Tertullian: Adversus Hermogenem

[1] Solemus haereticis compendii gratia de posteritate praescribere. In quantum enim ueritatis regula prior, quae etiam haereses futuras renuntiauit, in tantum posteriores quaeque doctrinae haereses praeiudicabuntur, quia sunt quae futurae ueritatis antiquiore regula praenuntiabantur.

[1] We are accustomed, for the sake of a shortcut, to file a plea of prescription against heretics on the ground of posteriority. For inasmuch as the rule of truth is prior—which even announced beforehand that heresies would arise—so far will all later heretical doctrines be prejudged, because they are those whose future coming was foretold by the more ancient rule of truth.

[2] Hermogenis autem doctrina tam nouella est; denique ad hodiernum homo in saeculo, et natura quoque haereticus, etiam turbulentus, qui loquacitatem facundiam existimet et inpudentiam constantiam deputet et maledicere singulis officium bonae conscientiae iudicet. Praeterea pingit licite, nubit assidue, legem dei in libidinem defendit, in artem contemnit, bis falsarius, et cauterio et stilo, totus adulter, et praedicationis et carnis, siquidem et nubentium contagio foetet nec ipse apostolicus Hermogenes in regula perseuerauit.

[2] But the doctrine of Hermogenes is so novel; indeed the man is to this very day in the world, and by nature also a heretic, even a turbulent one, who deems loquacity to be eloquence and impudence to be constancy, and judges that to malign individuals is the duty of a good conscience. Moreover, he paints illicitly, marries assiduously, defends the law of God for libido, and for the sake of his art he contemns it; twice a falsifier, both by cautery and by stylus; wholly an adulterer/adulterator, both of preaching and of flesh, since indeed he also reeks of the contagion of the marrying; nor did the “apostolic” Hermogenes himself persevere in the rule.

[3] Sed uiderit persona, cum doctrina mihi quaestio est. [Christum] Dominum non alium uidetur agnoscere, alium tamen facit quem aliter agnoscit, immo totum quod est deus aufert nolens illum ex nihilo uniuersa fecisse.

[3] But let the persona look to it, since for me the question is doctrine. [Christ] the Lord he seems to acknowledge as no other; yet he makes another, whom he acknowledges otherwise—indeed he takes away the whole of what God is, being unwilling that He made the universe out of nothing.

[4] A Christianis enim ad philosophos conuersus, de ecclesia in Academiam et Porticum, inde sumpsit [a Stoicis] materiam cum domino ponere, quae et ipsa semper fuerit neque nata neque facta nec initium habens omnino nec finem, ex qua dominus omnia postea fecerit.

[4] For he turned from the Christians to the philosophers, from the Church into the Academy and the Portico, and from there he adopted [from the Stoics] the view of positing matter together with the Lord, which likewise itself had always been—neither born nor made, nor having a beginning at all nor an end—from which the Lord afterward made all things.

II.

[1] Hanc primam umbram plane sine lurnine pessimus pictor illis argumentationibus colorauit praestruens aut[em] dominum de semetipso fecisse cuncta aut de nihilo aut de aliquo, ut, cum ostenderit neque ex semetipso fecisse potuisse neque ex nihilo, quod superest exinde confirmet, ex aliquo eum fecisse atque ita aliquid illud materiam fuisse.

[1] This first shadow, plainly without light, the worst painter colored with those argumentations, premising, however, that the Lord made all things either from himself or from nothing or from something, so that, when he has shown that he could not have made them either from himself or from nothing, he may from that confirm what remains: that he made them from something, and thus that that something was matter.

[2] Negat illum ex semetipso facere potuisse, quia partes ipsius fuissent quaecumque ex semetipso fecisset dominus; porro in partes non deuenire ut indiuisibilem et indemutabilem et eundem semper, qua dominus. Ceterum si de semetipso fecisset aliquid, ipsius fuisset aliquid; omne autem, et quod fieret et quod faceret, inperfectum habendum, quia ex parte fieret et ex parte faceret.

[2] He denies that he could have made from himself, because whatever the lord had made from himself would have been parts of himself; furthermore, he does not come down into parts, as being indivisible and immutable and always the same, as lord. Moreover, if he had made something from himself, it would have been something of himself; but everything, both that which would be made and that which would make, must be held imperfect, because it would be made in part and would make in part.

[3] ut si totus totum fecisset, oportuisset illum simul et totum esse et non totum, quia oporteret et totum esse, ut faceret semetipsum, et totum non esse, ut fieret de semetipso. Porro difficillimum: si enim esset, non fieret, esset enim; si uero non esset, non faceret, quia nihil esset. Eum autem qui semper sit non fieri sed esse illum in aeuum aeuorum.

[3] as if, if the whole had made the whole, it would have been necessary that he at once be both whole and not whole, because it would be necessary both that he be whole, in order that he might make himself, and that he be not whole, so that he might be made out of himself. Moreover, most difficult: for if he existed, he would not be being made, for he would exist; but if he did not exist, he would not make, because he would be nothing. But as for him who always is, not to be made but to be—that one unto the age of ages.

Igitur non de semetipso fecisse illum qui non eius fuerit condicionis, ut de semetipso facere potuisset.

Therefore he did not make out of himself, since he was not of such a condition as to have been able to make out of himself.

[4] Proinde ex nihilo non potuisse eum facere sic contendit, bonum et optimum definiens dominum, qui bona atque optima tam uelit facere quam sit; immo nihil non bonum atque optimum et uelle eum et facere. Igitur omnia ab eo bona et optima oportuisse fieri secundum condicionem ipsius. Inueniri autem et mala ab eo facta, utique non ex arbitrio nec ex uoluntate, quia si ex arbitrio et uoluntate, nihil incongruens et indignum sibi faceret.

[4] Accordingly he contends thus, that he could not make from nothing, defining the Lord as good and optimum, who as much wills to make good and optimum things as he is; indeed, that he both wills and does nothing that is not good and optimum. Therefore it ought to have been that all things be made by him good and optimum according to his condition. But bad things too are found to have been made by him—assuredly not from arbitrium nor from volition, because, if from arbitrium and volition, he would do nothing incongruent and unworthy of himself.

Quod ergo non arbitrio suo fecerit, intellegi oportere ex uitio alicuius rei factum ex materia esse sine dubio.

Therefore, that he did not make it by his own choice ought, without doubt, to be understood to have been made from matter, from the defect of some thing.

III.

[1] Adicit et aliud: deum semper deum etiam dominum fuisse, nunquam non dominum. Nullo porro modo potuisse illum semper dominum haberi, sicut et semper deum, si non fuisset aliquid retro semper cuius semper dominus haberetur; fuisse itaque materiam semper deo domino.

[1] He adds also another thing: that God has always been God, also Lord, never notlord. Moreover, in no way could he be considered always Lord, just as also always god, if there had not always previously been something of which he might always be held Lord; therefore there was matter always for God the Lord.

[2] Hanc coniecturam eius iam hinc destruere properabo, quam hactenus propter non intellegentes adiecisse duxi, ut sciant cetera quoque argumenta intellegi quam reuinci.

[2] This conjecture of his I will now forthwith hasten to demolish, which I have thus far deemed it right to append on account of the uncomprehending, so that they may know that the other arguments as well are understood as they are refuted.

[3] Dei nomen dicimus semper fuisse apud semetipsum et in semetipso, dominum uero non semper. Diuersa enim utriusque condicio: [sed] deus substantiae ipsius nomen, id est diuinitatis, dominus uero non substantiae sed potestatis. Substantiam semper fuisse cum suo nomine quod est deus; postea dominus, accedentis scilicet rei mentio.

[3] We say that the name “God” has always been with himself and in himself, but “lord” not always. For the condition of each is diverse: [but] “God” is the name of his substance, that is, of divinity, whereas “lord” is not of substance but of power. The substance has always existed with its own name, which is “God”; “lord” later—namely, the mention of an acceding thing.

[4] Nam ex quo esse coeperunt in quae potestas domini ageret, ex illo per accessionem potestatis et factus et dictus est dominus, quia et pater deus est et iudex deus est, non tamen ideo pater et iudex semper, quia deus semper, nam nec pater potuit esse ante filium nec iudex ante delictum. Fuit autem tempus cum ei delictum et filius non fuit quod iudicem et qui patrem dominum faceret. Sic et dominus non ant ea quorum dominus existeret sed dominus tantum futurus quandoque, sicut pater per filium, sicut iudex per delictum, ita et dominus per ea quae sibi seruitura fecisset.

[4] For from the time when there began to be things upon which the power of lordship might act, from that point, by an accession of power, he both was made and was called Lord, because both Father is God and Judge is God, yet not therefore Father and Judge always, because he is always God; for neither could he be Father before the Son nor Judge before a delict. There was, moreover, a time when for him there was neither delict nor Son, which would make him Judge and which would make the Father Lord. So too he was not Lord before those things existed of which he would be Lord, but only at some time to be Lord—just as Father through the Son, just as Judge through the delict, so also Lord through those things which he had made to be servient to himself.

[5] Argumentari tibi uideor, Hermogenes? Nauiter scriptura nobis patrocinatur, quae utrumque nomen ei distinxit et suo tempore ostendit. Nam 'deus' quidem, quod erat semper, statim nominat: In principio fecit deus caelum et terram, ac deinceps, quamdiu faciebat quorum dominus futurus erat, 'deus' solummodo ponit: Et dixit deus et fecit deus et uidit deus, et nusquam adhuc 'dominus'. At ubi uniuersa perfecit ipsumque uel maxime hominem qui, proprie dominus, et intellecturus erat dominum? et iam cognominaturus, tunc etiam 'dominus' nomen adiunxit: Et accepit deus dominus hominem quem finxit; et praecepit deus dominus Adae.

[5] Do I seem to be arguing with you, Hermogenes? Nimbly Scripture advocates for us, which has distinguished each name for him and showed it in its proper time. For ‘deus’, what he was always, it names straightway: In the beginning God made heaven and earth; and thereafter, as long as he was making the things of which he would be lord, it sets down ‘God’ only: And God said and God made and God saw, and nowhere as yet ‘Lord’. But when he perfected all things, and especially man himself who, properly a lord, was going to understand the Lord and already to give him a surname, then he also added the name ‘Lord’: And the Lord God took the man whom he had fashioned; and the Lord God commanded Adam.

Exinde dominus qui retro deus tantum, ex quo habuit cuius esset. Nam deus sibi erat, rebus autem tunc deus cum et dominus.

Thereafter, Lord, who formerly was only God, from the point when he had someone of whom he would be. For he was God for himself, but for things then God when also Lord.

[6] Igitur in quantum putabit ideo materiam semper fuisse quia dominus semper esset, in tantum constabit nihil fuisse, quia constat dominum non semper fuisse.

[6] Therefore, insofar as he will suppose that for this reason matter always existed because the lord would always be, to that extent it will stand that there was nothing, because it is established that the lord was not always.

[7] Adiciam et ego propter non intellegentes quorum Hermogenes extrema linea est, et quidem ex penitentia ipsius retorquebo aduersus illum. Cum enim neget materiam natam aut factam, sic quoque inuenio domini nomen deo non competisse in materiam, qua libera fuerit necesse est quae originem non habendo non habuit rem, quod erat nemini debens ideoque nemini seruiens. Itaque ex quo deus potestatem suam exercuit in eam faciendo ex materia, ex illo materia dominum deum passa demonstrat hoc illum tamdiu non fuisse quamdiu fuit hoc.

[7] I too will add, for the sake of the not-understanding, of whom Hermogenes is the uttermost line; and indeed, out of his own penitence, I will retort against him. For since he denies that matter was born or made, thus too I find that the name of lord did not befit God in relation to matter, since it must have been free, which, by not having an origin, did not have an autho< >r, seeing that it was owing to no one and therefore serving no one. And so, from the point at which God exercised his power upon it by making out of matter, from that point matter, having undergone the Lord God, shows this: that he had not been this for as long as it had been this.

IV.

[1] Hinc denique incipiam de materia retractare, quod eam deus sibi comparet proinde non natam, proinde non factam, proinde aeternam, sine initio sine fine proposita. Quis enim alius dei census quam aeternitas? Quis alius aeternitatis status quam semper fuisse et futurum esse ex praerogatiua nullius initii et nullius finis?

[1] From here, then, I shall begin to reconsider matter, because God counts it for himself as likewise not born, likewise not made, likewise eternal, set forth without beginning without end proposita. For what other census of God than eternity? What other status of eternity than to have always been and to be going to be, by the prerogative of no beginning and no end?

[2] Hoc si dei est proprium, solius dei erit, cuius est proprium, scilicet quia et si alii adscribatur, iam non erit dei proprium sed commune cum eo cui et adscribitur.

[2] If this is proper to God, it will be God’s alone, to whom it is proper, namely because even if it be ascribed to another, it will no longer be God’s proper [attribute] but common with him to whom it is also ascribed.

[3] Nam etsi sunt qui dicuntur dii siue in caelo siue in terra nomine, ceterum nobis unus deus pater ex quo omnia; quo magis apud nos solius dei esse debeat quod dei proprium est et, ut dixi, iam non proprium esset, quia alterius esset. Quod si deus est, unicum sit necesse est, ut unius sit.

[3] For even if there are those who are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth, in name, yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things; whereby all the more among us that which is God’s proper [property] ought to be of God alone, and, as I said, it would now no longer be proper, because it would be another’s. But if it is God, it must be unique, so that it may be of one.

[4] Aut quid erit unicum et singulare nisi cui nihil adaequabitur? quid principale nisi quod super omnia, nisi quod ante omnia et ex quo omnia? Haec deus solus habendo est et solus habendo unus est.

[4] Or what will be unique and singular except that to which nothing will be equated? what principal except that which is over all things, which is before all things and from which are all things? These things God alone, by possessing, is; and by possessing them alone he is one.

Si et alius habuerit, tot iam erunt dii quot habuerint quae dei sunt. Ita Hermogenes duos deos infert: materiam parem deo infert.

If another also has it, there will already be as many gods as have the things that are God’s. Thus Hermogenes brings in two gods: he brings in matter as equal to God.

[5] Deum autem unum esse oportet, quia quod summum sit deus est; summum autem non erit nisi quod unicum fuerit; unicum autem esse non poterit cui aliquid adaequabitur; adaequabitur autem deo materia cumaeterna censetur.

[5] But God ought to be one, because what is supreme is God; moreover, the supreme will be only what is unique; and that cannot be unique to which anything is equated; but matter will be equated to God when it is reckonedaeternal.

[1] 'Sed deus deus est et materia materia est.' Quasi diuersitas nominum comparationi resistat, si status idem uindicetur! Sit et natura diuersa, sit et forma non eadem, dummodo ipsius status una sit ratio. Innatus deus; an non et innata et materia?

[1] 'But god is god and matter is matter.' As though the diversity of names would resist comparison, if the same status be vindicated! Let even the nature be diverse, let even the form be not the same, provided only the rationale of the status itself is one. God unbegotten; or is not matter also unbegotten?

Semper deus; an non semper et materia? Ambo sine initio, ambo sine fine, ambo etiam auctores uniuersitatis, tam qui fecit quam de qua fecit. Neque enim potest non et materia auctrix omnium deputari, de qua uniuersitas consistit.

Always God; or is not matter also always? Both without beginning, both without end, both likewise authors of the universe, as much he who made as that from which he made. For indeed matter also cannot fail to be accounted an author of all things, of which the universe consists.

[2] Quomodo respondebit? Non statim materiam comparari deo si quid dei habeat, quia non totum habendo non concurrat in plenitudinem comparationis? Quid eo reliquit amplius, ut non totum dei materiae dedisse uideatur?

[2] How will he answer? Will he not straightway say that matter is not to be compared to God, if it has anything of God, because, not having the whole, it does not concur into the plenitude of comparison? What has he left to God besides, lest he seem to have given the whole of God to matter?

'Vel qua', inquit, 'et sic habente materia salua sit deo et auctoritas et substantia, qua solus et primus auctor est et dominus omnium censeatur.'

'Or how,' he says, 'with matter thus situated, will both authority and substance be kept safe for God, whereby he is considered the sole and first author and lord of all?'

[3] Veritas autem sic unum deum exigit, defendendo ut solius sit quicquid ipsius est. Ita enim ipsius erit, si fuerit solius, et ex hoc alius deus non possit admitti, dum nemini licet habere de deo aliquid.

[3] Truth, moreover, thus requires one God, by defending that whatever is his be of him alone. For thus it will be his, if it will be of him alone; and from this another god cannot be admitted, since to no one is it permitted to have anything of God.

[4] 'Ergo', inquis, 'nec nos habemus dei aliquid.' Immo habemus et habebimus, sed ab ipso, non a nobis. Nam et dii erimus, si meruerimus illi esse de quibus praedicauit Ego dixi, uos dii estis et Stetit deus in ecclesia deorum, sed ex gratia ipsius, non ex nostra proprietate, quia ipse est solus qui deos faciat.

[4] 'Therefore,' you say, 'neither do we have anything of God.' Nay rather, we have and shall have—but from himself, not from ourselves. For we too shall be gods, if we shall have merited to be among those about whom he has proclaimed, I have said, you are gods, and God stood in the assembly of gods; but from his grace, not from our own property, because he himself is the only one who makes gods.

[5] Materia autem proprium facit quod cum deo habet; aut si a deo accepit quod est dei, ordinem dico aeternitatis, potest et credi et habere illam cum deo aliquid et deum illam non esse. Quale est autem cum confitetur illam aliquid cum deo habere et uult solius dei esse quod materiam non negat habere?

[5] But what matter has with God makes that its proper attribute; or, if it received from God what is God’s—the order of eternity, I mean—it can both be believed to have something with God and yet not be God. What sort of case is it, moreover, when he confesses thatit has something with God and wants that to belong to God alone which he does not deny that matter has?

VI.

[1] Dicit saluum deo esse, ut et solus sit et primus et omnium auctor et omnium dominus et nemini comparandus,quae mox materiae quoque adscribit. Ille quidem deus. Contestabitur deus et iurauit nonnunquam per semetipsum quod alius non sit qualis ipse, sed mendacem eum faciet Hermogenes.

[1] He says it is kept safe for God, that he be both alone and first and the author of all and the lord of all and comparable to no one,which presently he also ascribes to matter. That indeed is God. God will attest and has sometimes sworn by himself that there is no other such as he is, but Hermogenes will make him a liar.

Erit enim et materia qualis deus, infecta, innata, initium non habens nec finem. Dicet deus: Ego primus. Et quomodo primus cuius materia coaetanea est?

For matter too will be as God is—unmade, innate, having no beginning nor end. God will say: I am first. And how is he first, whose matter is coeval?

Inter coaetaneos autem et contemporales ordo non est. Aut et materia prima est? Extendi, inquit, caelum solus.

But among coevals and contemporaries there is no order. Or is matter also first? “I stretched out the heaven alone,” he says.

Atquin non solus, cum ea enim extendit de qua et extendit.

And yet, not alone, for he extends with that from which he also extends.

[2] Cum proponit saluo dei statu fuisse materiam, uide ne irrideatur a nobis proinde saluo statu materiae fuisse deum? communi tamen statu amborum. Saluum ergo erit et materiae, ut et ipsa fuerit, sed cum deo, quia et deus solus, sed cum illa. Et ipsa prima cum deo, quia et deus primus cum illa, sed et ipsa incomparabilis cum deo, quia et deus incomparabilis cum illa, et auctrix cum deo et domina cum deo; sic aliquid et non totum materiae habere.

[2] When he proposes that matter existed with the status of God kept safe, see lest he be laughed at by us in turn, that with the status of matter kept safe there existed God?—yet in a common status of both. Therefore it will be safe also for matter, that it too existed, but with God, since God is “alone,” yet with it. And it too “first” with God, since God is “first” with it; and it too “incomparable” with God, since God is “incomparable” with it; and authoress with God and mistress with God; thus for matter to have something, and not the whole.

[3] Ita illi nihil reliquit Hermogenes quod non et materiae contulisset, ut non materia deo sed deus potius materiae comparetur. Atque adeo cum ea propria dei uindicamus, semper fuisse sine initio, sine fine et primum fuisse et solum et omnium auctorem, materiae quoque competat, quaero quid diuersum et alienum a deo ac per hoc priuatum materia possederit per quod deo non compararetur. In qua omnia dei propria recensentur, satis praeiudicant de reliqua comparatione.

[3] Thus Hermogenes has left to him nothing which he has not also bestowed upon matter, so that not matter to God but rather God is compared to matter. And indeed, since those things we vindicate as proper to God—to have always been without beginning, without end, and to have been first and only and the author of all things—also competat to matter, I ask what different and alien from God, and therefore private, matter has possessed by which it would not be compared to God. In which all the proper things of God are enumerated; they sufficiently prejudge the remaining comparison.

VII.

[1] Si minorem et inferiorem materiam deo et idcirco diuersam ab eo et idcirco incomparabilem illi contendit, ut maiori, ut superiori, praescribo non capere ullam diminutionem et humiliationem quod sit aeternum et innatum, quia hoc et deum faciat tantum quantus est, nullo minorem neque subiectiorem, immo omnibus maiorem et sublimiorem. Sicut enim cetera quae nascuntur aut finiunt et idcirco aeterna non sunt, semel opposita fini quae et initio, admittunt ea quae deus non capit, diminutionem dico interim et subiectionem, quia nata et facta sunt, ita et deus ideo ea non capit, quia nec natus omnino nec factus est. Et materiae autem status talis est.

[1] If he contends that matter is lesser and inferior to god, and therefore different from him and therefore incomparable to him, as to one greater, as to one higher, I lay down that what is eternal and inborn does not admit any diminution or humiliation, because this, too, makes god only as great as he is, lesser than none and subject to none, rather greater and more sublime than all. For just as the other things which are born or come to an end, and therefore are not eternal, once opposed by an end—which is also a beginning—admit those things which god does not take on, I mean diminution for a time and subjection, because they have been born and made, so also god for that reason does not take these on, because he has in no way been born nor made. And the condition of matter, moreover, is such.

[2] Igitur ex duobus aeternis ut innatis, ut infectis, deo atque materia, ob eandem rationem communis status ex aequo habentibus id quod neque diminui nec subici admittit, id est aeternitatem, neutrum dicimus altero esse minorem siue maiorem, neutrum altero humiliorem siue superiorem, sed stare ambo ex pari magna, ex pari sublimia, ex pari solidae et perfectae felicitatis quae censetur aeternitas.

[2] Therefore, from the two eternals, as innate, as unmade—God and matter—since, by the same rationale of a common status, they equally possess that which admits neither to be diminished nor to be subjected, that is, eternity, we say that neither is less nor greater than the other, neither humbler nor superior to the other; rather, both stand on a par as great, on a par as sublime, on a par in solid and perfect felicity, which is reckoned as eternity.

[3] Neque enim proximi erimus opinionibus nationum quae, si quando coguntur deum confiteri, tamen et alios infra illum uolunt. Diuinitas autem gradum non habet, utpote unica; quae si et in materia erit, ut proinde innata et infecta et aeterna, aderi[n]t utrobique, quia minor se nusquam poterit esse.

[3] For neither shall we be proximate to the opinions of the nations, who, if ever they are compelled to confess God, yet want others beneath Him. But Divinity has no grade, inasmuch as it is unique; and if it will be also in matter, as therefore innate and unfashioned and eternal, it will be present on both sides, because it will be able to be nowhere less than itself.

[4] Quomodo ergo discernere audebit Hermogenes atque ita subicere deo materiam, aeternam aeterno, innatam innato, auctricem auctori, dicere audentem: 'et ego prima, et ego ante omnia, et ego a qua omnia; pares fuimus, simul fuimus, ambo sine initio sine fine, ambo sine auctore sine deo. Quis me deo subicit contemporali coaetaneo? Si quia deus dicitur, habeo et ego meum nomen.

[4] How then will Hermogenes dare to discern and thus to subject matter to god, the eternal to the eternal, the innate to the innate, the authoress to the author, matter daring to say: 'even I am first, even I before all things, even I from whom are all things; we were equals, we were together, both without beginning without end, both without an author without a god. Who subjects me to a god contemporary, coeval? If because he is called god, I too have my own name.

Aut ego sum deus et ille materia, quia ambo sumus quod alter est nostrum'? Putas itaque materiam deo non comparasse quam scilicet subiciat illi?

Or am I God and he Matter, since we both are what the other of us is'? Do you suppose, then, that he has not compared Matter to God—the very thing that, to be sure, he subjects to Him?

VIII.

[1] Atquin etiam praeponit illam deo et deum potius subicit materiae, cum uult eum de materia cuncta fecisse. Si enim ex illa usus est ad opera mundi, iam et materia superior inuenitur, quae illi copiam operandi subministrauit, et deus subiectus materiae uidetur, cuius substantiae eguit. Nemo enim non eget eo de cuius utitur; nemo non subicitur ei de cuius eget ut possit uti: sic et nemo de alieno utendo non minor est eo de cuius utitur, et nemo qui praestat de suo uti non in hoc superior est eo cui praestat uti.

[1] And yet he even sets it before God and rather subjects God to matter, when he wants him to have made all things out of matter. For if he made use of it for the works of the world, now matter too is found to be superior, which supplied to him the means of working, and God is seen as subjected to matter, whose substance he needed. For no one does not need that of which he makes use; no one is not subjected to him of whom he has need, in order that he may be able to use it: thus too no one, by using what is another’s, is not lesser than the one whose thing he uses, and no one who grants the use of what is his own is not in this superior to the one to whom he grants to use.

Itaque materia ipsa quidem deo non eguit sed egenti se deo praestitit diuitem et locupletem et liberalem minori, opinor, et inualido et minus idoneo de nihilo facere quae uelit.

Therefore matter itself indeed did not need God, but to the needy god it presented itself rich and opulent and liberal to the lesser, I suppose, and invalid and less idoneous to make from nothing the things he willed.

[2] Grande re uera beneficium deo contulit, ut haberet hodie per quae deus cognosceretur et omnipotens uocaretur, nisi quod iam non omnipotens, si non et hoc potens: ex nihilo omnia proferre.

[2] A great benefit in truth it conferred upon God, that he should have today the means by which God would be recognized and be called omnipotent, except that now he is not omnipotent, if he is not powerful for this as well: to bring forth all things out of nothing.

[3] Sane et sibi praestitit aliquid materia, ut et ipsa cum deo possit agnosci, coaequalis deo, immo et adiutrix, nisi quod solus eam Hermogenes cognouit et haereticorum patriarchae philosophi; prophetis enim et apostolis usque adhuc latuit, puto et Christo.

[3] Truly matter also furnished something for itself, so that it too might be acknowledged with God, coequal with God, nay even an adjutrix (helper), except that only Hermogenes and the philosophers, patriarchs of the heretics, have known it; for it has up to now lain hidden from the prophets and the apostles, I suppose from Christ as well.

IX.

[1] Non potest dicere deum ut dominum materia usum ad opera mundi, dominus enim non potuit esse substantiae coaequalis.

[1] He cannot say that God, as Lord, used matter for the works of the world, for a lord could not be of coequal substance.

[2] Sed precario forsitan usus est, et ideo precario, non dominio, ut, cum ea mala[non] esset, de mala tamen sustinuerit uti, scilicet ex necessitate mediocritatis suae qua non ualebat ex nihilo uti, non ex potestate, quam si[bi] habuisset omnino ut deus in materiam quam malam norat, ante eam in bono conuertisset ut dominus et bonus, ut ita de bono, non de malo uteretur. Sed quia bonus quidem, dominus autem non, ideo qualem habuit tali[a] usus necessitatem suam ostendit cedentem condicioni materiae quam, si dominus fuisset, emendasset.

[2] But perhaps he used it precariously, and therefore precariously, not by dominion, so that, although it was [not] evil, nevertheless he endured to use what was evil—namely, from the necessity of his mediocrity, whereby he was not strong to use out of nothing, not from power, which, if he had had [for himself] altogether as God, in regard to the matter which he knew to be evil, he would beforehand have converted into the good as lord and good, so that thus he would use from the good, not from the evil. But because he was indeed good, dominus however not, therefore, such as he had it, by using such things he showed his necessity yielding to the condition of the matter which, if he had been lord, he would have emended.

[3] Sic enim Hermogeni respondendum est, cum ex dominio defendit deum materia usum et de re non sua, scilicet non facta ab ipso. Iam ergo malum ab ipso qui est mali, si non auctor, quia non effector, certe permissor, quia dominator.

[3] For thus must Hermogenes be answered, when he defends on the basis of dominion that God used matter and used a thing not his own, namely, not made by himself. Therefore now evil is from him to whom the evil belongs—if not the author, since not the effector, certainly the permitter, since the dominator.

[4] Si uero materia non et ipsius, qua malum dei non erit, de alieno ergo usus aut precario usus est, qua egens eius, aut et iniuria, qua praeualens eius. His enim tribus modis aliena sumuntur, iure beneficio impetu, id est dominio precario ui. Dominio non suppetente eligat Hermogenes qui<d> deo congruat, precario an ui de materia cuncta fecisse.

[4] But if matter is not His as well—whereby the evil will not be God’s—then He used what is another’s, either used it precariously, which shows His need of it, or even injuriously, which shows His prevailing over it. For in three ways are things of another taken: by right, by benefaction, by impetus—that is, by dominion, by precarium, by force. Dominion not being at hand, let Hermogenes choose what qui befits God: that He made all things from matter precario or by violence.

[5] Non ergo melius censuisset deus nihil omnino faciendum quam precario aut ui faciendum et quidem de malo? Nonne etiam si materia optima fuisset, que indecorum sibi existimasset de alieno, licet bono, facere? Satis itaque gloriae suae causa molitus est mundum, ut debitorem se alienae substantiae ostenderet <et> quidem non bonae!

[5] Would God not, then, have judged it better that nothing at all be made than that it be made by leave or by force—and indeed out of evil? Would he not also, even if the matter had been the best, have considered itqually unseemly for himself to make from what was another’s, albeit good? So then, for the sake of his own glory, did he labor over the world enough to show himself a debtor to an alien substance— indeed not a good one!

10.

[1] 'Ergo', inquis, 'ex nihilo faceret, ut mala quoque arbitrio eius imputarentur?' Magna, bona fide, caecitas haereticorum pro huiusmodi argumentatione, cum ideo aut alium deum bonum et optimum uolunt credi quia mali auctorem existiment creatoremaut materiam cum creatore proponunt, ut <m>al[i]um a materia, non a creatore deducant, quando nullus omnino deus liberetur ista quaestione, utnonauctor mali uideri proinde possit quisquis ille est qui malum, etsi non ipse fecit, tamen a quocumque et undeunde passus est fieri.

[1] 'Therefore,' you say, 'would he make out of nothing, so that evils also would be imputed to his arbitrium?' Great, in good faith, is the blindness of the heretics in argumentation of this sort, since for this reason they either wish another god to be believed good and best because they suppose the creator to be the author of evil,or they set forth matter together with the creator, so that they may deduce evil from matter, not from the creator, since no god at all is freed from this question, lest not the author of evil could accordingly seem to be whoever he is who, although he did not himself make the evil, yet has suffered it to be made by someone or other and from whatever quarter.

[2] Audiat igitur et Hermogenes, dum alibi de mali ratione distinguimus, interim se quoque nihil egisse hac sua iniectione. Ecce enim, etsi non auctor, sed assentator mali inuenitur deus qui malum materiae tanto sustinuit de bono ante mundi constitutionem quam ut bonus et mali aemulus emendasse debuerat.

[2] Let Hermogenes, then, also hear, while elsewhere we distinguish the rationale of evil; meanwhile let him recognize that he too has effected nothing by this his interjection. Behold, for God is found, if not an author, yet an assenter of evil, who endured the evil of matter, to the prejudice of the Good, before the constitution of the world, when, as Good and a rival of evil, he ought to have emended it.

[3] Aut enim potuit emendare sed noluit aut uoluit quidem uero non potuit infirmus deus. Si potuit et noluit, malus et ipse, quia malo fauit, et sic iam habetur eius quod, licet non instituerit, qui tamen, si noluisset illud esse, non esset, ipse iam fecit esse quod noluit non esse. Quo quid est turpius?

[3] For either he could emend but was unwilling, or indeed he was willing but was not able—an infirm god. If he could and was unwilling, he too is evil, because he favored the evil; and thus it is already reckoned as his, that, although he did not institute it, yet because, if he had been unwilling that it be, it would not be, he himself has already made to be that which he was unwilling not to be. What is more shameful than this?

Si id uoluit esse quod ipse noluit fecisse, aduersum semetipsum egit, cum et uoluit esse quod noluit fecisse et noluit fecisse quod uoluit esse. Quasi bonum uoluit esse et quasi malum noluit fecisse; quod non faciendo malum iudicauit, id sustinendo bonum pronuntiauit. Malum pro bono sustinendo et non potius eradicando assertor eius inuentus est, male, si per uoluntatem, turpiter, si per necessitatem.

If he willed that to be which he himself did not wish to have done, he acted against
himself, since he both willed to be what he did not wish to have done and did not wish to have done what he willed to be. As if it were good he willed it to be, and as if it were evil he did not wish to have done it; what by not doing he judged evil, that by sustaining he pronounced good. By sustaining evil in place of good, and not rather eradicating it, he is found to be its assertor—badly, if by will; disgracefully, if by necessity.

Aut famulus erit mali deus aut amicus, cum materiae malo conuersatus, nedum etiam de malo eius operatus.

Either the god will be a servant of evil or a friend, since he has consorted with the evil of matter, let alone even operated from its evil.

XI.

11.

[1] Et tamenunde nobis persuadet Hermogenes malam esse materiam? Non enim poterit non malum dicere cui malum adscribit. Nam definimus diminutionem et subiectionem capere non posse quod si<t> aeternum, ut alii coaeterno inferius deputetur.

[1] And yet, whence does Hermogenes persuade us that matter is evil? For he will not be able not to call evil that to which he ascribes evil. For we define that what is eternal cannot admit diminution and subjection, so that it be assigned as inferior to another coeternal.

Ita et nunc nec malum dicimus competere illi, quia nec ex hoc subici possit, quod nullo modo potest subici, quia aeternum est. Sed cum alias summum bonum constet esse quod sit aeternum ut deus, per quod solus est deus, dum aeternus est, et ita bonus, dum deus, quomodo materiae inerit malum, quam ut aeternam summum bonum credi necesse est?

Thus also now we say that evil does not befit it, because not even on this account can it be subjected—what in no way can be subjected—since it is eternal. But since elsewhere it stands established that the highest good is that which is eternal, as God, by which fact God alone is God, inasmuch as he is eternal, and thus good, inasmuch as he is God, how will evil inhere in matter, which, as eternal, must be believed to be the highest good?

[2] Aut si quod aeternum est poterit et mali capax esse, poterit hoc et in deum credi et sine causa gestiuit malum a deo transferre, si competit et aeterno competendo materiae.

[2] Or if that which is eternal can also be capable of evil, this could also be believed concerning God; and he has, without cause, eagerly strained to transfer evil from God, if it befits both the eternal and, by so befitting, matter.

[3] Iam uero si quod aeternum est malum potest credi, inuincibile et insuperabile erit malum ut aeternum, et tum nos frustra laboramus de auferendo malo ex nobis ipsis, tum et deus hoc frustra mandat et praecipit, immo et iudicium frustra constituit deus, iniustitia utique puniturus. Quodsi contra <erit> mali finis, cum praeses eius diabolus abierit in ignem quem praeparauit illi deus et angelis eius, prius in puteum abyssi relegatus, cum reuelatio filiorum dei redemerit conditionem a malo utique uanitati subiectam, cum restituta innocentia et integritate conditionis pecora condixerint bestiis et paruuli de serpentibus luserint, cum pater filio posuerit inimicos sub pedes, utique operarios mali ---- itaque si finis malo competit, necesse est competierit initium <et> erit materia habens initium habendo et finem mali; quae enim malo deputantur, secundum mali statum <materiae> computantur.

[3] Now indeed, if what is eternal can be believed to be evil, evil will be invincible and insuperable as eternal, and then we labor in vain to remove evil from our very selves, then also God commands and prescribes this in vain, nay rather and God establishes judgment in vain, being about, to be sure, to punish injustice. But on the contrary, if <there will be> an end of evil, when its ruler the devil will have gone away into the fire which God prepared for him and his angels, having first been relegated into the pit of the abyss, when the revelation of the sons of God will have redeemed the creation from evil, surely subjected to vanity, when, innocence and integrity of the creation having been restored, the cattle will have made covenant with the beasts and little children will have played with serpents, when the Father will have put enemies beneath the Son’s feet, namely the workers of evil ---- accordingly, if an end befits evil, it is necessary that a beginning also have befitted it <and> there will be matter having a beginning, in having also the end of evil; for those things which are assigned to evil are reckoned, according to the state of evil, to the <matter>.

XII.

12.

[1] Age nunc malam ac pessimam credamus esse materiam, utique natura, sicut deum bonum et optimum credimus, proinde natura. Porro naturam certam et fixam haberi oportebit, tam in malo perseuerantem apud materiam quam et in bono apud deum, inconuertibilem et indemutabilem scilicet, qua, si demutabitur natura in materia de malo in bonum, demutari poterit et in deo de bono [non] in malum.

[1] Come now, let us suppose matter to be evil and most evil, indeed by nature, just as we believe God to be good and best, likewise by nature. Moreover, it will have to be held that nature is certain and fixed, persevering as much in evil in the case of matter as also in good in the case of God—namely, inconvertible and immutable—because, if nature shall be changed in matter from evil into good, it could also be changed in God from good [not] into evil.

[2] Hoc loco dicet aliquis: 'Ergo de lapidibus filii Abrahae non suscitabuntur et genimina uiperarum non facie<n>t paenitentiae fructum et filii irae non fient filii pacis, si natura mutabilis non erit?' Temere ad ista exempla respicies, o homo. Non enim competunt ad causam materiae, quae innata est, ea quae nata sunt, lapides et uiperae et homines; horum enim natura habendo institutionem habere poterit et cessationem.

[2] At this point someone will say: 'Therefore from stones the sons of Abraham will not be raised up, and the offspring of vipers will not make the fruit of repentance, and the sons of wrath will not become sons of peace, if nature will not be mutable?' Rashly do you look to these examples, O man. For the things which are born—stones and vipers and men—do not pertain to the cause of matter, which is unborn; for the nature of these, by having an institution, will be able to have also a cessation.

[3] Materiam uero tene semel aeternam determinatam ut infectam, ut innatam et ideo indemutabilis et incorruptibilis naturae credendam, ex ipsius etiam sententia Hermogenis quam opponit, cum deum negat ex semetipso facere potuisse, quia non demutetur quod sit aeternum, amissurum scilicet quod fuerat, dum fit ex demutatione quod non erat, si non esset aeternum; dominum uero aeternum aliud esse non posse quam quod est semper.

[3] But hold matter once for all as eternal, determined as unmade, as unborn, and therefore to be believed of an inconvertible and incorruptible nature, even from the very opinion of Hermogenes himself which he puts forward in objection, when he denies that God was able to make from himself, because what is eternal is not changed—namely, it would lose what it had been while by a change it becomes what it had not been—if it were not eternal; but the eternal Lord can be nothing other than that which is always.

[4] Hac et ego definitione merito illum repercutiam. Materiam aeque reprehendo, cum ex illa mala, pessima etiam, bona atque optima a deo fiunt: Et uidit deus quia bona, et benedixit ea deus, utique quasi optima, non certe quasi mala ac pessima. Demutationem igitur admisit materia, et si ita est, statum aeternitatis amisit; mortua est denique sua forma.

[4] By this definition I too rightly rebut him. I likewise censure matter, since out of it bad—even the worst—good and even the best are made by God: And God saw that they were good, and God blessed them, assuredly as best, certainly not as bad and worst. Therefore matter admitted demutation, and if that is so, it lost the status of eternity; in fine, its own form is dead.

Sed aeternitas amitti non potest, quia nisi amitti non possit, aeternitas non est. Ergo nec demutationem potuit admisisse, quia si aeternitas est, demutari nullo modo potest.

But eternity cannot be lost, because unless it cannot be lost, it is not eternity. Therefore it could not have admitted demutation either, because if it is eternity, it can in no way be demutated.

XIII.

13.

[1] Et quaeretur, quomodo ex ea bona facta sint, quae ex demutatione nullo modo facta sunt. Unde in mala ac pessima boni atque optimi semen? Certe nec bona arbor fructus malos edit, quia nec deus nisi bonus, nec mala arbor bonos, quia nec materia est pessima.

[1] And it will be asked, how from it good things have been made, which in no way have been made from demutation. Whence, in an evil and most evil thing, the seed of the good and the best? Surely neither does a good tree put forth evil fruits, since neither is God anything but good, nor does an evil tree put forth good fruits, since neither is the matter most evil.

[2] Aut si dabimus illi aliquid etiam boni germinis, iam non erit uniformis naturae, id est malae in totum, sediam tum duplex, id est malae et bonae naturae, et quaeretur iterum an in <eadem> bono et malo potuerit conuenire, luci et tenebris, dulci et amaro.

[2] Or if we grant to it some good seed as well, it will no longer be of a uniform nature, that is, evil in its entirety, butalready then twofold, that is, of an evil and a good nature; and it will be asked again whether in the same [thing] good and evil could have convened—light and darkness, sweet and bitter.

[3] Aut si potuit utriusque diuersitas, boni et mali, concurrisse et duplex natura fuisse materiae, amborum ferax fructuum, iam nec bona ipsa deo deputabuntur, ut nec mala illi inputentur, sed utraque species de materiae proprietate sumpta ad materiam pertinebit. Quo pacto neque gratiam bonorum deo debebimus nec inuidiam malorum, quia nihil de suo operatus ingenio; per quod probabitur manifeste materiae deseruisse.

[3] Or if the diversity of both, of good and of evil, could have concurred, and there was a double nature of matter, fertile of the fruits of both, then neither will the good things themselves be assigned to God, just as the evils will not be imputed to him; but each species, taken from the property of matter, will pertain to matter. In which way we shall owe neither gratitude for the good things to God nor envy/ill-will for the evil things, because he has wrought nothing from his own ingenuity; through which it will be proved manifestly that he has forsaken matter.

XIV.

14.

[1] Nam et si dicatur licet ex occasione materiae, suo tamen arbitrio bona protulisse quasi nactus bonum materiae -- quamquam et hoc turpe sit ----, certe cum ex eadem etiam mala profert, uel haec utique non de suo arbitrio proferendo seruit materiae aliud non habens facere quam ex malo proferre, inuitus utique, qua bonus, ex necessitate, ut inuitus, et ex seruitute, ut ex necessitate.

[1] For even if it may be said that, on the occasion of matter, he nevertheless by his own choice brought forth good things, as if having chanced upon a good of matter -- although even this is shameful ----, certainly, since from that same source he also brings forth evil things, at least in bringing forth these not by his own choice he serves matter, having nothing else to do than to bring forth from evil, unwilling, to be sure, in so far as he is good, from necessity—unwilling—and from servitude—as from necessity.

[2] Quid ergo dignius, ex necessitate eum condidisse mala an ex uoluntate? Siquidem ex necessitate condidit, si ex materia, ex uoluntate, si ex nihilo. Iam enim sine causa laboras, ne malorum auctor constituatur deus, quia et si de materia fecit, ipsi deputabuntur qui fecit proinde quatenus fecit.

[2] What then is more worthy: that he created evils out of necessity or out of will? Indeed, he created out of necessity, if from matter; out of will, if from nothing. For now you labor without cause, lest God be constituted the author of evils, because even if he made them from matter, they will be imputed to the very one who made them, accordingly, to the extent that he made them.

Plane sic interest unde fecerit ac si de nihilo fecisset nec interest unde fecerit, ut inde fecerit unde eum magis decuit; magis autem eum decuit ex uoluntate fecisse quam ex necessitate, id est ex nihilo potius quam ex materia. Dignius est deum etiam malorum auctorem liberum credere quam seruum; quaecumque potestas ei quam pusillitas competit.

Clearly, in this way it both makes a difference whence he made [them] and makes no difference whence he made, in that he made from that source from which it more befitted him; and it befitted him more to have made by will than by necessity, that is, from nothing rather than from matter. It is more dignified to believe God the author even of evils as free rather than as a slave; whatever befits him is power rather than pusillanimity.

[3] Sic et, si[c] concedimus materiam quidem nihil boni habuisse, dominum uero, si quid boni edidit, sua uirtute edidisse, aliae aeque oborientur quaestiones. Primo, si bonum in materia omnino non fuit, non ex materia bonum factum, quod materia scilicet non habuit; dehinc, si non ex materia, iam ergo ex deo factum; si nec ex deo, iam ergo ex nihilo factum, hoc enim superest secundum Hermogenis dispositionem.

[3] Thus also, if we concede that matter indeed had nothing of good, but that the lord, if he produced anything good, produced it by his own virtue, other questions will likewise arise. First, if good was not in matter at all, good was not made from matter, since matter, to be sure, did not have it; then, if not from matter, therefore now it was made from God; if neither from God, therefore now it was made from nothing—for this is what remains according to Hermogenes’ disposition.

XV.

15.

[1] Porro si bonum neque ex materia factum est, quia non erat in illa, ut in mala, neque ex deo, quia nihil potuit ex deo fieri, sicut definit Hermogenes, inuenitur bonum iam ex nihilo factum ut ex nullo factum, ut neque ex materia neque ex deo. Et si bonum ex nihilo, cur non et malum? Immo cur non omnia ex nihilo, si aliquid ex nihilo?

[1] Furthermore, if the good was made neither from matter, because it was not in it, as in the evil, nor from God, because nothing could be made from God, as Hermogenes defines, the good is found now to have been made from nothing, as from no source, that is, neither from matter nor from God. And if the good is from nothing, why not the evil as well? Nay rather, why not all things from nothing, if anything is from nothing?

Nisi si insufficiens fuit diuina uirtus omnibus producendis, quae aliquid protulerit ex nihilo.

Unless, perhaps, the divine power was insufficient for producing all things, which has brought forth something out of nothing.

[2] Aut si ex materia mala bonum processit, quia neque ex nihilo neque ex deo, sequetur ut ex conuersione processerit materiae contra denegatam aeterni conuersionem. Ita unde bonum constitit, iam negabit Hermogenes inde illud constare potuisse; necesse est autem ex aliquo eorum processerit, ex quibus negauit procedere potuisse.

[2] Or if from evil matter the good proceeded, since neither from nothing nor from God, it will follow that it proceeded from the conversion of matter, contrary to the denied conversion of the Eternal. Thus, from that whence the good consisted, Hermogenes will now deny that it could have consisted from there; it is necessary, however, that it proceeded from some of those from which he denied it could have proceeded.

[3] Ceterum si ideo malum non ex nihilo, ne dei fiat de cuius arbitrio uidebitur factum sed ex materia, ut ipsius sit de cuius substantia erit factum, et hic, ut dixi, auctor mali habebitur deus qui, cum eadem uirtute et uoluntate debuisset omnla bona ex materia protulisse aut tantum bona, non omnia tamen bona protulit sed etiam mala, utique aut uolens esse mala, si poterat efficere ne esse<n>t, aut non ualens efficere omnia bona, si uoluit et non fecit, dum nihil intersit per infirmitatem dominus auctor mali extiterit an per uoluntatem. Aut quae fuit ratio ut, cum bona fecisset quasi bonus, etiam mala protulisset quasi non bonus, cum non congruentia sibi solummodo edidit? Quid necesse erat suo opere prolato etiam materiae negotium curare proinde et malum proferendo, solus ut cognosceretur bonus de bono, materia autem ne cognosceretur mala de malo?

[3] But if for this reason evil is not from nothing—lest it become God’s, by whose arbiter it will seem to have been made—but from matter, so that it may belong to that of which substance it will have been made, then here too, as I said, God will be held the author of evil, who, since with the same virtue and will he ought to have brought forth all good things out of matter, or at least only good things, yet he did not bring forth all good things, brought and also evils—assuredly either willing that evils exist, if he was able to effect that they not be, or not able to effect all good things, if he willed and did not do so—since it makes no difference whether the Lord has stood forth as author of evil through infirmity or through will. Or what was the rationale that, when he had made good things as a good [one], he also brought forth evils as a not-good [one], since he brings forth only things congruent with himself? What necessity was there, his own work having been brought forth, to take care also of matter’s business by likewise bringing forth evil, so that he alone might be known as good from good, but matter not be known as evil from evil?

Plus bonum floruisset sine mali afflatu.

The good would have flourished more without the afflatus of evil.

[4] Nam et Hermogenes expugnat quorundam argumentationes dicentium mala necessaria fuisse ad inluminationem bonorum ex contrariis intellegendorum.

[4] For even Hermogenes refutes the argumentations of certain persons saying that evils were necessary for the illumination of the good things, to be understood from contraries.

[5] Ergo aut nec propterea locus mali proferendi fuit aut si qua alia ratio exegit illud induci, cur non et ex nihilo potuerit induci ipsa ratione excusatura dominum, ne mali auctor existimaretur, quae nunc, de materia operatur [cum], mala excusat? Si excusat, adeo ubique et undique illuc compellitur quaestio quo nolunt qui ipsam mali rationem non examinando nec dinoscendo, quomodo illud aut deo adtribuant aut a deo separent, pluribus et indignioribus destructionibus deum obiciunt.

[5] Therefore either there was not on that account any place for bringing forth evil, or, if some other rationale demanded that it be introduced, why could it not also have been introduced out of nothing, by that very rationale that would excuse the Lord, lest he be thought the author of evil—the same rationale which now, it operates from matter [since], excuses the evils? If it excuses, then everywhere and on all sides the question is driven to that point to which they do not wish, who, by neither examining nor discerning the very rationale of evil—however they either attribute it to God or separate it from God—subject God to more and more and more unworthy destructions, exposing deum to attacks.

XVI.

16.

[1] Igitur in praestructione huius articuli et alibi forsitan retractandi equidem definio aut deo adscribendum et bonum et malum, quae ex materia fecit, aut materiae ipsi, ex qua fecit, aut utrumque utrique, qui ambo sibi obligantur, qui fecit et de qua fecit, aut alterum alteri; tertius enim praeter materiam et deum non est.

[1] Therefore, in the pre-structuring of this article, and perhaps to be reconsidered elsewhere, I for my part define either that both the good and the evil, which he made from matter, must be ascribed to God, or to the matter itself, from which he made them, or both to each, since both are bound to one another—he who made and that from which he made—or the one to the other; for a third, besides matter and God , does not exist.

[2] Porro si dei erit utramque, uidebitur deus etiam mali auctor; deus autem, ut bonus, auctor mali non erit. Si materiae utrumque, uidebitur materia etiam boni matrix; mala autem in totum materia boni non erit matrix. Si utriusque erit utrumque, in hoc quoque comparabitur deo materia et pares erunt ambo, ex aequo mali ac boni adfines; aequari autem deo materia non debet, ne duos deos efficiat.

[2] Moreover, if both will belong to God, God will appear the author of evil as well; but God, as good, will not be the author of evil. If both belong to matter, matter will appear the matrix of good as well; but matter, being wholly evil, will not be the matrix of good. If both will belong to both, in this too matter will be compared with God, and both will be equal, equally affine to evil and to good; but matter ought not to be equated with God, lest it make two gods.

Si alterum alterius, utique dei bonum et materiae malum, neque malum deo neque materiae bonum adscribetur; et bona autem et mala deus de materia faciendo cum ea facit.

If the one is the other’s, then assuredly the good is God’s and the evil matter’s; neither will evil be ascribed to God nor good to matter; and moreover both good things and evil things God, by making from matter, makes together with it.

[3] Haec si ita sunt, nescio qua possit euadere sententia Hermogenes qui deum, quoquo modo de materia malum condidit, siue uoluntate siue necessitate siue ratione, non putet mali auctorem. Porro si mali auctor est ipse qui fecit, plane socia materia per substantiae suggestum, excusas iam causam materiae introducendae. Nihilominus enim et per materiam deus auctor mali ostenditur, si ideo materia praesumpta est, ne deus mali auctor uideretur.

[3] If these things are so, I do not know by what opinion Hermogenes can escape, who, having had god, in whatever way, found evil out of matter—whether by will or by necessity or by reason—does not think Him the author of evil. Moreover, if he himself who made it is the author of evil, matter is plainly a partner through the support of substance, and you have now excused the reason for introducing matter. For nonetheless even through matter God is shown to be the author of evil, if for this reason matter was presumed, lest God seem the author of evil.

Exclusa itaque materia, dum excluditur causa eius, superest uti deum omnia ex nihilo fecisse constet.

Therefore, with matter excluded, as its cause is excluded, it remains that it be established that God made all things out of nothing.

[4] Videbimus an et mala, cum apparuerit, quae mala, et an mala interim ea quae putas. Dignius enim de suo arbitrio produxit haec quoque producendo de nihilo, quam de praeiudicio alieno, si de materia produxisset. Libertas, non necessitas, deo competit.

[4] We shall see whether evils also—and, when it becomes clear, what evils—and whether in the meantime tho se are evils which you suppose. For it was more worthy that he produced these also by producing out of nothing by his own decision, than from another’s prejudgment, if he had produced them from matter. Freedom, not necessity, befits God.

Malo uoluerit mala a semetipso condidisse quam non potuerit non condidisse.

I prefer that he should have willed to have established evils from himself rather than that he could not have not established them.

XVII.

17.

[1] Vnici dei status hanc regulam uindicat, non aliter unici nisi quia solius, non aliter solius nisi quia nihil cum illo. Sic et primus erit, quia omnia post illum; sic omnia post illum, quia omnia ab illo; sic ab illo, quia ex nihilo, ut illi quoque scripturae ratio constet: Quis cognouit sensum domini? aut quis illi consiliarius fuit?

[1] The status of the unique God vindicates this rule: he is unique in no other way than because he is the sole one, and he is sole in no other way than because there is nothing with him. Thus he will also be first, because all things are after him; thus all things after him, because all things are from him; thus from him, because from nothing, so that the rationale of that scripture also may stand: Who has known the mind of the Lord? or who has been his counselor?

aut quem consultatus est? aut uiam intellegentiae et scientiae quis demonstrauit illi? quis tradidit et retribuetur ei? Nemo utique, quia nulla uis, nulla materia, nulla natura substantiae alterius aderat illi.

or whom has he consulted? or who has demonstrauted to him the way of intelligence and science? who has given, and it will be repaid to him? No one, to be sure, since no force, no matter, no nature of another substance was present to him.

[2] Porro si de aliqua operatus est, necesse est ab ea ipsa acceperit et consilium et tractatum dispositionis, ut uiam intellegentiae et scientiae. Pro qualitate enim rei operari habuit et secundum ingenium materiae, non secundum suum arbitrium, adeo ut et mala pro natura non sua sed substantiae fecerit.

[2] Moreover, if he worked from something, it is necessary that from that very thing he received both counsel and the treatment of disposition, including the way of intelligence and science. For he had to operate according to the quality of the thing and according to the character of the matter, not according to his own arbitrament, to such a degree that he even made evils according to a nature not his own but of the substance.

XVIII.

18.

[1] Si necessaria est deo materia ad opera mundi, ut Hermogenes existimauit, habuit deus materiam longe digniorem et idoniorem, non apud philosophos aestimandam sed apud prophetas intellegendam, sophiam suam scilicet. Haec denique sola cognouit sensum domini. Quis enim scit quae sunt dei et quae in ipso nisi spiritus qui in ipso?

[1] If matter is necessary to God for the works of the world, as Hermogenes thought, God had matter far more worthy and more idoneous, not to be estimated among philosophers but to be understood among prophets, namely his own Sophia. This, in fine, alone has known the sense of the Lord. For who knows the things that are of God and the things in him except the Spirit who is in him?

Sophia autem spiritus: haec illi consiliarius fuit, uia intellegentiae et scientiae ipsa est; ex hac fecit faciendo per illam et faciendo cum illa. Cum pararet caelum, inquit, aderam illi, et cum fortia faciebat super uentos quae sursum nubila, et quomodo firmos ponebat fontes eius quae sub caelo est, ego eram compingens cum ipso. Ego eram, ad quem gaudebat; cotidie autem oblectabar in persona eius, quando oblectabatur, cum perfecisset orbem, et inoblectabatur in filiis hominum.

But Sophia is spirit: she was to him counselor; she herself is the way of intelligence and science; from her he made, by making through her and by making with her. “When he was preparing heaven,” he says, “I was present with him; and when he was making the mighty things over the winds, the clouds that are aloft; and how he was setting firm the fountains of that which is under heaven, I was joining together with him. I was the one in whom he rejoiced; and day by day I was taking delight in his person, when he took delight, when he had perfected the orb; and he took delight in the sons of men.”

Quis non hanc potius omnium fontem et originem commendet, materiam uere materiarum, non fini subditam, non statu diuersam, non motu inquietam, non habitu informem, sed insitam et propriam et compositam et decoram, quali deus potuit eguisse sui magis quam alieni <e>gen[i]s? Denique ut necessariam sensit ad opera mundi, statim eam condit et generat in semetipso. Dominus, inquit, condidit me initium uiarum suarum in opera sua: ante saecula fundauit me, priusquam faceret terram, priusquam montes collocarentur; ante omnes autem colles generauit me, prior autem abysso genita sum.

Who would not rather commend this as the fount and origin of all, the matter truly of matters, not subject to limit, not different in state, not restless in motion, not shapeless in form, but inborn and proper and composed and comely, of such a kind as God could have needed—his own rather than alien, needy things? And indeed, as soon as he perceived her to be necessary for the works of the world, straightway he establishes and begets her in himself. “The Lord,” he says, “created me the beginning of his ways for his works: before the ages he founded me, before he made the earth, before the mountains were set; but before all the hills he begot me, and I was born prior to the abyss.”

[2] Agnoscat ergo Hermogenes idcirco etiam sophiam dei natam et conditam praedicari, ne quid innatum et inconditum praeter solum deum crederemus. Si enim intra dominum quod ex ipso et in ipso fuit sine initio non fuit, sophia scilicet ipsius, exinde nata et condita ex quo in sensu dei ad opera mundi disponenda coepit agitari, multo magis non capit sine initio quicquam fuisse quod extra dominum fuerit.

[2] Let Hermogenes therefore acknowledge that for this reason even the sophia of God is proclaimed to be born and created, lest we believe anything unbegotten and unformed besides God alone. For if even within the Lord that which was from him and in him—his sophia, of course—was not without beginning, but was from that point born and created from when it began to be stirred in the mind of God for the arranging of the works of the world, much more does it not admit that anything which was outside the Lord was without beginning.

[3] Si uero sophia eadem dei sermo est [sensu sophia et], sine quo factum est nihil, sicut et dispositum sine sophia, quale est ut filio dei, sermone unigenito et primogenito, aliquid fuerit praeter patrem antiquius et hoc modo utique generosius, nedum quod innatum fortius et quod infectum facto ualidius, quia quod, ut esset, nullius eguit auctoris, multo sublimius erit eo quod, ut esset, aliquem habuit auctorem? Proinde si malum quidem innatum est, natus autem sermo dei -- eructauit enim inquit sermonem optimum -- non scio an a bono malum possit adduci, ualidius ab infirmo, ut innatum a nato. 4. Ita et hoc nomine materiam deo praeponit Hermogenes, praeponendo eam filio ---- filius enim sermo et deus sermo et Ego et pater unum sumus ----, nisi quod sustinebit aequo animo filius eam praeponi sibi quae patri adaequatur.

[3] If indeed that same Sophia of God is the Word [in sense both wisdom and], without whom nothing was made, just as nothing is arranged without wisdom, how is it that, for the Son of God, the only-begotten and first-begotten Word, there should have been anything besides the Father more ancient and thus assuredly more high-born — to say nothing of something unbegotten stronger than the begotten, and something unmade more powerful than the made — because that which, in order to be, needed no author will be much more sublime than that which, in order to be, had some author? Accordingly, if evil indeed is unbegotten, however born the Word of God — for, he says, my heart has uttered a good word — I do not know whether from the good evil can be brought forth, the stronger from the weaker, as the unbegotten from the begotten. 4. Thus also under this title Hermogenes puts matter before God, by putting it before the Son ---- for the Son is the Word and God is the Word and I and the Father are one ---- unless it be that the Son will with even mind endure that that should be put before himself which is made equal to the Father.

XIX.

19.

[1] Sed et ad originale instrumentum Moysi prouocabo unde et diuersa pars suspiciones suas ingratis fulcire conatur, ne scilicet non inde instrui uideretur unde oportet. Itaque occasiones sibi sumpsit quorundam uerborum, ut haereticis fere mos est simplicia quaeque torquere. Nam et ipsum principium in quo deus fecit et caelum et terram aliquid uolunt fuisse quasi substantiuum et corpulentum quod in materiam interpretari possit.

[1] But I will also appeal to the original instrument of Moses, from which likewise the opposing party tries, to no good purpose, to prop up their suspicions, namely so that they might not seem to be instructed from where they ought. Accordingly, it has taken pretexts for itself from certain words, as it is almost the custom of heretics to twist whatever is simple. For they even want the very “beginning,” in which God made both heaven and earth, to have been something, as it were, substantive and corpulent, which can be interpreted as matter.

[2] Nos autem unicuique uocabulo proprietatemsu<a>m uindicamus, principium initium esse et competisse ita poni rebus incipientibus fieri; nihil enim quod fieri habet sine initio esse, quin initium sit illi ipsum dum incipit fieri; ita principium siue initium inceptionis esse uerbum, non alicuius substantiae nomen.

[2] We, however, vindicate to each vocable its propriety, its own, that a beginning is a commencement and that it was fitting thus to be posited with respect to things beginning to come to be; for nothing that has to be made is without a beginning, but there is a beginning for it itself when it begins to come to be; thus “beginning” or “commencement” is a word of inception, not the name of any substance.

[3] Iam nunc si principalia dei opera caelum et terra sunt, quae ante omnia deus fecit suorum esse proprie principium, quae priora sunt facta, merito[que] sicpraefatur scriptura[m]: In principio fecit deus caelum et terram, quemadmodum dixisset: 'In fine[m] fecit deus caelum et terram', si post uniuersa fecisset. Aut si principium a<li>qua substantia est, erit et finis aliqua materia.

[3] Now then, if the principal works of God are heaven and earth, which God made before all things, to be, properly, the beginning of his own works, namely those that were made earlier, and deservedly thusprefaces the Scripture: 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth,' just as he would have said: 'At the end God made heaven and earth,' if he had made them after all things. Or if beginning is some substance, end will also be some matter.

[4] Plane licebit etiam substantiuum aliquid principium esse alii rei quae ex ipso sit futura, ut argilla principium testae, ut semen principium herbae, sed cum ita utimur uocabulo principii, quasi originis, non quasi ordinis nomine, adicimus et mentionem ipsius rei specialiter quam uolumus principium alterius rei. De cetero si sic ponamus uerbi gratia: 'In principio fecit figulus peluim uel urnam', iam non materiam significabit principium, non enim argillam nominaui principium, sed ordinem operis, quia figulus ante cetera primum peluim et urnam fecit exinde facturus et cetera; ad ordinationem operum principii uocabulum pertinebit, non ad originem substantiarum.

[4] Plainly, it will also be allowable that some substantive thing be a beginning to another thing which is going to be from it, as clay is the beginning of earthenware, as seed is the beginning of the herb; but when we use the vocabulary of “beginning” in this way, as if of origin, not as if of order, we also add a mention specifically of the thing itself which we wish to be the beginning of another thing. For the rest, if we thus set it, for example: “In the beginning the potter made a basin or an urn,” now “beginning” will not signify the matter, for I did not name clay as the beginning, but the order of the work, because the potter, before the rest, first made a basin and an urn, thereafter going to make the others; the vocabulary of “beginning” will pertain to the ordination of works, not to the origin of substances.

[5] Possum et aliter principium interpretari, non ab re tamen; nam et in Graeco principii uocabulum, quod est arch[i]e, non tantum ordinatiuum sed et potestatiuum capit principatum, unde et archontes dicunt principes et magistratus. Ergo secundum hanc quoque significationem principium pro principatu et potestate sumetur; in principatu enim et in potestate deus fecit caelum et terram.

[5] I can also interpret “beginning” otherwise, yet not inappropriately; for in Greek the word for “beginning,” which is arch[i]e, takes not only an ordinative but also a potestative sense, that is, a principate, whence they also call the archontes “princes” and “magistrates.” Therefore, according to this signification too, “beginning” will be taken for principate and power; for in principate and in power God made heaven and earth.

XX.

20.

[1] Sed ut nihil aliud significet Graeca uox quam principium et principium nihil aliud capiat quam initium, habemus etiam illam initium agnoscere quae dicit: Dominus condidit me in opera sua. Si enim per sophiam dei omnia facta sunt, et caelum ergo et terram deus faciens in principio, id est initio, in sophia sua fecit.

[1] But even if the Greek word signifies nothing else than beginning, and beginning takes nothing else than inception, we have also that which acknowledges an inception, which says: The Lord established me in his works. For if through the sophia of God all things were made, then God, making heaven and earth in the beginning, that is, at the inception, made them in his sophia.

[2] Denique si principium materiam significaret, non ita scriptura instruxisset: In principio deus fecit sed 'Ex principio'; non enim in materia sed ex materia fecisset. De sophia autem potuit dici: In principio. In sophia enim primo fecit in qua cogitando et disponendo iam fecerat, quoniam, et si ex materia facturus fuisset, ante in sophia cogitando et disponendo iam fecerat, quoniam [et si] erat initium uiarum, quia cogitatio et dispositio prima sophiae sit operatio de cogitatu uiam operibus instituens.

[2] Finally, if “beginning” were to signify matter, Scripture would not have so instructed: “In the beginning God made,” but “From the beginning”; for he would have made not in matter but from matter. But of Sophia it could be said: “In the beginning.” In Sophia, indeed, he first made, in which, by thinking and disposing, he had already made, since, even if he had been going to make from matter, beforehand in Sophia, by thinking and disposing, he had already made, since [even if] she was the beginning of the ways, because thought and disposition—the first operation of Sophia—by thought instituting a way for works.

[3] Hanc et inde auctoritatem scripturae mihi uindico, quod et deum qui fecit et ea quae fecit ostendens unde fecerit non proinde testatur. Nam cum in omni operatione tria sint principalia, qui facit et quod fit et ex quo fit, tria nomina sunt edenda in legitima operis enarratione, persona factoris, species facti, forma materiae. Si materia non edetur, ubi et opera et operae operator eduntur, apparet ex nihilo eum operatum; proinde enim ederetur ex quo, si ex aliquo fuisset operatus.

[3] I also claim for myself from there this authority of Scripture: that, while showing both the God who made and the things which he made, it does not likewise testify whence he made them. For since in every operation there are three principal things—the one who makes, that which is made, and that from which it is made—three names are to be set forth in the legitimate narration of the work: the person of the maker, the species of the made thing, the form of the matter. If the matter is not set forth where both the works and the worker of the works are set forth, it appears that he operated out of nothing; for the “from what” would likewise be set forth, if he had operated from something.

[4] Denique euangelium ut supplementum instrumenti ueteris adhibebo, in quo uel eo magis debuerat ostendi deus ex aliqua materia uniuersa fecisse, quo illic etiam per quem omnia fecerit reuelatur. In principio erat sermo ---- in quo principio scilicet deus fecit caelum et terram ---- et sermo erat apud deum et deus erat sermo. Omnia per illum facta sunt et sine illo factum est nihil.

[4] Finally, I will adduce the Gospel as a supplement to the Old Instrument, in which all the more it ought to have been shown that God made the universe out of some matter, since there also is revealed the one through whom he made all things. In the beginning was the Word ---- in which beginning, namely, God made heaven and earth ---- and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made.

Cum igitur et hic manifestetur et factor, id est deus, et facta, id est omnia, et per quem, id est sermo, nonne et unde omnia facta essent a deo per sermonem exegisset ordo profiteri, si ex aliquo facta essent? Ita quod non fuit, non potuit scriptura profiteri et non profitendo satis probauit non fuisse, quia profiteretur, si fuisset.

Since therefore even here both the maker, that is God, and the things made, that is all things, and through whom, that is the Word, are made manifest, would not the order have exacted a profession also of whence all things were made by God through the Word, if they had been made from something? Thus what was not, Scripture could not profess, and by not professing it sufficiently proved it was not, since it would have professed it, had it been.

XXI.

21.

[1] 'Ergo', inquis, 'si tu ideo praeiudicas ex nihilo facta omnia quia non sit manifeste relatum de materia praecedenti factum quid, uide ne diuersa pars ideo contendat ex materia omnia facta, quia proinde non aperte significatum sit ex nihilo quid factum.'

[1] 'Therefore,' you say, 'if you for that reason prejudge that all things were made out of nothing because it has not been manifestly related that anything was made from preceding matter, see lest the opposing party for that reason contend that from matter all things were made, because likewise it has not been openly signified that anything was made out of nothing.'

[2] Plane retorqueri quaedam facile possunt, non statim et ex aequo admitti, ubi diuersitas causae est. Dico enim, etsi non aperte scriptura pronuntiauit ex nihilo facta omnia, sicut nec ex materia, non tantem fuisse necessitatem aperte significandi de nihilo facta omnia quanta esset, si ex materia facta fuissent, quoniam quod fit ex nihilo, eo ipso dum non ostenditur ex aliquo factum, manifestatur ex nihilo factum et non periclitatur ne ex aliquo factum existimetur, quando non demonstretur ex quo sit factum.

[2] Plainly certain things can easily be retorted, yet not straightway and on equal terms admitted, where there is a diversity of the cause. For I say that, even if Scripture has not openly pronounced that all things were made out of nothing, just as neither out of matter, there was not so great a necessity of openly signifying that all things were made out of nothing as there would have been if they had been made out of matter, since what is made out of nothing, by that very fact, while it is not shown to have been made out of something, is manifested to have been made out of nothing, and is not in peril of being thought to have been made out of something, when it is not demonstrated out of what it has been made.

[3] Quod autem ex aliquo fit, nisi hoc ipsum aperte declaratur ex aliquo factum illud, dum ex quo factum sit ostenditur, periclitabitur primo uideri ex nihilo factum, quia non editur ex quo sit factum, dehinc, etsi ea sit condicione ut non possit uideri ex aliquo, proinde periclitabitur ex alio longe factum uideri quam ex quo factum est, dum non proponitur unde sit factum.

[3] But what is made from something, unless this very point is openly declared—that that thing was made from something—by showing that from which it was made, will run the risk at first of seeming to have been made out of nothing, because it is not brought forth from what it was made; then, even if it be under such a condition that it cannot fail to seem to have been made from something, it will in like manner run the risk of seeming to have been made from something far other than that from which it was made, while it is not set forth whence it was made.

[4] Ita si ex nihilo deus cuncta fecisse potuit, scriptura non adiecisse illum ex nihilo fecisse; ex materia eum fecisse omni modo debuit edixisse, licet ex materia fecisset, quia illud in totu<m> habebat intellegi, et si non significaretur, at istud in dubio, nisi significaretur.

[4] Thus, if God was able to have made all things out of nothing, the scripture not to have added that he made them out of nothing; that he made them out of matter it ought in every way to have declared, licet he had made them out of matter, because the former was bound in the whole to be understood, even if it were not signified, but the latter would be in doubt, unless it were signified.

XXII.

22.

[1] Atque adeo spiritus sanctus hanc scripturae suae rationem constituit ut, cum quid ex aliquo[quo] fit, et quod fit et unde fit referat. Fructificet, inquit, terra herbam foeni seminantem semen secundum genus et secundum similitudinem et lignum fructuosum faciens fructum, cuius semen in ipso in similitudinem. Et factum est sic.

[1] And indeed the Holy Spirit has established this method of His scripture, that, when something comes to be from something [something], it reports both what is made and whence it is made. “Let the earth bear fruit,” he says, “grass for hay sowing seed according to kind and according to likeness, and a fruitful tree making fruit, whose seed is in itself according to likeness.” And it was done so.

Et produxit terra herbam foeni seminantem semen secundum genus et lignum fructuosum faciens fructum, cuius semen in ipso in similitudinem. Et rursus: Et dixit deus: Producant aquae repentia animarum uiuarum et uolatilia uolantia super terram per firmamentum caeli. Et factum est sic.

And the earth produced the herb of hay sowing seed according to kind, and a fruitful tree making fruit, whose seed is in itself according to likeness. And again: And God said: Let the waters bring forth creeping animals of living souls, and winged things flying over the earth through the firmament of heaven. And it was done thus.

Et fecit deus cetos magnos et omnem animam animalium repentium, quae produxerunt aquae secundum genus ipsorum. Item post haec: Et dixit deus: Producat terra animam uiuam secundum genus, quadrupedia et repentia et bestias terrae secundum genus ipsorum.

And God made great cetaceans and every soul of creeping animals, which the waters brought forth according to their kind. Likewise after these things: And God said: Let the earth bring forth a living soul according to its kind, quadrupeds and creeping things and beasts of the earth according to their kind.

[2] Si ergo ex iam factis rebus alias res deus proferens ostendit per prophetam et dicit, quid unde protulerit ---- quamquam possimus unde illas prolatas aestimare, dum ne ex nihilo; iam enim facta erant quaedam ex quibus prolatae uideri possent ----, si tantam curam instructionis nostrae insumpsit spiritus sanctus, ut sciremus quid unde processerit, nonne proinde nos et de caelo et de terra compotes reddidisset significando unde ea esset operatus, si de aliqua materia origo constaret illorum, ne tanto magis ex nihilo ea uideretur operatus quanto nihil adhuc erat factum ex quo operatus uideretur? Itaque sicut ea quae de aliquo prolata sunt ostendit unde prolata sint, ita que non ostendit unde prolata sint ex nihilo prolata confirmat.

[2] If, therefore, God, bringing forth other things out of things already made, showed through the prophet and says what he brought forth and whence — although we can estimate whence those things were brought forth, provided it be not out of nothing; for already certain things had been made, out of which they could seem to have been brought forth —, if the Holy Spirit expended so great care for our instruction, that we might know what proceeded whence, would he not likewise have made us compotent with respect to heaven and earth also by signifying whence he had operated them, if the origin of those had consisted of some materia, lest he should seem to have operated them so much the more out of nothing, inasmuch as nothing had yet been made out of which he might be seen to have operated? Therefore, just as in the case of those things which have been brought forth out of something he shows whence they have been brought forth, so thse which he does not show whence they have been brought forth, he confirms to have been brought forth out of nothing.

[3] Igitur in principio deus fecit caelum et terram. Adoro scripturae plenitudinem qua mihi et factorem manifestat et facta. In euangelio uero amplius et ministrum atque arbitrum factoris inuenio sermonem.

[3] Therefore in the beginning God made heaven and earth. I adore the fullness of Scripture, by which it manifests to me both the Maker and the things made. But in the Gospel indeed, further, I find the Word as the minister and arbiter of the Maker.

An autem de aliqua subiacenti materia facta sint omnia, nusquam adhuc legi: scriptum esse doceat Hermogenis officina; si non est scriptum, timeat uae illud adicientibus aut detrahentibus destinatum.

But whether all things have been made from some subjacent matter, I have nowhere yet read: let the workshop of Hermogenes show that it is written; if it is not written, let him fear that woe destined for those who add or detract.

XXIII.

23.

[1] Sed ex sequentibus argumentatur, quia scriptum sit: Terra autem erat inuisibilis et incomposita. Nam et terrae nomen redigit materiam, quia terra sit quae facta est ex illa, et erat in hoc dirigit, quasi quae semper retro fuerit, innata et infecta, inuisibilis autem et 'rudis', quia informem et confusam et inconditam uult fuisse materiam.

[1] But he argues from the following, because it is written: Now the earth was invisible and incomposite. For he even reduces the name of earth matter, since earth is that which was made from it; and he directs the was to this, as if it had always previously been—unborn and unmade; invisible, moreover, and ‘rude,’ because he wants the matter to have been without form and confused and incondite.

[2] Has quidem opiniones eius singillatim reuincam sed interim uolo sic ei respondere: Putemus his articulis materiam demonstrari; numquid tamen, quia erat ante omnia, et tale aliquid esse ex ea factum scriptura significat? Atquin nihil tale significat. Fuerit licet materia quantum sibi licet uel potius Hermogeni: potuit et fuisse et tamen nihil deus ex illa fecisse, uel quia non decebat deum alicuius eguisse, certe quia nec ostenditur quicquam ex materia fecisse.

[2] These, indeed, his opinions I will refute individually; but meanwhile I wish thus to respond to him: Let us suppose that by these articles matter is demonstrated; does Scripture, however, for the reason that it was before all things, also signify that something of such a kind was made out of it? But in fact it signifies nothing of the kind. Let matter have existed as much as is permitted to itself—or rather, to Hermogenes; it both could have existed and yet God have made nothing out of it, either because it did not befit God to have been in need of anything, certainly because it is not shown that he made anything out of matter.

'Sine causa ergo esset', inquis. Non plane adeo sine causa. Nam etsi mundus non est factus ex illa, sed haeresis facta est et quidem hoc impudentior, quod non ex materia facta est haeresis sed materiam ipsam potius haeresis fecit.

'“Without cause, therefore, it would be,” you say. Not, plainly, so without cause. For even if the world was not made from it, heresy was made—and indeed the more impudent for this, that heresy was not made from matter, but rather heresy made matter itself.

XXIV.

24.

[1] Reuertor nunc ad singulos articulos per quos putauit significatam esse materiam et primo de nominibus expostulabo. Horum enim alterum legimus, quod est terrae, alterum non inuenimus, quod est materiae. Quaero ergo, cum materiae nominatio non extet in scriptura, quomodo ei etiam terrena appellatio adcommodetur in alio iam genere substantiae nota, quo magis materiae quoque nominatio extitisse debuerat consecuta etiam terrae appellationem, ut scirem terram commune cum materia esse nomen, ne illud ei soli substantiae uindicarem cuius et proprium, in qua magis notum est, uel ne illud in quamcumque aliam speciem, nec utique omni materia<e>, communicare possem, si uellem.

[1] I return now to the individual articles by which he thought matter to have been signified, and first I will expostulate about the names. For of these we read the one, which is of earth, we do not find the other, which is of matter. I therefore ask, since the nomination of matter does not exist in Scripture, how there is to be accommodated to it even the earthy appellation, already known in another genus of substance; by which all the more the nomination of matter too ought to have existed, having also obtained the appellation of earth, so that I might know earth to be a name common with matter, lest I should claim that term for that substance alone of which it is also the proper one, in which it is better known, or lest I should be able to communicate that term to any other species, and assuredly not to all matter<e>, if I wished.

Cum enim non extat proprium uocabulum eius rei cui commune uocabulum adscribitur, quanto non comparet cui adscribatur, cuicumque alii poterit adscribi. Ita Hermogenes, et si materiam ostenderet nominatam, deberet eandem probare terram quoque cognominatam, ut ita utrumque illi uocabulum uindicaret.

Since indeed, when there is no proper appellation for the thing to which a common appellation is ascribed, inasmuch as it does not appear to what it should be ascribed, it can be ascribed to any other whatsoever. Thus Hermogenes, even if he should show “matter” to have been named, ought to prove the same to have been cognominated “earth” as well, so that in this way he might vindicate for it both appellations.

XXV.

25.

[1] Vult igitur duas proponi terras in ista scriptura, unam quam in principio deus fecit, aliam materiam ex qua fecit, de qua dictum sit: Terra autem erat inuisibilis et rudis. Utique si quaeram ex duabus quae cui nomen terrae adcommodare debeat, dicetur hanc quae facta sit ex illa ex qua facta est uocabulum deriuasse, quia ueri similius sit ab origine sobolem potius quam originem a sobole uocitari. Hoc si ita est, alia nobis obuoluitur quaestio, an competat terram hanc quam deus fecit ex illa ex qua fecit cognomentum deriuasse.

[1] He therefore wants two earths to be set forth in this scripture: one which in the beginning God made, the other the matter out of which he made it, about which it is said: But the earth was invisible and rude. Assuredly, if I ask, from the two, to which the name “earth” ought to be accommodated, it will be said that this one which has been made derived the vocable from that from which it was made, because it is more verisimilar that the offspring be called from the origin rather than the origin from the offspring. If this is so, another question wraps itself around us: whether it be fitting that this earth which God made derived a cognomen from that out of which he made it.

[2] Audio enim apud Hermogenem ceterosque materiarios haereticos terram quidem illam informem et inuisibilem et rudem fuisse, hanc uero nostram proinde et formam et conspectum et cultum a deo consecutam, aliud ergo factam quam erat ea ex qua facta est. Porro aliud facta non potuit cum ea de nomine sociari a cuius condicione desciuerat. Si nomen proprium materiae illius fuit terra, haec quae non est materia, aliud scilicet facta, terrae quoque non capit nomen alienum et statu suo extraneum.

[2] For I hear that with Hermogenes and the other materialist heretics that earth was indeed formless and invisible and raw, but that this earth of ours in turn obtained from God both form and visibility and cultivation—therefore made other than that which that was from which it was made. Moreover, being made other, it could not be associated in name with that from whose condition it had defected. If “earth” was the proper name of that matter, this which is not matter, having been made, to wit, other, does not also take the name “earth,” a name alien and extraneous to its own state.

[3] 'Sed materia facta, id esthaec terra, habuit cum sua origine consortium nominis, sicut et generis.' Non adeo. Nam et testam, licet ex argilla confectam, iam non argillam uocabo sed testam, et electrum, licet ex auro et argento foederatum, nec argentum tamen nec aurum appellabo sed electmm. A cuius habitu quid diuertit, pariter et a uocatu eius recedit appellationis sicut et condicionis proprietate.

[3] 'But matter made, that is,this earth, had with its origin a consortium of the name, as also of the genus.' Not so. For even a potsherd, although fashioned from clay, I will no longer call clay but a potsherd; and electrum, although federated from gold and silver, yet I will call neither silver nor gold, but electrum. From whose habit whatever has diverged, it equally withdraws from its appellation, by the propriety of appellation just as of condition.

Quam autem transierit de statu terrae illius, id est materiae, ista terra uel eo palam est quod haec apud Genesin testimonium boni accipit: Et uidit deus quia bonum, illa autem apud Hermogenem in originem et causam malorum deputatur.

Moreover, that this earth has passed over from the state of that earth, that is, of matter, is evident even by this: that this one receives in Genesin the testimony of good—“And God saw that it was good”—whereas that one, with Hermogenes, is assigned to the origin and cause of evils.

[4] Postremo si ideo haec terra quia et illa, cur non et materia haec quoque quia et illa? Immo iam et caelum et omnia, si ex materia constant, et terrae et materiae uocari debuerunt.

[4] Finally, if for this reason this is earth because that one is too, why not also this be matter as well, because that one is too? Nay rather, even heaven and all things, if they consist of matter, ought to have been called both earths and matters.

[5] Satis ista de terrae nomine in quo[d] materiam intellegi uoluit; quod nomen unius elementi omnes sciunt natura primum, dehinc scriptura docente, nisi si et Sileno illi apud Midam regem adseueranti de alio orbe credendum est auctore Theopompo; sed et deos multos idem refert.

[5] Enough of that about the name of “earth” in which he wished “matter” to be understood; which name of a single element all know—by nature first, thereafter with Scripture teaching—unless indeed we are to believe Silenus too, that one at King Midas’s court, affirming about another orb, with Theopompus as authority; but this same man also reports many gods.

XXVI.

26.

[1] Nobis autem unus deus et una est terra quam in principio deus fecit. Cuius ordinem incipiens scriptura decurrere primo factam eam edicit, dehinc qualitatem ipsius edisserit, sicut et caelum primo factum professa: In principio deus fecit caelum, dehinc dispositionem eius superducit: Et separauit inter aquam quae erat infra firmamentum et quae erat super firmamentum, et uocauit deus firmamentum caelum, ipsum quod in primordio fecerat. Proinde et de homine: Et fecit deus hominem, ad imaginem dei fecit illum, dehinc qualiter fecerit reddit: Et finxit deus hominem de limo terrae et adflauit in faciem eius flatum uitae et factus est homo in animam uiuam.

[1] For us, however, there is one God and one earth which in the beginning God made. The Scripture, beginning to run through its order, declares that it was first made; thereafter it dissects its quality, just as it also, having professed that heaven was first made: In the beginning God made heaven, thereafter superinduces its disposition: And he separated between the water which was below the firmament and that which was above the firmament, and God called the firmament heaven, the very thing which he had made in the beginnings. Accordingly also concerning man: And God made man; in the image of God he made him; thereafter it renders how he made him: And God fashioned man from the mud of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made into a living soul.

Et utique sic decet narrationem inire: primo praefari, postea prosequi, <ante> nominare, deinde describere. Alioquin uanum, si eius rei cuius nullam praemiserat mentionem, id est materiae, ne ipsum quidem nomen, subito formam et habitum promulgauit, ante enarrat qualis esset antequam an esset ostendit, figuram deformat[i], nomen abscondit.

And assuredly thus it befits to enter upon the narration: first to preface, afterwards to prosecute, <before> to name, then to describe. Otherwise it is vain, if, of that thing of which he had put forward no mention, that is, of the matter, not even the name itself, he suddenly promulgated the form and habit; he narrates beforehand of what sort it was before he shows whether it was; he deforms the figure, he hides the name.

[2] At quanto credibilius secundum nos eius rei dispositionem scriptura subiunxit cuius institutionem simulque nominationem praemisit! Quam denique integer sensus est: In principio deus fecit caelum et terram, terra autem erat inuisibilis et rudis, quam deus scilicet fecit, de qua scriptura cum maxime edixerat! Nam et autem ipsum uelut fibula coniunctiuae particulae ad connexum narrationi adpositum est: Terra autem; hoc enim uerbo reuertitur ad eam de qua supra dixerat et alligat sensum.

[2] But how much more credible, in our judgment, that the scripture subjoined the disposition of the thing whose institution and at the same time nomination it had prefaced! How, finally, the sense is entire: In the beginning God made heaven and earth; but the earth was invisible and unformed—which, to be sure, God made, about which the scripture had most expressly declared! For even the autem itself, as it were a clasp of a conjunctive particle, has been set for the connexion to the narration: “But the earth;” for by this word it returns to that which it had said above and binds the sense.

Adeo aufer hinc autem et soluta compago est, ut tunc possit de alia terra dictum uideri: Terra erat inuisibilis et rudis.

So then, take away ‘autem’ from here and the compages is loosened, so that then it can seem to have been said about another earth: The earth was invisible and rude.

XXVII.

27.

[1] Sed tu supercilia capitis nutu digiti adcommodato altius tollens et quasi retro iactans 'erat' inquis, quasi semper fuerit, scilicet innata et infecta et idcirco materia credenda.

[1] But you, lifting the eyebrows higher with a nod of the head, your finger accommodated, and as if tossing them back, you say 'was', as though it had always been—namely innate and unfashioned—and therefore to be believed to be matter.

[2] At ego sine ullo lenocinio pronuntiationis simpliciter respondebo de omni re posse dici 'erat', etiam de ea quae facta, quae nata sit, quae aliquando non fuerit et quae materia non sit. Omne enim quod habet esse, unde habet, siue per initium siue sine initio, hoc ipso quod est etiam 'erat' dicetur. Cui competit prima uerbi positio in definitionem, eiusdem etiam declinatio uerbi decurret in relationem; 'est' definitionis caput, 'erat' relationis facit.

[2] But I, without any allurement of pronunciation, will simply answer that of every thing it can be said “was,” even of that which has been made, which has been born, which at some time was not, and which is not matter. For everything that has being, whence it has it, whether through a beginning or without a beginning, by this very fact that it is will also be said “was.” To that for which the first position of the verb is fitting in definition, the declension of the same verb will likewise run down into relation; “is” makes the head of definition, “was” makes that of relation.

[3] Haec sunt argutiae et subtilitates haereticorum simplicitatem communium uerborum torquentes in quaestionem: magna[m] scilicet quaestio est, si erat terra, quae facta est! Sane discutiendum an ei competat inuisibilem et rudem fuisse quae facta est an ei ex qua facta est, ut eiusdem sit 'erat' cuius et quod erat.

[3] These are the quibbles and subtleties of the heretics, twisting the simplicity of common words into a question: a great question, forsooth, if the earth “was,” which was made! Surely it must be examined whether it belongs to that which was made to have been invisible and rude (raw, unformed), or to that from which it was made, so that the same have the 'was' as that to which also the thing that was belonged.

XXVIII.

28.

[1] Atquin non tantum probabimus istum habitum huic terrae competisse, sed et alii non competisse. Nam si nuda sic materia deo subiacebat nullo scilicet elemento obstruente, siquidem nondum quicquam erat praeter ipsam et deum, utique inuisibilis esse non poterat, quia etsi tenebras uolet in substantia fuisse materiae ---- cui articulo respondere debebimus suo ordine ----, etiam homini tenebrae uisibiles sunt ---- hoc enim ipsum quod sunt tenebrae uide[n]tur ----, nedum deo. Et utique si inuisibilis esset, nullo modo cognosceretur qualitas eius.

[1] But indeed we shall not only prove that such a condition befitted this earth, but also that it did not befit another. For if bare sic matter was subject to God, with no element, to be sure, obstructing—since as yet there was nothing besides itself and God—surely it could not have been invisible, because even if he should will that darkness was in the substance of the matter ---- to which article we shall have to respond in its own order ----, even to a human being darkness is visible ---- for this very thing, that they are darkness, is seen ----, let alone to God. And surely, if it were invisible, in no way would its quality be known.

Unde ergo compertus est Hermogenes informem et confusam et inquietam illam fuisse quae ut inuisibilis latebat? Aut si hoc a deo reuelatum est, probare debet.

Whence, then, has Hermogenes ascertained that that thing which, as invisible, lay hidden was formless, confused, and unquiet? Or if this was revealed by God, he ought to prove it.

[2] Sic et an rudis dici potuerit expostulo. Certe enim rude illud est quod inperfectum est. Certe inperfectum non potest esse nisi quod factum est; quod enim minus factum est, inperfectum est.

[2] Thus too I demand whether it could have been called rude. For certainly that is rude which is imperfect. Certainly the imperfect cannot be anything except what has been made; for that which has been made to a lesser degree is imperfect.

'Certe', inquis. Ergo materia, quae facta non erat in totum, inperfecta esse non potuit; quae inperfecta non fuit, etiam rudis non fuit. Initium non habens, quia facta non fuit, caruit et rudimento; initii enim accidens est rudimentum.

'Certainly,' you say. Therefore matter, which had not been made at all, could not have been imperfect; what was not imperfect was not even rude. Not having a beginning, because it had not been made, it also lacked a rudiment; for a rudiment is an accident of a beginning.

Terra uero, quae facta est, meruit et rudis dici; statim enim ut facta est, habuit inperfectae locum ante perfectionem.

The earth indeed, which was made, merited also to be called rude; for immediately when it was made, it had the place of the imperfect before perfection.

XXIX.

29.

[1] Siquidem omnia opera sua deus ordine consummauit incultis primo elementis depalans quodam modo mundum, dehinc exornatis uelut dedicans. Nam et lumen non statim splendore solis impleuit et tenebras non statim solacio lunae temperauit et caelum non statim sideribus stellisque signauit et ma[te]ria non statim beluis frequentauit et ipsam terram non statim uaria fecunditate dotauit sed primo esse ei contulit, dehinc non in uacuum esse suppleuit. Sic enim et Esaias non in uacuum, ait, fecit illam sed inhabitari.

[1] Indeed God consummated all his works in order, first, with the elements uncultivated, in a certain way staking out the world, then, when they had been adorned, as though dedicating it. For he did not at once fill the light with the splendor of the sun, and he did not at once temper the darkness with the solace of the moon, and he did not at once mark the heaven with the constellations and stars, and he did not at once throng the sea with beasts, and he did not at once endow the earth itself with varied fecundity, but first he conferred being upon it, then he supplied its being so that it be not in a vacuum. For thus also Isaiah says: “Not in a vacuum did he make it, but to be inhabited.”

[2] Postea ergo quam facta est, futura etiam perfecta, interim erat inuisibilis et rudis, rudis quidem hoc quoque ipso quod inuisibilis, utnec uisui perfecta, simul[et] et ut de reliquo nondum instructa, inuisibilis uero, ut adhuc aquis tamquam munimento genitalis humoris obducta, qua forma etiam adfinis eius caro nostra producitur. Nam et Dauid ita canit: Domini est terra et plenitudo eius, orbis terrae, et omnes qui habitant in illa; ipse super maria fundauit eam et super flumina praeparauit eam. Segregatis enim aquis in cauationem sinum emicantior facta est arida quae antehac aquis tegebatur. Exinde itaque et uisibilis efficitur dicente deo: Congregetur aqua in congregatione una et uideatur arida.

[2] After therefore it was made, destined also to be perfected, in the meantime it was invisible and unformed, unformed indeed even in this very respect that it was invisible, so as to benot for sight perfected, and at the same time as not yet furnished in what remained; invisible, moreover, as being still overlaid by the waters as by a muniment of generative humor, in which form even our flesh, affine to it, is brought forth. For David also thus sings: The earth is the Lord’s, and its fullness, the orb of the earth, and all who dwell in it; he himself founded eam and prepared eam upon the rivers. For when the waters had been segregated into the cavationem sinum, the dry land, which previously had been covered by waters, became more-emergent. Thence accordingly it also is made visible, God saying: Let the water be gathered into one gathering, and let the dry land be seen.

'Videatur', inquit, non 'fi<a>t', iam enim facta erat sed inuisibilis usque tunc uideri sustinebat; 'arida' autem, quod erat futura ex diuortio humoris, tamen terra: et uocauit deus aridam terram, non materiam.

'Let it be seen,' he says, not 'let it be made,' for it had already been made but, being invisible, until then was awaiting to be seen; 'arid,' however, as that which would be to result from the divorce of the moisture, yet 'earth': and God called the arid 'earth,' not 'matter'.

[3] Sic et perfectionem postea consecuta desinit rudis haberi, cum pronuntiat deus: Fructificet terra herbam foeni seminantem semen secundum genus et secundum similitudinem, et lignum fructuosum faciens fructum, cuius semen in ipso in similitudinem, item: Producat terra animam uiuam secundum genus, et quadrupedia et repentia et bestias terrae secundum genus.

[3] Thus also, having afterward attained perfection, it ceases to be held rude, when God pronounces: Let the earth fructify grass for hay, sowing seed according to kind and according to likeness, and a fruit-bearing tree making fruit, whose seed is in itself according to likeness, likewise: Let the earth bring forth a living soul according to kind, and quadrupeds and creeping things and beasts of the earth according to kind.

[4] Impleuit igitur ordinem suum scriptura diuina, quam enim praedixerat inuisibilem et rudem, ei et uisionem reddidit et perfectionem. Non alia autem materia erat inuisibilis et rudis; ergo materia erit postea uisibilis et perfecta. Volo itaque uidere materiam, uisibilis enim facta est; uolo et perfectam eam recognoscere, ut ex illa etiam foeni herbam et ex illa decerpam lignum fructum et ex illa animalia usui meo famulentur.

[4] Therefore the divine scripture fulfilled its own order; for that which it had foretold as invisible and rude, to it it gave both visibility and perfection. Now it was not some other matter that was invisible and rude; therefore the matter will thereafter be visible and perfect. I wish, accordingly, to see the matter, for it has been made visible; I also wish to recognize it as perfect, so that from it likewise I may pluck the herb of hay, and from it I may gather the fruit-bearing tree, and from it the animals may serve my use.

Sed materia quidem nusquam, terra uero haec, id est coram. Hanc uideo, hanc perfruor ex quo inuisibilis et rudis esse desiit.

But the matter indeed is nowhere; the earth, however, is here, that is, before me. This I see, this I fully enjoy, since it has ceased to be invisible and rude.

[5] De qua manifestissime Esaias: Haec dicit dominus qui fecit caelum, iste deus qui demonstrauit terram et fecit illam. Certe eandem demonstrauit quam et fecit. Quomodo demonstrauit?

[5] About which most manifestly Isaiah: Thus says the Lord who made heaven, this God who demonstrated the earth and made it. Surely he demonstrated the same which he also made. How did he demonstrate it?

Utique dicendo: Videatur arida. Quare uideri iubet nisi quia retro non uidebatur, ut sic quoque eam non in uacuum fecisset faciendo uisibilem et ita habilem?

Indeed by saying: Let the dry land be seen. Why does he order it to be seen unless because formerly it was not being seen, so that thus also he would not have made it to no purpose by making it visible and thus serviceable?

[6] Et sic per omnia probatur nobis hanc, quam incolimus, eandem et factam esse a deo et ostensam, nec aliam fuisse rudem et inuisibilem quam quae et facta et ostensa est. Atque ita Terra autem erat inuisibilis et rudis ad eam pertinet quam deus cum caelo separauit.

[6] And thus through all things it is proved to us that this one, which we inhabit, is the same, both made by God and shown, and that there was not another that was unwrought and invisible than the one which both was made and shown. And thus But the Earth was invisible and unwrought pertains to that which God separated along with the heaven.

XXX.

30.

[1] Sic et sequentia coniecturam Hermogenis instruere uidebuntur, Et tenebrae super abyssum et spiritus dei super aquas ferebatur, quasi et hae confusae substantiae massalis illius molis argumenta portendant. Atquin singillatim definiens tenebras abyssum spiritum dei aquas nihil confusum nec in confusione incertum aestimari facit tam diuisa relatio certorum et distinctorum elementorum. Hoc quidem amplius, cum situs proprios eis adscribit, tenebras super abyssum, spiritum super aquas, negauit confusionem substantiarum quarum demonstrando dispositionem demonstrauit etiam distinctionem.

[1] Thus too the following will seem to furnish Hermogenes’s conjecture, “And darkness over the abyss, and the spiritum of God was borne over the waters,” as if these likewise were portending proofs of confused substances of that massy bulk. But in fact, by defining individually darkness, abyss, spiritum of God, waters, so divided a relation of sure and distinct elements makes it be reckoned that nothing is confused nor, in confusion, uncertain. Moreover, when he assigns to them their proper positions—darkness over the abyss, spiritum over the waters—he denied a confusion of substances; by demonstrating their disposition he also demonstrated their distinction.

[2] Vanissimum denique ut materia, quae informis inducitur, de tot formarum uocabulis informis adseueretur non edito quid sit illud corpus confusionis, quod unicum utique credendum est, si informe est.

[2] Most vain, finally, that matter, which is introduced as formless, be asserted formless from amid so many vocabularies of forms, without publishing what that body of confusion is, which must certainly be believed to be unique, if it is formless.

[3] Uniforme etenim quod informe est, informe autem quod ex uarietate confusum est: unam habeat necesse est speciem quod non habet speciem, dum ex multis unam habet speciem. Ceterum aut habebat in se species istas materia de quarum uocabulis intellegenda[s] esse, tenebras dico et abyssum et spiritum et aquas, aut non habebat; siautem habebat, quomodo inducitur non habens formas? si non habebat, <unde> agnoscitur?

[3] For the uniform is that which is formless, while the formless is that which has been confused out of variety: it is necessary that what does not have a form should have one single form, since out of many it has one form. Moreover, either matter had within itself those species—darkness, I say, and the abyss and the spirit and the waters—from whose names it is to be understood; or it did not have them. If,but , it had them, how is it introduced as not having forms? If it did not have them, <whence> is it recognized?

XXXI.

31.

[1] Sed et illud utique captabitur, de caelo solo et de terra ista scripturam significasse, quod ea[m] in principio deus fecerit, de speciebus autem supra dictis nihil tale, et ideo eas quae factae non significentur ad infectam materiam pertinere. Respondebimus huic quoque scrupulo.

[1] But that too will assuredly be caught at: that the Scripture signified only of heaven and of this earth, that God made them in the beginning, but concerning the aforesaid forms nothing of the sort; and therefore that those which are not signified as having been made pertain to unworked matter. We shall respond to this scruple as well.

[2] Scriptura diuina satis dissereret, si summas ipsas rerum a deo factas commendasset caelum et terram, habentes utique suggestus suos proprios qui in ipsis summis intellegi possent.

[2] The divine Scripture would have expounded sufficiently, if it had commended that the very summits of things were made by God—heaven and earth—having, to be sure, their own proper substructures which could be understood within those summits themselves.

[3] Suggestus autem caeli et terrae primo tunc fuerunt tenebrae et abyssus et spiritus et aquae. Nam terrae quidem suberat abyssus et tenebrae; si enim abyssus infra terram, tenebrae autem super abyssum, sine dubio et tenebrae et abyssus infra terram. Caelo uero spiritus et aquae subiacebant; nam si aquae super terram, qua[l]e eam texerant, spiritus autem super aquas, pariter et spiritus et aquae super terram; quae uero super terram, ea utique infra caelum.

[3] But the substructures of heaven and earth at the first were the darkness, the abyss, the spirit, and the waters. For, as to the earth, the abyss and the darkness underlay it; for if the abyss is beneath the earth, and the darkness above the abyss, without doubt both the darkness and the abyss are beneath the earth. But to the heaven the spirit and the waters were subjacent; for if the waters are above the earth, inasmuch as they covered it, and the spirit above the waters, equally both the spirit and the waters are above the earth; and the things that are above the earth are, assuredly, beneath the heaven.

Et sicut terra abysso et tenebris, ita et caelum spiritui et aquis incubabat et complectebatur.

And just as the earth was brooding over and embracing the abyss and the darkness, so too the heaven was brooding over and embracing the spirit and the waters.

[4] Et ita nouum non est ut id solum quod continet nominetur, qua summale, in isto autem intellegatur et quod continetur, qua portionale. Ecce, si dicam: 'ciuitas extruxit theatrum et circum, scena autem erat talis et talis, et statuae super euripum, et obeliscus super omnia ferebatur', quia non et has species edixerim factas a ciuitate, non erunt ab ea cum circo et theatro? An ideo non adieci factas has quoque species, qua inerant eis quae facta praedixeram, et inesse quibus inerant intellegi poterant?

[4] And thus it is not new that only that which contains is named, as the summal, but in this there is understood also that which is contained, as the portional. Behold, if I should say: 'the city built a theater and a circus, but the stage was such and such, and statues above the euripus, and the obelisk was borne above all,' because I will not also have declared these forms made by the city, will they not be from it along with the circus and the theater? Or is it for this reason that I did not add that these forms too were made, qua they were present in those things which I had previously said were made, and it could be understood that they inhere in the things in which they were?

Sed uacet hoc exemplum ut humanum; aliud de auctoritate scripturae ipsius arripiam. Fecit, inquit, deus hominem de terra et adflauit in faciem eius flatum uitae et factus est homo in animam uiuam. Faciem quidem eius hic nominat, sed nec ipsam factam a deo dixit, cutem uero et ossa et carnem et oculos et sudorem et sanguinem postea loquitur, quae nec tunc facta a deo significauit.

But let this example be set aside as human; I will seize another from the authority of Scripture itself. “God,” he says, “made man from earth and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made into a living soul.” He indeed names his face here, but he did not say that this itself was made by God; and later he speaks of the skin and the bones and the flesh and the eyes and the sweat and the blood, which he did not then signify as made by God.

Quid respondebit Hermogenes? Numquid et membra hominis ad materiam pertinebunt, quia non nominatim facta referuntur? An et haec in hominis factitatione cense<n>tur?

What will Hermogenes reply? Will even the members of man pertain to matter, because they are not recounted as made by name? Or are these too reckoned in the making of the man?

[5] Proinde membra erunt caeli et terrae abyssus et tenebrae, spiritus e<t > aquae. In corporibus enim membra sunt facta, in corporibus et membra sunt nominata. Nullum elementum non membrum est eius elementi quo continetur; omnia autem elementa caelo aut terra continentur.

[5] Accordingly, the abyss and the darkness, the spirit and the waters, will be the members of heaven and of earth. In bodies,for the members are made; in bodies too the members are named. No element is not a member of that element by which it is contained; but all the elements are contained by heaven or by earth.

XXXII.

32.

[1] Haec responderim pro scriptura praesenti, quatenus hic solorum corporum factitationem commendare uidetur caeli et terrae. Sciit esse qui ultro in corporibus et membra cognoscerent et ideo compendio usa est, prouidit tamen et hebetes et insidiosos qui dissimulato tacito intellectu ipsi[u]s quoque membris uerbum factitationis significatorum exigerent. Itaque et propter istos singulas species factas docet aliis in locis.

[1] I would answer these things on behalf of the present Scripture, inasmuch as here it seems to commend the factitation of bodies only, that is, of heaven and earth. She knew there would be those who, unbidden, would recognize in the bodies also the members, and so she used a compendium; yet she also provided for the dull and the insidious, who, with the tacit understanding dissembled, would demand for its members as well a word signifying factitation. Therefore, also on account of these, in other places she teaches that the individual species were made.

[2] Habes Sophiam prior autem abysso genita sum dicentem, ut credas abyssum quoque genitam, id est factam, quia et filios facimus, licet generemus. Nihil interest facta an nata sit abyssus, dum initium detur illi, quod non daretur, si materiae subiecta esset. De tenebris uero ipse dominus per Esaiam: Ego qui struxi lucem et feci tenebras.

[2] You have Sophia saying, “I was begotten prior to the abyss,” so that you may believe the abyss too to have been begotten, that is, made, since we also “make” sons, although we beget them. It makes no difference whether the abyss was made or born, provided that a beginning be given to it, which would not be given if it were subject to matter. As for the darkness, the Lord himself through Isaiah: “I who constructed the light and made the darkness.”

De spiritu aeque Amos: Qui solidat tonitruum et condit spiritum et adnuntiat in homines Christum suum, eum spiritum conditum ostendens qui in terras conditas deputabatur, qui super aquas ferebatur, librator et adflator et animator uniuersitatis, non ut quidam putant ipsum deum significari spiritum, quia deus spiritus - neque enim aquae dominum sustinere sufficerent ----, sed eum spiritum dicit de quo etiam uenti constiterunt, ut ait per Esaiam: Quia spiritus a me exiuit et flatum omne<m> ego feci. Item de aquis eadem Sophia: Et quomodo firmos ponebat fontes quae sub caelo, ego eram modulans cum ipso.

Concerning the spirit likewise Amos: Who solidifies the thunder and fashions the spirit and announces to men his Christ, showing that that spirit was made, which was reckoned among the things created on earth, which was being borne over the waters—the librator and inflator and animator of the universe—not, as some think, that God himself is signified by “spirit,” because God is spirit—for neither would the waters be sufficient to sustain the Lord ----, but he speaks of that spirit at whose presence even the winds stood fast, as he says through Isaiah: Because a spirit went forth from me, and every breath I made. Likewise concerning the waters the same Sophia: And how he was setting firm the springs that are under the heaven, I was there modulating with him.

[3] Cum ergo et eas species probamus a deo factas, etsi in Genesi tantummodo nomina<n>tur sine factitationis mentione, respondebitur fortasse ex diuerso plane factas eas sed ex materia, ut stilus quidem Moysei, Et tenebrae super abyssum et spiritus dei super aquas ferebatur, materiam sonet, ceterae uero scripturae quae ex materia factae sunt species in disperso demonstrent.

[3] Since therefore we also prove those species to have been made by God, although in Genesis they are only named without any mention of making, it will perhaps be answered from the opposite side that they were indeed plainly made, but out of matter, so that the style of Moses, “And darkness over the abyss, and the spirit of God was borne over the waters,” may sound of matter, while the other scriptures may demonstrate in dispersed fashion the species which were made from matter.

[4] Ergo sicut terra de terra, ita et abyssus ex abysso et tenebrae ex tenebris et spiritus et aquae ex spiritu et aquis constiterunt. Et sicut supra diximus, non potuit informis fuisse materia, species habebat, ut et aliae ex ea sint confectae; nisi quod non aliae sed ipsae ex semetipsis, siquidem non capit diuers[it]as fuisse quaeiisdem nominibus eduntur, quo[d] iam et operatio diuina otiosa uideri possit, si quae erant fecit, cum generosiora esse<n>t quae non erant facta quam si fierent.

[4] Therefore, just as earth from earth, so also the abyss from the abyss and darkness from darkness, and spirit and waters from spirit and waters, came to stand constituted. And, as we said above, matter could not have been formless, if it had species, so that others too might be composed from it; unless it be that not others but the very same things from themselves, since it does not admit that things which are put forth under the same names were diverse—because now even the divine operation might seem idle, if he made the things that already were, since those which had not been made would be more noble than if they were made.

[5] Igitur ut concludam, aut materiam tunc significauit Moyses scribens: Et tenebrae super abyssum et spiritus dei super aquas ferebatur --at cum hae species alibi postea demonstrantur factae a deo, debuerunt aeque demonstrari ex materia quam Moyses praemiserat factae ---- aut si species istas et non materiam significauit Moyses, ubi materia demonstrata sit quaero.

[5] Therefore, to conclude, either Moses then signified the matter when writing: ‘And darkness over the abyss, and the Spirit of God was being borne over the waters’ — but since these species elsewhere afterward are demonstrated to have been made by God, they ought equally to have been demonstrated as made out of the matter which Moses had praemised ---- or, if Moses signified these species and not the matter, I ask where the matter has been demonstrated.

XXXIII.

33.

[1] Sed dum illam Hermogenes inter colores suos inuenit ---- inter scripturas enim dei inuenire non potuerit ---- satis est quod omnia et facta a deo constat et ex materia facta non constat; quae etiam si fuisset, ipsam quoque a deo factam credidissemus, quia nihil innatum praeter deum praescribentes obtineremus. In hunc usque articulum locus est retractatui, donec ad scripturas prouocata deficiat exhibitio materiae. Expedita summa est: nihil inuenio factum nisi ex nihilo, quia quod factum inuenio non fuisse cognosco.

[1] But while Hermogenes finds that among his own colorings ---- for he could not have found it among the scriptures of God ---- it suffices that both it is certain that all things have been made by God, and it is not certain that they have been made out of matter; which, even if it had existed, we would have believed itself also to have been made by God, since, prescribing that nothing is inborn except God, we would maintain the point. Up to this very juncture there is room for reconsideration, until the exhibition of matter, when appealed to the scriptures, fails. The sum is clear: I find nothing made except out of nothing, because what I find to have been made I know not to have been.

Etiam si quid ex aliquo factum est, ex facto habet censum, ut ex terra herba et fructus et pecudes et figuratio hominis ipsius, ut ex aquis natatiles et uolatiles animae. Huiusmodi origines rerum ex his prolatarum potero materias appellare sed factas a deo et ipsas.

Even if anything has been made out of something, it has its reckoning as from a thing made, as from the earth grass and fruits and cattle and the figuration of man himself, as from the waters the swimming and the flying souls. Origins of this kind of things brought forth from these I shall be able to call “materials,” but even these themselves as made by God.

XXXIV.

34.

[1] Ceterum omne ex nihilo constitisse illa postremo diuina dispositio suadebit quae omniain nihilum redactura est.

[1] Moreover, that everything was constituted out of nothing, that final divine disposition will persuade, which is going to reduce all thingsin to nothing .

[2] Siquidem et caelum conuoluetur ut liber, immo nusquam fiet cum ipsa terra, cum qua primordio factum est. Caelum et terra praeteribunt, inquit, caelum primum et terra prima abierunt, et locus non est inuentus illis, quia scilicet quod et finit locum amittit. Sic et Dauid: Opera manuumtuarum caeli et ipsi peribunt.

[2] For indeed even the heaven will be rolled up like a book, nay rather it will become nowhere together with the earth itself, with which it was made in the primordial beginning. “Heaven and earth will pass away,” he says, “the first heaven and the first earth departed, and no place was found for them,” since, of course, that which also bounds a place loses place. Thus also David: “The heavens, the works of your hands—and they themselves will perish.”

Nam et si mutabit illos uelut opertorium et mutabuntur, sed et mutari perire est pristino statui que<m>, dum mutantur, amittunt. Et stellae quidem de caelo ruent, sicut fici arbor cum ualido commota uento acerba sua amittit, montes uero tamquam cera liquescent a conspectu domini, cum surrexerit scilicet confringere terram. Sed et paludes, inquit, arefaciam et quaerent aquam nec inuenient; etiam mare hactenus.

For even if he will change them like a covering and they will be changed, yet to be changed is also to perish: they lose the pristine state which, while they are being changed, they lose. And indeed the stars will fall from heaven, just as the fig tree, when shaken by a strong wind, loses its unripe fruits; but the mountains will melt like wax at the presence of the Lord, when he has risen, namely, to shatter the earth. And he says, “I will dry up the marshes, and they will seek water and will not find it; even the sea thus far.”

[3] Quae omnia et si aliter putauerit [spiritaliter] interpretanda, non tamen poterit auferre ueritatem ita futurorum quomodo scripta sunt. Si quae enim figurae sunt, ex rebus consistentibus fiant necesse est, non ex uacantibus, quia nihil potest ad similitudinem de suo praestare nisi sit ipsum quod tali similitudim praestet.

[3] All these things, even if one has thought them to be interpreted otherwise [spiritually], nevertheless he will not be able to remove the truth of the things to come just as they are written. For if there are any figures, it is necessary that they arise from subsistent things, not from vacant ones, because nothing can provide from its own toward a likeness unless there be the very thing that may furnish such a similitude.

[4] Reuertor igitur ad causam definientem omnia ex nihilo edita in nihilum peruentura. Ex aeterno enim, id est ex materia, nihil deus interibile fecisset nec ex maioribus minora condidisset, cui magis congruat ex minoribus maiora producere, id est ex interibili aeternum, quod et carni nostrae pollicetur.

[4] I return, therefore, to the cause defining that all things produced out of nothing are destined to come to nothing. For from the eternal, that is, from matter, God would have made nothing perishable, nor would he have fashioned lesser things from greater; to whom it is more congruent to produce greater things from lesser, that is, from the perishable the eternal, which he also promises to our flesh.

[5] Cuius uirtutis et potestatis suae hunc iam arrabonem uoluit in nobis collocasse, ut credamus etiam illum uniuersitatem ex nihilo uelut emortuam, quae scilicet non erat, in hoc, ut esset, suscitasse.

[5] Of whose virtue and of his own power he has wished already to have placed this arrabon in us, so that we may believe that he also has raised the universe out of nothing as if dead—which, of course, was not—into this, that it might be.

XXXV.

35.

[1] De cetero uero statu[m] materiae etsi non est retractandum ---- prius enim erat ut eam esse constaret ----, tamen ac si constiterit persequendus est ordo, quo magis eam non esse constet cuius nec reliquus statu<s> consistat, simul ut contrarietates suas agnoscat Hermogenes.

[1] As for the rest, truly the status of matter, although it is not to be re-examined ---- for it was earlier that it should be established that it exists ----, nevertheless, as if it had been established, the order is to be pursued, in order that it may all the more be established that it does not exist, the remainder of whose status does not even stand, and at the same time that Hermogenes may recognize his contrarieties.

[2] 'Prima', inquit, 'facie uidetur nobis incorporalis esse materia, exquisita autem ratione recta inuenitur neque corporalis neque incorporalis.' Quae est ista ratio recta quae nihil recti renuntiat,id est nihil certi? Nisi fallor enim, omnis res aut corporalis <aut incorporalis> sit necesse est ---- ut concedam interim esse aliquid incorporale, de substantiis dumtaxat, cum ipsa substantia corpus sit rei cuiusque ----; certe post corporale et incorporale nihil tertium.

[2] 'At first sight,' he says, 'matter seems to us to be incorporeal, but when by carefully exact right reasoning it is examined it is found to be neither corporeal nor incorporeal.' What is that right reason which reports nothing right,that is, nothing certain? For unless I am mistaken, every thing must be either corporeal <or incorporeal> ---- so that let me for the moment concede that there is something incorporeal, only with respect to substances, since substance itself is the body of each thing ----; surely after the corporeal and the incorporeal there is nothing third.

[3] Age nunc sit et tertium, quod illa recta ratio Hermogeniana compererit quae neque corporalem neque incorporalem materiam facit: ubi est? quale est? quid uocatur?

[3] Come now, let there even be a third thing, which that Hermogenian right reason has discovered, wh ich makes matter neither corporeal nor incorporeal: where is it? of what sort is it? what is it called?

quid describitur? quid intellegitur? Tantum hoc ratio renuntiauit, nec corporalem materiam nec incorporalem.

What is described? What is understood? Only this did reason report: neither corporeal matter nor incorporeal.

XXXVI.

36.

[1] Sed ecce contrarium subicit ---- aut alia fortasse ratio ei occurrit ---- ex parte corporalem renuntians materiam et ex parte incorporalem. Iam ergo ne neutrum sit, utrumque materia censenda est? Erit enim corporalis et incorporalis aduersus renuntiationem rectae rationis illius plane rationem non reddentis sententiae suae, sicut nec alia reddit.

[1] But behold, he puts forward the contrary ---- or perhaps another rationale occurs to him ---- reporting the matter as in part corporeal and in part incorporeal. So then, lest it be neither, are both to be assessed as matter? For it will be corporeal and incorporeal, against the report of rectae reason, of that man plainly not rendering a rationale of his own opinion, just as he neither renders another.

[2] Corporale[m] enim materiae uult esse de quo corpor edantur, incorporale uero inconditum motum eius. 'Si enim', ait, 'corpus tantummodo esse, nihil ei incorporale appareret, id est motus; si uero in totum incorporalis fuisset, nullum corpus ex ea fieret.'

[2] For he wants the material to be corporeal, from which bodies are brought forth, but incorporeal to be its unformed motion. 'For if,' he says, 'it were a body only, nothing incorporeal would appear in it, that is, motion; but if it had been entirely incorporeal, no body would be made from it.'

[3] Quanto haec rectior ratio! Nis[s] i quod, si t rectas lineas duci~~, Hermogenes, quam ratiocin~~aris, pictor te bardior non est. Qui<s> enim tibi concedit motum in secundam partem substantiae deputare[t], cum substantiua res non sit, quia nec corporalis, sed accidens, si forte, substantiae et corpori, ut actus et pulsus, ut lapsus et casus, ita et motus?

[3] How much more correct this reasoning! Unle[s]s that, if you draw so t straight lines duci~~, Hermogenes, as you ratiocin~~ate, the painter is no duller than you. Who<s> indeed grants you to depute motion into the second part of substance, since it is not a substantival thing, because neither corporal, but an accident, perhaps, of substance and of body, as act and impulse, as lapse and fall, so also motion?

[4] Nam si ue a semetipso quid mouetur, [f]actus eius est motus, certe pars substantiae non est, sicut tu motum substantiam facis <faciendo partem> materiae incorporalem. Omnia denique mouentur aut [ut] a semetipsis, ut animalia, aut ab aliis, ut inanimalia; tamen nec hominem nec lapidem et corporalem et incorporalem dicemus, quia et corpus habeat et motum, sed unam omnibus formam solius corporalitatis, quae substantiae res est. Si qua incorpora<lia> eis adsunt, aut actus aut passiones aut officia aut libidines eorum, non portiones deputamus.

[4] For if even something is moved by itself, its motion is its effect; certainly it is not a part of substance, just as you make motion a substance by making an incorporeal part of matter. Finally, all things are moved either by themselves, as animals, or by others, as inanimate things; yet we will call neither a man nor a stone both corporeal and incorporeal, because it has both body and motion, but we assign to all one form, that of corporality alone, which is a thing of substance. If any incorporeals are present to them—whether their acts or passions or offices or libidos—we do not reckon these as portions.

[5] Quo ergo facit portionem materiae in motum disponere, qui non ad substantiam pertinet sed ad substantiae habitum? Quid enim, si immobilem placuisset tibi inducere materiam, numquid immobilitas secunda pars formae uideretur? Sic itaque nec motus.

[5] To what end, then, does he make a portion of matter by arranging it under motion, which does not pertain to substance but to the habitus (condition) of substance? For what, if it had pleased you to introduce matter as immobile, would immobility appear a second part of form? So likewise, neither is motion.

Sed <d>e motu et alibi licebit.

But about motion, it will be permitted elsewhere.

XXXVII.

37.

[1] Nunc enim uideo te ad illam rursus rationem reuerti quae tibi nihil certi renuntiare consueuit. Nam sicut nec corporalem nec incorporalem infers materiam, ita nec bonam nec malam adlegas [s]et proinde superargumenta<n>s 'Si enim', inquis, 'esset bona, quae semper hoc fuerat, non desideraret compositionem dei; si esset natura mala, non accepisset translationem in melius nec quicquam compositionis suae adplicuisset illi deus tali natura; in uacuum enim laborasset.'

[1] For now I see you revert again to that line of reasoning which is accustomed to report nothing certain to you. For just as you bring forward neither a corporeal nor an incorporeal maters matter, so neither good nor bad do you allege; [b]ut accordingly over-arguing, 'For if,' you say, 'it were good, which it had always been, it would not desire the composition of God; if it were an evil nature, it would not have received a translation into the better, nor would God have applied anything of his composition to such a nature; for he would have labored in vain.'

[2] Verba haec tua sunt quorum te et alibi meminisse oportuerat, ne quid his contrarium inferres. Sed quoniam de mali et boni ambiguitate super materiam in praeteritis aliquid retractauimus, nunc ad praesentem et solam propositionem et argumentationem tuam respondebo. Nec dicam et hic te certum aliquid debuisse pronuntiasse, aut bona<m> aut mala<m> aut tertium aliquid, sed nec hic quod tibi libuit pronuntiasse custodisse.

[2] These are your words, which it was fitting that you should have remembered elsewhere as well, lest you bringin. But since concerning the ambiguity of evil and good over matter we have in previous discussions re-examined something, now I will respond to your present and sole proposition and argumentation. Nor shall I say even here that you ought to have pronounced something definite, either good or evil or some third thing, but that not even here have you kept what it pleased you to pronounce.

[3] Rescindis enim quod pronuntiasti nec bonam nec malam, quia, cum dicis: 'Si esset bona, non desideraret componi a deo,' mala<m> portendis et cum adponis: 'Si esse[n]t mala natura, non admitteret in melius translationem,' bonam subostendis. Atque ita et boni et mali adfinem constituisti [ei] quam nec bonam nec malam pronuntiasti.

[3] For you rescind what you pronounced neither good nor bad; for when you say: 'If it were good, it would not desire composition from God,' you portend it as bad; and when you add: 'If the nature were evil, it would not admit a translation into the better,' you hint at it as good. And thus you have constituted for it affinity with both good and evil, that which you pronounced neither good nor bad.

[4]Vt autem et argumentationem qua putasti te propositionem tuam confirmaturum retundam, oppono etiam illud: 'Si bona fuisset materia semper, quare non desiderasset in melius reformari? Quod bonum, non desiderat aut non optat aut non capit profectum, ut fiat de bono melius? Aeque si mala natura fuisset, quare non potuerit a deo conuerti ut a potentiore, ut ab eo qui lapidum quoque naturam conuertere ualeat in filios Abrahae?'

[4]That I may also blunt the argumentation by which you thought you would confirm your proposition, I likewise oppose this: 'If the matter had always been good, why would it not have desired to be re-formed for the better? What good thing does not desire or not opt for or not take on advancement, so that from good it may become better? Likewise, if it had been an evil nature, why could it not have been converted by God as by the more powerful, by him who is able also to convert the nature of stones into sons of Abraham?'

[5] Nempe ergo non tantum comparas dominum materiae, sed et subicis, a quo natura[m] materiae deuinci et edomari <in> melius <non> potuisset. Sed et quam hic non uis natura[m] malam, <malam> alibi te confessum negabis.

[5] Clearly then you not only posit a master of matter, but also subject him, by whom the nature of matter could have been thoroughly conquered and tamed better. But also the nature which here you do not wish to be evil, elsewhere you will deny that you have confessed as .

XXXVIII.

CHAPTER 38.

[1] De situ materiae id tracto quod et de modo,ut peruersitatem tuam traducam. Subiacentem facis deo materiam et utique locum <adsignas> illi qui sit infra deum. In loco ergo materia; si in loco, ergo intra locum; si intra locum, ergo determinatur a loco intra quem est; si determinatur, habet lineam extremam quam, quantum proprie pictor, agnoscis finem esse omni rei cuius linea extrema est. Non ergo erit infinita materia quae, dum in loco [quo] est, a loco determinatur et, dum determinatur ab illo, extrema eum linea patitur.

[1] On the situs of matter I handle that which also on the mode,ut to expose your perversity. You make matter subjacent to God and, to be sure, you to it a place which may be beflow God. Therefore matter is in a place; if in a place, then within a place; if within a place, then it is determined by the place within which it is; if it is determined, it has a boundary line which, so far as—properly speaking—a painter, you acknowledge to be the end of every thing whose boundary line it is. Therefore matter will not be infinite, since, while it is in the place [in which] it is, it is determined by the place, and, while it is determined by that, it undergoes an extreme line.

[2] At tu infinitam facis dicens: 'Infinita est autem eo quod semper est'.

[2] But you make it infinite, saying: 'It is infinite, moreover, because it always is'.

[3] Et si qui discipulorum tuorum uoluerit argumentari, quasi infinitam? aeuo, non modo corporis intellegi uelis, atquin corporaliter infinitam, ut corporaliter immensam et incircumscriptam, sequentia ostendunt. 'Vnde,' inquis, 'nec tota fabricatur sed partes eius.' Adeo corpore infinita, non tempore est et obduceris corpore <e>am infinitam faciens, cum locum ei adscribens intra locum et extremam loci lineam includis.

[3] And if any of your disciples should wish to argue, as though “infinite” by age you wished it to be understood, not in respect to body only, nay rather corporally infinite, as corporally immense and uncircumscribed, the following show it. ‘Whence,’ you say, ‘not the whole is fashioned but its parts.’ Thus it is infinite in body, not in time; and you are overborne by the bodily, by body <e>am making it infinite, since by assigning to it a place you include it within a place and within the extreme line of a place.

[4] Sed tamen cur non totam eam formauerit deus non scio, nisi qua ut inualidus aut inuidus. Itaque [ut] dimidium eius quae non tota formata sit quaero, qualis tota fuerit agnoscam. Debuerat enim deus ut exemplarium antiquitatis ad gloriam operis palam fecisse.

[4] But yet why God did not form it whole I do not know, unless somehow as either invalid or envious. Therefore [that] I seek its half, since it has not been wholly formed, I may recognize what it would have been like entire. For God ought, indeed, to have made public the exemplars of antiquity for the glory of the work.

XXXIX.

39.

[1] Sit nunc definitiua, sicut rectius tibi uidetur, per demutationes suas et translationes, sit et comprehensibilis, 'ut quae fabricatur,' inquis, 'a deo,' quia et conuertibilis et demutabilis et dispartibilis ---- 'Demutationes enim eius,' inquis, 'dispartibilem eam ostendunt' ----: et hic a lineis tuis excidisti quibus circa personam dei usus es praescribe<n>s deum illam non ex semetipso fecisse, quia in partes uenire non posset qui sit[a] aeternus et manens in aeuum ac per hoc immutabilis et indiuisibilis. Si et materia eadem aeternitate censetur, neque initium habens neque finem, eadem ratione non poterit pati dispertitionem et demutationem, qua nec deus; in aeternitatis consortio posita participet cum illo necesse est et uires et leges et condiciones aeternitatis.

[1] Let it now be definitive, as it seems to you more correct, by its demutations and translations; let it also be comprehensibile, ‘as that which is fashioned,’ you say, ‘by God,’ since it is both convertible and mutable and dispartible ---- ‘For its demutations,’ you say, ‘show it to be dispartible’ ----: and here you have fallen away from your own lines, with which, around the person of God, you were engaged, prescribi<n>g that God did not make that out of himself, because he who is eternal and abiding unto the age, and thereby immutable and indivisible, could not come into parts. If matter too is reckoned in the same eternity, having neither beginning nor end, by the same reasoning it will not be able to experience dispartition and demutation, just as neither can God; being placed in the consortium of eternity, it must share with God both the powers and the laws and the conditions of eternity.

[2] Aeque cum dicis: 'Partes autem eius omnia simul ex omnibus habent, ut ex partibus totum dinoscatur,' utique eas partes intellegi uis quae ex illa prolatae sunt, quae hodie uidentur a nobis. Quomodo ergo omnia ex omnibus habent, utique ex pristinis, quando qu<a>e hodie uidentur aliter habeant quam pristina fuerunt?

[2] Likewise when you say: 'But its parts all at once have everything out of all, so that from the parts the whole may be discerned,' of course you wish those parts to be understood which have been brought forth out of it, which today are seen by us. How then do they have all things out of all, namely from the pristine ones, since the things which today are seen are otherwise than the pristine were?

XL.

40.

[1] Dicis in melius reformatam materiam, utique deterioribus, et uis meliora deteriorum exemplarium ferre? Confusa res erat, nunc uero composita est, et uis ex compositis incomposita praeberi?

[1] You say that the material has been reformed for the better, namely the worse, and you wish to bring forth better things from worse exemplars? The thing was confused, but now indeed it is composed, and you want from composed things that the uncomposed be proffered?

[2] Nulla res speculum est rei alterius, id est non coaequalis. Nemo se apud tonsorem pro homine mulum inspexit; nisi si qui putat in hac extructione mundi disposita iam et compta informem et incultam materiam respondere. Quid hodie informe in mundo, quid retro speciatum in materia, [a]ut speculum sit mundus materiae?

[2] No thing is the mirror of another thing, that is, not coequal. No one has inspected himself at the barber’s as a mule instead of a man; unless someone thinks that, in this construction of the world—already disposed and groomed—the shapeless and uncultivated matter corresponds. What today is formless in the world, what formerly was endowed with species in matter, or is the world the mirror of matter?

Cum ornamenti[s] nomine sit penes Graecos mundus, quomodo inornata<e> materiae imaginem praefert, ut dicas totum eius ex partibus cognosci?

Since among the Greeks the world is under the name of ornament, how does it present the image of unadorned matter, so that you say that its whole is known from its parts?

[3] Certe ex illo toto erit etiam hoc quod non uenit in deformationem (et supra edidisti non totam eam fabricatam). Igitur uel hoc rude et confusum et incompositum non [in] potest in expolitis et distinctis et compositis recognosci, quae nec partes materiae appellari conuenit, cum a forma eius ex mutatione diuisa recesserunt.

[3] Surely from that whole there will be also this which did not come into deformation (and above you have set forth that not all of it was fabricated). Therefore even this rude and confused and uncomposed cannot [in] be recognized in the polished and distinct and composed things, which it is not fitting to call parts of matter, since, divided from its form by mutation, they have receded.

XLI.

41.

[1] Reuertor ad motum, ut ubique te lubricum ostendam. 'Inconditus et [in]confusus et turbulentus fuit materiae motus'; sic enim et ollae undique ebullientis similitudinem opponis. Et quomodo alibi alius a te adfirmatur? Cum enim uis materiam nec bonam nec malam inducere, 'Igitur,' inquis, 'subiacens materia aequalis momenti habens motum neque ad bonum neque ad malum plurimum uergit.' Si aequalis momenti, iam non turbulentus nec caccabacius, sed compositus et temperatus, scilicet qui inter bonum et malum suo arbitrio agitatus, in neutram tamen partem pronus et praeceps, mediam, quod aiunt, <a>gina<m> ten<ens> exin<de> librato impetu ferebatur.

[1] I return to motion, so as to show you slippery everywhere. “Unformed and [un]confused and turbulent was the motion of matter”; for thus you also set in opposition the likeness of a pot boiling over on all sides. And how elsewhere is another account affirmed by you? For when you wish to present matter as neither good nor evil, “Accordingly,” you say, “the underlying matter, having motion of equal weight, inclines very much neither toward good nor toward evil.” If of equal weight, then no longer turbulent nor cauldron‑boiling, but composed and tempered—namely, a motion which, stirred by its own choice between good and evil, yet is inclined and headlong into neither side, holding, as they say, the middle agina, and thence was borne with a balanced impetus.

Haec inquies non est, haec turbulenta et passiuitas non est, sed moderatio et modestia et iustitia motationis neutram <in> partem inclinantis. Plane si huc et illuc aut in alterum magis proclinaret, tunc inconcinnitatis et inaequalitatis et turbulentiae denotari mereretur.

You will say: this is not so; this is not turbulence and passivity, but the moderation and modesty and justice of a motion inclining in neither direction. Clearly, if it were to lean this way and that, or more into the one alternative, then it would deserve to be denoted by inconcinnity and inequality and turbulence.

[2] Porro si neque ad bonum neque ad malum pronior erat motus, utique inter bonum et malum agebatur, ut ex hoc quoque materia determinabilem apparet cuius motus [nec mala] nec malo nec bono pronus, eo quod in neutrum uergebat, inter utrumque ab utroque pendebat et hoc nomine ab utroque determinabatur.

[2] Furthermore, if the motion was inclined neither to the good nor to the evil, certainly it was being conducted between the good and the evil, so that from this too the matter might appear determinable, whose motion, [not bad] prone neither to the evil nor to the good, because it was verging toward neither, was depending between the two upon both, and under this designation was being determined by both.

[3] Sed et bonum et malum in loco facis, cum dicis motum materiae in neutrum eorum fuisse propensum. Materia enim, quae in loco erat, neque huc neque illuc deuergens in loca non deuergebat in quibus erat bonum et malum. Dans autem locum bono et malo corporalia ea facis faciendo localia, quia quae locum habent prius est ut corporalia sint ---- denique incorporalia proprium locum non haberent nisi in corpore, cum corpori accedunt ----, <ad> bonum autem et malum non deuergens materia ut ad corporalia aut localia non deuergebat.

[3] But you also set good and evil in a place, when you say that the motion of matter was inclined toward neither of them. For matter, which was in a place, since it was not veering to this side nor to that, was not veering into the places in which good and evil were. Moreover, by giving a place to good and evil you make them corporeal by making them local, for things that have a place are, as a prior condition, corporeal ---- indeed, incorporeals would not have a proper place except in a body, when they come to a body ----, and since matter was not veering toward good and evil, it was not veering toward corporeal or local things.

Bonum ergo et malum erras si substantias esse uis; substantias enim facis quibus loca adsignas, loca autem adsignas, cum materiae motum ab utraque regione suspendis.

Therefore, you err about good and evil if you wish them to be substances; for you make them substances to which you assign places, and you assign places when you suspend the motion of matter from both regions.

XLII.

42.

[1] Dispersisti omnia, ne de proximo quam contraria sibi sint relucerent, at ego colligam singula et conferam. Inconditum adseueras motum materiae eamque adicis sectari informitatem, dehinc alibi, desiderare componi a deo. Desiderat formationem quae sectatur informitatem?

[1] You have dispersed everything, lest at close quarters how contrary they are to each other might reflect; but I will gather the particulars and compare them. You assert the motion of matter to be incondite, and you add that it pursues formlessness; then elsewhere, that it desires to be composed by God. Does that which pursues formlessness desire formation?

Aut sectatur informitatem quae desiderat formationem?

Or does that which desires formation pursue formlessness?

[2] Non uis uideri deum aequari materiae et subicis habere illa cum deo communem. 'Impossibile enim,' inquis, 'non habentem illam commune aliquid cum deo ornari eam ab ipso.' Atquin si commune aliquid habebat cum deo, non desiderabat exornari ab ipso, pars scilicet dei per communionem, aut et deus poterat ornari a materia habendo cum illa aliquid et ipse commune; etiam in hoc necessitati subici<s> deum, si fuit aliquid in materia propter quod eam formare<t>.

[2] You do not wish God to seem to be equated with matter, and you add that it has commun with God. “For it is impossible,” you say, “for that which does not have something in common with God to be adorned by him.” But indeed, if it had something in common with God, it did not desire to be embellished by him—being, clearly, a part of God through communion—or even God could be adorned by matter, since he himself would also have something in common with it; and in this too you subject God to necessity, if there was something in matter on account of which he would form it.

[3] Commune autem inter illos facis, quod a semetipsis mouentur et semper moueantur. Quid minus materiae quam deo adscribis? Totum consortium diuinitatis hoc erit, libertas et aeternitas motus.

[3] The common thing, moreover, you make between them, that they are moved by themselves and are always moved. What less do you ascribe to matter than to God? The whole consortium of divinity will be this: the liberty and eternity of motion.

'Sed deus composite, materia incomposite mouentur.' Tamen diuinum proinde, motu proinde libero et aeterno. Atquin plus materiae das, cui licuit sic moueri quomodo deo non licuit.

'Sed the god, in a composite way, and matter, in an in-composite way, are moved.' Nevertheless, divine accordingly, by a motion accordingly free and eternal. But indeed you give more to matter, to which it was permitted to be moved in such a way as it was not permitted to God.

XLIII.

43.

[1] De motu et illud notauerim. Nam secundum ollae similitudinem 'Sic erat', inquis, 'materiae motus antequam disponeretur, concretus inquietus inadprehensibilis prae nimietate certaminis,' dehinc subicis: 'Stetit autem in dei compositionem et [in]adprehensibilem habuit inconditum motum prae tarditate inconditi motus'. Supra certamen motui adscribis, hic tarditatem.

[1] And about motion I would note this too. For according to the pot’s similitude, 'So it was,' you say, 'the motion of matter before it was arranged: compact, restless, inapprehensible on account of the excess of strife,' then you subjoin: 'But it stood for God’s composition and had an [in]apprehensible unformed motion because of the slowness of the unformed motion.' Above you ascribe strife to motion, here slowness.

[2] Nam de natura materiae quotiens cadas, accipe. Supra dicis: 'Si autem esset materia natura mala, non accepisset translationem in melius nec deus aliquid compositionis adcommodasset illi; in uacuum enim laborasset.' Finisti igitur duas sententias, nec materiam natura malam nec naturam eius a deo potuisse conuerti, horum immemor postea inferens: 'At ubi accepit compositionem a deo et ornata est, cessauit a natura'. Si in bonum reformata est, utique de malo reformata est, et si per compositionem dei cessauit a natura mali, <a> natura cessauit. Ergo et mala fuit natura ante compositionem et desinere potuit a natura post reformationem.

[2] And now, take in how often you fall concerning the nature of matter. Above you say: 'But if matter were by nature evil, it would not have accepted a translation into the better, nor would God have accommodated anything of composition to it; for he would have labored in a vacuum.' You have thus finished two propositions: neither that matter is by nature evil nor that its nature could have been converted by God; forgetful of these, you later adding: 'But when it received composition from God and was adorned, it ceased from its nature.' If it has been re-formed into the good, assuredly it has been re-formed from evil; and if through the composition of God it ceased from the nature of evil, <a> nature it ceased. Therefore it was also evil by nature before the composition, and it was able to cease from nature after the reformation.

XLIV.

44.

[1] Sed et qualiter operatum facias deum sequitur ut ostendam. Plane a philosophis recedis (se<d> tamen et a prophetis). Stoici enim uolunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse quomodo mel per fauos, at tu 'Non', inquis, 'pertransiens illam facit mundum, sed solummodo apparens et adpropinquans ei, sicut facit quid decor solummodo apparens et magnes lapis solummodo adpropinquans'.

[1] But also in what manner you make God to have operated, it follows that I should show. Clearly you recede from the philosophers (but yet also from the prophets). For the Stoics want God to have run down through matter just as honey through honeycombs; but you say, 'No, not passing through it does he make the world, but only appearing and drawing near to it, just as beauty does something by only appearing, and the magnet-stone by only approaching'.

[2] Quid simile deus fabricans mundum et decor uulnerans animum aut magnes adtrahens ferrum? Nam et si apparuit deus materiae, sed non uulnerauit illam, quod decor animum; et si adpropinquauit, sed non cohaesit illi, quod magnes ferro.

[2] What likeness is there between God fashioning the world and beauty wounding the mind, or a magnet attracting iron? For even if God appeared to the matter, yet he did not wound it, as beauty (does) the mind; and even if he approached, yet he did not cohere with it, as the magnet (does) with iron.

[3] Puta nunc exemplatua competere: certe si apparendo et adpropinquando materiae fecit ex illa deus mundum, utique ex quo apparuit fecit et ex quo adpropinquauit. Ergo quando non fecerat retro, nec apparuerat illi nec adpropinquauerat. Et cui credibile est deum non apparuisse materiae uel qua consubstantiali suae per aeternitatem?

[3] Suppose nowyour examples to be fitting: certainly, if by appearing and by approaching to matter god made from it the world, then assuredly from the time he appeared he made, and from the time he approached. Therefore, when previously he had not made, he had neither appeared to it nor approached it. And to whom is it credible that god had not appeared to matter, or to that which is consubstantial with his own, through eternity?

Ab ea longe fuisse quem credimus ubique esse et ubique apparere, cui etiam inanimalia et incorporalia laudes canunt apud Danielem? Quantus hic locus in quo deus a materia tantum distabat ut neque apparere<t> neque adpropinquare<t> ante mundi molitionem? Credo, peregrinatus est ad illam de longinquo, cum primum ei uoluit apparere et adpropinquare.

Was he far from it—the one whom we believe to be everywhere and to appear everywhere, to whom even the inanimate and the incorporeal sing praises in Daniel? How vast a space is this, in which God was so distant from matter that he would neither appear nor draw near before the world’s construction? I suppose he journeyed to it from afar, when he first wished to appear to it and to draw near.

XLV.

45.

[1] At enim prophetae et apostoli non ita tradunt mundum a deo factum apparente solummodo et adpropinquante materiae, quia nec materiam ullam nominauerunt, sed primo sophiam conditam, initi[ar]um uiarum in opera[m] ipsius, dehinc et sermonem prolatum per quem omnia facta sunt et sine quo factum est nihil; denique sermone eius caeli confirmati sunt et spiritu ipsius uniuersae uirtutes eorum. Hic est dei dextra et manus ambae per quas operatus est atque molitus est ---- opera enim manuum tuarum, inquit, caeli ----, per quas et mensus est caelum et palmo terram.

[1] But indeed the prophets and apostles do not hand down that the world was made by God only appearing and drawing near to matter, since neither did they name any matter at all, but first Wisdom founded, the beginning of his ways for his work; then also the Word brought forth, through whom all things were made and without whom nothing was made; finally, by his Word the heavens were made firm, and by his Spirit all their host. This is God’s right hand and both hands, through which he worked and fashioned—for, “the heavens are the works of your hands,” he says—by which also he measured the heaven and the earth with a span.

[2] Noli ita deo adulari, ut uelis illum solo uisu et solo accessu tot ac tantas substantias protulisse et non propriis uiribus institisse. Sic enim et Hieremias commendat: Deus faciens terram in ualentia sua, parans orbem in intellegentia sua, et suo sensu extendit caelos. Haec sunt uires eius quibus enixus totum hoc condidit.

[2] Do not so flatter God as to wish that by mere sight and mere approach he brought forth so many and so great substances, and did not establish them by his own forces. For thus also Jeremiah commends: God making the earth in his valence, preparing the orb in his intelligence, and by his own sense he stretches out the heavens. These are his forces by which, having labored, he founded this whole.

Maior est gloria eius, si laborauit; denique septima die requieuit ab operibus, utrumque suo more. Aut si app<a>re<n>s solummodo et adpropinquans fecit hunc mundum, numquid, cum facere[t] desiit, rursus apparere et adpropinquare cessauit? Atquin magis apparere coepit et ubique conueniri deus ex quo factus est mundus.

Greater is his glory if he labored; finally, on the seventh day he rested from his works, both in his own manner. Or if, by only appearing and approaching, he made this world, then when he ceased to make, did he in turn cease to appear and to approach? Nay rather, God began to appear more and to be met everywhere from the time the world was made.

[3] Vides ergo quemadmodum operatione dei uniuersa consistunt ualentia facientis terram, intellegentia parantis orbem et sensu extendentis caelum, non apparentis solummodo nec adpropinquantis sed adhibentis tantos animi sui nisus, sophiam ualentiam sensum sermonem spiritum uirtutem,quae illi non erant necessaria, si apparendo tantummodo et adpropinquando profectus fuisset. Haec autem sunt inuisibilia eius quae secundum apostolum ab institutione mundi factis eius conspiciuntur, non materiae nescio quae sed sensualia ipsius; quis enim cognouit sensum domini, de quo exclamat: <O> profundum diuitiarum et sophiae, ut <in>inuentibilia iudicia eius et <in>inuestigabiles uiae eius! Quid haec magis sapiunt quam: ut ex nihilo omnia facta sunt!

[3] You see, therefore, how by the operation of God the universe stands together: by the valence of the One making the earth, by the intelligence of the One preparing the orb, and by the sense of the One stretching out heaven, not of one only appearing nor approaching, but of one applying such exertions of his own mind—sophia, valence, sense, sermon, spirit, virtue—which were not necessary to him,si by merely appearing and approaching he had achieved the result. But these are his invisibles which, according to the apostole, from the foundation of the world are seen in his works, non not some I-know-not-what of matter but his own percepts; for who has known the sense of the Lord, about whom he exclaims: <O> depth of riches and of sophia, how <in>unfindable his judgments and <in>uninvestigable his ways! Whit do these savor more of than this: that out of nothing all things have been made!

Quae nec inueniri nec inuestigari nisi soli deo possent, alioquin inuestigabilia <et inuentibilia>, si ex materia sunt inuestigata et [non] inuenta.

Which could neither be found nor investigated except by God alone; otherwise they would be investigable and <discoverable>, if they are investigated from matter and [not] found.

[4] Igitur in quantum constit[u]it materiam nullam fuisse, ex hoc etiam, quod nec talem competat fuisse qualis inducitur, in tantum proba[re]tur omnia a deo ex nihilo facta; nisi quod Hermogenes eundem statum describendo materiae quo[d] est ipse, inconditum confusum turbulentum, ancipitis et praecipitis et feruidi motus, documentum artis suae dum ostendit, ipse <se> pinxit.

[4] Therefore, inasmuch as he has established that there was no matter, from this also—that it cannot have been such as it is introduced to be—to that extent it would be proved that all things were made by God out of nothing; except that Hermogenes, by describing for matter the same state which he himself is—incondite, confused, turbulent, of ambivalent and precipitous and fervid motion—while showing a proof of his art, painted himself.