Justinian•DIGESTA
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Dig. 46.3.0. De solutionibus et liberationibus.
46.2.0. On novations and delegations.
Digest 46.3.0. On payments and releases.
Dig. 46.6.0. Rem pupilli vel adulescentis salvam fore.
46.5.0. On praetorian stipulations.
Dig. 46.6.0. That the property of a ward or of a youth be kept safe.
46.8.0. That a matter be held ratified, and concerning ratihabition.
Qui satisdare promisit, ita demum implesse stipulationem satisdationis videtur, si eum dederit accessionis loco, qui obligari potest et conveniri: ceterum si dederit servum aut filium familias, ex quibus causis de peculio actio non datur, vel mulierem, quae auxilio senatus consulti utitur, dicendum est non esse impletam satisdationis stipulationem. plane si non idoneum fideiussorem dederit, magis est, ut satisfactum sit, quia qui admisit eum fideiubentem, idoneum esse comprobavit.
He who has promised to furnish security seems to have fulfilled the stipulation of suretyship only if he has given, by way of accession, someone who can be obligated and convened (sued); but if he has given a slave or a son under paternal power, in cases in which an action de peculio is not granted, or a woman who avails herself of the aid of the senatus consultum, it must be said that the stipulation for furnishing security has not been fulfilled. Clearly, if he has given an inadequate surety (fideiussor), the better view is that satisfaction has been rendered, since he who admitted him as guaranteeing (fideiubens) has verified him to be adequate.
Generaliter iulianus ait eum, qui heres exstitit ei, pro quo intervenerat, liberari ex causa accessionis et solummodo quasi heredem rei teneri. denique scripsit, si fideiussor heres extiterit ei, pro quo fideiussit, quasi reum esse obligatum, ex causa fideiussionis liberari: reum vero reo succedentem ex duabus causis esse obligatum. nec enim potest repperiri, quae obligatio quam peremat: at in fideiussore et reo repperitur, quia rei obligatio plenior est.
Generally Julian says that he who has become heir to him for whom he had intervened (as surety) is freed by reason of the accessory cause and is only held as though the heir of the principal debtor. Finally he wrote that, if a surety has become heir to him for whom he stood surety, he is obligated as if he were the principal debtor and is released from the cause of suretyship; whereas a debtor succeeding to a debtor is obligated on two causes. For neither can it be discovered which obligation should annihilate which; but in the case of a surety and a principal debtor it can be discovered, because the debtor’s obligation is fuller.
for where there is some difference of obligations, it can be constituted that the one be extinguished through the other; but when two are of the same power, no reason can be found why the one rather than the other should be consumed. He refers this to a case (species), in which he wishes to show that it is not something novel for two obligations to concur in a single person. The case is of this sort.
if a promissor becomes heir to a promissor, he bears two obligations; likewise, if a stipulator becomes heir to a stipulator, he will bear two species of obligation. Clearly, if he proceeds on one of them, he will consume both, namely because the nature of the two obligations that he would have is such that, when one of them is brought into judgment, the other is consumed.
Et post litem contestatam fideiussor accipi potest, quia et civilis et naturalis subest obligatio: et hoc et iulianus admittit eoque iure utimur. an ergo condemnato reo exceptione uti possit, quaeritur: nam ipso iure non liberatur. et si quidem iudicati actionis acceptus non est, sed tantum litis exercitationis, rectissime dicetur uti eum exceptione posse: si vero acceptus fuerit etiam totius causae, cessabit exceptio.
And even after issue has been joined, a surety (fideiussor) can be accepted, because both a civil and a natural obligation underlie; and Julianus admits this too, and we use that law. Whether, therefore, when the defendant has been condemned, he can use an exception is asked; for he is not freed ipso iure. And if indeed he has not been accepted for the action on the judgment (actio iudicati), but only for the exercise of the suit (litis exercitatio), it will be most correctly said that he can use the exception; but if he has been accepted also for the whole cause, the exception will cease.
Illud commune est in universis, qui pro aliis obligantur, quod, si fuerint in duriorem causam adhibiti, placuit eos omnino non obligari: in leviorem plane causam accipi possunt, propter quod in minorem summam recte fideiussor accipietur. item accepto reo pure ipse ex die vel sub condicione accipi potest: enimvero si reus sub condicione sit acceptus, fideiussor pure, non obligabitur.
This is common in all cases for those who are obligated on behalf of others: if they have been brought into a harsher position, it has been decided that they are not to be bound at all; plainly, they can be received into a lighter position, for which reason a surety will rightly be accepted for a smaller sum. Likewise, when the principal has been accepted purely, he himself may be accepted from a day (ex die) or under a condition; but indeed, if the principal has been accepted under a condition, the surety, if accepted purely, will not be bound.
Si qui stichum stipulatus fuerit, fideiussorem ita acceperit: " stichum aut decem fide tua iubes?", non obligari fideiussorem iulianus ait, quia durior eius fit condicio, utpote cum futurum sit, ut mortuo sticho teneatur. Marcellus autem notat non ideo tantum non obligari, quia in duriorem condicionem acceptus est, sed quia et in aliam potius obligationem acceptus est: denique pro eo, qui decem promiserit, non poterit fideiussor ita accipi, ut decem aut stichum promittat, quamvis eo casu non fit eius durior condicio.
If someone has stipulated for Stichus, and has taken a surety in this way: “Do you, on your faith, oblige yourself for Stichus or ten?”, Julian says the surety is not bound, because his condition becomes harsher, inasmuch as it will come about that he is held even if Stichus dies. Marcellus, however, notes that he is not unbound for this reason only, namely because he has been received into a harsher condition, but also because he has rather been received into a different obligation: finally, for one who has promised ten, a surety cannot be taken so as to promise ten or Stichus, although in that case his condition does not become harsher.
Si dubitet creditor, an fideiussores solvendo sint, et unus ab eo electus paratus sit offerre cautionem, ut suo periculo confideiussores conveniantur, in parte dico audiendum eum esse, ita tamen, et si satisdationes offerat et omnes confideiussores, qui idonei esse dicuntur, praesto sint: nec enim semper facilis est nominis emptio, cum numeratio totius debiti non sit in expedito.
If the creditor should doubt whether the sureties are solvent, and one chosen by him is ready to offer a security, so that at his own peril the co-sureties may be proceeded against, I say he must be heard in part, yet only so, if he both offers securities and all the co-sureties who are said to be suitable are present: for the purchase of the claim is not always easy, since the counting out of the whole debt is not ready to hand.
Filius familias pro patre poterit fideiubere nec erit sine effectu haec fideiussio, primo quidem, quod sui iuris effectus poterit teneri in id quod facere potest, dein quod et, dum in potestate manet, condemnari potest. sed an pater ex hac causa quod iussu teneatur, videamus: et puto ad omnes contractus quod iussu etiam referri. sed si ignorante patre pro eo fideiusserit, cessat ista actio: tamen quasi in rem patris versum sit, potest agi cum patre.
A filius familias will be able to stand surety on behalf of his father, and this suretyship will not be without effect: first, because once he has become sui iuris he can be held to the extent that he can perform; then also because, while he remains under power, he can be condemned. But whether the father is held on this ground by the actio quod iussu, let us consider: and I think that the quod iussu is to be referred also to all contracts. But if, the father being unaware, he has stood surety for him, that action fails; nevertheless, as though it had been turned to the father’s account (in rem patris versum), an action can be brought against the father.
Qui contra senatus consultum filio familias crediderit, mortuo eo fideiussorem a patre accipere non potest, quia neque civilem neque honorariam adversus patrem actionem habet nec est ulla hereditas, cuius nomine fideiussores obligari possent.
He who, contrary to a senatorial decree, has given credit to a son under paternal power, upon his death cannot take a guarantor from the father, because he has neither a civil nor an honorary (praetorian) action against the father, nor is there any inheritance in whose name guarantors could be bound.
Si mandatu meo titio decem credideris et mecum mandati egeris, non liberabitur titius: sed ego tibi non aliter condemnari debebo, quam si actiones, quas adversus titium habes, mihi praestiteris. item si cum titio egeris, ego non liberabor, sed in id dumtaxat tibi obligatus ero, quod a titio servare non potueris.
If at my mandate you have entrusted Titius with ten and have proceeded with me by the action on mandate, Titius will not be released; but I ought to be condemned to you only if you have assigned to me the actions which you have against Titius. Likewise, if you have proceeded with Titius, I shall not be released, but I shall be obligated to you only to the extent that you have not been able to recover from Titius.
Cum reus promittendi fideiussori suo heres exstitit, obligatio fideiussoria peremitur. quid ergo est? tamquam a reo debitum petatur et, si exceptione fideiussori competente usus fuerit, in factum replicatio dari debebit aut doli mali proderit.
When the principal debtor becomes heir to his surety, the fideiussory obligation is extinguished. What then? It is as though the debt were being demanded from the principal debtor; and if he should use the exception competent to the surety, a replication in factum ought to be granted, or the plea of dolus malus (fraud) will avail.
Si stipulatus esses a me sine causa et fideiussorem dedissem et nollem eum exceptione uti, sed potius solvere, ut mecum mandati iudicio ageret, fideiussori etiam invito me exceptio dari debet: interest enim eius pecuniam retinere potius quam solutam stipulatori a reo repetere.
If you had stipulated from me without cause and I had given a fideiussor, and I were unwilling that he use the exception, but rather that he pay, so that he might proceed against me with an action of mandate, the exception ought to be granted to the fideiussor even against my will: for it is in his interest to retain the money rather than, once paid to the stipulator, to seek it back from the defendant.
Si ex duobus, qui apud te fideiusserant in viginti, alter, ne ab eo peteres, quinque tibi dederit vel promiserit, nec alter liberabitur et, si ab altero quindecim petere institueris, nulla exceptione summoveris: reliqua autem quinque si a priore fideiussore petere institueris, doli mali exceptione submoveris.
If, out of two who had stood surety with you for twenty, the one, that you might not claim from him, has given or promised you five, the other will not be released; and, if you set about to demand fifteen from the other, you will be removed by no exception: but if you set about to demand the remaining five from the former surety, you will be removed by the exception of dolus malus.
Fideiussor obligari non potest ei, apud quem reus promittendi obligatus non est. quare si servus communis titii et sempronii nominatim titio dari stipulatus fuerit et fideiussorem ita interrogaverit: " titio aut sempronio id dare spondes?", titius quidem petere a fideiussore poterit, sempronii vero persona in hoc solum interposita videbitur, ut solvi ei ante litem contestatam et ignorante vel invito titio possit.
A surety cannot be obligated to one before whom the promissor is not obligated. Wherefore, if a slave common to Titius and Sempronius has stipulated that it be given expressly to Titius, and has questioned the surety thus: " do you promise to give that to Titius or to Sempronius?", Titius indeed will be able to demand from the surety, but the person of Sempronius will seem to have been interposed for this alone: that it may be paid to him before suit is joined and with Titius being unaware or unwilling.
Qui certo loco dari promisit, aliquatenus duriori condicioni obligatur, quam si pure interrogatus fuisset: nullo enim loco alio, quam in quem promisit, solvere invito stipulatore potest. quare si reum pure interrogavero et fideiussorem cum adiectione loci accepero, non obligabitur fideiussor.
He who has promised that it be given in a certain place is to some extent bound to a harsher condition than if he had been questioned purely: for he can discharge in no place other than that which he promised, against the stipulator’s will. Therefore, if I have questioned the principal debtor purely and have accepted a surety with an addition as to place, the surety will not be bound.
Naturales obligationes non eo solo aestimantur, si actio aliqua eorum nomine competit, verum etiam cum soluta pecunia repeti non potest: nam licet minus proprie debere dicantur naturales debitores, per abusionem intellegi possunt debitores et, qui ab his pecuniam recipiunt, debitum sibi recepisse.
Natural obligations are not assessed only on this ground, if some action lies in their name, but also when, once money has been paid, it cannot be sought back: for although natural debtors are said to owe less properly, by an abuse (of language) they can be understood as debtors, and those who receive money from them as having received what was owed to them.
Stipulatione in diem concepta fideiussor si sub condicione acceptus fuerit, ius eius in pendenti erit, ut, si ante diem condicio impleta fuerit, non obligetur, si concurreret dies et condicio vel etiam diem condicio secuta fuerit, obligetur.
When a stipulation conceived in diem has been made, if a fideiussor (surety) has been accepted under a condition, his right will be in suspense, so that, if the condition has been fulfilled before the day, he is not obligated; but if the day and the condition concur, or even if the condition has followed the day, he is obligated.
Cum fideiussor hoc modo acceptus esset: " si reus quadraginta, quae ei credidi, non solverit, fide tua esse iubes?", verisimile est id actum, ut, cum appellatus reus non solvisset, fideiussor teneretur. sed et si reus, antequam appellaretur, decessisset, fideiussor obligatus erit, quia hoc quoque casu verum est reum non solvisse.
When a surety had been accepted in this manner: "if the defendant shall not pay the forty which I credited to him, do you bid it to be on your faith?", it is likely that the transaction was such that, when, upon demand, the defendant did not pay, the surety would be held liable. But even if the defendant had died before he was called upon, the surety will be obligated, because in this case too it is true that the defendant did not pay.
Servus inscio domino pro quodam fideiusserat et eo nomine pecuniam solverat: quaerebatur, dominus possetne ab eo, cui soluta esset, repetere. respondit: interest, quo nomine fideiusserit: nam si ex causa peculiari fideiussit, tunc id, quod ex peculio solverit, repetere dominus non poterit, quod ex dominica causa solverit, vindicabitur: si vero extra causam peculii fideiusserit, quod ex pecunia dominica solverit, aeque vindicabitur, quod ex peculio, condici poterit.
A slave, his master unaware, had stood as fideiussor for a certain person and, under that title, had paid money; the question was raised whether the master could recover it from the one to whom it had been paid. He answered: it matters under what designation he had stood as fideiussor. For if he stood surety on account of the peculium, then the master will not be able to recover what he paid out of the peculium, but what he paid on a dominical account (i.e., on the master’s behalf) will be vindicated. If, however, he stood surety outside the cause of the peculium, what he paid out of the master’s money will likewise be vindicated, and what was out of the peculium may be pursued by condictio.
Sed et si servi dominus pecuniam solverit, repetere eam non ab eo pro quo fideiussit, sed ab eo cui numeravit poterit, cum servus fideiussionis nomine obligari non possit. sequitur ergo, ut ab eo, pro quo fideiusserat, repeti non possit, cum ipse aere alieno obligatus sit nec solutione liberari eius pecuniae nomine potuerit, cuius obligatio ad servum non pertinuit.
But also, if the master of a slave has paid the money, he will be able to seek to recover it not from him for whom the slave stood surety, but from him to whom he counted it out, since a slave cannot be bound under the name of suretyship. It follows, therefore, that it cannot be recovered from him for whom he had stood surety, since he himself is indebted and could not be freed by a payment on account of that sum whose obligation did not pertain to the slave.
Heres a debitore hereditario fideiussorem accepit, deinde hereditatem ex trebelliano restituit: fideiussoris obligationem in suo statu manere ait idemque in hac causa servandum, quod servaretur, cum heres, contra quem emancipatus filius bonorum possessionem accepit, fideiussorem accepit. ideoque in utraque specie transeunt actiones.
The heir accepted a surety from the hereditary debtor, then restored the inheritance under the Trebellianum: he says that the obligation of the surety remains in its status, and that the same is to be observed in this case as is observed when an heir, against whom an emancipated son has received possession of the goods, accepted a surety. And therefore in both kinds the actions pass over.
Servo tuo pecuniam credidi: eum tu manumisisti: deinde eundem fideiussorem accepi. si quidem in eam obligationem fideiubeat, quae adversus te intra annum sit, obligari eum ait: sin vero in naturalem suam, potius ut nihil agatur: non enim intellegi posse, ut quis pro se fideiubendo obligetur. quod si hic servus manumissus fideiussori suo heres existat, durare causam fideiussionis putavit et tamen nihilo minus naturalem obligationem mansuram, ut, si obligatio civilis pereat, solutum repetere non possit.
I lent money to your slave; you manumitted him; thereafter I accepted the same man as surety. If indeed he should stand surety for that obligation which would lie against you within a year, he says he is bound; but if rather for his own natural obligation, rather that nothing is effected: for it cannot be understood that someone is bound by standing surety for himself. But if this slave, once manumitted, should become heir to his surety, he thought the cause of the suretyship would endure and nevertheless that the natural obligation would remain, so that, if the civil obligation should perish, he cannot reclaim what has been paid.
nor is it contrary to these things that, when the principal debtor becomes heir to the surety, the suretyship obligation is removed, because then a double civil obligation with the same person cannot exist. conversely also, if the surety has become heir to the manumitted slave, the same obligation remains against him, although he is also held naturally, and no one can stand surety for himself.
Quod si stipulator reum heredem instituerit, omnimodo fideiussoris obligationem peremit, sive civilis sive tantum naturalis in reum fuisset, quoniam quidem nemo potest apud eundem pro ipso obligatus esse. quod si idem stipulator fideiussorem heredem scripserit, procul dubio solam fideiussoris obligationem peremit. argumentum rei, quod, si possessio rerum debitoris data sit creditori, aeque dicendum est fideiussorem manere obligatum.
But if the stipulator has instituted the defendant (reus) as heir, he in every way extinguishes the obligation of the surety (fideiussor), whether it had been civil or only natural against the defendant, since indeed no one can be bound, with the same person, on his own behalf. But if the same stipulator has written the surety as heir, without doubt he extinguishes only the obligation of the surety. A confirmation of the point is that, if possession of the debtor’s goods has been given to the creditor, it must likewise be said that the surety remains bound.
Cum et tu et titius eiusdem pecuniae rei essetis, eum, qui pro te fideiussit, posse et pro titio fideiubere respondit, quamvis eandem pecuniam eidem debiturus sit: nec tamen inanem eam creditori futuram: nonnullis enim casibus emolumentum habituram, veluti si ei, pro quo ante fideiussisset, heres existat: tunc enim confusa prima obligatione posteriorem duraturam.
Since both you and titius were liable in respect of the same money, he responded that the one who stood surety for you can also become surety for titius, although he will be going to owe the same money to the same person; nor, however, will it be empty for the creditor: for in some cases it will have an emolument, for instance if he becomes heir to him for whom he had previously stood surety; for then, the first obligation being confounded by confusion, the later will endure.
Cum fideiussor reo stipulandi heres exstiterit, quaeritur, an, quasi ipse a se exegerit, habeat adversus reum mandati actionem. respondit, cum reus obligatus maneat, non posse intellegi ipsum a se fideiussorem pecuniam exegisse: itaque ex stipulatu potius quam mandati agere debebit.
When the surety has become the heir of the stipulator against the debtor, the question arises whether, as though he had exacted it from himself, he has against the debtor an action of mandate. He replied that, since the debtor remains obligated, it cannot be understood that the surety has exacted the money from himself; therefore he ought to sue ex stipulatu rather than on mandate.
Lucius titius cum pro seio fratre suo apud septicium intervenire vellet, epistulam ita emisit: " si petierit a te frater meus, peto des ei nummos fide et periculo meo": post quam epistulam septicius seio pecuniam numeravit: deinde titius inter reliquos et seium fratrem pro tertia parte reliquit heredem. quaero, an, quia adversus seium debitorem septicii confusa sit actio pro tertia parte, qua titio fratri suo heres exstitit, cum coheredibus eius agere in solidum possit. Marcellus respondit cum coherede seii non pro maiore quam hereditaria parte mandati agi posse.
Lucius titius, when he wished to intercede with Septicius on behalf of his brother Seius, sent a letter as follows: " if my brother shall ask from you, I ask that you give him money on my credit and at my peril": after which letter Septicius counted out money to Seius: then titius left, among the rest, his brother Seius as heir for a third part. I ask whether, because the action against Seius, Septicius’s debtor, is confounded for the third part in which he became heir to his brother Titius, he can proceed against his coheirs for the whole. Marcellus answered that against Seius’s coheir one can sue on mandate for no more than the hereditary share.
Si plures sint fideiussores, unus pure, alius in diem vel sub condicione acceptus, succurri oportet ei, qui pure acceptus est, dum existere condicio potest, scilicet ut interim in virilem conveniatur. sed si, cum condicio exstitit, non est solvendo qui sub condicione acceptus est, restituendam actionem in pure acceptum pomponius scribit.
If there are several sureties, one accepted purely (unconditionally), another “to a day” (for a term) or under a condition, aid ought to be afforded to him who was accepted purely, while the condition can yet come to exist, namely that in the meantime he be proceeded against for a virile (pro rata) share. But if, when the condition has arisen, he who was accepted under the condition is not solvent, Pomponius writes that the action is to be restored against the one accepted purely.
Si fideiussor fuerit principalis et fideiussor fideiussoris, non poterit desiderare fideiussor, ut inter se et eum fideiussorem, pro quo fideiussit, dividatur obligatio: ille enim loco rei est nec potest reus desiderare, ut inter se et fideiussorem dividatur obligatio. proinde si ex duobus alter fideiussorem dederit, adversus eum quidem non dividitur obligatio, pro quo intervenit: adversus confideiussorem magis est ut dividatur.
If there be both a surety for the principal and a surety for a surety, the surety cannot demand that the obligation be divided between himself and that surety for whom he stood surety: for that man is in the place of the debtor, nor can a debtor demand that the obligation be divided between himself and his surety. Accordingly, if out of two one has provided a surety, the obligation is not divided against the one on whose behalf he intervened: rather, it is to be divided against the co-surety.
Si eum hominem, quem a titio petieram, pro quo satis de lite acceperam, titius liberum heredemque reliquerit: si quidem re vera ipsius fuit, dicendum est iudicium in eum transferri et, si non patiatur id fieri, committi stipulationem: si autem meus petitoris fuit neque iussu meo hereditatem adierit, fideiussores tenebuntur ob rem non defensam: si autem adierit me iubente, stipulatio evanescit. plane si meus fuerit et idcirco differam aditionem, ut, cum vicero, tunc eum iubeam adire et interim ob rem non defensam agere velim, non committitur stipulatio, quia vir bonus non arbitraretur.
If that man, whom I had sought from Titius, for whom I had received surety with respect to the lawsuit, Titius has left free and as heir: if indeed he was truly his, it must be said that the action is transferred onto him and, if he does not allow that to be done, the stipulation is incurred: but if he was mine, the petitioner’s, and he did not enter upon the inheritance by my order, the fideiussors will be held on account of the matter not defended: but if he entered at my bidding, the stipulation vanishes. Clearly, if he was mine and for that reason I defer the adition of the inheritance, so that, when I shall have won, then I order him to enter upon it, and in the meantime I wish to proceed on account of the matter not defended, the stipulation is not incurred, because a good man would not so judge.
Hi, qui accessionis loco promittunt, in leviorem causam accipi possunt, in deteriorem non possunt. ideo, si a reo mihi stipulatus sim, a fideiussore mihi aut titio, meliorem causam esse fideiussoris iulianus putat, quia potest vel titio solvere. quod si a reo mihi aut titio stipulatus, a fideiussore mihi tantum interrogem, in deteriorem causam acceptum fideiussorem iulianus ait.
Those who promise in the capacity of an accessory can be accepted into a lighter condition, but cannot be accepted into a worse one. Therefore, if I have stipulated from the debtor for payment to me, and from the surety for payment to me or to Titius, Julian thinks the surety’s condition is better, because he can pay to me or to Titius. But if, having stipulated from the debtor for payment to me or to Titius, I put the question to the surety for payment to me only, Julian says the surety is taken into a worse condition.
Cum fideiubeat aliquis pro servo, in solidum tenetur, etiamsi nihil in peculio sit. plane si pro domino fideiubeat, cum quo de peculio est, dumtaxat de peculio tenebitur, quod tunc erit, cum res iudicatur.
When someone becomes surety for a slave, he is liable in solidum (for the whole), even if there is nothing in the peculium. Clearly, if he becomes surety for the master, against whom the action de peculio lies, he will be liable only out of the peculium, which will be that which exists when the matter is adjudged.
Cum is qui et reum et fideiussores habens ab uno ex fideiussoribus accepta pecunia praestat actiones, poterit quidem dici nullas iam esse, cum suum perceperit et perceptione omnes liberati sunt. sed non ita est: non enim in solutum accipit, sed quodammodo nomen debitoris vendidit, et ideo habet actiones, quia tenetur ad id ipsum, ut praestet actiones.
When one who holds both the defendant and the sureties, after money has been received from one of the sureties, grants the actions, it could indeed be said that there are now none, since he has received what is his, and by the receipt all are released. But it is not so: for he does not receive in satisfaction, but has in a certain manner sold the debtor’s “name,” and therefore he has the actions, because he is bound to that very thing, to grant the actions.
A titio, qui mihi ex testamento sub condicione decem debuit, fideiussorem accepi et ei heres extiti: deinde condicio legati exstitit: quaero, an fideiussor mihi teneatur. respondit, si ei, a quo tibi erat sub condicione legatum, cum ab eo fideiussorem accepisses, heres exstiteris, non poteris habere fideiussorem obligatum, quia nec reus est, pro quo debeat, sed nec res ulla, quae possit deberi.
From Titius, who owed me ten under a testament subject to a condition, I accepted a surety and I became his heir; then the condition of the legacy occurred: I ask whether the surety is held to me. He replied that if, to the one by whom a legacy to you was under a condition, after you had accepted a surety from him, you became heir, you cannot have the surety obligated, because there is neither a principal debtor for whom he should be bound, nor any thing at all that could be owed.
Respondit, si fideiussores in id accepti sunt, quod a curatore servari non possit, et post impletam legitimam aetatem tam ab ipso curatore quam ab heredibus eius solidum servari potuit et cessante eo, qui pupillus fuit, solvendo esse desierit: non temere utilem in fideiussores actionem competere.
He replied that, if sureties have been accepted for that which cannot be made good by the curator, and, after the completion of the lawful age, the whole could have been made good both by the curator himself and by his heirs, and, the one who had been a ward ceasing, he has ceased to be solvent: a useful action does not readily lie against the sureties.
Si ita fideiussorem accepero: " quod ego decem credidi, de ea pecunia mille modios tritici fide tua esse iubes?", non obligatur fideiussor, quia in aliam rem, quam quae credita est, fideiussor obligari non potest, quia non, ut aestimatio rerum quae mercis numero habentur in pecunia numerata fieri potest, ita pecunia quoque merce aestimanda est.
If I have accepted a surety in this way: "as to the ten which I lent, do you, on your faith, bid that from that money there be a thousand modii of wheat?", the surety is not obligated, because a surety cannot be obligated for a different thing than that which was lent; for just as the appraisal (aestimatio) of things which are held in the number of wares (merchandise) can be made in counted money (pecunia numerata), so money in turn is not to be appraised by merchandise.
Stipulatus es opus arbitratu tuo ante certam diem fieri, quod si effectum non esset, quanti ut efficiatur opus locasses, tanti fideiussores cepisti: et quia opus effectum non erat, alii locasti et, cum posterior conductor satis non daret, ipse opus fecisti: quaero, an fideiussor teneatur. respondit: secundum ea verba stipulationis, quae a te proposita sunt, fideiussores non tenentur. non enim id fecisti, quod in stipulatione convenerat, id est opus alii non locasti, tametsi postea locasti: ea enim locatio, quam secutus es, perinde est, ac si interposita non esset et si statim tu opus facere coepisses.
You stipulated that a work be done, at your own discretion, before a fixed day; and that, if it were not brought about, you took sureties for as much as you would have let out the work to be completed for. And because the work was not completed, you let it out to another, and, when the later contractor did not give security, you did the work yourself. I ask whether the surety is bound. He answered: according to the words of the stipulation, as proposed by you, the sureties are not held. For you did not do what had been agreed in the stipulation, that is, you did not let the work to another, although you later did let it out: for that letting which you pursued is just as if it had not been interposed, and as if you had at once begun to do the work yourself.
Fideiussor pro venditore fundorum duorum altero evicto conventus ab emptore condemnatus est certam quantitatem: quaesitum est, an cum herede venditoris ante diem, quo iudicatum facere compelleretur, agere possit. respondit agere quidem posse, sed ex iusta causa ad officium iudicis pertinere quo fideiussor aut defendatur aut liberaretur.
A surety for the seller of two estates, one of which was evicted, having been sued by the buyer, was condemned to a certain sum. The question was asked whether he could bring an action against the seller’s heir before the day on which he would be compelled to satisfy the judgment. He answered that he can indeed sue, but that, on a just cause, it pertains to the judge’s office that the surety be either defended or released.
Si filius in causa peculiari ita fideiussorem acceperit: " quantam pecuniam credidero, fide tua esse iubes?" et emancipatus credat, patri quidem, si non est reus obligatus, non tenebitur, filio vero humanitatis intuitu obnoxius esse debet.
If a son, in a peculium matter, has thus taken a surety: "For whatever money I shall have lent, do you bid it to be under your faith?" and, after being emancipated, he lends, the surety will not be held to the father, if the father is not bound as a party; but to the son, out of regard for humanity, he ought to be liable.
Huic similis et illa quaestio videri potest, ob aetatem si restituatur in integrum unus fideiussor, an alter onus obligationis integrum excipere debeat. sed ita demum alteri totum irrogandum est, si postea minor intercessit, propter incertum aetatis ac restitutionis. quod si dolo creditoris inductus sit minor, ut fideiubeat, non magis creditori succurrendum erit adversus confideiussorem, quam si facta novatione circumvento minore desideraret in veterem debitorem utilem actionem sibi dari.
A question similar to this may also seem to arise: if, on account of age, one surety is restored in integrum, must the other take upon himself the entire burden of the obligation? But only then is the whole to be imposed on the other, if afterward a minor interceded, because of the uncertainty of age and of restitution. And if the minor was induced by the creditor’s fraud to become surety, the creditor is no more to be aided against the co‑surety than if, a novation having been made, with the minor circumvented, he were to desire that a useful action be granted to him against the former debtor.
Ex duobus fideiussoris heredibus si per errorem alter solidum exsolvat, quidam putant habere eum condictionem et ideo manere obligatum coheredem: cessante quoque condictione durare obligationem coheredis probant propterea, quod creditor, qui, dum se putat obligatum, partem ei, qui totum dedit, exsolverit, nullam habebit condictionem. quod si duo fideiussores accepti fuerint verbi gratia in viginti et alter ex duobus heredibus alterius fideiussoris totum creditori exsolverit, habebit quidem decem, quae ipso iure non debuit, condictionem: an autem et alia quinque milia repetere possit, si fideiussor alter solvendo est, videndum est: ab initio enim heres fideiussoris sive heredes ut ipse fideiussor audiendi sunt, ut scilicet pro parte singuli fideiussores qui sunt conveniantur. severior et utilior est in utroque casu illa sententia solutionem non indebitae quantitatis non debere revocari, quod etiam epistula divi pii significatur in persona fideiussoris, qui totum exsolverat.
Of two heirs of a surety, if by mistake one pays out the whole, some think that he has a condiction and therefore that the coheir remains obligated; and they also prove that, the condiction failing, the obligation of the coheir endures for this reason: the creditor, who, while he thinks himself obligated, has paid a part to him who gave the whole, will have no condiction. But if two sureties have been accepted, for example for twenty, and one of the two heirs of the other surety has paid out the whole to the creditor, he will indeed have a condiction for ten, which by the law he did not owe; but whether he can also recover another five thousand, if the other surety is solvent, must be examined: for from the beginning the heir of the surety, or the heirs, are to be heard as the surety himself, namely that the several sureties be proceeded against pro parte. The stricter and more serviceable opinion in both cases is that the payment of a not-undue quantity ought not to be revoked, which is also signified by a letter of the deified Pius in the case of a surety who had paid out the whole.
Quaesitum est, an fideiussor, qui " capuae pecuniam se daturum" romae promisit, si reus promittendi capuae esset, statim conveniri possit. dixi non magis fideiussorem confestim teneri, quam si ipse capuae spopondisset, cum reus adhuc capuam pervenire non potuisset: nec ad rem pertinere, quod hoc latere nemo dubitet nondum fideiussorem teneri, quia nec ipse reus promittendi teneretur. nam e contrario quoque si quis responderit, quoniam debitor capuae sit, fideiussorem confestim teneri non habita ratione taciti proprii temporis, eventurum, ut eo casu fideiussor conveniatur, quo debitor ipse, si romae fuisset, non conveniretur.
It has been asked whether a surety who at Rome promised " that he would give the money at Capua," if the principal promisor were at Capua, can be sued at once. I said that the surety is no more immediately held than if he himself had promised at Capua, since the principal could not yet have reached Capua. Nor is it to the point that, on this ground, no one doubts that the surety is not yet held, because the principal promisor himself would not be held. For conversely, if someone should reply that, since the debtor is at Capua, the surety is held at once without regard to the tacit proper interval of time, it would result that in that case the surety would be sued when the debtor himself, if he were at Rome, would not be sued.
accordingly it pleases us that the fideiussory obligation receive the condition of tacit time from the person of each, both of the principal promisor and of the surety himself, since, if one were to answer otherwise, the surety would be understood to have been accepted into a harsher condition contrary to the form of the law.
Debitori creditor pro parte heres extitit accepto coherede fideiussore: quod ad ipsius quidem portionem attinet, obligatio ratione confusionis intercidit aut ( quod est verius) solutionis potestate: sed pro parte coheredis obligatio salva est non fideiussoria, sed hereditaria, quoniam maior tollit minorem.
To a debtor the creditor became an heir in part, a coheir having been accepted as surety: as far as his own share is concerned, the obligation falls away by reason of confusion or ( which is truer) by the power of payment; but for the coheir’s share the obligation is preserved, not as suretyship, but as hereditary, since the greater removes the lesser.
Inter eos fideiussores actio dividenda est, qui solidum et partes viriles fide sua esse iusserunt. diversum erit verbis ita conceptis: " solidum aut partem virilem fide tua esse iubes?" tunc enim ab initio non nisi viriles partes singulos debere conveniet.
Among those sureties the action is to be divided who have ordered, by their faith, that the solidum (the whole) and the virile shares be under their guarantee. It will be different with the words framed thus: " solidum aut partem virilem fide tua esse iubes?" for then from the beginning it will be appropriate that each individual owes only virile shares.
Fideiussor, qui partem pecuniae suo nomine vel rei promittendi solvit, quo minus residui divisione facta portionis iudicium accipiat, recusare non debet: eam enim quantitatem inter eos qui solvendo sunt dividi convenit, quam litis tempore singuli debent. sed humanius est, si et alter solvendo sit litis contestationis tempore, per exceptionem ei qui solvit succurri.
A surety, who has paid part of the money in his own name or in that of the promissor, ought not to refuse, after a division of the residue has been made, to receive an action for a portion: for it is agreed that the amount which each owes at the time of suit is to be divided among those who are solvent. But it is more humane that, if the other too is solvent at the time of the joinder of issue, aid be afforded by an exception to the one who paid.
Duo rei promittendi separatim fideiussores dederunt: invitus creditor inter omnes fideiussores actiones dividere non cogitur, sed inter eos dumtaxat, qui pro singulis intervenerunt. plane si velit actionem suam inter omnes dividere, non erit prohibendus, non magis quam si duos reos pro partibus conveniret.
Two promisors have separately given sureties: an unwilling creditor is not compelled to divide the actions among all the sureties, but only among those who intervened for each individual. Clearly, if he should wish to divide his action among all, he will not be prohibited, no more than if he were to sue the two debtors for their shares.
Cum inter fideiussores actione divisa quidam post litem contestatam solvendo esse desierunt, ea res ad onus eius qui solvendo est non pertinet, nec auxilio defendetur aetatis actor: non enim deceptus videtur iure communi usus.
When, among fideiussors, with the action divided, certain persons after issue was joined ceased to be solvent, that circumstance does not pertain to the burden of him who is solvent, nor will the plaintiff be defended by the benefit of age; for he does not appear to have been deceived, having availed himself of the common law.
Amissi ruina pignoris damnum tam fideiussoris quam rei promittendi periculum spectat, nec ad rem pertinebit, si fideiussor ita sit acceptus: " quanto minus ex pretio pignoris distracti servari potuerit": istis enim verbis etiam totum contineri convenit.
The loss of a pledge through ruin pertains to the risk both of the surety (fideiussor) and of the promissor, nor will it be relevant, if the surety has been accepted on these terms: "by how much less out of the price of the pledge when sold it could be recovered"; for by these words it is agreed that even the whole amount is included.
Inter fideiussores actione divisa condemnatus si desierit esse solvendo, fraus vel segnitia tutoribus, qui iudicatum persequi potuerunt, damnum dabit: quod si divisam actionem inter eos, qui non erant solvendo, constabit, pupilli nomine restitutionis auxilium implorabitur.
Among the fidejussors, if one condemned under a divided action has ceased to be solvent, the fraud or sluggishness of the tutors, who could have pursued the judgment, will bring loss; but if it is established that the divided action was among those who were not solvent, the aid of restitution will be implored on the ward’s behalf.
Si in pignore contrahendo deceptus sit creditor, qui fideiussorem pro mutuo accepit, agit contraria pigneraticia actione, in quam actionem veniet quod interest creditoris. sed ea actio fideiussorem onerare non poterit: non enim pro pignore, sed pro pecunia mutua fidem suam obligat.
If, in contracting a pledge, the creditor has been deceived, having accepted a surety for a loan (mutuum), he proceeds by the counter-pigneratic action, and into that action will come the amount of the creditor’s interest (damages). But that action cannot burden the surety: for he obligates his faith/credit not for the pledge, but for the money lent.
Si ita stipulatus a seio fuero: " quantam pecuniam titio quandoque credidero, dare spondes?" et fideiussores accepero, deinde titio saepius credidero: nempe seius in omnes summas obligatus est et per hoc fideiussores quoque, et id, quod ex bonis eius servari potest, omnibus aequo iure proficere debet.
If I have so stipulated from seius: " whatever amount of money I shall at some time have credited/loaned to titio, do you promise to pay?" and I have accepted sureties, and thereafter I have more than once lent to titio: indeed, seius is obligated for all the sums, and through this the sureties as well; and that which can be recovered from his goods ought to benefit all with equal right.
Item si filius a patre vel servus a domino stipuletur, nec fideiussor acceptus tenetur, quia non potest pro eodem et eidem esse obligatus. ex diverso ergo patre a filio vel domino a servo stipulato fideiussor acceptus tenetur.
Likewise, if a son stipulates from his father or a slave from his master, an accepted surety is not bound, because he cannot be obligated for the same person and to the same person. Conversely, therefore, when the father has been stipulated from by the son, or the master by the slave, an accepted surety is bound.
Si nummos alienos quasi tuos mutuos dederis sine stipulatione, nec fideiussorem teneri pomponius ait. quid ergo, si consumptis nummis nascatur condictio? puto fideiussorem obligatum fore: in omnem enim causam acceptus videtur, quae ex ea numeratione nasci potest.
If you have given another’s coins as if your own by way of loan, without stipulation, Pomponius says that the surety is not liable. What then, if, after the coins have been consumed, a condiction arises? I think the surety will be bound; for he seems to have been accepted for every cause that can arise from that numeration (payment).
Inter creditricem et debitorem pactum intercesserat, ut, si centum, quae mutua dederit, ubi primum petita fuissent, non solverentur, ornamenta pignori data intra certum tempus liceret ei vendere et si quo minoris venissent, quodque sortis vel usurarum nomine deberetur, id creditrici redderetur, et fideiussor acceptus est: quaesitum est, an fideiussor in universam summam obligari potuerit. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur teneri fideiussorem in id, quod minus ex pignoribus venditis redactum esset.
An agreement had intervened between the creditrix and the debtor, that, if the one hundred which she had given as a mutuum, when first demanded, were not paid, the ornaments given in pledge might be sold by her within a fixed time, and, if they had gone for any lesser price, whatever was owed under the name of principal or of interest should be rendered to the creditrix, and a fideiussor (surety) was accepted: it was asked whether the fideiussor could be bound for the entire sum. He responded that, according to the matters proposed, the fideiussor is held for that by which less had been realized from the pledges sold.
Sicut reus principalis non alias, quam si de sua persona promittat, obligatur, ita fideiussores non alias tenentur, quam si se quid daturos vel facturos promittant: nam reum principalem daturum vel facturum aliquid frustra promittunt, quia factum alienum inutiliter promittitur.
Just as the principal defendant is obligated only if he promises on his own behalf, so too sureties are not otherwise held unless they promise that they themselves will give or do something: for they promise in vain that the principal defendant will give or do something, because another’s act is ineffectually promised.
Exceptione, quae tibi prodesse debebat, usus iniuria iudicis damnatus es: nihil tibi praestabitur iure mandati, quia iniuriam, quae tibi facta est, penes te manere quam ad alium transferri aequius est, scilicet si culpa tua iniustae damnationis causam praebuisti.
Having used an exception which ought to have profited you, you were condemned through the injustice of the judge: nothing will be afforded you by the law of mandate, because it is more equitable that the injury which was done to you remain with you rather than be transferred to another—namely, if by your own fault you furnished the cause of the unjust condemnation.
Pro aurelio romulo conductore vectigalis centum annua petronius thallus et alii fideiusserant: bona romuli fiscus ut obligata sibi occupaverat et conveniebat fideiussores tam in sortem quam in usuras: qui deprecabantur. lecta subscriptione fideiussionis, quoniam in sola centum annua se obligaverant, non in omnem conductionem, decrevit fideiussores in usuras non teneri, sed quidquid ex bonis fuisset redactum, prius in usuras cedere, reliquum in sortem, et ita in id quod defuisset fideiussores conveniendos exemplo pignorum a creditore distractorum.
For Aurelius Romulus, lessee (conductor) of a vectigal of one hundred yearly, Petronius Thallus and others had stood as sureties: the fisc, as having Romulus’s goods bound to itself, had seized them and was proceeding against the sureties both for the principal and for interest; who were petitioning for relief. On the subscription of the suretyship being read, since they had bound themselves only for the one hundred yearly, not for the whole lease, he decreed that the sureties were not held for interest, but that whatever had been realized from the goods should first be applied to interest, the remainder to principal, and thus that for what had been lacking the sureties should be proceeded against, by the example of pledges sold off by a creditor.
Tutor datus eius filio, cui ex fideiussoria causa obligatus erat, a semet ipso exigere debet, et quamvis tempore liberatus erit, tamen tutelae iudicio eo nomine tenebitur, item heres eius, quia cum eo ob tutelam, non ex fideiussione agitur. et quamvis non quasi fideiussor, sed quasi tutor solverit, etiamsi tempore liberatus est, mandati actionem eum habere adversus reum promittendi dixi. haeret enim in utraque causa adhuc illius debiti persecutio, nam eius solutione liberavit reum promittendi obligatione, in quam pro eo fideiusserat, et non titulus actionis, sed debiti causa respicienda est.
A tutor appointed for his son, to whom he had been bound on a fideiussory ground, ought to exact payment from himself; and although he will be released by lapse of time, nevertheless he will be held on that account by the action on guardianship, and likewise his heir, because suit is brought with him on account of the tutelage, not from the fideiussio. And although he has paid not as a fideiussor, but as a tutor, even if he has been released by lapse of time, I said that he has the mandati action against the promissory defendant (reus promittendi). For in each respect the pursuit of that debt still adheres; for by its payment he released the promissory defendant from the obligation in which he had stood as fideiussor for him; and it is not the title of the action, but the cause of the debt, that must be regarded.
For although that tutor, who as a fideiussor is bound with respect to the ward on behalf of the principal debtor, pays with the ward as authorizer—because, the reus promittendi having been released, he himself as tutor and likewise as fideiussor will be released, which he cannot effect by his own authority—nevertheless, even if he did it not with the intention of paying for himself, but for Titius, so as especially to release him, he will have against him an action of mandate.
Si a reo sub condicione fuero stipulatus, potero fideiussorem et in hanc et in aliam condicionem obligare, si modo eas coniungam: nisi enim utraque exstiterit, non tenebitur, cum reus ex una condicione teneatur. quod si eas disiungam, durior fit condicio fideiussoris nec ob id obligatur: quippe sive communis utriusque condicio extiterit sive alterutra, videatur adprehendi, cum reus non aliter teneatur, quam si communis exstiterit: aut igitur nullo modo tenebitur fideiussor, aut, quod magis est, tenebitur, si prius extiterit communis.
If I have stipulated from the principal under a condition, I can bind the surety both on this and on another condition, provided that I conjoin them: for unless both have come to pass, he will not be held, whereas the principal is held on the one condition. But if I disjoin them, the condition of the surety becomes harsher, and on that account he is not obligated: for whether the condition common to both has arisen or either one of the two, he would seem to be caught, whereas the principal is not held otherwise than if the common one has arisen. Therefore either the surety will in no way be held, or, what is more, he will be held if the common one has arisen first.
Sub diversis quoque condicionibus si fuerint interrogati, interest, utra eorum prior extiterit. si reo iniuncta, tenebitur etiam fideiussor, cum condicio eius exstiterit, tamquam si statim ab initio reus pure, fideiussor sub condicione acceptus esset. ex diverso autem, si fideiussoris condicio prior extiterit, non tenetur, perinde ac si statim ab initio pure acceptus esset reo sub condicione obligato.
Also, if they have been interrogated under different conditions, it matters which of them came first. If it was attached to the principal debtor, the surety also will be held when his condition has come to pass, as if from the outset the principal debtor had been accepted purely, and the surety under a condition. Conversely, if the surety’s condition came first, he is not held, just as if from the outset he had been accepted purely, with the principal debtor obligated under a condition.
Si reo in fundum obligato fideiussor in usum fructum accipiatur, quaesitum est, utrum obligetur fideiussor quasi in minus, an non obligetur quasi in aliud. nobis in eo videtur dubitatio esse, usus fructus pars rei sit an proprium quiddam: sed cum usus fructus fundi ius est, incivile est fideiussorem ex sua promissione non teneri.
If, with the debtor bound upon the estate, a surety is accepted for the usufruct, the question has been raised whether the surety is obligated as if for a lesser thing, or is not obligated as if for a different thing. To us there seems in this a doubt, whether the usufruct is a part of the thing or a something proper; but since the usufruct of an estate is a right, it is contrary to law that the surety not be held by his own promise.
Si a furioso stipulatus fueris, non posse te fideiussorem accipere certum est, quia non solum ipsa stipulatio nulla intercessisset, sed ne negotium quidem ullum gestum intellegitur. quod si pro furioso iure obligato fideiussorem accepero, tenetur fideiussor.
If you have stipulated from a madman, it is certain that you cannot accept a fideiussor (surety), because not only would the stipulation itself not have intervened, but not even any transaction is understood to have been conducted. But if, on behalf of a madman obligated in law, I have accepted a fideiussor, the fideiussor is bound.
Id quod volgo dictum est maleficiorum fideiussorem accipi non posse non sic intellegi debet, ut in poenam furti is, cui furtum factum est, fideiussorem accipere non possit ( nam poenas ob maleficia solvi magna ratio suadet), sed ita potius, ut qui cum alio cum quo furtum admisit, in partem, quam ex furto sibi restitui desiderat, fideiussorem obligare non possit, et qui alieno hortatu ad furtum faciendum provectus est, ne in furti poena ab eo qui hortatus est fideiussorem accipere possit. in quibus casibus illa ratio impedit fideiussorem obligari, quia scilicet in nullam rationem adhibetur fideiussor, cum flagitiosae rei societas coita nullam vim habet.
That common saying—that a surety for maleficia cannot be accepted—ought not to be understood thus: that, for the penalty of theft, the one to whom the theft was done cannot accept a surety (for strong reason urges that penalties for misdeeds be paid); but rather thus: that he who, together with another with whom he committed the theft, cannot bind a surety for the share which he desires to be restored to himself from the theft; and that he who was carried forward by another’s encouragement to commit theft should not be able, in the penalty of theft, to accept a surety from the one who encouraged him. In which cases that rationale prevents a surety from being bound, because indeed a surety is not employed for any rationale, since a partnership for a flagitious matter, having been contracted, has no force.
Granius antoninus pro iulio pollione et iulio rufo pecuniam mutuam accipientibus, ita ut duo rei eiusdem debiti fuerint, apud aurelium palmam mandator exstitit: iulii bona ad fiscum venerunt: similiter et creditori fiscus successerat. mandator allegabat se liberatum iure confusionis, quia fiscus tam creditori quam debitori successerat. et quidem si unus debitor fuisset, non dubitabam sicut fideiussorem, ita et mandatorem liberatum esse: quamvis enim iudicio convento principali debitore mandator non liberetur, tamen ubi successit creditor debitori, veluti solutionis iure sublata obligatione etiam mandator liberatur, vel quia non potest pro eodem apud eundem quis mandator esse.
Granius Antoninus, on behalf of Julius Pollio and Julius Rufus as they were receiving a loaned sum of money, in such a way that the two were co-defendants for the same debt, appeared as mandator before Aurelius Palma. The goods of Julius came to the fisc; likewise the fisc had succeeded to the creditor. The mandator alleged that he was released by the law of confusion, because the fisc had succeeded both to the creditor and to the debtor. And indeed, if there had been a single debtor, I did not doubt that, just as a fideiussor, so also a mandator would be released: for although, when the principal debtor has been sued by an action, the mandator is not released, nevertheless, where the creditor has succeeded to the debtor, as if by the right of payment the obligation were removed, the mandator also is released, or because no one can be mandator for the same matter to the same person.
but when there are two co-promisors and to one of them the creditor has become ^ has become^ heir, there is a just doubt whether the other also is released, as if the money had been paid, or whether only the person is exempted by a confusion of the obligation. And I think that by adition of the inheritance the person is exempted by a confusion of the obligation: but also the accessories from his person are freed for that reason, because they cannot be obligated for the same thing to the same person, so that just as they cannot otherwise begin, so neither do they remain. Therefore the other debtor of the same money is not released, and through this neither his surety nor his mandator.
plainly because he, by the action on mandate, can choose to proceed even against the creditor, the exceptio doli mali will be available to him if he begins to be sued. moreover, as to the other co-debtor, the creditor can sue either in solidum, if there was no partnership, or for a part, if they were partners. but if the creditor has become heir to the surety, or the surety to the creditor, I think it holds that, although there is a confusion of the obligation, the debtor is not released.
Si fideiussori sub condicione obligato " si navis ex asia venerit", quem sub hoc modo accepi, ut usque ad tempus vitae suae dumtaxat obligaretur, pendente condicione acceptum latum fuerit et is fideiussor adhuc pendente condicione mortuus fuerit: confestim a reo petere possum, quia existens condicio neque obligationem in personam iam mortui efficere neque acceptilationem confirmare possit.
If a surety has been bound under the condition, "if a ship shall have come from Asia," whom I accepted on this footing, that he be bound only up to the time of his life; and, while the condition is pending, a receipt-entry (acceptum) has been made, and that surety, the condition still pending, has died: I can straightway demand from the debtor, because a condition, upon coming into existence, can neither effect an obligation upon the person now dead nor confirm the acceptilation.
Cum procurator in rem agebat, cautionem dederat ratam rem dominum habiturum: postea victo eo dominus reversus iterum de eadem re agitabat, et cum reus haberet possessionem, et noluit eam restituere et ideo magno condemnatus est: in amplius fideiussores non tenentur: hoc enim non debet imputari fideiussoribus, quod ille propter suam poenam praestitit.
When the procurator was litigating an in rem action, he had given a cautio that the master would have the matter ratified; afterwards, with him having been defeated, the master returned and again litigated about the same matter, and since the defendant had possession and was unwilling to restore it, he was therefore condemned in a large sum; moreover, for any excess the sureties (fideiussors) are not bound: for this ought not to be imputed to the sureties, that he paid on account of his own penalty.
Illud non interest, qualis processit obligatio, utrum naturalis an civilis an honoraria, et utrum verbis an re an consensu: qualiscumque igitur obligatio sit, quae praecessit, novari verbis potest, dummodo sequens obligatio aut civiliter teneat aut naturaliter: ut puta si pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate promiserit.
It makes no difference what kind of obligation has arisen, whether natural or civil or honorary (praetorian), and whether by words or by thing or by consent: therefore, whatever obligation it is that has preceded, it can be novated by words, provided that the subsequent obligation binds either civilly or naturally: for example, if a ward has promised without the authority of his tutor (guardian).
Omnes res transire in novationem possunt: quodcumque enim sive verbis contractum est sive non verbis, novari potest et transire in verborum obligationem ex quacumque obligatione, dummodo sciamus novationem ita demum fieri, si hoc agatur, ut novetur obligatio: ceterum si non hoc agatur, duae erunt obligationes.
All matters can pass into novation: for whatever has been contracted either by words or not by words can be novated and pass into a verbal obligation from any obligation, provided that we understand that novation is only then effected if this is transacted, namely that the obligation be novated; otherwise, if this is not aimed at, there will be two obligations.
Si usus fructus debitorem meum delegavero tibi, non novatur obligatio mea: quamvis exceptione doli vel in factum tutus debeat esse adversus me is qui delegatus fuerit, et non solum donec manet ei usus fructus cui delegavi, sed etiam post interitum eius: videbimus quia etiam hoc incommodum sentit, si post mortem meam maneat ei usus fructus. et haec eadem dicenda sunt in qualibet obligatione personae cohaerenti.
If I have delegated to you the debtor of a usufruct, my obligation is not novated: although the one who has been delegated ought to be protected against me by an exception of fraud (dolus) or on the facts (in factum), and not only so long as the usufruct remains to him to whom I delegated it, but even after its extinction. We shall see that he also experiences this disadvantage if the usufruct remains to him after my death. And these same things are to be said in any obligation adhering to the person.
Cum enim pecunia mutua data stipulamur, non puto obligationem numeratione nasci et deinde eam stipulatione novari, quia id agitur, ut sola stipulatio teneat, et magis implendae stipulationis gratia numeratio intellegenda est fieri.
For when, after a loan of money has been given, we stipulate, I do not think that the obligation is born from the counting out and then novated by the stipulation, because the aim is that the stipulatio alone bind; and the counting out is rather to be understood as done for the sake of fulfilling the stipulatio.
Legata vel fideicommissa si in stipulationem fuerint deducta et hoc actum, ut novetur, fiet novatio, si quidem pure vel in diem fuerint relicta, statim, si vero sub condicione, non statim, sed ubi condicio extiterit. nam et alias qui in diem stipulatur, statim novat, si hoc actum est, cum certum sit diem quandoque venturum: at qui sub condicione stipulatur, non statim novat, nisi condicio extiterit.
Legacies or fideicommissa, if they have been brought into a stipulation and it has been agreed that it be novated, a novation will be effected—if indeed they were left purely (absolutely) or for a term (in diem), then immediately; but if under a condition, not immediately, but when the condition has arisen. For likewise, one who stipulates for a term (in diem) novates at once, if this has been agreed, since it is certain that the day will someday come; whereas one who stipulates under a condition does not novate at once, unless the condition has arisen.
Si quis ita stipulatus a seio sit: " quod a titio stipulatus fuero, dare spondes?", an, si postea a titio stipulatus sim, fiat novatio solusque teneatur seius? et ait celsus novationem fieri, si modo id actum sit, ut novetur, id est ut seius debeat quod titius promisit: nam eodem tempore et impleri prioris stipulationis condicionem et novari ait, eoque iure utimur.
If someone has thus stipulated from seius: " what I shall have stipulated from titius, do you promise to give?", then, if afterward I should stipulate from titius, is a novation effected and is seius alone held liable? and celsus says that a novation is effected, provided only that this was the transaction, that it be novated, that is, that seius should owe what titius promised: for he says that at the same time both the condition of the prior stipulation is fulfilled and a novation is made, and we use this law.
Si ab alio promissam sibi dotem maritus ab uxore dotis nomine stipulatus sit, non duplari dotem, sed fieri novationem placet, si hoc actum est: quid enim interest, ipsa an alius quilibet promittat? quod enim ego debeo si alius promittat, liberare me potest, si novationis causa hoc fiat: si autem non novandi animo hoc intervenit, uterque quidem tenetur, sed altero solvente alter liberatur. non tamen si quis stipuletur quod mihi debetur, aufert mihi actionem, nisi ex voluntate mea stipuletur: liberat autem me is qui quod debeo promittit, etiamsi nolim.
If the husband, in the name of the dowry, has stipulated from his wife for a dowry that had been promised to him by another, it is held that the dowry is not doubled, but that a novation takes place, if this was the object of the transaction: for what difference does it make whether she herself or any other person whatever promises? For that which I owe, if another promises it, can release me, if this is done for the sake of novation: but if this has intervened not with the intention of novating, indeed each is bound, yet when the one pays, the other is released. Nevertheless, if someone stipulates for what is owed to me, he does not take away my action, unless he stipulates with my consent: however, he who promises what I owe releases me, even if I am unwilling.
Si pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate rem salvam fore stipulatus pubes factus ratam stipulationem habuerit novandi causa, tollitur tutelae actio. si non habuerit ratum, licet tutelae egisset, habet tamen adhuc ex stipulatu actionem: sed iudex tutelae non aliter condemnare debet, quam si ex stipulatione liberatio fieret.
If a pupil, without the tutor’s authority, has stipulated that the thing would be safe, and after becoming of age has held the stipulation ratified for the sake of novation, the action of guardianship is removed. If he has not had it ratified, although he may have proceeded by the action of guardianship, nevertheless he still has an action from stipulation: but the judge in the guardianship matter ought not to condemn otherwise than as if a release under the stipulation were effected.
Qui actum stipulatur, deinde iter, nihil agit: item usum fructum stipulatus si usum stipuletur, nihil agit. sed qui iter stipulatus actum postea stipuletur, aliud magis stipulatur: aliud est enim iter, aliud actus.
He who stipulates for the right of driving (actus), and then for a right of way (iter), does nothing; likewise, one who, having stipulated for a usufruct, should stipulate for use, does nothing. But he who, having stipulated for a right of way, afterwards stipulates for the right of driving, rather stipulates for something else: for one thing is a right of way, another a right of driving.
Si quis delegaverit debitorem, qui doli mali exceptione tueri se posse sciebat, similis videbitur ei qui donat, quoniam remittere exceptionem videtur. sed si per ignorantiam promiserit creditori, nulla quidem exceptione adversus creditorem uti poterit, quia ille suum recepit: sed is qui delegavit tenetur condictione vel incerti, si non pecunia soluta esset, vel certi, si soluta esset, et ideo, cum ipse praestiterit pecuniam, aget mandati iudicio.
If someone has delegated a debtor who knew that he could protect himself by the exception of fraud (dolus malus), he will seem like one who makes a gift, since he appears to remit the exception. But if through ignorance he has promised to the creditor, he will be able to use no exception against the creditor, because the latter has received what is his; but he who delegated is liable by a condictio, either incerti if the money had not been paid, or certi if it had been paid; and therefore, when he himself has furnished the money, he will bring an action on mandate.
Quotiens quod pure debetur, novandi causa sub condicione promittitur, non statim fit novatio, sed tunc demum, cum condicio extiterit. et ideo si forte stichus fuerit in obligatione et pendente condicione decesserit, nec novatio continget, quia non subest res eo tempore, quo condicio impletur. unde Marcellus et si post moram stichus in condicionalem obligationem deductus sit, purgari moram nec in sequentem deduci obligationem putat.
As often as that which is owed purely is, for the sake of novating, promised under a condition, novation does not occur at once, but only then, when the condition has come to pass. And therefore, if perhaps Stichus was in the obligation and, while the condition is pending, has died, no novation will occur, because the thing is not in existence at the time when the condition is fulfilled. Whence Marcellus also thinks that, even if after delay Stichus has been brought into a conditional obligation, the delay is not purged nor is it carried over into the subsequent obligation.
Sed si quod sub condicione debetur, pure quis novandi causa stipuletur, nec nunc quidem statim novat, licet pura stipulatio aliquid egisse videatur, sed tunc novabit, cum exstiterit condicio: etenim existens condicio primam stipulationem committit commissamque in secundam transfert. et ideo si forte persona promissoris pendente condicione fuerit deportata, Marcellus scribit ne quidem existente condicione ullam contingere novationem, quoniam nunc, cum extitit condicio, non est persona quae obligetur.
But if something is owed under a condition, and someone stipulates purely for the sake of novating, he does not even now at once effect a novation, although the pure stipulation seems to have accomplished something; rather, he will then novate when the condition has come into existence: for a condition, once existing, triggers the first stipulation and transfers what has been triggered into the second. And therefore, if perhaps the promisor’s person, while the condition is pending, has been deported, Marcellus writes that not even when the condition exists does any novation occur, since now, when the condition has arisen, there is no person who can be bound.
Doli exceptio, quae poterat deleganti opponi, cessat in persona creditoris, cui quis delegatus est. idemque est et in ceteris similibus exceptionibus, immo et in ea, quae ex senatus consulto filio familias datur: nam adversus creditorem, cui delegatus est ab eo, qui mutuam pecuniam contra senatus consultum dederat, non utetur exceptione, quia nihil in ea promissione contra senatus consultum fit: tanto magis, quod hic nec solutum repetere potest. diversum est in muliere, quae contra senatus consultum promisit: nam et in secunda promissione intercessio est.
The exception of fraud, which could be raised against the delegating party, ceases as to the person of the creditor to whom someone has been delegated. And the same holds in the other similar exceptions, indeed even in that which by senatorial decree is given to a son in the family. For against the creditor to whom he was delegated by one who had given a loan of money contrary to the senatorial decree, he will not employ the exception, because nothing in that promise is done against the senatorial decree: all the more, because here he cannot even reclaim what was paid. It is different in the case of a woman who promised contrary to the senatorial decree: for even in the second promise there is intercession.
and the same is the case with a minor who, having been overreached, is delegated, because, if he is still a minor, he is again circumvented; it is different if he has already passed the age of twenty-five years, although he can still be restored against the prior creditor. The reason, moreover, why exceptions are denied against the second creditor is that in private contracts and pactions the petitioner cannot easily know what was transacted between the one who is delegated and the debtor, or, even if he knows, he ought to dissemble, lest he appear curious; and therefore it is deservedly to be denied against him to plead an exception from the person of the debtor.
Novatio non potest contingere ea stipulatione, quae non committitur. nec huic contrarium est, quod, si stipulatus a titio fuero novandi animo sub condicione, quod mihi sempronius debet, et pendente condicione titius decesserit, quamvis ante aditam hereditatem condicio exstiterit, novatio fieret: hic enim morte promissoris non extinguitur stipulatio, sed transit ad heredem cuius personam interim hereditas sustinet.
Novation cannot come about through a stipulation which does not come into effect. Nor is it contrary to this that, if I have stipulated from Titius with the intention of novating, under the condition regarding what Sempronius owes me, and while the condition is pending Titius has died, although the condition has arisen before the inheritance is entered upon, a novation would be effected: for here the stipulation is not extinguished by the death of the promisor, but passes to the heir, whose person in the meantime the inheritance sustains.
Si is, cui decem titius, quindecim seius debebat, ab attio stipulatus est quod ille aut quod ille debeat, dari sibi, novatum utrumque non est, sed in potestate attii est, pro quo velit solvere et eum liberare. fingamus autem ita actum, ut alterutrum daret: nam alioquin utrumque stipulatus videtur et utrumque novatum, si novandi animo hoc fiat.
If the person to whom titius owed ten and seius fifteen has stipulated from attius that what the one or what the other owes be given to him, neither is novated, but it is in the power of attius to pay on behalf of whichever he wishes and to release him. But let us suppose it was transacted thus, that he should give the one or the other: for otherwise he seems to have stipulated for both, and both are novated, if this is done with the intention of novating.
Fundum cornelianum stipulatus quanti fundus est postea stipulor: si non novandi animo secunda stipulatio facta est, cessat novatio: secunda vero stipulatio tenet, ex qua non fundus, sed pecunia debetur. itaque si reus promittendi fundum solvat, secunda stipulatio iure non tollitur, nec si litem actor ex prima contestetur. denique meliore vel deteriore facto sine culpa debitoris postea fundo praesens aestimatio fundo petito recte consideretur, in altera vero ea aestimatio venit, quae secundae stipulationis tempore fuit.
Having stipulated for the Cornelian estate, I afterwards stipulate: “for as much as the estate is worth.” If the second stipulation was not made with the intention of novating, there is no novation; yet the second stipulation holds, from which not the estate, but money is owed. And so, if the promissor pays by delivering the estate, the second stipulation is not by law removed, nor if the plaintiff joins issue on the first. Finally, if the estate has afterwards become better or worse without the debtor’s fault, the present valuation is rightly considered when the estate is demanded; but in the other case that valuation is applied which existed at the time of the second stipulation.
Aliam causam esse novationis voluntariae, aliam iudicii accepti multa exempla ostendunt. perit privilegium dotis et tutelae, si post divortium dos in stipulationem deducatur vel post pubertatem tutelae actio novetur, si id specialiter actum est: quod nemo dixit lite contestata: neque enim deteriorem causam nostram facimus actionem exercentes, sed meliorem, ut solet dici in his actionibus, quae tempore vel morte finiri possunt.
Many examples show that the cause of voluntary novation is one thing, and that of the acceptance of a suit is another. The privilege of the dowry and of guardianship perishes, if after divorce the dowry is brought into stipulation, or after puberty the action of guardianship is novated, if this has been specifically agreed: which no one has said when issue has been joined; for by exercising the action we do not make our case worse, but better, as it is wont to be said in those actions which can be concluded by time or by death.
Si rem aliquam dari stipulatus sum, deinde eandem sub condicione novandi animo ab eodem stipuler, manere oportet rem in rebus humanis, ut novationi locus sit, nisi si per promissorem steterit, quo minus daret. ideoque si hominem mihi dare te oporteat et in mora fueris, quo minus dares, etiam defuncto eo teneris: et si, priusquam decederet, cum iam mora facta sit, eundem a te sub condicione stipulatus fuero et servus postea decesserit, deinde condicio exstiterit, cum iam ex stipulatu obligatus es mihi, novatio quoque fiet.
If I have stipulated that some thing be given, and then I stipulate the same from the same person under a condition with the intention of novating, the thing must remain among human affairs, so that there is room for novation, unless it has been by the promisor’s doing that he did not give. And therefore, if it ought to be that you give me a slave and you have been in mora so that you did not give, you are liable even after he has died: and if, before he passed away, since delay has already occurred, I shall have stipulated the same from you under a condition and the slave has subsequently died, then, when the condition has come about, since you are already obligated to me ex stipulatu, a novation too will occur.
Si duo rei stipulandi sint, an alter ius novandi habeat, quaeritur et quid iuris unusquisque sibi adquisierit. fere autem convenit et uni recte solvi et unum iudicium petentem totam rem in litem deducere, item unius acceptilatione peremi utrisque obligationem: ex quibus colligitur unumquemque perinde sibi adquisisse, ac si solus stipulatus esset, excepto eo quod etiam facto eius, cum quo commune ius stipulantis est, amittere debitorem potest. secundum quae si unus ab aliquo stipuletur, novatione quoque liberare eum ab altero poterit, cum id specialiter agit, eo magis cum eam stipulationem similem esse solutioni existimemus.
If there are two co-creditors under a stipulation, the question is whether one has the right of novating, and what right each has acquired for himself. It is generally agreed that payment may rightly be made to one alone, and that one who brings the action can bring the whole matter into litigation; likewise, that by the acceptilation of one the obligation is extinguished for both. From which it is gathered that each has acquired for himself just as if he had stipulated alone, except that by the act also of him with whom the stipulator’s right is common he can lose the debtor. According to which, if one of them stipulates from someone, he will also be able by novation to release him from the other, when he is specially aiming at that, all the more since we consider that stipulation to be similar to payment.
otherwise, what shall we say, if one has delegated to his creditor the common debtor, and the latter has taken a stipulation from him? or if a woman has ordered that an estate be promised to the dowry for her husband, or, being about to marry, has promised it to him as dowry? for the debtor will be freed from both.
Si titius donare mihi volens delegatus a me creditori meo stipulanti spopondit, non habebit adversus eum illam exceptionem, ut quatenus facere potest condemnetur: nam adversus me tali defensione merito utebatur, quia donatum ab eo petebam, creditor autem debitum persequitur.
If Titius, wishing to donate to me, being delegated by me to my creditor, promised to him as he was stipulating, he will not have against him that exception, namely that he be condemned only insofar as he can perform: for against me he was rightly using such a defense, because I was seeking a donation from him, whereas the creditor pursues a debt.
Dubitari non debet, quin filius servusve, cui administratio peculii permissa est, novandi quoque peculiaria debita ius habeat, utique si ipsi stipulentur, maxime si etiam meliorem suam condicionem eo modo faciunt. nam si alium iubeant stipulari, interest, utrum donandi animo alium iubeant stipulari an ut ipsi filio servove negotium gerat: quo nomine etiam mandati actio peculio adquiritur.
It ought not be doubted that a son or a slave, to whom the administration of the peculium has been permitted, also has the right to novate debts of the peculium, in particular if they themselves stipulate, and especially if by that means they also make their own condition better. For if they order another to stipulate, it makes a difference whether they order another to stipulate with the intention of donating, or so that he may conduct the business for the son or slave himself: under which title the action on mandate is also acquired to the peculium.
In summa admonendi sumus nihil vetare una stipulatione plures obligationes novari, veluti si ita stipulemur: " quod titium et seium mihi dare oportet, id dari spondes?" licet enim ex diversis causis singuli fuerant obligati, utrique tamen novationis iure liberantur, cum utriusque obligatio in huius personam, a quo nunc stipulemur, confluat.
In sum, we must be admonished that nothing forbids by one stipulation several obligations to be novated, for example if we stipulate thus: "Do you promise that what Titius and Seius ought to give to me is to be given?" For although each had been bound from different causes, nevertheless both are liberated by the right of novation, since the obligation of each flows together into the person of him from whom we now stipulate.
Quotiens quis debitor ex pluribus causis unum debitum solvit, est in arbitrio solventis dicere, quod potius debitum voluerit solutum, et quod dixerit, id erit solutum: possumus enim certam legem dicere ei quod solvimus. quotiens vero non dicimus, in quod solutum sit, in arbitrio est accipientis, cui potius debito acceptum ferat, dummodo in id constituat solutum, in quod ipse, si deberet, esset soluturus quoque debito se exoneraturus esset, si deberet, id est in id debitum, quod non est in controversia, aut in illud, quod pro alio quis fideiusserat, aut cuius dies nondum venerat: aequissimum enim visum est creditorem ita agere rem debitoris, ut suam ageret. permittitur ergo creditor constituere, in quod velit solutum, dummodo sic constituamus, ut in re sua constitueret, sed constituere in re praesenti, hoc est statim atque solutum est:
Whenever a debtor, bound from several causes, pays one debt, it is in the payer’s discretion to say which debt he preferred to have paid, and what he says, that will be deemed paid: for we can prescribe a definite rule to that which we pay. But whenever we do not say to which it has been paid, it is in the receiver’s discretion to which debt he should carry it as credited, provided he determines it as paid to that to which he himself, if he were the one owing, would be about to pay and by which debt he too would be about to discharge himself, if he owed—namely, to that debt which is not in controversy, or to that for which someone had stood surety for another, or to that whose day had not yet come: for it seemed most equitable that the creditor should manage the debtor’s affair as though he were managing his own. Therefore it is permitted to the creditor to determine to which he wishes it to be paid, provided we so determine as he would determine in his own affair, but to determine in the present matter, that is, immediately as soon as it is paid:
In his vero, quae praesenti die debentur, constat, quotiens indistincte quid solvitur, in graviorem causam videri solutum, si autem nulla praegravet, id est si omnia nomina similia fuerint, in antiquiorem. gravior videtur, quae et sub satisdatione videtur, quam ea quae pura est.
in those, indeed, which are due on the present day, it is settled that whenever something is paid without distinction, it is considered paid to the more onerous cause; but if none preponderates, that is, if all the accounts (nomina) are similar, to the older one. a more onerous is deemed to be that which is under surety, than that which is pure.
Imperator antoninus cum divo patre suo rescripsit, cum distractis pignoribus creditor pecuniam redigit: si sint usurae debitae et aliae indebitae, quod solvitur in usuras, ad utramque causam usurarum tam debitarum quam indebitarum pertinere: puta quaedam earum ex stipulatione, quaedam ex pacto naturaliter debebantur. si vero summa usurarum debitarum et non debitarum non eadem sit, aequaliter ad utramque causam proficit quod solutum est, non pro rata, ut verba rescripti ostendunt. sed si forte usurae non sint debitae et quis simpliciter solverit, quas omnino non erat stipulatus, imperator antoninus cum divo patre suo rescripsit, ut in sortem cedant.
The Emperor Antoninus, together with his deified father, wrote in a rescript that, when the pledges have been sold and the creditor converts them into money, if some interest is owed and other interest not owed, that which is paid toward interest pertains to both causes of interest, both owed and not owed: for example, some of them were owed from stipulation, some from pact naturally. But if the sums of owed and not-owed interest are not the same, what has been paid profits each cause equally, not pro rata, as the words of the rescript show. Yet if perhaps interest is not owed and someone has simply paid interest which he had in no way stipulated, the Emperor Antoninus, together with his deified father, wrote that it should be imputed into the principal.
To the same rescript it is subjoined thus: “What has been established in general—that money paid is to be entered by receipt as going first to interest—seems to pertain to that interest which the debtor is compelled to discharge; and just as interest given by agreement of a pact cannot be reclaimed, so, under a proper title, sums not counted out will not, by the discretion of the recipient, be held as paid.”
Apud Marcellum libro vicensimo digestorum quaeritur, si quis ita caverit debitori " in sortem et usuras se accipere", utrum pro rata et sorti et usuris decedat an vero prius in usuras et, si quid superest, in sortem. sed ego non dubito, quin haec cautio " in sortem et in usuras" prius usuras admittat, tunc deinde, si quid superfuerit, in sortem cedat.
With Marcellus, in the twentieth book of the Digesta, it is asked, if someone has thus stipulated with the debtor, " that he accepts into the principal and interest," whether it should be deducted pro rata from both the principal and the interest, or rather first from the interest and, if anything remains, from the principal. But I do not doubt that this stipulation " into the principal and into the interest" admits the interest first, and then thereafter, if anything has remained, it goes to the principal.
Si quid ex famosa causa et non famosa debeatur, id solutum videtur, quod ex famosa causa debetur. proinde si quid ex causa iudicati et non iudicati debeatur, id putem solutum, quod ex causa iudicati debetur, et ita pomponius probat. ergo si ex causa quae infitiatione crescit vel poenali debetur, dicendum est id solutum videri, quod poenae habet liberationem.
If something is owed from a notorious (famosa) cause and from a non-notorious one, that is deemed paid which is owed from the notorious cause. Accordingly, if something is owed from a cause of iudicatum (a judgment) and from one not judged, I would think that to be paid which is owed from the judgment; and thus Pomponius approves. Therefore, if something is owed from a cause that increases by denial (infitiatio) or is penal, it must be said that that is seen as paid which has the liberation from the penalty.
Qui decem debet, partem solvendo in parte obligationis liberatur et reliqua quinque sola in obligatione remanent: item qui stichum debet, parte stichi data in reliquam partem tenetur. qui autem hominem debet, partem stichi dando nihilo minus hominem debere non desinit: denique homo adhuc ab eo peti potest. sed si debitor reliquam partem stichi solverit vel per actorem steterit, quo minus accipiat, liberatur.
He who owes ten, by paying a part is released in part of the obligation, and only the remaining five remain in obligation: likewise, he who owes Stichus, with a part of Stichus given, is held for the remaining part. But he who owes a man, by giving a part of Stichus, nonetheless does not cease to owe the man: finally, the man can still be demanded from him. But if the debtor shall pay the remaining part of Stichus, or if it stood through the plaintiff that he did not accept, he is released.
Ratum autem habere dominus debet, cum primum certior factus est. sed hoc en platei et cum quodam spatio temporis accipi debet, sicut in legato, cum de repellendo quaereretur, spatium quoddam temporis adsumitur nec minimum nec maximum et quod magis intellectu percipi quam ex locutione exprimi possit.
However, the owner ought to hold it ratified as soon as he has been informed. But this must be taken plainly and with a certain span of time, just as in a legacy, when inquiry was made about postponement, a certain span of time is assumed, neither minimal nor maximal, and one which can be perceived more by intellect than expressed by locution.
Sunt quidam tutores, qui honorarii appellantur: sunt qui rei notitiae gratia dantur: sunt qui ad hoc dantur, ut gerant, et hoc vel pater adicit, ut unus puta gerat, vel voluntate tutorum uni committitur gestus, vel praetor ita decernit. dico igitur, cuicumque ex tutoribus fuerat solutum etsi honorariis ( nam et ad hos periculum pertinet), recte solvi, nisi interdicta eis fuerit a praetore administratio: nam si interdicta est, non recte solvitur. idem dico et si quis sciens suspectis postulatis solvat: nam iis interim videtur interdicta administratio.
There are certain guardians who are called honorary: there are those who are appointed for the sake of knowledge of the matter: there are those who are appointed for this, that they may administer, and this either the father adds, that one, say, should administer, or by the will of the guardians the management is entrusted to one, or the praetor so decrees. Therefore I say that, to whichever of the guardians payment has been made, even to honorary ones ( for liability pertains to these also), it is rightly paid, unless administration has been interdicted to them by the praetor: for if it has been interdicted, it is not rightly paid. I say the same also if someone pays knowing that petitions to have them declared suspect have been lodged: for to such persons in the meantime the administration is regarded as interdicted.
Sub condicione debitori si acceptum feratur, postea condicione existente intellegitur iam olim liberatus. et hoc etiam si solutio re fiat, accidere aristo dicebat. scripsit enim, si quis, qui sub condicione pecuniam promisit, dedit eam ea condicione, ut, si condicio exstitisset, in solutum cederet, existente condicione liberari eum nec obstare, quod ante eius pecunia facta est.
If, under a condition, it is entered as received to the debtor, then later, when the condition comes to exist, he is understood to have been long since liberated. And Aristo said that this occurs even if the payment is made in the thing. For he wrote: if someone who promised money under a condition gave it on this condition, that, if the condition should have come to exist, it would cede in solutum, then, with the condition existing, he is liberated; nor does it stand in the way that earlier the money became the creditor’s.
Cassius ait, si cui pecuniam dedi, ut eam creditori meo solveret, si suo nomine dederit, neutrum liberari, me, quia non meo nomine data sit, illum, quia alienam dederit: ceterum mandati eum teneri. sed si creditor eos nummos sine dolo malo consumpsisset, is, qui suo nomine eos solvisset, liberatur, ne, si aliter observaretur, creditor in lucro versaretur.
Cassius says, if I have given money to someone, so that he might pay it to my creditor, if he should give it in his own name, neither is released: me, because it was not given in my name; him, because he has given another’s: but, for the rest, he is held liable under the mandate. But if the creditor has consumed those coins without dolus malus, he who has paid them in his own name is released, lest, if it were observed otherwise, the creditor should be in profit.
Si quis servo pecuniis exigendis praeposito solvisset post manumissionem, si quidem ex contractu domini, sufficiet, quod ignoraverit manumissum: quod si ex causa peculiari, quamvis scierit manumissum, si tamen ignoraverit ademptum ei peculium, liberatus erit. utroque autem casu manumissus si intervertendi causa id fecerit, furtum domino facit: nam et si debitori meo mandavero, ut titio pecuniam solveret, deinde titium vetuero accipere idque ignorans debitor titio simulanti se procuratorem solverit, et debitor liberabitur et titius furti actione tenebitur.
If someone should have paid to a slave appointed over the exaction of monies after manumission, then, if indeed it was on the master’s contract, it will suffice that he was ignorant that he had been manumitted; but if it was on account of a peculium, although he knew him to have been manumitted, nevertheless if he was unaware that the peculium had been taken away from him, he will be released. In either case, however, if the manumitted man did this for the purpose of diverting (interverting), he commits theft against the master. For even if I have instructed my debtor to pay money to Titius, and then have forbidden Titius to receive it, and the debtor, not knowing this, has paid to Titius pretending himself to be a procurator, both the debtor will be released and Titius will be held by the action for theft.
Fugitivus meus, cum pro libero se gereret, nummos mihi subreptos credidit tibi: obligari te mihi labeo ait et, si eum liberum existimans solveris ei, liberari te a me, sed si alii solvisses iussu eius vel is ratum habuisset, non liberari, quia priore casu mei nummi facti essent et quasi mihi solutum intellegeretur. et ideo servus meus quod peculiari nomine crediderit, exigendo liberabit debitorem, delegando autem vel novando non idem consequeretur.
My fugitive, while he was conducting himself as a free man, lent to you coins stolen from me. Labeo says that you are obligated to me, and that, if, supposing him to be free, you paid him, you are released from me; but if you had paid another at his order, or if he had ratified it, you would not be released, because in the former case the coins would have become mine and it would be understood as if payment had been made to me. And therefore, what my slave shall have lent in the name of his peculium, by exacting it he will release the debtor; but by delegating or by novating he would not achieve the same result.
Si decem stipulatus a titio deinde stipuleris a seio, quanto minus ab illo consecutus sis: etsi decem petieris a titio, non tamen absolvitur seius: quid enim, si condemnatus titius nihil facere potest? sed et si cum seio prius egeris, titius in nullam partem liberatur: incertum quippe est, an omnino seius debiturus sit: denique si totum titius solverit, nec debitor fuisse videbitur seius, quia condicio eius deficit.
If you have stipulated for ten from Titius and then you stipulate from Seius, to the extent that you have obtained less from the former; even if you have demanded ten from Titius, nevertheless Seius is not absolved: for what if, though Titius has been condemned, he can do nothing? But even if you have proceeded first with Seius, Titius is in no part released: for it is uncertain whether Seius will be a debtor at all. Finally, if Titius shall have paid the whole, Seius will be seen not to have been a debtor, because his condition fails.
Ubi fideiussor pro duobus dena fideiussit, obligatus est in viginti, et sive viginti sive dena solverit, utrumque reum liberabit. sed si quinque solverit, videamus, quem ex reis relevet in quinque? erit ille relevatus, de quo actum est aut, si non appareat, antiquius debitum erit inspiciendum.
Where a fideiussor has stood surety for two persons, ten apiece, he is bound for twenty; and whether he pays twenty or ten, he will free both debtors. But if he pays five, let us consider which of the debtors he relieves by five: it will be that one about whom there was an agreement, or, if this does not appear, the earlier debt must be looked into.
Ex parte heres institutus si decem, quae defunctus promiserat, tota solvit, pro parte quidem qua heres est liberabitur, pro parte autem reliqua ea condicet. sed si antequam condicat, ei adcreverit reliqua pars hereditatis, etiam pro ea parte erit obligatus et ideo condicenti indebitum doli mali exceptionem obstare existimo.
If one instituted as heir for a share pays in full the 10 which the deceased had promised, he will be liberated for the share in which he is heir, but for the remaining share he will bring a condictio for it. But if, before he brings the condictio, the remaining part of the inheritance accretes to him, he will also be obligated for that part; and therefore I consider that, for one suing for the indebitum, the exceptio of dolus malus stands in the way.
Si creditor fundum pigneraticium vendiderit et quantum ei debebatur, receperit, debitor liberabitur. sed et si acceptum emptori pretium tulisset creditor vel ab eo stipulatus esset, debitor nihilo minus liberatur. sed si servus pigneratus a creditore venierit, quamdiu redhiberi possit, non liberabitur debitor, sicut in quolibet pignore vendito, quamdiu res inempta fieri possit.
If the creditor shall have sold the pledged estate and has received as much as was owed to him, the debtor will be freed. But also, if the creditor had acknowledged to the purchaser that the price was received, or had stipulated from him, the debtor is nonetheless released. But if a pledged slave has been sold by the creditor, so long as he can be redhibited, the debtor will not be freed, just as in any pledge sold, so long as the thing can be made unbought.
Etiam circa stipulationem et ex testamento actionem, si res tradita fuerit quae debebatur, quamdiu aliquid iuri rei deest, adhuc tamen ipsa res petenda est: ut puta possum fundum petere, licet mihi traditus sit, si ius quoddam cautionis supererit.
Also with respect to stipulation and the action from a testament, if the thing that was owed has been delivered, so long as something is lacking to the right in the thing, nevertheless the thing itself must still be claimed: for example, I can claim the estate, although it has been delivered to me, if a certain right of security remains.
Cum stichus et pamphilus communi servo promissi sunt, alteri stichus, alteri pamphilus solvi non potest, sed dimidiae singulorum partes debentur. idemque est, si quis aut duos stichos aut duos pamphilos dari promisit aut communi duorum servo homines decem dare promisit: nam ambigua vox est decem homines, quemadmodum decem denarii: atque utriusque rei dimidium duobus modis intellegi potest. sed in nummis et oleo ac frumento et similibus, quae communi specie continentur, apparet hoc actum, ut numero dividatur obligatio, quatenus et commodius promissori stipulatoribusque est.
When Stichus and Pamphilus have been promised as a slave in common, Stichus cannot be rendered to the one and Pamphilus to the other, but halves of each are owed. And the same holds if someone promised that two Stichuses or two Pamphiluses be given, or promised to give, as a slave common to two persons, ten men: for “ten men” is an ambiguous expression, just as “ten denarii”; and in either case the half can be understood in two ways. But in the case of coins and oil and grain and the like, which are contained under a common kind, it appears this was intended—that the obligation be divided by number, in so far as it is more convenient both for the promisor and for the stipulators.
Inter artifices longa differentia est et ingenii et naturae et doctrinae et institutionis. ideo si navem a se fabricandam quis promiserit vel insulam aedificandam fossamve faciendam et hoc specialiter actum est, ut suis operis id perficiat, fideiussor ipse aedificans vel fossam fodiens non consentiente stipulatore non liberabit reum. quare etiam si illis stipulationibus fideiussor accesserit: " per te non fieri, quo minus mihi ire agere liceat?", prohibens ire fideiussor stipulationem non committit et, si patientiam praestet, non efficiet, quo minus committatur stipulatio.
Among artisans there is a wide difference in genius, nature, doctrine, and training. Therefore, if someone has promised that a ship is to be built by himself, or an apartment‑block to be erected, or a ditch to be made, and it has been specially agreed that he complete it by his own work, a surety who himself builds or digs the ditch will not, without the stipulator’s (the promisee’s) consent, release the principal debtor. Wherefore, even if the surety has acceded to those stipulations: " per te non fieri, quo minus mihi ire agere liceat?", by prohibiting the going the surety does not commit a breach of the stipulation; and if he should offer forbearance, he will not thereby bring it about that the stipulation is not committed.
Si servus peculiari nomine crediderit eique debitor, cum ignoraret dominum mortuum esse, ante aditam hereditatem solverit, liberabitur. idem iuris erit et si manumisso servo debitor pecuniam solverit, cum ignoraret ei peculium concessum non esse. neque intererit, vivo an mortuo domino pecunia numerata sit: nam hoc quoque casu debitor liberatur, sicut is, qui iussus est a creditore pecuniam titio solvere, quamvis creditor mortuus fuerit, nihilo minus recte titio solvit, si modo ignoraverit creditorem mortuum esse.
If a slave has given credit under the name of his peculium, and the debtor to him, while unaware that the master had died, has paid before the inheritance was entered upon, he will be discharged. The same law will hold also if the debtor has paid money to a manumitted slave while unaware that a peculium had not been granted to him. Nor will it make a difference whether the money was counted out with the master alive or dead: for in this case too the debtor is released, just as one who has been ordered by the creditor to pay money to Titius, although the creditor has died, nonetheless rightly pays Titius, provided only that he was unaware that the creditor was dead.
Qui stichum aut pamphilum dari promisit, si stichum vulneraverat, non magis eum dando liberatur, quam si solum stichum promisisset et a se vulneratum daret. item qui hominem dari promisit et vulneratum a se offert, non liberatur. iudicio quoque accepto si hominem is cum quo agetur vulneratum a se offert, condemnari debebit.
He who promised stichus or pamphilum to be delivered, if he had wounded stichus, is no more discharged by giving him than if he had promised stichus alone and gave him wounded by himself. Likewise, he who promised that a person be delivered and offers him wounded by himself is not discharged. And, once the action has been accepted, if the defendant offers a person wounded by himself, he ought to be condemned.
Qui hominem aut decem tibi aut titio dari promisit, si titio partem hominis tradiderit, mox tibi decem numeraverit, non titio, sed tibi partem hominis condicet, quasi indebitum tua voluntate titio solveret. idemque iuris erit etiam, si mortuo titio decem solverit, ut tibi potius quam heredi titii partem hominis condicat.
He who has promised that either a slave or ten be given to you or to Titius, if he has delivered to Titius a part of the slave, and soon after has counted out ten to you, will bring a condictio not against Titius but against you for the part of the slave, as though he were paying an undue thing to Titius by your will. And the same law will obtain even if, after Titius has died, he has paid the ten, so that he brings a condictio to you rather than to Titius’s heir for the part of the slave.
Si duo rei stipulandi hominem dari stipulati fuerint et promissor utrique partes diversorum hominum dederit, dubium non est, quin non liberetur. sed si eiusdem hominis partes utrique dederit, liberatio contingit, quia obligatio communis efficiet, ut quod duobus solutum est, uni solutum esse videatur. nam ex contrario cum duo fideiussores hominem dari spoponderint, diversorum quidem hominum partes dantes non liberantur: at si eiusdem hominis partes dederint, liberantur.
If two parties as stipulators have stipulated that a slave be given, and the promisor has given to each of them shares of different slaves, there is no doubt that he is not released. But if he has given to each shares of the same slave, release ensues, because the common obligation will bring it about that what has been paid to two is seen as having been paid to one. For conversely, when two sureties have promised that a slave be given, by giving shares of different slaves they are not released; but if they have given shares of the same slave, they are released.
Si titium omnibus negotiis meis praeposuero, deinde vetuero eum ignorantibus debitoribus administrare negotia mea, debitores ei solvendo liberabuntur: nam is, qui omnibus negotiis suis aliquem proponit, intellegitur etiam debitoribus mandare, ut procuratori solvant.
If I shall have put Titius in charge of all my affairs, and then, the debtors being unaware, shall have forbidden him to administer my affairs, the debtors will be freed by paying to him: for he who sets someone over all his affairs is understood also to mandate to the debtors that they pay to the procurator.
Si gener socero, ignorante filia, dotem solvisset, non est liberatus, sed condicere socero potest, nisi ratum filia habuisset. et propemodum similis est gener ei, qui absentis procuratori solveret, quia in causam dotis particeps et quasi socia obligationis patri filia esset.
If a son-in-law, the daughter being unaware, should pay the dowry to the father-in-law, he is not released, but he can bring a condictio against the father-in-law, unless the daughter had ratified it. And he is well-nigh similar to one who would pay to the procurator of an absentee, because in the matter of the dowry the daughter was a participant and, as it were, a partner in the obligation to her father.
Quidam filium familias, a quo fideiussorem acceperat, heredem instituerat: quaesitum est, si iussu patris adisset hereditatem, an pater cum fideiussore agere posset. dixi, quotiens reus satisdandi reo satis accipiendi heres existeret, fideiussores ideo liberari, quia pro eodem apud eundem debere non possent.
A certain man had instituted as heir a son under paternal power, from whom he had received a surety; it was asked whether, if by his father’s order he had entered upon the inheritance, the father could bring an action against the surety. I said that whenever the party bound to furnish security becomes heir to the party entitled to receive security, the sureties are for that reason released, because they could not be obligated for the same person to the same person.
Quod servus ex peculio suo credidisset aut deposuisset, id ei, sive venisset sive manumissus esset, recte solvi potest, nisi aliqua causa interciderit, ex qua intellegi possit invito eo, cuius tum is servus fuisset, ei solvi. sed et si quis dominicam pecuniam ab eo faeneratus esset, si permissu domini servus negotium dominicum gessisset, idem iuris est: videtur enim voluntate domini qui cum servo negotium contraheret et ab eo accipere et ei solvere.
What a slave had lent or deposited out of his peculium, that can rightly be paid to him, whether he had been sold or had been manumitted, unless some cause has intervened from which it can be understood that it is being paid to him against the will of the person whose slave he then had been. But also, if someone had lent out the master’s money through him, if with the master’s permission the slave had conducted the master’s business, the same law obtains: for he who contracted business with the slave is deemed, by the will of the master, both to receive from him and to pay to him.
Si pater meus praegnate uxore relicta decesserit et ex causa hereditaria totum hoc, quod patri meo debitum fuisset, petissem, nihil me consumpsisse quidam existimant: si nemo natus sit, recte me egisse, quia in rerum natura verum fuisset me solum heredem fuisse. iulianus notat: verius est me eam partem perdidisse, pro qua heres fuissem, antequam certum fuisset neminem nasci, aut quartam partem, quia tres nasci potuerunt, aut sextam, quia quinque: nam et aristoteles scripsit quinque nasci posse, quia vulvae mulierum totidem receptacula habere possunt: et esse mulierem romae alexandrinam ab aegypto, quae quinque simul peperit et tum habebat incolumes, et hoc et in aegypto adfirmatum est mihi.
If my father, his pregnant wife having been left behind, has died, and on hereditary grounds I had demanded all that which would have been owed to my father, some think that I have consumed nothing: if no one is born, I acted rightly, because in the nature of things it would have been true that I alone was heir. Julian notes: it is truer that I lost that share for which I would have been heir, before it had become certain that no one would be born—either a fourth part, because three could have been born, or a sixth, because five; for Aristotle also wrote that five can be born, because women’s wombs can have just so many receptacles; and that there was at Rome an Alexandrian woman from Egypt, who gave birth to five at once and at that time had them unhurt, and this was affirmed to me both at Rome and in Egypt.
Quotiens unus ex fideiussoribus suam partem solvisset, tamquam negotium reo gessisset, perinde habendum est, ac si reus ipse unius fideiussoris partem solvisset: sed tamen ut non ex sorte decedat, sed is fideiussor solus liberatur, cuius nomine solutio facta fuerit.
Whenever one of the sureties shall have paid his own share, it must be held, as though he had managed the defendant’s business, the same as if the defendant himself had paid the share of one surety: but nevertheless, so that no deduction be made from the principal, and only that surety is released in whose name the payment has been made.
Cum quis sibi aut titio dari stipulatus sit, magis esse ait, ut ita demum recte titio solvi dicendum sit, si in eodem statu maneat, quo fuit, cum stipulatio interponeretur: ceterum sive in adoptionem sive in exilium ierit vel aqua et igni ei interdictum vel servus factus sit, non recte ei solvi dicendum: tacite enim inesse haec conventio stipulationi videtur " si in eadem causa maneat".
When someone has stipulated that it be given to himself or to Titius, he says it is rather the case that it is only then to be said that payment has been duly made to Titius if he remains in the same status in which he was when the stipulation was interposed; but if he has gone into adoption or into exile, or has been interdicted from water and fire, or has become a slave, it is not to be said that payment has been duly made to him; for this agreement seems to be tacitly included in the stipulation: “if he remain in the same condition.”
Si debitorem meum iusserim titio solvere, deinde titium vetuerim accipere et debitor ignorans solverit, ita eum liberari existimavit, si non ea mente titius nummos acceperit, ut eos lucretur. alioquin, quoniam furtum eorum sit facturus, mansuros eos debitoris et ideo liberationem quidem ipso iure non posse contingere debitori, exceptione tamen ei succurri aequum esse, si paratus sit condictionem furtivam, quam adversus titium habet, mihi praestare: sicuti servatur, cum maritus uxori donaturus debitorem suum iubeat solvere: nam ibi quoque, quia nummi mulieris non fiunt, debitorem non liberari, sed exceptione eum adversus maritum tuendum esse, si condictionem, quam adversus mulierem habet, praestet. furti tamen actionem in proposito mihi post divortium competituram, quando mea intersit interceptos nummos non esse.
If I have ordered my debtor to pay Titius, then have forbidden Titius to receive, and the debtor, unaware, has paid, he thought that the debtor is thereby freed, provided that Titius did not receive the coins with the intention of profiting by them. Otherwise, since he would be going to commit theft of them, they would remain the debtor’s, and therefore discharge by operation of law could not befall the debtor; yet it is equitable that he be aided by an exception, if he is prepared to make over to me the condictio for theft (condictio furtiva) which he has against Titius. This is maintained, just as when a husband, intending to make a donation to his wife, orders his debtor to pay: for there too, because the coins do not become the woman’s, the debtor is not freed, but is to be protected by an exception against the husband, if he makes over the condictio which he has against the woman. Nevertheless, in the case proposed the action of theft (actio furti) will lie for me after a divorce, since it is to my interest that the coins were not intercepted.
De peculio cum domino actum est: is damnatus solvit. et fideiussores pro servo acceptos liberari respondit: eandem enim pecuniam in plures causas solvi posse argumentum esse, quod, cum iudicatum solvi satisdatum est et damnatus reus solvat, non solum actione iudicati, sed etiam ex stipulatu et ipse et fideiussores liberentur. et magis simile esse, quod, cum possessor hereditatis existimans se heredem esse solverit, heres non liberetur: tunc enim propterea id evenire, quod ille suo nomine indebitam pecuniam dando repetitionem eius haberet.
An action about the peculium was brought against the master: he, having been condemned, paid. And he answered that the sureties (fidejussors) taken on behalf of the slave are released: for there is the argument that the same money can be paid to several causes, because, when security has been furnished that the judgment be paid and the condemned defendant pays, not only by the action on the judgment, but also under the stipulation, both he himself and the sureties are released. And it is more similar that, when a possessor of an inheritance, supposing himself to be the heir, has paid, the heir is not released: for then this happens for the reason that he, in his own name, by giving money not owed, would have repetition (recovery) of it.
Qui hominem promisit si statuliberum solvat, magis puto non esse exspectandam condicionem: sed et creditorem agere posse et illi condictionem competere. quod si interim condicio defecerit, liberatur, perinde atque si quis pendente condicione solvit per errorem et antequam condiceret, condicio exstiterit. illud nullo modo dici conveniet, si mortuo sticho condicio deficiat, liberari debitorem, quamvis, si vivente eo defecerit, liberaretur, quando isto casu nullo tempore perfecte hominem meum feceris: alioquin prope erit, ut etiam, si eum servum, in quo usus fructus alienus est, mihi solveris isque usu fructu manente decesserit, ea solutione liberatus videaris: quod nullo modo probandum est, sicuti si communem solvisses isque decessisset.
He who has promised a man, if he pays a statuliber, I think the condition is not to be awaited; rather both the creditor can bring an action and to him (the promisor) a condiction is competent. But if in the meantime the condition should fail, he is released, just as if someone, while the condition was pending, paid by mistake and, before he could bring a condiction, the condition came to pass. It will in no wise be fitting to say that, if, Stichus having died, the condition fails, the debtor is released, although, if it had failed while he was living, he would be released, since in this case at no time will you have made the man perfectly mine. Otherwise, it would nearly follow that even if you paid me a slave in whom another’s usufruct exists, and he should die while the usufruct remained, you would seem to be released by that payment; which is by no means to be approved, just as if you had paid a slave held in common and he had died.
Si quis pro eo reverso fideiusserit, qui, cum rei publicae causa abesset, actione qua liberatus sit, deinde annus praeterierit, an fideiussor liberetur? quod iuliano non placebat, et quidem si cum fideiussore experiundi potestas non fuit: sed hoc casu in ipsum fideiussorem ex edicto actionem restitui debere, quemadmodum in eum fideiussorem, qui hominem promissum occidit.
If someone has stood as surety for the return of a person who, while he was absent for the sake of the commonwealth, has been freed by the action, and then a year has passed—whether the surety is released? This did not please Julian, and indeed not if there was no power of proceeding at law against the surety; but in this case an action ought to be restored, under the edict, against the surety himself, just as against the surety who has killed the promised man.
Qui pro te apud titium fideiusserat, pignus in suam obligationem dedit: post idem heredem te instituit. quamvis ex fideiussoria causa non tenearis, nihilo minus tamen pignus obligatum manebit. at si idem alium fideiussorem dederit atque ita heredem te instituerit, rectius existimari ait sublata obligatione eius, pro quo fideiussum sit, eum quoque qui fideiusserit liberari.
He who on your behalf had stood surety with Titius gave a pledge into his own obligation: afterwards the same man appointed you heir. Although you are not held on the basis of the suretyship cause, nonetheless the pledge will remain obligated. But if the same man had given another surety and thus appointed you heir, he says it is more correct to consider that, the obligation of him for whom surety was given being removed, he too who stood surety is released.
Si, soluturus pecuniam tibi, iussu tuo signatam eam apud nummularium, quoad probaretur, deposuerim, tui periculi eam fore mela libro decimo scribit. quod verum est, cum eo tamen, ut illud maxime spectetur, an per te steterit, quo minus in continenti probaretur: nam tunc perinde habendum erit, ac si parato me solvere tu ex aliqua causa accipere nolles. in qua specie non utique semper tuum periculum erit: quid enim, si inopportuno tempore vel loco optulerim?
If, being about to pay you money, at your order I have deposited it, sealed, with a money‑changer until it be approved, Mela writes in the tenth book that it will be at your risk. Which is true, with this, however: that it be especially considered whether it was by you that it failed to be approved then and there; for then it must be treated just as if, I being ready to pay, you for some cause were unwilling to accept. In which scenario it will not, to be sure, always be at your risk: for what if I proffered at an inopportune time or place?
I think it follows from this that, even if both the buyer deposits the coins and the seller the merchandise, because they had too little mutual trust, the buyer’s coins are at his risk ( certainly, if he himself chose the person with whom they were to be deposited), and nonetheless the merchandise also is at the buyer’s risk, since the sale is perfected.
In numerationibus aliquando evenit, ut una numeratione duae obligationes tollantur uno momento: veluti si quis pignus pro debito vendiderit creditori: evenit enim, ut et ex vendito tollatur obligatio et debiti. item si pupillo, qui sine tutoris auctoritate mutuam pecuniam accepit, legatum a creditore fuerit sub ea condicione, si eam pecuniam numeraverit, in duas causas videri eum numerasse, et in debitum suum, ut in falcidiam heredi imputetur, et condicionis gratia, ut legatum consequatur. item si usus fructus pecuniae numeratae legatus fuerit, evenit, ut una numeratione et liberetur heres ex testamento et obliget sibi legatarium.
In payments it sometimes happens that by one counting-out two obligations are removed at one moment: for example, if someone has sold the pledge for the debt to the creditor; for it comes about that both the obligation arising from the sale is taken away and that of the debt. Likewise, if to a ward, who has received money as a loan without the tutor’s authority, a legacy has been made by the creditor under this condition, if he shall have paid out that money, he is seen to have paid for two causes, both toward his own debt, so that it is imputed to the heir in the Falcidian calculation, and for the sake of the condition, so that he may obtain the legacy. Likewise, if the usufruct of money counted out has been bequeathed, it happens that by one payment both the heir is freed under the testament and he obligates the legatee to himself.
Si quis aliam rem pro alia volenti solverit et evicta fuerit res, manet pristina obligatio. etsi pro parte fuerit evicta, tamen pro solido obligatio durat: nam non accepisset re integra creditor, nisi pro solido eius fieret.
If someone, to a willing party, has paid a different thing in place of another, and the thing has been evicted, the original obligation remains. And even if it has been evicted in part, nevertheless the obligation endures for the whole: for the creditor would not have accepted, the matter being intact, unless it were done for the whole.
Plane, ut scaevola aiebat, etiamsi perierit res ante litem contestatam, interdum quasi locupletior factus intellegitur, id est si necessariam sibi rem emit, quam necessario de suo erat empturus: nam hoc ipso, quo non est pauperior factus, locupletior est. sic et in filio familias putabat macedonianum cessare, si in necessarias causas filius mutuam pecuniam acceperit et eam perdiderit.
Clearly, as Scaevola used to say, even if the thing has perished before the suit was joined, sometimes a person is understood as, so to speak, having been enriched—namely, if he purchased a necessary thing for himself which he would necessarily have bought from his own funds: for by this very fact, in that he has not been made poorer, he is wealthier. So too he thought the Macedonian law ceased to apply in the case of a filius familias, if for necessary causes the son received money on loan and lost it.
Titia cum propter dotem bona mariti possideret, omnia pro domina egit, reditus exegit et moventia distraxit: quaero, an ea, quae ex re mariti percepit, in dotem ei reputari debeant. Marcellus respondit reputationem eius quod proponeretur non iniquam videri: pro soluto enim magis habendum est, quod ex ea causa mulier percepit. sed si forte usurarum quoque rationem arbiter dotis reciperandae habere debuerit, ita est computandum, ut, prout quidque ad mulierem pervenit, non ex universa summa decedat, sed prius in eam quantitatem, quam usurarum nomine mulierem consequi oportebat: quod non est iniquum.
Titia, since on account of the dowry she possessed her husband’s goods, did everything as mistress, exacted the revenues, and sold the movables: I ask whether those things which she received from the husband’s property ought to be reckoned to her into the dowry. Marcellus responded that the reputation (reckoning) of what is proposed does not seem inequitable: for what the woman received on that account is rather to be held as paid. But if perchance the arbiter for the recovery of the dowry ought also to have regard to the account of interest, it is to be computed thus: that, as each item came to the woman, it does not come off from the entire sum, but first into that amount which under the name of interest it was proper for the woman to obtain: which is not inequitable.
Solutam pecuniam intellegimus utique naturaliter, si numerata sit creditori. sed et si iussu eius alii solvatur, vel creditori eius vel futuro debitori vel etiam ei cui donaturus erat, absolvi debet. ratam quoque solutionem si creditor habuerit, idem erit.
We understand money to be paid, naturally, if it has been counted out to the creditor. But also, if by his order it is paid to another—either to his creditor or to his future debtor or even to the one to whom he was going to make a donation—the debtor ought to be discharged. Likewise, if the creditor has ratified the payment, it will be the same.
also if money has been paid to a tutor, or to a curator, or to a procurator, or to any successor, or to a slave actor (steward), the payment will profit him. but if an “accepted” entry (acceptum) has been made for that which was bound by hypothec under the name of stipulation, or it has been accepted without stipulation, the word “payment” will not avail, but the furnishing of surety (satisdatio) suffices.
Si, cum aurum tibi promisissem, ignoranti quasi aurum aes solverim, non liberabor: sed nec repetam hoc quasi indebitum solutum, quod sciens feci. petentem tamen te aurum exceptione summovebo, si non reddas aes quod accepisti.
If, when I had promised you gold, I, you being unaware, paid bronze as if it were gold, I shall not be discharged; but neither shall I reclaim this as paid as not-owed, since I did it knowingly. However, when you demand the gold, I will repel you by an exception, if you do not give back the bronze which you received.
and he says that it makes a difference with what intention the payment was made, whether that the debtor be freed at once or rather when the principal had ratified: in the former case it is immediately possible to bring a condictio against the procurator, and only then is the condictio extinguished when the principal has ratified; in the latter, only then does the condictio arise when the principal has not ratified.
Et si duo rei stipulandi sunt, quorum alterius absentis procuratori datum, antequam is ratum haberet, interim alteri solutum est, in pendenti est posterior solutio ac prior: quippe incertum est, debitum an indebitum exegerit.
And if there are two co-stipulators, of whom payment was given to the procurator of the one who was absent, before he had ratified it, and in the meantime payment was made to the other, the later payment, as also the earlier, is in suspense: for it is uncertain whether he exacted a debt or a non-debt.
Si ita stipulatus sim: " mihi aut titio dare spondes?" et debitor constituerit se mihi soluturum, quamvis mihi competat de constituta actio, potest adhuc adiecto solvere. et si a filio familias mihi aut titio stipulatus sim, patrem posse titio solvere quod in peculio est, scilicet si suo, non filii nomine solvere velit: dum enim adiecto solvitur, mihi solvi videtur: et ideo si indebitum adiecto solutum sit, stipulatori posse condici iulianus putat: ut nihil intersit, iubeam te titio solvere an ab initio stipulatio ita concepta sit.
If I have stipulated thus: "Do you promise to give to me or to Titius?" and the debtor has constituted that he will pay me, although the action de constituta is competent to me, he can still pay to the adiectus. And if I have stipulated from a son in the power of a father, "to me or to Titius," the father can pay to Titius what is in the peculium, namely if he wishes to pay in his own name, not in the son’s name: for so long as payment is made to the adiectus, it is considered to be paid to me; and therefore, if a not‑owed thing has been paid to the adiectus, Julian thinks it can be recovered by condiction by the stipulator; so that it makes no difference whether I order you to pay Titius or the stipulation was framed thus from the beginning.
Dispensatorem meum testamento liberum esse iussi et peculium ei legavi: is post mortem meam a debitoribus pecunias exegit: an heres meus retinere ex peculio eius quod exegit possit, quaeritur. et si quidem post aditam hereditatem exegerit pecuniam, dubitari non debet, quin de peculio eo nomine retineri nihil debeat, quia liber factus incipit debere, si liberantur solutione debitores. cum vero ante aditam hereditatem pecuniam accepit dispensator, si quidem liberantur debitores ipsa solutione, non est dubium, quin de peculio id retinendum sit, quia incipit debere hic heredi quasi negotiorum gestorum vel mandati actione.
I ordered in my will that my steward be free, and I bequeathed to him the peculium. He, after my death, collected monies from debtors. The question is whether my heir can retain, out of his peculium, what he collected. And if indeed he collected the money after the inheritance was entered upon, there should be no doubt that nothing ought to be retained from the peculium on that account, because, once made free, he himself begins to owe, if the debtors are discharged by the payment. But when the steward received the money before the inheritance was entered, if indeed the debtors are released by the payment itself, there is no doubt that this is to be retained out of the peculium, because here he begins to owe the heir, as it were by the action for management of affairs (negotiorum gestorum) or for mandate (mandati).
but if they are not released, that question arises: when, while managing my business, you have received from my debtors, then I have not ratified it and soon wish to sue by the action for management of affairs, shall I sue with effect if I give security that you will be kept indemnified? Which indeed I do not think: for the action for management of affairs is removed on the ground that I have not ratified; and by this you are constituted my debtor.
Si pupilli debitor iubente eo sine tutoris auctoritate pecuniam creditori eius numeravit, pupillum quidem a creditore liberat, sed ipse manet obligatus: sed exceptione se tueri potest. si autem debitor pupilli non fuerat, nec pupillo condicere potest, qui sine tutoris auctoritate non obligatur, nec creditori, cum quo alterius iussu contraxit: sed pupillus in quantum locupletior factus est, utpote debito liberatus, utili actione tenebitur.
If the ward’s debtor, at his order and without the authority of the tutor, pays money to the ward’s creditor, he does indeed release the ward vis-à-vis the creditor, but he himself remains obligated; yet he can protect himself by an exception. But if he had not been the ward’s debtor, he can neither sue the ward by condictio (since the ward is not obligated without the tutor’s authority) nor the creditor, with whom he contracted at another’s order; but the ward, to the extent he has been made more wealthy—namely, having been freed from the debt—will be held by a useful action.
Si quis duos homines promiserit et stichum solverit, poterit eiusdem stichi dominium postea consecutus dando liberari. in nummis minor vel prope nulla dubitatio est: nam et apud alfenum servius eum, qui minus a debitore suo accipere et liberare eum vellet, respondit posse saepius aliquos nummos accipiendo ab eo eique retro dando ac rursus accipiendo id efficere: veluti, si centum debitorem decem acceptis liberare creditor velit, ut, cum decem acceperit, eadem ei retro reddat, mox ab eo accipiat ac novissime retineat: etsi in dubitationem a quibusdam hoc male deducatur, quod non possit videri is qui ita accepit, ut ei a quo accepit retro reddat, solvisse potius quam decessisse.
If someone has promised two men and has paid Stichus, he will be able, after acquiring the dominion of that same Stichus, to be released by giving him. In the case of coins the doubt is less or almost none: for even, according to Alfenus, Servius replied that one who wished to accept less from his debtor and to release him could bring it about by repeatedly receiving some coins from him and giving them back to him and receiving them again: as, for instance, if a creditor wishes to release a debtor of 100 by 10 having been received, that, when he has received 10, he should give the same back to him, then receive it from him and finally retain it; although some wrongly draw this into doubt on the ground that he who has thus received, so as to give back to the one from whom he received, cannot be thought to have effected payment rather than to have yielded (remitted) his claim.
Servus decem dare iussus pupillo et liber esse, si heres sit pupillus sive tantum condicio in eum collata sit, an absente quoque tutore pupillo dando libertatem consequatur? moveris comparatione condicionis, quae constitit in facto, veluti " si pupillo servierit", quae potest impleri citra interventum quoque tutoris. et quid, inquis, si curatorem habeat et si furioso dare iussus sit, an curatori dando liberetur?
A slave, ordered to give ten to a ward and to be free, if the heir be the ward, or if the condition has only been conferred upon him, does he, by giving to the ward even with the guardian absent, obtain liberty? You are moved by a comparison with a condition which consists in a fact, as, for example, “if he shall have served the ward,” which can be fulfilled even without the intervention of the guardian. And what, you ask, if he has a curator, and if he has been ordered to give to a madman: is he made free by giving to the curator?
and suppose a piece of land were bequeathed to someone, on condition that he should have given to a pupil or to an insane person. And it must be understood that in all these cases payment is validly made to the tutor or to the curator, but it is not rightly discharged to the persons themselves, that is, to the insane man or to the pupil, lest the giving perish through their weakness: for the testator did not aim at this, that, in whatever way it had been given, the condition should be deemed fulfilled.
Si hominem, in quo usus fructus alienus est vel qui erat pignori titio obligatus, noxae dedisti, poterit is, cui condemnatus es, tecum agere iudicati, nec exspectabimus, ut creditor evincat. sed si usus fructus interierit vel dissoluta fuerit pignoris obligatio, existimo processuram liberationem.
If you have handed over in noxal surrender a person in whom there is another’s usufruct, or who had been bound in pledge to Titius, the one to whom you have been condemned will be able to bring against you the action on the judgment, nor will we wait for the creditor to obtain eviction. But if the usufruct has perished or the obligation of the pledge has been dissolved, I think the release will proceed.
Si fideiussor procuratori creditoris solvit et creditor post tempus, quo liberari fideiussor poterit, ratum habuit, tamen quia fideiussor, cum adhuc ex causa fideiussionis teneretur, solvit, nec repetere potest nec minus agere adversus reum mandati potest, quam si tum praesenti dedisset.
If a fideiussor pays the creditor’s procurator, and the creditor, after the time at which the fideiussor could be released, has ratified it, nevertheless, because the fideiussor paid while he was still bound on account of the fideiussion, he can neither reclaim nor can he any the less bring an action against the mandate-defendant, than if he had then given it to the person present.
Item si ignorans creditor procuratori suo solutum servo debitoris filiove acceptum fecerit, postea autem rescierit et ratum habuerit, confirmatur solutio et quod acceptum latum sit, nullius momenti est: et contra, si ratum non habuerit, quod acceptum fecerit, confirmatur.
Likewise, if a creditor, being unaware, has entered as received to his procurator a payment that was made to the debtor’s slave or son, and afterwards has learned of it and ratified it, the payment is confirmed, and the fact that an entry of receipt was made is of no moment; and conversely, if he has not ratified it, what he entered as received is confirmed.
Qui decem debet, si ea optulerit creditori et ille sine iusta causa ea accipere recusavit, deinde debitor ea sine sua culpa perdiderit, doli mali exceptione potest se tueri, quamquam aliquando interpellatus non solverit: etenim non est aequum teneri pecunia amissa, quia non teneretur, si creditor accipere voluisset. quare pro soluto id, in quo creditor accipiendo moram fecit, oportet esse. et sane si servus erat in dote eumque optulit maritus et is servus decessit, aut nummos optulit eosque non accipiente muliere perdiderit, ipso iure desinet teneri.
He who owes ten, if he has tendered them to the creditor and the latter without just cause refused to accept them, and then the debtor without his own fault lost them, can protect himself by the exceptio doli mali, although, having been interpellated, he did not pay at some point: for it is not equitable to be held for money that has been lost, since he would not be held if the creditor had been willing to accept. Therefore, what the creditor made delay in accepting ought to count as paid. And indeed, if there was a slave in the dowry and the husband tendered him and that slave died, or he tendered coins and, the wife not accepting them, he lost them, by the law itself he will cease to be bound.
Cum stichum mihi deberes et in solvendo moram fecisses, sub condicione eum promisisti: pendente ea stichus decessit: videamus, an, quia novari prior obligatio non potest, petitio servi competat ea, quae competeret, si non intercessisset stipulatio. sed in promptu contradictio est debitorem, cum stipulanti creditori sub condicione promisit, non videri in solutione hominis cessasse: nam verum est eum, qui interpellatus dare noluit, offerentem postea periculo liberari.
When you owed me Stichus and had made delay in performing, you promised him under a condition; while that was pending, Stichus died. Let us see whether, since the prior obligation cannot be novated, the claim for the slave is available such as would be available if the stipulation had not intervened. But an objection is ready at hand: that the debtor, when he promised under a condition to the stipulating creditor, is not seen to have been remiss in the performance as to the man; for it is true that he who, when interpellated, was unwilling to give, upon later offering is freed from peril.
Idem responsum est, si quis, cum subreptus sibi servus esset, sub condicione stipulatus fuerit quidquid furem dare facere oportet: nam et fur condictione liberatur, si dominus oblatum sibi accipere noluit. si tamen, cum in provincia forte servus esset, intercesserit stipulatio ( et finge prius quam facultatem eius nancisceretur fur vel promissor, decessisse servum), non poterit rationi, quam supra reddidimus, locus esse: non enim optulisse eum propter absentiam intellegi potest.
The same answer is given, if someone, when a slave had been stolen away from him, stipulated under a condition “whatever it is proper for the thief to give or do”: for the thief too is released from the condictio, if the master was unwilling to accept what was tendered to him. If, however, when the slave chanced to be in a province, the stipulation intervened ( and imagine that, before the thief or the promisor had obtained the means, the slave died), the reasoning which we set forth above can find no place: for it cannot be understood that he tendered it, on account of the absence.
Stichum aut pamphilum stipulatus sum, cum esset meus pamphilus: nec si meus esse desierit, liberabitur promissor pamphilum dando: neutrum enim videtur in pamphilo homine constitisse nec obligatio nec solutio. sed ei, qui hominem dari stipulatus est, unum etiam ex his, qui tunc stipulatoris servi erant, dando promissor liberatur: vi quidem ipsa et hic ex his dari stipulatus est, qui eius non erant. fingamus ita stipulatum: " hominem ex his, quos sempronius reliquit, dare spondes?", cum tres sempronius reliquisset, eorumque aliquem stipulatoris fuisse: num mortuis duobus, qui alterius erant, supererit ulla obligatio, videamus.
I stipulated for Stichus or Pamphilus, when Pamphilus was mine; nor, if he has ceased to be mine, will the promisor be set free by giving Pamphilus: for neither the obligation nor the solution seems to have been grounded in the man Pamphilus. But where one has stipulated that a man be given, the promisor is released even by giving one of those who at that time were the stipulator’s slaves; for by the very force of the words he too has stipulated that one be given from among those who were not his. Let us suppose the stipulation was thus: " do you promise to give a man from among those whom Sempronius left?", when Sempronius had left three, and one of them belonged to the stipulator: now let us see whether, the two who were another’s having died, any obligation will survive.
Qui hominem debebat, stichum, cui libertas ex causa fideicommissi praestanda est, solvit: non videtur liberatus: nam vel minus hic servum dedit quam ille, qui servum dedit nondum noxa solutum. num ergo et si vispellionem aut alias turpem dederit hominem, idem sit? et sane datum negare non possumus et differt haec species a prioribus: habet enim servum, qui ei auferri non possit.
He who owed a person, Stichus—who must be furnished freedom by reason of a fideicommissum—paid: he does not seem to be discharged; for here he gave even less of a slave than the one who gave a slave not yet released from noxal liability. Is it then the same, if he should have delivered a corpse-bearer or otherwise a disgraceful man? And indeed we cannot deny that something was delivered, and this case differs from the former ones: for he has a slave who cannot be taken away from him.
Ob triginta nummos pecuniae creditae fideiussorem in viginti dedi et pignus: ex venditione autem pignoris creditor decem consecutus est: utrum ex universitate id decedit, ut quidam putant, si in solvendis decem nihil debitor dixisset, an sicut ego puto, in totis decem fideiussori contingit liberatio? quia hoc dicendo potuit hoc efficere debitor, ut, ubi non dixit, id potius soluturum existimetur, quod satisdato debeatur? magis tamen existimo licuisse creditori in id, quod solus debebat reus, accepto referre.
On account of 30 coins of money lent I provided a surety for 20 and a pledge; and from the sale of the pledge the creditor obtained 10: does that come off the whole, as some think, if, when the 10 were being paid, the debtor said nothing; or, as I think, does release in the full 10 accrue to the surety? For by saying this the debtor could have brought it about that, where he did not say it, it is rather deemed that that has been paid which is owed by reason of the suretyship furnished. Yet I am more inclined to think it was permissible for the creditor, in his acknowledgment, to apply it to that which the principal defendant alone owed.
Modestinus respondit, si post solutum sine ullo pacto omne, quod ex causa tutelae debeatur, actiones post aliquod intervallum cessae sint, nihil ea cessione actum, cum nulla actio superfuerit: quod si ante solutionem hoc factum est vel, cum convenisset, ut mandarentur actiones, tunc solutio facta esset mandatum subsecutum est, salvas esse mandatas actiones, cum novissimo quoque casu pretium magis mandatarum actionum solutum quam actio quae fuit perempta videatur.
Modestinus responded: if, after payment has been made, without any pact, of everything that is owed from the cause of tutelage, the actions, after some interval, have been ceded, nothing has been effected by that cession, since no action remained; but if this was done before payment, or, when it had been agreed that the actions be mandated (assigned), then payment was made and the mandate followed, the mandated actions are preserved, since even in this latest case it appears that rather the price of the mandated actions was paid than the action which had been extinguished.
Si alieni nummi inscio vel invito domino soluti sunt, manent eius cuius fuerunt: si mixti essent, ita ut discerni non possent, eius fieri qui accepit in libris gaii scriptum est, ita ut actio domino cum eo, qui dedisset, furti competeret.
If another’s coins were paid without the knowledge or against the will of the owner, they remain his whose they were: if they were mixed such that they could not be discerned, they become the property of the one who received them, as is written in the books of Gaius, with the result that an action for theft would lie for the owner against him who had given them.
Pecuniam, quam mihi debes, aut aliam rem si in conspectu meo ponere te iubeam, efficitur, ut et tu statim libereris et mea esse incipiat: nam tum, quod a nullo corporaliter eius rei possessio detinetur, adquisita mihi et quodammodo manu longa tradita existimanda est.
If I should order you to place in my sight the money which you owe me, or some other thing, it is brought about that both you are immediately released and it begins to be mine: for then, because the possession of that thing is held corporeally by no one, it is to be regarded as acquired by me and, in a certain manner, delivered by the long hand.
Prout quidque contractum est, ita et solvi debet: ut, cum re contraxerimus, re solvi debet: veluti cum mutuum dedimus, ut retro pecuniae tantundem solvi debeat. et cum verbis aliquid contraximus, vel re vel verbis obligatio solvi debet, verbis, veluti cum acceptum promissori fit, re, veluti cum solvit quod promisit. aeque cum emptio vel venditio vel locatio contracta est, quoniam consensu nudo contrahi potest, etiam dissensu contrario dissolvi potest.
Just as each thing has been contracted, so too it ought to be discharged: namely, when we have contracted by delivery, it ought to be discharged by delivery; for instance, when we have given a mutuum (a loan for consumption), the same amount of money ought to be paid back. And when we have contracted by words, the obligation ought to be discharged either by delivery or by words—by words, as when an acceptilation is made to the promisor; by delivery, as when he pays what he promised. Likewise, when purchase or sale or letting has been contracted, since it can be contracted by naked consent, it can also be dissolved by contrary dissent.
Si lancem deposuerit apud me titius et pluribus heredibus relictis decesserit: si pars heredum me interpellet, optimum quidem esse, si praetor aditus iussisset me parti heredum eam lancem tradere, quo casu depositi me reliquis coheredibus non teneri. sed et si sine praetore sine dolo malo hoc fecero, liberabor aut ( quod verius est) non incidam in obligationem. optimum autem est id per magistratum facere.
If Titius has deposited a platter with me and, leaving multiple heirs, has died: if a portion of the heirs should interpellate me, it is indeed best, if the praetor, having been approached, should have ordered me to hand over that platter to the portion of the heirs, in which case I would not be held by the action of deposit (depositi) to the remaining coheirs. But even if I have done this without the praetor and without evil intent, I shall be released or (what is truer) I shall not fall into an obligation. However, the best course is to do this through the magistrate.
Si, cum cornelius fundum suum nomine seiae viro eius doti dedisset nec de eo reddendo quicquam cavisset, fecit, ut inter se vir et seia paciscerentur, ut divortio facto is fundus cornelio redderetur: non puto divortio facto virum vetante seia eum fundum cornelio tuto redditurum esse, sicuti si, cum pactum conventum nullum intercessisset, divortio facto mulier iussit eum fundum cornelio reddi, deinde antequam redderetur, vetuisset, non tuto redderetur. sed si antequam seia vetaret, cornelio eum fundum reddidisset nec causam habuisset existimandi id invita seia facturum esse, nec melius nec aequius esse existimarem eum fundum seiae reddi.
If, when cornelius had given his estate, in the name of seia, to her husband as dowry, and had made no provision about its being returned, he then brought it about that the husband and seia should agree by pact between themselves that, upon a divorce being effected, that estate would be returned to cornelius: I do not think that, once the divorce has been effected, with seia forbidding, the husband would safely return that estate to cornelius—just as, if no pact-convention had intervened, and upon the divorce the woman ordered that estate to be returned to cornelius, then, before it was returned, forbade it, it would not be safely returned. But if, before seia forbade, he had returned that estate to cornelius and had no cause to suppose that he would be doing it against seia’s will, I would not judge it either better or more equitable that that estate be returned to seia.
Egisti de peculio servi nomine cum domino: non esse liberatos fideiussores eius respondit. at si idem servus ex peculio suo permissa administratione peculii nummos solvisset, liberatos esse fideiussores eius recte legisti.
You brought an action de peculio, in the slave’s name, against the master: it has been answered that his fideiussors (sureties) are not released. But if the same slave, out of his own peculium, with administration of the peculium permitted, had paid the coins, you have rightly read that his fideiussors are released.
Hoc iure utimur, ut litis procuratori non recte solvatur: nam et absurdum est, cui iudicati actio non datur, ei ante rem iudicatam solvi posse. si tamen ad hoc datus sit, ut et solvi possit, solvendo eo liberabitur.
We use this law, that payment is not properly made to the procurator of the lawsuit: for it is also absurd that to one to whom the action on the adjudged (actio iudicati) is not given, it should be possible that payment be made before the matter is adjudged. If, however, he has been appointed for this purpose, that he also may be paid, by paying him the debtor will be released.
Filiae intestato patri heredis negotia mater gessit et res vendendas per argentarios dedit idque ipsum codice conscriptum est: argentarii universum redactum venditionis solverunt et post solutionem novem fere annis, quidquid agendum erat, nomine pupillae mater egit eamque marito nuptum collocavit et res ei tradidit. quaesitum est, an puella cum argentariis aliquam actionem habet, quando non ipsa stipulata sit pretium rerum, quae in venditionem datae sunt, sed mater. respondit, si de eo quaereretur, an iure ea solutione argentarii liberati essent, responderi iure liberatos.
The mother managed the affairs of a daughter who was heiress to a father dying intestate and consigned the goods to be sold through the bankers, and this very thing was written in the ledger: the bankers paid the whole proceeds of the sale collected, and after the payment, for almost nine years, whatever had to be transacted the mother transacted in the name of the ward, and settled her in marriage to a husband and delivered the property to her. The question was asked whether the girl has any action against the bankers, since it was not she herself who had stipulated for the price of the things that were consigned for sale, but the mother. He answered that, if the inquiry were whether by that payment the bankers were discharged by law, the answer is that they were lawfully discharged.
claudius: for that question underlies, hinging on jurisdiction—whether they seem to have in good faith paid to the mother the prices of the things which they knew to belong to the ward, who did not have the right of administration: and therefore, if they knew this, they are not released, namely if the mother is not solvent.
Ex pluribus causis et chirographis creditor ita cavit: " titius maevius dico me accepisse et habere et accepto tulisse a gaio titio reliquum omne ratione posita eius pecuniae, quam mihi stichus gaii titii servus caverat". quaesitum est, an ex ceteris chirographis, quae non stichus cavit, sed ipse debitor, integra manet actio ex reliquis chirographis per ipsum debitorem cautis. respondit eam solam obligationem dissolutam, ex qua solutum proponeretur.
From several causes and chirographs the creditor thus took security: " titius maevius I say that I have received and hold and have entered as received from gaius titius all the remainder, an account having been rendered, of that money which Stichus, slave of Gaius Titius, had given security for to me." It was asked whether, from the other chirographs, which were not secured by Stichus but by the debtor himself, the action remains intact on the remaining chirographs secured through the debtor himself. He replied that only that obligation is dissolved, from which payment would be asserted.
Lucius titius ex duobus chirographis, quibus quadringenta ei a seio debebantur, altero centum, altero trecentum, scripsit seio, ut unius chirographi centum per maevium et septicium sibi mitterentur: quaero, an seius, si maevio et septicio ex trecentum quoque solvisse se dicat, liberatus sit. respondit, si nec mandavit, ut ex trecentum solveretur, nec solutum ratum habuit, non esse liberatum.
Lucius Titius, from two chirographs, by which four hundred were owed to him by Seius—one for one hundred, the other for three hundred—wrote to Seius that the one hundred of one chirograph be sent to him through Maevius and Septicius: I ask whether Seius, if he says that he has also paid to Maevius and Septicius from the three hundred, is discharged. He responded: if he neither mandated that payment be made from the three hundred, nor held the payment as ratified, he is not discharged.
Lucius titius duabus stipulationibus, una quindecim sub usuris maioribus, altera viginti sub usuris levioribus seium eadem die obligavit, ita ut viginti prius solverentur, id est idibus septembribus: debitor post diem utriusque stipulationis cedentem solvit viginti sex neque dictum est ab altero, pro qua stipulatione solveretur. quaero, an quod solutum est eam stipulationem exoneraverit, cuius dies ante cessit, id est ut viginti sortis videantur et in usuras eorum sex data. respondit magis id accipi ex usu esse.
Lucius Titius by two stipulations, one for fifteen under greater usuries, the other for twenty under lighter usuries, obligated himself to Seius on the same day, in such a way that the twenty should be paid first, that is, on the Ides of September: the debtor, after the day of each stipulation had fallen due, paid twenty-six, and it was not said by either party for which stipulation it was being paid. I ask whether what was paid exonerated that stipulation whose day fell earlier, that is, that the twenty be seen as principal and six as given into their usuries. He responded that it is rather in accordance with usage to take it so.
Filius, qui administrabat ut heres paterna bona, pecuniam ex his sempronio mutuam dedit et eandem particulatim recepit, deinde se abstinuit, quia minor annis erat, ab ea hereditate: quaesitum est, curator bonorum patris constitutus an adversus sempronium utilem actionem habet. respondit nihil proponi, cur non is, qui solvisset id quod mutuum ita acceperat, liberatus esset.
A son, who as heir was administering his father’s goods, lent money from these to Sempronius and received the same back in parts; then he abstained from that inheritance, because he was under age: it was asked whether, a curator of the father’s goods having been appointed, he has a useful action against Sempronius. He replied that nothing is put forward why the one who had paid what he had so received as a loan would not be discharged.
Si debitor tuus non vult a te liberari et praesens est, non potest invitus a te solvi. paulus: immo debitorem tuum etiam praesentem etiam invitum liberare ita poteris supponendo, a quo debitum novandi causa stipuleris: quod etiamsi acceptum non feceris, tamen statim, quod ad te attinet, res peribit: nam et petentem te doli mali praescriptio excludet.
If your debtor does not wish to be released by you and is present, he cannot be paid off by you against his will. paul: rather, you will be able to free your debtor, even present and even unwilling, by substituting someone from whom you stipulate the debt for the purpose of novation; and even if you do not effect an acceptilation, nevertheless at once, so far as concerns you, the matter is extinguished: for the defense of fraud will bar you even if you sue.
For, if he should allege that “it ought to be given to himself,” either on the ground that it ought to be given to him because he has become heir, or on the ground that it would be owed to him in his own name. And yet there is a great difference in this matter: for if one of the co-parties (rei) can be removed by a temporal exception of a pact concluded (pacti conventi), it will matter whether the one who has become heir proceeds in his own name or in the hereditary right, so that thus you may be able to observe whether there is room for the exception or not.
Sed et si reus heredem fideiussorem scripserit, confunditur obligatio. et quasi generale quid retinendum est, ut, ubi ei obligationi, quae sequellae locum optinet, principalis accedit, confusa sit obligatio: quotiens duae sint principales, altera alteri potius adicitur ad actionem, quam confusionem parere.
But also, if the defendant has written his heir as surety (fidejussor), the obligation is confounded (merged). And it is to be retained as a sort of general principle, that where to that obligation which holds the place of a sequel (i.e., an accessory) a principal is added, the obligation is confounded; whereas whenever there are two principal [obligations], the one is rather added to the other for an action than to produce confusion.
Sed et si fideiussor alienos nummos in causam fideiussionis dedit, consumptis his mandati agere potest: et ideo si eam pecuniam solvat, quam subripuerat, mandati aget, postquam furti vel ex causa condictionis praestiterit.
But also, if a surety used another’s money for the purpose of the suretyship, once this has been consumed he can bring an action on mandate; and therefore, if he pays the money which he had stolen, he will bring an action on mandate after he has made satisfaction for theft or on the basis of a condictio.
Fabius ianuarius papiniano salutem. cum titius gaio seio deberet ex causa fideicommissi certam quantitatem et tantundem eidem ex alia causa, quae peti quidem non poterat, ex solutione autem petitionem non praestat, titii servus actor absente domino solvit eam summam, quae efficeret ad quantitatem unius debiti, cautumque est ei solutum ex universo credito: quaero, id quod solutum est in quam causam acceptum videtur. respondi, si quidem titio seius ita cavisset, ut sibi solutum ex universo credito significaret, crediti appellatio solam fideicommissi pecuniam demonstrare videtur, non eam, quae petitionem quidem non habet, solutione autem facta repeti pecunia non potest.
Fabius ianuarius to papinianus, greetings. When titius owed to gaius seius, from the cause of a fideicommissum, a fixed amount, and as much to the same from another cause, which indeed could not be sued for, and from payment does not furnish a petition, the slave of titius, his agent (actor), with the master absent, paid that sum which would make up the amount of one debt, and it was stipulated that it had been paid to him out of the entire credit: I ask, into which cause what was paid is deemed accepted (acceptum). I answered: if indeed seius had thus stipulated to titius so as to signify that payment had been made to himself “out of the entire credit,” the appellation “creditum” seems to point only to the money of the fideicommissum, not to that which indeed has no petition, but, once payment has been made, the money cannot be repeated (reclaimed).
but since Titius’s slave, the actor, paid the money with the master absent, not even the ownership of the coins would have been transferred into that species of obligation which had the aid of an exceptio, if it were put forward that the payment was made on that cause; because it is not plausible that the master had appointed the slave to the paying of monies under that species which ought not to have been paid, any more than that he should pay the peculium-coins on account of a fideiussion, which the slave did not undertake for the advantage of the peculium.
" stichum aut pamphilum, utrum ego velim, dare spondes?" altero mortuo qui vivit solus petetur, nisi si mora facta sit in eo mortuo, quem petitor elegit: tunc enim perinde solus ille qui decessit praebetur, ac si solus in obligationem deductus fuisset.
" do you promise to give stichus or pamphilus, whichever I may wish?" if one has died, the survivor alone will be claimed, unless delay has occurred with respect to that deceased one whom the claimant chose: for then that one alone who has deceased is provided, just as if he alone had been brought into the obligation.
Quod si promissoris fuerit electio, defuncto altero qui superest aeque peti poterit. enimvero si facto debitoris alter sit mortuus, cum debitoris esset electio, quamvis interim non alius peti possit, quam qui solvi etiam potest, neque defuncti offerri aestimatio potest, si forte longe fuit vilior, quoniam id pro petitore in poenam promissoris constitutum est, tamen, si et alter servus postea sine culpa debitoris moriatur, nullo modo ex stipulatu agi poterit, cum illo in tempore, quo moriebatur, non commiserit stipulationem. sane quoniam impunita non debent esse admissa, doli actio non immerito desiderabitur: aliter quam in persona fideiussoris, qui promissum hominem interfecit, quia tenetur ex stipulatu actione fideiussor, quemadmodum tenebatur, si debitor sine herede decessisset.
But if the choice belonged to the promissor, when one has died the survivor can equally be demanded. Indeed, if through the act of the debtor one of them has died, since the choice was the debtor’s, although in the meantime no one else can be claimed except the one who can also be delivered, neither can the valuation of the deceased be tendered, if perchance he was far cheaper, since that was established for the petitioner as a penalty against the promissor. Nevertheless, if the other slave afterwards dies without the debtor’s fault, no action ex stipulatu can in any way be brought, since at the time when he was dying the stipulation had not been breached. Yet, since admitted wrongs ought not to go unpunished, an action of fraud (actio doli) will rightly be sought—otherwise than in the case of a surety (fideiussor) who killed the promised man (slave), for the surety is held by the ex stipulatu action, just as he would be held if the debtor had died without an heir.
Aditio hereditatis nonnumquam iure confundit obligationem, veluti si creditor debitoris vel contra debitor creditoris adierit hereditatem. aliquando pro solutione cedit, si forte creditor, qui pupillo sine tutoris auctoritate nummos crediderat, heres ei extitit: non enim quanto locupletior pupillus factus est, consequeretur, sed in solidum creditum suum ex hereditate retinet. aliquando evenit, ut inanis obligatio aditione hereditatis confirmetur.
The entry upon an inheritance sometimes by law confounds the obligation, as, for example, if the creditor of a debtor, or conversely the debtor of a creditor, has entered upon the inheritance. Sometimes it counts in lieu of payment, if by chance a creditor, who had lent money to a ward without the tutor’s authority, has become his heir: for he would not recover only to the extent that the ward has been made more wealthy, but he retains his claim in full out of the inheritance. Sometimes it happens that an empty obligation is confirmed by the entry upon the inheritance.
for if an heir who has restored the inheritance under the Trebellianic arrangement becomes heir to the fideicommissary, or a woman who had interceded on behalf of Titius becomes heir to that same man, the civil obligation—by reason of the inheritance of him who was bound by law—begins to lose the aid of the exception: for it is not fitting to bring succor to the female sex when she is imperiled in her own name.
Quod volgo iactatur fideiussorem, qui debitori heres extitit, ex causa fideiussionis liberari, totiens verum est, quotiens rei plenior promittendi obligatio invenitur. nam si reus dumtaxat fuit obligatus, fideiussor liberabitur. e contrario non potest dici non tolli fideiussoris obligationem, si debitor propriam et personalem habuit defensionem: nam si minori viginti quinque annis bonae fidei pecuniam credidit isque nummos acceptos perdidit et intra tempora in integrum restitutionis decessit herede fideiussore, difficile est dicere causam iuris honorarii, quae potuit auxilio minori esse, retinere fideiussoris obligationem, quae principalis fuit et cui fideiussoris accessit sine contemplatione iuris praetorii.
What is commonly bandied about—that a surety who has become heir to the debtor is released from the cause of suretyship—is true as often as the principal debtor is found to have a fuller obligation of promising. For if the principal alone was obligated, the surety will be released. Conversely, it cannot be said that the surety’s obligation is not removed if the debtor had a proper and personal defense. For if someone lent money, under good faith, to a minor under twenty-five years, and the minor lost the moneys received, and within the period for in integrum restitution died, the surety being his heir, it is difficult to say that the ground of the ius honorarium—which could have been a help to the minor—should retain the obligation (the principal one, to which that of the surety acceded) without regard to the praetorian law.
Naturalis obligatio ut pecuniae numeratione, ita iusto pacto vel iureiurando ipso iure tollitur, quod vinculum aequitatis, quo solo sustinebatur, conventionis aequitate dissolvitur: ideoque fideiussor, quem pupillus dedit, ex istis causis liberari dicitur.
A natural obligation, just as by the numeration of money, so also by a just pact or by an oath, is by the law itself extinguished; for the bond of equity, by which alone it was sustained, is dissolved by the equity of the convention: and therefore the surety whom a ward furnished is said to be released on these grounds.
Quaesitum est, an ita stipulari quis possit: " mihi aut filio meo decem dari?" vel ita: " mihi aut patri?" sed non incommode potest adhiberi distinctio, ut filio quidem stipulante patris tunc adiciatur persona, cum stipulatio ei adquiri non possit: e contrario autem nihil prohibeat patre stipulante filii personam adici, cum totiens, quod pater filio stipulatur, sibi stipulatus intellegitur, cum ipsi sibi stipulatus non est, et in proposito manifestum est non obligationis, sed solutionis gratia filii personam adiectam.
It has been asked whether someone can stipulate thus: "that ten be given to me or to my son?" or thus: "to me or to my father?" But a distinction can appropriately be applied, such that, when the son is the stipulator, the person of the father is then added when the stipulation cannot be acquired for him; conversely, however, nothing prevents, when the father is the stipulator, the person of the son being added, since whenever the father stipulates for the son, he is understood to have stipulated for himself, although he has not stipulated to himself; and in the case proposed it is evident that the person of the son has been added not for the sake of obligation, but for the sake of payment.
Nam si furiosi vel pupilli persona adiecta sit, ita tutori vel curatori pecunia recte dabitur, si condicionis quoque implendae causa recte pecunia tutori vel curatori datur. quod quidem labeo et pegasus putaverunt utilitatis causa recipiendum: idque ita recipi potest, si pecunia in rem vel pupilli vel furiosi versa est, quomodo si domino iussus dare servo dedisset, ut domino daret. ceterum qui servo dare iussus est, domino dando non aliter implesse condicionem intellegendus est, quam si ex voluntate servi dedit.
For if the person of a madman or a ward be adjoined, then money will rightly be given to the guardian or curator, provided that, for the sake of fulfilling the condition, it is likewise proper that money be given to the guardian or curator. And indeed Labeo and Pegasus thought that this should be accepted for the sake of utility: and it can be so accepted, if the money has been turned to the advantage of either the ward or the madman, just as if, having been ordered by the master to give to the slave, he had given it to the slave so that he might give it to the master. Moreover, he who is ordered to give to the slave is not to be understood to have fulfilled the condition by giving to the master, except if he gave in accordance with the will of the slave.
Si creditor debitoris hereditatem ad se non pertinentem possedit et tantum ad eum pervenit, quantum, si quilibet alius bonorum possessor ei solveret, liberaret heredem, non potest dici fideiussores liberari: neque enim ipsum sibi solvisse pecuniam credendum est, a quo hereditas evincitur.
If a creditor has possessed the debtor’s inheritance not pertaining to himself, and so much has come to him as would, if any other possessor of the goods were to pay it to him, release the heir, it cannot be said that the sureties are released: for it is not to be believed that he has paid the money to himself, from whom the inheritance is evicted.
Dolo fecisti, quo minus possideres quod ex hereditate ad alium pertinente adprehenderas: si possessor corpus aut litis aestimationem praestitit, ea res tibi proderit, quia nihil petitoris interest: ceterum si tu ante conventus ex praeterito dolo praestiteris, nihil ea res possessori proderit.
You acted by fraud, so that you did not possess what you had apprehended from an inheritance pertaining to another: if the possessor has furnished the corpus or the litis estimation, that will profit you, because it is of no concern to the claimant; but if you, before being sued, have made satisfaction on account of prior fraud, that will be of no benefit to the possessor.
Si mandatu meo titio pecuniam credidisses, eiusmodi contractus similis est tutori et debitori pupilli: et ideo mandatore convento et damnato, quamquam pecunia soluta sit, non liberari debitorem ratio suadet, sed et praestare debet creditor actiones mandatori adversus debitorem, ut ei satisfiat. et hoc pertinet tutoris et pupilli debitoris non fecisse comparationem: nam cum tutor pupillo tenetur ob id, quod debitorem eius non convenit, neque iudicio cum altero accepto liberatur alter nec, si damnatus tutor solverit, ea res proderit debitori: quin etiam dici solet tutelae contraria actione agendum, ut ei pupillus adversus debitores actionibus cedat.
If at my mandate you had lent money to Titius, a contract of this sort is similar to that between a tutor and the debtor of a ward; and therefore, when the mandator has been sued and condemned, although the money has been paid, reason counsels that the debtor is not released, but the creditor ought also to furnish the mandator with the actions against the debtor, so that he may be satisfied. And this pertains to having made no comparison between the tutor and the ward’s debtor: for since the tutor is held to the ward on account of his not having proceeded against the latter’s debtor, neither, when a judgment has been obtained against the one, is the other released, nor, if the condemned tutor pays, will that fact benefit the debtor; indeed it is even said that one should proceed by the counter-action of tutelage, so that the ward may cede to him the actions against the debtors.
Pupilli debitor tutore delegante pecuniam creditori tutoris solvit: liberatio contigit, si non malo consilio cum tutore habito hoc factum esse probetur. sed et interdicto fraudatorio tutoris creditor pupillo tenetur, si eum consilium fraudis participasse constabit.
The debtor of the ward, the guardian making a delegation, pays the money to the guardian’s creditor: discharge ensues, unless it is proved that this was done with ill counsel in concert with the guardian. But also by the interdict against fraud, the guardian’s creditor is liable to the ward, if it is established that he participated in a design of fraud.
Cum pupilla magistratui, qui per fraudem pupillo tutorem dedit, heres extitisset, tutores eius cum adulescente transegerunt: eam transactionem pupilla ratam habere noluit: nihilo minus erit tutorum pecunia liberata nec tutores contra adulescentem actionem nec utilem habebunt, qui suum reciperavit. plane si adulescens pecuniam restituere tutori pupillae maluerit, rescisso quod gestum est actionem utilem in pupillam heredem magistratus accipiet.
When a girl became heir to the magistrate who, by fraud, had given a tutor to a boy-ward, her tutors made a settlement with the adolescent: the girl was unwilling to hold that settlement ratified; nonetheless, the tutors’ liability as to the money will be discharged, nor will the tutors have an action, not even a useful one, against the adolescent, who has recovered what was his. Plainly, if the adolescent should prefer to restore the money to the girl’s tutor, then, what was done having been rescinded, the magistrate will grant a useful action against the girl, the heir of the magistrate.
Soror, cui legatum ab herede fratre debebatur, post motam legati quaestionem transegit, ut nomine debitoris contenta legatum non peteret. placuit, quamvis nulla delegatio facta neque liberatio secuta esset, tamen nominis periculum ad eam pertinere itaque, si legatum contra placitum peteret, exceptionem pacti non inutiliter opponi.
A sister, to whom a legacy was owed by her brother the heir, after the question of the legacy had been set in motion, settled, to the effect that, content with the debtor’s claim (nomen), she would not seek the legacy. It was decided that, although no delegation had been made and no release had followed, nevertheless the risk of the claim (nomen) pertains to her; and thus, if she were to demand the legacy contrary to the agreement, the exception of the pact could not be ineffectually opposed.
Cum eodem tempore pignora duobus contractibus obligantur, pretium eorum pro modo pecuniae cuiusque contractus creditor accepto facere debet nec in arbitrio eius electio erit, cum debitor pretium pignoris consortioni subiecerit: quod si temporibus discretis superfluum pignorum obligari placuit, prius debitum pretio pignorum iure solvetur, secundum superfluo compensabitur.
When at the same time pledges are bound to two contracts, the creditor must credit the price of them according to the measure of the money of each contract, and the choice will not lie in his discretion, since the debtor has subjected the price of the pledge to a consortium; but if at distinct times it was agreed that an excess of pledges be obligated, the prior debt will by law be discharged by the price of the pledges, the second will be compensated by the surplus.
Cum ex pluribus causis debitor pecuniam solvit, utriusque demonstratione cessante potior habebitur causa eius pecuniae, quae sub infamia debetur: mox eius, quae poenam continet: tertio quae sub hypotheca vel pignore contracta est: post hunc ordinem potior habebitur propria quam aliena causa, veluti fideiussoris. quod veteres ideo definierunt, quod verisimile videretur diligentem debitorem admonitum ita negotium suum gesturum fuisse. si nihil eorum interveniat, vetustior contractus ante solvetur.
When from several causes the debtor pays money, if neither party specifies, the cause will be held preferable of that money which is owed under infamy: next, that which contains a penalty: third, that which was contracted under hypothec or pledge: after this order, one’s own cause will be preferred to that for another, as, for example, that of a surety (fideiussor). The ancients defined this for the reason that it would seem probable that a diligent debtor, when admonished, would have managed his business thus. If none of these intervenes, the older contract will be discharged first.
Qui res suas obligavit, postea aliquam possessionem ex his pro filia sua dotem promittendo obligavit et solvit. si ea res a creditore evicta est, dicendum est maritum ex dotis promissione agere posse, ac si statuliberum remve sub condicione legatam dotis nomine pro filia pater solvisset: harum enim rerum solutio non potest nisi ex eventu liberare, scilicet quo casu certum erit remanere eas.
He who has obligated his own goods, and afterwards, by promising a dowry for his daughter, obligated and paid over some possession from them. If that thing is evicted by a creditor, it must be said that the husband can bring an action on the promise of the dowry, just as if the father had paid, in the name of a dowry for his daughter, a statuliber or a thing bequeathed under a condition: for the payment of these sorts of things cannot discharge except from the event, namely in the case in which it will be certain that they remain.
Rem autem castrensis peculii solventem patrem perinde accipere debemus, ac si alienam dedisset, quamvis possit residere apud eum, cui soluta est, prius mortuo intestato filio: sed tunc adquisita creditur, cum filius decesserit: et utique cuius fuerit, eventus declaret sitque et hoc ex his, quae post factis, in praeteritum quid fuerit, declarent.
We ought to treat a father who discharges a matter of the castrense peculium just as if he had given another’s property, although it can remain with the person to whom it was paid, if first the son has died intestate: but then it is deemed to have been acquired when the son has deceased; and in any case let the outcome declare whose it was, and let this also be among those instances in which things done afterwards declare what, in the past, it was.
Mihi dare decem pure aut titio kalendis vel sub condicione, aut mihi kalendis ianuariis, titio februariis utiliter stipulor: quod si mihi kalendis februariis, titio kalendis ianuariis, potest dubitari. sed rectius dicitur utiliter stipulatum: nam cum in diem sit ea quoque obligatio, etiam mihi solvi potest ante februarias: igitur et illi solvi poterit.
I usefully stipulate for ten to be given to me purely or to titio on the kalends, or under a condition; or to me on the kalends of january, to titio in february: but if to me on the kalends of february, to titio on the kalends of january, there can be doubt. But it is more correct to say it was usefully stipulated: for since that obligation also is for a day, it can even be paid to me before the february kalends; therefore it can be paid to him as well.
Qui stipulatus " sibi aut titio" si hoc dicit " si titio non solveris" dari sibi, videtur condicionaliter stipulari. et ideo etiam sic facta stipulatione: " mihi decem aut quinque titio dari?" quinque titio solutis liberabitur reus a stipulatore. quod ita potest admitti, si hoc ipsum expressim agebatur, ut quasi poena adiecta sit in persona stipulantis, si titio solutum non esset.
He who has stipulated “to himself or to Titius,” if he says this, “if you do not pay to Titius,” that it be given to himself, seems to stipulate conditionally. And therefore even with a stipulation made thus: “that ten be given to me or five to Titius?” with five paid to Titius the defendant (reus) will be released from the stipulator. This can be admitted in this way, if this very point was being expressly transacted, namely that, as it were, a penalty be added on in the person of the stipulator, if it were not paid to Titius.
but when it is stipulated simply "to himself or to titius," titius is brought in only for the sake of payment, and therefore, with five paid to him, the remaining five will remain in obligation. conversely, if I have stipulated five for myself, ten for that man, the payment of five to titius does not satisfy the wording of the stipulation so that he be released from me: further, if he pays ten, he will not reclaim five, but ten will be owed to me by an action of mandate.
Mihi romae aut ephesi titio dari stipulor: an solvendo titio ephesi a me liberetur, videamus: nam si diversa facta sunt, ut iulianus putat, diversa res est. sed cum praevalet causa dandi, liberatur: liberaretur enim et si mihi stichum, illi pamphilum dari stipulatus essem et titio pamphilum solvisset. at ubi merum factum stipulor, puta insulam in meo solo aedificari aut in titii loco, numquid, si in titii loco aedificet, non contingat liberatio?
I stipulate that there be given either to me at Rome, or to Titius at Ephesus: let us see whether, by paying Titius at Ephesus, he is released as against me. For if they are made as different things, as Julian thinks, it is a different matter. But since the cause of giving prevails, he is released: for he would also be released if I had stipulated that Stichus be given to me and that Pamphilus be given to that man, and Titius had paid Pamphilus. But where I stipulate for a mere act, suppose that a tenement be built on my ground or on Titius’s site, then, if he builds on Titius’s site, would not release ensue?
Si servus fructuarius ex re fructuarii domino proprietatis aut fructuario stipuletur, inutilis est stipulatio: at ex re proprietarii si ipsi domino aut fructuario stipuletur, recte stipulatur: tantum enim solutionis capax est fructuarius hoc casu, non etiam obligationis.
If a usufructuary’s slave, on account of the usufructuary’s property, should stipulate from the owner of the ownership or from the usufructuary, the stipulation is ineffectual: but on account of the owner’s property, if he should stipulate to the owner himself or to the usufructuary, he stipulates rightly; for in this case the usufructuary is capable only of solution (performance), not also of obligation.
Aream promisi alienam: in ea dominus insulam aedificavit: an stipulatio extincta sit, quaesitum est. respondi, si alienum hominem promisi et is a domino manumissus est, liberor. nec admissum est, quod celsus ait, si idem rursus lege aliqua servus effectus sit, peti eum posse: in perpetuum enim sublata obligatio restitui non potest, et si servus effectus sit, alius videtur esse.
I promised a plot belonging to another: on it the owner built an insula: it was asked whether the stipulation is extinguished. I answered: if I promised someone else’s slave and he has been manumitted by the owner, I am released. Nor was it admitted, what Celsus says, that if the same person has again become a slave by some law, he can be claimed: for an obligation once removed cannot be restored in perpetuity, and if he has become a slave, he is regarded as another.
nor did he employ a similar argument, namely that, if the owner has dismantled the ship which you promised, and then has fastened it together again with the same planks, you are bound: for here it is the same ship which you pledged you would give, so that the obligation seems rather to be in abeyance than to have been extinguished. but it will become similar to the case of the manumitted man, if you suppose that the ship was dismantled with the purpose that the planks be converted to other uses, and then, the plan having been changed, the same planks were assembled: for the later ship will seem to be another, just as that other is another man. a plot of ground on which a building has been set is not similar to these: for it has not ceased to exist in the nature of things.
Nay rather, both the plot can be claimed and its estimation must be paid: for the plot is a part of the tenement and indeed the greatest part, to which even the superficies yields. We shall say differently if the promised slave has been captured by enemies: here in the meantime he cannot be claimed, as if before the day; but if he returns by postliminium, then he will rightly be claimed: for here the obligation has ceased. The plot, however, persists, just like the other things of which the building consisted.
Quaero, an curatoribus vel tutoribus in provincia datis romae pecunia solvi possit, quae in provincia ita ab his faenerata esset, ut romae solveretur, cum idem curatores vel tutores rerum italicarum administrationem non sustinent, an, si solverit debitor, liberetur. paulus respondit his tutoribus vel curatoribus recte pupillo pecuniam debitam solvi, qui negotia eius administrant: eos autem, qui provincialium rerum curatores vel tutores sunt, italica negotia administrare non solere, nisi specialiter tutores provincialium rerum, ut sibi romae redderetur, promitti curaverunt.
I ask whether money can be paid at Rome to curators or tutors appointed in a province, when in the province it had been lent by them at interest on the terms that it be paid at Rome, since those same curators or tutors do not undertake the administration of Italian affairs; and whether, if the debtor pays, he is released. Paul replied that it is proper for the money owed to the ward to be paid to those tutors or curators who administer his business; but those who are curators or tutors of provincial affairs are not accustomed to administer Italian business, unless the tutors of provincial affairs have specifically taken care to have it promised that it would be rendered to them at Rome.
Paulus respondit aliam causam esse debitoris solventis, aliam creditoris pignus distrahentis: nam cum debitor solvit pecuniam, in potestate eius esse commemorare, in quam causam solveret: cum autem creditor pignus distraheret, licere ei pretium in acceptum referre etiam in eam quantitatem, quae natura tantum debebatur, et ideo deducto eo debitum peti posse.
Paulus replied that the case of a debtor paying is one thing, and that of a creditor selling a pledge is another: for when the debtor pays money, it is in his power to specify on what account he is paying; but when the creditor sells the pledge, he is allowed to credit the price as received even toward that amount which by its nature only was owed (the principal), and therefore, with that deducted, the debt can be demanded.
Creditor oblatam a debitore pecuniam ut alia die accepturus distulit: mox pecunia, qua illa res publica utebatur, quasi aerosa iussu praesidis sublata est: item pupillaris pecunia, ut possit idoneis nominibus credi servata, ita interempta est: quaesitum est, cuius detrimentum esset. respondi secundum ea quae proponerentur nec creditoris nec tutoris detrimentum esse.
A creditor deferred money offered by the debtor, intending to accept it on another day: soon the currency which that commonwealth was using was withdrawn by order of the governor, as if of base metal; likewise, a ward’s money, kept so that it might be lent on suitable names, was thus destroyed: it was asked whose loss it was. I responded, according to what was set forth, that the loss was neither the creditor’s nor the guardian’s.
Cum de sorte debita constaret, de usura litigatum esset, novissime ex appellatione pronuntiatum est solutas quidem usuras non repeti, in futurum vero non deberi: quaero, pecunia data utrum usuris cedere deberet, quod petitor defenderet, an vero sorti proficeret. respondi, si qui dabat, in sortem se dare dixisset, usuris non debere proficere.
When it was established concerning the principal owed, and there had been litigation about the interest, most recently on appeal it was pronounced that interest paid is not to be recovered, but that for the future it is not to be owed: I ask whether the money paid ought to go to interest—which the plaintiff would maintain—or rather to benefit the principal. I answered that, if the one paying had said he was giving it into the principal, it ought not to benefit the interest.
Valerius lucii titii servus scripsit: " accepi a mario marino ex summa maiore tot aureos": quaero, an haec summa in proximum annum ei accepto ferri debeat, cum superioris anni sit reliquator. respondi videri in primam quamque summam liberationem proficere.
Valerius, the slave of lucius titius, wrote: " I received from mario marinus, out of the greater sum, so many aurei": I ask whether this sum ought to be carried to his credit for the next year, since he is in arrears for the previous year. I replied that it seems to go to the discharge of whichever sum is first in order.
Titius mutuam pecuniam accepit et quincunces usuras spopondit easque paucis annis solvit: postea nullo pacto interveniente per errorem et ignorantiam semisses usuras solvit: quaero, an patefacto errore id, quod amplius usurarum nomine solutum esset quam in stipulatum deductum, sortem minueret. respondit, si errore plus in usuris solvisset quam deberet, habendam rationem in sortem eius quod amplius solutum est.
Titius received a loan of money and promised interest at five-twelfths, and he paid it for a few years: afterwards, with no agreement intervening, through error and ignorance he paid interest at a half: I ask whether, once the error is laid open, that which under the name of interest had been paid more than had been fixed in the stipulation would diminish the principal. he answered that, if by error he had paid more in interest than he owed, account should be taken toward the principal of that which has been paid in excess.
Aliud est iure stipulationis titio solvi posse, aliud postea permissu meo id contingere. nam cui iure stipulationis recte solvitur, ei etiam prohibente me recte solvi potest: cui vero alias permisero solvi, ei non recte solvitur, si, priusquam solveretur, denuntiaverim promissori, ne ei solveretur.
It is one thing that, by right of the stipulation, payment can be made to Titius; it is another that afterward this occurs by my permission. For to the one to whom, by right of the stipulation, it is properly paid, to him it can properly be paid even if I forbid it; but to the one to whom I have otherwise permitted payment to be made, it is not properly paid, if, before it was paid, I have given notice to the promisor that it not be paid to him.
Verborum obligatio aut naturaliter resolvitur aut civiliter: naturaliter veluti solutione aut cum res in stipulationem deducta sine culpa promissoris in rebus humanis esse desiit: civiliter veluti acceptilatione vel cum in eandem personam ius stipulantis promittentisque devenit.
A verbal obligation is dissolved either naturally or civilly: naturally, for example, by payment, or when the thing brought into the stipulation, without the fault of the promisor, has ceased to exist in human affairs; civilly, for example, by acceptilation, or when the right of the stipulator and of the promisor has come into the same person.
Ei, qui mandatu meo post mortem meam stipulatus est, recte solvitur, quia talis est lex obligationis: ideoque etiam invito me recte ei solvitur. ei autem, cui iussi debitorem meum post mortem meam solvere, non recte solvitur, quia mandatum morte dissolvitur.
To him who, by my mandate, after my death has stipulated, payment is rightly made, because such is the law of the obligation; and therefore even against my will payment is rightly made to him. But to him to whom I ordered my debtor to pay after my death, payment is not rightly made, because a mandate is dissolved by death.
Pluribus stipulationibus factis si promissor ita accepto rogasset: " quod ego tibi promisi, habesne acceptum?", si quidem apparet, quid actum est, id solum per acceptilationem sublatum est: si non apparet, omnes stipulationes solutae sunt: dummodo illud sciamus, si ego aliud accepto tuli, aliud tu rogasti, nihil valere acceptilationem.
With several stipulations having been made, if the promisor were to ask for acceptilation in this way: “what I promised you, do you have it as accepted?”, then, if it is apparent what was transacted, that alone is removed by acceptilation; if it is not apparent, all the stipulations are dissolved; provided we know this: if I took acceptilation for one thing, while you asked for another, the acceptilation is of no effect.
Accepto liberare servus communis alterum ex dominis etiam ab altero domino potest: id enim et labeoni placuit. denique libro pithanon scripsit, si a primo domino secundo socio domino suo stipulatus fuerit, posse secundum accepto rogare et per acceptilationem primum liberare, quem ipse obligaverat: sic fieri, ut per unum atque eundem servum et constituatur et tollatur obligatio.
A co-owned slave can, by an entry of receipt, release one of the masters even on behalf of the other master: for this too pleased Labeo. Indeed, in the book Pithanon he wrote that, if on behalf of his second co-owner master he has stipulated from the first master, the second can ask to have it entered as received and by acceptilation release the first, whom he himself had bound: thus it comes about that through one and the same slave an obligation is both constituted and taken away.
Filius familias promittendo patrem civiliter non obligat, sed se obligat: propter quod accepto rogare filius familias potest, ut se liberet, quia ipse obligatus est, pater autem acceptum rogando nihil agit, cum non sit ipse obligatus, sed filius. idem erit et in servo dicendum: nam et servus accepto liberari potest, et tolluntur etiam honorariae obligationes, si quae sunt adversus dominum. quia hoc iure utimur, ut iuris gentium sit acceptilatio: et ideo puto et graece posse acceptum fieri, dummodo sic fiat, ut latinis verbis solet: exeis labwn dynaria tosa; exo labwn.
A son in the father’s power, by promising, does not civilly obligate the father, but obligates himself: wherefore the son in power can ask for acceptilation, in order to free himself, because he himself is obligated, but the father by asking for acceptilation does nothing, since he himself is not obligated, but the son. The same must be said also in the case of a slave: for a slave too can be freed by acceptilation, and the honorary obligations also are removed, if there are any against the master. Because we use this law, that acceptilation is of the ius gentium (law of nations): and therefore I think an acceptilation can also be effected in Greek, provided it be done as it is wont with Latin words: “Have you received so many denarii?” “I have received.”
Species adquirendi est liberare dominum obligatione: et ideo fructuarius quoque servus liberare acceptum rogando fructuarium potest, quia ex re eius videtur ei adquirere. sed et si usum tantum habemus, idem fiet. idemque dicemus et in eo, qui bona fide nobis servit, et in ceteris, qui nostro iuri subiecti sunt.
A kind of acquiring is to free the master from an obligation; and therefore a slave of a usufructuary too can free the usufructuary by requesting entry as “received” (acceptum), because he is seen to acquire for him out of his property. But even if we have only use (usus), the same will happen. And we will say the same of one who serves us in good faith, and of the others who are subject to our legal power.
Si id, quod in stipulationem deductum est, divisionem non recipiat, acceptilatio in partem nullius erit momenti, ut puta si servitus fuit praedii rustici vel urbani. plane si usus fructus sit in stipulatum deductus, puta fundi titiani, poterit pro parte acceptilatio fieri et erit residuae partis fundi usus fructus. si tamen viam quis stipulatus accepto iter vel actum fecerit, acceptilatio nullius erit momenti: hoc idem est probandum, si actus accepto fuerit latus.
If that which has been brought into stipulation does not admit division, an acceptilation for a part will be of no effect—for example, if it was a servitude of a rural or urban estate. Clearly, if a usufruct has been brought into stipulation, say of the Titian estate, an acceptilation can be made for a part, and there will be a usufruct of the remaining part of the estate. If, however, someone who stipulated for a via, by acceptilation makes it an iter or an actus, the acceptilation will be of no effect; the same is to be approved if an actus has, by acceptilation, been made broad.
Illud certum est eum, qui fundum stipulatus usum fructum vel viam accepto facit, in ea esse causa, ut acceptilatio non valeat: qui enim accepto facit, vel totum vel partem eius, quod stipulatus est, debet accepto facere, hae autem partes non sunt, non magis quam si quis domum stipulatus accepto ferat cementa vel fenestras vel parietem vel diaetam.
It is certain that one who, having stipulated for an estate, effects an acceptilation upon receiving a usufruct or a right of way, is in such a case that the acceptilation is not valid: for he who effects an acceptilation ought to effect it for either the whole or a part of that which he stipulated; but these are not parts, no more than if someone, having stipulated for a house, were to accept by acceptilation the building-stones or the windows or a wall or a suite.
Si quis usum fructum stipulatus usum accepto tulerit, si quidem sic tulerit acceptum quasi usu debito, liberatio non continget: si vero quasi ex usu fructu, cum possit usus sine fructu constitui, dicendum est acceptilationem valere.
If someone, having stipulated for a usufruct, has entered the use as accepted, then if he has so entered it as accepted as though the use were owed, release will not ensue; but if as though under the usufruct, since use can be constituted without fruit, it must be said that the acceptilation is valid.
Si is, qui hominem stipulatus est, stichum accepto tulerit, iulianus libro quinquagensimo quarto digestorum scripsit acceptilationem aliquid egisse tolisseque totam obligationem: quod enim invito stipulatori promissor solvere potest, id et acceptum latum liberationem pariet.
If he who has stipulated for a slave has carried Stichus to the account as received, Julian, in the fifty-fourth book of the Digest, wrote that the acceptilation has effected something and has removed the whole obligation: for what the promissor can pay to an unwilling stipulator, that, once carried as accepted, will also bring about liberation.
Qui ita stipulatur a fideiussore: " quod titio credidero, fide tua esse iubes?", deinde, antequam crederet, acceptum fecit fideiussori, reus non liberabitur, sed quandoque ei creditum fuerit, tenetur: nam et si fideiussorem non ante liberatum esse credimus, quam cum fuerit creditum reo, non tamen reus antiquiore acceptilatione, quam obligatio eius est, liberari potuit.
He who stipulates thus from a surety: "what I shall have credited to Titius, do you bid to be on your faith?", then, before he gave the credit, made an acceptilation to the surety, the principal debtor will not be freed, but whenever credit shall have been given to him, he is held liable: for even if we believe that the surety is not freed before the time when credit has been given to the debtor, nevertheless the debtor could not be freed by an acceptilation older than his obligation is.
Tutor, curator furiosi acceptum ferre non potuit, nec procurator quidem potest facere acceptum: sed hi omnes debent novare ( possunt enim) et sic accepto facere. ne his quidem accepto fieri potest, sed novatione facta potuerunt liberari per acceptilationem. nam et in absentium persona hoc remedio uti solemus: stipulamur ab aliquo id novandi causa, quod nobis absens debet, et ita accepto liberamus, a quo stipulati sumus: ita fiet, ut absens novatione, praesens acceptilatione liberetur.
A tutor, or the curator of an insane person, could not enter it as received (acceptum), nor indeed can a procurator effect an acceptilation; but all these ought to novate ( for they can) and thus bring about an acceptilation. Nor even by these can an acceptilation be effected, but, a novation having been made, they could be released by acceptilation. For in the case of absentees we are accustomed to use this remedy as well: we stipulate from someone, for the sake of novating, that which an absent person owes us, and thus by acceptilation we free the one from whom we have stipulated; thus it will come about that the absent is freed by novation, the present by acceptilation.
Si is qui stichum promisit ita interroget: " quod stichum promisi, stichum et pamphilum habesne acceptos?", puto recte accepto latum et pro supervacuo pamphili mentionem factam, quemadmodum si is qui decem promisit ita interroget: " quod tibi decem promisi, viginti habesne accepta?", etiam decem nomine erit liberatus.
If he who promised Stichus should question thus: "as to the Stichus I promised, have you accepted Stichus and Pamphilus?", I think the acceptilation has been duly made and the mention of Pamphilus is superfluous; just as if he who promised ten should question thus: "as to the ten I promised you, have you accepted twenty?", he will also be released in respect of the ten.
Si ex pluribus obligatis uni accepto feratur, non ipse solus liberatur, sed et hi, qui secum obligantur: nam cum ex duobus pluribusque eiusdem obligationis participibus uni accepto fertur, ceteri quoque liberantur, non quoniam ipsis accepto latum est, sed quoniam velut solvisse videtur is, qui acceptilatione solutus est.
If, from several persons obligated, an acceptilation is made to one, not he alone is released, but also those who are bound with him: for when, of two or more participants in the same obligation, an acceptilation is made to one, the others likewise are released—not because an acceptilation has been made to them, but because the one who has been released by acceptilation is deemed as though he had paid.
Eius rei stipulatio, quam acceptio sequatur, a gallo aquilio talis exposita est: " quidquid te mihi ex quacumque causa dare facere oportet oportebit praesens in diemve, quarumque rerum mihi tecum actio quaeque adversus te petitio vel adversus te persecutio est eritve, quodve tu meum habes tenes possides: quanti quaeque earum rerum res erit, tantam pecuniam dari stipulatus est aulus agerius, spopondit numerius negidius". " quod numerius negidius aulo agerio promisit spopondit, id haberetne a se acceptum, numerius negidius aulum agerium rogavit, aulus agerius numerio negidio acceptum fecit " .
The stipulation of that matter, which an acceptilation follows, has been set forth by gaius aquilius thus: " whatever you ought or will ought to give or do to me from whatever cause, whether presently or for a day, and as to whatever things I have with you an action, and whatever petition against you or persecution against you there is or will be, and whatever of mine you have, hold, possess: of whatever value the matter of each of those things will be, aulus agerius has stipulated that so much money be given, numerius negidius has promised". " as to what numerius negidius promised and vowed to aulus agerius, whether he should have it accepted from him, numerius negidius asked aulus agerius, aulus agerius made it accepted to numerius negidius " .
Si sub condicione legatum mihi datum novandi causa stipulatus sum et ante existentem condicionem acceptum fecero, nerva filius ait, etiamsi condicio extiterit, neque ex testamento competituram actionem, quia novatio facta sit, neque ex stipulatu, quae acceptilatione soluta sit.
If, a legacy having been given to me under a condition, I have stipulated for the sake of novation and, before the condition existed, I have made acceptilation, Nerva the son says that, even if the condition has come about, neither will the action under the testament be competent, because novation has been effected, nor under the stipulation, which has been released by acceptilation.
Si ego tibi acceptum feci, nihilo magis ego a te liberatus sum. paulus: immo cum locatio conductio, emptio venditio conventione facta est et nondum res intercessit, utrimque per acceptilationem, tametsi ab alterutra parte dumtaxat intercessit, liberantur obligatione.
If I have made it “accepted” to you, I am none the more thereby freed by you. paulus: Rather, when a letting-and-hiring and a purchase-and-sale have been made by convention, and performance has not yet intervened, on both sides by acceptilation—although it has intervened only on the one side—they are released from the obligation.
Stipulatio itaque ex operis novi nuntiatione alias satisdationem, alias repromissionem habet. ex qua operis novi nuntiatione satisdari oporteat, quemadmodum satisdetur. namque de eo opere, quod in privato factum erit, satisdatio est: de eo, quod in publico, repromitti oportet: sed hi quidem, qui suo nomine cavent, repromittunt, qui alieno, satisdant.
Accordingly, stipulation arising from a notice of a new work sometimes has a giving of security (satisdation), sometimes a repromise. From which notice of a new work it is proper that security be given, and in what manner security is given. For in regard to the work which will have been done on private property, there is a satisdation; in regard to that which is on public property, it ought to be repromised: but those who give a cautio in their own name repromise, those who in another’s name give security by satisdation.
Sicuti stipulatio ex operis novi nuntiatione, qua cavetur, ut opus restituatur: ideoque sive actor sive reus decesserit pluribus heredibus relictis, uno vincente vel victo totum opus restitui debebit: quamdiu enim aliquid superest, tamdiu non potest videri opus restitutum.
Just as with a stipulation arising from a Notice of a New Work, by which it is provided that the work be restored: and therefore, if either the plaintiff or the defendant has died leaving several heirs, upon one prevailing or being defeated the whole work must be restored: for as long as anything remains, so long the work cannot be deemed restored.
Incertam quantitatem continet stipulatio iudicatum solvi et rem ratam dominum habiturum et damni infecti et his similes, in quibus respondetur scindi eas in personas heredum, quamvis possit dici ex persona heredum promissoris non posse descendentem a defuncto stipulationem diversam condicionem cuiusque facere. at in contrarium summa ratione fit, ut uno ex heredibus stipulatoris vincente in partem eius committatur stipulatio: hoc enim facere verba stipulationis " quanti ea res est". sed si unus ex heredibus promissoris totam rem possideat, in solidum eum damnandum iulianus scribit: in quantum autem ipse ea stipulatione vel fideiussores an omnino teneantur, dubitari potest: et videndum ait, ne non committatur. sed si lite contestata possessor decesserit, unum ex heredibus non maiore ex parte damnandum, licet totum fundum possideat, quam ex qua heres est.
A stipulation contains an uncertain quantitas in “to pay what has been adjudged,” and “that the master will have the matter ratified,” and “for threatened damage (damnum infectum),” and others like these, in which the response is that they are split among the persons of the heirs, although it can be said that, from the person of the promisor’s heirs, a stipulation descending from the deceased cannot make a different condition for each individual. But, on the contrary, it is with highest reason done that, if one of the stipulator’s heirs prevails, the stipulation is incurred in his share; for the words of the stipulation “how much that thing is worth” bring this about. But if one of the promisor’s heirs should possess the whole thing, Julian writes that he is to be condemned for the whole (in solidum). As to how far he himself by that stipulation, or the sureties, are bound—or whether at all—there can be doubt; and he says one must consider whether it is not committed. But if, after joinder of issue (lis contestata), the possessor has died, one of the heirs is not to be condemned in a greater part, although he possess the whole farm (fundus), than that from which he is heir.
In omnibus praetoriis stipulationibus hoc servandum est, ut, si procurator meus stipuletur, mihi causa cognita ex ea stipulatione actio competat. idem est et cum institor in ea causa esse coepit, ut interposita persona eius dominus mercis rem amissurus sit, veluti bonis eius venditis: succurrere enim domino praetor debet.
In all praetorian stipulations this is to be observed: if my procurator stipulates, then, once the cause has been examined, an action under that stipulation is competent to me. The same holds also when an institor has come into that position that, with his person interposed, the owner of the merchandise would be about to lose the thing—for example, upon his goods being sold; for the praetor ought to succor the owner.
Paulus notat: qui sub condicione institutus est, adgnita bonorum possessione cogitur substituto in diem cavere longiorem: praetor enim beneficium suum nemini vult esse captiosum et potest videri calumniose satis petere, quem alius antecedit.
Paulus notes: one who has been instituted under a condition, upon having claimed the possession of the goods (bonorum possessio), is compelled to furnish longer security to the substitute appointed in diem; for the praetor does not wish his beneficium to be captious to anyone, and he who is preceded by another can seem to be demanding surety calumniously.
Valeriano respondit: si praeses, qui ante in triennium caveri iusserat, postea in longum tempus caveri praecepit: quia a prima stipulatione prorsus discedi voluerat, exceptionem primae stipulationi obligatis peperisse videtur.
He replied to Valerian: if a governor, who previously had ordered that security be given for a three-year period, afterwards ordered that security be given for a long time: because he had wished to depart entirely from the first stipulation, he seems to have created an exception for those bound by the first stipulation.
Sed enim qui non gessit, omnino non tenebitur: nam nec actio tutelae eum qui non gessit tenet, sed utili actione conveniendus est, quia suo periculo cessavit: et tamen ex stipulatu actione neque ipse neque fideiussores eius tenebuntur. compellendus igitur erit ad administrationem propterea, ut stipulatione quoque ista possit teneri.
But indeed he who has not administered will not be held at all: for the action of guardianship does not bind him who has not administered, but he must be proceeded against by a useful action, because he has failed to act at his own peril; and yet by the action ex stipulatu neither he himself nor his sureties will be held. He will therefore be compelled to the administration, for this reason, that he may also be able to be bound by this stipulation.
Hanc stipulationem placet finita demum tutela committi et fideiussoribus diem exinde incipere cedere. in curatore aliud est: sed et in eo, qui pro tutore negotia gessit, aliud dicendum est. itaque istae stipulationes, si quidem quis tutor fuit, finita demum tutela committentur: si vero pro tutore negotia gessit, conveniens est dicere, statim atque quaeque res salva non esse coepisset, committi stipulationem.
it is held that this stipulation is incurred only once the guardianship has ended, and that for the sureties the day begins to run from then. in the case of a curator it is otherwise: but also in the case of one who has managed affairs in place of a guardian, something else must be said. accordingly these stipulations, if indeed someone was guardian, will be incurred only when the guardianship is ended: but if he managed affairs as in place of a guardian, it is fitting to say that the stipulation is incurred as soon as any thing began not to be safe.
Si quis curator datus non gesserit curam, consequens erit dicere stipulationem non committi: sed eadem hic erunt dicenda, quae in tutore diximus, illo secus, quod haec stipulatio statim, atque quid salvum esse desinit, committitur et fideiussoribus dies cedit: sed in se revolvitur.
If any curator appointed shall not have carried on the care, it will be consequent to say that the stipulation is not committed: but the same things will have to be said here as we said in the case of a tutor, with this difference, that this stipulation is committed at once, as soon as anything ceases to be safe, and the day accrues also to the sureties: but it turns back upon itself.
Cum pupillus a tutore stipulatur rem salvam fore, non solum quae in patrimonio habet, sed etiam quae in nominibus sunt ea stipulatione videntur contineri: quod enim in tutelae iudicium venit, hoc et ea stipulatione continetur.
When a pupil stipulates from his tutor that the property shall be safe, not only the things he has in his patrimony, but also those which are on the books as claims are understood to be contained in that stipulation: for whatever comes within the action of guardianship is likewise contained by that stipulation.
Cum rem salvam fore pupillo cavetur, committitur stipulatio, si, quod ex tutela dari fieri oportet, non praestetur: nam et si salva ei res sit, ob id non est, quia, quod ex tutela dari fieri oportet, non solvitur.
When security is taken that the property will be safe for the ward, the stipulation is forfeited if what ought to be given or done under the guardianship (tutelage) is not rendered: for even if his property is safe, that does not for that reason avail, because what ought to be given or done under the guardianship is not discharged.
Si plures fideiussores a tutore pupillo dati sunt, non esse eum distringendum, sed in unum dandam actionem ita, ut ei, qui conveniretur, actiones praestarentur. nec quisquam putaverit ab iure discessum, postquam pro ea parte placuit tutores condemnari, quam administraverunt, et ita demum in solidum, si res a ceteris non servetur et idonea culpa detegatur, quod suspectum facere supersederit: nam aequitas arbitri atque officium viri boni videtur eam formam iuris desiderasse. ceterum fideiussores civiliter in solidum obligati ceteris quidem agentibus, ut dividatur actio, impetrare possunt: pupillo vero agente, qui non ipse contraxit, sed in tutorem incidit et ignorat omnia, beneficium dividendae actionis iniuriam habere visum est, ne ex una tutelae causa plures ac variae quaestiones apud diversos iudices constituerentur.
If several fidejussors have been furnished by a tutor for a pupil, he is not to be distrained, but the action is to be given against one only, on condition that to the one who is sued the actions are afforded. Nor should anyone think there is a departure from law, since it has been resolved that tutors are to be condemned for that part which they administered, and only then in solidum if the matter is not safeguarded by the others and suitable fault is uncovered, namely that he has refrained from bringing a proceeding to have them declared suspect: for the equity of an arbiter and the office of a good man seems to have desired that form of law. Moreover, fidejussors civilly bound in solidum can, when others are suing, obtain that the action be divided; but when the pupil is plaintiff, who did not himself contract, but has fallen upon a tutor and knows nothing, the benefit of dividing the action has been judged to carry unfairness, lest from one guardianship cause multiple and diverse questions be set up before different judges.
Sed et si forte ex liberis vel parentibus aliquis interveniat vel vir uxoris nomine, a quibus mandatum non exigitur, an committatur stipulatio, quaeritur: magisque erit, ne committi debeat, nisi fuerit ei mandatum vel ratum habitum: quod enim eis agere permittitur edicto praetoris, non facit eos procuratores. itaque si talis persona interveniat, ex integro erit cavendum.
But also, if by chance someone from the children or parents should intervene, or a husband in the name of his wife—persons from whom a mandate is not required—the question is whether the stipulation is committed; and the stronger view will be that it ought not to be committed, unless a mandate has been given to him or the matter has been held ratified. For what is permitted them to do by the praetor’s edict does not make them procurators. And so, if such a person intervenes, security will have to be given afresh.
Sed et si quidem tutor sit, non tamen quasi tutor negotia administret ( vel dum ignorat vel alia ex causa), dicendum erit non committi stipulationem: nam edicto praetoris illi tutori agendi facultas datur, cui a parente maioreve parte tutorum eorumve, cuius ea iurisdictio fuit, tutela permissa erit.
But even if he is indeed a guardian, yet does not administer the affairs as a guardian ( or while he is unaware or for another cause), it must be said that the stipulation is not incurred: for by the edict of the praetor the faculty of suing is given to that guardian to whom the guardianship shall have been permitted by the parent, or by the greater part of the guardians, or by him whose jurisdiction that was.
Nunc videamus, qualis defensio exigatur, ne committatur stipulatio, et quarum personarum. et si quidem ex personis enumeratis in defensionem quis succedat, palam est recte rem defendi nec committi stipulationem. si vero exstrinsecus persona defensoris interveniat, aeque stipulatio non committetur, si modo ille paratus sit rem boni viri arbitratu defendere, hoc est satisdare: sic enim videtur defendere, si satisdet: ceterum si simpliciter paratus sit intervenire nec admittatur, committetur ista stipulatio ob rem non defensam.
Now let us see what kind of defense is required, lest the stipulation be committed, and of which persons. And if indeed someone from the persons enumerated should succeed into the defense, it is clear that the matter is rightly defended and the stipulation is not committed. But if a defender’s person should intervene from outside, likewise the stipulation will not be committed, provided that he is ready to defend the matter by the arbitrament of a good man, that is, to give surety: for thus he is seen to defend, if he gives surety. Otherwise, if he is simply ready to intervene and is not admitted, this stipulation will be committed on account of the matter not having been defended.
Quid tamen, si et hoc sibi adsumpserint, ut defendant, an mandati possint agere? et si quidem victi sunt, utique quod ob rem iudicatam praestiterunt consequentur: sumptus tamen litis minime petent. si autem optinuerunt, poterunt sumptus litis consequi, quasi iuxta mandatum, etsi non mandatum fecerint.
What then, if they have also assumed this for themselves, namely to defend—can they bring an action on mandate? And if indeed they have been defeated, they will certainly recover what they have rendered on account of the res judicata; the expenses of the suit, however, they will by no means claim. But if they have prevailed, they will be able to obtain the expenses of the suit, as though in accordance with a mandate, even though they did not contract a mandate.
Si tamen plures fideiussores defendere fuerint parati, videamus, utrum unum defensorem debent dare, an vero sufficiat, ut unusquisque eorum pro parte sua defendat vel defensorem substituat. et magis est, ut, nisi unum dent procuratorem, desiderante scilicet hoc actore, committatur stipulatio ob rem non defensam: nam et plures heredes rei necesse habebunt unum dare procuratorem, ne defensio per plures scissa incommodo aliquo adficiat actorem. aliud est in heredibus actoris, quibus necessitas non imponitur, ut per unum litigent.
If, however, several sureties should be ready to defend, let us consider whether they ought to provide one defender, or whether it suffices that each of them defend for his own share or substitute a defender. And the stronger view is that, unless they provide one procurator—namely, the plaintiff desiring this—the stipulation on account of the matter not defended is triggered: for multiple heirs of the defendant will likewise be obliged to provide one procurator, lest a defense split among several subject the plaintiff to some inconvenience. It is otherwise with the heirs of the plaintiff, upon whom no necessity is imposed to litigate through one.
Si ante acceptum iudicium prohibitus fuerit procurator a domino et actor ignorans prohibitum eum esse egerit, an stipulatio committatur? et nihil aliud dici potest quam committi. quod si quis sciens prohibitum esse egerit, iulianus non putat stipulationem committi: nam ut committatur, non sufficere ait cum ea persona acceptum esse iudicium, quae stipulationi comprehensa est, sed oportere etiam causam personae eandem esse, quae stipulationis interponendae tempore fuit.
If, before the action has been accepted, the procurator has been forbidden by the principal, and the plaintiff, unaware that he was forbidden, has proceeded, is the stipulation incurred? And nothing else can be said than that it is incurred. But if someone, knowing that he was forbidden, has proceeded, Julian does not think the stipulation is incurred: for, in order that it be incurred, he says it is not sufficient that the action be accepted with that person who is encompassed in the stipulation, but it is also necessary that the cause/status of the person be the same as it was at the time the stipulation was interposed.
and therefore, if he who was given as procurator has become heir to the master and thus has accepted the iudicium, or even though prohibited has accepted it, the stipulation is not committed: for it has also been answered elsewhere that, if someone, defending an absentee, has furnished security, then, whether a procurator appointed by him, or after he has become his heir, has accepted the iudicium, the fideiussors are not held.
Si ad defendendum procurator datus fuerit, satisdare iubetur iudicatum solvi stipulatione, quae non ab ipso procuratore, sed a domino litis interponitur. quod si procurator aliquem defendat, ipse cogitur satisdare iudicatum solvi stipulatione.
If a procurator has been given for the purpose of defense, he is ordered that surety be given by the stipulation “that the adjudged sum be paid,” which is interposed not by the procurator himself, but by the master of the suit. But if a procurator defends someone on his own, he himself is compelled to give surety by the stipulation “that the adjudged sum be paid.”
Si servus, qui in rem actione petebatur, lite contestata decesserit, deinde possessor litem deseruerit, quidam fideiussores eius pro lite datos non teneri putant, quia mortuo homine nulla iam res sit: quod falsum est, quoniam expedit de evictione actionis conservandae causa, item fructuum nomine rem iudicari.
If a slave, who was being claimed by an action in rem, has died after the suit has been joined, and then the possessor has deserted the suit, some think that his sureties given for the suit are not held, because, the man being dead, there is now no thing; which is false, since it is expedient that the matter be adjudged both on account of eviction for the sake of conserving the action, and likewise under the name of fruits.
Cum quaerebatur, si interposita iudicatum solvi stipulatione, cum quis rem non defenderet, postea ex eremodicio sententiam esset passus, an ob rem iudicatam clausula committatur: dicebam unam clausulam in stipulatione iudicatum solvi et ob rem non defensam et ob rem iudicatam in se habere: cum igitur iudicatum solvi stipulatio una cludatur clausula, sive res iudicetur sive res non defendatur, merito quaeritur, si altera causa committatur, an ex altera rursum committi possit. ecce enim si quis stipuletur: " si navis ex asia venerit, aut si titius consul fuerit", constat, sive navis prior venerit sive titius consul ante factus sit, committi stipulationem: sed ubi commissa est ex priore causa, ex altera, licet existat condicio, amplius non committitur: altera causa enim, non utraque inerat stipulationi. proinde videndum, stipulatio ob rem non defensam utrum commissa est re non defensa an non prius creditur commissa, nisi ex stipulatione lis fuerit contestata?
When it was asked, if, a stipulation iudicatum solvi having been interposed, when someone did not defend the matter, and afterwards had suffered a sentence from a default-judgment, whether the clause ob rem iudicatam is committed: I used to say that a single clause in the iudicatum solvi stipulation contains in itself both ob rem non defensam and ob rem iudicatam: since therefore the iudicatum solvi stipulation is enclosed under one clause, whether the matter is adjudged or the matter is not defended, it is rightly asked, if one ground is committed, whether it can again be committed on the other. For behold, if someone should stipulate: " if the ship shall have come from Asia, or if Titius shall have been consul", it is agreed that, whether the ship has come first or Titius has earlier been made consul, the stipulation is committed: but when it has been committed on the prior ground, on the other, although the condition exists, it is not further committed: for the other ground, not both, inhered in the stipulation. Accordingly, it must be considered whether the stipulation ob rem non defensam is committed when the matter is not defended, or whether it is not believed to have been committed earlier, unless suit has been joined on the stipulation?
what is more: and therefore it does not seem that the due day accrues at once for the sureties, when the matter has begun not to be defended. accordingly, if by chance the suit, for which a defense was necessary, has been ended, whether by solution (payment) or by transaction (settlement) or by acceptilation, or by any other mode, it has consequently been decided that the clause “on account of the matter not having been defended” lapses.
Si fuero a fideiussore procuratoris stipulatus iudicatum solvi quasi in rem acturus et postea in personam egero, vel alia actione acturus, aliam autem dictavero actionem, non committitur stipulatio, quia de alia actum videtur, de alia stipulatio interposita.
If I have stipulated from the surety of a procurator that what is adjudged be paid (iudicatum solvi), on the footing that I was going to proceed in rem, and afterward I have proceeded in personam, or if, being about to proceed by one action, I have, however, named another action, the stipulation is not triggered, because it appears that one matter was proceeded with, but a stipulation was interposed concerning another.
Si ex duobus fideiussoribus, qui iudicatum solvi spoponderant, alter ob rem non defensam partem suam solverit, nihilo minus res defendi poterit. nec tamen is, qui solverit, repetet: stipulatio enim pro parte eius perempta est, perinde ac si acceptum ei factum fuisset.
If, of two sureties who had promised that the adjudged sum would be paid, one, on account of the case’s not having been defended, pays his share, nonetheless the case can be defended. Yet the one who paid will not recover: for the stipulation has been extinguished as to his share, just as if an entry of receipt had been made to him.
Quotiens ex stipulatione iudicatum solvi ob rem non defensam agitur cum fideiussoribus, non est iniquum caveri dominum priore iudicio absolvi, quia omissa cautione fideiussores mandati iudicio non consequentur aut certe cogantur dominum priore iudicio defendere.
Whenever, on a stipulation “to pay what has been adjudged,” action is brought against the sureties on account of a matter not defended, it is not inequitable that security be taken that the principal be absolved in the prior suit, because, if the cautio is omitted, the sureties will not obtain relief by the action of mandate, or at any rate will be compelled to defend the principal in the prior suit.
Ex iudicatum solvi stipulatione ob rem non defensam cum uno ex fideiussoribus agere volo: is, quod pro parte eius fit, solvere mihi paratus est: non debet mihi in eum dari iudicium. neque enim aequum est aut iudicio destringi aut ad infitiationem compelli eum, qui sine iudice dare paratus est, quo non amplius adversarius eius per iudicem ab eo consecuturus est.
By the stipulation “to pay what has been adjudged,” on account of a matter not defended, I wish to proceed against one of the sureties: he is prepared to pay me what is due for his share: judgment ought not to be granted to me against him. For it is not equitable that he be either constrained by a judgment or driven to a denial, who is prepared to pay without a judge, than which his adversary would not obtain more from him through a judge.
Novissima clausula iudicatum solvi stipulationis " dolum malum abesse afuturumque esse" et in futurum tempus permanens factum demonstrat. itaque et si forte decesserit is, qui dolo fecerit, tenebitur heres eius: verbum enim " afuturumque esse" plenissimum est et ad omne tempus refertur, ut, si aliquo tempore non afuerit dolus, quoniam verum sit non afuisse, committatur haec clausula.
The last clause of the iudicatum solvi stipulation, " that malicious fraud be absent and will be absent," also shows a state enduring into future time. And so, even if the one who acted with fraud should happen to die, his heir will be bound: for the word " and will be absent" is most full and is referred to all time, so that, if at any time fraud has not been absent, since it is true that it has not been absent, this clause is forfeited.
Cum apud sempronium iudicem datum reus defenderetur, stipulatione cautum est, ut, quod sempronius iudex iudicasset, praestaretur: a cuius sententia petitor appellavit et, cum apud competentem appellationi iudicem res ageretur, defensore condemnato quaesitum est, an stipulatio commissa esset. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur non esse iure commissam. claudius: ideo stipulatione adicitur: " quive in eius locum substitutus erit".
When before sempronius, an appointed judge, the defendant was being defended, it was provided by stipulation that whatever sempronius the judge had adjudged should be rendered: from whose sentence the claimant appealed; and when, before the judge competent for the appeal, the matter was being conducted, the defendant having been condemned, the question was asked whether the stipulation had been triggered. he responded that, according to the things that were set forth, it had not been committed in law. claudius: therefore there is added to the stipulation: " or whoever shall be substituted in his place".
Si unus ex fideiussoribus ob rem non defensam conventus sit, deinde postea res defendatur, alter fideiussorum ob rem iudicatam conveniri potest. et si reus promittendi duobus heredibus relictis decesserit, alter rem non defendat, alter defendat: is qui non defendat ob rem non defensam conveniri potest, ille qui defendat ob rem iudicatam, quoniam in unius eiusdemque persona non posse committi has duas clausulas creditur et nos dicimus semper praevalere rei iudicatae clausulam eamque solam committi.
If one of the sureties has been sued on account of the matter not having been defended, and then afterwards the matter is defended, another of the sureties can be sued on account of a res judicata. And if the promissor, having left two heirs, has died, one not defending the matter, the other defending it: he who does not defend can be sued on account of the matter not defended, he who does defend on account of the res judicata, since it is believed that in one and the same person these two clauses cannot be committed; and we say that the clause of res judicata always prevails, and that that alone is committed.
Cum quis de rato stipularetur: quamvis non idem, sed alius a domino conveniretur, qui conveniri non posset, si ratum habuisset, committi stipulationem placuit, veluti si cum fideiussor aut alter ex reis promittendi, qui socius est, convenitur.
When someone should stipulate de rato: although not the same person, but another than the principal is proceeded against, who could not be proceeded against if he had held it ratified, it has been decided that the stipulation is committed; for instance, if the surety or one of the co-promisors, who is a partner, is proceeded against.
Cum minor viginti quinque annis creditor pecuniam reciperare vellet, interpositus procurator debitori de rato habendo cavit: restitutione in integrum data neque indebiti condictionem neque stipulationem committi constabat. idemque eveniret, si falsi procuratoris actum minor annis ratum habuerit. et ideo ita cavendum erit praecedente mandato: " si ille in integrum restitutus fuerit heresve eius aut is, ad quem ea res, qua de agitur, pertinebit, quanti ea res erit, tantam pecuniam dari". mandato vero non interveniente vulgaribus verbis de rato habendo haec quoque prudentius inter consentientes adstruentur: alioquin si non conveniat nec creditor minus consentiat, actionem dari oportebit.
When a creditor under twenty-five years wished to recover money, an interposed procurator gave a caution to the debtor for holding the matter as ratified (de rato habendo): with restitutio in integrum granted, it was established that neither the condiction for what was not due nor the stipulation was incurred. The same would occur if the minor ratified the act of a false procurator. And therefore it will have to be provided thus, a prior mandate having preceded: " if he shall have been restored in integrum, or his heir, or the person to whom the matter at issue will pertain, that as much money be given as the thing will be worth." But if no mandate intervenes, with the usual words de rato habendo these provisions also will more prudently be added among consenting parties: otherwise, if there be no agreement and the creditor all the less does not consent, an action ought to be granted.
Falsus procurator de rato habendo cavit atque ita dominus a sententia iudicis procuratore victo provocavit: stipulationis defecisse condicionem apparuit, cum ad auxilium commune superatus confugisset. quod si dominus, qui ratum non habuit, pecuniam exegerit, stipulatio de rato committetur in eam pecuniam, quam dominus accepit, quamvis nihil procurator acceperit.
A false procurator gave a bond for having it ratified, and thus the principal appealed from the judge’s sentence, the procurator having been defeated: it appeared that the condition of the stipulation had failed, since, once defeated, he had taken refuge in the common aid. But if the principal, who did not ratify, has exacted money, the de rato stipulation will be committed with respect to that money which the principal received, although the procurator received nothing.
Procurator ad exhibendum egit et adversarius absolutus est, quia non possidebat: at cum possessionem eiusdem rei nanctus esset, agit cum eo dominus ad exhibendum. sabinus ait fideiussores non teneri, quoniam haec alia res sit: nam et si dominus egisset, mox, absoluto adversario quia non possideret, ex integro ageret, non obstaturam rei iudicatae exceptionem.
the procurator sued by an action ad exhibendum and the adversary was absolved, because he did not possess; but when he had obtained possession of the same thing, the owner brings an action ad exhibendum against him. sabinus says the sureties are not bound, since this is another matter; for even if the owner had sued, then, the adversary having been absolved because he did not possess, he would sue anew from the start, and the exception of res judicata would not obstruct.
Si procurator a debitore pecuniam exegerit et satisdederit dominum ratam rem habere, mox dominus de eadem pecunia egit et litem amiserit, committi stipulationem: et, si procurator eandem pecuniam domino sine iudice solverit, condicturum. sed cum debitor ex stipulatu agere coeperit, potest dici dominum, si defensionem procuratoris suscipiat, non inutiliter doli mali exceptione adversus debitorem uti, quia naturale debitum manet.
If a procurator has exacted money from the debtor and has given surety that the master will have the matter ratified, then the master has litigated about the same money and has lost the suit, the stipulation is committed; and, if the procurator has paid the same money to the master out of court, the debtor will bring a condiction. But when the debtor has begun to sue ex stipulatu, it can be said that the master, if he takes up the procurator’s defense, does not use to no purpose the exception of dolus malus against the debtor, because a natural debt remains.
Si quis a procuratore status controversiam patiatur, satis accipere debet a procuratore, ne impune saepius pro suo statu conveniretur et, si dominus venientesque ab eo personae ratum non habuerunt, quod procurator eum in servitutem petierit vel adversus procuratorem ex servitute in libertatem petitus fuerit, quanti ea res est, ei praestetur, scilicet cum de libertate eius constiterit, id est quanti interfuerit eius de statu suo rursus non periclitari et propter impendia, quae in litem fecerit. sed labeo certam summam comprehendendam existimabat, quia aestimatio libertatis ad infinitum extenderetur. ex quo autem dominus ratum non habuerit, committi videtur stipulatio, sed non ante ex ea agi poterit, quam de libertate iudicatum fuerit, quia, si servus sit iudicatus, inutilis fit stipulatio, cum et, si qua sit actio, eam domino adquisisse intellegitur.
If anyone suffers a controversy concerning status at the hands of a procurator, he ought to take security from the procurator, lest he be summoned with impunity repeatedly regarding his own status; and, if the owner and the persons coming from him have not ratified what the procurator has done—namely, that the procurator has claimed him into servitude, or that, against the procurator, he has been claimed from servitude into liberty—let as much as the matter is worth be rendered to him, of course when it has been established about his liberty, that is, as much as it has been in his interest not to be put at risk again concerning his status, and on account of the expenditures which he has made in the suit. But Labeo thought that a definite sum should be included, because the valuation of liberty would extend ad infinitum. From the time, however, that the owner has not ratified, the stipulation is deemed to be incurred; but no action can be brought on it before judgment has been given about liberty, because, if he has been adjudged a slave, the stipulation becomes useless, since also, if there be any action, it is understood that he has acquired it for the owner.
Iulianus ait interesse, quando dominus ratam habere deberet solutionem in procuratorem factam, an tunc demum, cum primum certior factus esset. hoc autem en platei accipiendum et cum quodam spatio temporis nec minimo nec maximo et quod magis intellectu percipi, quam elocutione exprimi possit. quid ergo, si, quod primo ratum non habuit, postea habebit ratum?
Julianus says it makes a difference whether the master ought to have the payment made to the procurator held as ratified, or only then, when he was first made certain (informed). This, however, is to be taken in a broad way and with a certain span of time, neither minimal nor maximal, and one that can be grasped more by intellect than expressed by elocution. What then, if what he did not at first ratify, he will afterward ratify?
it profits nothing more toward impeding his action, and for that reason, because he did not at first ratify it, he says he has his action preserved. and therefore, if he exacts what had been paid to the procurator, action can be brought equally on that stipulation as if he had not afterwards said that he ratified it. but I think the exception of dolus malus will have place.
Amplius non peti verbum labeo ita accipiebat, si iudicio petitum esset. si autem in ius eum vocaverit et satis iudicio sistendi causa acceperit, iudicium tamen coeptum non fuerit, ego puto non committi stipulationem amplius non peti: hic enim non petit, sed petere vult. si vero soluta esset pecunia, licet sine iudicio, committitur stipulatio: nam et si quis adversus petentem compensatione deductioneve usus sit, recte dictum est petisse eum videri et stipulationem committi amplius non peti.
Labeo took the phrase “that no further be sought” in this sense: if it had been sought by an action. But if he has called him into court and has received surety for the purpose of appearing at the trial, yet the trial has not been begun, I think the stipulation “that no further be sought” is not breached; for here he does not seek, but wants to seek. If, however, the money had been paid, even without a judgment, the stipulation is breached; for even if someone, against a claimant, has used compensation or deduction, it has been rightly said that he is considered to have sought, and that the stipulation “that no further be sought” is breached.
Si indebitum procuratori solutum sit, agi statim ex hac stipulatione adversus procuratorem potest, ut ratum habeat dominus, ut possit dinosci, utrumne domino condici debeat id quod indebitum solutum sit, si is ratum habeat, an vero procuratori condicendum sit, si dominus ratum non habeat.
If an indebitum has been paid to a procurator, an action can at once be brought on this stipulation against the procurator, that the dominus may hold it ratified, so that it may be determined whether what was paid as not due ought to be reclaimed by condictio from the dominus, if he ratifies it, or rather a condictio should be brought against the procurator, if the dominus does not ratify.
Cum debitore decem creditoris nomine titius egit: partem petitionis ratam habuit dominus. dicendum est obligationis partem consumptam, quemadmodum si decem stipulatus esset aut exegisset creditorque non totum, sed partem gestae rei comprobasset. idcirco si ex stipulatu " decem aut stichum, utrum ego voluero" absente me titius domino quinque petisset, insecuta ratihabitione recte actum videri.
When Titius brought an action against the debtor for ten in the creditor’s name, the master ratified part of the claim. It must be said that part of the obligation is consumed, just as if he had stipulated for ten or had exacted it, and the creditor had approved not the whole, but part of the transacted matter. Therefore, if under a stipulation " ten or Stichus, whichever I shall wish" Titius, with me absent, had demanded five from the master, upon a subsequent ratihabition (ratification) it is considered to have been rightly done.
Si procurator ratam rem dominum heredemve eius habiturum caverit et unus ex heredibus domini ratum habeat, alter non habeat, sine dubio committetur stipulatio pro ea parte, pro qua ratum non habebitur, quia in id committitur, quod stipulatoris intersit. nam et si ipse dominus pro parte ratum habuerit, pro parte non habuerit, non ultra quam in partem committetur stipulatio, quia in id committitur, quod intersit agentis. et ideo saepius ex ea stipulatione agi potest, prout intersit agentis, quod litigat, quod consumit, quod advocat, quod damnatus solvit, sicut in stipulatione damni infecti accidere potest, ut is qui stipulatus sit subinde agat: cavet enim " si quid ibi ruet scindetur fodietur aedificabitur". finge ergo subinde damnum dari: non erit dubium, quin agere possit: nam si toto damno computato tunc agendum est, propemodum non ante aget, quam dies stipulationis praeterierit, intra quem si damnum datum sit, stipulatione cautum erit: quod verum non est.
If a procurator has given security that the master or his heir will hold the matter ratified, and one of the master’s heirs holds it ratified while another does not, without doubt the stipulation will be forfeited for that part for which it is not held ratified, because it is forfeited to the extent of the stipulator’s interest. For even if the master himself has held it ratified in part and not ratified in part, the stipulation will not be forfeited beyond that part, because it is forfeited to the extent of the acting party’s interest. And therefore one can sue repeatedly on that stipulation, according as it is of interest to the acting party: what he litigates, what he expends, what counsel he summons, what he pays when condemned; just as in the stipulation of damnum infectum it can happen that he who has stipulated sues from time to time: for he provides, “if anything there shall collapse, be split, be dug, be built.” Suppose therefore damage is inflicted repeatedly: there will be no doubt that he can sue. For if one must then sue with the entire damage computed, he will almost not sue before the day of the stipulation has passed—within which, if damage has been inflicted, it will have been provided for by the stipulation—which is not true.
Non solum in actionibus, quas procurator intendit, verum in stipulationibus quoque, quas interponi desiderat, si vicem repraesentant actionum, cavere eum de rato oportet. quare si duplae stipulationem procurator interponat, de rato cavere debet. sed et si damni infecti stipulatio a procuratore interponatur, de rato debet procurator cavere.
Not only in the actions which the procurator brings, but also in the stipulations which he desires to interpose, if they take the place of actions, he ought to give security de rato. Therefore, if the procurator interposes a stipulation for the double, he ought to give security de rato. And likewise, if a stipulation for damage not yet done is interposed by the procurator, the procurator ought to give security de rato.
Ne satisdatio ratam rem dominum habiturum exigatur in his quae nomine eius ageret, qui eum se fecisse procuratorem libello principi dato professus est, prodest. quod si iudicatum solvi satis ab eo procuratore postuletur, necesse est, ut iuri manifesto pareatur.
It is advantageous to one who has professed, by a petition (libellus) delivered to the princeps, that he made him a procurator, that the demand for a surety of ratification (satisdatio de rato) not be exacted in those matters which he would transact in his name. But if security for payment of the judgment (iudicatum solvi) is demanded from that procurator, it is necessary that manifest law be obeyed.
Si sine iudice non debitam pecuniam exegerit procurator et dominus ratam solutionem non habuerit, sed eandem pecuniam petere instituerit: fideiussores tenentur et condictio, qua procurator teneretur, si stipulatio interposita non fuisset, peremitur. quotiens enim procuratori pecunia solvitur et dominus eam solutionem ratam non habet, existimo id agi, ut condictio perematur et sola actio ei, qui indebitum solvit, adversus procuratorem ex stipulatu competat. hoc amplius praestant fideiussores impensas, quae in iudicium factae fuissent.
If a procurator, without a judge, has exacted money not owed and the master has not held the payment as ratified, but has instituted a suit to demand the same money: the sureties are held, and the condiction by which the procurator would be held if a stipulation had not been interposed is extinguished. For whenever money is paid to the procurator and the master does not ratify that payment, I consider the effect to be that the condiction is extinguished and that the sole action for him who paid what was not owed lies against the procurator ex stipulatu. Moreover, the sureties also make good the expenses which would have been incurred in the suit.
Quod si procurator per iudicem non debitam pecuniam exegisset, dici potest, sive ratum dominus habuisset sive non habuisset, fideiussores non teneri, vel quia nulla res esset, quam dominus ratam habere possit, vel quia nihil stipulatoris interest ratum haberi: adficietur ergo iniuria is, qui procuratori solvit. magis tamen est, ut, si dominus ratum non habuerit, fideiussores teneantur.
But if a procurator, through a judge, had exacted money not owed, it can be said that, whether the master had ratified it or had not ratified it, the sureties are not bound—either because there would be no matter that the master could ratify, or because it is of no interest to the stipulator that it be ratified: therefore he who paid the procurator will suffer injury. However, the stronger view is that, if the master has not ratified, the sureties should be bound.
Cum autem procurator recte petit, dominus perperam, non debet procurator praestare, ne iniuria iudicis dominus aliquid consequatur: numquam enim propter iniuriam iudicis fideiussores obligantur. verius tamen est hoc casu fideiussores non nisi in impensas litis teneri.
However, when the procurator rightly sues and the master wrongly, the procurator ought not to be liable, lest by the judge’s injustice the master obtain anything: for never are fideiussors bound on account of the judge’s injustice. Nevertheless, it is more correct that in this case the fideiussors are held only for the expenses of the suit.
Iulianus. si procuratori eius, qui mortuus erat, sine iudice soluta fuerint legata, stipulatio committetur, nisi heres ratum habuerit, utique si debita fuerint: tunc enim non dubie interest stipulatoris ratam solutionem ab herede haberi, ne bis eadem praestet.
Iulianus. if, to the procurator of one who had died, legacies have been paid without a judge, the stipulation will be triggered, unless the heir has ratified it, especially if they were owed: for then it is without doubt in the interest of the stipulator that a ratified payment be had from the heir, lest he render the same things twice.
Si in stipulationem ratam rem haberi hactenus comprehensum fuerit " lucium titium ratum habiturum?",cum id aperte ageretur, ut heredis ceterorumque personae, ad quos ea res pertinet, omitterentur, difficile est existimari doli clausulam committi. sane cum per imprudentiam hae personae omittantur, actio ex doli clausula competit.
If, in a stipulation for the matter to be held ratified, it has been included only this far: “Will Lucius Titius have it ratified?”, since it was being done openly with the aim that the heir and the other persons to whom the matter pertains be omitted, it is difficult to judge that the clause of fraud is incurred. But indeed, when these persons are omitted through inadvertence, an action from the clause of fraud lies.
Si procurator iudicium de hereditate ediderit, deinde dominus fundum ex ea hereditate petierit, stipulatio ratam rem haberi committetur, quia, si verus procurator fuisset, exceptio rei iudicatae dominum summoveret. plerumque autem stipulatio ratam rem haberi his casibus committetur, quibus, si verus procurator egisset, domino aut ipso iure aut propter exceptionem actio inutilis esset.
If a procurator has instituted a suit concerning an inheritance, and then the principal claims a parcel of land out of that inheritance, the stipulation that the matter be held ratified will be forfeit; because, if he had been a true procurator, the exception of res judicata would bar the principal. For the most part, moreover, the stipulation that the matter be held ratified is forfeit in those cases in which, if a true procurator had acted, the action would be useless to the principal either by the law itself or by reason of an exception.
Qui patris nomine iniuriarum agit ob eam rem, quod filius eius verberatus pulsatusve sit, in stipulatione cogendus est filii quoque personam comprehendere, praesertim cum fieri possit, ut pater ante decedat, quam sciret procuratorem suum egisse, et ita iniuriarum actio redeat ad filium.
He who, in the father’s name, brings an action for injuries on account of this matter, that his son has been beaten or struck, must in the stipulation be compelled to include the person of the son as well, especially since it can happen that the father dies before he knew that his procurator had acted, and thus the action for injuries reverts to the son.
Sed et si nepoti iniuria facta fuerit et procurator avi propter hanc causam iniuriarum aget, non solum filii, sed etiam nepotis persona comprehendenda erit in stipulatione: quid enim prohibet et patrem et filium, antequam scirent procuratorem egisse, decedere ? quo casu iniquum est fideiussores non teneri nepote iniuriarum agente.
But also, if an injury has been done to a grandson and the grandfather’s procurator, on account of this cause, will bring an action of injuries, not only the person of the son but also that of the grandson must be included in the stipulation: for what forbids both father and son, before they knew that the procurator had brought suit, from dying ? in which case it is inequitable that the fidejussors are not held, the grandson bringing an action of injuries.
Procurator cum peteret pecuniam, satisdedit amplius non peti: post iudicium acceptum extitit, qui et ipse procuratorio nomine eandem pecuniam peteret: quaesitum est, cum is, qui postea peteret, procurator non esset et propter hoc exceptionibus procuratoriis excludi posset, num fideiussores prioris procuratoris tenerentur. iulianus respondit: verius est non obligari fideiussores: nam in stipulatione cavetur non petiturum eum, cuius de ea re actio petitio persecutio sit, et ratum habituros omnes, ad quos ea res pertinebit: hic autem, qui procurator non est, nec actionem nec petitionem habere intellegendus est.
When the procurator was demanding money, he furnished surety that it would not be demanded further; after a judgment had been obtained, there arose one who likewise, under the name of procurator, sought the same money. The question was asked whether, since he who was later demanding it was not a procurator and for this reason could be excluded by procuratorial exceptions, the fideiussors (sureties) of the prior procurator were bound. Julianus responded: it is truer that the fideiussors are not obligated; for in the stipulation it is provided that he will not demand who has an action, petition (claim), or prosecution concerning that matter, and that all to whom the matter will pertain will ratify it; but this man, who is not a procurator, is to be understood to have neither an action nor a petition (claim).
An autem et si mortuus fuisset qui petisset vel furere coeperit, ratum haberi possit, videamus: nam si in universum perinde haberi debet, ac si tunc, cum ratum habeat, per eum bonorum possessionem petat, frustra his casibus ratum habetur. sed illud consequens futurum etiam si paeniteat illum petisse, ratum haberi non posse, quod utique sit absurdum. rectius itaque dicitur neutram eorum causam impedire ratihabitionem.
But whether, if the one who had petitioned were dead or had begun to be insane, it can be held ratified, let us consider: for if in general it ought to be regarded just as if then, when he has it ratified, he were through him seeking possession of goods, in these cases ratification is in vain. But the following would result—that even if he repents of having petitioned, it cannot be held ratified—which would of course be absurd. More correctly, therefore, it is said that neither of those conditions impedes ratihabition.
Pater dotem a se datam absente filia petit et ratam rem habituram eam cavit: ea prius quam ratum haberet, mortua est. negavit committi stipulationem, quia et si verum sit ratum eam non habuisse, nihil tamen mariti intersit dotem restitui, cum patri etiam mortua filia salva esse dos debeat.
A father, the dowry given by himself with his daughter absent, made a claim and guaranteed that she would have the matter ratified: she died before she could ratify it. He denied that the stipulation was incurred, because even if it is true that she did not ratify, nevertheless it is of no concern to the husband that the dowry be restored, since to the father, even with the daughter dead, the dowry ought to remain safe.
Procurator cum ab eo aes alienum exegerat, qui tempore liberaretur, ratam rem dominum habiturum cavit: deinde post tempus liberato iam debitore dominus ratam rem habet. posse debitorem agere cum procuratore existimavit, cum iam debitor liberatus sit: argumentum rei, quod, si nulla stipulatio interposita sit, condictio locum adversus procuratorem habitura sit: in locum autem condictionis interponi stipulationem.
When a procurator had exacted a debt from one who was to be freed at a set time, he gave a guarantee that his master would have the matter ratified; then, after the time, with the debtor now freed, the master does have the matter ratified. Africanus considered that the debtor can bring an action against the procurator, since the debtor is now freed: an argument of the case is that, if no stipulatio were interposed, a condictio would have a place against the procurator; but in place of the condictio a stipulatio is interposed.