Augustine: DE CIVITATE DEI

[I] Diximus iam superioribus libris ad humanum genus non solum naturae similitudine sociandum, uerum etiam quadam cognationis necessitudine in unitatem concordem pacis uinculo conligandum ex homine uno Deum uoluisse homines instituere, neque hoc genus fuisse in singulis quibusque moriturum, nisi duo primi, quorum creatus est unus ex nullo, altera ex illo, id inoboedientia meruissent, a quibus aQmissum est tam grande peccatum, ut in deterius eo natura mutaretur humana, etiam in posteros obligatione peccati et mortis necessitate transmissa. Mortis autem regnum in homines usque adeo dominatum est, ut omnes in secundam quoque mortem, cuius nullus est finis, poena debita praecipites ageret, nisi inde quosdam indebita Dei gratia liberaret. Ac per hoc factum est, ut, cum tot tantaeque gentes per tenarum orbem diuersis ritibus moribusque uiuentes multiplici linguarum armorum uestium sint uarietate distinctae, non tamen amplius quam duo quaedam genera humanae societatis existerent, quas ciuitates duas secundum scripturas nostras merito appellare possemus.

[1] We have said already in the preceding books that God willed to institute men from one man, so that the human race might be associated not only by a similitude of nature, but also by a certain necessitude of cognation into a concordant unity, bound by the bond of peace; and that this race would not have been going to die in each and every individual, unless the first two—of whom the one was created from no one, the other from him—had deserved that by disobedience; by whom so great a sin was admitted, that by it human nature was changed for the worse, with even to posterity the obligation of sin and the necessity of death transmitted. Moreover, the reign of death so dominated over men that it would drive all headlong into the second death also, of which there is no end, the due penalty, unless the unmerited grace of God were to free some from it. And through this it came about that, although so many and so great nations throughout the orb of lands, living by diverse rites and customs, are marked off by a manifold variety of tongues, arms, and garments, nevertheless there exist no more than two certain kinds of human society, which we could with good reason, according to our Scriptures, call two cities.

Vna quippe est hominum secundum carnem, altera secundum spiritum uiuere in sui cuiusqm generis pace uolentium et, cum id quod expetunt adsequuntur, in sui cuiusque generis pace uiuentium.

One, indeed, is of human beings according to the flesh, the other according to the spirit—of those wishing to live in the peace of each one’s own kind and, when they attain what they seek, living in the peace of each one’s own kind.

[II] Prius ergo uidendum est, quid sit secundum carnem, quid secundum spiritum uiuere. Quisquis enim hoc quod diximus prima fronte inspicit, uel non recolens uel minus aduertens quem ad modum scripturae sanctae loquantur, potest putare philosophos quidem Epicureos secundum carnem uiuere, qma summum bonum hominis in corporis uoluptate posuerunt, et si qui alii sunt, qui quoque modo corporis honum summum bonum esse hominis opinati sunt, et eorum omne uulgus, qui non aliquo dogmate uel eo modo philosophantur, sed procliues ad libidinem nisi ex uoluptatibus, quas corporeis sensibus capiunt, gaudere nesciunt; Stoicos autem, qui summum bonum hominis in animo ponunt, secundum spiritum uiuere, quia et hominis animus quid est nisi spiritus? Sed sicut loquitur scriptura diuina, secundum carnem uiuere utrique monstrantur.

[2] First, then, we must see what it is to live according to the flesh, and what to live according to the spirit. For whoever at first glance inspects what we have said, either not recalling or paying too little heed to the manner in which the holy scriptures speak, can suppose that the Epicurean philosophers live according to the flesh, because they placed the highest good (summum bonum) of the human being in bodily pleasure; and likewise any others who in whatever way have thought the good of the body to be the highest good of the human being; and the whole common crowd of those who do not philosophize by any dogma or in that mode, but, inclined to libido, know not how to rejoice except from the pleasures which they seize by bodily senses. But that the Stoics, who place the highest good of the human being in the mind (animus), live according to the spirit—since the human animus, what is it if not spirit? Yet, as divine scripture speaks, both are shown to live according to the flesh.

Carnem quippe appellat non solum corpus terreni atque mortalis animantis (ueluti cum dicit: Non omnis caro eadem caro. alia quidem hominis, alia autem caro pecoris, alia uolucrum, alia piscium), sed et aliis multis modis significatione huius nominis utitur, inter quos uarios locutionis modos saepe etiam ipsum hominem, id est naturam hominis, carnem nuncupat, modo locutionis a parte totum, quale est: Ex operibus legis non iustificabitur omnis caro. Quid enim uoluit intellegi nisi omnis homo?

He calls “flesh” not only the body of the terrene and mortal animate being (as when he says: “Not every flesh is the same flesh. one indeed of man, but another flesh of cattle, another of birds, another of fishes”), but he also employs the signification of this name in many other ways, among which various modes of locution he often even denominates the man himself, that is, the nature of man, “flesh,” a mode of locution from a part, the whole, such as: “By works of the law every flesh will not be justified.” For what did he wish to be understood except “every human being”?

Quod apertius paulo post ait: In lege nemo iustificatur, et ad Galatas: Scientes autem quia non iustificatur homo ex operibus legis. Secundum hoc intellegitur: Et Vcrbum caro factum est, id est homo; quod non recte accipientes quidam putauerunt Christo humanam animam defuisse. Sicut enim a toto pars accipitur, ubi Mariae Magdalenae uerba in euangelio leguntur dicentis: Tulerunt Dominum meum et nescio ubi posuerunt eum, cum de sola Christi carne loqueretur, quam sepultam de monumento putabat ablatam: ita et a parte totum carne nominata intellegitur homo, sicuti ea sunt quae supra commemorauimus.

Which he says more plainly a little later: “In the law no one is justified,” and to the Galatians: “But knowing that a man is not justified by works of the law.” According to this is understood: “And the Word was made flesh,” that is, man; which, not taking it rightly, some supposed that a human soul was lacking to Christ. For as from the whole a part is taken, where the words of Mary Magdalene are read in the Gospel, saying: “They have taken away my Lord, and I do not know where they have put him,” when she was speaking of the flesh of Christ alone, which she thought, buried, had been taken away from the tomb: so also from the part the whole—man—is understood when flesh is named, just as are those things which we have recalled above.

Cum igitur multis modis, quos perscrutari et colligere longum est, diuina scriptura nuncupet carnem: quid sit secundum carnem uiuere (quod profecto malum est, cum ipsa carnis natura non sit malum) ut indagare possimus, inspiciamus diligenter illum locum epistulae Pauli apostoli quam scripsit ad Galatas, ubi ait: Manifesta autem sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicationes, inmunditiae, luxuria, idolorum seruitus, ueneficia, inimicitiae, contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, dissensiones, haereses, inuidiae, ebrietates, comisationes et his similia; quae praedico uobis, sicut praedixi, quoniam qui talia agunt regnum Dei non possidebunt. Iste totus epistulae apostolicae locus, quantum ad rem praesentem satis esse uidebitur, consideratus poterit hanc dissoluere quaestione ", quid sit secundum carnem uiuere. In operibus namque camis, quae manifesta esse dixit eaque commemorata damnauit, non illa tantum inuenimus, quae ad uoluptatem peffinent carnis, sicuti sunt fornicationes, inmunditiae, luxuria, ebrietates, comisationes; uerum etiam illa, quibus animi uitia demonstrantur a uoluptate carnis aliena.

Since therefore in many ways—which it would be long to search out and collect—divine Scripture entitles “flesh,” in order that we may be able to track down what it is to live according to the flesh (which indeed is an evil, since the very nature of the flesh is not an evil), let us carefully inspect that passage of the epistle of the Apostle Paul which he wrote to the Galatians, where he says: “Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornications, uncleannesses, luxury, idolatry, sorceries, enmities, contentions, emulations, animosities, dissensions, heresies, envies, drunkennesses, revels, and things like these; which I foretell to you, just as I foretold, that those who do such things will not possess the kingdom of God.” This whole passage of the apostolic epistle, considered so far as it will seem sufficient for the present matter, will be able to resolve this question, “what it is to live according to the flesh.” For in the works of the flesh, which he said are manifest and which, when he had recounted them, he condemned, we find not only those which pertain to the pleasure of the flesh, such as fornications, uncleannesses, luxury, drunkennesses, revels; but also those by which the vices of the mind are shown, alien from the pleasure of the flesh.

Quis enim seruitutem, quae idolis exhibetur, ueneficia, inimicitias, contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, dissensiones, haereses, inuidias non potius intellegat animi uitia esse quam carnis? Quando quidem fieri potest, ut propter idololatriam uel haeresis alicuius errorem a uoluptatibus corporis temperetur; et tamen etiam tunc homo, quamuis carnis libidines continere atque cohibere uideatur, secundum carnem uiuere hac apostolica auctoritate conuincitur, et in eo, quod abstinet a uoluptatibus carnis, damnabilia opera carnis agere demonstratur. Quis inimicitias non in animo habeat?

For who would not understand that the servitude rendered to idols, the sorceries, enmities, contentions, emulations, animosities, dissensions, heresies, envies are rather vices of the soul than of the flesh? Since indeed it can happen that, on account of idolatry or the error of some heresy, one is restrained from the pleasures of the body; and yet even then a man, although he may seem to contain and curb the lusts of the flesh, is convicted by this apostolic authority of living according to the flesh, and, in that he abstains from the pleasures of the flesh, is shown to be doing the damnable works of the flesh. Who does not hold enmities in the mind?

aut quis ita loquatur, ut inimico suo uel quem putat inimicum dicat: "Malam carnem," ac non potius: "Malum animum habes aduersus me"? Postremo sicut carnalitates, ut ita dicam, si quis audisset, non dubitaret carni tribuere, ita nemo dubitat animositates ad animum pertinere. Cur ergo haec omnia et his similia doctor gentium in fide et ueritate opera carnis appeuat, nisi quia eo locutionis modo, quo totum significatur a parte, ipsum hominem uult nomine carnis intellegi?

or who speaks thus, that he would say to his enemy, or to one whom he thinks an enemy, "Bad flesh," and not rather: "You have a bad mind against me"? Finally, just as "carnalities," so to speak, if someone had heard it, he would not hesitate to attribute to the flesh, so no one doubts that animosities pertain to the mind. Why therefore does the teacher of the nations in faith and truth call all these and things similar the works of the flesh, unless because by that mode of locution by which the whole is signified from a part, he wishes the very man to be understood by the name "flesh"?

[III] Quod si quisquam dicit carnem causam esse in malis moribus quorumcumque uitiorum, eo quod anima carne affecta sic uiuit, profecto non uniuersam hominis naturam diligenter aduertit. Nam "corpus quidem corruptibile adgrauat animam." Vnde etiam idem apostolus agens de hoc corruptibili corpore, de quo paulo ante dixerat: Etsi exterior homo noster corrumpitur: Scimus, inquit, quia, si terrena nostra domus habitationis resoluatur, aedo ficationem habemus ex Deo, domum non manu factam aeternam in caelis. Etenim in hoc ingemescimus, habitaculum nostrum quod de caelo est superindui cupientes; si tamen et induti, non nudi inueniamur.

[3] But if anyone says that the flesh is the cause, in evil morals, of whatever vices, on the ground that the soul, affected by the flesh, thus lives, assuredly he does not attentively observe the whole nature of man. For "the corruptible body weighs down the soul." Whence also the same apostle, dealing with this corruptible body, about which a little before he had said: "Even if our exterior man is being corrupted": "We know," he says, "that, if our earthly house of habitation be dissolved, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For indeed in this we groan, desiring to be super-clothed with our habitation which is from heaven; if indeed, even being clothed, we be not found naked."

Etenom quo sumus in hac habitatione, ingemescimus grauati, in quo nolumus exspoliari, sed superuestiri, ut absorbeatur mortale a uita. Et adgrauamur ergo corruptibili corpore, et ipsius adgrauationis causam non naturam substantiamque corporis, sed eius corruptionem scientes nolumus corpore spoliari, sed eius inmortalitate uestiri. Et tunc enim erit, sed quia corruptibile non erit, non grauabit.

Indeed, while we are in this habitation, we groan, weighed down; in which we do not want to be despoiled, but supervested, so that the mortal may be absorbed by life. And we are weighed down, therefore, by the corruptible body; and knowing that the cause of that very aggravation is not the nature and substance of the body, but its corruption, we do not wish to be stripped of the body, but to be clothed with its immortality. And then indeed it will be, but because it will not be corruptible, it will not weigh down.

Adgrauat ergo nunc anomam corpus corruptibile, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum muUa cogitantem. Verum tamen quia omnia mala animae ex corpore putant accidisse, in errore sunt.

Therefore now the corruptible body aggravates the soul, and the earthly inhabitation depresses the sense thinking many things. Yet nevertheless, because they think that all the evils of the soul have happened from the body, they are in error.

Quamuis enim Vergilius Platonicam uideatur luculentis uersibus explicare sententiam dicens:

Although indeed Vergil seems to be explaining the Platonic opinion in luculent verses, saying:

Igneus est ollis uigor et caelestis origo

Fiery is their vigor and celestial their origin

Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant

in their seeds, insofar as noxious bodies do not retard

Terrenique hebetant artus moribundaque membra, omnesque illas notissimas quattuor animi perturbationes, cupiditatem timorem, laetitiam tristitiam, quasi origines omnium peccatorum atque uitiorum uolens intellegi ex corpore accidere subiungat et dicat:

The terrene limbs and moribund members do dull, and let him subjoin and say that all those most well-known four perturbations of the mind, cupidity, fear, joy, sadness, as though wishing them to be understood to occur from the body as the origins of all sins and vices:

Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque,

Hence they fear and desire, they grieve and rejoice,

nec auras

nor the breezes

Suspiciunt, clausae tenebris et carcere caeco: tamen aliter se habet fides nostra. Nam corruptio corporis, quae adgrauat animam, non peccati primi est causa, sed poena; nec caro corruptibilis animam peccatricem, sed anima peccatrix fecit esse corruptibilem carnem. Ex qua corruptione carnis licet existant quaedam incitamenta uitiorum et ipsa desideria uitiosa, non tamen omnia uitae iniquae uitia tribuenda sunt carni, ne ab his omnibus purgemus diabolum, qui non habet carnem.

They look up, shut in by darkness and a blind prison: nevertheless our faith stands otherwise. For the corruption of the body, which aggravates the soul, is not the cause of the first sin, but the penalty; nor did corruptible flesh make the soul sinful, but the sinful soul made the flesh to be corruptible. From which corruption of the flesh, although certain incitements of vices and the desires themselves that are vicious come to be, nevertheless not all the vices of an iniquitous life are to be attributed to the flesh, lest we purge from all these the devil, who does not have flesh.

Etsi enim diabolus fornicator uel ebriosus uel si quid huius modi mali est, quod ad carnis pertinet uoluptates, non potest dici, cum sit etiam talium peccatorum suasor et instigator occultus: est tamen maxime superbus atque inuidus. Quae illum uitiositas sic obtinuit, ut propter hanc esset in carceribus caliginosi huius aeris aeterno supplicio destinatus. Haec autem uitia, quae tenent in diabolo principatum, carni tribuit apostolus, quam certum est diabolum non habere.

For although the devil cannot be called a fornicator or an inebriate, or anything of this sort of evil that pertains to the pleasures of the flesh—since he is also the hidden persuader and instigator of such sins—yet he is above all proud and envious. Such viciousness has so possessed him that on account of it he was destined to the prisons of this caliginous air for eternal punishment. But these vices, which hold the principate in the devil, the Apostle attributes to the flesh, which it is certain the devil does not have.

Dicit enim inimicitias, contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, inuidias opera esse carnis; quorum omnium malorum caput atque origo superbia est, quae sine carne regnat in diabolo. Quis autem illo est inimicior sanctis? Quis aduersus eos contentiosior, animosior et magis aemulus atque inuidus inuenitur?

For he says enmities, contentions, emulations, animosities, envies are works of the flesh; of all which evils the head and origin is pride, which, without flesh, reigns in the devil. Who is more inimical than he to the saints? Who is found against them more contentious, more animose, and more emulous and envious?

At haec omnia cum habeat sine carne, quo modo sunt ista opera carnis, nisi quia opera sunt hominis, quem, sicut dixi, nomine carnis appellat? Non enim habendo carnem, qUam non habet diabolus, sed uiuendo secundum se ipsum, hoc est secundum hominem, factus est homo similis diabolo; quia et ille secundum se ipsum uiuere uoluit, quando in ueritate non stetit, ut non de Dei, sed de suo mendacium loqueretur, qui non solum mendax, uerum etiam mendacii pater est. Primus est quippe mentitus, et a quo peccatum, ab illo coepit esse mendacium.

But since he has all these without flesh, how are those the works of the flesh, unless because they are the works of man, whom, as I said, he calls by the name “flesh”? For not by having flesh—which the devil does not have—but by living according to himself, that is, according to man, man has been made like the devil; because he too wished to live according to himself, when he did not stand in the truth, so that he spoke a mendacity not of God but of his own—he who is not only mendacious, but even the father of the lie. For he was the first to lie, and from the one from whom sin took its start, from that one the lie began to be.

[IV] Cum ergo uiuit homo secundum hominem, non secundum Deum, similis est diabolo; quia nec angelo secundum angelum, sed secundum Deum uiuendum fuit, ut staret in ueritate et ueritatem de iuius, non de suo mendacium loqueretur. Nam et de homine alio loco idem apostolus ait: Si autem ueritas Dei in meo mendacio abundauit. Nostrum ffixit mendacium, ueritatem Dei.

[4] Therefore, when a man lives according to man, not according to God, he is similar to the devil; for neither was it for the angel to live according to an angel, but according to God, so that he might stand in the truth and speak truth from His, not from his own—to speak a lie. For also about man in another place the same apostle says: But if the truth of God has abounded through my lie. Our lie has made the truth of God abound.

Cum itaque uiuit homo secundum ueritatem, non uiuit secundum se ipsum, sed secundum Deum. Deus est enim qui dixit: Ego sum ueritas. Cum uero uiuit secundum se ipsum, hoc est secundum hominem, non secmdum Deum, profecto secundum mendacium uiuit; non quia homo ipse mendacium est, cum sit eius auctor et creator Deus, qui non est utique auctor creatorque mendacii, sed quia homo ita factus est rectus, ut non secundum se ipsum, sed secundum eum, a quo factus est, uiueret, id est illius potius quam suam faceret uoluntatem: non ita uiuere, quem ad modum est factus ut uiueret, hoc est mendacium.

Accordingly, when man lives according to truth, he does not live according to himself, but according to God. For God is he who said: I am the Truth. But when he lives according to himself, that is, according to man, not according to God, assuredly he lives according to mendacity; not because man himself is a mendacity, since his author and creator is God, who certainly is not the author and creator of mendacity, but because man was made upright in such a way that he should live not according to himself, but according to him by whom he was made, that is, that he should do his will rather than his own: not to live in the way he was made to live—this is mendacity.

Beatus quippe uult esse etiam non sic uiuendo ut possit esse. Quid est ista uoluntate mendacius? Vnde non frustra dici potest omne peccatum esse mendacium.

For indeed he wishes to be blessed even while not living in such a way as he can be. What is more mendacious than this will? Whence it can not without cause be said that every sin is a lie.

Non enim fit peccatum nisi ea uoluntate, qua uolumus ut bene sit nobis uel nolumus ut male sit nobis. Ergo mendacium est, quod, cum fiat ut bene sit nobis, hinc potius male est nobis, uel cum fiat, ut melius sit nobis, hinc potius peius est nobis. Vnde hoc, nisi quia de Deo potest bene esse homini, quem delinquendo deserit, non de se ipso, secundum quem uiuendo delinquit?

For sin does not come to be except by that will by which we will that it be well with us or we are unwilling that it be ill with us. Therefore a lie is that which, when it is done in order that it may be well with us, from this rather it is ill with us; or when it is done that it may be better for us, from this rather it is worse for us. Whence is this, unless because it can be well for a man from God—whom, by sinning, he forsakes—not from himself, according to whom, by living, he sins?

Quod itaque diximus, hinc extitisse duas ciuitates diuersas inter se atque contrarias, quod alii secundum carnem, alii secundum spiritum uiuerent: potest etiam isto modo dici quod alii secundum hominem, alii secundum Deum uiuant. Apertissime quippe <Paulus> ad Corinthios dicit: Cum enim <sint> inter uos aemulatio et contentio, nonne carnales estis et secundum hominem ambulatis? Quod ergo est ambulare secundum hominem, hoc est esse carnalem, quod a carne, id est a parte hominis, intellegitur homo.

Quod therefore we have said, that from here there have arisen two cities diverse from one another and contrary, because some lived according to the flesh, others according to the spirit: it can also in this way be said that some live according to man, others according to God. For most openly says to the Corinthians: For when there among you emulation and contention, are you not carnal and walking according to man? Therefore what it is to walk according to man, this is to be carnal, since by the flesh, that is, by a part of man, man is understood.

Eosdem ipsos quippe dixit superius animales, quos postea carnales, ita loquens: Quis enim scit, inquit, hominum, quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est? Sic et quae Dei sunt, nemo scit nisi spiritus Dei. Nos autem, inquit, non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui ex Deo est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis; quae et loquimur, non in sapientiae humanae doctis uerbis, sed doctis spiritu, spiritalibus spiritalia comparantes.

Indeed he said above that these very same people were animal, whom afterward he calls carnal, speaking thus: For who of men knows the things of a man, except the spirit of the man which is in him? So also the things of God no one knows except the Spirit of God. But we, he says, have not received the spirit of this world, but the Spirit which is from God, that we may know the things that have been given to us by God; which also we speak, not in words taught by human wisdom, but taught by the Spirit, comparing spiritual things with spiritual things.

Animalis autem homo non percipit quae sunt spiritus Dei; stultitia est enim illi. Talibus igitur, id est animalibus, paulo post dicit: Et ego, fratres, non potui loqui uobis quasi spiritalibus, sed quasi carnalibus; et illud et hoc eodem loquendi modo, id est a parte totum. Et ab anima namque et a carne, quae sunt partes hominis, potest totum significari, quod est homo; atque ita non est aliud animalis homo, aliud carnalis, sed idem ipsum est utrumque, id est secundum hominem uiuens homo; sicut non aliud quam homines significantur, siue ubi legitur: Ex operibus legis non iustificabitur omnis caro, siue quod scriptum est: Septuaginta quinque animae descenderunt cum Iacob in Aegyptum.

But the soulish man does not receive the things of the Spirit of God; for it is foolishness to him. To such, therefore, that is, to the soulish, a little later he says: And I, brothers, was not able to speak to you as to spiritual, but as to carnal; and that and this are in the same manner of speaking, that is, the whole from a part. For from “soul” and from “flesh,” which are parts of the human, the whole can be signified, which is the human; and thus the soulish man and the carnal man are not one thing and another, but both are the same, that is, the man living according to the human; just as nothing other than “humans” are signified whether where it is read: By works of the Law no flesh shall be justified, or where it is written: Seventy-five souls went down with Jacob into Egypt.

Et ibi enim per omnem carnem omnis homo, et ibi per septuaginta quinque animas septuaginta quinque homines intelleguntur. Et quod dictum est: Non in sapientiae humanae doctis uerbis, potuit dici: "Non in sapientiae carnalis .; sicut quod dictum est: Secundum hominem ambulatis, potuit dici: "Secundum carnem". Magis autem hoc apparuit in his quae subiunxit: Cum enim quis dicat: Ego quidem sum Pauli, alius autem: Ego Apollo, nonne homines estis? Quod dicebat: Animales estis, et: Carnales estis, expressius dixit: Homines estis, quod est: "Secundum hominem uiuitis, non secundum Deum, secundum quem si uiueretis, dii essetis."

For there too by all flesh every man, and there by 75 souls 75 men are understood. And what was said: Not in words taught by human wisdom, could have been said: "Not in carnal wisdom .; just as what was said: "You walk according to man," could have been said: "According to the flesh". But this appeared more in the things he subjoined: For when someone says: I indeed am of Paul, but another: I of Apollos, are you not men? What he was saying: You are animal, and: You are carnal, he said more expressly: You are men, which is: "You live according to man, not according to God, according to whom, if you were living, you would be gods."

[V] Non igitur opus est in peccatis uitiisque nostris ad Creatoris iniuriam camis accusare naturam, quae in genere atque ordine suo bona est; sed deserto Creatore bono uiuere secundum creatum bonum non est bonum, siue quisque secundum carnem siue secundum animam siue secundum totum hominem, qui ex anima constat et carne (unde et nomine solius animae et nomine solius carnis significari potest) eligat uiuere. Nam qui uelut summum bonum laudat animae naturam et tamquam malum naturam carnis accusat, profecto et animam carnaliter adpetit et carnem camaliter fugit, quoniam id uanitate sentit humana, non ueritate diuina. Non quidem Platonici sicut Manichaei desipiunt, ut tamquam mali naturam terrena corpora detestentur, cum omnia elementa, quibus iste mundus uisibilis contrectabilisque compactus est, qualitatesque eorum Deo artifici tribuant; uerum tamen ex terrenis artubus moribundisque membris sic affici animas opinantur, ut hinc eis sint morbi cupiditatum et timorum et laetitiae siue tristitiae; quibus quattuor uel perturbationibus, ut Cicero appellat, uel passionibus, ut plerique uerbum e uerbo Graeco exprimunt, omnis humanorum morum uitiositas continetur. Quod si ita est, quid est quod Aeneas apud Vergilium, cum audisset a patre apud inferos animas rursus ad corpora redituras, hanc opinionem miratur exclamans:

[5] Therefore it is not necessary, in our sins and vices, to accuse the nature of the flesh to the injury of the Creator, since in its genus and order it is good; but, the good Creator having been deserted, to live according to a created good is not good, whether one chooses to live according to the flesh or according to the soul or according to the whole man, who consists of soul and flesh (whence he can be signified by the name of soul alone and by the name of flesh alone). For he who praises the nature of the soul as though it were the highest good and accuses the nature of the flesh as though it were an evil, assuredly both seeks the soul carnally and shuns the flesh carnally, since he feels this by human vanity, not by divine truth. The Platonists indeed are not foolish in the same way as the Manichaeans, so as to detest earthly bodies as if they were of an evil nature, since they ascribe all the elements, by which this visible and tangible world is compacted, and their qualities, to God the Artificer; yet they think that souls are affected in such a way by earthly joints and dying members that from here come to them the diseases of desires and of fears and of joy or sadness; by which four—either “perturbations,” as Cicero calls them, or “passions,” as most express the word from the Greek—the whole viciousness of human morals is contained. But if this is so, what is the meaning that Aeneas in Vergil, when he had heard from his father in the underworld that souls would return again to bodies, marvels at this opinion, exclaiming:

O pater, anne aliquas ad caelum hinc ire putandum est
Sublimes animas iterumque ad tarda reuerti

O father, is it to be thought that some souls go from here to heaven
Uplifted, and again revert to sluggish bodies?

Corpora? Quae lucis miseris tam dira cupido? Numquidnam haec tam dira cupido ex terrenis artubus moribundisque membris adhuc inest animarum illi praedicatissimae puritati?

Bodies? What so dire a desire of light for the wretched? Is it by any chance that this so dire desire, from earthly limbs and moribund members, still inheres in that most-proclaimed purity of souls?

Nonne ab huius modi eorporeis, ut dicit, pestibus omnibus eas asserit esse purgatas, cum rursus incipiunt in corpora uelle reuerti? Vnde colligitur, etiamsi ita se haberet, quod est omnino uanissimum, uicissim alternans incessabiliter euntium atque redeuntium animarum mundatio et inquinatio, non potuisse ueraciter dici omnes culpabiles atque uitiosos motus animarum eis ex terrenis corpolibus inolescere, si quidem secundum ipsos illa, ut locutor nobilis ait, dira cupido usque adeo non est ex corpore, ut ab omni corporea peste purgatam et extra omne corpus animam constitutam ipsa esse compellat in corpore. Vnde etiam illis fatentibus non ex carne tantum afficitur anima, ut cupiat metuat, laetetur aegrescat, uerum etiam ex se ipsa his potest motibus agitari.

Does he not assert that from all such, as he says, corporeal pests they are purgated, when they again begin to will to return into bodies? Whence it is gathered—even if the case were so, which is altogether most vain—that the purification and the pollution of souls, of those going and returning in turn, alternating incessantly, could not veraciously be said to have all the culpable and vicious motions of souls grow onto them from earthly bodies, if indeed according to them that, as a noble speaker says, dire desire is so far from being from the body that it itself compels the soul, purged from every corporeal pest and set outside every body, to be in a body. Whence also, by their own confessing, the soul is affected not from flesh only—so that it may desire, fear, rejoice, fall ill—but indeed also from itself it can be agitated by these motions.

[VI] Interest autem qualis sit uoluntas hominis; quia si pe: uersa est, peruersos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, uerum etiam laudabiles erunt. Voluntas est quippe in omnibus; immo omnes nihil aliud quam uoluntates sunt. Nam quid est cupiditas et laetitia nisi uoluntas in eorum consensione quae uolumus?

[6] But it matters what the will of a human is; because, if it is perverse, it will have these motions perverse; but if it is right, they will be not only inculpable, but even laudable. Will, indeed, is in all things; nay rather, all are nothing other than wills. For what are desire and joy except will in the consent of those things which we will?

Et quid est metus atque tristitia nisi uoluntas.in dissensione ab his quae nolumus? Sed cum consentimus appetendo ea quae uolumus, cupiditas; cum autem consentimus fruendo his quae uolumus, laetitia uocatur. Itemque cum dissentimus ab eo quod accidere nolumus, talis uoluntas metus est; cum autem dissentimus ab eo quod nolentibus acciffit, talis uoluntas tristitia est.

And what are fear and sadness except the will in dissension from those things which we do not will? But when we consent by appetition to the things that we will, it is called desire; when, however, we consent by enjoying (in fruition of) the things that we will, it is called joy. Likewise, when we dissent from that which we are unwilling to happen, such a will is fear; but when we dissent from that which befalls the unwilling, such a will is sadness.

Et omnino pro uarietate rerum, quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur uel offenditur uoluntas hominis, ita in hos uel illos affectus mutatur et uertitur. Quaproper homo, qui secundum Deum, non secundum hominem uiuit, oportet ut sit amator boni; unde fit consequens ut malum oderit. Et quoniam nemo natura, sed quisquis malus est, uitio malus est: perfectum odium debet malis, qui secundum Deum uiuit, ut nec propter uitium oderit hominem nec amet uitium propter hominem, sed oderit uitium, amet hominem.

And altogether, in proportion to the variety of things which are desired and fled, just as the will of man is enticed or is offended, so it is changed and turned into these affections or those. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, not according to man, it is fitting that he be a lover of the good; whence it follows that he should hate evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice, he who lives according to God owes perfect hatred to evils, so that he neither hate the man on account of the vice nor love the vice on account of the man, but hate the vice, love the man.

Sanato enim uitio totum quod amare, nihil autem quod debeat; odisse remanebit.

For when the vice has been healed, there will remain everything to love, but nothing that he ought to hate.

[VII] Nam cuius propositum est amare Deum et non secundum hominem, sed secundum Deum amare proximum, sicut etiam se ipsum: procul dubio propter hunc amorem dicitur uoluntatis bonae, quae usitatius in scripturis sanctis caritas appellatur; sed amor quoque secundum easdem sacras litteras dicitur. Nam et amatorem boni apostolus dicit esse debere, quem regendo populo praecipit eligendum, et ipse Dominus Petrum apostolum interrogans cum dixisset: Diligis me plus his? ille respondit: Domine, tu scis quia amo te; et iterum Dominus quaesiuit, non utrum amaret, sed utrum diligeret eum Petrus; at ille respondit iterum: Domine, tu scis quia amo te; tertia uero interrogatione et ipse lesUs non ait:— "Diligis me?" sed: Amas me? ubi secutus ait euangelista: Contristatus est Petrus, quia dixit ei tertio: Amas me? cum Dominus non tertio, sed semel dixerit: Amas me? bis autem dixerit: Diligis me? Vnde intellegimus, quod etiam cum dicebat Dominus: Diligis me? nihil aliud dicebat quam: Amas me? Petrus autem non mutauit huius unius rei uerbum, sed etiam tertio: Domine, inquit, tu omnia scis, tu scis quia amo te.

[7] For the one whose purpose is to love God, and to love his neighbor not according to man but according to God, as also himself: without doubt on account of this love he is said to be of good will, which more commonly in the holy scriptures is called charity; yet love also is said according to those same sacred letters. For the apostle also says that the one who is to be chosen for governing the people must be a lover of the good, and the Lord himself, questioning the apostle Peter, when he had said: Do you love me more than these? he replied: Lord, you know that I love you; and again the Lord asked, not whether he loved him, but whether he cherished him; but he replied again: Lord, you know that I love you; however, at the third question Jesus himself did not say:— "Do you cherish me?" but: Do you love me? whereupon the evangelist added: Peter was grieved, because he said to him a third time: Do you love me? although the Lord had not a third time, but once, said: Do you love me? and twice had said: Do you cherish me? Whence we understand that even when the Lord said: Do you cherish me? he was saying nothing other than: Do you love me? Peter, however, did not change the word of this one thing, but even the third time said: Lord, he said, you know all things, you know that I love you.

Hoc propterea commemorandum putaui, quia nonnulli arbitrantur aliud esse dilectionem siue caritatem, aliud amorem. Dicunt enim dilectionem accipiendam esse in bono, amorem in malo. Sic autem nec ipsos auctores saecularium litterarum locutos esse certissimum est.

For this reason I have thought this ought to be noted, because some suppose that dilection or charity is one thing, love another. For they say that dilection is to be taken in a good sense, love in a bad. But it is most certain that not even the authors of secular literature have spoken thus.

Sed uiderint philosophi utrum uel qua ratione ista discernant; amorem tamen eos in bonis rebus et erga ipsum Deum magni pendere, libri eorum satis loquuntur. Sed scripturas religionis nostrae, quarum auctoritatem ceteris omnibus litteris anteponimus, non aliud dicere amorem, aliud dilectionem uel caritatem, insinuandum fuit. Nam et amorem in bono dici iam ostendimus.

But let the philosophers see to it whether, or by what rationale, they distinguish these things; nevertheless, that they hold love in high esteem in good matters and toward God himself, their books speak quite enough. But it needed to be insinuated that the Scriptures of our religion—whose authority we set before all other writings—do not call love one thing, and dilection or charity another. For we have already shown that love is said in a good sense.

Sed ne quis existimet amorem quidem et in malo et in bono, dilectionem autem non nisi in bono esse dicendam, illud adtendat quod in psalmo scriptum est: Qui autem diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam, et illud apostoli lohannis: Si quis dilexerit mundum, non est dilectio Patris in illo. Ecce uno loco dilectio et in bono et in malo. Amorem autem in malo (quia in bono iam ostendimus) ne quisquam flagitet, legat quod scriptum est: Erunt enim homines se ipsos amantes, amatores pecuniae.

But lest anyone suppose that love indeed is both in evil and in good, but that dilection is to be said only in good, let him attend to what is written in the Psalm: “But he who loves iniquity hates his own soul,” and to that of the apostle John: “If anyone shall have loved the world, the dilection of the Father is not in him.” Behold in one place dilection both in good and in evil. But as for love in evil (since in good we have already shown it), if anyone should demand it, let him read what is written: “For men will be self-lovers, lovers of money.”

Recta itaque uoluntas est bonus amor et uoluntas peruersa malus amor. Amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est, id autem habens eoque fruens laetitia; fugiens quod ei aduersatur, timor est, idque si acciderit sentiens tristitia est. Proinde mala sunt ista, si malus amor est; bona, si bonus.

Thus the right will is good love, and the perverse will bad love. Love, then, gaping after having what is loved, is cupidity; but having it and enjoying it is joy; fleeing what is adverse to it is fear, and, if this should occur, experiencing it is sadness. Accordingly these are evil if the love is bad; good, if good.

Quod dicimus, de scripturis probemus. Concupiscit apostolus dissolui et esse cum Christo; et: Concupiuit anima mea desiderare iudicia tua, uel si accommodatius dicitur: Desiderauit anoma mea cuncupiscere iudicia tua; et: Concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum. Hoc tamen loquendi obtinuit consuetudo, ut, si cupiditas uel concupiscentia dicatur nec addatur cuius rei sit, non nisi in malo possit intellegi.

What we say, let us prove from the Scriptures. The apostle concupisces to be dissolved and to be with Christ; and: My soul has concupisced to desire your judgments, or, if it is said more fittingly: My soul has desired to concupisce your judgments; and: The concupiscence of wisdom leads to the kingdom. Yet the custom of speaking has obtained this: that, if cupidity or concupiscence be said and it be not added of what thing it is, it can be understood only in an evil sense.

Laetitia in bono est: Laetamini in Domino et exultate iusti; et: Dedisti laetitiam in cor meum; et: Adimplebis me laetitia cum uultu tuo. Timor in bono est apud apostolum, ubi ait: Cum timore et tremore uestram ipsorum salutem operamini; et: Noli altum sapere, sed time; et: Timeo autem, ne, sicut serpens Euam seduxit astutia sua, sic et uestrae mentes corrumpantur a castitate, quae est in Christo. De tristitia uero, quam Cicero magis aegritudinem appellat, dolorem autem Vergilius, ubi ait: "Dolent gaudentque", (sed ideo malui tristitiam dicere, quia aegritudo uel dolor usitatius in corporibus dicitur), scrupulosior quaestio est, utrum inueniri possit in bono.

Joy is in the good: Be glad in the Lord and exult, you righteous; and: You have given joy into my heart; and: You will fill me with joy with your countenance. Fear is in the good with the apostle, where he says: With fear and trembling work out your own salvation; and: Do not be high-minded, but fear; and: I fear, however, lest, just as the serpent deceived Eve by his craftiness, so too your minds be corrupted from the chastity which is in Christ. But concerning sadness, which Cicero more calls “sickness” (aegritudo), and Vergil “pain” (where he says: “Dolent gaudentque”), (but for that reason I preferred to say “sadness,” because “sickness” or “pain” is more commonly said of bodies), the question is more scrupulous, whether it can be found in the good.

[VIII] Quas enim Graeci appellant *eu)paqei/as, Latine autem Cicero constantias nominauit, Stoici tres esse uoluerunt pro tribus perturbationibus in animo sapientis, pro cupiditate uoluntatem, pro laetitia gaudium, pro metu cautionem; pro aegritudine uero uel dolore, quam nos uitandae ambiguitatis gratia tristitiam maluimus dicere, negauerunt esse posse aliquid in animo sapientis. Voluntas quippe, inquiunt, appetit bonum, quod facit sapiens; gaudium de bono adepto est, quod ubique adipiscitur sapiens; cautio deuitat malum, quod debet sapiens deuitare; tristitia porro quia de malo est, quod iam accidit, nullum autem malum existimant posse accidere sapienti, nihil in eius animo pro illa esse posse dixerunt. Sic ergo illi loquuntur, ut uelle gaudere cauere negent nisi sapientem; stultum autem non nisi cupere laetari, metuere contristari; et illas tres esse constantias, has autem quattuor perturbationes secundum Ciceronem, secundum autem plurimos passiones.

[VIII] For what the Greeks call *eu)paqei/as*, Cicero in Latin named constancies, and the Stoics wished there to be three, corresponding to the three perturbations in the mind of the wise man: in place of desire, will; in place of gladness, joy; in place of fear, caution; but for sickness-of-soul or pain, which, for the sake of avoiding ambiguity, we have preferred to call sadness, they denied that there could be anything in the mind of the wise man. For will, they say, is an appetite for the good, which the wise man does; joy is from a good obtained, which the wise man attains everywhere; caution avoids evil, which the wise man ought to avoid; but sadness, since it is of an evil that has already happened, and since they think that no evil can befall a wise man, they said nothing could be in his mind corresponding to it. Thus, then, they speak so as to deny that anyone but the wise man wills, rejoices, is cautious; but that the fool only desires, is glad, fears, is saddened; and that those three are constancies, whereas these four are perturbations according to Cicero, but according to very many, passions.

Graece autem illae tres, sicut dixi, appellantur *eu)pa/qeiai; istae autem quattuor *pa/qh. Haec locutio utrum scripturis sanctis congruat, cum quaererem quantum potui diligenter, illud inueni quod ait propheta: Non est gaudere impiis, dicit Dominus; tamquam impii laetari possint potius quam gaudere de malis, quia gaudium proprie bonorum et piorum est. Item illud in euangelio: Quaecumque uultis ut faciant uobis homines, haec et uos facite illis, ita dictum uidetur, tamquam nemo possit aliquid male uel turpiter uelle, sed cupere. Denique propter consuetudinem locutionis nonnulli interpretes addiderunt "bona" et ita interpretati sunt: "Quaecumque uultis ut faciant uobis homines bona." Cauendum enim putauerunt, ne quisquam inhonesta uelit sibi fieri ab hominibus, ut de turpioribus taceam, certe luxuriosa conuiuia, in quibus se, si et ipse illis faciat, hoc praecept existimet impleturum.

But in Greek those three, as I said, are called *eu)pa/qeiai; those four, however, *pa/qh. As I inquired as diligently as I could whether this way of speaking accords with the holy Scriptures, I found that saying of the prophet: “It is not for the impious to rejoice, says the Lord;” as though the impious can be glad rather than rejoice over evils, because joy is properly the portion of the good and the pious. Likewise that word in the Gospel: “Whatever you will that men should do to you, do you also to them,” seems to be said as though no one can will anything evil or base, but only desire it. Accordingly, on account of customary usage of speech some translators have added “good things” and have so rendered it: “Whatever good things you will that men should do to you.” For they thought it necessary to beware lest anyone should will that dishonorable things be done to him by men— not to speak of the more shameful ones— at least sumptuous banquets, in which he might suppose he fulfills this precept if he also does the same for them.

Sed in Graeco euangelio, unde in Latinum translatum est, non legitur "bona", sed: Quaecumque uultis ut faciant uobis homines, haec et uos facite illis; credo propterea, quia in eo quod dixit uultis, iam uoluit intellegi "bona". Non enim ait "cupitis".

But in the Greek Gospel, whence it has been translated into Latin, “good things” is not read, but: Whatever you wish that men should do to you, these do you also to them; I believe for this reason, because in that he said “you wish” (vultis), he already wanted “good things” to be understood. For he does not say “you desire” (cupitis).

Non tamen semper his proprietatibus locutio nostra frenanda est, sed interdum his utendum est; et cum legimus eos, quorum auctoritati resultare fas non est, ibi sunt intellegendae, ubi rectus sensus alium exitum non potest inuenire; sicut ista sunt, quae exempli gratia partim ex propheta, partim ex euangelio commemorauimus. Quis enim nescit impios exultare laetitia? et tamen: Non est gaudere impiis, dicit Dominus.

Yet our locution is not always to be reined in by these proprieties, but sometimes these are to be used; and when we read in those to whose authority it is not lawful to gainsay, they are to be understood there where the right sense cannot find another exit; just as are those which, for example, we have commemorated partly from the prophet, partly from the gospel. For who does not know that the impious exult with joy? and yet: It is not for the impious to rejoice, says the Lord.

Vnde, nisi quia gaudere aliud est, quando proprie signateque hoc uerbum ponitur? Item quis negauerit non recte praecipi hominibus, ut quaecumque ab aliis sibi fieri cupiunt, haec eis et ipsi faciant; ne se inuicem turpitudine inlicitae uoluptatis oblectent? et tamen saluberrimum uerissimumque praeceptum est: Quaecumque uultis ut faciant uobis homines, eadem et uos facite illis.

Whence, unless because “to rejoice” is something other, when this word is used properly and distinctly? Likewise, who would deny that it would not be rightly enjoined upon human beings, that whatever they desire to be done to themselves by others, these things they themselves also should do to them; lest they delight one another in the turpitude of illicit pleasure? And yet the most salutary and truest precept is: Whatever you will that men should do to you, the same also do you to them.

Et hoc unde, nisi quia hoc loco mUdo quodam proprio uoluntas posita est, quae in malo accipi non potest? Locutione uero usitatiore, quam frequentat maxime consuetudo sermonis, non utique diceretur: Noli uelle mentiri omne mendacium, nisi esset et uoluntas mala, a cuius prauitate illa distinguitur, quam praedicauerunt angeli dicentes: Pax in terra hominibus bonae uoluntatis. Nam ex abundanti additum est "bonae", si esse non potest nisi bona.

And whence is this, except because in this place will has been set in a certain proper mode, which cannot be taken in an evil sense? But in a more usual locution, which the custom of speech most of all frequents, it certainly would not be said: “Do not will to lie every lie,” unless there were also an evil will, from whose depravity that is distinguished which the angels proclaimed, saying: “Peace on earth to men of good will.” For “good” has been added out of abundance, if it cannot be anything except good.

Quid autem magnum in caritatis laudibus dixisset apostolus, quod non gaudeat super iniquitate, nisi Ouia ita malignitas gaudet? Et apud auctores saecularium litterarum talis istorum uerborum indifferentia reperitur. Ait enim Cicero orator amplissimus: "Cupio, patres conscripti, me esse clementem." Quia id uerbum in bono posuit, quis tam peruerse doctus existat, qui non eum "Cupio", sed "Volo" potius dicere debuisse contendat?

What great thing, moreover, would the apostle have said in the praises of charity, that it does not rejoice over iniquity, except because malignity rejoices in this way? And among the authors of secular literature such an indifference of these words is found. For Cicero, a most distinguished orator, says: "I desire, Conscript Fathers, to be clement." Because he set that word in a good sense, who would be so perversely learned as to contend that he ought to have said not "I desire" but rather "I will/wish"?

Porro apud Terentium flagitiosus adulescens insana flagrans cupidine:

Furthermore, in Terence, a flagitious adolescent blazing with insane cupidity:

Nihil uolo aliud, inquit, nisi Philumenam. Quam uoluntatem fuisse libidinem responsio, quae. ibi serui eius sanioris inducitur, satis indicat. Ait namque domino suo:

"I want nothing else," he says, "except Philumena." That this will was lust is sufficiently indicated by the reply which is introduced there by his more sober slave. For he says to his master:

Quanto satius est,
Te id dare operam, qui istum amorem ex animo
amoueas tuo,

How much better it is,
You to give your effort to this,
that you remove that love from your mind,

Quam id loqui, quo magis libido frustra accendatur tua? Gaudium uero eos et in malo posuisse ille ipse Vergilianus testis est uersus, ubi has quattuor perturbationes summa breuitate complexus est:

Rather than to say that which makes your libido more in vain inflamed? And that they have set joy even among the evil, that very Vergilian verse is a witness, where he has encompassed these four perturbations with utmost brevity:

Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque.

From this they fear and desire, they grieve and rejoice.

Dixit etiam idem auctor:

The same author also said:

Mala mentis gaudia.

The mind’s evil joys.

Proinde uolunt cauent gaudent et boni et mali; atque ut eadem aliis uerbis enuntiemus, cupiunt timent laetantur et boni et mali; sed illi bene, isti male, sicut hominibus seu recta seu peruersa uoluntas est. Ipsa quoque tristitia, pro qua Stoici nihil in animo sapientis inueniri posse putauerunt, reperitur in bono et maxime apud nostros. Nam laudat apostolus Corinthios, quod contristati fuerint secundum Deum.

Accordingly, the good and the bad alike will, are cautious, and rejoice; and, to enunciate the same in other words, the good and the bad alike desire, fear, and exult; but those do so well, these badly, just as among men the will is either straight or perverse. Even sadness itself, about which the Stoics thought that nothing could be found in the mind of the wise man, is found in the good, and especially among our own. For the Apostle praises the Corinthians, because they were made sorrowful according to God.

Sed fortasse quis dixerit illis apostolum fuisse congratulatum, quod contristati fuerint paenitendo, qualis tristitia, nisi eorum qui peccauerint, esse non potest. Ita enim dicit: Video quod epistula illa, etsi ad horam, contristauit uos; nunc gaudeo, non quoa contristali estis, sed quia contristati eslis in paenitentiam. Contristati enim estis secundum Deum, ut in nullo detrimentum patiamini ex nobis.

But perhaps someone will say that the apostle congratulated them because they had been saddened by repenting—a kind of sadness which cannot exist except in those who have sinned. For thus he says: I see that that epistle, even if for an hour, made you sorrowful; now I rejoice, not because you were saddened, but because you were saddened unto repentance. For you were saddened according to God, so that in nothing you might suffer detriment from us.

Quae enim secundum Deum est tristitia, paenitentiam in salutem inpaenitendam operatur; mundi autem tristitia mortem operatur. Ecce enim id ipsum secundum Deum contristari, quantam perfecit in uobis industriam. Ac per hoc possunt Stoici pro suis partibus respondere, ad hoc uideri utilem esse tristitiam, ut peccasse paeniteat; in animo autem sapientis ideo esse non posse, quia nec peccatum in eum cadit, cuius paenitentia contristetur, nec ullum aliud malum, quod perpetiendo et sentiendo sit tristis.

For the sadness according to God works repentance unto salvation not-to-be-repented; but the sadness of the world works death. Behold, indeed, this very being-saddened according to God, how great diligence it has perfected in you. And through this the Stoics can, for their part, respond that sadness seems useful for this: that one may repent of having sinned; but in the mind of the wise man it therefore cannot be, because neither does sin fall upon him, by the repentance of which he would be saddened, nor any other evil, which by undergoing and by feeling he would be sad.

Nam et Alcibiadem ferunt (si me de nomine hominis memoria non fallit), cum sibi beatus uideretur, Socrate disputante et ei quam miser esset, quoniam stultus esset, demonstrante fleuisse. Huic ergo stultitia fuit causa etiam huius utilis optandaeque tristitiae, qua homo esse se dolet, quod esse non debet. Stoici autem non stultum, sed sapientem aiunt tristem esse non posse.

For they also report that Alcibiades (if my memory does not fail me about the man’s name), when he seemed happy to himself, with Socrates disputing and demonstrating to him how miserable he was, since he was foolish, wept. To this man, therefore, stupidity was the cause even of this useful and to-be-desired sadness, whereby a human being is pained at being what he ought not to be. But the Stoics say that it is not the foolish man, but the wise man, who cannot be sad.

[IX] Verum his philosophis, quod ad istam quaestionem de animi perturbationibus adtinet, iam respondimus in nono huius operis libro, ostendentes eos non tam de rebus, quam de uerbis cupidiores esse contentionis quam ueritatis. Apud nos autem iuxta scripturas sanctas sanamque doctrinam ciues sanctae ciuitatis Dei in huius uitae peregrinatione secundum Deum uiuentes metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones rectas habent. Metuunt poenam aeternam, cupiunt uitam aeter nam; dolent in re, quia ipsi in semet ipsis adhuc ingemescunt adoptionem expectantes, redemptionem corporis sui; gaudent in spe, quia fiet sermo, qui scriptus est: Absorta est mors in uictoriam.

[9] But to these philosophers, as it pertains to that question about the perturbations of the soul, we have already responded in the ninth book of this work, showing that they are more desirous of contention than of truth, and that not so much about things as about words. But among us, according to the holy Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy City of God, in the pilgrimage of this life living according to God, both fear and desire, grieve and rejoice; and because their love is right, they hold all these affections aright. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve in reality, because they themselves within themselves still groan, awaiting adoption, the redemption of their body; they rejoice in hope, because the word that is written will come to pass: “Death is swallowed up in victory.”

Item metuunt peccare, cupiunt perseuerare; dolent in peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis. Vt enim metuant peccare, audiunt: Quoniam abundabit iniquitas, refrigescet caritas multorum; ut cupiant perseuerare, audiunt quod scriptum est: Qui perseuerauerit usque in finem, hic saluus erit; ut doleant in peccatis, audiunt: Si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus, et ueritas in nobis non est; ut gaudeant in operibus bonis, audiunt: Hilarem datorem diligit Deus. Item sicuti se infirmitas eorum firmitasque habuerit, metuunt temptari, cupiunt temptari; dolent in temptationibus, gaudent in temptationibus.

Likewise they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sins, they rejoice in good works. For, that they may fear to sin, they hear: Because iniquity will abound, the charity of many will grow cold; that they may desire to persevere, they hear what is written: He who perseveres unto the end, this one will be saved; that they may grieve in sins, they hear: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us; that they may rejoice in good works, they hear: God loves a cheerful giver. Likewise, according as their weakness or their firmness obtains, they fear to be tempted, they desire to be tempted; they grieve in temptations, they rejoice in temptations.

Vt enim metuant temptari, audiunt: Si quis praeoccupatus fuerit in aliquo delicto, uos, qui spiritales estis, instruite huius modi in spiritu mansuetudinis, intendens te ipsum, ne et tu tempteris. ut autem cupiant temptari, audiunt quendam uirum fortem ciuitatis Dei dicentem: Proba me, Domine, et tempta me; ure renes meos et cor meum; ut doleant in temptationibus, uident Petrum flentem; ut gaudeant in temptationibus, audiunt Iacobum dicentem: Omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, cum in temptationes uarias incideritis.

For indeed, that they may fear to be tempted, they hear: If anyone should be pre-occupied in any transgression, you who are spiritual, instruct such a one in a spirit of mansuetude, attending to yourself, lest you also be tempted. but that they may desire to be tempted, they hear a certain strong man of the City of God saying: Prove me, Lord, and tempt me; burn my reins and my heart; that they may grieve in temptations, they see Peter weeping; that they may rejoice in temptations, they hear James saying: Count it all joy, my brothers, when you have fallen into various temptations.

Non solum autem propter se ipsos his mouentur affectibus, uerum etiam propter eos, quos liberari cupiunt et ne pereant metuunt, et dolent si pereunt et gaudent si liberantur. Illum quippe optimum et fortissimum uirum, qui in suis infirmitatibus gloriatur, ut eum potissimum commemoremus, qui in ecclesiam Christi ex gentibus uenimus, doctorem gentium in fide et ueritate, qui et plus omnibus suis coapostolis laborauit et pluribus epistulis populos Dei, non eos tantum, qui praesentes ab illo uidebantur; uerum etiam illos, qui futuri praeuidebantur, instruxit; illum, inquam, uirum, athletam Christi, doctum ab illo, unctum de illo, crucifixum cum illo, gloriosum in illo, in theatro huius mundi, cui spectaculum factus est et angelis et hominibus, legitime magnum agonem certantem et palmam supernae uocationis in anteriora sectantem, oculis fidei libentissime spectant gaudere cum gaudentibus, flere cum flentibus, foris habentem pugnas, intus timores, cupientem dissolui et esse cum Christo, desiderantem uidere Romanos, ut aliquem fructum habeat et in illis, sicut et in ceteris gentibus, aemmantem Corinthios et ipsa aemulatione metuentem, ne seducantur eorum mentes a castitate, quae in Christo est, magnam tristitiam et continuum dolorem cordis de Israelitis habentem, quod ignorantes Dei iustitiam et suam uolentes constituere iustitiae Dei non essent subiecti; nec solum dolorem, uerum etiam luctum suum denuntiantem quibusdam, qui ante peccauerunt et non egerunt paenitentiam super inmunditia et fornicationibus suis.

Not only, moreover, on account of themselves are they moved by these affections, but also on account of those whom they desire to be freed and fear lest they perish, and they grieve if they perish and rejoice if they are delivered. That best and most valiant man, who glories in his infirmities—to commemorate him above all, we who have come into the Church of Christ from the nations—the teacher of the nations in faith and truth, who both labored more than all his co-apostles and by more letters instructed the peoples of God, not only those who were present and were seen by him, but also those who were foreseen as future; that man, I say, the athlete of Christ, taught by him, anointed from him, crucified with him, glorious in him, in the theatre of this world, to which he was made a spectacle both to angels and to men, lawfully contending the great contest and pursuing the palm of the supernal vocation toward the things before, with the eyes of faith they most gladly behold rejoicing with those who rejoice, weeping with those who weep, having fightings without, fears within, desiring to be dissolved and to be with Christ, longing to see the Romans, that he may have some fruit also among them, as among the other nations, emulating the Corinthians and by that very emulation fearing lest their minds be seduced from the chastity which is in Christ, having great sadness and continual pain of heart concerning the Israelites, because, ignorant of the justice of God and wishing to establish their own, they were not subject to the justice of God; and not only sorrow, but also denouncing his mourning to certain ones who had sinned before and had not done penitence over their uncleanness and fornications.

Hi motus, hi affectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate uenientes si uitia uocanda sunt, sinamus, ut ea, quae uere uitia sunt, uirtutes uocentur. Sed cum rectam rationem sequantur istae affectiones, quando ubi oportet adbibentur, quis eas tunc morbos seu uitiosas passiones audeat dicere? Quam ob rem etiam ipse Dominus in forma serui agere uitam dignatus humanam, sed nullum habens omnino peccatum adhibuit eas, ubi adhibendas esse iudicauit.

These motions, these affections, coming from love of the good and from holy charity—if they are to be called vices, let us allow that those things which truly are vices be called virtues. But since these affections follow right reason, when they are applied where it is fitting, who would then dare to call them diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord himself, in the form of a servant, deigning to live a human life, yet having no sin at all, employed them where he judged they were to be employed.

Neque enim, in quo uerum erat hominis corpus et uerus hominis animus, falsus erat humanus affectus. Cum ergo eius in euangelio ista referuntur, quod super duritia cordis ludaeorum cum ira contristatus sit, quod dixerit: Gaudeo propter uos, ut credatis, quod Lazarum suscitaturus etiam lacrimas fuderit, quod concupiuerit cum discipulis suis manducare pascha, quod propinquante passione tristis fuerit anima eius: non falso utique referuntur. Verum ille hos motus certae dispensationis gratia ita cum uoluit suscepit animo humano, ut cum uoluit factus est homo.

For neither, in him in whom there was a true human body and a true human soul, was the human affection false. Therefore, when in the Gospel there are related these things: that, over the hardness of heart of the Jews, he was saddened with anger; that he said, “I rejoice on your account, that you may believe;” that, being about to raise Lazarus, he even shed tears; that he earnestly desired with his disciples to eat the Passover; that, with the Passion drawing near, his soul was sorrowful—assuredly they are not reported falsely. Rather, he assumed these motions in a human soul, for the sake of a certain dispensation, when he willed, just as he became man when he willed.

Proinde, quod fatendum est, etiam cum rectas et secundum Deum habemus has affectiones, huius uitae sunt, non illius, quam futuram speramus, et saepe illis etiam inuiti cedimus. Itaque aliquando, quamuis non culpabili cupiditate, sed laudabili caritate moueamur, etiam dum nolumus flemus. Habemus ergo eas ex humanae condicionis infinnitate; non autem ita Dominus Iesus, cuius et infirmitas fuit ex potestate.

Therefore, which must be admitted, even when we have these affections right and according to God, they are of this life, not of that one which we hope is to come; and we often yield to them even unwilling. And so sometimes, although we are moved not by blameworthy cupidity but by laudable charity, even while we do not wish, we weep. We have them, then, from the infirmity of the human condition; not so, however, the Lord Jesus, whose very infirmity was from power.

Sed dum uitae huius infinnitatem gerimus, si eas omnino nullas habeamus, tunc potius non recte uiuimus. Vituperabat enim et detestabatur apostolus quosdam, quos etiam esse dixit sine affectione. Culpauit etiam illos sacer psalmus, de quibus ait: Sustinui qui simul contristaretur, et non fuit.

But while we bear the infirmity of this life, if we were to have them not at all, then rather we would not live rightly. For the Apostle vituperated and detested certain persons, whom he also said to be “without affection.” The sacred Psalm also blamed those of whom it says: “I waited for one who would be saddened together with me, and there was none.”

Nam omnino non dolere, dum sumus in hoc loco miseriae, profecto, sicut quidam etiam apud saeculi huius litteratos sensit et dixit, 'non sine magna mercede contingit inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore'. Quocirca illa, quae *a)pa/qeia Graece dicitur (quae si Latine posset inpassibilitas diceretur), si ita intellegenda est (in animo quippe, non in corpore accipitur), ut sine his affectionibus uiuatur, quae contra rationem accidunt mentemque perturbant, bona plane et maxime optanda est, sed nec ipsa huius est uitae. Non enim qualiumcumque hominum uox est, sed maxime piorum multumque iustorum atque sanctorum: Si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus et ueritas in nobis non est. Tunc itaque *a)pa/qeia ista erit, quando peccatum in homine nullum erit.

For to feel no grief at all, while we are in this place of misery, indeed—as a certain man even among the literati of this age perceived and said—‘it does not occur without a great price: of inhumanity in the mind, of stupor in the body.’ Wherefore that which in Greek is called *a)pa/qeia (which, if it could be in Latin, would be called impassibility), if it is to be understood thus (for it is taken in the mind, not in the body), namely, that one lives without those affections which happen against reason and disturb the mind, is plainly good and most to be desired, but neither is it of this life. For it is not the voice of just any men, but of the most pious and very just and holy: If we should say that we do not have sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us. Then therefore this *a)pa/qeia will be, when there will be no sin in man.

Nunc uero satis bene uiuitur, <si> sine crimine; sine peccato autem qui se uiuere existimat, non id agit, ut peccatdm non habeat, sed ut ueniam non accipiat. Porro si *a)pa/qeia illa dicenda est, cum animum contingere omnino non potest ullus affectus, quis hunc stuporem non omnibus uitiis iudicet esse peiorem? Potest ergo non absurde dici perfectam beatitudinem sine stimulo timoris et sine ulla tristitia futuram; non ibi autem futurum amorem gaudiumque quis dixerit, nisi omni modo a ueritate seclusus?

Now indeed one lives well enough, <si> without crime; but he who supposes that he lives without sin does not bring it about that he should not have sin, but that he should not receive pardon. Moreover, if that *a)pa/qeia is to be so called, when no affect can in any way touch the mind, who would not judge this stupor to be worse than all vices? It can therefore not absurdly be said that perfect beatitude will be without the goad of fear and without any sadness; but who would say that love and joy will not be there, unless in every way shut out from truth?

Si autem *a)pa/qeia illa est, ubi nec metus ullus exterret nec angit dolor, auersanda est in hac uita, si recte, hoc est secundum Deum, uiuere uolumus; in illa uero beata, quae sempiterna promittitur, plane speranda est.

If, however, that apatheia is where no fear terrifies and no pain torments, it is to be shunned in this life, if we wish to live rightly, that is, according to God; but in that truly blessed life, which is promised as sempiternal, it is clearly to be hoped for.

Timor namque ille, de quo dicit apostolus lohannes: Timor non est in caritate, sed perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem, quia timor poenam habet; qui autem timet, non est perfectus in caritate, non est eius generis timor, cuius ille, quo timebat apostolus Paulus, ne Corinthii serpentina seducerentur astutia; hunc enim timorem habet caritas, immo non habet nisi caritas; sed illius generis est timor qui non est in caritate, de quo ipse apostolus Paulus ait: Non enim accepistis spiritum seruitutis iterum in timore. Timor uero ille castus permanens in saeculum saeculi, si erit et in futuro saeculo, <nam quo alio modo potest intellegi permanere in saeculum saeculi Pn non est timor exterrens a malo quod accidere potest, sed tenens in bono quod amitti non potest. Vbi enim boni adepti amor inmutabilis est, profecto, si dici potest, mali cauendi timor securus est.

For that fear, of which the apostle John says: Fear is not in charity, but perfect charity casts fear outside, because fear has punishment; and he who fears has not been perfected in charity, is not the kind of fear of which that was, whereby the apostle Paul was afraid lest the Corinthians be seduced by serpentine cunning; for charity has this fear—indeed, none but charity has it; but it is of that kind of fear which is not in charity, of which the apostle Paul himself says: For you have not received a spirit of servitude again in fear. But that chaste fear remaining unto the age of the age, if it will be also in the future age, <for in what other way can it be understood to remain unto the age of the age Pn it is not a fear that terrifies away from an evil that can happen, but one that holds in the good that cannot be lost. For where the love of the attained good is immutable, assuredly, if one may so say, the fear of avoiding evil is secure.

Timoris quippe casti nomine ea uoluntas significata est, qua nos necesse erit nolle peccare, et non sollicitudine infirmitatis, ne forte peccemus, sed tranquillitate caritatis cauere peccatum. Aut si nullius omnino generis timor esse poterit in illa certissima securitate perpetuorum feliciumque gaudiorum, sic est dictum: Timor Domini castus permanens in saeculum saeculi, quem ad modum dictum est: Patientia pauperum non peribit in aeternum. Neque enim aeterna erit ipsa patientia, quae necessaria non est, nisi ubi toleranda sunt mala; sed aeternum erit, quo per patientiam peruenitur.

By the very name of chaste fear that will is signified, by which it will be necessary for us to be unwilling to sin, and to beware of sin not by the solicitude of infirmity, lest perhaps we should sin, but by the tranquility of charity. Or if no kind at all of fear could exist in that most certain security of perpetual and happy joys, thus it is said: “The Fear of the Lord is chaste, enduring forever and ever,” in the manner in which it is said: “The patience of the poor will not perish forever.” For neither will that patience itself be eternal, which is not necessary except where evils are to be endured; but eternal will be that which is reached through patience.

Ita fortasse timor castus in saeculum sa eculi dictus est permanere, quia id permanebit, quo timor ipse perducit. Quae cum ita sint, quoniam recta uita ducenda est, qua perueniendum sit ad beatam, omnes affectus istos uita recta rectos habet, peruersa peruersos. Beata uero eademque aeterna amorem habebit et gaudium non solum rectum, uerum etiam certum; timorem autem ac dolorem nullum.

Thus perhaps chaste fear is said to remain into the age of the age, because that will remain to which fear itself leads. Since these things are so, since a right life must be led, by which one may arrive at the blessed life, a right life has all these affections right, a perverse life perverse. But the blessed and likewise eternal life will have love and joy not only right but also certain; but fear and pain none.

Vnde iam apparet utcumque, quales esse debeant in hac peregrinatione ciues ciuitatis Dei, uiuentes secundum spiritum, non secundum carnem, hoc est secundum Deum, non secundum hominem, et quales in illa, quo tendunt, inmortalitate futuri sint. Ciuitas porro, id est societas, impiorum non secundum Deum, sed secundum hominem uiuentium et in ipso cultu falsae contemptuque uerae diuinitatis doctrinas hominum daemonumue sectantium his affectibus prauis tamquam morbis et perturbationibus quatitur. Et si quos ciues habet, qui moderari talibus motibus et eos quasi temperare uideantur, sic impietate superbi et elati sunt, ut hoc ipso sint in eis maiores tumores, quo minores dolores.

Whence it now somehow appears what sort the citizens of the City of God ought to be in this pilgrimage, living according to the spirit, not according to the flesh, that is, according to God, not according to man, and what they will be in that immortality whither they tend. The city, that is, the society, of the impious living not according to God but according to man, and, in the very worship of the false and contempt of the true divinity, following the doctrines of men or of demons, is shaken by these perverse affections as by diseases and perturbations. And if it has any citizens who seem to moderate such motions and, as it were, to temper them, they are so proud and puffed up by impiety that by this very fact there are in them the greater swellings, in proportion as the pains are less.

Et si nonnmii tanto inmaniore, quanto rariore uanitate hoc in se ipsis adamauerint, ut nullo prorsus erigantur et excitentur, nullo flectantur atque inclinentur affectu: humanitatem totam potius amittunt, quam ueram adsequuntur tranquillitatem. Non enim quia durum aliquid, ideo rectum, aut quia stupidum est, ideo sanum.

And if some, by a vanity the more monstrous the rarer, have so loved this in themselves that they are in no way at all raised up and excited, by no affection bent and inclined: they rather lose their whole humanity than attain true tranquillity. For not because something is hard is it therefore right, nor because it is stupid is it therefore sound.

[X] Sed utrum primus homo uel primi homines (duorum erat quippe coniugium) habebant istos affectus in corpore animab ante peccatum, quales in corpore spiritali non habebimus omni purgato finitoque peccato, non inmerito quaeritur. Si enim habebant, quo modo erant beati in illo memorabili beatitudinis loco, id est paradiso? Quis tandem absolute dici beatus potest, qui timore afficitur uel dolore?

[10] But whether the first man or the first humans (for the conjugal union was of two) had these affects in the animal body before sin—such as we shall not have in the spiritual body, when all sin has been purged and brought to an end—is not unreasonably asked. For if they had them, how were they blessed in that memorable place of beatitude, that is, paradise? Who, at length, can be said to be blessed absolutely who is affected with fear or with pain?

Quid autem timere aut dolere poterant illi homines in tantorum tanta afluentia bonorum, ubi nec mors metuebatur nec ulla corporis mala ualetudo, nec aberat quicquam, quod bona uoluntas adipisceretur, nec inerat quod carnem animumue hominis feliciter uiuentis offenderet? Amor erat inperturbatus in Deum atque inter se coniugum fida et sincera societate uiuen. tium, et ex hoc amore grande gaudium, non desistente quod amabatur ad fruendum.

What, moreover, could those human beings fear or grieve, amid such an affluence of so great goods, where neither death was feared nor any evil bodily health, nor was anything lacking that a good will might attain, nor was there present anything that might offend the flesh or the mind of a human being living happily? There was an unperturbed love toward God and, between themselves, of the spouses a faithful and sincere fellowship of those living, and from this love a great joy, with that which was loved not ceasing to be enjoyed.

Erat deuitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente nullum omnino alicunde malum, quod contristaret, inruebat. An forte cupiebant prohibitum lignum ad uescendum contingere, sed mori metuebant, ac per hoc et cupiditas et metus iam tunc illos homines etiam in illo perturbabat loco? Absit ut hoc existimemus fuisse, ubi nullum erat omnino peccatum.

There was a tranquil avoidance of sin; with it remaining, no evil at all from anywhere, which might sadden, rushed in. Or perhaps they were desiring to touch the prohibited tree for eating, but were fearing to die, and through this both desire and fear were already then perturbing those humans even in that place? Far be it that we suppose this to have been, where there was absolutely no sin.

Neque enim nullum peccatum est ea quae lex Dei prohibet concupiscere atque ab his abstinere timore poenae, non amore iustitiae. Absit, inquam, ut ante omne peccatum iam ibi fuerit tale peccatum, ut hoc de ligno admitterent, quod de muliere Dominus ait: Si quis uiderit mulieYem ad concupiscendum eam, iam moechatus est eam in corde suo. Quam igitur felices erant et nullis agitabantur perturbationibus animorum, nullis corporum laedebantur incommodis: tam felix uniuersa societas esset humana, si nec illi malum, quod etiam in posteros traicerent, nec quisquam ex eorum stirpe iniquitate committeret, quod damnatione reciperet; atque ista permanente felicitate, donec per illam benedictionem, qua dictum est: Crescite et multiplicamini, praedestinatorum sanctorum numerus compleretur, alia maior daretur, quae beatissimis angelis data est, ubi iam esset Certa SeCuritaS peCCatUrUm neminem neminemqUe mOritUrum, et talis esset uita sanctorum post nullum laboris doloris mortis experimentum, qualis erit post haec omnia in incorruptione corporum reddita resurrectione mortuorum.

For it is indeed a sin both to covet those things which the law of God prohibits and to abstain from them out of fear of penalty, not out of love of justice. Far be it, I say, that before any sin there had already been such a sin there, that they would admit concerning the tree what the Lord says about the woman: If anyone has looked at a woman to lust after her, he has already committed adultery with her in his heart. How happy, then, they were, and they were stirred by no perturbations of souls, were harmed by no inconveniences of bodies: so happy would the whole human society be, if neither they had done the evil which they would also transfer to their descendants, nor would anyone of their stock commit by iniquity that which he would receive by condemnation; and with that felicity remaining, until through that benediction in which it was said: Increase and multiply, the number of predestined saints were completed, another greater would be given, which has been given to the most blessed angels, where there would already be a sure security that no one would sin and no one would die; and such would be the life of the saints, after no experience of labor, pain, or death, as it will be after all these things, in the incorruption of bodies restored by the resurrection of the dead.

[XI] Sed quia Deus cuncta praesciuit et ideo quoque hominem peccaturum ignorare non potuit: secundum id, quod praesciuit atque disposuit, ciuitatem sanctam debemus adserere, non secundum illud, quod in nostram cognitionem peruenire non potuit, quia in Dei dispositione non fuit. Neque enim homo peccato suo diuinum potuit perturbare consilium, quasi Deum quod statuerat mutare conpulerit; cum Deus praesciendo utrumque praeuenerit, id est, et homo, quem bonum ipse creauit, quam malus esset futurus, et quid boni etiam sic de illo esset ipse facturus. Deus enim etsi dicitur statuta mutare

[11] But because God foreknew all things and therefore also could not be ignorant that man would sin: we ought to assert the holy city according to that which He foreknew and disposed, not according to that which could not come into our cognition, because it was not in God’s disposition. For neither could man by his sin perturb the divine counsel, as if he had compelled God to change what He had decreed; since God by foreknowing anticipated both, that is, both how evil the man—whom He Himself created good—would be in the future, and what good even so He Himself would make from him. For God, even if He is said to change what was decreed—

Fecit itaque Deus, sicut scriptum est, hominem rectum ac per hoc uoluntatis bonae. Non enim rectus esset bonam non habens uoluntatem. Bona igitur uoluntas opus est Dei; cum ea quippe ab illo factus est homo.

Therefore God made, as it is written, man upright and thereby of good will. For he would not be upright if he did not have a good will. Therefore a good will is a work of God; for with it indeed man was made by Him.

Mala uero uoluntas prima, quoniam omnia opera mala praecessit in homine, defectus potius fuit quidam ab opere Dei ad sua opera quam opus ullum, et ideo mala opera, quia secundum se, non secundum Deum; ut eorum operum tamquam fructuum malorum uoluntas ipsa esset uelut arbor mala aut ipse homo in quantum malae uoluntatis. Porro mala uoluntas quamuis non sit secundum naturam, sed contra naturam, quia uitium est, tamen eius naturae est, cuius est uitium, quod nisi in natura non potest esse: sed in ea, quam creauit ex nihilo, non quam genuit Creator de semet ipso, sicut genuit Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia; quia, etsi de terrae puluere Deus finxit hominem, eadem terra omnisque terrena materies omnino de nihilo est, animamque de nihilo factam dedit corpori, cum factus est homo. Vsque adeo autem mala uincuntur a bonis, ut, quamuis sinantur esse ad demonstrandum quam possit et ipsis bene uti iustitia prouidentissima Creatoris, bona tamen sine malis esse possint, sicut Deus ipse uerus et summus, sicut omnis super istum caliginosum aerem caelestis inuisibilis uisibilisque creatura; mala uero sine bonis esse non possint, quoniam naturae, in quibus sunt, in quantum naturae sunt, utique bonae sunt.

But the first evil will, since it preceded all evil works in man, was rather a certain defect from the work of God to his own works than any work at all, and therefore the works are evil because they are according to himself, not according to God; so that of those works, as of evil fruits, the will itself should be as it were an evil tree, or the man himself, insofar as he is of an evil will. Furthermore, although an evil will is not according to nature but against nature, because it is a vice, nevertheless it belongs to the very nature of which it is the vice, which cannot be except in a nature: but in that nature which He created out of nothing, not which the Creator begot from Himself, as He begot the Word, through whom all things were made; for even if God fashioned man from the dust of the earth, that same earth and all earthly matter is altogether out of nothing, and He gave to the body a soul made out of nothing, when man was made. To such a degree, moreover, are evils conquered by goods, that, although they are allowed to exist to show how much the most provident justice of the Creator can even make good use of them, yet goods can exist without evils—just as God Himself, true and highest, just as every heavenly creature, invisible and visible, above this caliginous air; but evils cannot exist without goods, since the natures in which they are, insofar as they are natures, are assuredly good.

Detrahitur porro malum non aliqua natura, quae accesserat, uel ulla eius parte sublata, sed ea, quae uitiata ac deprauata fuerat, sanata atque correcta. Arbitrium igitur uoluntatis tunc est uere liberum, cum uitiis peccatisque non seruit. Tale datum est a Deo; quod amissum proprio uitio, nisi a quo dari potuit, reddi non potest.

Moreover, evil is not taken away by some nature that had been added, nor by any part of it being removed, but by that which had been vitiated and depraved being healed and corrected. Therefore the free choice of the will is then truly free, when it does not serve vices and sins. Such was given by God; which, once lost by one’s own vice, cannot be given back except by Him by whom it could be given.

Vnde Veritas dicit: Si uos Filius liberauerit, tunc uere liberi eritis. Id ipsum est autem, ac si diceret: "Si uos Filius saluos fecerit, tunc uere salui eritis." Inde quippe liberator, unde saluator.

Whence Truth says: If the Son frees you, then you will truly be free. That is the very same thing, however, as if he were saying: "If the Son saves you, then you will truly be saved." For from that source, indeed, comes the Liberator, whence the Savior.

Viuebat itaque homo secundum Deum in paradiso et corporali et spiritali. Neque enim erat paraffisus corporalis propter corporis bona et propter mentis non erat spiritalis; aut uero erat spiritalis quo per interiores et non erat corporalis quo per exteriores sensus homo frueretur. Erat plane utrumque propter utrumque.

Therefore man lived in accordance with God in paradise, both corporal and spiritual. For neither was paradise corporal on account of the goods of the body, nor was it spiritual on account of the mind; or indeed, it was spiritual whereby the man might enjoy through the interior senses, and not corporal whereby he might enjoy through the exterior senses. It was plainly both on account of both.

Postea uero quam superbus ille angelus ac per hoc inuidus per eandem superbiam a Deo ad semet ipsum conuersus et quodam quasi tyrannico fastu gaudere subditis quam esse subditus eligens de spiritali paradiso cecidit (de cuius lapsu sociorumque eius, qui ex angelis Dei angeli eius effecti sunt, in libris undecimo et duodecimo huius operis satis, quantum potui, disputaui), malesuada uersutia in hominis sensum serpere affectans, cui utique stanti, quoniam ipse ceciderat, inuidebat, colubrum in paradiso corporali, ubi cum duobus illis hominibus, masculo et femina, animalia etiam terrestria cetera subdita et innoxia uersabantur, animal scilicet lubricum et tortuosis anfractibus mobile, operi suo congruum, per quem loqueretur, elegit; eoque per angelicam praesentiam praestantioremque naturam spiritali nequitia sibi subiecto et tamquam instrumento abutens fallacia sermocinatus est feminae, a parte scilicet inferiore illius humanae copulae incipiens, ut gradatim perueniret ad totum, non existimans uirum facile credulum nec errando posse decipi, sed dum alieno cedit errori. Sicut enim Aaron erranti populo ad idolum fabricandum non consensit inductus, sed cessit obstrictus nec Salomonem credibile est errore putasse idolis esse seruiendum, sed blanditns femineis ad illa sacrilegia fuisse conpulsum: ita credendum est illum uirum suae feminae, uni unum, hominem homini, coniugem coniugi, ad Dei legem transgrediendam non tamquam uerum loquenti credidisse seductum, sed sociali necessitudine paruisse. Non enim frustra dixit apostolus: Et Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta est, nisi quia illa quod ei serpens locutus est, tamquam uerum esset, accepit, ille autem ab unico noluit consortio dirimi nec in communione peccati; nec ideo minus reus, si sciens prudensque peccauit.

Afterwards, however, when that proud and therefore envious angel, by that same pride turned from God to himself, and, choosing, with a certain as-it-were tyrannical haughtiness, rather to rejoice in being over subjects than to be a subject, fell from the spiritual paradise (about whose fall, and that of his associates, who from the angels of God became his angels, I have disputed sufficiently, as far as I could, in the eleventh and twelfth books of this work), aiming that his wheedling craftiness creep into the sense of man—whom, since he himself had fallen, he envied as standing—he chose a serpent in the bodily paradise, where, along with those two human beings, male and female, the other terrestrial animals also, subject and harmless, moved about, an animal, to wit, slippery and mobile in tortuous windings, congruent to his work, through which he might speak; and by subjecting it to himself through angelic presence and more excellent nature, by spiritual malice, and abusing it as an instrument, with deceptive discourse he spoke to the woman, beginning, namely, from the lower part of that human union, so that by degrees he might arrive at the whole, not supposing the man easily credulous nor able to be deceived by erring, but when he yields to another’s error. For just as Aaron did not consent, being induced, to the erring people in making an idol, but yielded, being constrained; nor is it credible that Solomon, through error, thought that idols must be served, but that by feminine blandishments he was compelled to those sacrileges: so it is to be believed that that man, to his woman, one to one, a human to a human, a spouse to spouse, for transgressing the law of God did not believe her as one speaking truth, being seduced, but obeyed because of social necessity. For not in vain did the apostle say: “And Adam was not deceived, but the woman, having been deceived,” except because she received what the serpent spoke to her as though it were true, whereas he did not wish to be sundered from the unique companionship, nor from the communion of sin; nor on that account is he less guilty, if he sinned knowingly and prudently.

Vnde et apostolus non ait: "Non peccauit", sed: Non est seductus; nam utique ipsum ostendit, ubi dicit: Per unum hominem peccatum intrauit in mundum, et paulo post apertius: In similitudine, inquit, praeuaricationis Adae. Hos autem seductos intellegi uoluit, qui id, quod faciunt, non putant esse peccatum; ille autem sciuit. Afioquin quo modo uerum erit: Adam non est seductus?

Whence also the apostle does not say: “He did not sin,” but: “He was not deceived;” for indeed he shows that he himself did, where he says: “Through one man sin entered into the world,” and a little later, more openly: “In the likeness,” he says, “of the prevarication of Adam.” But he wished those to be understood as deceived who do not think that what they do is sin; but he knew it. Otherwise, how will it be true: “Adam was not deceived”?

Sed inexpertus diuinae seueritatis in eo falli potuit, ut ueniale crederet esse commissum. Ac per hoc in eo quidem, quo mulier seducta est, non est ille seductus, sed eum fefellit, quo modo fuerat iudicandum quod erat dicturus: Mulier, quam dedisti mecum, ipsa mihi dedit, et manducaui. Quid ergo pluribus?

But, unexperienced in divine severity, he could have been deceived in this, that he believed what was committed to be venial. And through this, in the respect in which the woman was seduced, he was not seduced; but he was deceived as to the manner in which what he was going to say was to be judged: “The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave to me, and I ate.” What then is the need of more?

Etsi credendo non sunt ambo decepti, peccando tamen amho sunt capti et diaboli laqueis inplicati.

Although in believing not both were deceived, yet in sinning both were captured and entangled in the devil’s snares.

[XII] Si quem uero mouet, cur aliis peccatis sic natura non mutetur humana, quem ad modum illa duorum primorum hominum praeuaricatione mutata est, ut tantae corruptioni, quantam uidemus atque sentimus, et per hanc subiaceret et morti ac tot et tantis tamque inter se contrariis perturbaretur et fluctuaret affectibus, qualis in paradiso ante peccatum, licet in corpore animali esset, utique non fuit —- si quis hoc mouetur, ut dixi, non ideo debet existimare leue ac paruum illud fuisse commissum, quia in esca factum est, non quidem mala nec noxia, nisi quia prohibita; neque enim quicquam mali Deus in illo tantae felicitatis loco crearet atque plantaret. Sed oboedientia commendata est in praecepto, quae uirtus in creatura rationali mater quodam modo est omnium custosque uirtutum; quando quidem ita facta est, ut ei subditam esse sit utile; perniciosum autem suam, non eius a quo creata est facere uoluntatem. Hoc itaque de uno cibi genere non edendo, ubi aliorum tanta copia subiacebat, tam leue praeceptum ad obseruandum, tam breue ad memoria retinendum, ubi praesertim nondum uoluntati cupiditas resistebat, quod de poena transgressionis postea subsecutum est, tanto maiore iniustitia uiolatum est, quanto faciliore posset obseruantia custodiri.

[12] If, however, anyone is moved as to why by other sins human nature is not thus changed, in the manner that it was changed by the prevarication of those two first humans, so that it would lie under so great a corruption as we see and feel, and through this be subject to death, and be disturbed and tossed by so many and so great affections so mutually contrary, such as in paradise before the sin, although it was in an animal body, assuredly it was not —- if anyone is moved by this, as I said, he ought not on that account to suppose that that which was committed was light and small, because it was done in food, not indeed evil nor noxious, except because it was forbidden; for God would not create and plant anything evil in that place of so great felicity. But obedience was commended in the precept, which virtue in the rational creature is in a certain manner the mother and guardian of all the virtues; since indeed it is so made that it is useful for it to be subject to Him; but pernicious to do its own will, and not that of Him by whom it was created. Therefore this precept about not eating from one kind of food, where so great an abundance of others lay ready, so light for observing, so brief for retaining in memory, especially where as yet cupidity did not resist the will, and as for what later followed as the punishment of the transgression, was violated with so much the greater injustice, by how much more easily the observance could have been kept.

[XIII] In occulto autem mali esse coeperunt, ut in apertam inoboeffientiam laberentur. Non enim ad malum opus perueniretur, nisi praecessisset uoluntas mala. Porro malae uoluntatis initium quae potuit esse nisi superbia?

[13] But they began to be evil in secret, so that they slipped into open disobedience. For one would not have come to an evil work, unless an evil will had preceded. Furthermore, what could be the beginning of an evil will, if not pride?

Initium enim omnis peccati superbia est. Quid est autem superbia nisi peruersae celsitudinis appetitus? Peruersa enim est celsitudo deserto eo, cui debet animus inhaerere, principio sibi quodam modo fieri atque esse principium.

For the beginning of every sin is pride. But what is pride except an appetite for perverse loftiness? For loftiness is perverse when, with him abandoned to whom the mind ought to adhere, it makes itself, in a certain way, a principle to itself and is a principle.

Hoc fit, cum sibi nimis placet. Sibi uero ita placet, cum ab illo bono inmutabili deficit, quod ei magis placere debuit quam ipse sibi. Spontaneus est autem iste defectus, quoniam, si uoluntas in amore superioris inmutabilis boni, a quo inlustrabatur ut uideret et accendebatOr ut amaret, stabilis permaneret, non inde ad sibi placendum auerteretur et ex hoc tenebresceret et frigesceret, ut uel illa crederet uerum dixisse serpentem, uel ille Dei mandato uxoris praeponeret uoluntatem putaretque se uenialiter transgressorem esse praecepti, si uitae suae sociam non desereret etiam in societate peccati.

This happens, when it pleases itself too much. And it thus pleases itself, when it falls away from that immutable good, which ought to have pleased it more than it itself pleased itself. Moreover, this defect is spontaneous, since, if the will had remained stable in the love of the superior immutable good, by which it was being illuminated that it might see and was being kindled that it might love, it would not have been turned away from it to self-pleasing and from this have grown dark and grown cold, so that either she would believe the serpent to have spoken true, or he would prefer the will of his wife to the command of God and would think himself to be a transgressor of the precept venially, if he should not desert the companion of his life even in the society of sin.

Non ergo malum opus factum est, id est illa transgressio, ut cibo prohibito uescerentur, nisi ab eis qui iam mali erant. Neque enim fieret ille fructus malus nisi ab arbore mala. Vt autem esset arbor mala, contra naturam factum est, quia nisi uitio uoluntatis, quod contra naturam est, non utique fieret.

Therefore the evil work was not done—that is, that transgression, that they should eat of forbidden food—except by those who were already evil. For that bad fruit would not be produced except from an evil tree. But that there should be an evil tree was done against nature, since it would certainly not come to be except by a vice of the will, which is against nature.

Sed uitio deprauari nisi ex nihilo facta natura non posset. Ac per hoc ut natura sit, ex eo habet quod a Deo facta est; ut autem ab eo quod est deficiat, ex hoc quod de nihilo facta est. Nec sic defecit homo, ut omnino nihil esset, sed ut inclinatus ad se ipsum minus esset, quam erat, cum ei qui summe est inhaerebat.

But a nature could not be depraved by vice unless it were made out of nothing. And therefore, that it be a nature, it has from the fact that it was made by God; but that it should defect from Him who is, it has from this, that it was made out of nothing. Nor did man defect in such wise as to be altogether nothing, but so that, inclined toward himself, he was less than he had been when he adhered to Him who supremely is.

Relicto itaque Deo esse in semet ipso, hoc est sibi placere, non iam nihil esse est, sed nihilo propinquare. Vnde superbi secundum scripturas sanctas alio nomine appellantur sibi placentes. Bonum est enim sursum habere cor; non tamen ad se ipsum, quod est superbiae, sed ad Dominum, quod est oboedientiae, quae nisi humilium non potest esse.

Therefore, with God left behind, to be in oneself—that is, to be pleasing to oneself—is no longer to be nothing, but to draw near to nothing. Whence the proud, according to the holy Scriptures, are by another name called self-pleasers. For it is good to have the heart upward; yet not to oneself, which belongs to pride, but to the Lord, which belongs to obedience—an obedience which cannot be except of the humble.

Est igitur aliquid humilitatis miro modo quod sursum faciat cor, et est aliquid elationis quod deorsum faciat cor. Hoc quidem quasi contrarium uidetur, ut elatio sit deorsum et humilitas sursum. Sed pia humilitas facit subditum superiori; nihil est autem superius Deo; et ideo exaltat humilitas, quae facit subditum Deo.

Therefore there is something of humility which in a wondrous way makes the heart upward, and there is something of elation which makes the heart downward. This indeed seems as if contrary, that elation is downward and humility upward. But pious humility makes one subject to a superior; and nothing is higher than God; and therefore humility exalts, which makes one subject to God.

Elatio autem, quae in uitio est, eo ipso respuit subiectionem et cadit ab illo, quo non est quicquam superius, et ex hoc erit inferius et fit quod scriptum est: Deiecisti eos, cum extollerentur. Non enim ait: "Cum elati fuissent", ut prius extollerentur et postea deicerentur; sed cum extollerentur, tunc deiecti sunt. Ipsum quippe extolli iam deici est.

But elation, which is in vice, by that very fact rejects subjection and falls from Him than whom there is nothing superior, and from this it will be inferior; and what is written comes to pass: “You cast them down, when they were being exalted.” For he does not say: “When they had been elated,” as though they were first exalted and afterwards cast down; but when they were being exalted, then they were cast down. For to be exalted itself is already to be cast down.

Quapropter quod nunc in ciuitate Dei et ciuitati Dei in hoc peregrinantis aeculo maxime commendatur humilitas et in eius rege, qui est Christus, maxime praedicatur contrariumque huic uirtuti elationis uitium in eius aduersario, qui est diabolus, maxime dominari sacris litteris edocetur: profecto ista est magna differentia, qua ciuitas, unde loquimur, utraque dis cernitur, una scilicet societas piorum hominum, altera impiorum, singula quaeque cum angelis ad se pertinentibus, in quibus praecessit hac amor Dei, hac amor sui.

Wherefore, since now in the City of God, and for the City of God peregrinating in this age, humility is most especially commended, and in its King, who is Christ, is most especially proclaimed; and the contrary to this virtue, the vice of elation, in its adversary, who is the devil, is taught by the sacred letters to hold chief dominion: assuredly this is the great difference by which the two cities of which we speak are discerned—namely, the one a society of pious men, the other of impious—each with the angels belonging to itself, in which, in this one the love of God has gone before, in that one the love of self.

Manifesto ergo apertoque peccato, ubi factum est quod Deus fieri prohibuerat, diabolus hominem non cepisset, nisi iam ille sibi ipsi placere coepisset. Hinc enim et delectauit quod dictum est: Eritis sicut dii. Quod melius esse possent summo ueroque principio cohaerendo per oboedientiam, non suum sibi existendo principium per superbiam.

Therefore, with the sin manifest and open, when that was done which God had forbidden to be done, the devil would not have seized the man, unless he had already begun to please himself. Hence too what was said, "You shall be like gods," delighted; whereas they could be better by cohering to the highest and true Principle through obedience, not by existing for themselves as their own principle through pride.

Dii enim creati non sua ueritate, sed Dei ueri participatione sunt dii. Plus autem appetendo minus est, qui, dum sibi sufficere deligit, ab illo, qui ei uere sufficit, deficit. Illud itaque malum, quo, cum sibi homo placet, tamquam sit et ipse lumen, auertitur ab eo lumine, quod ei si placeat et ipse fit lumen —- illud, inquam, malum praecessit in abdito, ut sequeretur hoc malum quod perpetratum est in aperto.

For gods indeed are gods, not by their own verity, but by participation in the true God. But by desiring more he is less, who, while he chooses to suffice to himself, falls away from him who truly suffices for him. That evil, therefore, whereby, when a man pleases himself, as though he himself also were light, he is turned away from that light which, if it should please him, he himself also becomes light —- that evil, I say, preceded in secret, so that this evil might follow which was perpetrated in the open.

Verum est enim quod scriptum est: Ante ruinam exaltatur cor ct ante gloriam humiliatur. Illa prorsus rmna, quae fit in occulto, praecedit ruinam, quae fit in manifesto, dum illa ruina esse non putatur. Quis enim exaltationem ruinam putat, cum iam ibi sit defectus, quo est relictus Excelsus?

For it is true what is written: Before ruin the heart is exalted, and before glory it is humbled. That very ruin which happens in the occult precedes the ruin which happens in the manifest, while that is not thought to be ruin. For who thinks exaltation to be ruin, when already there is a defection there whereby the Most High has been forsaken?

Quis autem ruinam esse non uideat, quando fit mandati euidens atque indubitata transgressio? Propter hoc Deus illud prohibuit, quod cum eSet admissum, nulla defendi posset imaginatione iustitiae. Et audeo dicere superbis esse utile cadere in aliquod apertum manifestmmque peccatum, unde sibi displiceant, qui iam sibi placendo ceciderant.

But who does not see it to be a ruin, when there is an evident and indubitable transgression of the mandate? For this reason God prohibited that which, when it had been committed, could be defended by no imagination of justice. And I dare to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into some open and manifest sin, whence they may become displeasing to themselves, who had already fallen by pleasing themselves.

Salubrius enim Petrus sibi dispUcuit, quando fleuit, quam sibi placuit, quando praesumpsit. Hoc dicit et sacer psalmus: Imple facies eorum ognomonia, et quaerent nomen tuum, Domine, id est, ut tu eis placeas quaerentibus nomen tuum, qui sibi placuerant quaerendo suum.

More salubriously indeed Peter displeased himself when he wept, than he pleased himself when he presumed. The sacred psalm says this as well: Fill their faces with ignominy, and they will seek your name, O Lord, that is, that you may be pleasing to those seeking your name, who had pleased themselves by seeking their own.

[XIV] Sed est peior damnabiliorque superbia, qua etiam in peccatis manifestis suffugium excusationis inquiritur; sicut illi primi homines, quorum et illa dixit: Serpens seduxit me, et manducaui, et ille dixit: Mulier, quam dedo sti mecum, haec mihi dedit a ligno, et edi. Nusquam hic sonat petitio ueniae, nusquam inploratio medicinae. Nam licet isti non sicut Cain quod commiserunt negent, adhuc tamen superbia in aliud quaerit referre quod perperam fecit: superbia mulieris in serpentem, superbia uiri in mulierem.

[14] But there is a worse and more damnable pride, by which even in manifest sins a refuge of excusation is sought; just as those first humans, of whom the woman said: “The serpent deceived me, and I ate,” and the man said: “The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me from the tree, and I ate.” Nowhere here is there the sound of a petition for pardon, nowhere an imploration of medicine. For although these do not, like Cain, deny what they committed, nevertheless pride still seeks to refer to something else what it has done amiss: the pride of the woman onto the serpent, the pride of the man onto the woman.

Sed accusatio potius quam excusatio uera est, ubi mandati diuini est aperta transgressio. Neque enim hoc propterea non fecerunt, quia id mulier serpente suadente, uir muliere inpertiente commisit, quasi quicquam Deo, cui uel crederetur uel cederetur, anteponendum fuit.

But it is accusation rather than true excusation where there is an open transgression of the divine mandate. For neither did they on that account not do this, because the woman committed it with the serpent persuading, the man with the woman proffering it, as if anything ought to be set before God, to whom either it should have been believed or yielded.

[XV] Quia ergo contemptus est Deus iubens, qui creauerat, qui ad suam imaginem fecerat, qui ceteris animalibus praeposuerat, qui in paradiso constituerat, qui rerum omnium copiam salutisque praestiterat, qui praeceptis nec pluribus nec grandibus nec difficilibus onerauerat, sed uno breuissimo atque leuissimo ad oboedientiae salubritatem adminiculauerat, quo eam creaturam, cui libera seruitus expediret, se esse Dominum commonebat: iusta damnatio subsecuta est, talisque damnatio, ut homo, qui custodiendo mandatum futurus fuerat etiam carne spiritalis, fieret etiam mente carnalis et qui sua superbia sibi placuerat, Dei iustitia sibi donaretur; nec sic, ut in sua esset omnimodis potestate, sed a se ipse quoque dissentiens sub illo, cui peccando consensit, pro libertate, quam concupiuit, duram miseramque ageret seruitutem, mortuus spiritu uolens et corpore moriturus inuitus, desertor aeternae uitae etiam aeterna, nisi gratia liberaret, morte damnatus. Quisquis huius modi damnationem uel nimiam uel iniustam putat, metiri profecto nescit, quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando, ubi tanta erat non peccanffi facilitas. Sicut enim Abrahae non inmerito magna oboedientia praedicatur, quia, ut occideret filium, res difficillima est imperata: ita in paradiso tanto maior inoboedientia fuit, quanto id, quod praeceptum est, nullius difficultatis fuit.

[XV] Because therefore God, commanding, was contemned—he who had created, who had made [man] to his own image, who had set him over the other animals, who had established him in paradise, who had furnished abundance of all things and of salvation, who had burdened him with precepts neither more numerous nor great nor difficult, but had supported him with one most brief and most light unto the salubriousness of obedience, by which he reminded that creature, for whom free servitude would be expedient, that he himself was Lord—a just condemnation followed; and such a condemnation, that the man who, by guarding the mandate, was going to be even in flesh spiritual, became even in mind carnal; and he who by his own pride had pleased himself, by the justice of God was given over to himself; not thus, however, that he should be in every way in his own power, but even disagreeing with himself, under him to whom by sinning he consented, instead of the liberty which he coveted, he should lead a hard and wretched servitude, dead in spirit willingly and about to die in body unwillingly, a deserter from eternal life, condemned also to eternal death, unless grace should free him. Whoever thinks a condemnation of this sort either excessive or unjust surely does not know how to measure how great the iniquity was in sinning, where so great was the ease of not sinning. For just as Abraham’s great obedience is not without merit proclaimed, because a most difficult thing was commanded—that he should kill his son—so in paradise the disobedience was so much the greater, inasmuch as that which was commanded was of no difficulty.

Et sicut oboedientia secundi hominis eo praedicabilior, quo factus est oboediens usque ad mortem: ita inoboedientia primi hominis eo detestabilior, quo factus est inoboediens usque ad mortem. Vbi enim magna est inoboedientiae poena proposita et res a Creatore facilis imperata, quisnam satis explicet, quantum malum sit non oboedire in re facili et tantae potestatis imperio et tanto tenente supplicio?

And just as the obedience of the second man is the more praiseworthy in that he was made obedient unto death, so the disobedience of the first man is the more detestable in that he was made disobedient unto death. Where, indeed, a great penalty of disobedience has been set forth, and an easy thing has been commanded by the Creator, who can sufficiently explain how great an evil it is not to obey in an easy matter, to the command of so great a Power, and with so great a punishment impending?

Denique, ut breuiter dicatur, in illius peccati poena quid inoboedientiae nisi inoboedientia retributa est? Nam quae hominis est alia miseria nisi aduersus eum ipsum inoboedientia eius ipsius, ut, quoniam noluit quod potuit, quod non potest uelit? In paradiso enim etiamsi non omnia poterat ante peccatum, quidquid tamen non poterat, non uolebat, et ideo poterat omnia quae uolebat; nunc uero sicut in eius stirpe cognoscimus et diuina scriptura testatur, homo uanitati simUis factus est.

To conclude, to say it briefly, in the penalty of that sin what was repaid to inobedience except inobedience? For what other misery of man is there than his own inobedience against himself, so that, since he would not what he could, he now wills what he cannot? For in paradise, even if before the sin he could not do all things, nevertheless whatever he could not do, he did not will; and therefore he was able to do all that he willed; but now, as we recognize in his lineage and as divine Scripture bears witness, man has been made like to vanity.

Quis enim enumerat, quam multa quae non potest uelit, dum sibi ipse, id est uoluntati eius ipse animus eius eoque inferior caro eius, non obtemperat? Ipso namque inuito et animus plerumque turbatur et caro dolet et ueterescit et moritur, et quidquid aliud patimur, quod non pateremur inuiti, si uoluntati nostrae nostra natura omni modo atque ex omnibus partibus oboediret. At enim aliquid caro patitur, quo seruire non sinitur.

Who, indeed, can enumerate how many things he wishes which he cannot, while he does not obey himself—that is, while his own mind does not obey his will, and his flesh, inferior to it, does not obey? For even with himself unwilling, the mind is very often disturbed, and the flesh aches, grows old, and dies, and whatever else we suffer—things which we would not suffer against our will, if our nature obeyed our will in every way and from all parts. But indeed the flesh undergoes something whereby it is not permitted to be in service.

Quid interest unde, dum tamen per iustitiam dominantis Dei, cui subditi seruire noluimus, caro nostra nobis, quae subdita fuerat, non seruiendo molesta sit, quamuis nos Deo non seruiendo molesti nobis potuerimus esse, non illi? Neque enim sic ille nostro, ut nos seruitio corporis indigemus, et ideo nostra est quod recipimus, non illius poena quod fecimus. Dolores porro, qui dicuntur carnis, animae sunt in carne et ex carne.

What does it matter from what source, so long as, by the justice of the dominant God—whom, though subject, we were unwilling to serve—our flesh, which had been subject, by not serving is troublesome to us, although by not serving God we could have been troublesome to ourselves, not to Him? For He does not so need our service as we need the service of the body; and therefore what we receive is our own penalty for what we have done, not His. Moreover, the pains that are called “of the flesh” are the soul’s, in the flesh and from the flesh.

Quid enim caro per se ipsam sine anima uel dolet uel concupiscit? Sed quod concupiscere caro dicitur uel dolere, aut ipse homo est, sicut disseruimus, aut aliquid animae, quod carnis afficit passio, uel aspera, ut faciat dolorem, uel lenis, ut uoluptatem. Sed dolor carnis tantum modo offensio est animae ex carne et quaedam ab eius passione dissensio, sicut animi dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt.

For what does flesh by itself, without the soul, either suffer pain or desire? But what is said, that “the flesh desires or feels pain,” is either the man himself, as we have argued, or something of the soul, which a passion of the flesh affects—either rough, so as to make pain, or gentle, so as to make pleasure. But the pain of the flesh is merely an offense to the soul from the flesh and a certain dissension from its passion, just as the pain of the mind, which is called sadness, is a dissension from those things which have happened to us against our will.

Sed tristitiam plerumque praecedit metus, qui et ipse in anima est, non in carne. Dolorem autem carnis non praecedit ullus quasi metus carnis, qui ante dolorem in carne sentiatur. Voluptatem uero praecedit appetitus quidam, qui sentitur in carne quasi cupiditas eius, sicut fames et sitis et ea, quae in genitalibus usitatius libido nominatur, cum hoc sit generale uocabulum omnis cupiditatis.

But sadness is for the most part preceded by fear, which itself too is in the soul, not in the flesh. But no sort of, as it were, fear of the flesh precedes the pain of the flesh, which might be felt in the flesh before the pain. Pleasure, however, is preceded by a certain appetite, which is felt in the flesh as if its cupidity, such as hunger and thirst and those things which in the genitals are more commonly called libido, since this is the general term of all cupidity.

Nam et ipsam iram nihil aliud esse quam ulciscendi libidinem ueteres definierunt; quamms nonnumquam homo, ubi uindictae nullus est sensus, etiam rebus inanimis irascatur, et male scribentem stilum conlidat uel calamum frangat iratus. Verum et ista licet inrationabilior, tamen quaedam ulciscendi libido est, et nescio qua, ut ita dixerim, quasi umbra retribfitionis, ut qui male faciunt, mala patiantur. Est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur; est libido habendi pecuniam, quae auaritia; est libido quomodocumque uincendi, quae peruicacia; est libido gloriandi, quae iactantia nuncupatur.

For even the ancients defined ire itself to be nothing other than the lust of avenging; although sometimes a man, where there is no sense of vindication, even grows angry at inanimate things, and in anger dashes a stylus that writes badly or breaks a reed-pen. Yet even this, though more irrational, is nevertheless a certain lust of avenging, and I know not what, so to speak, as it were a shadow of retribution, to wit, that those who do ill may suffer ill. Therefore there is the lust of avenging, which is called ire; there is the lust of having money, which is avarice; there is the lust of winning somehow or other, which is pervicacity; there is the lust of glorying, which is called jactancy.

Sunt multae uariaeque libidines, quarum nonnullae habent etiam uocabula propria, quaedam uero non habent. Quis enim facile dixerit, quid uocetur libido dominandi, quam tamen plurimum ualere in tyrannorum animis etiam ciuilia bella testantur?

There are many and various libidos, some of which even have their own proper terms, but certain ones do not. For who would easily say what the lust of dominion should be called, which nevertheless even civil wars attest to be most powerful in the minds of tyrants?

[XVI] Cum igitur sint multarum libidines rerum, tamen, cum libido dicitur neque cuius rei libido sit additur, non fere adsolet animo occurrere nisi illa, qua obscenae partes corporis excitantur. Haec autem sibi non solum totum corpus nec solum extrinsecus, uerum etiam intrinsecus uindicat totumque commouet hominem animi simul affectu cum carnis appetitu coniuncto atque permixto, ut ea uoluptas sequatur, qua maior in corporis uoluptatibus nulla est; ita ut momento ipso temporis, quo ad eius peruenitur extremum, paene omnis acies et quasi uigilia cogitationis obruatur. Quis autem amicus sapientiae sanctorumque gaudiorum coniugalem agens uitam, sed, sicut apostolus monuit, sciens suum uas possidere in sanctificatione et honore, non in morbo desiderii, sicut et gentes, quae ignorant Deum, non mallet, si posset, sine hac libidine filios procreare, ut etiam in hoc serendae prolis officio sic eius menti ea, quae ad hoc opus creata sunt, quem ad modum cetera suis quaeque operibus distributa membra seruirent, nutu uoluntatis acta, non aestu libidinis incitata?

[16] Since, therefore, there are libidos for many things, yet when libido is spoken of, and it is not added of what thing the libido is, there is hardly accustomed to occur to the mind anything except that by which the obscene parts of the body are excited. And this claims for itself not only the whole body and not only from without, but also from within; and it stirs the whole human being, with an affection of the mind joined and mingled with an appetite of the flesh, so that that pleasure follows than which there is no greater among bodily pleasures; to such a degree that at the very moment of time when the extreme of it is reached, almost all the keenness and, as it were, the wakefulness of thought is overwhelmed. But what friend of wisdom and of holy joys, living a conjugal life, yet, as the apostle admonished, knowing how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honor, not in the disease of desire, as also the Gentiles who do not know God—would he not prefer, if he could, to beget children without this libido, so that even in this duty of sowing offspring, the things which were created for this work might serve his mind, just as the other members severally are assigned to their own works, moved by the nod of the will, not incited by the heat of libido?

Sed neque ipsi amatores huius uoluptatis siue ad concubitus coniugales siue ad inmunditias flagitiorum cum uoluerint commouentur; sed aliquando inportunus est ille motus poscente nullo, aliquando autem destituit inhiantem, et cum in animo concupiscentia ferueat, friget in corpore; atque ita mirum in modum non solum generandi uoluntati, uerum etiam lasciuiendi libidini libido non seruit, et cum tota plerumque menti cohibenti aduersetur, nonnumquam et aduersus se ipsa diuiditur commotoque animo in commouendo corpore se ipsa non sequitur.

But neither do the lovers of this pleasure, whether for conjugal intercourse or for the uncleannesses of flagitious crimes, get stirred when they wish; rather at times that motion is importunate with no one demanding, at other times it abandons the one gaping, and when concupiscence boils in the mind, it is cold in the body; and thus, in a wondrous manner, libido serves not only not the will to beget, but not even the libido of wantoning, and while for the most part it opposes the restraining mind altogether, sometimes also it is divided against itself, and with the mind aroused, in arousing the body it does not follow itself.

[XVII] Merito huius libidinis maxime pudet, merito et ipsa membra, quae suo quodam, ut ita dixerim, iure, non omni modo ad arbitrium nostrum mouet aut non mouet, pudenda dicuntur, quod ante peccatum hominis non fuerunt. Nam sicut scriptum est: Nudi erant, et non confundebantur, non quod eis sua nuditas esset incognita, sed turpis nuditas nondum erat, quia nondum libido membra illa praeter arbitrium commouebat, nondum ad hominis inoboedientiam redarguendam sua inoboedientia caro quodam modo testimonium perhibebat. Neque enim caeci creati erant, ut inperitum uulgus opinatur; quando quidem et ille uidit animalia, quibus nomina inposuit, et de illa legitur: Vidit mulier quia bonum lignum in escam et quia placet oculis ad uidendum.

[17] Deservedly there is most shame of this libido; deservedly even the members themselves—which, by their own, so to speak, right, do or do not move not in every way at our arbitrium—are called the pudenda, which before the sin of man they were not. For as it is written: They were naked, and were not ashamed, not because their own nakedness was unknown to them, but shameful nakedness was not yet, because libido was not yet stirring those members beyond the will; the flesh was not yet, by its own disobedience, in a certain manner bearing witness to convict man’s disobedience. For they were not created blind, as the unskilled common crowd supposes; since indeed he saw the animals to which he imposed names, and concerning her it is read: The woman saw that the tree was good for food and that it pleases the eyes to be looked upon.

Patebant ergo oculi eorum, sed ad hoc non erant aperti, hoc est non adtenti, ut cognoscerent quid eis indumento gratiae praestaretur, quando membra eorum uoluntati repugnare nesciebant. Qua gratia remota, ut poena reciproca inoboedientia plecteretur, extitit in motu corporis quaedam inpudens nouitas, unde esset indecens nuditas, et fecit adtentos reddiditque confusos. Hinc est quod, postea quam mandatum Dei aperta transgressione uiolarunt, scriptum est de illis: Et aperti sunt oculi amborum et agnouerunt quia nudi erant, et consuerunt folia fici et fecerunt sibi campestria.

Therefore their eyes were open, but they were not open to this, that is, not attentive, to recognize what was afforded to them by the vestment of grace, when their members did not know to resist their will. With that grace removed, in order that inobedience might be punished by a reciprocal penalty, there arose in the motion of the body a certain impudent novelty, whence there was an indecent nakedness, and it made them attentive and rendered them confounded. Hence it is that, after they had violated the command of God by an open transgression, it is written of them: “And the eyes of both were opened and they recognized that they were naked, and they sewed fig leaves and made for themselves loincloths.”

Aperti sunt, inquit, oculi amborum, non ad uidendum, nam et antea uidebant, sed ad discernendum inter bonum quod amiserant et malum quo ceciderant. Vnde et ipsum lignum, eo quod istam faceret dinoscentiam, si ad uescendum contra uetitum tangeretur, ex ea re nomen accepit, ut appellaretur lignum sciendi boni et mali. Experta enim morbi molestia euidentior fit etiam iucunditas sanitatis.

The eyes of both were opened, he says, not for seeing—for even before they saw—but for discerning between the good which they had lost and the evil into which they had fallen. Whence also the very tree, because it would make this cognition, if it were touched for eating contrary to the forbidden, received from that fact its name, so that it was called the tree of knowing good and evil. For, after the vexation of disease has been experienced, the pleasantness of health becomes even more evident.

Cognouerunt ergo quia nudi erant, nudati scilicet ea gratia, qua fiebat ut nuditas corporis nulla eos lege peccati menti eorum repugnante confunderet. Hoc itaque cognouerunt, quod felicius ignorarent, si Deo credentes et oboedientes non committerent, quod eos cogeret experiri infidelitas et inoboedientia quid nocet. Proinde confusi inoboedientia carnis suae, tamquam teste poena inoboedientiae suae, consuerunt folia fici et fecerunt sibi campestria, id est succinctoria genitalium.

They therefore recognized that they were naked—stripped, to wit, of that grace by which it came to pass that the nakedness of the body did not confound them, with no law of sin resisting their mind. This, therefore, they recognized, which more felicitously they would have been ignorant of, if, believing God and being obedient, they had not committed that which would compel them to experience what harm infidelity and disobedience do. Accordingly, confounded by the disobedience of their flesh, as though with the punishment as witness of their disobedience, they sewed fig leaves and made for themselves campestria, that is, girdings of the genitals.

Nam quidam interpretes "succinctoria" posuerunt. Porro autem "campestria" Latinum quidem uerbum est, sed ex eo dictum, quod iuuenes, qui nudi exercebantur in campo, pudenda operiebant; unde qui ita succincti sunt, campestratos uulgus appellat. Quod itaque aduersus damnatam culpa inoboedientiae uoluntatem libido inoboedienter mouebat, uerecundia pudenter tegebat.

For certain interpreters have put down "succinctoria." Moreover, "campestria" is indeed a Latin word, but is so called from this: that young men, who exercised naked in the field, used to cover their pudenda; whence those thus girded the common folk call "campestrati." Therefore what libido, moving disobediently against the will condemned by the fault of disobedience, was stirring, modesty bashfully covered.

Ex hoc omnes gentes, quoniam ab illa stirpe procreatae sunt, usque adeo tenent insitum pudenda uelare, ut quidam barbari illas corporis partes nec in balneis nudas habeant, sed cum earum tegimentis lauent. Per opacas quoque Indiae solitudines, cum quidam nudi philosophentur, unde gymnosophistae nominantur, adhibent tamen genitalibus tegmina, quibus per cetera membrorum carent.

From this, all nations, since they have been procreated from that stock, to such a degree retain as ingrafted the veiling of the pudenda, that certain barbarians do not have those parts of the body naked even in the baths, but bathe with their coverings. Through the shadowy solitudes of India also, although some philosophize naked, whence they are named Gymnosophists, nevertheless they apply coverings to the genitals, of which they are devoid for the rest of their limbs.

[XVIII] Opus uero ipsum, quod libidine tali peragitur, non solum in quibusque stupris, ubi latebrae ad subterfugienda humana iudicia requiruntur, uerum etiam in usu scortorum, quam terrena ciuitas licitam turpitudinem fecit, quamuis id agatur, quod eius ciuitatis nulla lex uindicat, deuitat tamen publicum etiam permissa atque inpunita libido conspectum, et uerecundia naturali habent prouisum lupanaria ipsa secretum faciliusque potuit inpudicitia non habere uincla prohibitionis, quam inpudentia remouere latibula illius foeditatis. Sed hanc etiam ipsi turpes turpitudinem uocant, cuius licet sint amatores, ostentatores esse non audent. Quid?

[18] The very work itself which is carried through by such libido, not only in whatever acts of stuprum, where hiding-places are sought to subterfuge human judgments, but also in the use of scorts, which the earthly city has made a licit turpitude, although that is done which no law of that city prosecutes, nevertheless libido, even where permitted and unpunished, avoids the public gaze; and by natural modesty it has been provided that the lupanaria themselves keep secrecy, and unchastity could more easily lack the bonds of prohibition than impudence remove the lurking-places of that foulness. But even they themselves, base as they are, call this a turpitude; though they are lovers of it, they do not dare to be ostentators of it. What?

concubitus coniugalis, qui secundum matrimonialium praescripta tabularum procreandorum fit causa liberorum, nonne et ipse quamquam sit licitus et honestus, remotum ab arbitris cubile conquirit? Nonne omnes famulos atque ipsos etiam paranymphos et quoscumque ingredi quaelibet necessitudo permiserat, ante mittit foras, quam uel blandiri coniux coniugi incipiat? Et quoniam, sicut ait etiam quidam "Romani maximus auctor eloquii", omnia recte facta in luce se conlocari uolunt, id est appetunt sciri: hoc recte factum sic appetit sciri, ut tamen erubescat uideri.

Conjugal intercourse, which according to the prescriptions of the matrimonial tablets is done for the sake of begetting children, does not even it, although it is licit and honorable, seek out a bed removed from witnesses? Does it not send out all the servants and even the paranymphs themselves, and whomever any tie had permitted to enter, before the spouse begins to caress the spouse? And since, as even a certain "the greatest Roman author of eloquence" says, all deeds rightly done wish to place themselves in the light, that is, they strive to be known: this right deed thus strives to be known, yet blushes to be seen.

Quis enim nescit, ut filii procreentur, quid inter se coniuges agant? quando quidem ut id agatur, tanta celebritate ducuntur uxores; et tamen cum agitur, unde filii nascantur, nec ipsi filii, si qui inde iam nati sunt, testes fieri permittuntur. Sic enim hoc recte factum ad sui notitiam lucem appetit animorum, ut tamen refugiat oculorum.

For who does not know, that children be procreated, what spouses do with one another? since indeed, in order that that may be done, wives are led in marriage with such great celebration; and yet when that is being done, whence children are born, not even the children themselves, if any have already been born from it, are permitted to be made witnesses. For thus this rightly done act seeks for itself the light of notice in minds, yet it shrinks from the eyes.

Vnde hoc, nisi quia sic geritur quod deceat ex natura, ut etiam quod pudeat comitetur ex poena?

Whence this, unless because that which is seemly by nature is thus conducted, so that even what causes shame is accompanied as by a penalty?

[XIX] Hinc est quod et illi philosophi, qui ueritati proprius accesserunt, iram atque libidinem uitiosas animi partes esse confessi sunt, eo quod turbide atque inordinate mouerentur ad ea etiam, quae sapientia perpetrari uetat, ac per hoc opus habere moderatrice mente atque ratione. Quam partem animi tertiam uelut in arce quadam ad istas regendas perhibent conlocatam, ut illa imperante, istis seruientibus possit in homine iustitia ex omni animi parte seruari. Hae igitur partes, quas et in homine sapiente ac temperante fatentur esse uitiosas, ut eas ab his rebus, ad quas iniuste mouentur, mens conpescendo et cohibendo refrenet ac reuocet atque ad ea permittat, quae sapientiae lege concessa sunt (sicut iram ad exerendam iustam cohercitionem, sicut libidinem ad propagandae prolis officium) —- hae, inquam, partes in paradiso ante peccatum uitiosae non erant.

[19] Hence it is that even those philosophers who approached verity more nearly confessed anger and lust to be vicious parts of the soul, for the reason that they are stirred turbulently and inordinately even toward things which wisdom forbids to be perpetrated, and therefore have need of a moderating mind and reason. They aver that this third part of the soul is placed, as it were, in a certain citadel for governing those, so that, with it commanding and these serving, justice may be preserved in a man from every part of the soul. These parts, therefore, which they admit to be vicious even in a wise and temperate man—so that the mind, by quelling and restraining, may bridle and call them back from those things toward which they are moved unjustly, and may permit them to those which are granted by the law of wisdom (as anger to exercise just coercion, as lust to the office of propagating offspring)—these parts, I say, in paradise before sin were not vicious.

Non enim contra rectam uoluntatem ad aliquid mouebantur, unde necesse esset eas rationis tamquam frenis regentibus abstinere. Nam quod nunc ita mouentur et ab eis, qui temperanter et iuste et pie uiuunt, alias facilius, alias difficibus, tamen cohibendo et repugnando modificantur, non est utique sanitas ex natura, sed languor ex culpa. Quod autem irae opera aliarumque affectionum in quibusque dictis atque factis non sic abscondit uerecundia, ut opera libidinis, quae fiunt genitalibus membris, quid causae est, nisi quia in ceteris membra corporis non ipsae affectiones, sed, cum eis consenserit, uoluntas mouet, quae in usu eorum omnino dominatur?

For they were not being moved toward anything against the right will, such that it would be necessary to hold them back by reason, as by governing reins. For the fact that now they are so moved, and that by those who live temperately and justly and piously they are, at times more easily, at times with more difficulty, nevertheless moderated by restraining and resisting—this is assuredly not health from nature, but languor from fault. But as to why modesty does not so hide the works of anger and of the other affections in whatever sayings and doings, as it does the works of libido, which are done by the genital members—what is the cause, unless that in the other members of the body it is not the affections themselves, but the will, when it has consented to them, that moves the members, which altogether has dominion in their use?

Nam quisquis uerbum emittit iratus uel etiam quemquam percutit, non posset hoc facere, nisi lingua et manus iubente quodam modo uoluntate mouerentur; quae membra, etiam cum ira nulla est, mouentur eadem uoluntate. At uero genitales corporis partes ita libido suo iuri quodam modo mancipauit, ut moueri non ualeant, si ipsa defuerit et nisi ipsa uel ultro uel excitata surrexerit. Hoc est quod pudet, hoc est quod intuentium oculos erubescendo deuitat; magisque fert homo spectantium multitudinem, quando iniuste irascitur homini, quam uel unius aspectum, et quando iuste miscetur uxori.

For whoever emits a word in anger, or even strikes someone, would not be able to do this unless the tongue and the hands were moved, as it were at the command, by the will; which members, even when there is no anger, are moved by the same will. But truly the genital parts of the body libido has, in a certain manner, brought under its own dominion, so that they are not able to be moved if it is lacking, and unless it itself either of its own accord or when excited has risen. This is what brings shame, this is what, by blushing, avoids the eyes of onlookers; and a man more readily bears a multitude of spectators when he is unjustly angered at a man than even the gaze of a single person when he is justly mingled with his wife.

[XX] Hoc illi canini philosophi, hoc est Cynici, non uiderunt, proferentes contra humanam uerecundiam quid aliud quam caninam, hoc est inmundam inpudentemque sententiam? ut scilicet, quoniam iustum est quod fit in uxore, palam ndn pudeat id agere nec in uico aut platea qualibet coniugalem concubitum deuitare. Vicit tamen pudor naturalis opinionem huius erroris.

[20] This the doggish philosophers, that is, the Cynics, did not see, bringing forward against human modesty what else than a doggish—namely, an unclean and impudent—opinion? namely, that, since what is just is what is done with a wife, it should not be shameful to do that openly, nor to avoid conjugal intercourse in a neighborhood or in any street or public square. Nevertheless, natural modesty overcame the opinion of this error.

Nam etsi perhibent, hoc aliquando gloriabundum fecisse Diogenem, ita putantem sectam suam nobiliorem futuram, si in hominum memoria insignior eius inpudentia figeretur, postea tamen a Cynicis fieri cessatum est, plusque ualuit pudor, ut erubescerent homines hominibus, quam error, ut homines canibus esse similes affectarent. Vnde et illum uel illos, qui hoc fecisse referuntur, potius arbitror concumbentium motus dedisse oculis hominum nescientium quid sub pallio gereretur, quam humano premente conspectu potuisse illam peragi uoluptatem. Ibi enim philosophi non erubescebant uideri se uelle concumbere, ubi libido ipsa erubesceret surgere.

For although they report that Diogenes, exulting, once did this, thinking thus that his sect would become more noble if his more conspicuous impudence were fixed in the memory of men, nevertheless afterward the Cynics ceased to do it, and modesty prevailed more—so that men blushed before men—than error, by which men would affect to be like dogs. Whence I judge that he, or those, who are reported to have done this, rather furnished to the eyes of men—who did not know what was being transacted under the cloak—the motions of those coupling, than that that pleasure could have been consummated under the pressing human gaze. For there the philosophers did not blush to be seen as wishing to concumb, where libido itself would blush to arise.

Et nunc uidemus adhuc esse philosophos Cynicos; hi enim sunt, qui non solum amiciuntur pallio, uermm etiam clauam ferunt; nemo tamen eorum audet hoc facere, quod si aliqui ausi essent, ut non dicam ictibus lapidantium, certe conspuentium saliuis obruerentur. Pudet igitur huius libidinis humanam sine ulla dubitatione naturam, et merito pudet. In eius quippe inoboedientia, quae genitalia corporis membra solis suis motibus subdidit et potestati uoluntatis eripuit, satis ostenditur, quid sit hominis illi primae inoboedientiae retributum; quod in ea parte maxime oportuit apparere, qua generatur ipsa natura, quae illo primo et magno in deterius est mutata peccato; a cuius nexu nullus eruitur, nisi id, quod cum omnes in uno essent, in communem perniciem perpetratum est et Dei iustitia uindicatum, Dei gratia in singmis expietur.

And now we see that there are still Cynic philosophers; for these are they who not only are clothed with a pallium, but even carry a club; yet none of them dares to do this, for if any had dared, not to say by the blows of stone-throwers, surely they would be overwhelmed by the salivas of those spitting. Therefore this libido, without any doubt, puts human nature to shame, and rightly it shames. For in its inobedience, which has subjected the genital members of the body to their own motions alone and has snatched them from the power of the will, it is sufficiently shown what retribution for that first inobedience has been rendered to man; which it was most fitting should appear in that part wherein nature itself is generated, the nature which by that first and great sin was changed for the worse; from whose bond no one is rescued, unless that which, when all were in one, was perpetrated unto the common perdition and vindicated by the justice of God, be expiated by the grace of God in individuals.

[XXI] Absit itaque, ut credamus illos coniuges in paradiso constitutos per hanc libidinem, de qua erubescendo eadem membra texerunt, impleturos fuisse quod in sua benedictione Deus dixit: Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram. Post peccatum quippe orta est haec libido; post peccatum ea " natma non inpudens amissa potestate, cui comus ex omni parte seruiebat, sensit adtendit, erubuit operuit. Illa uero benedictio nuptiarum, ut coniugati crescerent et multiplicarentur et implerent terram, quamuis et in delinquentibus manserit, tamen antequam delinquerent data est, ut cognosceretur procreationem filiorum ad gloriam conubii, non ad poenam pertinere peccati.

[21] Far be it, then, that we should believe that those spouses, placed in paradise, would have fulfilled, through this lust—on account of which, by blushing, they covered those same members—what God said in His blessing: Increase and multiply and fill the earth. For after the sin this lust arose; after the sin that nature, not shameless, having lost the power to which the mind in every part was in service, perceived, took heed, blushed, covered itself. But that blessing of nuptials—that the married should grow and multiply and fill the earth—although it remained even in delinquents, nevertheless was given before they sinned, so that it might be known that the procreation of children pertains to the glory of connubium, not to the penalty of sin.

Sed nunc homines, profecto illius quae in paradiso fuit felicitatis ignari, nisi per hoc, quod experti sunt, id est per libiffinem, de qua uidemus etiam ipsam honestatem erubescere nuptiarum, non potuisse gigni filios opinantur, alii scripturas diuinas, ubi legitur post peccatum puduisse nuditatis et pudenda esse contecta, prorsus non accipientes, sed infideliter inridentes; alii uero quamuis eas accipiant et honorent, illud tamen quod dictum est: Crescite et multiplicamini, non secundum carnalem fecunditatem uolunt intellegi, quia et secundum animam legitur tale aliquid dictum: Multiplicabis me in anima mea in uirtute, ut id, quod in genesi sequitur: Et implete terram et dominamini eius, terram intellegant carnem, quam praesentia sua implet anima eiusque maxime dominatur, cum in uirtute multiplicatur; carnales autem fetus sine libidine, quae post peccatum exorta inspecta, confusa uelata est, nec tunc nasci potuisse, sicut neque nunc possunt, nec in paradiso futuros fuisse, sed foris, sicut et factum est. Nam postea quam inde dimissi sunt, ad gignendos filios coierunt eosque genuerunt.

But now men, plainly ignorant of that felicity which was in paradise, suppose that sons could not have been begotten except through this, which they have experienced—that is, through libido—on account of which we see even the very honesty of nuptials blushing; some not receiving at all the divine Scriptures, where it is read that after the sin there was shame of nakedness and the pudenda were covered, but faithlessly deriding them; others indeed, although they receive and honor them, nevertheless do not wish that which was said, Be fruitful and multiply, to be understood according to carnal fecundity, because something of this sort is read as said according to the soul: You will multiply me in my soul in virtue; so that what follows in Genesis, And fill the earth and have dominion over it, they understand the earth to be the flesh, which the soul fills by its presence and most of all rules when it is multiplied in virtue; but that carnal offspring without libido—which, arisen after the sin, when inspected is confounded and veiled—neither then could have been born (just as neither now can they), nor would have been in paradise, but outside, just as in fact it happened. For after they were sent out from there, they came together for the begetting of sons and begot them.

[XXII] Nos autem nullo modo dubitamus secundum benedictionem Dei crescere et multiplicari et implere terram donum esse nuptiarum, quas Deus ante peccatum hominis ab initio constituit, creando masculum et feminam, qui sexus euidens utique in carne est. Huic quippe operi Dei etiam benedictio ipsa subiuncta est. Nam cum scriptura dixisset: Masculum et feminam fecit eos, continuo subdidit: Et benedixit eos Deus dicens: Crescite et multiplicamini et implete terram et dominamini eius, et cetera.

[22] But we in no way doubt that, according to the benediction of God, to increase and to be multiplied and to fill the earth is a gift of nuptials, which God, before the sin of man, from the beginning constituted by creating male and female—the sex which is, of course, evident in the flesh. To this work of God the benediction itself also was subjoined. For when Scripture had said: Male and female he made them, it straightway added: And God blessed them, saying: Increase and be multiplied and fill the earth and have dominion over it, and so forth.

Quae omnia quamquam non inconuenienter possint etiam ad intellectum spiritalem referri, masculum tamen et feminam non sicut simile aliquid etiam in homine uno intellegi potest, quia uidelicet in eo aliud est quod regit, aliud quod regitur; sed sicut euidentissime apparet in diuersi sexus corporibus, masculum et feminam ita creatos, ut prolem generando crescerent et multiplicarentur et implerent terram, magnae absurditatis est reluctari. Neque enim de spiritu qui imperat et carne quae obtemperat, aut deanimo rationali qui regit et inrationali cupiditate quae regitur, aut de uirtute contemplatiua quae excellit et de actiua quae subditur, aut de intellectu mentis et sensu corporis, sed aperte de uinculo coniugali, quo inuicem sibi uterque sexus obstringitur, Dominus interrogatus utrum liceret quacumque causa dimittere uxorem, quoniam propter duritiam cordis Israelitarum Moyses dari permisit libellum repudii, respondit atque ait: Non legistis, quia, qui fecit ab initio, masculum et feminam fecit eos et dixit: Propter hoc dimittet humo patrem et matrem et, adhaerebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una? Itaque iam non sunt duo, sed una caro.

All of which things, although they can not inappropriately be referred also to a spiritual understanding, yet “male and female” are not to be understood as something similar even within one man—since in him, to wit, one thing is that which rules and another that which is ruled—but, as it most manifestly appears in bodies of different sex, to resist that male and female were thus created, that by generating offspring they might grow and be multiplied and fill the earth, is a great absurdity. For it is not of the spirit that commands and the flesh that obeys, or of the rational soul that rules and the irrational concupiscence that is ruled, or of the contemplative virtue that excels and the active that is subjected, or of the intellect of the mind and the sense of the body, but openly of the conjugal bond by which each sex is mutually bound to the other, that the Lord, when asked whether it were permitted for any cause to dismiss a wife—since Moses, on account of the hardness of heart of the Israelites, allowed a bill of repudiation to be given—answered and said: Have you not read that he who made from the beginning made them male and female, and said: For this cause a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh? Therefore they are now no longer two, but one flesh.

Quod ergo Deus coniunxit, homo non separet. Certum est igitur masculum et feminam ita primitus institutos, ut nunc homines duos diuersi sexus uidemus et nouimus, unum autem dici uel propter coniunctionem uel propter originem feminae, quae de masculi latere creata est. Nam et apostolus per hoc primum, quod Deo instituente praecessit, exemplum singulos quusque admonet, ut uiri uxores suas diligant.

What therefore God has conjoined, let man not separate. It is certain, then, that male and female were in the first instance instituted in such a way that, just as now we see and know two human beings of diverse sex, they are nevertheless said to be one, either on account of the conjunction or on account of the origin of the female, who was created from the side of the male. For the apostle also, by this primacy which, with God instituting it, went before, provides an exemplar to admonish each individual, that men should love their wives.

[XXIII] Quisquis autem dicit non fuisse coituros nec generaturos, nisi peccassent, quid dicit, nisi propter numerositatem sanctorum necessarium hominis fuisse peccatum? Si enim non peccando soli remanerent, quia, sicut putant, nisi peccassent, generare non possent: profecto ut non soli duo iusti homines possent esse, sed multi, necessarium peccatum fuit. Quod si credere absurdum est, illud potius est credendum, quod sanctorum numerus quantus conplendae illi sufficit beatissimae ciuitati, tantus existeret, etsi nemo peccasset, quantus nunc per Dei gratiam de multitudine colfigitur peccatorum, quo usque filii saeculi huius generant et generantur.

[23] But whoever says that they would not have had coition nor generated, unless they had sinned—what does he say except that, for the numerosity of the saints, the sin of man was necessary? For if by not sinning they would have remained alone, because, as they suppose, unless they had sinned they could not generate: plainly, in order that there might be not only two just human beings but many, sin was necessary. But if it is absurd to believe this, rather this is to be believed: that the number of the saints—as great as suffices for the filling of that most blessed City—would have existed, even if no one had sinned, as great as is now gathered by the grace of God from the multitude of sinners, so long as the sons of this age generate and are generated.

Et ideo illae nuptiae dignae felicitate paradisi, si peccatum non fuisset, et diligendam prolem gignerent et pudendam libidinem non haberent. Sed quo modo id fieri posset, nunc non est quo demonstretur exemplo. Nec ideo tamen incredibile debet uideri etiam illud unum sine ista libidine uoluntati potuisse seruire, cui tot membra nunc seruiunt.

And therefore those nuptials would be worthy of the felicity of paradise, if sin had not been, and they would beget offspring to be loved and would not have shameful libido. But in what way that could be done, there is now no means by which it may be demonstrated by example. Nor for that reason ought it, however, to seem incredible that even that one [member] could have been able to serve the will without that libido, to which so many members now serve.

An uero manus et pedes mouemus, cum uolumus, ad ea, quae his membris agenda sunt, sine ullo renisu, tanta facilitate, quanta et in nobis et in aliis uidemus, maxime in artificibus quorumque operum corporalium, ubi ad exercendam infirmiorem tardioremque naturam agilior accessit industria; et non credimus ad opus generationis filiorum, si libido non fuisset, quae peccato inoboedientiae retributa est, oboedienter hominibus ad uoluntatis nutum similiter ut cetera potuisse illa membra seruire? Nonne Cicero in libris de re publica, cum de imperiorum differentia disputaret et huius rei similitudinem ex natura hominis adsumeret, ut filiis dixit imperari corporis membris propter oboediendi facilitatem; uitiosas uero animi partes ut seruos asperiore imperio coherceri? Et utique ordine naturali animus anteponitur corpori, et tamen ipse animus imperat corpori facilius quam sibi.

Or indeed do we move our hands and feet, when we will, to those things that are to be done by these members, without any resistance, with just such facility as we see both in ourselves and in others, especially in the artificers of whatever corporeal works, where, for the exercising of a weaker and slower nature, a nimbler industry has come in to assist; and do we not believe that, for the work of the generation of children, if libido had not existed—libido which has been meted out as retribution for the sin of disobedience—those members could have served human beings obediently at the nod of the will, just as the rest? Does not Cicero in the books On the Republic, when he was disputing about the difference of commands and took a likeness of this matter from the nature of man, say that the members of the body are commanded as children because of the ease of obeying, but that the vicious parts of the mind are coerced, like slaves, by a harsher command? And assuredly by the natural order the mind is set before the body, and yet the mind itself commands the body more easily than itself.

Verum tamen haec libido, de qua nunc disserimus, eo magis erubescenda extitit, quod animus in ea nec sibi efficaciter imperat, ut omnino non libeat, nec omni modo corpori, ut pudenda membra uoluntas potius quam libido commoueat; quod si ita esset, pudenda non essent. Nunc uero pudet animum resisti sibi a corpore, quod ei natura inferiore subiectum est. In aliis quippe affectionibus cum sibi resistit, ideo minus pudet, quia, cum a se ipso uincitur, ipse se uincit; etsi inordinate atque uitiose, quia ex his partibus, quae rationi subici debent, tamen a partibus suis ac per hoc, ut dictum est, a se ipso uincitur.

Nevertheless, this libido, about which we are now discoursing, has turned out all the more blush‑worthy, because therein the mind neither effectively commands itself so as not to desire at all, nor in every way commands the body, so that the shameful members are moved by will rather than by libido; which, if it were so, they would not be shameful. Now indeed the mind is ashamed to be resisted by the body, which is subject to it by an inferior nature. For in other affections, when it resists itself, for that reason it is less ashamed, because, when it is conquered by itself, it is itself that conquers itself—albeit inordinately and viciously, since it is by those parts which ought to be subject to reason; nevertheless it is conquered by its own parts and, through this, as has been said, by itself.

Nam cum ordinate se animus uincit, ut inrationabiles motus eius menti rationique subdantur, si tamen et illa Deo subdita est, laudis atque uirtutis est. Minus tamen pudet, cum sibi animus ex uitiosis suis partibus non obtemperat, quam cum ei corpus, quod alterum ab illo est atque infra illum est et cuius sine illo natura non uiuit, uolenti iubentique non cedit.

For when the mind conquers itself in an orderly way, so that its irrational motions are subjected to mind and reason—if, however, that too is subjected to God—it is a matter of praise and virtue. Yet it shames less when the mind does not obey itself from its own vicious parts, than when the body—which is other than it and beneath it, and whose nature does not live without it—does not yield to it when it wills and commands.

Sed cum alia membra retinentur uoluntatis imperio, sine quibus illa, quae contra uoluntatem libidine concitantur, id quod appetunt implere non possunt, pudicitia custoditur, non amissa, sed non permissa delectatione peccati. Hunc renisum, hanc repugnantiam, hanc uoluntatis et libidinis rixam uel certe ad uoluntatis sufficientiam libidinis indigentiam procul dubio, nisi culpabilis inoboedientia poenali inoboedientia plecteretur, in paradiso nuptiae non haberent, sed uoluntati membra, ut cetera, ita cuncta seruirent. Ita genitale aruum uas in hoc opus creatum seminaret, ut nunc terram manus, et quod modo de hac re nobis uolentibus diligentius disputare uerecundia resistit et compellit ueniam honore praefato a pudicis auribus poscere, cur id fieret nulla causa esset, sed in omnia, quae de huius modi membris sensum cogitandis adtingerent, sine ullo timore obscenitatis liber senno ferretur, nec ipsa uerba essent, quae uocarentur obscena, sed quidquid inde diceretur, tam honestum esset, quam de aliis cum loquimur corporis partibus.

But when the other members are held in check by the command of the will—without which those that are stirred up by libido against the will cannot fulfill what they crave—chastity is guarded, not lost, but with the delectation of sin not permitted. This backward-bending, this repugnance, this wrangle of will and libido, or at least, alongside the will’s sufficiency, libido’s indigence—without doubt, unless culpable disobedience were punished by penal disobedience—nuptials in paradise would not have had; rather the members would serve the will, as the rest do, so all. Thus the genital field, the vessel created for this work, would sow, as the hand now [sows] the earth; and that which modesty now resists when we are willing to discuss this matter more carefully, and compels us, with the aforesaid honor, to ask pardon of chaste ears—there would be no cause why that should be done; but into all considerations that touched on thinking about members of this kind, free discourse would move without any fear of obscenity; nor would there be words themselves that are called “obscene,” but whatever might be said from that quarter would be as honest as when we speak of other parts of the body.

Quisquis ergo ad has litteras inpudicus accedit, culpam refugiat, non naturam; facta denotet suae turpitudinis, non uerba nostrae necessitatis; in quibus mihi facillime pudicus et religiosus lector uel auditor ignoscit, donec infidelitatem refellam, non de fide rerum inexpertarum, sed de sensu expertarum argumentantem. Legit enim haec sine offensione, qui non exhorret apostolum horrenda feminarum flagitia reprehendentem, quae inmutauerunt naturalem usum in eum usum, qui est contra naturam, praecipue quia nos non damnabilem obscenitatem nunc, sicut ille, commemoramus atque reprehendimus, sed in explicandis, quantum possumus, humanae generationis effectibus uerba tamen, sicut ille, obscena uitamus.

Whoever therefore approaches these letters unchaste, let him shun the fault, not nature; let him mark the deeds of his own turpitude, not the words of our necessity; in which matters a chaste and religious reader or hearer most easily pardons me, until I refute the unbelief that argues not from faith in unexperienced things, but from the sense of things experienced. For he reads these without offense who does not shudder at the Apostle reproving the horrendous flagitious acts of women, who altered the natural use into that use which is against nature, especially since we now do not, as he did, recall and censure damnable obscenity, but, in explaining, as far as we are able, the effects of human generation, yet, as he, we avoid obscene words.

[XXIV] Seminaret igitur prolem uir, susciperet femina genitalibus membris, quando id opus esset et quantum opus esset, uoluntate motis, non libidine concitatis. Neque enim ea sola membra mouemus ad nutum, quae conpactis articulata sunt ossibus, sicut manus et pedes et digitos, uerum etiam illa, quae mollibus remissa sunt neruis, cum uolumus, mouemus agitando et porrigendo producimug et torquendo flectimus et constringendo duramus, sicut ea sunt, quae in ore ac facie, quantum potest, uoluntas mouet. Pulmones denique ipsi omnium, nisi medullarum, mollissimi uiscerum et ob hoc antro pectoris communiti, ad spiritum ducendum ac remittendum uocemque emittendam seu modificandam, sicut folles fabrorum uel organorum, flantis, respirantis, loquentis, clamantis, cantantis seruiunt uoluntati.

[24] Accordingly, the man would sow progeny, the woman would receive it with genital members, when that work were needed and as much as it were needed, the members moved by will, not incited by libido. For we do not move at a nod only those members which are jointed with compact bones, like hands and feet and fingers, but also those which are relaxed by soft sinews: when we will, we move them—by agitating and by stretching we prolong them, by twisting we bend them, and by constricting we harden them—such as are those which in the mouth and face the will, as far as it can, moves. Finally, the lungs themselves, of all the viscera the softest except the marrows, and on account of this housed in the cavern of the chest, serve the will for drawing in and sending back breath and for emitting or modulating the voice, like the bellows of smiths or of organs, to the one who blows, breathes, speaks, shouts, sings.

Omitto quod animalibus quibusdam naturaliter inditum est, ut tegmen, quo corpus omne uestitur, si quid in quocumque loco eius senserint abigendum, ibi tantum moueant, ubi sentiunt, nec solum insidentes muscas, uerum etiam haerentes hastas cutis tremore discutiant. Numquid quia id non potest homo, ideo Creator quibus uoluit animantibus donare non potuit? Sic ergo et ipse homo potuit oboedientiam etiam inferiorum habere membrorum, quam sua inoboedientia perdidit.

I omit the fact that in certain animals it has been naturally implanted that the tegument with which the whole body is clothed, if they sense anything anywhere on it that ought to be driven off, they move only there where they feel it, and that they shake off not only flies sitting upon them, but even spears adhering by a tremor of the skin. Is it because a man cannot do this that therefore the Creator could not bestow it upon whatever animals he willed? Thus even man himself could have had the obedience of his lower members as well, which he lost by his own disobedience.

Neque enim Deo difficile fuit sic illum condere, ut in eius carne etiam illud non nisi eius uoluntate moueretur, quod nunc nisi libidine non mouetur.

For it was not difficult for God thus to fashion him, that in his flesh even that which now is not moved except by libido would be moved only by his will.

Nam et hominum quorundam naturas nouimus multum ceteris dispares et ipsa raritate mirabiles nonnulla ut uolunt de corpore facientium, quae alii nullo modo possunt et audita uix credunt. Sunt enim, qui et aures moueant uel singulas uel ambas simul. Sunt qui totam caesariem capite inmoto, quantum capilli occupant, deponunt ad frontem reuocantque cum uolunt.

For we also know the natures of certain humans, very unlike the rest and marvelous by their very rarity, doing from the body some things as they will, which others by no means can do and, even when heard of, scarcely believe. For there are those who move their ears, either singly or both at once. There are those who, with the head unmoved, let down the whole head of hair, to the extent the hairs occupy, to the forehead and recall it when they wish.

Sunt qui eorum quae uorauerint incredibiliter plurima et uaria paululum praecordiis contrectatis tamquam de sacculo quod placuerit integerrimum proferunt. Quidam uoces auium pecorumque et aliorum quorumlibet hominum sic imitantur atque exprimunt, ut, nisi uideantur, discerni omnino non possint. Nonnulli ab imo sine paedore ullo ita numerosos pro arbitrio sonitus edunt, ut ex illa etiam parte cantare uideantur.

There are some who, of the things they have devoured—amazingly many and various—when their precordia have been lightly handled, bring forth, as from a little satchel, whatever pleases, entirely intact. Certain persons so imitate and express the voices of birds, of herds, and of men of any sort whatsoever, that, unless they are seen, they cannot at all be discerned. Some, from the depth, without any foulness whatsoever, emit at will such numerous and rhythmical sounds that they seem even to sing from that part.

Ipse sum expertus sudare hominem solere, cum uellet. Notum est quosdam flere, cum uolunt, atque ubertim lacrimas fundere. Iam illud multo est incredibilius, quod plerique fratres memoria recentissima experti sunt.

I myself have observed a man sweat whenever he wished. It is known that certain people weep when they will, and pour forth tears copiously. Now that is much more incredible, which very many brothers have experienced in most recent memory.

Presbyter fuit quidam Restitutus nomine in paroecia Calamensis ecclesiae. Quando ei placebat (rogabatur autem ut hoc faceret ab eis, qui rem mirabilem coram scire cupiebant), ad imitatas quasi lamentantis cuiuslibet hominis uoces ita se auferebat a sensibus et iacebat simillimus mortuo, ut non solum uellicantes atque pungentes minime sentiret, sed aliquando etiam igne ureretur admotu sine ullo doloris sensu nisi postmodum ex uulnere; non autem obnitendo, sed non sentiendo non mouere corpus eo probabatur, quod tamquam in defuncto nullus inueniebatur anhelitus; hominum tamen uoces, si clarius loquerentur, tamquam de longinquo se audire postea referebat. Cum itaque corpus etiam nunc quibusdam, licet in came corruptibili hanc aerumnosam ducentibus uitam, ita in plerisque motionibus et affectionibus extra usitatum naturae modum mirabiliter seruiat: quid causae est, ut non credamus ante inoboedientiae peccatum corruptionisque supplicium ad propagandam prolem sine ulla libidine sermre uoluntati humanae humana membra potuisse?

There was a certain presbyter named Restitutus in the parish of the Church of Calama. When it pleased him (and he was asked to do this by those who wished to know the marvel face to face), upon imitated voices as it were of any lamenting person he so withdrew himself from his senses and lay most like to a dead man, that not only did he in no way feel those who pinched and pricked him, but sometimes even, when fire was applied, he was burned without any sense of pain except afterward from the wound; and he was proved not to move his body, not by resisting, but by not feeling, in that, as in one deceased, no breath was found; yet he afterward reported that he heard human voices, if they spoke more clearly, as if from afar. Since, therefore, even now the body in certain persons—though carrying on this grievous life in corruptible flesh—does so marvelously serve in very many motions and affections beyond the customary mode of nature: what reason is there that we should not believe that, before the sin of disobedience and the punishment of corruption, the human members could have been able to serve the human will for propagating progeny without any libido?

Donatus est itaque homo sibi, quia deseruit Deum placendo sibi, et non oboediens Deo non potuit oboedire nec sibi. Hinc euidentior miseria, qua homo non uiuit ut uult. Nam si ut uellet uiueret, beatum se putaret; sed nec sic tamen esset, si turpiter uiueret.

Thus man was given over to himself, because by pleasing himself he deserted God; and, not being obedient to God, he was not able to obey even himself. Hence the more evident misery, whereby man does not live as he wills. For if he were to live as he would, he would reckon himself blessed; yet not even so would he be, if he were to live basely.

[XXV] Quamquam si diligentius adtendamus, nisi beatus non uiuit ut uult, et nullus beatus nisi iustus. Sed etiam ipse iustus non uiuet ut uult, nisi eo peruenerit, ubi mori falli offendi omnino non possit eique sit certum ita semper futurum. Hoc enim natura expetit, nec plene atque perfecte beata erit nisi adepta quod expetit.

[25] Although, if we attend more diligently, no one lives as he wills except the blessed, and no one is blessed except the just. But even the just man himself will not live as he wills unless he has arrived at that point where he cannot at all die, be deceived, or be harmed, and it is certain to him that it will always be so. For nature desires this, nor will it be fully and perfectly blessed unless it has obtained what it seeks.

Nunc uero quis hominum potest ut uult uiuere, quando ipsum uiuere non est in potestate? Viuere enim uult, mori cogitur. Quo modo ergo uiuit ut uult, qui non uiuit quamdiu uult?

Now indeed, who of men is able to live as he wills, when living itself is not in his power? For he wills to live, he is compelled to die. In what way, then, does he live as he wills, who does not live as long as he wills?

Quod si mori uoluerit, quo modo potest ut uult uiuere, qui non uult uiuere? Et si ideo mori uelit, non quo nolit uiuere, sed ut post mortem melius uiuat: nondum ergo ut uult uiuit, sed cum ad id quod uult moriendo peruenerit. Verum ecce uiuat ut uult, quoniam sibi extorsit sibique imperauit non uelle quod non potest, atque hoc uelle quod potest (sicut ait Terentius:

But if he should have willed to die, how can he live as he wills, who does not will to live? And if therefore he should will to die, not because he does not will to live, but in order that after death he may live better: not yet, then, does he live as he wills, but when by dying he shall have come to that which he wills. Yet behold, let him live as he wills, since he has extorted from himself and has commanded himself not to will what he cannot, and to will this which he can (as Terence says:

Quoniam non potest id fieri quod uis.

Since what you wish cannot be done.

Id uelis quod possis): num ideo beatus est; quia patienter miser est? Beata quippe uita si non amatur, non habetur. Porro si amatur et habetur, ceteris omnibus rebus excellentius necesse est ametur, quoniam propter hanc amandum est quidquid aliud amatur.

Will that which you can): is he therefore blessed, because he is patiently wretched? For a blessed life, if it is not loved, is not had. Furthermore, if it is loved and had, it is necessary that it be loved more excellently than all other things, since on account of this, whatever else is loved is to be loved.

Porro si tantum amatur, quantum amari digna est (non enim beatus est, a quo ipsa beata uita fion amatur ut digna est): fieri non potest, ut eam, qui sic amat, non aeternam uelit. Tunc igitur beata erit, quando aeterna erit.

Moreover, if it is loved only as much as it is worthy to be loved (for he is not blessed, by whom the blessed life itself is not loved as it is worthy to be), it cannot be that he who loves it thus does not will it to be eternal. Then therefore it will be blessed, when it will be eternal.

[XXVI] Viuebat itaque homo in paradiso sicut uolebat, quamdiu hoc uolebat quod Deus iusserat; uiuebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus; uiuebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper uiuere habens in potestate. Cibus aderat ne esuriret, potus ne sitiret, lignum uitae ne illum senecta dissolueret. Nihil corruptionis in corpore uel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis eius sensibus ingerebat.

[26] Thus the man lived in paradise as he willed, so long as he willed that which God had commanded; he lived enjoying God, from which good he was good; he lived without any want, having it in his power to live thus forever. Food was at hand lest he hunger, drink lest he thirst, the tree of life lest old age dissolve him. Nothing of corruption in the body or from the body was bringing any annoyances upon any of his senses.

Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus ictus metuebatur extrinsecus. Summa in carne sanitas, in animo tota tranquillitas. Sicut in paradiso nullus aestus aut frigus, sic in eius habitatore nulla ex cupiditate uel timore accidebat bonae uoluntatis offensio.

No disease within, no blow was feared without. The highest health in the flesh; in the mind complete tranquility. Just as in paradise there was no heat or cold, so in its inhabitant no offense to good will befell arising from cupidity or from fear.

Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum. Gaudium uerum perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta, atque inter se coniugum fida ex honesto amore societas, concors mentis corporisque uigilia et mandati sine labore custodia. Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat inuitum.

Nothing at all was sad, nothing was vainly gleeful. True joy was perpetuated from God, toward whom charity blazed from a pure heart and a good conscience and a faith not feigned, and between the spouses there was a faithful fellowship from honest love, a concordant vigil of mind and body, and a keeping of the command without labor. No lassitude wearied the one at leisure, no sleep pressed the unwilling.

In tanta facilitate rerum et felicitate hominum absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo, sed eo uoluntatis nutu mouerentur membra illa quo cetera, et sine ardoris inlecebroso stimulo cum tranquillitate animi et corporis nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris. Neque enim quia experientia probari non potest, ideo credendum non est, quando illas corporis partes non ageret turbidus calor, sed spontanea potestas, sicut opus esset, adhiberet, ita tunc potuisse utero coniugis salua integritate feminei genitalis uirile semen inmitti, sicut nunc potest eadem integritate salua ex utero uirginis fluxus menstrui cruoris emitti. Eadem quippe uia posset illud inici, qua hoc potest eici.

In so great an ease of things and felicity of men, far be it that we suspect that offspring could not be sown without the disease of libido, but that by the nod of the will those members would be moved as the others are, and without the alluring stimulus of ardor, with tranquility of mind and body and with no corruption of integrity, the husband would be poured into the bosom of his wife. For not indeed because it cannot be proved by experience is it therefore not to be believed, since those parts of the body would not be driven by turbid heat, but a spontaneous power, as there was need, would apply them; thus then it could have been that, with the integrity of the female genital preserved, virile seed be sent into the womb of the spouse, just as now, with the same integrity preserved, the flow of menstrual blood can be emitted from the womb of a virgin. For by the same way that could be inserted by which this can be ejected.

Vt enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis inpulsus feminea uiscera relaxaret, sic ad fetandum et concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed uoluntarius usus naturam utramque coniungeret. De rebus loquimur nunc pudendis et ideo, quamuis, antequam earum puderet, quales esse potuissent coniciamus ut possumus, tamen necesse est, ut nostra disputatio magis frenetur ea, quae nos reuocat, uerecundia, quam eloquentia, quae nobis parum suppetit, adiuuetur. Nam cum id quod dico nec ipsi experti fuerint, qui experiri potuerunt <quoniam praeoccupante peccato exilium de paradiso ante meruerunt, quam sibi in opere serendae propaginis tranquillo arbitrio conuenirentn, quo modo nunc, cum ista commemorantur, sensibus occunit humanis nisi experientia libidinis turbidae, non coniectma placidae uoluntatis?

For just as for giving birth it would not be the groan of pain but the impulse of maturity that relaxed the female viscera, so for begetting and conceiving it would be not the appetite of libido but a voluntary use that joined both natures. We are speaking now about pudenda matters, and therefore, although, before there was shame of them, we conjecture as we can what they might have been like, nevertheless it is necessary that our disputation be more reined in by modesty, which calls us back, than helped by eloquence, which scarcely suffices us. For since that which I say not even they themselves experienced, who could have experienced it <since, sin forestalling, they deserved exile from paradise before they came together for themselves, in the work of sowing progeny, by tranquil judgment>, in what way now, when these things are recalled, does it meet human senses except by the experience of turbid libido, not by a conjecture of placid will?

Hinc est quod inpedit loquentem pudor, etsi non deficiat ratio cogitantem. Verum tamen omnipotenti Deo, summo ac summe bono creatori omnium naturarum, uoluntatum autem bonarum adiutori et remuneratori, malarum autem relictori et damnatori, utrarumque ordinatori, non defuit utique consilium, quo certum numerum ciuium in sua sapientia praedestinatum etiam ex damnato genere humano suae ciuitatis impleret, non eos iam meritis, quando quidem uniuersa massa tamquam in uitiata raffice damnata est, sed gratia discernens et liberatis non solum de ipsis, uerum etiam de non liberatis, quid eis largiatur, ostendens. Non enim debita, sed gratuita bonitate tunc se quisque agnoscit erutum malis, cum ab eorum hominum consortio fit inmunis, cum quibus illi iuste esset poena communis.

Hence it is that modesty impedes the speaker, though reason does not fail the thinker. Yet, nevertheless, to the omnipotent God, the most high and supremely good creator of all natures, the helper and remunerator of good wills, but the forsaker and condemner of evil ones, and the ordainer of both, there did not, to be sure, fail a counsel by which he might fill with citizens a fixed number, predestined in his wisdom, even from the condemned human race, for his own city—now not distinguishing them by merits, since the whole lump, as if in a vitiated rootstock, is condemned, but distinguishing by grace and, with respect to the liberated, showing—both from themselves and from the non-liberated—what he lavishly grants to them. For it is not by debts owed, but by gratuitous goodness, that each one then recognizes himself as rescued from evils, when he becomes immune from the fellowship of those men with whom a common punishment would be just for him.

Cur ergo non crearet Deus, quos peccaturos esse praesciuit, quando quidem in eis et ex eis, et quid eorum culpa mereretur, et quid sua gratia donaretur, posset ostendere, nec sub illo creatore ac dispositore peruersa inordinatio delinquentium rectum peruerteret ordinem rermm?

Why then would God not create those whom he foreknew would be sinners, since indeed in them and from them he could show both what their fault would merit and what his grace would be granted, and under that Creator and Disposer the perverse inordination of the delinquents would not overturn the right order of things?

[XXVII] Proinde peccatores, et angeli et homines, nihil agunt, quo inpediantur magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes uoluntates eius, quoniam qui prouidenter atque omnipotenter sua cuique distribuit, non solum bonis, uerum etiam malis bene uti nouit. Ac per hoc propter meritum primae malae uoluntatis ita damnato atque obdurato angelo malo, ut iam bonam uoluntatem ulterius non haberet, bene utens Deus cur non permitteret, ut ab illo primus homo, qui rectus, hoc est bonae uoluntatis, creatus fuerat, temptaretur? Quando quidem sic erat institutus, ut, si de adiutorio Dei fideret bonus homo, malum angelum uinceret; si autem creatorem atque adiutorem Deum superbe sibi placendo desereret, uinceretur; meritum bonum habens in adiuta diuinitus uoluntate recta, malum uero in deserente Deum uoluntate peruersa.

[27] Accordingly sinners, both angels and men, do nothing by which the great works of the Lord are impeded, exquisite in all his wills, since he who providently and omnipotently distributes to each his own knows how to use well not only the good but also the evil. And therefore, on account of the merit of the first evil will, the evil angel having been so condemned and hardened that he no longer had a good will, why should not God, using him well, permit that the first man—who had been created upright, that is, of good will—should be tempted by him? For indeed he was so constituted that, if the good man should trust in the help of God, he would conquer the evil angel; but if, by proudly pleasing himself, he should desert God his creator and helper, he would be conquered—having a good merit in a right will divinely aided, but an evil one in a perverse will deserting God.

Quia et ipsum fidere de adiutorio Dei non quidem posset sine adiutorio Dei, nec tamen ideo ab his diuinae gratiae beneficiis sibi placendo recedere non habebat in potestate. Nam sicut in hac carne uiuere sine adiumentis alimentorum in potestate non est, non autem in ea uiuere in potestate est, quod faciunt qui se ipsos necant: ita bene uiuere sine adiutorio Dei etiam in paradiso non erat in potestate; erat autem in potestate male uiuere, sed beatitudine non permansura et poena iustissima secutura. Cum igitur huius futuri casus humani Deus non esset ignarus, cur eum non sineret inuidi angeli malignitate temptari?

Because even to trust in the aid of God he indeed could not without the aid of God; yet nevertheless for that reason he did have it in his power, by self‑pleasing, to withdraw from these benefits of divine grace. For just as in this flesh to live without the aids of aliment is not in one’s power, but not to live in it is in one’s power—something which those do who kill themselves—so to live well without the aid of God, even in paradise, was not in his power; it was, however, in his power to live badly, yet with beatitude not remaining and a most just penalty to follow. Since therefore God was not ignorant of this future fall of man, why would He not allow him to be tempted by the malignity of the envious angel?

nullo modo quidem quod uinceretur incertus, sed nihilo minus praescius quod ab eius semine adiuto sua gratia idem ipse diabolus fuerat sanctorum gloria maiore uincendus. Ita factum est, ut nec Deum aliquid futurorum lateret, nec praesciendo quemqua "peccare conpelleret et, quid interesset inter propriam cuiusque praesumptionem et suam tuitionem, angelicae et humanae rationali creaturae consequenti experientia demonstraret. Quis enim audeat credere aut dicere, ut neque angelus neque homo caderet, in Dei potestate non fuisse?

in no way indeed presciently uncertain that he would be conquered, yet nonetheless foreknowing that by his seed, aided by His grace, that very devil was to be conquered with a greater glory of the saints. Thus it was brought about that nothing of future things lay hidden from God, nor by foreknowing did He compel anyone to sin, and that what difference there is between each one’s own presumption and His tuition, He might demonstrate to the rational creature, angelic and human, by the consequent experience. For who would dare to believe or to say that it had not been in God’s power that neither angel nor man should fall?

Sed hoc eorum potestati maluit non auferre atque ita, et quantum mali eorum superbia et quantum boni sua gratia ualeret, ostendere.

But this he preferred not to take away from their power, and thus to show both how much of evil their pride could avail, and how much of good his own grace could avail.

[XXVIII] Fecerunt itaque ciuitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem uero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. Denique illa in se ipsa, haec in Domino gloriatur. Illa enim quaerit ab hominibus gloriam; huic autem Deus conscientiae testis maxima est gloria.

[28] Thus two loves have made two cities: the earthly, namely, the love of self even to the contempt of God; the celestial, rather, the love of God even to the contempt of self. Finally, the former glories in herself; the latter glories in the Lord. For the former seeks glory from men; but for the latter, God—the witness of conscience—is the greatest glory.

Illa in gloria sua exaltat caput suum; haec dicit Deo suo: Gloria mea et exaltans caput meum. Illi in principibus eius uel in eis quas subiugat nationibus dominandi libido dominatur; in hac seruiunt inuicem in caritate et praepositi consulendo et subditi obtemperando. Illa in suis potentibug diligit uirtutem suam; haec dicit Deo suo: Diligam te, Domine, uirtus mea.

That one exalts her head in her glory; this one says to her God: My glory and the exalter of my head. In that one, the lust of dominating dominates in its princes or in those nations which it subjugates; in this one they serve one another in charity, the superiors by giving counsel and the subordinates by obeying. That one in her powerful men loves her own virtue; this one says to her God: I will love you, O Lord, my strength.

Ideoque in illa sapientes eius secundum hominem uiuentes aut corporis aut animi sui bona aut utriusque sectati sunt, aut qui potuerunt cognoscere Deum, non ut Deum honorauerunt aut gratias egerunt, sed euanuerunt in cogilationibus suis, et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum; dicentes se esse sapientes (id est dominante sibi.superbia in sua sapientia sese extollentes) stulti facti sunt et inmutauerunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et uolucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium (ad huiusce modi enim simulacra adoranda uel duces populorum uel sectatores fuerunt), et coluerunt atque seruierunt creaturae potius quam Creatori, qui est benedictovs in saecula; in hac autem nulla est hominis sapientia nisi pietas, qua recte colitur uerus Deus, id expectans praemium in societate sanctorum non solum hominum, uerum etiam angelorum, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus.

And therefore in that city its wise men, living according to man, pursued the goods either of their body or of their soul or of both; or those who were able to know God did not honor Him as God or give thanks, but became vain in their cogitations, and their foolish heart was darkened; saying that they were wise (that is, pride ruling them, exalting themselves in their own wisdom), they were made fools and transmuted the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds and quadrupeds and serpents (for to idols of this sort either leaders of peoples or their followers bowed for adoration), and they paid cult to and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed unto the ages; but in this one there is no wisdom of man except piety, by which the true God is rightly worshiped, awaiting that reward in the society of the saints, not only of men but also of angels, that God may be all in all.