by their masters, to such a degree that they are even manumitted in passing, as when a praetor or proconsul or praeses goes into the bath or into the theater.

Libertinorum autem status tripertitus antea fuerat: nam qui manumittebantur, modo maiorem et iustam libertatem consequebantur et fiebant cives Romani, modo minorem et Latini ex lege Iunia Norbana fiebant, modo inferiorem et fiebant ex lege Aelia Sentia dediticiorum numero. sed dediticiorum quidem pessima condicio iam ex multis temporibus in desuetudinem abiit, Latinorum vero nomen non frequentabatur: ideoque nostra pietas, omnia augere et in meliorem statum reducere desiderans, in duabus constitutionibus hoc emendavit et in pristinum statum reduxit, quia et a primis urbis Romae cunabulis una atque simplex libertas competebat, id est eadem quam habebat manumissor, nisi quod scilicet libertinus sit qui manumittitur, licet manumissor ingenuus sit. et dediticios quidem per constitutionem expulimus, quam promulgavimus inter nostras decisiones, per quas, suggerente nobis Triboniano, viro excelso, quaestore, antiqui iuris altercationes placavimus: Latinos autem Iunianos et omnem quae circa eos fuerat observantiam alia constitutione per eiusdem quaestoris suggestionem correximus, quae inter imperiales radiat sanctiones, et omnes libertos, nullo nec aetatis manumissi nec dominii manumissoris nec in manumissionis modo discrimine habito, sicuti antea observabatur, civitate Romana donavimus: multis additis modis, per quos possit libertas servis cum civitate Romana, quae sola in praesenti est, praestari.

However, the status of freedmen had formerly been tripartite: for those who were manumitted sometimes obtained the greater and just liberty and became Roman citizens, sometimes the lesser and became Latins by the Lex Junia Norbana, sometimes the lowest and, by the Lex Aelia Sentia, became of the number of the dediticii. But the condition of the dediticii, indeed the worst, has already for many times fallen into disuse, and the name of the Latins was not in frequent use: and therefore our piety, desiring to augment all things and to bring them back into a better state, corrected this in two constitutions and restored it to the pristine state, since from the very cradles of the City of Rome one and simple liberty pertained, that is, the same which the manumittor had—except, of course, that he who is manumitted is a freedman (libertinus), although the manumittor is freeborn (ingenuus). And the dediticii indeed we expelled by a constitution, which we promulgated among our decisions, through which—Tribonian, a most distinguished man, quaestor, suggesting it to us—we appeased the altercations of the ancient law: but the Junian Latins and the whole observance which had been around them we corrected by another constitution on the suggestion of the same quaestor, which shines among the imperial sanctions; and we endowed all freedmen, no distinction being had either of the age of the manumitted or of the ownership of the manumittor or of the mode of manumission, as was previously observed, with Roman citizenship: with many modes added by which liberty can be afforded to slaves together with Roman citizenship, which alone at present exists.

LIB. I, TIT. VI.
QUI QUIBUS EX CAUSIS MANUMITTERE NON POSSUNT.

BOOK 1, TITLE 6.
WHO, FOR WHAT CAUSES, CANNOT MANUMIT.

Non tamen cuicunque volenti manumittere licet. nam is qui in fraudem creditorum manumittit nihil agit, quia lex Aelia Sentia impedit libertatem. Licet autem domino qui solvendo non est testamento servum suum cum libertate heredem instituere, ut fiat liber heresque ei solus et necessarius, si modo nemo alius ex eo testamento heres extiterit, aut quia nemo heres scriptus sit, aut quia is qui scriptus est qualibet ex causa heres non extiterit.

Not, however, is it permitted to just anyone who wishes to manumit. For he who manumits in fraud of creditors does nothing, because the Lex Aelia Sentia impedes liberty. It is permitted, however, for a master who is not solvent to appoint by testament his own slave as heir with liberty, so that he may become free and his heir, sole and necessary, provided that no one else has emerged as heir from that testament, either because no heir has been appointed, or because the one who has been appointed, for whatever cause, has not become heir.

idque eadem lege Aelia Sentia provisum est, et recte: valde enim prospiciendum erat, ut egentes homines, quibus alius heres extaturus non esset, vel servum suum necessarium heredem habeant, qui satisfacturus esset creditoribus, aut, hoc eo non faciente, creditores res hereditarias servi nomine vendant, nec iniuria defunctus afficiatur. Idemque iuris est et si sine libertate servus heres institutus est. quod nostra constitutio non solum in domino qui solvendo non est, sed generaliter constituit, nova humanitatis ratione, ut ex ipsa scriptura institutionis etiam libertas ei competere videatur, cum non est verisimile, eum quem heredem sibi elegit, si praetermiserit libertatis dationem, servum remanere voluisse et neminem sibi heredem fore.

and this too has been provided by the same Aelian Sentian law, and rightly: for it had to be very carefully foreseen that needy men, for whom no other heir would be forthcoming, might at least have their own slave as a “necessary heir,” who would satisfy the creditors; or, if he does not do this, that the creditors sell the hereditary assets in the slave’s name, and that the deceased not be afflicted with injustice. And the same is the law even if the slave was instituted heir without liberty. Which our constitution has established not only for a master who is insolvent, but generally, by a new reasoning of humanity, so that from the very writing of the institution even liberty appears to be competent to him, since it is not plausible that he, having chosen someone as his heir, if he has omitted the granting of liberty, wished him to remain a slave and that he himself should have no heir.

In fraudem autem creditorum manumittere videtur qui vel iam eo tempore quo manumittit solvendo non est, vel qui datis libertatibus desiturus est solvendo esse. praevaluisse tamen videtur, nisi animum quoque fraudandi manumissor habuit, non impediri libertatem, quamvis bona eius creditoribus non sufficiant: saepe enim de facultatibus suis amplius quam in his est sperant homines. itaque tunc intellegimus impediri libertatem, cum utroque modo fraudantur creditores, id est et consilio manumittentis et ipsa re, eo quod bona non suffectura sunt creditoribus.

In fraud of creditors, however, he is seen to manumit who either already at the time when he manumits is not solvent, or who, by liberties granted, is going to cease to be solvent. Nevertheless it seems to have prevailed that, unless the manumitter also had an intent to defraud, liberty is not impeded, although his goods do not suffice for the creditors: for often men hope from their faculties more than is in them. And so we understand liberty to be impeded when in both ways the creditors are defrauded, that is, both by the design of the manumitter and by the thing itself, in that the goods will not be sufficient for the creditors.

Eadem lege Aelia Sentia domino minori annis viginti non aliter manumittere permittitur, quam si vindicta apud consilium iusta causa manumissionis adprobata fuerit manumissi. Iustae autem manumissionis causae sunt, veluti si quis patrem aut matrem aut filium filiamve aut fratrem sororemve naturales aut paedagogum, nutricem, educatorem aut alumnum alumnamve aut collactaneum manumittat, aut servum procuratoris habendi gratia, aut ancillam matrimonii causa, dum tamen intra sex menses uxor ductatur, nisi iusta causa impediat, et qui manumittitur procuratoris habendi gratia, ne minor septem et decem annis manumittatur. Semel autem causa adprobata, sive vera sive falsa sit, non retractatur.

By the same Lex Aelia Sentia, a master under twenty years is not permitted to manumit otherwise than if, by vindicta before a council, a just cause of the manumission of the manumitted has been approved. Now just causes of manumission are, for example, if someone manumits a father or mother or a son or daughter, or a brother or sister by nature; or a paedagogue, a nurse, an educator, or a foster-son or foster-daughter, or a milk-sibling; or a slave for the sake of having a procurator; or a maidservant for the sake of marriage, provided, however, that within six months she is taken as a wife, unless a just cause impedes; and the one who is manumitted for the sake of having a procurator must not be manumitted if he is under seventeen years. But once the cause has been approved, whether it is true or false, it is not recalled.

Cum ergo certus modus manumittendi minoribus viginti annis dominis per legem Aeliam Sentiam constitutus sit, eveniebat ut qui quattuordecim annos aetatis expleverit, licet testamentum facere possit et in eo heredem sibi instituere legataque relinquere possit, tamen, si adhuc minor sit annis viginti, libertatem servo dare non poterat. quod non erat ferendum, si is, cui totorum bonorum in testamento dispositio data erat, uni servo libertatem dare non permittebatur. quare nos similiter ei quemadmodum alias res ita et servos suos in ultima voluntate disponere, quemadmodum voluerit, permittimus, ut et libertatem eis possit praestare.

Since therefore a fixed mode of manumitting for masters under twenty years of age had been established by the Lex Aelia Sentia, it came about that one who had completed fourteen years of age, although he could make a testament and therein appoint an heir for himself and leave legacies, nevertheless, if he were still under twenty years, could not grant liberty to a slave. Which was not to be endured, if he to whom the disposition of all his goods in a testament had been given was not permitted to give liberty to a single slave. Wherefore we likewise permit him, just as he may dispose of other things, so also to dispose of his own slaves in his last will, as he shall have wished, so that he may also be able to bestow liberty upon them.

sed cum libertas inaestimabilis est et propter hoc ante vicesimum aetatis annum antiquitas libertatem servo dari prohibebat: ideo nos, mediam quodammodo viam eligentes, non aliter minori viginti annis libertatem in testamento dare servo suo concedimus, nisi septimum et decimum annum impleverit et octavum decimum tetigerit. cum enim antiquitas huiusmodi aetati et pro aliis postulare concessit, cur non etiam sui iudicii stabilitas ita eos adiuvare credatur, ut et ad libertates dandas servis suis possint provenire.

but since liberty is inestimable and for this reason antiquity prohibited that liberty be given to a slave before the twentieth year of age: therefore we, choosing in a certain way a middle road, do not otherwise concede to one under twenty years to give liberty in his testament to his slave, unless he has completed the seventeenth year and has touched the eighteenth. For since antiquity granted to such an age also to petition on behalf of others, why should not the stability of their own judgment likewise be believed to aid them, so that they may also be able to come to granting liberties to their own slaves.

LIB. I, TIT. VII.

BOOK 1, TITLE 7.

DE LEGE FURIA CANINIA SUBLATA.

ON THE LEX FURIA CANINIA ABROGATED.

Lege Furia Caninia certus modus constitutus erat in servis testamento manumittendis. quem quasi libertatibus impedientem et quodammodo invidam tollendam esse censuimus; cum satis fuerat inhumanum, vivos quidem licentiam habere totam suam familiam libertate donare, nisi alia causa impediat libertati, morientibus autem huiusmodi licentiam adimere.

By the Lex Furia Caninia a fixed measure had been established for manumitting slaves by testament. Which, as if impeding liberties and in a certain manner invidious, we have judged ought to be removed; since it was sufficiently inhumane that the living indeed have the license to bestow liberty upon their entire household, unless some other cause impedes liberty, but to take away such license from the dying.

LIB. I, TIT. VIII.

BOOK 1, TITLE 8.

DE HIS QUI SUI VEL ALIENI IURIS SUNT.

ON THOSE WHO ARE OF THEIR OWN RIGHT OR OF ANOTHER'S RIGHT.

Sequitur de iure personarum alia divisio. nam quaedam personae sui iuris sunt, quaedam alieno iuri subiectae sunt: rursus earum quae alieno iuri subiectae sunt, aliae in potestate parentum, aliae in potestate dominorum sunt. videamus itaque de his quae alieno iuri subiectae sunt: nam si cognoverimus quae istae personae sint, simul intellegemus quae sui iuris sunt.

Another division follows concerning the law of persons. For certain persons are of their own right, certain are subject to another’s right: again, of those who are subject to another’s right, some are in the power of their parents, others in the power of their masters. Let us therefore consider those who are subject to another’s right: for if we have recognized which persons these are, at the same time we shall understand which are of their own right.

ac prius dispiciamus de his qui in potestate dominorum sunt.

and first let us consider those who are under the power of masters.

In potestate itaque dominorum sunt servi. quae quidem potestas iuris gentium est: nam apud omnes peraeque gentes animadvertere possumus, dominis in servos vitae necisque potestatem esse, et quodcumque per servum adquiritur id domino adquiritur. Sed hoc tempore nullis hominibus qui sub imperio nostro sunt licet sine causa legibus cognita et supra modum in servos suos saevire.

Therefore slaves are in the power of their masters. Which power indeed is of the ius gentium (the law of nations): for among all nations equally we can observe that masters have the power of life and death over slaves, and that whatever is acquired through a slave is acquired for the master. But at this time no persons who are under our imperium are permitted, without a cause recognized by the laws and beyond measure, to be savage toward their own slaves.

nam ex constitutione divi Pii Antonini qui sine causa servum suum occiderit, non minus puniri iubetur quam qui servum alienum occiderit. sed et maior asperitas dominorum eiusdem principis constitutione coercetur. nam consultus a quibusdam praesidibus provinciarum de his servis qui ad aedem sacram vel ad statuas principum confugiunt, praecepit, ut si intolerabilis videatur dominorum saevitia, cogantur servos bonis condicionibus vendere, ut pretium dominis daretur: et recte; expedit enim rei publicae, ne quis re sua male utatur.

for by the constitution of the deified Pius Antoninus, whoever without cause shall have killed his own slave is ordered to be punished no less than one who shall have killed another’s slave. But even the greater harshness of masters is restrained by a constitution of that same emperor. For, when consulted by certain governors of provinces about those slaves who flee for refuge to a sacred shrine or to the statues of the emperors, he commanded that, if the savagery of the masters should seem intolerable, they be compelled to sell the slaves on good conditions, so that the price be given to the masters: and rightly; for it is expedient for the commonwealth that no one make ill use of his own property.

cuius rescripti ad Aelium Marcianum emissi verba haec sunt:

the words of which rescript, sent to Aelius Marcianus, are these:

"Dominorum quidem potestatem in suos servos illibatam esse oportet nec cuiquam hominum ius suum detrahi. sed dominorum interest, ne auxilium contra saevitiam vel famen vel intolerabilem iniuriam denegetur his qui iuste deprecantur. ideoque cognosce de querellis eorum qui ex familia Iulii Sabini ad statuam confugerunt, et si vel durius habitos quam aequum est, vel infami iniuria affectos cognoveris, veniri iube, ita ut in potestatem domini non revertantur.

"Indeed, the power of masters over their own slaves ought to be inviolate, nor should anyone’s right be detracted. But it is of concern to the masters that help not be denied against savagery or hunger or intolerable injury to those who rightly petition. And so, take cognizance of the complaints of those who have fled to the statue from the household of Julius Sabinus, and if you ascertain that they have been either treated more harshly than is equitable, or afflicted with infamous injury, order them to be sold, in such a way that they do not return into the power of the master.

qui Sabinus, si meae constitutioni fraudem fecerit, sciet, me dmissum severius exsecuturum."

"And Sabinus, if he commits fraud against my constitution, will know that I will enforce it more severely."

LIB. I, TIT. IX.
DE PATRIA POTESTATE.

BOOK 1, TITLE 9.
ON PATERNAL POWER.

In potestate nostra sunt liberi nostri, quos ex iustis nuptiis procreaverimus. Nuptiae autem sive matrimonium est viri et mulieris coniunctio, individuam consuetudinem vitae continens. Ius autem potestatis quod in liberos habemus proprium est civium Romanorum: nulli enim alii sunt homines qui talem in liberos habeant potestatem qualem nos habemus.

In our power are our children, whom we have procreated from just nuptials. Nuptials, however, or matrimony, is the joining of a man and a woman, containing an indivisible consuetude of life. But the right of power which we have over children is proper to Roman citizens: for there are no other men who have such power over their children as we have.

Qui igitur ex te et uxore tua nascitur, in tua potestate est: item qui ex filio tuo et uxore eius nascitur, id est nepos tuus et neptis, aeque in tua sunt potestate, et pronepos et proneptis et deinceps ceteri. qui tamen ex filia tua nascitur, in tua potestate non est, sed in patris eius.

Therefore, whoever is born from you and your wife is in your power; likewise, those who are born from your son and his wife—namely, your grandson and granddaughter—are equally in your power, and so too your great‑grandson and great‑granddaughter, and thereafter the others. One who, however, is born from your daughter is not in your power, but in that of his father.

LIB. I, TIT. X.
DE NUPTIIS.

BOOK 1, TITLE 10.
ON NUPTIALS.

Iustas autem nuptias inter se cives Romani contrahunt, qui secundum praecepta legum coeunt, masculi quidem puberes, feminae autem viripotentes, sive patresfamilias sint sive filiifamilias, dum tamen filiifamilias et consensum habeant parentum, quorum in potestate sunt. nam hoc fieri debere et civilis et naturalis ratio suadet in tantum ut iussum parentis praecedere debeat. unde quaesitum est, an furiosi filia nubere aut furiosi filius uxorem ducere possit? cumque super filio variabatur, nostra processit decisio, qua permissum est ad exemplum filiae furiosi filium quoque posse et sine patris interventu matrimonium sibi copulare secundum datum ex constitutione modum.

But just nuptials are contracted among themselves by Roman citizens who come together according to the precepts of the laws, the males indeed of puberty, but the females of husband-taking age (marriageable), whether they are fathers-of-family or sons-in-family, provided, however, that sons-in-family also have the consent of the parents in whose power they are. For that this must be done both civil and natural reason urges, to such an extent that the command of the parent ought to take precedence. Whence it has been asked whether the daughter of a madman may marry, or the son of a madman may take a wife; and since there was variation concerning the son, our decision has gone forth, by which it has been permitted, on the example of the madman’s daughter, that the son also can, even without the father’s intervention, join marriage to himself according to the manner given by the constitution.

Ergo non omnes nobis uxores ducere licet: nam quarundam nuptiis abstinendum est: inter eas enim personas quae parentum liberorumve locum inter se optinent nuptiae contrahi non possunt, veluti inter patrem et filiam vel avum et neptem vel matrem et filium vel aviam et nepotem et usque ad infinitum: et si tales personae inter se coierunt, nefarias atque incestas nuptias contraxisse dicuntur. et haec adeo ita sunt ut, quamvis per adoptionem parentum liberorumve loco sibi esse coeperint, non possint inter se matrimonio iungi, in tantum ut etiam dissoluta adoptione idem iuris maneat: itaque eam quae tibi per adoptionem filia aut neptis esse coeperit, non poteris uxorem ducere, quamvis eam emancipaveris.

Therefore we are not permitted to lead all women as wives: for from the nuptials of certain women one must abstain: for between those persons who hold the place of parents or of children toward each other nuptials cannot be contracted, as between a father and a daughter or a grandfather and a granddaughter or a mother and a son or a grandmother and a grandson, and on to infinity: and if such persons have come together with one another, they are said to have contracted nefarious and incestuous nuptials. And these things are so to such a degree that, although through adoption they have begun to be in the place of parents or of children to one another, they cannot be joined to each other in matrimony, to the extent that even with the adoption dissolved the same law remains: and so her who has begun to be to you a daughter or granddaughter by adoption you will not be able to take as a wife, although you have emancipated her.

Inter eas quoque personas, quae ex transverso gradu cognationis iunguntur, est quaedam similis observatio, sed non tanta. sane enim inter fratrem sororemque nuptiae prohibitae sunt, sive ab eodem patre eademque matre nati fuerint, sive ex alterutro eorum. sed si qua per adoptionem soror tibi esse coeperit, quamdiu quidem constat adoptio sane inter te et eam nuptiae consistere non possunt: cum vero per emancipationem adoptio dissoluta sit, poteris eam uxorom ducere: sed et si tu emancipatus fueris, nihil est impedimento nuptiis.

Among those persons also who are joined in the collateral degree of kinship, there is a certain similar observance, but not so great. For indeed marriages between brother and sister are prohibited, whether they were born from the same father and the same mother, or from either one of them. But if someone has begun to be your sister through adoption, so long as the adoption plainly subsists, certainly marriage cannot stand between you and her: but when through emancipation the adoption has been dissolved, you will be able to take her as a wife: and even if you yourself have been emancipated, there is nothing as an impediment to the marriage.

et ideo constat, si quis generum adoptare velit, debere eum ante filiam suam emancipare: et si quis velit nurum adoptare, debere eum ante filium emancipare. Fratris vel sororis filiam uxorem ducere non licet. sed nec neptem fratris vel sororis ducere quis potest, quamvis quarto gradu sint.

and therefore it is settled that, if anyone should wish to adopt a son-in-law, he ought first to emancipate his daughter: and if anyone should wish to adopt a daughter-in-law, he ought first to emancipate his son. It is not permitted to take as a wife the daughter of a brother or a sister. Nor can anyone take as a wife the granddaughter of a brother or of a sister, although they are in the fourth degree.

cuius enim filiam uxorem ducere non licet, eius neque neptem permittitur. eius vero mulieris quam pater tuus adoptavit filiam non videris impediri uxorem ducere, quia neque naturali neque civili iure tibi coniungitur. Duorum autem fratrum vel sororum liberi vel fratris et sororis iungi possunt.

for one whose daughter it is not permitted to take as wife, neither is it allowed to take his granddaughter. but as for the daughter of that woman whom your father adopted, you do not seem to be hindered from taking her as wife, because she is conjoined to you by neither natural nor civil law. moreover, the children of two brothers or of two sisters, or of a brother and a sister, may be joined in marriage.

Item amitam, licet adoptivam, uxorem ducere non licet, item materteram, quia parentum loco habentur. qua ratione verum est, magnam quoque amitam et materteram magnam prohiberi uxorem ducere. Adfinitatis quoque veneratione quarundam nuptiis abstinere necesse est.

Likewise it is not permitted to marry an aunt, even an adoptive one, and likewise not a maternal aunt, because they are held in the place of parents. By this reasoning it is true that a great-aunt as well, both the paternal great-aunt and the maternal great-aunt, is prohibited to be taken as a wife. Out of reverence for affinity too, it is necessary to abstain from the marriages of certain persons.

ut ecce privignam aut nurum uxorem ducere non licet, quia utraeque filiae loco sunt. quod scilicet ita accipi debet, si fuit nurus aut privigna: nam si adhuc nurus est, id est si adhuc nupta est filio tuo, alia ratione uxorem eam ducere non poteris, quia eadem duobus nupta esse non potest: item si adhuc privigna tua est, id est si mater eius tibi nupta est, ideo eam uxorem ducere non poteris, quia duas uxores eodem tempore habere non licet. Socrum quoque et novercam prohibitum est uxorem ducere, quia matris loco sunt.

as, for instance, it is not permitted to take a stepdaughter or a daughter-in-law as wife, because both are in the place of a daughter. which, of course, ought to be understood thus, if she was a daughter-in-law or a stepdaughter: for if she is still a daughter-in-law, that is, if she is still married to your son, for another reason you will not be able to take her as wife, because the same woman cannot be married to two husbands: likewise, if she is still your stepdaughter, that is, if her mother is married to you, for that reason you will not be able to take her as wife, because it is not permitted to have two wives at the same time. It is also prohibited to take a mother-in-law and a stepmother as wife, because they are in the place of a mother.

quod et ipsum dissoluta demum adfinitate procedit: alioquin si adhuc noverca est, id est si adhuc patri tuo nupta est, communi iure impeditur tibi nubere, quia eadem duobus nupta esse non potest: item si adhuc socrus est id est si adhuc filia eius tibi nupta est, ideo impediuntur nuptiae, quia duas uxores habere non potes. Mariti tamen filius ex alia uxore et uxoris filia ex alio marito, vel contra, matrimonium recte contrahunt, licet habeant fratrem sororemve ex matrimonio postea contracto natos. Si uxor tua post divortium ex alio filiam procreaverit, haec non est quidem privigna tua, sed Iulianus huiusmodi nuptiis abstinere debere ait: nam nec sponsam filii nurum esse nec patris sponsam novercam esse, rectius tamen et iure facturos eos, qui huiusmodi nuptiis se abstinuerint.

which itself proceeds only once the affinity has at last been dissolved: otherwise, if she is still a stepmother, that is, if she is still married to your father, she is hindered by the common law from marrying you, because the same woman cannot be married to two men: likewise, if she is still a mother‑in‑law, that is, if her daughter is still married to you, therefore the nuptials are impeded, because you cannot have two wives. Nevertheless, a husband’s son by another wife and a wife’s daughter by another husband, or conversely, rightly contract matrimony, although they have a brother or sister born from a marriage afterwards contracted. If your wife, after a divorce, has borne a daughter by another man, this person is indeed not your stepdaughter, but Julian says that one ought to abstain from nuptials of this kind: for neither is a son’s betrothed a daughter‑in‑law nor a father’s betrothed a stepmother, yet those who have abstained from nuptials of this sort will act more correctly and lawfully.

Illud certum est, serviles quoque cognationes impedimento esse nuptiis, si forte pater et filia aut frater et soror manumissi fuerint. Sunt et aliae personae quae propter diversas rationes nuptias contrahere prohibentur quas in libris digestorum seu pandectarum ex veteri iure collectarum enumerari permisimus.

It is certain that servile cognations too are an impediment to nuptials, if perchance a father and daughter or a brother and sister have been manumitted. There are also other persons who, for diverse reasons, are prohibited from contracting marriage, which we have permitted to be enumerated in the books of the Digests, or Pandects, collected from the ancient law.

Si adversus ea quae diximus aliqui coierint, nec vir nec uxor nec nuptiae nec matrimonium nec dos intellegitur. itaque ii qui ex eo coitu nascuntur in potestate patris non sunt, sed tales sunt, quantum ad patriam potestatem pertinet, quales sunt ii quos mater vulgo concepit. nam nec hi patrem habere intelleguntur, cum his etiam incertus est: unde solent filii spurii appellari, vel a Graeca voce quasi sporãdhn concepti, vel quasi sine patre filii.

If any have come together in contravention of the things we have said, neither husband nor wife nor nuptials nor matrimony nor dowry is understood. And so those who are born from that intercourse are not in the father’s power, but, so far as paternal power (patria potestas) is concerned, they are of the same sort as those whom the mother conceived promiscuously. For neither are these understood to have a father, since in their case he is even uncertain: whence they are wont to be called spurious sons, either from the Greek word, as though conceived sporãdhn, or as though sons without a father.

sequitur ergo, ut et dissoluto tali coitu nec dotis exactioni locus sit. qui autem prohibitas nuptias coeunt et alias poenas patiuntur, quae sacris constitutionibus continentur.

it follows therefore that, with such coitus/union dissolved, there is no place for the exaction of the dowry. but those who contract prohibited nuptials also suffer other penalties, which are contained in the sacred constitutions.

Aliquando autem evenit, ut liberi quidem statim ut nati sunt in potestate parentum non fiant, postea autem redigantur in potestatem. qualis est is qui dum naturalis fuerat postea curiae datus potestati patris subicitur. nec non is qui a muliere libera procreatus, cuius matrimonium minime legibus interdictum fuerat sed ad quam pater consuetudinem habuerat.

Sometimes, however, it happens that children indeed do not, immediately as soon as they are born, come into the power of their parents, but afterwards are brought back into that power. Such is he who, while he had been a natural child, afterwards, being given to the curia, is subjected to the power of his father; and likewise he who was procreated by a free woman, whose marriage was in no way interdicted by the laws, but with whom the father had had cohabitation.

postea ex nostra constitutione, dotalibus instrumentis compositis, in potestate patris efficitur: quod et alii si ex eodem matrimonio non fuerint procreati, similiter nostra constitutio praebuit.

afterwards, by our constitution, once the dowry instruments have been drawn up, he is brought into the father’s power: which our constitution has likewise provided for others who have not been procreated from the same marriage.

LIB. I, TIT. XI.
DE ADOPTIONIBUS.

BOOK 1, TITLE 11.
ON ADOPTIONS.

Non solum tamen naturales liberi, secundum ea quae diximus, in potestate nostra sunt, verum etiam ii quos adoptamus. Adoptio autem duobus modis fit, aut principali rescripto aut imperio magistratus. imperatoris auctoritate adoptamus eos easve, qui quaeve sui iuris sunt.

Not only, however, are natural children, according to the things we have said, under our power, but also those whom we adopt. Adoption, moreover, is effected in two ways, either by a principal rescript or by the command of a magistrate. By the emperor’s authority we adopt those, male or female, who are in their own right (sui iuris).

quae species adoptionis dicitur adrogatio. imperio magistratus adoptamus eos easve qui quaeve in potestate parentium sunt, sive primum gradum liberorum optineant, qualis est filius filia, sive inferiorem, qualis est nepos neptis, pronepos proneptis. Sed hodie ex nostra constitutione, cum filiusfamilias a patre naturali extraneae personae in adoptionem datur, iura potestatis naturalis patris minime dissolvuntur nec quidquam ad patrem adoptivum transit nec in potestate eius est, licet ab intestato iura successionis ei a nobis tributa sunt.

This species of adoption is called adrogation. By the imperium of a magistrate we adopt those who are in the power of their parents, whether they hold the first degree of children, such as a son or a daughter, or a lower degree, such as a grandson or granddaughter, great‑grandson or great‑granddaughter. But today, by our constitution, when a filiusfamilias is given by his natural father into adoption to an extraneous person, the rights of the natural father’s power are in no way dissolved, nor does anything pass to the adoptive father, nor is he in that father’s power, although we have bestowed upon him rights of succession ab intestato.

si vero pater naturalis non extraneo, sed avo fílii sui materno, vel, si ipse pater naturalis fuerit emancipatus, etiam paterno, vel proavo simili modo paterno vel materno, filium suum dederit in adoptionem: in hoc casu quia in unam personam concurrunt et naturalia et adoptionis iura, manet stabile ius patris adoptivi, et naturali vinculo copulatum et legitimo adoptionis modo constrictum, ut et in familia et in potestate huiusmodi patris adoptivi sit. Cum autem impubes per principale rescriptum adrogatur, causa cognita adrogatio permittitur et exquiritur causa adrogationis, an honesta sit expediatque pupillo, et cum quibusdam condicionibus adrogatio fit, id est ut caveat adrogator personae publicae, hoc est tabulario, si intra pubertatem pupillus decesserit, restituturum se bona illis qui, si adoptio facta non esset, ad successionem eius venturi essent. item non alias emancipare eos potest adrogator, nisi causa cognita digni emancipatione fuerint et tunc sua bona eis reddat.

if, however, the natural father has given his son in adoption not to an outsider, but to the son’s maternal grandfather, or, if the natural father himself has been emancipated, also to the paternal [grandfather], or to the great‑grandfather in like manner, paternal or maternal: in this case, because both the natural and the rights of adoption concur in one person, the right of the adoptive father remains stable, both joined by the natural bond and constrained by the legitimate mode of adoption, so that the son is both in the family and in the power of such an adoptive father. And when one under puberty is adrogated by principal rescript, adrogation is permitted after inquiry into the cause, and the cause of the adrogation is examined, whether it is honorable and expedient for the ward; and the adrogation is made with certain conditions, that is, that the adrogator give security to a public person, that is, to the registrar, that if the ward should die before puberty, he will restore the goods to those who, if the adoption had not been made, would have come to his succession. Likewise, the adrogator cannot otherwise emancipate them, unless, the cause having been examined, they have been judged worthy of emancipation, and then he returns their own goods to them.

sed et si decedens pater eum exheredaverit vel vivus sine insta causa eum emancipaverit, iubetur quartam partem ei suorum bonoram relinquere, videlicet praeter bona quae ad patrem adoptivum transtulit et quorum commodum ei adquisivit postea. Minorem natu non posse maiorem adoptare placet: adoptio enim naturam imitatur et pro monstro est ut maior sit filius quam pater. debet itaque is qui sibi per adrogationem vel adoptionem filium facit, plena pubertate, id est decem et octo annis praecedere.

but also if the father, dying, has disinherited him, or while alive has emancipated him without just cause, he is ordered to leave to him a fourth part of his own goods, namely apart from the goods which he transferred to the adoptive father and the profit of which he afterward acquired for him. It is agreed that one younger by birth cannot adopt one older: for adoption imitates nature, and it is a monstrosity that the son be older than the father. Therefore he who makes for himself a son by adrogation or adoption ought to be ahead by full puberty, that is, by 18 years.

Licet autem et in locum nepotis vel neptis vel in locum pronepotis vel proneptis vel deinceps adoptare, quamvis filium quis non habeat. Et tam filium alienum quis in locum nepotis potest adoptare, quam nepotem in locum filii. Sed si quis nepotis loco adoptet, vel quasi ex eo filio quem habet iam adoptatum, vel quasi ex illo quem naturalem in sua potestate habet: in eo casu et filius consentire debet, ne ei invito suus heres adgnascatur.

However, it is permitted also to adopt into the place of a grandson or granddaughter, or into the place of a great-grandson or great-granddaughter, and so on in succession, although one may not have a son. And one can as well adopt another’s son into the place of a grandson as a grandson into the place of a son. But if someone adopts in the place of a grandson, either as if from that son whom he already has adopted, or as if from that one whom he has as a natural son in his own power: in that case the son also must consent, lest, against his will, his own heir accrue to him.

sed ex contrario si avus ex filio nepotem dat in adoptionem, non est necesse filium consentire. In plurimis autem causis adsimilatur is qui adoptatus vel adrogatus est, ei qui ex legitimo matrimonio natus est. et ideo si quis per imperatorem sive apud praetorem vel apud praesidem provinciae non extraneum adoptaverit, potest eundem alii in adoptionem dare.

but on the contrary, if a grandfather gives a grandson from his son into adoption, it is not necessary for the son to consent. Moreover, in very many cases he who has been adopted or adrogated is assimilated to one who has been born from a legitimate marriage. And therefore, if anyone has adopted a non-stranger through the emperor or before the praetor or before the governor of a province, he can give that same person into adoption to another.

Sed et illud utriusque adoptionis commune est, quod et hi qui generare non possunt, quales sunt spadones, adoptare possunt, castrati autem non possunt. Feminae quoque adoptare non possunt, quia nec naturales liberos in potestate sua habent: sed ex indulgentia principis ad solatium liberorum amissorum adoptare possunt. Illud proprium est illius adoptionis quae per sacrum oraculum fit, quod is qui liberos in potestate habet, si se adrogandum dederit, non solum ipse potestati adrogatoris subicitur, sed etiam liberi eius in eiusdem fiunt potestate tamquam nepotes.

SBut this too is common to both kinds of adoption, that even those who cannot beget, such as spadones (eunuchs), can adopt, whereas the castrati cannot. Women likewise cannot adopt, because they do not have natural children in their own power: but by the indulgence of the princeps they can adopt as a solace for children lost. That is peculiar to the adoption which is done through the sacred oracle, that he who has children in his power, if he gives himself to be adrogated, not only is himself subjected to the power of the adrogator, but his children also come into the same person’s power as though grandchildren.

sic enim et divus Augustus non ante Tiberium adoptavit, quam is Germanicum adoptavit: ut protinus adoptione facta incipiat Germanicus Augusti nepos esse. Apud Catonem bene scriptum refert antiquitas, servi si a domino adoptati sint, ex hoc ipso posse liberari. unde et nos eruditi in nostra constitutione etiam eum servum quem dominus actis intervenientibus filium suum nominaverit liberum esse constituimus, licet hoc ad ius filii accipiendum ei non sufficit.

for thus even the deified Augustus did not adopt Tiberius before that man adopted Germanicus: so that, adoption having been effected forthwith, Germanicus begins to be Augustus’s grandson. Antiquity reports, well written in Cato, that if slaves have been adopted by their master, from this very fact they can be set free. Whence also we, being instructed, have in our constitution established that even that slave whom the master, with the records intervening, has named his son is to be free, although this does not suffice for him to receive the right of a son.

LIB. I, TIT. XII.

BOOK 1, TITLE 12.

QUIBUS MODIS IUS POTESTATIS SOLVITUR.

BY WHAT MEANS THE RIGHT OF POWER IS DISSOLVED.

Videamus nunc, quibus modis ii qui alieno iuri subiecti sunt eo iure liberantur. et quidem servi quemadmodum potestate liberantur, ex his intellegere possumus quae de servis manumittendis superius euimas.

Let us now see by what modes those who are subject to another’s right are liberated from that right. And indeed how slaves are liberated from power we can understand from those things which we have set forth above about manumitting slaves.

Hi vero qui in potestate parentis sunt mortuo eo sui iuris fiunt. sed hoc distinctionem recipit. nam mortuo patre sane omnimodo filii filiaeve sui iuris efficiuntur.

But those who are under a parent’s power, when he has died, become of their own right. But this admits a distinction. For, the father having died, certainly in every way sons or daughters become of their own right.

mortuo vero avo non omnimodo nepotes neptesque sui iuris fiunt, sed ita si post mortem avi in potestatem patris sui recasuri non sunt: itaque si moriente avo pater eorum et vivit et in potestate patris sui est, tunc post obitum avi in potestate patris sui fiunt: si vero is quo tempore avus moritur aut iam mortuus est aut exiit de potestate patris, tunc hi, quia in potestatem eius cadere non possunt, sui iuris fiunt.

but when the grandfather has died, the grandsons and granddaughters do not in every way become sui iuris, but only if after the death of the grandfather they are not about to fall back into their father’s power: and so, if at the grandfather’s dying their father both lives and is under the power of his own father, then after the grandfather’s decease they come under their father’s power: but if he, at the time the grandfather dies, is either already dead or has exited from his father’s power, then they, because they cannot fall into his power, become sui iuris.

Cum autem is qui ob aliquod maleficium in insulam deportatur civitatem amittit, sequitur ut, quia eo modo ex numero civium Romanorum tollitur, perinde acsi mortuo eo desinant liberi in potestate eius esse. pari ratione et si is qui in potestate parentis sit in insulam deportatus fuerit, desinit in potestate parentis esse. sed si ex indulgentia principali restituti fuerint, per omnia pristinum statum recipiunt.

But when a person who, on account of some malefaction, is deported to an island loses citizenship, it follows that, because in that way he is removed from the number of Roman citizens, his children cease to be in his power as if he had died. By a like reasoning, also if one who is in the power of a parent has been deported to an island, he ceases to be in the power of the parent. But if they have been restored by imperial indulgence, they in all respects regain their former status.

Relegati autem patres in insulam in potestate sua liberos retinent: et e contario liberi relegate in postestate parentum remanent. Poenae servus effectus filios in potestate habere desinit. servi autem poenae efficiuntur, qui in metallum damnantur et qui bestiis subiciuntur.

However, fathers relegated to an island retain their children in their own power: and conversely, children relegated remain in the power of their parents. One who has been made a slave of punishment ceases to have sons in his power. But they are made slaves of punishment who are condemned to the mines and who are subjected to the beasts.

Filiusfamilias si militaverit, vel si senator vel consul fuerit factus, manet in patris potestate. militia enim vel consularia dignitas patris potestate filium non liberat. sed ex constitutione nostra summa patriciatus dignitas illico ab imperialibus codicillis praestitis a patria potestate liberat.

A son of the household, if he has served in the military, or if he has been made a senator or consul, remains in the father’s power. For military service or the consular dignity does not free the son from the father’s power. But by our constitution the supreme dignity of the patriciate, immediately upon imperial codicils being bestowed, frees (him) from paternal power.

quis enim patiatur patrem quidem posse per emancipationis modum suae potestatis nexibus filiam relaxare, imperatoriam autem celsitudinem non valere eum quem sibi patrem elegit ab aliena eximere potestate?

for who would endure that a father can, by the mode of emancipation, release his daughter from the bonds of his own power, but that the imperial Highness is not able to exempt from another’s power the one whom it has chosen for itself as a father?

Si ab hostibus captus fuerit parens, quamvis servus hostium fiat, tamen pendet, ius liberorum propter ius postliminii: quia hi qui ab hostibus capti sunt si reversi fuerint, omnia pristina iura recipiunt. idcirco reversus et liberos habebit in potestate, quia postliminium fingit eum qui captus est semper in civitate fuisse: si vero ibi decesserit, exinde, ex quo captus est pater, filius sui iuris fuisse videtur. ipse quoque filius neposve si ab hostibus captus fuerit, similiter dicimus propter ius postliminii ius quoque potestatis parentis in suspenso esse.

If a parent should be captured by the enemy, although he become a slave of the enemies, nevertheless the right over the children is pending, on account of the right of postliminy: because those who have been captured by enemies, if they return, receive back all their former rights. Therefore, on returning he will also have the children in his power, because postliminy feigns that he who was captured was always in the commonwealth: if however he should have died there, from then, from the time when the father was captured, the son is seen to have been sui iuris. He himself also, the son or the grandson, if he should be captured by enemies, we likewise say that, on account of the right of postliminy, the right too of the parent’s power is in suspense.

dictum est autem postliminium a limine et post, et eum qui ab hostibus captus in fines nostros postea pervenit postliminio reversum recte dicimus. nam limina sicut in domibus finem quendam faciunt, sic et imperii finem limen esse veteres voluerunt. hinc et limes dictus est quasi finis quidam et terminus.

Moreover, it is said that postliminy is from limen (threshold) and post; and him who, having been captured by enemies, later reaches our borders we rightly say has returned by postliminy. For thresholds, just as in houses they make a certain boundary, so too the ancients wished the threshold to be the boundary of the empire. Hence also limes is so called, as if a certain boundary and terminus.

ab eo postliminium dictum quia eodem limine revertebatur quo amissus erat. sed et qui victis hostibus recuperatur, postliminio rediisse existimatur.

from this it is called postliminium, because one returns by the same threshold by which he was lost. but likewise, one who is recovered after the enemies have been vanquished is considered to have returned by postliminium.

Praeterea emancipatione quoque desinunt liberi in potestate parentum esse. sed ea emancipatio antea quidem vel per antiquam legis observationem procedebat, quae per imaginarias venditiones et intercedentes manumissiones celebrabatur, vel ex imperiali rescripto. nostra autem providentia et hoc in melius per constitutionem reformavit, ut, fictione pristina explosa, recta via apud competentes iudices vel magistratus parentes intrent et filios suos vel filias vel nepotes vel neptes ac deinceps sua manu dimitterent.

Furthermore, by emancipation also children cease to be in the power of their parents. But formerly that emancipation proceeded either by the observance of the ancient law, which was celebrated through imaginary sales and intervening manumissions, or by imperial rescript. Our providence, however, has reformed this too for the better by constitution, so that, with the former fiction exploded, by a straight way before competent judges or magistrates parents may enter and release by their own hand their sons or daughters or grandsons or granddaughters, and thereafter in succession.

et tunc ex edicto praetoris in huius filii vel filiae, nepotis vel neptis, bonis, qui vel quae a parente manumissus vel manumissa fuerit, eadem iura praestantur parenti quae tribuuntur patrono in bonis liberti: et praeterea si impubes sit filius vel filia vel ceteri, ipse parens ex manumissione tutelam eius nanciscitur. Admonendi autem sumus, liberum esse arbitrium ei qui filium et ex eo nepotem vel neptem in potestate habebit, filium quidem de potestate dimittere, nepotem vero vel neptem retinere: et ex diverso filium quidem in potestate retinere, nepotem vero vel neptem manumittere (eadem et de pronepote vel pronepte dicta esse intellegantur), vel omnes sui iuris efficere. Sed et si pater filium, quem in potestate habet, avo vel proavo naturali secundum nostras constitutiones super his habitas in adoptionem dederit, id est si hoc ipsum, actis intervenientibus, apud competentem iudicem manifestavit, praesente eo qui adoptatur, et non contradicente nec non eo qui adoptat, solvitur quidem ius potestatis patris naturalis, transit autem in huiusmodi parentem adoptivum, in cuius persona adoptionem plenissimam esse antea diximus.

and then, by the praetor’s edict, in the property of such a son or daughter, grandson or granddaughter, who has been manumitted by the parent, the same rights are afforded to the parent as are granted to a patron in the property of a freedman: and, moreover, if the son or daughter, or the others, be under age (impubes), the parent himself acquires from the manumission that one’s guardianship (tutela). We must, however, be reminded that it is free discretion for him who will have in his power a son and from him a grandson or granddaughter, to release the son indeed from power, but to retain the grandson or granddaughter: and conversely to retain the son in power, but to manumit the grandson or granddaughter (let the same be understood to have been said about a great‑grandson or great‑granddaughter), or to make them all sui iuris. But also, if a father gives in adoption a son whom he has in his power to his natural grandfather or great‑grandfather, according to our constitutions enacted on these matters, that is, if he has manifested this very thing, the acts intervening, before the competent judge, with the one who is adopted present and not objecting, nor he who adopts, the right of the natural father’s power is indeed dissolved, but it passes to such an adoptive parent, in whose person we have previously said the adoption is most complete.

Illud autem scire oportet, quod, si nurus tua ex filio tuo conceperit et filium postea emancipaveris vel in adoptionem dederis praegnante nuru tua, nihilo minus quod ex ea nascitur, in potestate tua nascitur: quod si post emancipationem vel adoptionem fuerit conceptum, patris sui emancipati vel avi adoptivi potestati subicitur: et quod neque naturales liberi neque adoptiv ullo paene modo possunt cogere parentum de potestate sua eos dimittere.

But this ought to be known: that, if your daughter‑in‑law has conceived by your son, and afterward you emancipate the son or give him in adoption while your daughter‑in‑law is pregnant, nonetheless that which is born from her is born under your power: but if it has been conceived after the emancipation or adoption, it is subjected to the power of its father who has been emancipated, or of its adoptive grandfather: and that neither natural children nor adopted children can in almost no way compel their parents to release them from their power.

LIB. I, TIT. XIII.

BOOK 1, TITLE 13.

DE TUTELIS.

ON GUARDIANSHIPS.

Transeamus nunc ad aliam divisionem. nam ex his personis quae in potestate non sunt, quaedam vel in tutela sunt vel in curatione, quaedam neutro iure tenentur. videamus igitur de his quae in tutela vel in curatione sunt: ita enim intellegemus ceteras personas, quae neutro iure tenentur.

Let us now pass to another division. For of those persons who are not in paternal power, some are either in tutelage or in curatorship, some are held by neither right. Let us therefore consider those who are in tutelage or in curatorship: thus we shall understand the other persons, who are held by neither right.

ac prius dispiciamus de his quae in tutela sunt. Est autem tutela, ut Servius definivit, ius ac potestas in capite libero ad tuendom eum qui propter aetatem se defendere nequit, iure civili data ac permissa. Tutores autem sunt qui eam vim ac potestatem habent, exque re ipsa nomen ceperunt itaque appellantur tutores quasi tuitores atque defensores, sicut aeditui dicuntur, qui aedes tuentur.

and first let us examine those who are in tutelage. Now tutelage, as Servius defined it, is a right and power over a free person, for the guarding of one who, on account of age, is not able to defend himself, granted and permitted by the civil law. Tutors, moreover, are those who have that force and power, and from the very thing itself they took their name; and thus they are called tutors, as it were tuitores and defenders—just as aeditui are so called, who watch over the aedes (temple).

Permissum est itaque parentibus, liberis impuberibus, quos in potestate habent, testamento tutores dare. et hoc in filio filiaque omnimodo procedit; nepotibus tamen neptibusque ita demum parentes possunt testamento tutores dare, si post mortem eorum in patris sui potestatem non sint recasuri. itaque si filius tuus mortis tuae tempore in potestate tua sit, nepotes ex eo non poterunt testamento tuo tutorem habere, quamvis in potestate tua fuerint; scilicet quia mortuo te in patris sui potestatem recasuri sunt.

It is permitted, therefore, for parents to give guardians by testament to their underage (pre‑pubescent) children whom they have in their power. And this proceeds in every way for a son and a daughter; yet to grandsons and granddaughters parents can give guardians by testament only if after their death they are not going to fall back into their father’s power. Therefore, if your son is in your power at the time of your death, the grandchildren from him will not be able to have a guardian by your testament, although they were in your power; plainly because, you being dead, they are going to fall back into their father’s power.

Cum autem in compluribus aliis causis postumi pro iam natis habentur, et in hac causa placuit non minus postumis quam iam natis testamento tutores dari posse, si modo in ea causa sint, ut, si vivis parentibus nascerentur, sui et in potestate eorum fierent. Sed si emancipato filio tutor a patre testamento datus fuerit, confirmandus est ex sententia praesidis omnimodo, id est sine inquisitione.

However, since in several other causes posthumous children are held as already born, in this cause too it has been decided that guardians can be given by testament to posthumous children no less than to those already born, provided only that they are in such a condition that, if they were born while their parents were alive, they would be their own children and come under their power. But if a guardian has been given by the father by testament to an emancipated son, he must in any case be confirmed by the decision of the governor, that is, without inquiry.

LIB. I, TIT. XIV.

BOOK 1, TITLE 14.

QUI DARI TUTORES TESTAMENTO POSSUNT.

WHO CAN BE APPOINTED GUARDIANS BY TESTAMENT.

Dari autem potest tutor non solum paterfamilias, sed etiam filiusfamilias. Sed et servus proprius testamento cum libertate recte tutor dari potest. sed sciendum est, eum et sine libertate tutorem datum tacite et libertatem directam accepisse videri et per hoc recte tutorem esse.

But a tutor can be appointed not only a paterfamilias, but also a filiusfamilias. But also one’s own slave can rightly be appointed tutor by will together with liberty. But it must be known that, if he has been appointed tutor even without liberty, he is understood to have tacitly received direct liberty as well, and through this to be rightly a tutor.

plane si per errorem quasi liber tutor datus sit, aliud dicendum est. servus autem alienus pure inutiliter datur testamento tutor: sed ita CUM LIBER ERIT utiliter datur. proprius autem servus inutiliter eo modo datur tutor.

plainly, if through error a tutor has been given as if free, a different thing must be said. but a slave belonging to another is purely ineffectually given by testament as tutor: but thus WHEN HE WILL BE FREE he is given usefully. however one’s own slave is ineffectually given as tutor in that manner.

Furiosus vel minor viginti quinque annis tutor testamento datus tutor erit cum compos mentis aut maior viginti quinque annis fuerit factus.

An insane person or a minor under 25 years, appointed tutor by testament, will be tutor when he has become of sound mind or has become 25 years of age or older.

Ad certum tempus vel ex certo tempore vel sub condicione vel ante heredis institutionem posse dari tutorem non dubitatur. Certae autem rei vel causae tutor dari non potest, quia personae, non causae vel rei datur.

That a guardian can be appointed for a fixed time or from a certain time or under a condition or before the institution of the heir is not doubted. But a guardian cannot be appointed for a certain thing or cause, because he is given to a person, not to a cause or a thing.

Si quis "filiabus" suis vel "filiis" tutores dederit, etiam postumae vel postumo videtur dedisse, quia filii vel filiae appellatione et postumus et postuma continentur. quid, si nepotes sint, an appellatione filiorum et ipsis tutores dati sunt? dicendam est, ut ipsis quoque dati videantur, si modo "liberos" dixit. ceterum si "filios," non continebuntur: aliter enim filii, aliter nepotes appellantur.

If someone has appointed guardians for his "daughters" or "sons," he is considered to have appointed them also for a posthumous daughter or posthumous son, because under the appellation "sons" or "daughters" both the posthumous son and the posthumous daughter are contained. What if there are grandchildren—have guardians been given to them also by the appellation "sons"? It must be said that they too are considered to have been given, provided he said "children." But if he said "sons," they will not be included: for "sons" are called in one way, "grandchildren" in another.

plane si "postumis" dederit, tam filii postumi quam ceteri liberi continebuntur.

plainly, if he has given "to postumi," both posthumous sons and the other children will be included.

LIB. I, TIT. XV.
DE LEGITIMA ADGNATORUM TUTELA.

BOOK 1, TITLE 15.
ON THE LEGITIMATE TUTELAGE OF AGNATES.

Quibus autem testamento tutor datus non sit his ex lege duodecim tabularum adgnati sunt tutores, qui vocantur legitimi. Sunt autem adgnati per virilis sexus cognationem coniuncti, quasi a patre cognati, veluti frater eodem patre natus, fratris filius neposve ex eo, item patruus et patrui filius neposve ex eo. at qui per feminini sexus personas cognatione iunguntur non sunt adgnati, sed alias naturali iure cognati. itaque amitae tuae filius non est tibi adgnatus, sed cognatus (et invicem scilicet tu illi eodem iure coniungeris), quia qui nascuntur patris non matris familiam sequuntur.

But for those to whom a guardian has not been given by will, their agnates are guardians by the Law of the Twelve Tables, who are called legitimate. Now, agnates are joined by kinship through the male sex, as if cognate from the father: for example, a brother born of the same father, a brother’s son or grandson from him, likewise a paternal uncle and a paternal uncle’s son or grandson from him. But those who are joined by kinship through persons of the female sex are not agnates, but otherwise cognates by natural law. And so the son of your paternal aunt (amita) is not your agnate, but a cognate (and reciprocally, of course, you are connected to him by the same law), because those who are born follow the family of the father, not of the mother.

Quod autem lex ab intestato vocat ad tutelam adgnatos, non hanc habet significationem, si omnino non fecerit testamentum is qui poterat tutores dare, sed si quantum ad tutelam pertinet, intestatus decesserit. quod tunc quoque accidere intellegitur, cum is qui datus est tutor, vivo testatore decesserit. Sed adgnationis quidem ius omnibus modis capitis deminutione plerumque perimitur: nam adgnatio iuris est nomen.

But that the law, ab intestate, calls the agnates to tutela does not have this signification, namely, if the one who could appoint tutors has in no way made a testament, but if, so far as pertains to the tutela, he has died intestate. Which is understood to happen then also, when the tutor who was given has died while the testator was still alive. But the ius of agnation is for the most part in every way destroyed by capitis deminutio: for agnation is a name of law.

cognationis vero ius non omnibus modis commutatur, quia civilis ratio civilia quidem iura corrumpere potest, naturalia vero non utique.

But the law of cognation is not changed in every way, because the civil order can indeed corrupt civil laws, but natural ones, by no means.

LIB. I, TIT. XVI.

BOOK 1, TITLE 16.

DE CAPITIS MINUTIONE.

ON DIMINUTION OF STATUS.

Est autem capitis deminutio prioris status commutatio, eaque tribus modis accidit: nam aut maxima est capitis deminutio aut minor, quam quidam mediam vocant, aut minima.

Now, capitis deminutio is a change of prior status, and it happens in three ways: for it is either the greatest capitis deminutio or the lesser, which some call the middle, or the least.

Maxima est capitis deminutio, cum aliquis simul et civitatem et libertatem amittit. quod accidit in his qui servi poenae efficiuntur atrocitate sententiae, vel liberti ut ingrati circa patronos condemnati, vel qui ad pretium participandum se venumdari passi sunt.

The greatest is capitis deminutio, when someone at the same time loses both citizenship and liberty. This happens in the case of those who are made penal slaves by the atrocity of the sentence, or freedmen condemned as ungrateful toward their patrons, or those who have allowed themselves to be sold in order to share in the price.

Minor sive media est capitis deminutio, cum civitas quidem amittitur, libertas vero retinetur. quod accidit ei cui aqua et igni interdictum fuerit, vel ei qui in insulam deportatus est.

The lesser or middle capitis deminutio is when citizenship is indeed lost, but liberty is retained. This occurs to one to whom fire and water have been interdicted, or to one who has been deported to an island.

Minima capitis deminutio est, cum et civitas et libertas retinetur, sed status hominis commutatur. quod accidit in his qui, cum sui iuris fuerunt, coeperunt alieno iuri subiecti esse, vel contra. Servus autem manumissus capite non minuitur, quia nullum caput habuit.

The least capitis deminutio is when both citizenship and liberty are retained, but the status of the man is changed. This happens in those who, when they were of their own right, began to be subject to another’s right, or the reverse. But a slave, once manumitted, is not diminished in caput, because he had no caput.

Quibus autem dignitas magis quam status permutatur, capite non minuuntur: et ideo senatu motos capite non minui constat. Quod autem dictum est, manere cognationis ius et post capitis deminutionem, hoc ita est. si minima capitis deminutio interveniat: manet enim cognatio.

However, those for whom dignity rather than status is altered are not diminished in caput: and therefore it is established that those removed from the senate are not diminished in caput. But as to what has been said, that the right of cognation remains even after capitis deminutio, thus it is. if the least capitis deminutio should intervene: for cognation remains.

nam si maxima capitis deminutio incurrat, ius quoque cognationis perit, ut puta servitute alicuius cognati, et ne quidem, si manumissus fuerit, receipit cognationem. sed et si in insulam deportatus quis sit, cognatio solvitur.

for if the greatest capitis deminutio be incurred, the right of cognation also perishes, as for example through the servitude of some kinsman; and not even, if he should be manumitted, does he recover cognation. but also, if someone be deported to an island, cognation is dissolved.

Cum autem ad adgnatos tutela pertineat, non simul ad omnes pertinet, sed ad eos tantum qui proximiore gradu sunt, vel, si eiusdem gradus sint, ad omnes.

But since guardianship pertains to the agnates, it does not pertain to all at once, but only to those who are in the nearer degree, or, if they are of the same degree, to all.

LIB. I, TIT. XVII.

BOOK 1, TITLE 17.

DE LEGITIMA PATRONORUM TUTELA.

ON THE STATUTORY GUARDIANSHIP OF PATRONS.

Ex eadem lege duodecim tabularum libertorum et libertarum tutela ad patronos liberosque eorum pertinet, quae et ipsa legitima tutela vocatur: non quia nominatim ea lege de hac tutela cavetur, sed quia perinde accepta est per interpretationem atque si verbis legis introducta esset. eo enim ipso, quod hereditates libertorum libertarumque, si intestati decessissent, iusserat lex ad patronos liberosve eorum pertinere, crediderunt veteres, voluisse legem etiam tutelas ad eos pertinere, cum et adgnatos, quos ad hereditatem vocat, eosdem et tutores esse iussit et quia plerumque, ubi successionis est emolumentum, ibi et tutelae onus esse debet. ideo autem diximus plerumque, quia, si a femina impubes manumittatur.

From the same Law of the Twelve Tables the guardianship of freedmen and freedwomen pertains to patrons and their children, which likewise is called legitimate guardianship: not because in that law provision is made by name about this guardianship, but because it has been received by interpretation just as if it had been introduced by the words of the law. For by that very fact that the law ordered the inheritances of freedmen and freedwomen, if they died intestate, to pertain to the patrons or their children, the ancients believed that the law also willed the tutelas to pertain to them, since it ordered that the agnates—whom it calls to the inheritance—be the same persons also guardians; and because, for the most part, where there is the emolument of succession, there ought also to be the burden of guardianship. We said “for the most part” for this reason, because, if a minor (impubes) is manumitted by a woman.

ipsa ad hereditatem vocatur, cum alius est tutor.

she herself is called to the inheritance, while another is the tutor.

LIB. I, TIT. XVIII.

BOOK 1, TITLE 18.

DE LEGITIMA PARENTUM TUTELA.

ON THE LEGITIMATE GUARDIANSHIP OF PARENTS.

Exemplo patronorum recepta est et alia tutela, quae et ipsa legitima vocatur. nam si quis filium aut filiam, nepotem aut neptem ex filio, et deinceps, impuberes emancipaverit, legitimus eorum tutor erit.

By the example of patrons another tutelage has been accepted, which is itself called legitimate. For if anyone has emancipated a son or daughter, a grandson or granddaughter through a son, and further descendants, being under age, he will be their legitimate tutor.

LIB. I, TIT. XIX.

BOOK 1, TITLE 19.

DE FIDUCIARIA TUTELA.

ON FIDUCIARY GUARDIANSHIP.

Est et alia tutela, quae fiduciaria appellatur. nam si parens filium vel filiam, nepotem vel neptem, et deinceps, impuberes manumiserit, legitimam nanciscitur eorum tutelam: quo defuncto, si liberi virilis sexus extant, fiduciarii tutores filiorum suorum vel fratris vel sororis et ceterorum efficiuntur. atqui patrono legitimo tutore mortuo, liberi quoque eius legitimi sunt tutores: quoniam filius quidem defuncti, si non esset a vivo patre emancipatus, post obitum eius sui iuris efficeretur nec in fratrum potestatem recideret ideoque nec in tutelam, libertus autem si servus mansisset, utique eodem iure apud liberos domini post mortem eius futurus esset.

There is also another guardianship, which is called fiduciary. For if a parent has manumitted a son or daughter, a grandson or granddaughter, and so on, while under puberty, he acquires their legitimate guardianship: upon his death, if male children exist, they become fiduciary tutors of their own children or of a brother or sister and of the others. But when a patron, a legitimate tutor, has died, his children too are legitimate tutors: since the son of the deceased, if he had not been emancipated by his father while alive, after his death would become sui iuris and would not fall back into the power of his brothers and therefore not into tutelage; but a freedman, if he had remained a slave, would certainly be under the same law with respect to the master’s children after his death.

ita tamen ii ad tutelam vocantur, si perfectae aetatis sint. quod nostra constitutio generaliter in omnibus tutelis et curationibus observari praecepit.

however, they are called to the guardianship only if they are of full age. which our constitution has prescribed to be observed generally in all guardianships and curatorships.

LIB. I, TIT. XX.
DE ATILIANO TUTORE, VEL EO QUI EX LEGE IULIA ET TITIA DABATUR.

BOOK 1, TITLE 20.
ON THE ATILIAN TUTOR, OR THE ONE WHO WAS GIVEN UNDER THE LEX JULIA AND LEX TITIA.

Si cui nullus omnino tutor fuerat, ei dabatur in urbe quidem Roma a praetore urbano et maiore parte tribunorum plebis tutor ex lege Atilia, in provinciis vero a praesidibus provinciarum ex lege Iulia et Titia. Sed et si testamento tutor sub condicione aut die certo datus fuerat, quamdiu condicio aut dies pendebat, ex iisdem legibus tutor dari poterat. item si pure datus fuerat, quamdiu nemo ex testamento heres existebat, tamdiu ex iisdem legibus tutor petendus erat, qui desinebat tutor esse, si condicio existeret aut dies veniret aut heres existeret.

If anyone had absolutely no guardian at all, there was given to him in the city of Rome indeed by the urban praetor and the greater part of the tribunes of the plebs a guardian under the Lex Atilia, but in the provinces by the governors of the provinces under the Lex Julia and Titia. But also, if a guardian had been given by testament under a condition or for a fixed day, so long as the condition or the day was pending, a guardian could be given under the same laws. Likewise, if he had been given unconditionally, then so long as no heir under the testament existed, for that time a guardian had to be sought under those same laws; he ceased to be guardian if the condition came to pass or the day arrived or an heir came into being.

Ab hostibus quoque tutore capto, ex his legibus tutor petebatur, qui desinebat esse tutor, si is qui captus erat in civitatem reversus fuerat: nam reversus recipiebat tutelam iure postliminii. Sed ex his legibus pupillis tutores desierunt dari, posteaquam primo consules pupillis utriusque sexus tutores ex inquisitione dare coeperunt, deinde praetores ex constitutionibus. nam supra scriptis legibus neque de cautione a tutoribus exigenda rem salvam pupillis fore, neque de compellendis tutoribus ad tutelae administrationem quidquam cavetur.

Also, when the guardian had been captured by the enemy, under these laws a guardian was sought, who ceased to be guardian if the one who had been captured had returned into the community: for upon return he recovered the guardianship by the right of postliminium. But under these laws guardians ceased to be appointed for wards after, first, the consuls began to give guardians to wards of both sexes upon inquiry, and then the praetors according to constitutions. For in the above-written laws there is no provision either about requiring surety from guardians that the property would be safe for the wards, or about compelling guardians to the administration of the guardianship.

Sed hoc iure utimur, ut Romae quidem praefectus urbis vel praetor secundum suam iurisdictionem, in provinciis autem praesides ex inquisitione tutores crearent, vel magistratus iussu praesidum, si non sint magnae pupilli facultates. Nos autem per constitutionem nostram et huiusmodi difficultates hominum resecantes nec exspectata iussione praesidum, disposuimus, si facultas pupilli vel adulti usque ad quingentos solidos valeat, defensores civitatum (una cum eiusdem civitatis religiosissimo antistite vel apud alias publicas personas) vel magistratus, vel iuridicum Alexandrinae civitatis tutores vel curatores creare, legitima cautela secundum eiusdem constitutionis normam praestanda, videlicet eoram periculo qui eam accipiant.

But we use this law, that at Rome indeed the prefect of the city or the praetor, according to his jurisdiction, and in the provinces the presidents, upon inquisition, should appoint tutors, or the magistrates by order of the presidents, if the pupil’s resources are not great. But we, by our constitution and cutting away such difficulties of men, and without the order of the presidents being awaited, have decreed that, if the resources of the pupil or of the adult are worth up to 500 solidi, the defenders of the cities (together with the most religious prelate of the same city, or in the presence of other public persons), or the magistrates, or the iuridicus of the city of Alexandria, may appoint tutors or curators, lawful security being furnished according to the norm of the same constitution, namely at the peril of those who accept it.

Impuberes autem in tutela esse naturali iure conveniens est, ut is qui perfectae aetatis non sit alterius tutela regatur. Cum igitur pupillorum pupillarumque tutores negotia gerunt, post pubertatem tutelae iudicio rationem reddunt.

But that the pre-pubescent be in tutela is consonant with natural law, namely that one who is not of perfected age be governed by the tutelage of another. Accordingly, when the tutors of male and female wards transact business, after puberty they render an account by the guardianship (tutela) action.

LIB. I, TIT. XXI.

BOOK 1, TITLE 21.

DE AUCTORITATE TUTORUM.

ON THE AUTHORITY OF GUARDIANS.

Auctoritas autem tutoris in quibusdam causis necessaria pupillis est, in quibusdam non est necessaria. ut ecce si quid dari sibi stipulentur, non est necessaria tutoris auctoritas: quod si aliis pupilli promittant, necessaria est: namque placuit, meliorem quidem suam condicionem licere eis facere etiam sine tutoris auctoritate, deteriorem vero non aliter quam tutore auctore. unde in his causis ex quibus mutuae obligationes nascuntur, in emptionibus venditionibus, locationibus conductionibus, mandatis, depositis, si tutoris auctoritas non interveniat, ipsi quidem qui cum his contrahunt obligantur, at invicem pupilli non obligantur.

But the authority of the tutor is in some cases necessary for wards, in others it is not necessary. For instance, if they stipulate that something be given to themselves, the authority of the tutor is not necessary; but if the wards promise something to others, it is necessary: for it has been decided that they are permitted to make their own condition better even without the authority of the tutor, but to make it worse not otherwise than with the tutor as authorizer. And so, in those cases from which mutual obligations arise, in purchases and sales, leasings and hirings, mandates, deposits, if the authority of the tutor does not intervene, those who contract with them indeed are bound, but in turn the wards are not bound.

Neque tamen hereditatem adire neque bonorum possessionem petere neque hereditatem ex fideicommisso suscipere aliter possunt nisi tutoris auctoritate, quamvis lucrosa sit neque ullum damnum habeat. Tutor autem statim in ipso negotio praesens debet auctor fieri, si hoc pupillo prodesse existimaverit. post tempus vero aut per epistulam interposita auctoritas nihil agit.

Nor, however, can they either enter upon an inheritance, or seek bonorum possessio, or receive an inheritance from a fideicommissum, otherwise than with the tutor’s authority, even though it is lucrative and entails no loss. Moreover, the tutor must at once, being present in the very transaction, become an auctor, if he deems this to benefit the pupil. But authority interposed after the time, or by letter, effects nothing.

Si inter tutorem pupillumve iudicium agendum sit, quia ipse tutor in rem suam auctor esse non potest, non praetorius tutor, ut olim, constituitur, sed curator in locum eius datur, quo interveniente iudicium peragitur et eo peracto curator esse desinit.

If a lawsuit is to be conducted between a tutor and a pupil, since the tutor himself cannot be an authorizer in his own matter, not a praetorian tutor, as once, is appointed, but a curator is given in his place; with his intervention the action is carried through, and when it has been completed he ceases to be curator.

LIB. I, TIT. XXII.

BOOK 1, TITLE 22.

QUIBUS MODIS TUTELA FINITUR.

BY WHAT MEANS GUARDIANSHIP IS ENDED.

Pupilli pupillaeque cum puberes esse coeperint, tutela liberantur. pubertatem autem veteres quidem non solum ex annis, sed etiam ex habitu corporis in masculis aestimari volebant. nostra autem maiestas dignum esse castitate temporum nostrorum bene putavit, quod in feminis et antiquis impudicum esse visum est, id est inspectionem habitudinis corporis, hoc etiam in masculos extendere: et ideo sancta constitutione promulgata pubertatem in masculis post quartum decimum annum completum illico initium accipere disposuimus, antiquitatis normam in femininis personis bene positam suo ordine relinquentes, ut post duodecimum annum completum viripotentes esse credantur.

Wards, male and female, when they have begun to be of puberty, are freed from guardianship. But the ancients wished puberty in males to be assessed not only from years, but also from the habitus of the body. Our Majesty, however, has well thought it worthy, in the chastity of our times, to extend also to males that which, in the case of females, even to the ancients seemed indecent—namely, the inspection of bodily habitus: and therefore, a sacred constitution having been promulgated, we have determined that puberty in males takes its beginning immediately after the completion of the 14th year, leaving in proper order the norm of antiquity, well placed with respect to female persons, that after the completion of the 12th year they are believed to be capable of a husband.

Item finitur tutela, si adrogati sint adhuc impuberes vel deportati: item si in servitutem pupillus redigatur, ut ingratus a patrono, vel ab hostibus fuerit captus. Sed et si usque ad certam condicionem datus sit testamento, aeque evenit, ut desinat esse tutor existente condicione. Simili modo finitur tutela morte vel tutorum vel pupillorum.

Likewise guardianship is ended, if the wards, still prepubescent, have been adrogated or deported: likewise if the ward is reduced into servitude, whether as an ingrate by his patron, or has been captured by enemies. But also if he has been appointed by testament only up to a certain condition, it likewise happens that he ceases to be tutor when the condition exists. In a similar way guardianship is ended by the death either of the tutors or of the wards.

Sed et capitis deminutione tutoris, per quam libertas vel civitas eius amittitur, omnis tutela perit. minima autem capitis deminutione tutoris, veluti si se in adoptionem dederit, legitima tantum tutela perit, ceterae non pereunt. sed pupilli et pupillae capitis deminutio, licet minima sit, omnes tutelas tollit.

But also, by a capitis deminutio of the tutor, whereby his liberty or his citizenship is lost, all tutelage perishes. But with a minimal capitis deminutio of the tutor, as for instance if he has given himself into adoption, only the legitimate tutelage perishes; the others do not perish. But a capitis deminutio of a male or female ward, although it be minimal, removes all tutelages.

Praeterea qui ad certum tempus testamento dantur tutores, finito eo, deponunt tutelam. Desinunt autem esse tutores, qui vel removentur a tutela ob id quod suspecti visi sunt, vel ex iusta causa sese excusant et onus administrandae tutelae deponunt secundum ea quae inferius proponemus.

Furthermore, those tutors who are given by testament for a fixed time, when that is finished, lay down the tutelage. Moreover, they cease to be tutors who either are removed from tutelage on the ground that they have seemed suspect, or, for a just cause, excuse themselves and lay down the burden of administering the tutelage, according to those things which we shall set forth below.

LIB. I, TIT. XXIII.

BOOK 1, TITLE 23.

DE CURATORIBUS.

ON CURATORS.

Masculi puberes et feminae viripotentes usque ad vicesimum quintum annum completum curatores accipiunt; qui licet puberes sint, adhuc tamen huius aetatis sunt, ut negotia sua tueri non possint. Dantur autem curatores ab iisdem magistratibus a quibus et tutores. sed curator testamento non datur, sed datus confirmatur decreto praetoris vel praesidis.

Males who are pubescent and women capable of a husband (of marriageable age) receive curators up to the completed twenty-fifth year; who, although they are pubescent, are nevertheless still of such an age that they cannot manage their own affairs. Curators are granted by the same magistrates by whom tutors are. But a curator is not given by testament; rather, if one has been given, he is confirmed by decree of the praetor or the provincial governor.

Item inviti adulescentes curatores non accipiunt praeterquam in litem: curator enim et ad certam causam dari potest. Furiosi quoque et prodigi, licet maiores viginti quinque annis sint, tamen in curatione sunt adgnatorum ex lege duodecim tabularum. sed solent Romae praefectus urbis vel praetor et in provinciis praesides ex inquisitione eis dare curatores.

Likewise, adolescents do not receive curators against their will, except in a lawsuit: for a curator can also be given for a specific cause. The insane and the prodigal, although they are over twenty-five years, nevertheless are in the curatorship of their agnates by the Law of the Twelve Tables. But at Rome the prefect of the city or the praetor, and in the provinces the governors, are accustomed, upon inquiry, to assign curators to them.

Sed et mente captis et surdis et mutis et qui morbo perpetuo laborant, quia rebus suis superesse non possunt, curatores dandi sunt. Interdum autem et pupilli curatores accipiunt, ut puta si legitimus tutor non sit idoneus, quia habenti tutorem tutor dari non potest. item si testamento datus tutor vel a praetore vel a praeside idoneus non sit ad administrationem nec tamen frandulenter negotia administrat, solet ei curator adiungi.

But also for the mentally captured and for the deaf and the mute, and for those who labor under a perpetual morbus, because they are not able to be over their own affairs, curators are to be appointed. Sometimes, moreover, even pupils receive curators, for instance if the legitimate tutor is not idoneous, since to one having a tutor a tutor cannot be given. Likewise, if a tutor given by testament or by the praetor or by the governor is not idoneous for administration, and yet does not administer the affairs fraudulently, a curator is wont to be adjoined to him.

item in locum tutorum qui non in perpetuum sed ad tempus a tutela excusantur solent curatores dari.

likewise, in the place of guardians who are excused from tutelage not in perpetuity but for a time, curators are wont to be appointed.

Quodsi tutor adversa valetudine vel alia necessitate impeditur, quo minus negotia pupilli administrare possit, et pupillus vel absit vel infans sit, quem velit actorem periculo ipsius praetor, vel qui provinciae praeerit, decreto constituet.

But if the guardian is impeded by adverse health or by some other necessity, so that he cannot administer the ward’s affairs, and the ward is either absent or an infant, the praetor, or the one presiding over the province, will by decree appoint as an agent whom he wishes, at his own peril.

LIB. I, TIT. XXIV.

BOOK 1, TITLE 24.

DE SATISDATIONE TUTORUM VEL CURATORUM.

ON THE GIVING OF SECURITY BY TUTORS OR CURATORS.

Ne tamen pupillorum pupillaramve et eorum qui quaeve in curatione sunt negotia a tutoribus curatoribusve consumantur vel deminuantur, curat praetor, ut et tutores et curatores eo nomine satisdent. sed hoc non est perpetuum: nam tutores testamento dati satisdare non coguntur, quia fides eorum et diligentia ab ipso testatore probata est: item ex inquisitione tutores vel curatores dati satisdatione non onerantur, quia idonei electi sunt. Sed et si ex testamento vel inquisitione duo pluresve dati fuerint, potest unus offerre satis de indemnitate pupilli vel adulescentis et contutori vel concuratori praeferri, ut solus administret, vel ut contutor satis offerens praeponatur ei et ipse solus administret.

Lest, however, the affairs of male or female wards and of those who are under curatorship be consumed or diminished by tutors or curators, the praetor sees to it that both tutors and curators give security under that head. But this is not perpetual: for tutors given by testament are not compelled to give security, because their good faith and diligence have been approved by the testator himself: likewise tutors or curators appointed after an inquisition are not burdened with security, because they were chosen as suitable. But also, if from a testament or an inquisition two or more have been appointed, one may offer security for the indemnity of the ward or adolescent and be preferred to the co-tutor or co-curator, so that he alone administers; or else the co-tutor offering security may be set over him, and he himself alone administers.

itaque per se non potest petere satis a contutore vel concuratore suo, sed offerre debet, ut electionem det contutori suo, utrum velit satis accipere an satis dare. quodsi nemo eorum satis offerat si quidem adscriptum fuerit a testatore, quis gerat, ille gerere debet: quodsi non fuerit adscriptum, quem maior pars elegerit, ipse gerere debet, ut edicto praetoris cavetur. sin autem ipsi tutores dissenserint circa eligendum eum vel eos qui gerere debent, praetor partes suas interponere debet.

and so, by himself he cannot demand security from his co-tutor or co-curator, but he ought to offer it, so as to give his co-tutor the choice whether he wishes to receive security or to give security. but if none of them offers security, if indeed it shall have been written in by the testator who is to administer, that one ought to administer: but if it shall not have been written in, he whom the greater part shall have chosen ought to administer, as is provided by the praetor’s edict. but if the tutors themselves shall disagree about choosing him or those who ought to administer, the praetor ought to interpose his authority.

idem et in pluribus ex inquisitione datis probandum est, id est ut maior pars eligere possit, per quem administratio fieret.

The same is to be approved also in the case where several have been given by inquisition, that is, that the greater part may be able to choose through whom the administration would be carried out.

Sciendum autem est, non solum tutores vel curatores pupillis et adultis ceterisque personis ex administratione teneri, sed etiam in eos qui satisdationem accipiunt subsidiariam actionem esse, quae ultimum eis praesidium possit afferre. subsidiaria autem actio datur in eos qui vel omnino a tutoribus vel curatoribus satisdari non curaverint aut non idonee passi essent caveri. quae quidem tam ex prudentium responsis quam ex constitutionibus imperialibus et in heredes eorum extenditur.

It must be known, moreover, that not only guardians or curators are held liable to wards and adults and the other persons from their administration, but that there is also a subsidiary action against those who accept suretyship, which can bring them a last-resort safeguard. subsidiary action, moreover, is given against those who either have not at all taken care that surety be furnished by the guardians or curators, or have allowed it to be taken not adequately. which indeed, both from the responses of the jurists and from imperial constitutions, is extended also to their heirs.

Quibus constitutionibus et illud exprimitur, ut, nisi caveant tutores vel curatores, pignoribus captis coerceantur. Neque autem praefectus urbis neque praetor neque praeses provinciae neque quis alius cui tutores dandi ius est, hac actione tenebitur: sed hi tantummodo qui satisdationem exigere solent.

And in these constitutions it is also expressed that, unless tutors or curators provide surety, they shall be coerced by pledges seized. Nor, moreover, shall the prefect of the city, nor the praetor, nor the governor of a province, nor any other who has the right of appointing tutors, be held liable by this action: but only those who are wont to exact surety.

LIB. I, TIT. XXV.

BOOK 1, TITLE 25.

DE EXCUSATIONIBUS TUTORUM VEL CURATORUM.

ON THE EXCUSES OF TUTORS OR CURATORS.

Excusantur autem tutores vel curatores variis ex causis: plerumque autem propter liberos, sive in potestate sint sive emancipati. si enim tres liberos quis superstites Romae habeat vel in Italia quattuor vel in provinciis quinque, a tutela vel cura possunt excusari exemplo ceterorum munerum: nam et tutelam et curam placuit publicum munus esse. sed adoptivi liberi non prosunt, in adoptionem autem dati naturali patri prosunt.

Tutors or curators are excused, moreover, for various causes: most often on account of children, whether they are under his power or emancipated. For if someone has three surviving children at Rome, or in Italy four, or in the provinces five, they can be excused from tutelage or curatorship by the example of the other public burdens: for it has been decided that both tutelage and curatorship are a public duty. But adoptive children do not avail; whereas those given into adoption do avail their natural father.

item nepotes ex filio prosunt, ut in locum patris succedant: ex filia non prosunt. filii autem superstites tantum ad tutelae vel curae muneris excusationem prosunt: defuncti non prosunt. sed si in bello amissi sunt, quaesitum est, an prosint.

Likewise grandsons through a son avail, so that they succeed into the place of their father: through a daughter they do not avail. But only surviving sons avail for the excusation from the office of tutelage or curatorship: the deceased do not avail. But if they have been lost in war, the question has been raised whether they avail.

et constat, eos solos prodesse qui in acie amittuntur: hi enim, quia pro re publica ceciderunt, in perpetuum per gloriam vivere intelleguntur. Item divus Marcus in semestribus rescripsit, eum qui res fisci administrat a tutela vel cura, quamdiu administrat, excusari posse. Item qui rei publicae causa absunt, a tutela et cura excusantur.

and it is established that only those count who are lost in the battle line: for these, because they fell for the republic, are understood to live forever through glory. Likewise the deified Marcus, in the semiannual rescripts, wrote in reply that he who administers the affairs of the fisc can be excused from guardianship or curatorship, so long as he is administering. Likewise those who are absent for the sake of the republic are excused from guardianship and curatorship.

sed et si fuerunt tutores vel curatores, deinde rei publicae causa abesse coeperunt, a tutela et cura excusantur, quatenus rei publicae causa absunt, et interea curator loco eorum datur. qui si reversi fuerint, recipiunt onus tutelae nec anni habent vacationem, ut Papinianus responsorum libro quinto scripsit: nam hoc spatium habent ad novas tutelas vocati. Et qui potestatem aliquam habent excusare se possunt, ut divus Marcus rescripsit, sed coeptam tutelam deserere non possunt.

But also, if they have been tutors or curators and then began to be absent for the sake of the commonwealth, they are excused from tutelage and curatorship, insofar as they are absent for the sake of the commonwealth, and meanwhile a curator is given in their place. If they have returned, they take back the burden of the tutelage and do not have a year’s exemption, as Papinian wrote in the fifth book of his Responses: for those called to new tutelages have this interval. And those who have some authority can excuse themselves, as the deified Marcus rescripted, but they cannot desert a tutelage once begun.

Item propter litem, quam cum pupillo vel adulto tutor vel curator habet, excusare se nemo potest: nisi forte de omnibus bonis vel hereditate controversia sit. Item tria onera tutelae non affectatae vel curae praestant vacationem, quamdiu administrantur: ut tamen plurium pupillorum tutela vel cura eorundem bonorum, veluti fratrum, pro una computetur. Sed et propter paupertatem excusationem tribui tam divi fratres quam per se divus Marcus rescripsit, si quis imparem se oneri iniuncto possit docere.

Likewise, on account of a lawsuit which a tutor or curator has with a pupil or an adult, no one can excuse himself: unless perhaps there is a dispute about all the goods or the inheritance. Likewise, three burdens of a guardianship not sought-after or of a curatorship grant exemption, so long as they are being administered: provided, however, that the guardianship or curatorship of several pupils over the same goods, as for example brothers, is counted as one. But also on account of poverty an excuse is to be granted, as both the deified brothers and, on his own, the deified Marcus rescribed, if anyone can show himself unequal to the burden enjoined.

Item propter adversam valetudinem, propter quam nec suis quidem negotiis interesse potest, excusatio locum habet. Similiter eum qui litteras nesciret excusandum esse divus Pius rescripsit: quamvis et imperiti litterarum possunt ad administrationem negotiorum sufficere. Item si propter inimicitiam aliquem testamento tutorem pater dederit, hoc ipsum praestat ei excusationem: sicut per contrarium non excusantur qui se tutelam patri pupillorum administraturos promiserunt.

Likewise, on account of adverse health, on account of which he cannot attend even to his own affairs, exemption has a place. Similarly, the deified Pius rescripted that one who did not know letters ought to be excused: although even those unskilled in letters can suffice for the administration of affairs. Likewise, if on account of enmity a father has given someone by testament as a tutor, this very fact affords him an excuse: just as conversely those are not excused who have promised the father of the wards that they would administer the tutelage.

Non esse autem admittendam excusationem eius qui hoc solo utitur, quod ignotus patri pupillorum sit, divi fratres rescripserunt. Inimicitiae, quas quis cum patre pupillorum vel adultorum exercuit, si capitales fuerunt nec reconciliatio intervenit, a tutela solent excusare. Item si quis status controversiam a pupillorum patre passus est, excusatur a tutela.

But that the excusation of one who uses this alone—that he is unknown to the father of the wards—is not to be admitted, the deified brothers wrote in a rescript. Enmities which someone carried on with the father of the wards or of the adults, if they were capital and no reconciliation intervened, are wont to excuse from tutelage. Likewise, if anyone has suffered a controversy of status at the hands of the father of the wards, he is excused from tutelage.

Item maior septuaginta annis a tutela vel cura se potest excusare. minores autem viginti et quinque annis olim quidem excusabantur: a nostra autem constitutione prohibentur ad tutelam vel curam aspirare, adeo ut nec excusatione opus fiat. qua constitutione cavetur, ut nec pupillus ad legitimam tutelam vocetur nec adultus: cum erat incivile, eos qui alieno auxilio in rebus suis administrandis egere noscuntur et sub aliis reguntur, aliorum tutelam vel curam subire.

Likewise one over seventy years can excuse himself from tutelage or curatorship. minors, however, under twenty-five years were indeed formerly excused: but by our constitution they are prohibited from aspiring to tutelage or curatorship, to such a degree that there is no need for an excuse. by which constitution it is provided that neither a ward is called to legitimate tutelage nor an adult: since it was uncivil that those who are known to need another’s aid in administering their own affairs and are ruled under others should undergo the tutelage or curatorship of others.

Idem et in milite observandum est, ut nec volens ad tutelae munus admittatur. Item Romae grammatici, rhetores et medici et qui in patria sua id exercent et intra numerum sunt, a tutela vel cura habent vacationem.

The same is to be observed also in the soldier, that, even if willing, he is not admitted to the office of tutelage. Likewise at Rome the grammarians, rhetoricians, and physicians, and those who in their own country practice that and are within the number, have exemption from tutelage or curatorship.

Qui autem se vult excusare, si plures habeat excusationes et de quibusdam non probaverit, aliis uti intra tempora non prohibetur. qui excusare se volunt, non appellant: sed intra dies quinquaginta continuos, ex quo cognoverunt, excusare se debent (cuiuscumque generis sunt, id est qualitercumque dati fuerint tutores), si intra centesimum lapidem sunt ab eo loco ubi tutores dati sunt: si vero ultra centesimum habitant, dinumeratione facta viginti millium diurnorum et amplius triginta dierum. quod tamen, ut Scaevola dicebat, sic debet computari, ne minus sint quam quinquaginta dies.

He who, however, wishes to excuse himself, if he has several excuses and has not proved some of them, is not prohibited from using others within the time limits. Those who wish to excuse themselves do not appeal: but within fifty continuous days from the time they learned, they ought to excuse themselves (of whatever kind they are, that is, in whatever way the tutors were appointed), if they are within the hundredth milestone from the place where the tutors were appointed: but if they live beyond the hundredth, with a reckoning made at twenty miles per day and, in addition, thirty days. Which, however, as Scaevola used to say, ought to be computed thus, so that they are not fewer than fifty days.

Datus autem tutor ad universum patrimonium datus esse creditur. Qui tutelam alicuius gessit, invitus curator eiusdem fieri non compellitur, in tantum ut, licet pater qui testamento tutorem dederit adiecit, se eundem curatorem dare, tamen invitum eum curam suscipere non cogendum, divi Severus et Antoninus rescripserunt. Iidem rescripserunt, maritum uxori suae curatorem datum excusare se posse, licet se immisceat.

However, a tutor who is appointed is considered to have been appointed to the whole patrimony. One who has administered the tutela of someone is not compelled, against his will, to become curator of the same person—indeed, to such an extent that, although a father who by testament appointed a tutor added that he appoints the same man as curator, nevertheless the deified Severus and Antoninus issued a rescript that he is not to be forced to assume the curatorship unwilling. The same emperors rescripted that a husband appointed curator to his own wife can excuse himself, even though he involves himself.

Si quis autem falsis allegationibus excusationem tutelae meruit, non est liberatus onere tutelae.

But if anyone, by false allegations, has obtained an excuse from tutelage, he is not freed from the burden of tutelage.

LIB. I, TIT. XXVI.

BOOK 1, TITLE 26.

DE SUSPECTIS TUTORIBUS ET CURATORIBUS.

ON SUSPECT TUTORS AND CURATORS.

Sciendum est suspecti crimen e lege duodecim tabularum descendere. Datum est autem ius removendi suspectos tutores Romae praetori et in provinciis praesidibus earum et legato proconsulis. Ostendimus, qui possunt de suspecto cognoscere: nunc videamus, qui suspecti fieri possunt.

It must be known that the accusation of being suspect descends from the Law of the Twelve Tables. Moreover, the right of removing suspected guardians has been given at Rome to the praetor, and in the provinces to their governors and to the legate of the proconsul. We have shown who can take cognizance concerning a suspect: now let us see who can be made suspect.

et quidem omnes tutores possunt, sive testamentarii sint sive alterius generis tutores. quare et si legitimus sit tutor, accusari poterit. quid si patronus? adhuc idem erit dicendum: dummodo meminerimus, famae patroni parcendum, licet ut suspectus remotus fuerit.

and indeed all guardians can be suspected, whether they are testamentary or guardians of another kind. wherefore even if the guardian is a statutory guardian, he can be accused. what if he is a patron? still the same must be said: provided that we remember that the patron’s good name is to be spared, although, as suspect, he has been removed.

Consequens est ut videamus, qui possint suspectos postulare. et sciendum est, quasi publicam esse hanc actionem, hoc est omnibus patere. quin immo et mulieres admittuntur ex rescripto divorum Severi et Antonini, sed hae solae, quae pietatis necessitudine ductae ad hoc procedunt, ut puta mater: nutrix quoque et avia possunt, potest et soror: sed et si qua mulier fuerit, cuius praetor propensam in pietatem mentem intellexerit, non sexus verecundiam egredientem sed pietate productam, non continere iniuriam pupillorum, admittit eam ad accusationem.

It follows that we should see who can bring a motion to have them declared suspect. And it must be known that this action is quasi-public, that is, open to all. Indeed, rather, even women are admitted by the rescript of the deified Severus and Antoninus, but only those who, led by the bond of piety, proceed to this, for instance the mother: the nurse too and the grandmother can, and the sister can as well: but also, if there is any woman whose mind the praetor has understood as inclined to piety, not transgressing the modesty of her sex but prompted by piety, not able to endure the wrong to the wards, he admits her to the accusation.

Impuberes non possunt tutores suos suspectos postulare: puberes autem curatores suos ex consilio necessariorum suspectos possunt arguere: et ita divi Severus et Antoninus rescripserunt. Suspectus est autem et qui non ex fide tutelam gerit, licet solvendo est, ut Iulianus quoque scripsit. sed et antequam incipiat gerere tutelam tutor, posse eum quasi suspectum removeri, idem Iulianus scripsit, et secundum eum constitutum est.

Those under puberty cannot petition that their tutors be declared suspect: but those past puberty can, on the counsel of their necessary kin, arraign their curators as suspect: and thus the deified Severus and Antoninus have issued a rescript. Moreover, he is suspect who does not administer the tutelage in good faith, although he is solvent, as Julian also wrote. But even before a tutor begins to administer the tutelage, that he can be removed as if suspect, the same Julian wrote, and in accordance with him it has been established.

Suspectus autem remotus, si quidem ob dolum, famosus est: si ob culpam, non aeque. Si quis autem suspectus postulatur, quoad cognitio finiatur interdicitur ei administratio, ut Papiniano visum est. Sed si suspecti cognitio suscepta fuerit posteaque tutor vel curator decesserit, extinguitur cognitio suspecti.

The suspect, once removed, if indeed on account of fraud, is infamous: if on account of fault, not equally. But if anyone is proceeded against as suspect, until the inquiry is finished, administration is interdicted to him, as it seemed to Papinian. But if the inquiry into suspicion has been undertaken and afterwards the tutor or curator has died, the inquiry into suspicion is extinguished.

Si quis tutor copiam sui non faciat ut alimenta pupillo decernantur, cavetur epistula divorum Severi et Antonini. ut in possessionem bonorum eius pupillus mittatur: et quae mora deteriora futura sunt, dato curatore distrahi iubentur. ergo ut suspectus romoveri poterit qui non praestat alimenta.

If any tutor does not make himself available so that alimenta (maintenance) may be decreed for the pupil, it is provided by the epistle of the deified Severus and Antoninus that the pupil be put into possession of his goods: and the things which would become worse by delay, with a curator appointed, are ordered to be sold off. Therefore, as suspect he can be removed who does not furnish alimenta.

Sed si quis praesens negat propter inopiam alimenta posse decerni, si hoc per mendacium dicat, remittendum eum esse ad praefectum urbis puniendum placuit, sicut ille remittitur qui data pecunia ministerium tutelae redemit. Libertus quoque, si fraudulenter gessisse tutelam filiorum vel nepotum patroni probetur, ad praefectum urbis remittitur puniendus. Novissime sciendum est, eos qui frandulenter tutelam vel curam administrant, etiamsi satis offerent, removendos a tutela, quia satisdatio propositum tutoris malevolum non mutat, sed diutius grassandi in re familiari facultatem praestat.

But if someone who is present denies that maintenance can be decreed on account of poverty, and if he says this by a lie, it has been decided that he must be remitted to the prefect of the city to be punished, just as he is remitted who, money having been paid, has bought off the ministry of guardianship. A freedman also, if it is proved that he has conducted the tutelage of his patron’s sons or grandsons fraudulently, is remitted to the prefect of the city to be punished. Lastly, it must be known that those who administer guardianship or curatorship fraudulently, even if they offer surety, are to be removed from the guardianship, because the giving of security does not change the guardian’s malevolent purpose, but provides the opportunity to continue preying longer upon the family estate.

Suspectum enim eum putamus qui moribus talis est ut suspectus sit: enimvero tutor vel curator, quamvis pauper est, fidelis tamen et diligens, removendus non est quasi suspectus.

For we consider him suspect who is such in character as to be suspect: indeed, however, a tutor or curator, although he is poor, yet faithful and diligent, is not to be removed as if suspect.