Spinoza: ETHICA

Humanam impotentiam in moderandis et coercendis affectibus servitutem voco; homo enim affectibus obnoxius sui juris non est sed fortunæ in cujus potestate ita est ut sæpe coactus sit quanquam meliora sibi videat, deteriora tamen sequi. Hujus rei causam et quid præterea affectus boni vel mali habent, in hac parte demonstrare proposui. Sed antequam incipiam, pauca de perfectione et imperfectione deque bono et malo præfari lubet.

I call human impotence in moderating and coercing the affects servitude; for a man subject to affects is not his own master but is in the power of Fortune, in whose control he is such that he is often compelled, although he sees the better for himself, nevertheless to follow the worse. The cause of this matter, and what moreover the affects have of good or of evil, I have proposed to demonstrate in this part. But before I begin, it pleases me to preface a few things concerning perfection and imperfection and concerning good and evil.

Qui rem aliquam facere constituit eamque perfecit, rem suam perfectam esse non tantum ipse sed etiam unusquisque qui mentem auctoris illius operis et scopum recte noverit aut se novisse crediderit, dicet. Exempli gratia si quis aliquod opus (quod suppono nondum esse peractum) viderit noveritque scopum auctoris illius operis esse domum ædificare, is domum imperfectam esse dicet et contra perfectam simulatque opus ad finem quem ejus auctor eidem dare constituerat, perductum viderit. Verum si quis opus aliquod videt cujus simile nunquam viderat nec mentem opificis novit, is sane scire non poterit opusne illud perfectum an imperfectum sit.

Whoever has determined to do some thing and has perfected it, will say his thing to be perfect, not only he himself, but also anyone who has rightly known, or believes himself to have known, the mind of the author of that work and the scope, will say so. For example, if someone has seen some work (which I suppose is not yet completed) and has known that the author’s aim in that work is to build a house, he will say the house is imperfect, and conversely perfect as soon as he has seen the work brought through to the end which its author had resolved to give to it. But if someone sees some work whose like he had never seen, nor knows the mind of the workman, he certainly will not be able to know whether that work is perfect or imperfect.

Atque hæc videtur prima fuisse horum vocabulorum significatio. Sed postquam homines ideas universales formare et domuum, ædificiorum, turrium etc. exemplaria excogitare et alia rerum exemplaria aliis præferre inceperunt, factum est ut unusquisque id perfectum vocaret quod cum universali idea quam ejusmodi rei formaverat, videret convenire et id contra imperfectum quod cum concepto suo exemplari minus convenire videret quanquam ex opificis sententia consummatum plane esset.

And this seems to have been the first signification of these vocabularies. But after men began to form universal ideas and to devise exemplars of houses, buildings, towers, etc., and to prefer some exemplars of things to others, it came about that each called perfect that which he saw to agree with the universal idea he had formed of a thing of that sort, and, conversely, imperfect that which he saw to agree less with his conceived exemplar, although in the craftsman’s judgment it was plainly consummated.

Nec alia videtur esse ratio cur res naturales etiam quæ scilicet humana manu non sunt factæ, perfectas aut imperfectas vulgo appellent; solent namque homines tam rerum naturalium quam artificialium ideas formare universales quas rerum veluti exemplaria habent et quas naturam (quam nihil nisi alicujus finis causa agere existimant) intueri credunt sibique exemplaria proponere. Cum itaque aliquid in natura fieri vident quod cum concepto exemplari quod rei ejusmodi habent, minus convenit, ipsam naturam tum defecisse vel peccavisse remque illam imperfectam reliquisse credunt. Videmus itaque homines consuevisse res naturales perfectas aut imperfectas vocare magis ex præjudicio quam ex earum vera cognitione.

Nor does there seem to be any other reason why natural things, even those which, to wit, have not been made by human hand, are commonly called perfect or imperfect; for men are wont to form universal ideas both of natural and of artificial things, which they hold as exemplars of things, and which they believe Nature (whom they suppose to act for nothing except for the cause of some end) contemplates and sets before herself as exemplars. When therefore they see something come to be in nature which agrees less with the conceived exemplar that they have of a thing of that sort, they believe that Nature herself then has failed or erred and has left that thing imperfect. We see, therefore, that men have been accustomed to call natural things perfect or imperfect rather from prejudice than from a true cognition of them.

Ostendimus enim in primæ partis appendice Naturam propter finem non agere; æternum namque illud et infinitum Ens quod Deum seu Naturam appellamus, eadem qua existit necessitate agit. Ex qua enim naturæ necessitate existit, ex eadem ipsum agere ostendimus (propositione 16 partis I). Ratio igitur seu causa cur Deus seu Natura agit et cur existit una eademque est. Ut ergo nullius finis causa existit, nullius etiam finis causa agit sed ut existendi, sic et agendi principium vel finem habet nullum.

For we have shown in the appendix of the first part that Nature does not act for the sake of an end; for that eternal and infinite Being which we call God or Nature acts by the same necessity by which it exists. For from the same necessity of nature by which it exists, we have shown that it acts (proposition 16 of part 1). Therefore the reason or cause why God or Nature acts and why it exists is one and the same. Accordingly, as it exists for the sake of no end, so also it acts for the sake of no end; and just as in existing, so also in acting it has no beginning (principium) or end.

Causa autem quæ finalis dicitur, nihil est præter ipsum humanum appetitum quatenus is alicujus rei veluti principium seu causa primaria consideratur. Exempli gratia cum dicimus habitationem causam fuisse finalem hujus aut illius domus, nihil tum sane intelligimus aliud quam quod homo ex eo quod vitæ domesticæ commoda imaginatus est, appetitum habuit ædificandi domum. Quare habitatio quatenus ut finalis causa consideratur, nihil est præter hunc singularem appetitum qui revera causa est efficiens quæ ut prima consideratur quia homines suorum appetituum causas communiter ignorant.

But the cause which is called final is nothing other than human appetite itself, insofar as it is considered as, as it were, the principle or primary cause of some thing. For example, when we say that habitation was the final cause of this or that house, we then truly understand nothing else than that a man, from having imagined the conveniences of domestic life, had an appetite to build a house. Wherefore habitation, insofar as it is considered as a final cause, is nothing other than this singular appetite, which is in truth the efficient cause, which is considered as first because men commonly are ignorant of the causes of their appetites.

Sunt namque ut jam sæpe dixi suarum quidem actionum et appetituum conscii sed ignari causarum a quibus ad aliquid appetendum determinantur. Quod præterea vulgo aiunt Naturam aliquando deficere vel peccare resque imperfectas producere, inter commenta numero de quibus in appendice partis primæ egi. Perfectio igitur et imperfectio revera modi solummodo cogitandi sunt nempe notiones quas fingere solemus ex eo quod ejusdem speciei aut generis individua ad invicem comparamus et hac de causa supra (definitione 6 partis II) dixi me per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligere; solemus enim omnia Naturæ individua ad unum genus quod generalissimum appellatur, revocare nempe ad notionem entis quæ ad omnia absolute Naturæ individua pertinet.

For they are, as I have already often said, indeed conscious of their own actions and appetites but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined to desire something. Moreover, what people commonly say—that Nature sometimes fails or sins and produces imperfect things—I number among the fictions about which I have treated in the appendix of the first part. Perfection, therefore, and imperfection are in truth only modes of thinking, namely notions which we are accustomed to feign from the fact that we compare individuals of the same species or genus with one another, and for this cause above (definition 6 of part 2) I said that by reality and perfection I understand the same; for we are accustomed to refer all the individuals of Nature to one genus which is called the most general, namely to the notion of being, which pertains absolutely to all the individuals of Nature.

Quatenus itaque Naturæ individua ad hoc genus revocamus et ad invicem comparamus et alia plus entitatis seu realitatis quam alia habere comperimus eatenus alia aliis perfectiora esse dicimus et quatenus iisdem aliquid tribuimus quod negationem involvit ut terminus, finis, impotentia etc. eatenus ipsa imperfecta appellamus quia nostram mentem non æque afficiunt ac illa quæ perfecta vocamus et non quod ipsis aliquid quod suum sit, deficiat vel quod Natura peccaverit. Nihil enim naturæ alicujus rei competit nisi id quod ex necessitate naturæ causæ efficientis sequitur et quicquid ex necessitate naturæ causæ efficientis sequitur, id necessario fit.

Insofar, therefore, as we refer the individuals of Nature back to this genus and compare them with one another, and discover that some have more of entity, that is, of reality, than others, to that extent we say that some are more perfect than others; and insofar as we attribute to them something that involves a negation, such as terminus, finis, impotentia, etc., to that extent we call them imperfect, because they do not affect our mind as equally as those which we call perfect, and not because something that is theirs is lacking to them, or because Nature has erred. For nothing pertains to the nature of any thing except that which follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause; and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of an efficient cause, that thing happens necessarily.

Bonum et malum quod attinet, nihil etiam positivum in rebus in se scilicet consideratis indicant nec aliud sunt præter cogitandi modos seu notiones quas formamus ex eo quod res ad invicem comparamus. Nam una eademque res potest eodem tempore bona et mala et etiam indifferens esse. Exempli gratia musica bona est melancholico, mala lugenti, surdo autem neque bona neque mala.

As for good and evil, they indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves, and are nothing other than modes of thinking or notions which we form from the fact that we compare things to one another. For one and the same thing can at the same time be good and bad and even indifferent. For example, music is good for the melancholic, bad for the mourner, but for the deaf neither good nor bad.

Verum quamvis se res ita habeat, nobis tamen hæc vocabula retinenda sunt. Nam quia ideam hominis tanquam naturæ humanæ exemplar quod intueamur formare cupimus, nobis ex usu erit hæc eadem vocabula eo quo dixi sensu retinere. Per bonum itaque in sequentibus intelligam id quod certo scimus medium esse ut ad exemplar humanæ naturæ quod nobis proponimus, magis magisque accedamus.

Yet although the matter stands thus, nevertheless these terms are to be retained by us. For since we desire to form the idea of man as an exemplar of human nature at which we may contemplate, it will be to our use to retain these same terms in the sense in which I have said. By “good,” therefore, in what follows I shall understand that which we certainly know to be a means whereby we may, more and more, approach the exemplar of human nature which we propose to ourselves.

Per malum autem id quod certo scimus impedire quominus idem exemplar referamus. Deinde homines perfectiores aut imperfectiores dicemus quatenus ad hoc idem exemplar magis aut minus accedunt. Nam apprime notandum est cum dico aliquem a minore ad majorem perfectionem transire et contra, me non intelligere quod ex una essentia seu forma in aliam mutatur.

By evil, however, I mean that which we certainly know hinders us from referring ourselves to that same exemplar. Then we shall call men more perfect or less imperfect insofar as they approach this same exemplar more or less. For it is especially to be noted that when I say someone passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, and conversely, I do not understand that he is changed from one essence or form into another.

Equus namque exempli gratia tam destruitur si in hominem quam si in insectum mutetur sed quod ejus agendi potentiam quatenus hæc per ipsius naturam intelligitur, augeri vel minui concipimus. Deinde per perfectionem in genere realitatem uti dixi intelligam hoc est rei cujuscunque essentiam quatenus certo modo existit et operatur nulla ipsius durationis habita ratione. Nam nulla res singularis potest ideo dici perfectior quia plus temporis in existendo perseveravit; quippe rerum duratio ex earum essentia determinari nequit quandoquidem rerum essentia nullum certum et determinatum existendi tempus involvit sed res quæcunque, sive ea perfectior sit sive minus, eadem vi qua existere incipit, semper in existendo perseverare poterit ita ut omnes hac in re æquales sint.

For a horse, for example, is just as much destroyed if it be changed into a man as if into an insect; but we conceive that its power of acting, insofar as this is understood through its own nature, is increased or diminished. Next, by perfection in general I will understand reality, as I said—that is, the essence of any thing whatsoever, insofar as it exists and operates in a certain manner, with no regard had to its duration. For no singular thing can on that account be called more perfect because it has persevered a longer time in existing; indeed, the duration of things cannot be determined from their essence, since the essence of things involves no certain and determinate time of existing; but any thing whatsoever, whether it be more perfect or less, by the same force with which it begins to exist, will always be able to persevere in existing, so that all are equal in this matter.

DEFINITIONES

DEFINITIONS

I. Per bonum id intelligam quod certo scimus nobis esse utile.

1. By the good I shall understand that which we certainly know to be useful to us.

II. Per malum autem id quod certo scimus impedire quominus boni alicujus simus compotes. De his præcedentem vide præfationem sub finem.

2. By evil, however, I understand that which we surely know to impede our being in possession of some good. Concerning these, see the preceding preface toward the end.

III. Res singulares voco contingentes quatenus dum ad earum solam essentiam attendimus, nihil invenimus quod earum existentiam necessario ponat vel quod ipsam necessario secludat.

3. I call singular things contingent insofar as, while we attend to their sole essence, we find nothing that necessarily posits their existence or that necessarily excludes it.

IV. Easdem res singulares voco possibiles quatenus dum ad causas ex quibus produci debent, attendimus, nescimus an ipsæ determinatæ sint ad easdem producendum. In scholio I propositionis 33 partis I inter possibile et contingens nullam feci differentiam quia ibi non opus erat hæc accurate distinguere.

4. I call the same singular things possible, insofar as, when we attend to the causes from which they ought to be produced, we do not know whether they themselves are determined to be produced by those same causes. In the scholium to Proposition 33 of Part 1 I made no distinction between the possible and the contingent, because there there was no need to distinguish these accurately.

V. Per contrarios affectus in sequentibus intelligam eos qui hominem diversum trahunt quamvis ejusdem sint generis ut luxuries et avaritia quæ amoris sunt species nec natura sed per accidens sunt contrarii.

V. By contrary affects in what follows I shall understand those which draw a man in different directions, although they are of the same genus, as lust and avarice, which are species of love and are contrary not by nature but per accidens.

VI. Quid per affectum erga rem futuram, præsentem et præteritam intelligam, explicui in scholiis I et II propositionis 18 partis III, quod vide. Sed venit hic præterea notandum quod ut loci sic etiam temporis distantiam non nisi usque ad certum quendam limitem possumus distincte imaginari hoc est sicut omnia illa objecta quæ ultra ducentos pedes a nobis distant seu quorum distantia a loco in quo sumus, illam superat quam distincte imaginamur, æque longe a nobis distare et perinde ac si in eodem plano essent, imaginari solemus, sic etiam objecta quorum existendi tempus longiore a præsenti intervallo abesse imaginamur quam quod distincte imaginari solemus, omnia æque longe a præsenti distare imaginamur et ad unum quasi temporis momentum referimus.

VI. What I understand by an affect toward a future, present, and past thing, I explained in scholia 1 and 2 of Proposition 18 of Part 3, which see. But it is furthermore to be noted here that, as of place, so also of time we can imagine the distance distinctly only up to a certain limit; that is, just as all those objects which are more than two hundred feet distant from us, or whose distance from the place in which we are exceeds that which we distinctly imagine, we are wont to imagine as being equally far from us, and as if they were on the same plane; so also the objects whose time of existing we imagine to be at a longer interval from the present than that which we are wont distinctly to imagine, we imagine all to be equally distant from the present, and we refer them, as it were, to one single moment of time.

VII. Per finem cujus causa aliquid facimus, appetitum intelligo.

7. By the end for the sake of which we do something, I understand appetite.

VIII. Per virtutem et potentiam idem intelligo hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III) virtus quatenus ad hominem refertur, est ipsa hominis essentia seu natura quatenus potestatem habet quædam efficiendi quæ per solas ipsius naturæ leges possunt intelligi.

VIII. By virtue and power I understand the same thing, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3) virtue, insofar as it is referred to man, is the very essence of man or his nature, insofar as it has the power of effecting certain things which can be understood through the laws of his own nature alone.

AXIOMA: Nulla res singularis in rerum natura datur qua potentior et fortior non detur alia. Sed quacunque data datur alia potentior a qua illa data potest destrui.

AXIOM: No singular thing in the nature of things is given for which there is not another more potent and stronger. But whatever is given, there is given another more potent by which that given can be destroyed.

PROPOSITIO I: Nihil quod idea falsa positivum habet, tollitur præsentia veri quatenus verum.

PROPOSITION 1: Nothing that a false idea has of the positive is removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true.

DEMONSTRATIO: Falsitas in sola privatione cognitionis quam ideæ inadæquatæ involvunt, consistit (per propositionem 35 partis II) nec ipsæ aliquid habent positivum propter quod falsæ dicuntur (per propositionem 33 partis II) sed contra quatenus ad Deum referuntur, veræ sunt (per propositionem 32 partis II). Si igitur id quod idea falsa positivum habet præsentia veri quatenus verum est, tolleretur, tolleretur ergo idea vera a se ipsa, quod (per propositionem 4 partis III) est absurdum. Ergo nihil quod idea etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Falsity consists solely in the privation of cognition which inadequate ideas involve (by Proposition 35 of Part 2), nor do they themselves have anything positive on account of which they are called false (by Proposition 33 of Part 2), but on the contrary, insofar as they are referred to God, they are true (by Proposition 32 of Part 2). If therefore that which the false idea has of the positive were removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true, then the true idea would be removed by itself, which (by Proposition 4 of Part 3) is absurd. Therefore nothing which an idea etc. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Intelligitur hæc propositio clarius ex II corollario propositionis 16 partis II. Nam imaginatio idea est quæ magis corporis humani præsentem constitutionem quam corporis externi naturam indicat, non quidem distincte sed confuse; unde fit ut mens errare dicatur. Exempli gratia cum solem intuemur, eundem ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare imaginamur, in quo tamdiu fallimur quamdiu veram ejus distantiam ignoramus sed cognita ejusdem distantia tollitur quidem error sed non imaginatio hoc est idea solis quæ ejusdem naturam eatenus tantum explicat quatenus corpus ab eodem afficitur adeoque quamvis veram ejusdem distantiam noscamus, ipsum nihilominus prope nobis adesse imaginabimur. Nam ut in scholio propositionis 35 partis II diximus, non ea de causa solem adeo propinquum imaginamur quia ejus veram distantiam ignoramus sed quia mens eatenus magnitudinem solis concipit quatenus corpus ab eodem afficitur.

SCHOLIUM: This proposition is understood more clearly from corollary 2 of proposition 16 of part 2. For imagination is an idea which indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of an external body, not indeed distinctly but confusedly; whence it comes about that the mind is said to err. For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine the same to be about two hundred feet distant from us, in which we are mistaken so long as we are ignorant of its true distance; but once that distance is known, the error is indeed removed, but not the imagination, that is, the idea of the sun, which explains its nature only to the extent that the body is affected by it; and so, although we know its true distance, nevertheless we shall imagine it to be near us. For, as we said in the scholium of proposition 35 of part 2, it is not for this reason that we imagine the sun so near because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun only to the extent that the body is affected by it.

Sic cum solis radii aquæ superficiei incidentes ad nostros oculos reflectuntur, eundem perinde ac si in aqua esset, imaginamur tametsi verum ejus locum noverimus et sic reliquæ imaginationes quibus mens fallitur, sive eæ naturalem corporis constitutionem sive quod ejusdem agendi potentiam augeri vel minui indicant, vero non sunt contrariæ nec ejusdem præsentia evanescunt. Fit quidem cum falso aliquod malum timemus, ut timor evanescat audito vero nuntio sed contra etiam fit cum malum quod certe venturum est, timemus ut timor etiam evanescat audito falso nuntio atque adeo imaginationes non præsentia veri quatenus verum evanescunt sed quia aliæ occurrunt iis fortiores quæ rerum quas imaginamur, præsentem existentiam secludunt, ut propositione 17 partis II ostendimus.

Thus when the sun’s rays, falling upon the surface of the water, are reflected to our eyes, we imagine the sun just as if it were in the water, although we may know its true place; and so the remaining imaginations by which the mind is deceived—whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body, or that its power of acting is increased or diminished—are not contrary to the true, nor do they vanish at the presence of it. It does indeed happen, when we fear some evil falsely, that the fear vanishes upon hearing a true message; but conversely it also happens, when we fear an evil that is certainly going to come, that the fear likewise vanishes upon hearing a false message. And thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the true, insofar as it is true, but because others occur, stronger than they, which exclude the present existence of the things we imagine, as we showed in proposition 17 of part 2.

PROPOSITIO II: Nos eatenus patimur quatenus Naturæ sumus pars quæ per se absque aliis non potest concipi.

PROPOSITION 2: We suffer (are passive) insofar as we are a part of Nature which by itself, without others, cannot be conceived.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nos tum pati dicimur cum aliquid in nobis oritur cujus non nisi partialis sumus causa (per definitionem 2 partis III) hoc est (per definitionem 1 partis III) aliquid quod ex solis legibus nostræ naturæ deduci nequit. Patimur igitur quatenus Naturæ sumus pars quæ per se absque aliis nequit concipi. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: We are then said to suffer when something arises in us of which we are only a partial cause (by definition 2 of Part 3), that is (by definition 1 of Part 3), something which cannot be deduced from the sole laws of our nature. We therefore suffer insofar as we are a part of Nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO III: Vis qua homo in existendo perseverat, limitata est et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur.

PROPOSITION 3: The power whereby a man perseveres in existing is limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex axiomate hujus. Nam dato homine datur aliquid aliud, puta A potentius et dato A datur deinde aliud, puta B ipso A potentius et hoc in infinitum ac proinde potentia hominis potentia alterius rei definitur et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: It is evident from this axiom. For, a man being given, something else is given, say A, more potent; and A being given, then something else is given, say B, more potent than A itself; and this into infinity; and hence the power of man is defined by the power of another thing and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO IV: Fieri non potest ut homo non sit Naturæ pars et ut nullas possit pati mutationes nisi quæ per solam suam naturam possint intelligi quarumque adæquata sit causa.

PROPOSITION 4: It cannot occur that man is not a part of Nature, and that he can suffer no mutations except those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which the cause is adequate.

DEMONSTRATIO: Potentia qua res singulares et consequenter homo suum esse conservat, est ipsa Dei sive Naturæ potentia (per corollarium propositionis 24 partis I) non quatenus infinita est sed quatenus per humanam actualem essentiam explicari potest (per propositionem 7 partis III). Potentia itaque hominis quatenus per ipsius actualem essentiam explicatur, pars est infinitæ Dei seu Naturæ potentiæ hoc est (per propositionem 34 partis I) essentiæ, quod erat primum. Deinde si fieri posset ut homo nullas posset pati mutationes nisi quæ per solam ipsius hominis naturam possint intelligi, sequeretur (per propositiones 4 et 6 partis III) ut non posset perire sed ut semper necessario existeret atque hoc sequi deberet ex causa cujus potentia finita aut infinita sit nempe vel ex sola hominis potentia, qui scilicet potis esset ut a se removeret reliquas mutationes quæ a causis externis oriri possent vel infinita Naturæ potentia a qua omnia singularia ita dirigerentur ut homo nullas alias posset pati mutationes nisi quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt. At primum (per propositionem præcedentem cujus demonstratio universalis est et ad omnes res singulares applicari potest) est absurdum; ergo si fieri posset ut homo nullas pateretur mutationes nisi quæ per solam ipsius hominis naturam possent intelligi et consequenter (sicut jam ostendimus) ut semper necessario existeret, id sequi deberet ex Dei infinita potentia et consequenter (per propositionem 16 partis I) ex necessitate divinæ naturæ quatenus alicujus hominis idea affectus consideratur, totius Naturæ ordo quatenus ipsa sub extensionis et cogitationis attributis concipitur, deduci deberet atque adeo (per propositionem 21 partis I) sequeretur ut homo esset infinitus, quod (per I partem hujus demonstrationis) est absurdum.

DEMONSTRATION: The power by which singular things, and consequently man, preserves his being is the very power of God or of Nature (by the corollary of proposition 24 of part 1), not insofar as it is infinite but insofar as it can be explicated through the human actual essence (by proposition 7 of part 3). Therefore the power of man, insofar as it is explicated through his actual essence, is a part of the infinite power of God or Nature, that is (by proposition 34 of part 1) of the essence, which was the first point. Then, if it were possible that man could suffer no changes except those which can be understood through the nature of man alone, it would follow (by propositions 4 and 6 of part 3) that he could not perish but would always necessarily exist; and this would have to follow from a cause whose power is either finite or infinite, namely either from man’s power alone—who, to wit, would be able to remove from himself the remaining changes which might arise from external causes—or from the infinite power of Nature, by which all singulars would be so directed that man could suffer no other changes except those which serve his conservation. But the first (by the preceding proposition, whose demonstration is universal and can be applied to all singular things) is absurd; therefore, if it could come about that man suffered no changes except those which can be understood through the nature of man alone, and consequently (as we have already shown) that he would always necessarily exist, this would have to follow from the infinite power of God, and consequently (by proposition 16 of part 1) from the necessity of the divine nature, inasmuch as the idea of some man is considered as affected; the order of the whole of Nature, insofar as it is conceived under the attributes of extension and thought, would have to be deduced; and thus (by proposition 21 of part 1) it would follow that man would be infinite, which (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd.

Fieri itaque nequit ut homo nullas alias patiatur mutationes nisi quarum ipse adæquata sit causa. Q.E.D.

Therefore it cannot be brought about that a man suffers no other changes except those of which he himself is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur hominem necessario passionibus esse semper obnoxium communemque Naturæ ordinem sequi et eidem parere seseque eidem quantum rerum natura exigit, accommodare.

COROLLARY: Hence it follows that man is necessarily always subject to passions, and follows the common order of Nature and obeys the same, and accommodates himself to it as much as the nature of things requires.

PROPOSITIO V: Vis et incrementum cujuscunque passionis ejusque in existendo perseverantia non definitur potentia qua nos in existendo perseverare conamur sed causæ externæ potentia cum nostra comparata.

PROPOSITION 5: The force and increment of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, is not defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own.

DEMONSTRATIO: Passionis essentia non potest per solam nostram essentiam explicari (per definitiones 1 et 2 partis III) hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III) passionis potentia definiri nequit potentia qua in nostro esse perseverare conamur sed (ut propositione 16 partis II ostensum est) definiri necessario debet potentia causæ externæ cum nostra comparata. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The essence of a passion cannot be explicated through our essence alone (by definitions 1 and 2 of Part 3), that is (by proposition 7 of Part 3) the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in our being, but (as was shown by proposition 16 of Part 2) it must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO VI: Vis alicujus passionis seu affectus reliquas hominis actiones seu potentiam superare potest ita ut affectus pertinaciter homini adhæreat.

PROPOSITION 6: The force of some passion or affect can overcome the remaining actions or power of a man, so that the affect adheres pertinaciously to the man.

DEMONSTRATIO: Vis et incrementum cujuscunque passionis ejusque in existendo perseverantia definitur potentia causæ externæ cum nostra comparata (per propositionem præcedentem) adeoque (per propositionem 3 hujus) hominis potentiam superare potest etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The force and increment of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are defined by the power of the external cause compared with our own (by the preceding proposition), and thus (by proposition 3 of this) it can surpass the power of the man, etc. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO VII: Affectus nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem affectu coercendo.

PROPOSITION 7: An affect can be neither coerced nor removed except by an affect contrary to it and stronger than the affect being coerced.

DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus quatenus ad mentem refertur est idea qua mens majorem vel minorem sui corporis existendi vim quam antea affirmat (per generalem affectuum definitionem quæ reperitur sub finem tertiæ partis). Cum igitur mens aliquo affectu conflictatur, corpus afficitur simul affectione qua ejus agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur. Porro hæc corporis affectio (per propositionem 5 hujus) vim a sua causa accipit perseverandi in suo esse; quæ proinde nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi a causa corporea (per propositionem 6 partis II) quæ corpus afficiat affectione illi contraria (per propositionem 5 partis III) et fortiore (per axioma hujus) atque adeo (per propositionem 12 partis II) mens afficietur idea affectionis fortioris et contrariæ priori hoc est (per generalem affectuum definitionem) mens afficietur affectu fortiori et contrario priori qui scilicet prioris existentiam secludet vel tollet ac proinde affectus nec tolli nec coerceri potest nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: An affect, insofar as it is referred to the mind, is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of its body’s existing than before (by the general definition of the affects which is found at the end of the Third Part). Since therefore the mind is conflicted by some affect, the body is at the same time affected by an affection whereby its power of acting is increased or diminished. Moreover, this affection of the body (by Proposition 5 of this Part) receives from its cause a force of persevering in its being; which accordingly can neither be coerced nor removed except by a corporeal cause (by Proposition 6 of Part 2) which affects the body with an affection contrary to it (by Proposition 5 of Part 3) and stronger (by the Axiom of this Part); and thus (by Proposition 12 of Part 2) the mind will be affected by the idea of an affection stronger and contrary to the prior, that is (by the general definition of the affects) the mind will be affected by an affect stronger and contrary to the prior, which, namely, will exclude or remove the existence of the prior; and therefore an affect can neither be removed nor coerced except by an affect contrary and stronger. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Affectus quatenus ad mentem refertur nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi per ideam corporis affectionis contrariæ et fortioris affectione qua patimur. Nam affectus quo patimur nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi per affectum eodem fortiorem eique contrarium (per propositionem præcedentem) hoc est (per generalem affectuum definitionem) nisi per ideam corporis affectionis fortioris et contrariæ affectioni qua patimur.

COROLLARY: An affect, insofar as it is referred to the mind, can neither be coerced nor removed except through the idea of the body’s affection that is contrary to and stronger than the affection by which we suffer. For the affect by which we suffer can neither be coerced nor removed except by an affect stronger than it and contrary to it (by the preceding proposition), that is (by the general definition of affects), except through the idea of the body’s affection stronger than and contrary to the affection by which we suffer.

PROPOSITIO VIII: Cognitio boni et mali nihil aliud est quam lætitiæ vel tristitiæ affectus quatenus ejus sumus conscii.

PROPOSITION 8: The cognition of good and evil is nothing else than an affect of joy or of sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Id bonum aut malum vocamus quod nostro esse conservando prodest vel obest (per definitiones 1 et 2 hujus) hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III) quod nostram agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet. Quatenus itaque (per definitiones lætitiæ et tristitiæ, quas vide in scholio propositionis 11 partis III) rem aliquam nos lætitia vel tristitia afficere percipimus, eandem bonam aut malam vocamus atque adeo boni et mali cognitio nihil aliud est quam lætitiæ vel tristitiæ idea quæ ex ipso lætitiæ vel tristitiæ affectu necessario sequitur (per propositionem 22 partis II). At hæc idea eodem modo unita est affectui ac mens unita est corpori (per propositionem 21 partis II) hoc est (ut in scholio ejusdem propositionis ostensum) hæc idea ab ipso affectu sive (per generalem affectuum definitionem) ab idea corporis affectionis revera non distinguitur nisi solo conceptu; ergo hæc cognitio boni et mali nihil est aliud quam ipse affectus quatenus ejusdem sumus conscii. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: We call that good or evil which is of use or harm to the preservation of our being (by definitions 1 and 2 of this), that is (by proposition 7 of part 3) that which increases or diminishes, helps or constrains our power of acting. Accordingly, insofar as (by the definitions of joy and sadness, which see in the scholium to proposition 11 of part 3) we perceive that some thing affects us with joy or sadness, we call the same thing good or evil; and thus the cognition of good and evil is nothing other than the idea of joy or sadness, which necessarily follows from the very affect of joy or sadness (by proposition 22 of part 2). But this idea is united to the affect in the same way as the mind is united to the body (by proposition 21 of part 2), that is (as shown in the scholium of the same proposition) this idea is not really distinguished from the affect itself, or (by the general definition of the affects) from the idea of a bodily affection, except by concept alone; therefore this cognition of good and evil is nothing other than the affect itself, insofar as we are conscious of the same. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO IX: Affectus cujus causam in præsenti nobis adesse imaginamur, fortior est quam si eandem non adesse imaginaremur.

PROPOSITION 9: The affect whose cause we imagine to be present to us is stronger than if we imagined that same cause not to be present.

DEMONSTRATIO: Imaginatio est idea qua mens rem ut præsentem contemplatur (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 17 partis II) quæ tamen magis corporis humani constitutionem quam rei externæ naturam indicat (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II). Est igitur affectus (per generalem affectuum definitionem) imaginatio quatenus corporis constitutionem indicat. At imaginatio (per propositionem 17 partis II) intensior est quamdiu nihil imaginamur quod rei externæ præsentem existentiam secludit; ergo etiam affectus cujus causam in præsenti nobis adesse imaginamur, intensior seu fortior est quam si eandem non adesse imaginaremur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Imagination is the idea by which the mind contemplates a thing as present (see its definition in the scholium to proposition 17 of part 2), which nevertheless indicates the constitution of the human body rather than the nature of the external thing (by corollary 2 of proposition 16 of part 2). Therefore an affect (by the general definition of affects) is imagination insofar as it indicates the constitution of the body. But imagination (by proposition 17 of part 2) is more intense so long as we imagine nothing that excludes the present existence of the external thing; therefore also the affect whose cause we imagine to be present with us is more intense, or stronger, than if we imagined that same cause not to be present. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Cum supra in propositione 18 partis III dixerim nos ex rei futuræ vel præteritæ imagine eodem affectu affici ac si res quam imaginamur præsens esset, expresse monui id verum esse quatenus ad solam ipsius rei imaginem attendimus; est enim ejusdem naturæ sive res ut præsentes imaginati simus sive non simus sed non negavi eandem debiliorem reddi quando alias res nobis præsentes contemplamur quæ rei futuræ præsentem existentiam secludunt, quod tum monere neglexi quia in hac parte de affectuum viribus agere constitueram.

SCHOLIUM: Since above in Proposition 18 of Part 3 I said that from the image of a future or past thing we are affected with the same affect as if the thing which we imagine were present, I expressly warned that this is true insofar as we attend to the image of the thing itself alone; for it is of the same nature whether we have imagined the thing as present or not; but I did not deny that the same is rendered weaker when we contemplate other things present to us which exclude the present existence of the future thing, which I then neglected to warn because in this part I had determined to treat of the powers of the affects.

COROLLARIUM: Imago rei futuræ vel præteritæ hoc est rei quam cum relatione ad tempus futurum vel præteritum secluso præsenti contemplamur, cæteris paribus debilior est imagine rei præsentis et consequenter affectus erga rem futuram vel præteritam cæteris paribus remissior est affectu erga rem præsentem.

COROLLARY: The image of a future or past thing, that is, of a thing which we contemplate in relation to a future or past time, the present being excluded, other things being equal, is weaker than the image of a present thing, and consequently the affect toward a future or past thing, other things being equal, is more remiss than the affect toward a present thing.

PROPOSITIO X: Erga rem futuram quam cito affuturam imaginamur, intensius afficimur quam si ejus existendi tempus longius a præsenti distare imaginaremur et memoria rei quam non diu præteriisse imaginamur, intensius etiam afficimur quam si eandem diu præteriisse imaginaremur.

PROPOSITION 10: Toward a future thing which we imagine soon to be present, we are affected more intensely than if we imagined its time of existence to be farther distant from the present; and by the memory of a thing which we imagine not to have passed long ago, we are likewise affected more intensely than if we imagined the same to have passed long ago.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus enim rem cito affuturam vel non diu præteriisse imaginamur, eo ipso aliquid imaginamur quod rei præsentiam minus secludit quam si ejusdem futurum existendi tempus longius a præsenti distare vel quod dudum præterierit, imaginaremur (ut per se notum) adeoque (per præcedentem propositionem) eatenus intensius erga eandem afficiemur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For insofar as we imagine a thing as soon about to be present, or as not long since to have passed, by that very fact we imagine something that excludes the presence of the thing less than if we imagined that the time of the same thing’s future existence is farther distant from the present, or that it passed long ago (as is self-evident); and thus (by the preceding proposition) to that extent we shall be affected more intensely toward the same. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Ex iis quæ ad definitionem 6 hujus partis notavimus, sequitur nos erga objecta quæ a præsenti longiore temporis intervallo distant quam quod imaginando determinare possumus quamvis ab invicem longo temporis intervallo distare intelligamus, æque tamen remisse affici.

SCHOLIUM: From the things which we have noted to Definition 6 of this part, it follows that we are affected equally, yet faintly, toward objects which are distant from the present by a longer interval of time than what we can determine by imagining, although we understand them to be distant from one another by a long interval of time.

PROPOSITIO XI: Affectus erga rem quam ut necessariam imaginamur, cæteris paribus intensior est quam erga possibilem vel contingentem sive non necessariam.

PROPOSITION 11: The affect toward a thing which we imagine as necessary, other things being equal, is more intense than toward one possible or contingent, that is, not necessary.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus rem aliquam necessariam esse imaginamur eatenus ejus existentiam affirmamus et contra rei existentiam negamus quatenus eandem non necessariam esse imaginamur (per scholium I propositionis 33 partis I) ac proinde (per propositionem 9 hujus) affectus erga rem necessariam cæteris paribus intensior est quam erga non necessariam. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Insofar as we imagine some thing to be necessary, to that extent we affirm its existence; and conversely we deny the existence of the thing insofar as we imagine that same thing to be not necessary (by scholium 1 of proposition 33 of part 1); and hence (by proposition 9 of this part) the affect toward a necessary thing, other things being equal, is more intense than toward a non-necessary one. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XII: Affectus erga rem quam scimus in præsenti non existere et quam ut possibilem imaginamur, cæteris paribus intensior est quam erga contingentem.

PROPOSITION 12: The affect toward a thing which we know not to exist at present and which we imagine as possible, other things being equal, is more intense than toward a contingent one.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus rem ut contingentem imaginamur, nulla alterius rei imagine afficimur quæ rei existentiam ponat (per definitionem 3 hujus) sed contra (secundum hypothesin) quædam imaginamur quæ ejusdem præsentem existentiam secludunt. At quatenus rem in futurum possibilem esse imaginamur eatenus quædam imaginamur quæ ejusdem existentiam ponunt (per definitionem 4 hujus) hoc est (per propositionem 18 partis III) quæ spem vel metum fovent atque adeo affectus erga rem possibilem vehementior est. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are affected by no image of another thing which posits the thing’s existence (by definition 3 of this), but on the contrary (according to the hypothesis) we imagine certain things which exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine a thing to be possible in the future, to that extent we imagine certain things which posit its existence (by definition 4 of this), that is (by Proposition 18 of Part 3) which foster hope or fear; and so the affect toward the possible thing is more vehement. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Affectus erga rem quam scimus in præsenti non existere et quam ut contingentem imaginamur, multo remissior est quam si rem in præsenti nobis adesse imaginaremur.

COROLLARY: The affect toward a thing which we know not to exist in the present, and which we imagine as contingent, is much more remiss than if we imagined the thing to be present to us.

DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus erga rem quam in præsenti existere imaginamur, intensior est quam si eandem ut futuram imaginaremur (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus) et multo vehementior est quam si tempus futurum a præsenti multum distare imaginaremur (per propositionem 10 hujus). Est itaque affectus erga rem cujus existendi tempus longe a præsenti distare imaginamur, multo remissior quam si eandem ut præsentem imaginaremur et nihilominus (per propositionem præcedentem) intensior est quam si eandem rem ut contingentem imaginaremur atque adeo affectus erga rem contingentem multo remissior erit quam si rem in præsenti nobis adesse imaginaremur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The affect toward a thing which we imagine to exist in the present is more intense than if we were to imagine the same as future (by the corollary of proposition 9 of this), and much more vehement than if we were to imagine the future time to be far distant from the present (by proposition 10 of this). Therefore the affect toward a thing whose time of existing we imagine to be far distant from the present is much more remiss than if we were to imagine the same as present, and nevertheless (by the preceding proposition) more intense than if we imagined the same thing as contingent; and so the affect toward a contingent thing will be much more remiss than if we imagined the thing to be present to us. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XIII: Affectus erga rem contingentem quam scimus in præsenti non existere, cæteris paribus remissior est quam affectus erga rem præteritam.

PROPOSITION 13: The affect toward a contingent thing which we know not to exist at present, other things being equal, is more remiss than the affect toward a past thing.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus rem ut contingentem imaginamur, nulla alterius rei imagine afficimur quæ rei existentiam ponat (per definitionem 3 hujus). Sed contra (secundum hypothesin) quædam imaginamur quæ ejusdem præsentem existentiam secludunt. Verum quatenus eandem cum relatione ad tempus præteritum imaginamur eatenus aliquid imaginari supponimur quod ipsam ad memoriam redigit sive quod rei imaginem excitat (vide propositionem 18 partis II cum ejusdem scholio) ac proinde eatenus efficit ut ipsam ac si præsens esset, contemplemur (per corollarium propositionis 17 partis II) atque adeo (per propositionem 9 hujus) affectus erga rem contingentem quam scimus in præsenti non existere, cæteris paribus remissior erit quam affectus erga rem præteritam. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are affected by no image of another thing which posits the existence of the thing (by definition 3 of this). But on the contrary (according to the hypothesis) we imagine certain things which exclude its present existence. However, insofar as we imagine the same with relation to past time, to that extent we are supposed to imagine something which brings it back to memory or which excites the image of the thing (see proposition 18 of part II with its scholium), and accordingly to that extent it brings it about that we contemplate it as if it were present (by the corollary of proposition 17 of part II) and thus (by proposition 9 of this) the affect toward a contingent thing which we know does not exist in the present, other things being equal, will be more remiss than the affect toward a past thing. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XIV: Vera boni et mali cognitio quatenus vera nullum affectum coercere potest sed tantum quatenus ut affectus consideratur.

PROPOSITION 14: The true cognition of good and evil, insofar as it is true, can coerce no affect, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.

DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus est idea qua mens majorem vel minorem sui corporis existendi vim quam antea affirmat (per generalem affectuum definitionem) atque adeo (per propositionem 1 hujus) nihil positivum habet quod præsentia veri tolli possit et consequenter vera boni et mali cognitio quatenus vera nullum affectum coercere potest. At quatenus affectus est (vide propositionem 8 hujus) si fortior affectu coercendo sit, eatenus tantum (per propositionem 7 hujus) affectum coercere poterit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: An affect is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser power of existing of its body than before (by the general definition of affects), and therefore (by proposition 1 of this part) it has nothing positive that could be taken away by the presence of the true; and consequently the true cognition of good and evil, insofar as it is true, can coerce no affect. But insofar as it is an affect (see proposition 8 of this part), if it be stronger than the affect to be coerced, only to that extent (by proposition 7 of this part) will it be able to coerce the affect. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XV: Cupiditas quæ ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur, multis aliis cupiditatibus quæ ex affectibus quibus conflictamur oriuntur, restingui vel coerceri potest.

PROPOSITION 15: The desire which arises from the true cognition of good and evil can be extinguished or restrained by many other desires which arise from the affects with which we are conflicted.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex vera boni et mali cognitione quatenus hæc (per propositionem 8 hujus) affectus est, oritur necessario cupiditas (per 1 affectuum definitionem) quæ eo est major quo affectus ex quo oritur major est (per propositionem 37 partis III). Sed quia hæc cupiditas (per hypothesin) ex eo quod aliquid vere intelligimus, oritur, sequitur ergo ipsa in nobis quatenus agimus (per propositionem 3 partis III) atque adeo per solam nostram essentiam debet intelligi (per definitionem 2 partis III) et consequenter (per propositionem 7 partis III) ejus vis et incrementum sola humana potentia definiri debet. Porro cupiditates quæ ex affectibus quibus conflictamur oriuntur, eo etiam majores sunt quo hi affectus vehementiores erunt atque adeo earum vis et incrementum (per propositionem 5 hujus) potentia causarum externarum definiri debet quæ, si cum nostra comparetur, nostram potentiam indefinite superat (per propositionem 3 hujus) atque adeo cupiditates quæ ex similibus affectibus oriuntur, vehementiores esse possunt illa quæ ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur ac proinde (per propositionem 7 hujus) eandem coercere vel restinguere poterunt. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: From the true cognition of good and evil, insofar as this (by proposition 8 of this) is an affect, there necessarily arises a desire (by definition 1 of the affects) which is the greater the greater the affect from which it arises is (by proposition 37 of part 3). But because this desire (by the hypothesis) arises from our truly understanding something, it follows that it belongs to us insofar as we act (by proposition 3 of part 3), and thus must be understood through our essence alone (by definition 2 of part 3), and consequently (by proposition 7 of part 3) its force and increase must be defined by human power alone. Moreover, the desires which arise from the affects with which we are conflicted are also the greater the more vehement these affects are; and thus their force and increase (by proposition 5 of this) must be defined by the power of external causes which, if compared with ours, surpass our power indefinitely (by proposition 3 of this). And thus desires which arise from similar affects can be more vehement than that which arises from the true cognition of good and evil and therefore (by proposition 7 of this) will be able to coerce or extinguish the same. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XVI: Cupiditas quæ ex cognitione boni et mali quatenus hæc cognitio futurum respicit, oritur, facilius rerum cupiditate quæ in præsentia suaves sunt, coerceri vel restingui potest.

PROPOSITION 16: The desire which arises from the cognition of good and evil, insofar as this cognition regards the future, can more easily be restrained or extinguished by the desire for things which are pleasant in the present.

DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus erga rem quam futuram imaginamur, remissior est quam erga præsentem (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus). At cupiditas quæ ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur, tametsi hæc cognitio circa res quæ in præsentia bonæ sunt, versetur, restingui vel coerceri potest aliqua temeraria cupiditate (per propositionem præcedentem cujus demonstratio universalis est); ergo cupiditas quæ ex eadem cognitione quatenus hæc futurum respicit, oritur, facilius coerceri vel restingui poterit etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The affect toward a thing which we imagine as future is more remiss than toward a present one (by the corollary of proposition 9 of this). But the desire which arises from the true cognition of good and evil, although this cognition be conversant with things which are good in the present, can be extinguished or restrained by some rash desire (by the preceding proposition, whose demonstration is universal); therefore the desire which arises from the same cognition, insofar as this regards the future, will be able more easily to be restrained or extinguished, etc. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XVII: Cupiditas quæ oritur ex vera boni et mali cognitione quatenus hæc circa res contingentes versatur, multo adhuc facilius coerceri potest cupiditate rerum quæ præsentes sunt.

PROPOSITION 17: The cupidity which arises from a true cognition of good and evil, insofar as this concerns contingent things, can still much more easily be restrained by the cupidity for things that are present.

DEMONSTRATIO: Propositio hæc eodem modo ac propositio præcedens demonstratur ex corollario propositionis 12 hujus.

DEMONSTRATION: This proposition is demonstrated in the same manner as the preceding proposition, from the corollary of proposition 12 of this.

SCHOLIUM: His me causam ostendisse credo cur homines opinione magis quam vera ratione commoveantur et cur vera boni et mali cognitio animi commotiones excitet et sæpe omni libidinis generi cedat; unde illud poetæ natum : video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor. Quod idem etiam Ecclesiastes in mente habuisse videtur cum dixit : qui auget scientiam, auget dolorem. Atque hæc non eum in finem dico ut inde concludam præstabilius esse ignorare quam scire vel quod stulto intelligens in moderandis affectibus nihil intersit sed ideo quia necesse est nostræ naturæ tam potentiam quam impotentiam noscere ut determinare possimus quid ratio in moderandis affectibus possit et quid non possit et in hac parte de sola humana impotentia me acturum dixi.

SCHOLIUM: By these things I believe that I have shown the cause why men are moved by opinion rather than by true reason, and why the true cognition of good and evil excites the commotions of the mind and often yields to every kind of libido; whence that saying of the poet was born: I see the better things and approve them, I follow the worse. The same thing Ecclesiastes also seems to have had in mind when he said: he who increases knowledge increases sorrow. And I do not say these things to the end that I might conclude therefrom that it is more preferable to be ignorant than to know, or that the intelligent man differs in nothing from the fool in moderating the affects, but for this reason: because it is necessary for our nature to know both its power and its impotence, so that we may determine what reason can do in moderating the affects and what it cannot do; and in this part I have said that I will treat solely of human impotence.

Nam de rationis in affectus potentia separatim agere constitui.

For I have resolved to treat separately of the power of reason over the affects.

PROPOSITIO XVIII: Cupiditas quæ ex lætitia oritur, cæteris paribus fortior est cupiditate quæ ex tristitia oritur.

PROPOSITION 18: The desire which arises from joy, other things being equal, is stronger than the desire which arises from sadness.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia (per 1 affectuum definitionem) hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III) conatus quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur. Quare cupiditas quæ ex lætitia oritur, ipso lætitiæ affectu (per definitionem lætitiæ, quam vide in scholio propositionis 11 partis III) juvatur vel augetur; quæ autem contra ex tristitia oritur, ipso tristitiæ affectu (per idem scholium) minuitur vel coercetur atque adeo vis cupiditatis quæ ex lætitia oritur, potentia humana simul et potentia causæ externæ, quæ autem ex tristitia sola humana potentia definiri debet ac proinde hac illa fortior est. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: Desire is the very essence of man (by Definition 1 of the affects), that is (by proposition 7 of part 3) the conatus by which a man strives to persevere in his being. Therefore desire which arises from joy is, by the very affect of joy (by the definition of joy, which see in the scholium to proposition 11 of part 3), helped or increased; but that which, on the contrary, arises from sadness is, by the very affect of sadness (by the same scholium), diminished or restrained; and thus the force of desire which arises from joy is defined by human power together with the power of an external cause, whereas that which arises from sadness must be defined by human power alone, and accordingly this is stronger than that. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: His paucis humanæ impotentiæ et inconstantiæ causas et cur homines rationis præcepta non servent, explicui. Superest jam ut ostendam quid id sit quod ratio nobis præscribit et quinam affectus cum rationis humanæ regulis conveniant, quinam contra iisdem contrarii sint. Sed antequam hæc prolixo nostro geometrico ordine demonstrare incipiam, lubet ipsa rationis dictamina hic prius breviter ostendere ut ea quæ sentio facilius ab unoquoque percipiantur.

SCHOLIUM: In these few points I have explicated the causes of human impotence and inconstancy, and why men do not observe the precepts of reason. It now remains that I show what that is which reason prescribes to us, and which affects are congruent with the rules of human reason, and which, on the contrary, are contrary to the same. But before I begin to demonstrate these in our prolix geometrical order, it pleases me first to exhibit here briefly the very dictates of reason, so that the things which I think may be more easily perceived by each person.

Cum ratio nihil contra naturam postulet, postulat ergo ipsa ut unusquisque seipsum amet, suum utile, quod revera utile est, quærat et id omne quod hominem ad majorem perfectionem revera ducit, appetat et absolute ut unusquisque suum esse quantum in se est, conservare conetur. Quod quidem tam necessario verum est quam quod totum sit sua parte majus (vide propositionem 4 partis III). Deinde quandoquidem virtus (per definitionem 8 hujus) nihil aliud est quam ex legibus propriæ naturæ agere et nemo suum esse (per propositionem 7 partis III) conservare conetur nisi ex propriæ suæ naturæ legibus, hinc sequitur primo virtutis fundamentum esse ipsum conatum proprium esse conservandi et felicitatem in eo consistere quod homo suum esse conservare potest. Secundo sequitur virtutem propter se esse appetendam nec quicquam quod ipsa præstabilius aut quod utilius nobis sit, dari, cujus causa deberet appeti.

Since reason postulates nothing against nature, it therefore itself postulates that each person love himself, seek his own useful—what is truly useful—and desire everything that truly leads a human to greater perfection, and absolutely that each person strive, as far as in him lies, to preserve his being. Which is indeed as necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its part (see proposition 4 of part 3). Then, since virtue (by definition 8 of this) is nothing other than to act from the laws of one’s own nature, and no one strives to preserve his being (by proposition 7 of part 3) except from the laws of his own nature, hence it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the very endeavor to preserve one’s own being, and that felicity consists in this: that a human can preserve his being. Secondly, it follows that virtue is to be appetited for its own sake, and that nothing is given which is preferable to it or which is more useful to us, for the sake of which it ought to be desired.

Tertio denique sequitur eos qui se interficiunt animo esse impotentes eosque a causis externis suæ naturæ repugnantibus prorsus vinci. Porro ex postulato 4 partis II sequitur nos efficere nunquam posse ut nihil extra nos indigeamus ad nostrum esse conservandum et ut ita vivamus ut nullum commercium cum rebus quæ extra nos sunt, habeamus et si præterea nostram mentem spectemus, sane noster intellectus imperfectior esset si mens sola esset nec quicquam præter se ipsam intelligeret. Multa igitur extra nos dantur quæ nobis utilia quæque propterea appetenda sunt.

Thirdly, finally, it follows that those who kill themselves are impotent in spirit, and that they are utterly conquered by external causes repugnant to their nature. Moreover, from Postulate 4 of Part 2 it follows that we can never bring it about that we need nothing outside ourselves for the conservation of our being, and that we live in such a way as to have no commerce with things that are outside us; and if, besides, we consider our mind, assuredly our intellect would be more imperfect if the mind were alone and understood nothing except itself. Many things, therefore, are given outside us which are useful to us and which for that reason are to be desired.

Ex his nulla præstantiora excogitari possunt quam ea quæ cum nostra natura prorsus conveniunt. Si enim duo exempli gratia ejusdem prorsus naturæ individua invicem junguntur, individuum componunt singulo duplo potentius. Homini igitur nihil homine utilius; nihil inquam homines præstantius ad suum esse conservandum optare possunt quam quod omnes in omnibus ita conveniant ut omnium mentes et corpora unam quasi mentem unumque corpus componant et omnes simul quantum possunt suum esse conservare conentur omnesque simul omnium commune utile sibi quærant; ex quibus sequitur homines qui ratione gubernantur hoc est homines qui ex ductu rationis suum utile quærunt, nihil sibi appetere quod reliquis hominibus non cupiant atque adeo eosdem justos, fidos atque honestos esse.

Of these nothing more preeminent can be devised than those things which altogether agree with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of precisely the same nature are joined to one another, they compose an individual twice as potent as each singly. For man, therefore, nothing is more useful than man; nothing, I say, more excellent can men desire for the conservation of their being than that all should in all things so agree that the minds and bodies of all compose, as it were, one mind and one body, and that all together, as much as they can, strive to conserve their being, and all together seek for themselves the common utility of all; whence it follows that men who are governed by reason, that is, men who under the duct of reason seek their own utility, desire nothing for themselves which they do not also desire for the rest of men, and therefore that they are the same just, faithful, and honest.

Hæc illa rationis dictamina sunt quæ hic paucis ostendere proposueram antequam eadem prolixiore ordine demonstrare inciperem, quod ea de causa feci ut, si fieri posset, eorum attentionem mihi conciliarem qui credunt hoc principium, quod scilicet unusquisque suum utile quærere tenetur, impietatis, non autem virtutis et pietatis esse fundamentum. Postquam igitur rem sese contra habere breviter ostenderim, pergo ad eandem eadem via qua huc usque progressi sumus, demonstrandum.

These are those dicta of reason which I had proposed to show here in a few words before I began to demonstrate the same in a more prolix order, which I did for this cause, that, if it could be done, I might conciliate to myself the attention of those who believe that this principle—namely, that each person is bound to seek his own utile—is the foundation of impiety, and not of virtue and piety. After I have briefly shown, therefore, that the matter stands otherwise, I proceed to the demonstration of the same by the same way by which we have progressed hitherto.

PROPOSITIO XIX: Id unusquisque ex legibus suæ naturæ necessario appetit vel aversatur quod bonum vel malum esse judicat.

PROPOSITIO 19: Each person, from the laws of his nature, necessarily appetites or is averse to what he judges to be good or evil.

DEMONSTRATIO: Boni et mali cognitio est (per propositionem 8 hujus) ipse lætitiæ vel tristitiæ affectus quatenus ejusdem sumus conscii ac proinde (per propositionem 28 partis III) id unusquisque necessario appetit quod bonum et contra id aversatur quod malum esse judicat. Sed hic appetitus nihil aliud est quam ipsa hominis essentia seu natura (per definitionem appetitus, quam vide in scholio propositionis 9 partis III et 1 affectuum definitionem). Ergo unusquisque ex solis suæ naturæ legibus id necessario appetit vel aversatur etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The cognition of good and evil is (by proposition 8 of this) the very affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of the same; and hence (by proposition 28 of part 3) each person necessarily desires what he judges to be good, and on the contrary is averse to what he judges to be evil. But this appetite is nothing other than the very essence or nature of man (by the definition of appetite, which see in the scholium to proposition 9 of part 3, and in definition 1 of the affects). Therefore each person, from the sole laws of his nature, necessarily desires or is averse to, etc. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XX: Quo magis unusquisque suum utile quærere hoc est suum esse conservare conatur et potest eo magis virtute præditus est et contra quatenus unusquisque suum utile hoc est suum esse conservare negligit eatenus est impotens.

PROPOSITION 20: The more each person strives and is able to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, by so much he is endowed with virtue; and, conversely, insofar as each person neglects his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, to that extent he is impotent.

DEMONSTRATIO: Virtus est ipsa humana potentia quæ sola hominis essentia definitur (per definitionem 8 hujus) hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III) quæ solo conatu quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur, definitur. Quo ergo unusquisque magis suum esse conservare conatur et potest eo magis virtute præditus est et consequenter (per propositiones 4 et 6 partis III) quatenus aliquis suum esse conservare negligit eatenus est impotens. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Virtue is the very human power which is defined solely by the essence of man (by definition 8 of this), that is (by proposition 7 of part 3), which is defined by the sole endeavor whereby man strives to persevere in his being. Therefore, the more each person endeavors and is able to preserve his being, by so much the more he is endowed with virtue; and consequently (by propositions 4 and 6 of part 3), insofar as someone neglects to preserve his being, to that extent he is powerless. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Nemo igitur nisi a causis externis et suæ naturæ contrariis victus suum utile appetere sive suum esse conservare negligit. Nemo inquam ex necessitate suæ naturæ sed a causis externis coactus alimenta aversatur vel se ipsum interficit, quod multis modis fieri potest nempe interficit aliquis se ipsum coactus ab alio qui ejus dexteram qua ensem casu prehenderat, contorquet et cogit versus cor ipsum gladium dirigere vel quod ex mandato tyranni ut Seneca cogatur venas aperire suas hoc est majus malum minore vitare cupiat vel denique ex eo quod causæ latentes externæ ejus imaginationem ita disponunt et corpus ita afficiunt ut id aliam naturam priori contrariam induat et cujus idea in mente dari nequit (per propositionem 10 partis III). At quod homo ex necessitate suæ naturæ conetur non existere vel in aliam formam mutari, tam est impossibile quam quod ex nihilo aliquid fiat, ut unusquisque mediocri meditatione videre potest.

SCHOLIUM: No one therefore, unless overcome by external causes and contrary to his nature, neglects to appetite his own advantage, that is, to conserve his own being. No one, I say, from the necessity of his nature, but compelled by external causes, shuns nourishment or kills himself, which can happen in many ways: namely, someone kills himself, compelled by another who by chance had seized his right hand with which he held the sword, twists it, and forces him to aim the blade toward his heart; or because, by the mandate of a tyrant—as with Seneca—he is compelled to open his veins, that is, he desires to avoid a greater evil by a lesser; or finally from this, that hidden external causes so dispose his imagination and so affect his body that it assumes another nature contrary to the prior one, and whose idea cannot be given in the mind (by Proposition 10 of Part 3). But that a man, from the necessity of his nature, should endeavor not to exist or to be changed into another form, is as impossible as that something be made from nothing, as anyone with moderate meditation can see.

PROPOSITIO XXI: Nemo potest cupere beatum esse, bene agere et bene vivere qui simul non cupiat esse, agere et vivere hoc est actu existere.

PROPOSITION 21: No one can desire to be happy, to act well, and to live well who does not at the same time desire to be, to act, and to live, that is, to exist in act.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus propositionis demonstratio seu potius res ipsa per se patet et etiam ex cupiditatis definitione. Est enim cupiditas (per 1 affectuum definitionem) beate seu bene vivendi, agendi etc. ipsa hominis essentia hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III) conatus quo unusquisque suum esse conservare conatur.

DEMONSTRATION: The demonstration of this proposition, or rather the thing itself, is evident through itself, and also from the definition of cupidity. For cupidity (by Definition 1 of the Affects) of living blessedly or well, acting, etc., is the very essence of man, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3) the conatus by which each person endeavors to preserve his being.

Ergo nemo potest cupere etc. Q.E.D.

Therefore no one can desire etc. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXII: Nulla virtus potest prior hac (nempe conatu sese conservandi) concipi.

PROPOSITION 22: No virtue can be conceived prior to this (namely, the conatus of self-conservation).

DEMONSTRATIO: Conatus sese conservandi est ipsa rei essentia (per propositionem 7 partis III). Si igitur aliqua virtus posset hac nempe hoc conatu prior concipi, conciperetur ergo (per definitionem 8 hujus) ipsa rei essentia se ipsa prior, quod (ut per se notum) est absurdum. Ergo nulla virtus etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The endeavor to preserve oneself is the very essence of the thing (by Proposition 7 of Part 3). If, therefore, some virtue could be conceived as prior to this, namely to this endeavor, then (by Definition 8 of this) the very essence of the thing would be conceived as prior to itself, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore no virtue, etc. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Conatus sese conservandi primum et unicum virtutis est fundamentum. Nam hoc principio nullum aliud potest prius concipi (per propositionem præcedentem) et absque ipso (per propositionem 21 hujus) nulla virtus potest concipi.

COROLLARY: The endeavor of self-preservation is the first and sole foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle no other can be conceived (by the preceding proposition), and without it (by proposition 21 of this) no virtue can be conceived.

PROPOSITIO XXIII: Homo quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo quod ideas habet inadæquatas, non potest absolute dici ex virtute agere sed tantum quatenus determinatur ex eo quod intelligit.

PROPOSITION 23: Man, insofar as he is determined to do anything from the fact that he has inadequate ideas, cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue, but only insofar as he is determined from the fact that he understands.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus homo ad agendum determinatur ex eo quod inadæquatas habet ideas eatenus (per propositionem 1 partis III) patitur hoc est (per definitiones 1 et 2 partis III) aliquid agit quod per solam ejus essentiam non potest percipi hoc est (per definitionem 8 hujus) quod ex ipsius virtute non sequitur. At quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo quod intelligit eatenus (per eandem propositionem 1 partis III) agit hoc est (per definitionem 2 partis III) aliquid agit quod per solam ipsius essentiam percipitur sive (per definitionem 8 hujus) quod ex ipsius virtute adæquate sequitur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Insofar as a man is determined to act from the fact that he has inadequate ideas, to that extent (by proposition 1 of Part 3) he undergoes passion; that is (by definitions 1 and 2 of Part 3) he does something which cannot be perceived through his essence alone, that is (by definition 8 of this) which does not follow from his virtue. But insofar as he is determined to do something from what he understands, to that extent (by the same proposition 1 of Part 3) he acts; that is (by definition 2 of Part 3) he does something which is perceived through his essence alone, or (by definition 8 of this) which follows adequately from his virtue. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXIV: Ex virtute absolute agere nihil aliud in nobis est quam ex ductu rationis agere, vivere, suum esse conservare (hæc tria idem significant) idque ex fundamento proprium utile quærendi.

PROPOSITION 24: To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us than to act under the guidance of reason, to live, to conserve one’s being (these three signify the same), and that on the foundation of seeking one’s own utility.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex virtute absolute agere nihil aliud est (per definitionem 8 hujus) quam ex legibus propriæ naturæ agere. At nos eatenus tantummodo agimus quatenus intelligimus (per propositionem 3 partis III). Ergo ex virtute agere nihil aliud in nobis est quam ex ductu rationis agere, vivere, suum esse conservare idque (per corollarium propositionis 22 hujus) ex fundamento suum utile quærendi. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: To act from virtue absolutely is nothing else (by definition 8 of this) than to act from the laws of one’s own nature. But we act only insofar as we understand (by Proposition 3 of Part III). Therefore to act from virtue is nothing else in us than to act under the guidance of reason, to live, to preserve one’s being, and this (by the corollary of Proposition 22 of this) from the foundation of seeking one’s own utility. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXV: Nemo suum esse alterius rei causa conservare conatur.

PROPOSITION 25: No one endeavors to preserve his own being for the sake of another thing.

DEMONSTRATIO: Conatus quo unaquæque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, sola ipsius rei essentia definitur (per propositionem 7 partis III) eaque sola data, non autem ex alterius rei essentia necessario sequitur (per propositionem 6 partis III) ut unusquisque suum esse conservare conetur. Patet præterea hæc propositio ex corollario propositionis 22 hujus partis. Nam si homo alterius rei causa suum esse conservare conaretur, tum res illa primum esset virtutis fundamentum (ut per se notum) quod (per prædictum corollarium) est absurdum.

DEMONSTRATION: The endeavor by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself (by proposition 7 of part 3), and, that alone being given, it does not necessarily follow from the essence of another thing (by proposition 6 of part 3) that each one should endeavor to preserve his being. Moreover, this proposition is evident from the corollary of proposition 22 of this part. For if a man were to endeavor to preserve his being for the sake of another thing, then that thing would, in the first place, be the foundation of virtue (as is self-evident), which (by the aforesaid corollary) is absurd.

Ergo nemo suum esse etc. Q.E.D.

Therefore no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another thing, etc. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXVI: Quicquid ex ratione conamur, nihil aliud est quam intelligere nec mens quatenus ratione utitur, aliud sibi utile esse judicat nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit.

PROPOSITION 26: Whatever we endeavor from reason is nothing else than to understand, nor does the mind, insofar as it uses reason, judge anything else to be useful to itself except that which conduces to understanding.

DEMONSTRATIO: Conatus sese conservandi nihil est præter ipsius rei essentiam (per propositionem 7 partis III) quæ quatenus talis existit, vim habere concipitur ad perseverandum in existendo (per propositionem 6 partis III) et ea agendum quæ ex data sua natura necessario sequuntur (vide definitionem appetitus in scholio propositionis 9 partis III). At rationis essentia nihil aliud est quam mens nostra quatenus clare et distincte intelligit (vide ejus definitionem in II scholio propositionis 40 partis II). Ergo (per propositionem 40 partis II) quicquid ex ratione conamur, nihil aliud est quam intelligere. Deinde quoniam hic mentis conatus quo mens quatenus ratiocinatur suum esse conatur conservare, nihil aliud est quam intelligere (per primam partem hujus) est ergo hic intelligendi conatus (per corollarium propositionis 22 hujus) primum et unicum virtutis fundamentum nec alicujus finis causa (per propositionem 25 hujus) res intelligere conabimur sed contra mens quatenus ratiocinatur nihil sibi bonum esse concipere poterit nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit (per definitionem 1 hujus). Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The endeavor of conserving oneself is nothing other than the very essence of the thing (by proposition 7 of Part 3), which, insofar as it exists as such, is conceived to have a power to persevere in existing (by proposition 6 of Part 3) and to do those things which necessarily follow from its given nature (see the definition of appetite in the scholium to proposition 9 of Part 3). But the essence of reason is nothing else than our mind insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly (see its definition in the 2nd scholium to proposition 40 of Part 2). Therefore (by proposition 40 of Part 2) whatever we endeavor from reason is nothing else than to understand. Next, since this endeavor of the mind, whereby the mind insofar as it reasons strives to conserve its being, is nothing other than to understand (by the first part of this), therefore this endeavor of understanding (by the corollary to proposition 22 of this) is the first and unique foundation of virtue; nor for the sake of any end (by proposition 25 of this) shall we endeavor to understand things, but on the contrary the mind insofar as it reasons will be able to conceive as good for itself nothing except that which conduces to understanding (by definition 1 of this). Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXVII: Nihil certo scimus bonum aut malum esse nisi id quod ad intelligendum revera conducit vel quod impedire potest quominus intelligamus.

PROPOSITION 27: We know nothing for certain to be good or evil except what truly conduces to understanding, or what can impede us from understanding.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens quatenus ratiocinatur nihil aliud appetit quam intelligere nec aliud sibi utile esse judicat nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit (per propositionem præcedentem). At mens (per propositiones 41 et 43 partis II, cujus etiam scholium vide) rerum certitudinem non habet nisi quatenus ideas habet adæquatas sive (quod per scholia propositionis 40 partis II idem est) quatenus ratiocinatur; ergo nihil certo scimus bonum esse nisi id quod ad intelligendum revera conducit et contra id malum quod impedire potest quominus intelligamus. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The mind, insofar as it reasons, appetites nothing other than to understand, nor judges anything else to be useful to itself except what conduces to understanding (by the preceding proposition). But the mind (by propositions 41 and 43 of Part 2; see also their scholium) has no certainty of things except insofar as it has adequate ideas, or (which is the same by the scholia on proposition 40 of Part 2) insofar as it reasons; therefore we know for certain nothing to be good except that which really conduces to understanding, and, conversely, that to be evil which can hinder us from understanding. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXVIII: Summum mentis bonum est Dei cognitio et summa mentis virtus Deum cognoscere.

PROPOSITION 28: The supreme good of the mind is knowledge of God, and the supreme virtue of the mind is to know God.

DEMONSTRATIO: Summum quod mens intelligere potest, Deus est hoc est (per definitionem 6 partis I) Ens absolute infinitum et sine quo (per propositionem 15 partis I) nihil esse neque concipi potest adeoque (per propositiones 26 et 27 hujus) summum mentis utile sive (per definitionem 1 hujus) bonum est Dei cognitio. Deinde mens quatenus intelligit eatenus tantum agit (per propositiones 1 et 3 partis III) et eatenus tantum (per propositionem 23 hujus) potest absolute dici quod ex virtute agit. Est igitur mentis absoluta virtus intelligere.

DEMONSTRATIO: The highest that the mind can understand is God, that is (by definition 6 of part 1) a Being absolutely infinite, and without whom (by proposition 15 of part 1) nothing can be nor be conceived; and so (by propositions 26 and 27 of this) the supreme utility of the mind, or (by definition 1 of this) good, is the cognition of God. Then the mind, insofar as it understands, only to that extent acts (by propositions 1 and 3 of part 3), and only to that extent (by proposition 23 of this) can it absolutely be said to act from virtue. Therefore the mind’s absolute virtue is to understand.

At summum quod mens intelligere potest, Deus est (ut jam jam demonstravimus). Ergo mentis summa virtus est Deum intelligere seu cognoscere. Q.E.D.

But the highest thing that the mind can understand is God (as we have just now demonstrated). Therefore the mind’s highest virtue is to understand or to cognize God. Which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITIO XXIX: Res quæcunque singularis cujus natura a nostra prorsus est diversa, nostram agendi potentiam nec juvare nec coercere potest et absolute res nulla potest nobis bona aut mala esse nisi commune aliquid nobiscum habeat.

PROPOSITION 29: Any singular thing whose nature is entirely diverse from ours can neither help nor coerce our power of acting, and absolutely no thing can be good or bad for us unless it has something in common with us.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cujuscunque rei singularis et consequenter (per corollarium propositionis 10 partis II) hominis potentia qua existit et operatur, non determinatur nisi ab alia re singulari (per propositionem 28 partis I) cujus natura (per propositionem 6 partis II) per idem attributum debet intelligi per quod natura humana concipitur. Nostra igitur agendi potentia quomodocunque ea concipiatur, determinari et consequenter juvari vel coerceri potest potentia alterius rei singularis quæ aliquid commune nobiscum habet et non potentia rei cujus natura a nostra prorsus est diversa et quia id bonum aut malum vocamus quod causa est lætitiæ aut tristitiæ (per propositionem 8 hujus) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 partis III) quod nostram agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet, ergo res cujus natura a nostra prorsus est diversa nobis neque bona neque mala esse potest. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The power of any singular thing, and consequently (by the corollary to Proposition 10 of Part 2) of a human being, by which it exists and operates, is determined only by another singular thing (by Proposition 28 of Part 1), whose nature (by Proposition 6 of Part 2) must be understood through the same attribute by which human nature is conceived. Therefore our power of acting, however it be conceived, can be determined, and consequently aided or coerced, by the power of another singular thing which has something in common with us, and not by the power of a thing whose nature is utterly diverse from our own; and because we call that good or evil which is the cause of joy or sadness (by Proposition 8 of this), that is (by the scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3) what augments or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting, therefore a thing whose nature is utterly diverse from our own can be neither good nor evil for us. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXX: Res nulla per id quod cum nostra natura commune habet, potest esse mala sed quatenus nobis mala est eatenus est nobis contraria.

PROPOSITION 30: No thing, by that which it has in common with our nature, can be bad; but insofar as it is bad for us, to that extent it is contrary to us.

DEMONSTRATIO: Id malum vocamus quod causa est tristitiæ (per propositionem 8 hujus) hoc est (per ejus definitionem, quam vide in scholio propositionis 11 partis III) quod nostram agendi potentiam minuit vel coercet. Si igitur res aliqua per id quod nobiscum habet commune, nobis esset mala, posset ergo res id ipsum quod nobiscum commune habet, minuere vel coercere, quod (per propositionem 4 partis III) est absurdum. Nulla igitur res per id quod nobiscum commune habet, potest nobis esse mala sed contra quatenus mala est hoc est (ut jam jam ostendimus) quatenus nostram agendi potentiam minuere vel coercere potest eatenus (per propositionem 5 partis III) nobis est contraria.

DEMONSTRATION: We call that evil which is the cause of sadness (by Proposition 8 of this), that is (by its definition, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), that which diminishes or coerces our power of acting. If therefore some thing, through that which it has in common with us, were evil for us, then a thing could diminish or coerce that very thing which it has in common with us, which (by Proposition 4 of Part 3) is absurd. Therefore no thing, through that which it has in common with us, can be evil for us, but on the contrary, insofar as it is evil, that is (as we have just now shown), insofar as it can diminish or coerce our power of acting, to that extent (by Proposition 5 of Part 3) it is contrary to us.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITIO XXXI: Quatenus res aliqua cum nostra natura convenit eatenus necessario bona est.

PROPOSITION 31: Insofar as any thing agrees with our nature, to that extent it is necessarily good.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus enim res aliqua cum nostra natura convenit, non potest (per propositionem præcedentem) esse mala. Erit ergo necessario vel bona vel indifferens. Si hoc ponatur nempe quod neque bona sit neque mala, nihil ergo (per definitionem 1 hujus) ex ipsius natura sequetur quod nostræ naturæ conservationi inservit hoc est (per hypothesin) quod ipsius rei naturæ conservationi inservit sed hoc est absurdum (per propositionem 6 partis III); erit ergo quatenus cum nostra natura convenit, necessario bona.

DEMONSTRATION: For insofar as some thing agrees with our nature, it cannot (by the preceding proposition) be bad. Therefore it will necessarily be either good or indifferent. If this be posited, namely that it is neither good nor bad, then nothing (by Definition 1 of this Part) will follow from its nature which serves the preservation of our nature, that is (by the hypothesis) which serves the preservation of the nature of the thing itself; but this is absurd (by Proposition 6 of Part 3); therefore, insofar as it agrees with our nature, it is necessarily good.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur quod quo res aliqua magis cum nostra natura convenit, eo nobis est utilior seu magis bona et contra quo res aliqua nobis est utilior, eatenus cum nostra natura magis convenit. Nam quatenus cum nostra natura non convenit, erit necessario a nostra natura diversa vel eidem contraria. Si diversa, tum (per propositionem 29 hujus) neque bona neque mala esse poterit; si autem contraria, erit ergo etiam ei contraria quæ cum nostra natura convenit hoc est (per propositionem præcedentem) contraria bono seu mala.

COROLLARY: Hence it follows that the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful to us or the more good it is; and conversely, the more a thing is useful to us, to that extent it agrees more with our nature. For insofar as it does not agree with our nature, it will necessarily be either diverse from our nature or contrary to it. If diverse, then (by proposition 29 of this) it can be neither good nor bad; but if contrary, then it will also be contrary to that which agrees with our nature, that is (by the preceding proposition) contrary to the good, or evil.

Nihil igitur nisi quatenus cum nostra natura convenit, potest esse bonum atque adeo quo res aliqua magis cum nostra natura convenit, eo est utilior et contra. Q.E.D.

Nothing therefore, except insofar as it agrees with our nature, can be good; and thus, the more some thing agrees with our nature, the more it is useful, and conversely. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXXII: Quatenus homines passionibus sunt obnoxii, non possunt eatenus dici quod natura conveniant.

PROPOSITION 32: Insofar as men are subject to the passions, they cannot, to that extent, be said to agree with nature.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quæ natura convenire dicuntur, potentia convenire intelliguntur (per propositionem 7 partis III) non autem impotentia seu negatione et consequenter (vide scholium propositionis 3 partis III) neque etiam passione; quare homines quatenus passionibus sunt obnoxii, non possunt dici quod natura conveniant. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Things which are said to agree by nature are understood to agree in power (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), not however by impotence or negation, and consequently (see the scholium of Proposition 3 of Part 3) not even by passion; wherefore men, insofar as they are subject to passions, cannot be said to agree by nature. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Res etiam per se patet; qui enim ait album et nigrum in eo solummodo convenire quod neutrum sit rubrum, is absolute affirmat album et nigrum nulla in re convenire. Sic etiam si quis ait lapidem et hominem in hoc tantum convenire quod uterque sit finitus, impotens vel quod ex necessitate suæ naturæ non existit vel denique quod a potentia causarum externarum indefinite superatur, is omnino affirmat lapidem et hominem nulla in re convenire; quæ enim in sola negatione sive in eo quod non habent conveniunt, ea revera nulla in re conveniunt.

SCHOLIUM: The thing is also evident of itself; for he who says that white and black agree in this only, that neither is red, absolutely affirms that white and black agree in no respect. So also if someone says that a stone and a man agree in this alone, that each is finite, impotent, or that he does not exist by the necessity of his nature, or finally that he is indefinitely overpowered by the power of external causes, he altogether affirms that a stone and a man agree in no respect; for things which agree in a mere negation, or in that which they do not have, in reality agree in no respect.

PROPOSITIO XXXIII: Homines natura discrepare possunt quatenus affectibus qui passiones sunt, conflictantur et eatenus etiam unus idemque homo varius est et inconstans.

PROPOSITION 33: Humans can differ by nature insofar as they are buffeted by affects which are passions, and to that extent even one and the same human is variable and inconstant.

DEMONSTRATIO: Affectuum natura seu essentia non potest per solam nostram essentiam seu naturam explicari (per definitiones 1 et 2 partis III) sed potentia hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III) natura causarum externarum cum nostra comparata definiri debet; unde fit ut uniuscujusque affectus tot species dentur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur (vide propositionem 56 partis III) et ut homines ab uno eodemque objecto diversimode afficiantur (vide propositionem 51 partis III) atque eatenus natura discrepent et denique ut unus idemque homo (per eandem propositionem 51 partis III) erga idem objectum diversimode afficiatur atque eatenus varius sit etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The nature or essence of affects cannot be explicated by our essence or nature alone (by Definitions 1 and 2 of Part 3), but by power, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), it must be defined by the nature of external causes compared with our own; whence it happens that for each affect there are as many species as there are species of the objects by which we are affected (see Proposition 56 of Part 3), and that men are affected diversely by one and the same object (see Proposition 51 of Part 3) and to that extent differ in nature, and finally that one and the same man (by the same Proposition 51 of Part 3) is affected diversely toward the same object and to that extent is variable, etc. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXXIV: Quatenus homines affectibus qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt invicem esse contrarii.

PROPOSITION 34: Insofar as men are conflicted by affects which are passions, they can be contrary to one another.

DEMONSTRATIO: Homo exempli gratia Petrus potest esse causa ut Paulus contristetur propterea quod aliquid habet simile rei quam Paulus odit (per propositionem 16 partis III) vel propterea quod Petrus solus re aliqua potitur quam ipse Paulus etiam amat (vide propositionem 32 partis III cum ejusdem scholio) vel ob alias causas (harum præcipuas vide in scholio propositionis 55 partis III) atque adeo inde fiet (per definitionem 7 affectuum) ut Paulus Petrum odio habeat et consequenter facile fiet (per propositionem 40 partis III cum ejus scholio) ut Petrus Paulum contra odio habeat atque adeo (per propositionem 39 partis III) ut invicem malum inferre conentur hoc est (per propositionem 30 hujus) ut invicem sint contrarii. At affectus tristitiæ semper passio est (per propositionem 59 partis III); ergo homines quatenus conflictantur affectibus qui passiones sunt, possunt invicem esse contrarii. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: A man, for example Peter, can be a cause that Paul is made-sorrowful for the reason that he has something similar to a thing which Paul hates (by proposition 16 of part 3), or for the reason that Peter alone enjoys some thing which Paul himself also loves (see proposition 32 of part 3 with the scholium of the same), or on other grounds (see the chief of these in the scholium of proposition 55 of part 3); and thus it will come about (by definition 7 of the affects) that Paul holds Peter in hate, and consequently it will easily come about (by proposition 40 of part 3 with its scholium) that Peter in turn holds Paul in hate, and thus (by proposition 39 of part 3) that they try mutually to inflict harm, that is (by proposition 30 of this) that they are mutually contrary. But the affect of sadness is always a passion (by proposition 59 of part 3); therefore men, insofar as they are conflicted by affects which are passions, can be contrary to one another. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Dixi quod Paulus odio Petrum habeat quia imaginatur id eundem possidere quod ipse Paulus etiam amat; unde prima fronte videtur sequi quod hi duo ex eo quod idem amant et consequenter ex eo quod natura conveniunt, sibi invicem damno sint atque adeo si hoc verum est, falsæ essent propositio 30 et 31 hujus partis. Sed si rem æqua lance examinare velimus, hæc omnia convenire omnino videbimus. Nam hi duo non sunt invicem molesti quatenus natura conveniunt hoc est quatenus uterque idem amat, sed quatenus ab invicem discrepant.

SCHOLIUM: I said that Paul holds Peter in hatred because he imagines that he possesses the same thing which Paul himself also loves; whence at first sight it seems to follow that these two, from the fact that they love the same thing and consequently from the fact that they agree by nature, are to one another a damage, and thus, if this is true, propositions 30 and 31 of this part would be false. But if we should wish to examine the matter with an even balance, we shall see that all these things absolutely agree. For these two are not troublesome to one another insofar as they agree by nature, that is, insofar as each loves the same thing, but insofar as they are discrepant from one another.

Nam quatenus uterque idem amat, eo ipso utriusque amor fovetur (per propositionem 31 partis III) hoc est (per definitionem 6 affectuum) eo ipso utriusque lætitia fovetur. Quare longe abest ut quatenus idem amant et natura conveniunt, invicem molesti sint. Sed hujus rei causa ut dixi nulla alia est quam quia natura discrepare supponuntur.

Insofar as each loves the same thing, by that very fact the love of each is fostered (by Proposition 31 of Part 3), that is (by Definition 6 of the affects) by that very fact the joy of each is fostered. Wherefore it is far from the case that, insofar as they love the same thing and agree in nature, they are troublesome to one another. But the cause of this matter, as I said, is none other than that they are supposed to differ in nature.

Supponimus namque Petrum ideam habere rei amatæ jam possessæ et Paulum contra ideam rei amatæ amissæ. Unde fit ut hic tristitia et ille contra lætitia afficiatur atque eatenus invicem contrarii sint. Et ad hunc modum ostendere facile possumus reliquas odii causas ab hoc solo pendere quod homines natura discrepant et non ab eo in quo conveniunt.

For we suppose that Peter has the idea of the loved thing already possessed, and Paul, on the contrary, the idea of the loved thing lost. Whence it happens that this one is affected with sadness, and that one, on the contrary, with joy, and to that extent they are contrary to one another. And in this way we can easily show that the remaining causes of hatred depend on this alone: that human beings differ by nature, and not on that wherein they agree.

PROPOSITIO XXXV: Quatenus homines ex ductu rationis vivunt eatenus tantum natura semper necessario conveniunt.

PROPOSITION 35: Insofar as humans live by the leading of reason, only to that extent do they always necessarily agree in nature.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus homines affectibus qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt esse natura diversi (per propositionem 33 hujus) et invicem contrarii (per propositionem præcedentem). Sed eatenus homines tantum agere dicuntur quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt (per propositionem 3 partis III) atque adeo quicquid ex humana natura quatenus ratione definitur, sequitur id (per definitionem 2 partis III) per solam humanam naturam tanquam per proximam suam causam debet intelligi. Sed quia unusquisque ex suæ naturæ legibus id appetit quod bonum et id amovere conatur quod malum esse judicat (per propositionem 19 hujus) et cum præterea id quod ex dictamine rationis bonum aut malum esse judicamus, necessario bonum aut malum sit (per propositionem 41 partis II). Ergo homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt eatenus tantum ea necessario agunt quæ humanæ naturæ et consequenter unicuique homini necessario bona sunt hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 31 hujus) quæ cum natura uniuscujusque hominis conveniunt atque adeo homines etiam inter se quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, necessario semper conveniunt. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Insofar as men are assailed by affects which are passions, they can be diverse by nature (by Proposition 33 of this Part) and mutually contrary (by the preceding Proposition). But only to that extent are men said to act, namely, insofar as they live under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 3 of Part 3); and therefore whatever follows from human nature, insofar as it is defined by reason, (by Definition 2 of Part 3) must be understood to be through human nature alone as through its proximate cause. But since each person, by the laws of his own nature, strives after what he judges to be good and tries to remove what he judges to be evil (by Proposition 19 of this Part), and since, moreover, what we judge by the dictate of reason to be good or evil is necessarily good or evil (by Proposition 41 of Part 2), therefore men, insofar as they live under the guidance of reason, only to that extent necessarily do those things which are good for human nature and, consequently, necessarily good for each individual man; that is (by the Corollary of Proposition 31 of this Part), the things which agree with the nature of each and every man; and so men also among themselves, insofar as they live under the guidance of reason, necessarily always agree. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM I: Nihil singulare in rerum natura datur quod homini sit utilius quam homo qui ex ductu rationis vivit. Nam id homini utilissimum est quod cum sua natura maxime convenit (per corollarium propositionis 31 hujus) hoc est (ut per se notum) homo. At homo ex legibus suæ naturæ absolute agit quando ex ductu rationis vivit (per definitionem 2 partis III) et eatenus tantum cum natura alterius hominis necessario semper convenit (per propositionem præcedentem); ergo homini nihil inter res singulares utilius datur quam homo etc.

COROLLARY 1: Nothing singular in the nature of things is given that is more useful to a man than a man who lives under the guidance of reason. For that is most useful to a man which agrees most with his own nature (by the Corollary of Proposition 31 of this), that is (as is self-evident), man. But a man acts absolutely from the laws of his nature when he lives under the guidance of reason (by Definition 2 of Part III), and only to that extent does he necessarily always agree with the nature of another man (by the preceding Proposition); therefore for a man nothing among singular things is given more useful than man, etc.

Q.E.D.

WHICH WAS TO BE DEMONSTRATED.

COROLLARIUM II: Cum maxime unusquisque homo suum sibi utile quærit, tum maxime homines sunt sibi invicem utiles. Nam quo magis unusquisque suum utile quærit et se conservare conatur eo magis virtute præditus est (per propositionem 20 hujus) sive quod idem est (per definitionem 8 hujus) eo majore potentia præditus est ad agendum ex suæ naturæ legibus hoc est (per propositionem 3 partis III) ad vivendum ex ductu rationis. At homines tum maxime natura conveniunt cum ex ductu rationis vivunt (per propositionem præcedentem); ergo (per præcedens corollarium) tum maxime homines erunt sibi invicem utiles cum maxime unusquisque suum utile sibi quærit.

COROLLARY 2: When most of all each man seeks his own utility for himself, then most of all men are useful to one another. For the more each one seeks his own utility and endeavors to preserve himself, by so much the more he is endowed with virtue (by proposition 20 of this), or, what is the same (by definition 8 of this), he is endowed with the greater power for acting according to the laws of his nature—that is (by proposition 3 of part 3), for living under the guidance of reason. But men then most of all agree by nature when they live under the guidance of reason (by the preceding proposition); therefore (by the preceding corollary) men will then most of all be mutually useful when most of all each one seeks his own utility for himself.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM: Quæ modo ostendimus, ipsa etiam experientia quotidie tot tamque luculentis testimoniis testatur ut omnibus fere in ore sit : hominem homini Deum esse. Fit tamen raro ut homines ex ductu rationis vivant sed cum iis ita comparatum est ut plerumque invidi atque invicem molesti sint. At nihilominus vitam solitariam vix transigere queunt ita ut plerisque illa definitio quod homo sit animal sociale, valde arriserit et revera res ita se habet ut ex hominum communi societate multo plura commoda oriantur quam damna.

SCHOLIUM: What we have just shown, experience itself also daily testifies with so many and such luculent testimonies that it is on almost everyone’s lips: that man is a god to man. Yet it rarely happens that men live under the guidance of reason, but their condition is such that for the most part they are envious and troublesome to one another. Nevertheless, they can scarcely pass a solitary life, so that to most people that definition, that man is a social animal, has greatly pleased; and in reality the matter stands thus: that from the common society of men far more advantages arise than harms.

Rideant igitur quantum velint res humanas satyrici easque detestentur theologi et laudent quantum possunt melancholici vitam incultam et agrestem hominesque contemnant et admirentur bruta; experientur tamen homines mutuo auxilio ea quibus indigent multo facilius sibi parare et non nisi junctis viribus pericula quæ ubique imminent, vitare posse; ut jam taceam quod multo præstabilius sit et cognitione nostra magis dignum hominum quam brutorum facta contemplari. Sed de his alias prolixius.

Let satirists, then, laugh at human affairs as much as they will, and let theologians detest them, and let melancholics praise, as much as they can, an uncultivated and agrestic life, and despise men and admire brutes; nevertheless men will experience that by mutual aid they can procure for themselves the things they need much more easily, and that only with conjoined forces can they avoid the perils which everywhere are imminent; not to mention that it is far more preferable and more worthy of our cognition to contemplate the deeds of men rather than of brutes. But of these things elsewhere more prolixly.

PROPOSITIO XXXVI: Summum bonum eorum qui virtutem sectantur, omnibus commune est eoque omnes æque gaudere possunt.

PROPOSITION 36: The summum bonum of those who follow virtue is common to all, and in it all can equally rejoice.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex virtute agere est ex ductu rationis agere (per propositionem 24 hujus) et quicquid ex ratione conamur agere, est intelligere (per propositionem 26 hujus) atque adeo (per propositionem 28 hujus) summum bonum eorum qui virtutem sectantur, est Deum cognoscere hoc est (per propositionem 47 partis II et ejusdem scholium) bonum quod omnibus hominibus commune est et ab omnibus hominibus quatenus ejusdem sunt naturæ, possideri æque potest. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: To act from virtue is to act from the guidance of reason (by proposition 24 of this); and whatever we endeavor to do from reason is to understand (by proposition 26 of this); and thus (by proposition 28 of this) the highest good of those who follow virtue is to know God, that is (by proposition 47 of part 2 and the scholium of the same), the good which is common to all men and can be possessed equally by all men, insofar as they are of the same nature. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Si quis autem roget quid si summum bonum eorum qui virtutem sectantur, non esset omnibus commune? an non inde ut supra (vide propositionem 34 hujus) sequeretur quod homines qui ex ductu rationis vivunt hoc est (per propositionem 35 hujus) homines quatenus natura conveniunt, essent invicem contrarii? Is hoc sibi responsum habeat non ex accidenti sed ex ipsa natura rationis oriri ut hominis summum bonum omnibus sit commune, nimirum quia ex ipsa humana essentia quatenus ratione definitur, deducitur et quia homo nec esse nec concipi posset si potestatem non haberet gaudendi hoc summo bono.

SCHOLIUM: But if someone should ask, what if the highest good of those who follow virtue were not common to all? would it not then, as above (see proposition 34 of this), follow that men who live under the guidance of reason, that is (by proposition 35 of this) men insofar as they agree in nature, would be contrary to one another? Let him have this answer for himself: that it arises not from accident but from the very nature of reason that man’s highest good is common to all, namely because it is deduced from human essence itself, insofar as it is defined by reason, and because man could neither be nor be conceived if he did not have the power of rejoicing in this highest good.

Pertinet namque (per propositionem 47 partis II) ad mentis humanæ essentiam adæquatam habere cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei.

For it pertains (by proposition 47 of part 2) to the essence of the human mind to have an adequate cognition of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

PROPOSITIO XXXVII: Bonum quod unusquisque qui sectatur virtutem, sibi appetit, reliquis hominibus etiam cupiet et eo magis quo majorem Dei habuerit cognitionem.

PROPOSITION 37: The good which each person who follows virtue seeks for himself, he will also desire for other human beings, and all the more, the greater knowledge of God he has.

DEMONSTRATIO: Homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, sunt homini utilissimi (per corollarium I propositionis 35 hujus) atque adeo (per propositionem 19 hujus) ex ductu rationis conabimur necessario efficere ut homines ex ductu rationis vivant. At bonum quod unusquisque qui ex rationis dictamine vivit hoc est (per propositionem 24 hujus) qui virtutem sectatur, sibi appetit, est intelligere (per propositionem 26 hujus); ergo bonum quod unusquisque qui virtutem sectatur, sibi appetit, reliquis hominibus etiam cupiet. Deinde cupiditas quatenus ad mentem refertur, est ipsa mentis essentia (per 1 affectuum definitionem); mentis autem essentia in cognitione consistit (per propositionem 11 partis II) quæ Dei cognitionem involvit (per propositionem 47 partis II) et sine qua (per propositionem 15 partis I) nec esse nec concipi potest adeoque quo mentis essentia majorem Dei cognitionem involvit, eo cupiditas qua is qui virtutem sectatur, bonum quod sibi appetit, alteri cupit, etiam major erit.

DEMONSTRATION: Men, insofar as they live under the guidance of reason, are most useful to man (by corollary 1 of proposition 35 of this), and therefore (by proposition 19 of this) under the guidance of reason we shall necessarily strive to bring it about that men live under the guidance of reason. But the good which each person who lives by the dictate of reason, that is (by proposition 24 of this) who pursues virtue, desires for himself is to understand (by proposition 26 of this); therefore the good which each person who pursues virtue desires for himself, he will also desire for the remaining men. Next, desire, insofar as it is referred to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (by definition 1 of the Affects); but the essence of the mind consists in cognition (by proposition 11 of part 2), which involves the cognition of God (by proposition 47 of part 2), and without which (by proposition 15 of part 1) it can neither be nor be conceived; and so, the more the essence of the mind involves a greater cognition of God, the greater also will be the desire with which he who pursues virtue desires for another the good which he desires for himself.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

ALITER: Bonum quod homo sibi appetit et amat, constantius amabit si viderit alios idem amare (per propositionem 31 partis III) atque adeo (per corollarium ejusdem propositionis) conabitur ut reliqui idem ament et quia hoc bonum (per propositionem præcedentem) omnibus commune est eoque omnes gaudere possunt, conabitur ergo (per eandem rationem) ut omnes eodem gaudeant et (per propositionem 37 partis III) eo magis quo hoc bono magis fruetur. Q.E.D.

OTHERWISE: The good which a man appetites and loves, he will love more constantly if he sees others love the same (by Proposition 31 of Part 3) and thus (by the corollary of the same proposition) he will strive that the rest love the same; and because this good (by the preceding proposition) is common to all and all can rejoice in it, he will therefore strive (by the same reasoning) that all rejoice in the same; and (by Proposition 37 of Part 3) so much the more, the more he will enjoy this good. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM I: Qui ex solo affectu conatur ut reliqui ament quod ipse amat et ut reliqui ex suo ingenio vivant, solo impetu agit et ideo odiosus est præcipue iis quibus alia placent quique propterea etiam student et eodem impetu conantur ut reliqui contra ex ipsorum ingenio vivant. Deinde quoniam summum quod homines ex affectu appetunt bonum sæpe tale est ut unus tantum ejus possit esse compos, hinc fit ut qui amant mente sibi non constent et dum laudes rei quam amant narrare gaudent, timeant credi. At qui reliquos conatur ratione ducere, non impetu sed humaniter et benigne agit et sibi mente maxime constat.

SCHOLIUM 1: He who from sheer affect strives that the rest love what he himself loves, and that the rest live according to his own temperament, acts by mere impetus, and is therefore odious especially to those to whom other things are pleasing, and who on that account likewise strive and with the same impetus attempt that the rest, contrariwise, live according to their temperament. Next, since the highest good which men appetite from affect is often such that only one can be in possession of it, hence it comes about that those who love are not self-consistent in mind, and while they rejoice to narrate the praises of the thing which they love, they fear to be believed. But he who strives to lead the rest by reason acts not by impetus but humanely and benignly, and is most self-consistent in mind.

Porro quicquid cupimus et agimus cujus causa sumus quatenus Dei habemus ideam sive quatenus Deum cognoscimus, ad religionem refero. Cupiditatem autem bene faciendi quæ eo ingeneratur quod ex rationis ductu vivimus, pietatem voco. Cupiditatem deinde qua homo qui ex ductu rationis vivit, tenetur ut reliquos sibi amicitia jungat, honestatem voco et id honestum quod homines qui ex ductu rationis vivunt, laudant et id contra turpe quod conciliandæ amicitiæ repugnat.

Furthermore, whatever we desire and do, of which we are the cause, insofar as we have an idea of God or insofar as we know God, I refer to religion. The desire of doing well which is engendered from the fact that we live under the guidance of reason, I call piety. Then the desire by which a man who lives under the guidance of reason is bound to join others to himself by friendship, I call honorableness; and that is honorable which men who live under the guidance of reason praise, and, on the contrary, that is base which is opposed to the conciliation of friendship.

Præter hæc civitatis etiam quænam sint fundamenta ostendi. Differentia deinde inter veram virtutem et impotentiam facile ex supra dictis percipitur nempe quod vera virtus nihil aliud sit quam ex solo rationis ductu vivere atque adeo impotentia in hoc solo consistit quod homo a rebus quæ extra ipsum sunt, duci se patiatur et ab iis ad ea agendum determinetur quæ rerum externarum communis constitutio, non autem ea quæ ipsa ipsius natura in se sola considerata postulat. Atque hæc illa sunt quæ in scholio propositionis 18 hujus partis demonstrare promisi, ex quibus apparet legem illam de non mactandis brutis magis vana superstitione et muliebri misericordia quam sana ratione fundatam esse.

Besides these, I have also shown what the foundations of the state are. The difference then between true virtue and impotence is easily perceived from what has been said above, namely, that true virtue is nothing other than to live by the sole guidance of reason; and so impotence consists solely in this, that a man allows himself to be led by things which are outside himself, and is determined by them to act toward those things which the common constitution of external things, and not those which his own nature, considered in itself alone, demands. And these are the things which, in the scholium of Proposition 18 of this Part, I promised to demonstrate, from which it appears that that law about not slaughtering brutes is founded more on empty superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason.

Docet quidem ratio nostrum utile quærendi necessitudinem cum hominibus jungere sed non cum brutis aut rebus quarum natura a natura humana est diversa sed idem jus quod illa in nos habent, nos in ea habere. Imo quia uniuscujusque jus virtute seu potentia uniuscujusque definitur, longe majus homines in bruta quam hæc in homines jus habent. Nec tamen nego bruta sentire sed nego quod propterea non liceat nostræ utilitati consulere et iisdem ad libitum uti eademque tractare prout nobis magis convenit quandoquidem nobiscum natura non conveniunt et eorum affectus ab affectibus humanis sunt natura diversi (vide scholium propositionis 57 partis III). Superest ut explicem quid justum, quid injustum, quid peccatum et quid denique meritum sit.

Reason indeed teaches that, in seeking our utile, we should join ourselves in fellowship with human beings, but not with beasts or with things whose nature is diverse from human nature; rather, that we have the same right over them as they have over us. Nay rather, since the right of each is defined by the virtue or power of each, human beings have by far a greater right over beasts than these have over humans. Yet I do not deny that beasts feel; but I deny that on that account it is not lawful to look to our utility and to use them at our pleasure, and to treat them as suits us better, since they do not agree with us in nature, and their affects are by nature different from human affects (see the scholium of proposition 57 of part 3). It remains to explain what is just, what unjust, what sin is, and finally what merit is.

Sed de his vide sequens scholium.

But concerning these, see the following scholium.

SCHOLIUM II : In appendice partis primæ explicare promisi quid laus et vituperium, quid meritum et peccatum, quid justum et injustum sit. Laudem et vituperium quod attinet, in scholio propositionis 29 partis III explicui; de reliquis autem hic jam erit dicendi locus. Sed prius pauca de statu hominis naturali et civili dicenda sunt.

SCHOLIUM 2 : In the appendix of the first part I promised to explicate what praise and vituperation are, what merit and sin, what is just and unjust. As concerns praise and vituperation, I have explained in the scholium of proposition 29 of part 3; but for the remaining matters, here now will be the place to speak. Yet first a few things must be said about the natural and civil state of man.

Existit unusquisque summo naturæ jure et consequenter summo naturæ jure unusquisque ea agit quæ ex suæ naturæ necessitate sequuntur atque adeo summo naturæ jure unusquisque judicat quid bonum, quid malum sit suæque utilitati ex suo ingenio consulit (vide propositiones 19 et 20 hujus) seseque vindicat (vide corollarium II propositionis 40 partis III) et id quod amat, conservare et id quod odio habet, destruere conatur (vide propositionem 28 partis III). Quod si homines ex ductu rationis viverent, potiretur unusquisque (per corollarium I propositionis 35 hujus) hoc suo jure absque ullo alterius damno. Sed quia affectibus sunt obnoxii (per corollarium propositionis 4 hujus) qui potentiam seu virtutem humanam longe superant (per propositionem 6 hujus) ideo sæpe diversi trahuntur (per propositionem 33 hujus) atque sibi invicem sunt contrarii (per propositionem 34 hujus) mutuo dum auxilio indigent (per scholium propositionis 35 hujus). Ut igitur homines concorditer vivere et sibi auxilio esse possint, necesse est ut jure suo naturali cedant et se invicem securos reddant se nihil acturos quod possit in alterius damnum cedere. Qua autem ratione hoc fieri possit ut scilicet homines qui affectibus necessario sunt obnoxii (per corollarium propositionis 4 hujus) atque inconstantes et varii (per propositionem 33 hujus) possint se invicem securos reddere et fidem invicem habere, patet ex propositione 7 hujus partis et propositione 39 partis III.

Each person exists by the highest right of nature, and consequently by the highest right of nature each person does the things that follow from the necessity of his own nature; and thus by the highest right of nature each judges what is good and what is evil, and consults for his own utility according to his own temperament (see Propositions 19 and 20 of this), and vindicates himself (see Corollary 2 of Proposition 40 of Part 3), and strives to preserve what he loves and to destroy what he holds in hatred (see Proposition 28 of Part 3). But if men lived under the guidance of reason, each would enjoy (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 35 of this) this his right without any harm to another. But because they are subject to affects (by the Corollary of Proposition 4 of this), which far surpass human power or virtue (by Proposition 6 of this), therefore they are often drawn in different directions (by Proposition 33 of this) and are contrary to one another (by Proposition 34 of this), even while they need mutual help (by the Scholium of Proposition 35 of this). Therefore, in order that men may live in concord and be of help to one another, it is necessary that they cede their natural right and render one another secure that they will do nothing which could result in another’s harm. But by what method this can be brought about—namely, that men who are necessarily subject to affects (by the Corollary of Proposition 4 of this), and inconstant and variable (by Proposition 33 of this), can render one another secure and have mutual trust—appears from Proposition 7 of this Part and Proposition 39 of Part 3.

Nempe quod nullus affectus coerceri potest nisi affectu fortiore et contrario affectui coercendo et quod unusquisque ab inferendo damno abstinet timore majoris damni. Hac igitur lege societas firmari poterit si modo ipsa sibi vindicet jus quod unusquisque habet sese vindicandi et de bono et malo judicandi quæque adeo potestatem habeat communem vivendi rationem præscribendi legesque ferendi easque non ratione quæ affectus coercere nequit (per scholium propositionis 17 hujus) sed minis firmandi. Hæc autem societas legibus et potestate sese conservandi firmata civitas appellatur et qui ipsius jure defenduntur, cives; ex quibus facile intelligimus nihil in statu naturali dari quod ex omnium consensu bonum aut malum sit quandoquidem unusquisque qui in statu est naturali suæ tantummodo utilitati consulit et ex suo ingenio et quatenus suæ utilitatis tantum habet rationem quid bonum quidve malum sit, decernit et nemini nisi sibi soli obtemperare lege ulla tenetur atque adeo in statu naturali peccatum concipi nequit.

Namely, that no affect can be coerced except by an affect stronger and contrary to the affect to be coerced, and that each one abstains from inflicting harm from fear of a greater harm. By this law, therefore, a society can be made firm, if only it vindicate to itself the right which each one has of vindicating himself and of judging concerning good and evil, and thus have the power to prescribe a common manner of living and to enact laws, and to strengthen these not by reason (which cannot coerce affects, by the scholium to proposition 17 of this part) but by menaces. Now this society, strengthened by laws and by the power of preserving itself, is called a state (civitas), and those who are defended by its right are citizens; from which we easily understand that in the natural state there is nothing given which by the consent of all is good or evil, since each one who is in the natural state consults only his own utility and, from his own ingenium, and in so far as he has regard only to his own utility, determines what is good and what evil, and is bound by no law to obey anyone except himself alone; and thus in the natural state sin cannot be conceived.

At quidem in statu civili ubi et communi consensu decernitur quid bonum quidve malum sit et unusquisque civitati obtemperare tenetur. Est itaque peccatum nihil aliud quam inobedientia quæ propterea solo civitatis jure punitur et contra obedientia civi meritum ducitur quia eo ipso dignus judicatur qui civitatis commodis gaudeat. Deinde in statu naturali nemo ex communi consensu alicujus rei est dominus nec in Natura aliquid datur quod possit dici hujus hominis esse et non illius sed omnia omnium sunt ac proinde in statu naturali nulla potest concipi voluntas unicuique suum tribuendi aut alicui id quod ejus sit eripiendi hoc est in statu naturali nihil fit quod justum aut injustum possit dici; at quidem in statu civili ubi ex communi consensu decernitur quid hujus quidve illius sit.

But indeed in the civil state, where by common consensus it is determined what is good and what evil, each person is bound to obey the state. Sin, therefore, is nothing other than disobedience, which for that reason is punished solely by the right of the state; and conversely, obedience is counted to the citizen as merit, because by that very fact he is judged worthy to rejoice in the advantages of the state. Next, in the natural state, no one by common consensus is lord of any thing, nor in Nature is there anything given that can be said to belong to this man and not to that one, but all things are everyone’s; and hence, in the natural state, no will can be conceived of assigning to each his own or of snatching from anyone that which is his—that is, in the natural state nothing occurs which can be called just or unjust; but indeed in the civil state, where by common consensus it is determined what is of this one and what of that one.

Ex quibus apparet justum et injustum, peccatum et meritum notiones esse extrinsecas, non autem attributa quæ mentis naturam explicent. Sed de his satis.

From which it appears that the just and the unjust, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, not attributes that explain the nature of the mind. But enough about these.

PROPOSITIO XXXVIII: Id quod corpus humanum ita disponit ut pluribus modis possit affici vel quod idem aptum reddit ad corpora externa pluribus modis afficiendum, homini est utile et eo utilius quo corpus ab eo aptius redditur ut pluribus modis afficiatur aliaque corpora afficiat et contra id noxium est quod corpus ad hæc minus aptum reddit.

PROPOSITION 38: That which disposes the human body in such a way that it can be affected in more ways, or which likewise renders it apt to be affected by external bodies in more ways, is useful to a human, and the more useful the more the body by it is rendered more apt both to be affected in more ways and to affect other bodies; and conversely, that is noxious which renders the body less apt for these things.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quo corpus ad hæc aptius redditur, eo mens aptior ad percipiendum redditur (per propositionem 14 partis II) adeoque id quod corpus hac ratione disponit aptumque ad hæc reddit, est necessario bonum seu utile (per propositiones 26 et 27 hujus) et eo utilius quo corpus ad hæc aptius potest reddere et contra (per eandem propositionem 14 partis II inversam et propositiones 26 et 27 hujus) noxium si corpus ad hæc minus aptum reddat. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The more the body is rendered apt for these things, the more the mind is rendered apt for perceiving (by proposition 14 of part 2), and so that which in this way disposes the body and renders it apt for these things is necessarily good or useful (by propositions 26 and 27 of this part), and the more useful the more it can render the body apt for these things; and on the contrary (by the same proposition 14 of part 2 taken inversely, and propositions 26 and 27 of this part) noxious, if it renders the body less apt for these things. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXXIX: Quæ efficiunt ut motus et quietis ratio quam corporis humani partes ad invicem habent, conservetur, bona sunt et ea contra mala quæ efficiunt ut corporis humani partes aliam ad invicem motus et quietis habeant rationem.

PROPOSITION 39: Those things which effect that the ratio of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have among one another be conserved are good, and, conversely, those things are bad which effect that the parts of the human body have another ratio of motion and rest among one another.

DEMONSTRATIO: Corpus humanum indiget ut conservetur plurimis aliis corporibus (per postulatum 4 partis II). At id quod formam humani corporis constituit, in hoc consistit quod ejus partes motus suos certa quadam ratione sibi invicem communicent (per definitionem ante lemma 4, quam vide post propositionem 13 partis II). Ergo quæ efficiunt ut motus et quietis ratio quam corporis humani partes ad invicem habent, conservetur, eadem humani corporis formam conservant et consequenter efficiunt (per postulata 3 et 6 partis II) ut corpus humanum multis modis affici et ut idem corpora externa multis modis afficere possit adeoque (per propositionem præcedentem) bona sunt. Deinde quæ efficiunt ut corporis humani partes aliam motus et quietis rationem obtineant, eadem (per eandem definitionem partis II) efficiunt ut corpus humanum aliam formam induat hoc est (ut per se notum et in fine præfationis hujus partis monuimus) ut corpus humanum destruatur et consequenter ut omnino ineptum reddatur ne possit pluribus modis affici ac proinde (per propositionem præcedentem) mala sunt. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The human body needs, in order to be preserved, very many other bodies (by postulate 4 of part 2). But that which constitutes the form of the human body consists in this: that its parts communicate their motions to one another according to a certain determinate ratio (by the definition before lemma 4, which see after proposition 13 of part 2). Therefore those things which bring it about that the ratio of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have toward one another is preserved, those same things preserve the form of the human body and consequently bring it about (by postulates 3 and 6 of part 2) that the human body is affected in many ways and that the same can affect external bodies in many ways and thus (by the preceding proposition) are good. Next, those things which bring it about that the parts of the human body obtain another ratio of motion and rest, the same (by the same definition of part 2) bring it about that the human body assumes another form, that is (as is self-evident and as we warned at the end of the preface of this part), that the human body is destroyed, and consequently that it is rendered altogether unfit to be affected in many ways; and hence (by the preceding proposition) they are bad. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Quantum hæc menti obesse vel prodesse possunt in quinta parte explicabitur. Sed hic notandum quod corpus tum mortem obire intelligam quando ejus partes ita disponuntur ut aliam motus et quietis rationem ad invicem obtineant. Nam negare non audeo corpus humanum retenta sanguinis circulatione et aliis propter quæ corpus vivere existimatur, posse nihilominus in aliam naturam a sua prorsus diversam mutari.

SCHOLIUM: How much these can harm or profit the mind will be explained in Part Five. But here it is to be noted that I understand the body then to undergo death when its parts are so disposed that they obtain among themselves a different ratio of motion and rest. For I do not dare to deny that the human body, the circulation of the blood being retained and the other things on account of which the body is thought to live remaining, can nevertheless be changed into another nature entirely diverse from its own.

Nam nulla ratio me cogit ut statuam corpus non mori nisi mutetur in cadaver; quin ipsa experientia aliud suadere videtur. Fit namque aliquando ut homo tales patiatur mutationes ut non facile eundem illum esse dixerim, ut de quodam hispano poeta narrare audivi qui morbo correptus fuerat et quamvis ex eo convaluerit, mansit tamen præteritæ suæ vitæ tam oblitus ut fabulas et tragœdias quas fecerat suas non crediderit esse et sane pro infante adulto haberi potuisset si vernaculæ etiam linguæ fuisset oblitus. Et si hoc incredibile videtur, quid de infantibus dicemus?

For no rationale compels me to posit that a body does not die unless it is changed into a cadaver; nay, experience itself seems to suggest otherwise. For sometimes it happens that a man undergoes such mutations that I would not easily say he is the same person, as I heard told of a certain Spanish poet who had been seized by an illness and, although he recovered from it, nevertheless remained so forgetful of his past life that he did not believe the plays and tragedies which he had composed to be his own; and truly he might have been regarded as an adult infant, if he had also forgotten his vernacular tongue. And if this seems incredible, what shall we say of infants?

Quorum naturam homo provectæ ætatis a sua tam diversam esse credit ut persuaderi non posset se unquam infantem fuisse nisi ex aliis de se conjecturam faceret. Sed ne superstitiosis materiam suppeditem movendi novas quæstiones, malo hæc in medio relinquere.

Of whom a man of advanced age believes the nature to be so different from his own that he could not be persuaded that he had ever been an infant unless he made a conjecture about himself from others. But, lest I supply material to the superstitious for setting new questions in motion, I prefer to leave these things in the middle.

PROPOSITIO XL: Quæ ad hominum communem societatem conducunt sive quæ efficiunt ut homines concorditer vivant, utilia sunt et illa contra mala quæ discordiam in civitatem inducunt.

PROPOSITION 40: Those things which conduce to the common society of human beings, or which bring it about that humans live in concord, are useful; and, on the contrary, those things are evils which introduce discord into the state.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam quæ efficiunt ut homines concorditer vivant, simul efficiunt ut ex ductu rationis vivant (per propositionem 35 hujus) atque adeo (per propositiones 26 et 27 hujus) bona sunt et (per eandem rationem) illa contra mala sunt quæ discordias concitant. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For the things which bring it about that men live in concord, at the same time bring it about that they live under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 35 of this); and thus (by Propositions 26 and 27 of this) they are good, and (by the same reasoning) on the contrary those things are evil which excite discords. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XLI: Lætitia directe mala non est sed bona; tristitia autem contra directe est mala.

PROPOSITION 41: Joy is not directly bad but good; sadness, however, on the contrary, is directly bad.

DEMONSTRATIO: Lætitia (per propositionem 11 partis III cum ejusdem scholio) est affectus quo corporis agendi potentia augetur vel juvatur; tristitia autem contra est affectus quo corporis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur adeoque (per propositionem 38 hujus) lætitia directe bona est etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: Joy (by proposition 11 of part 3 together with its scholium) is an affect whereby the body’s power of acting is increased or aided; but sadness, on the contrary, is an affect whereby the body’s power of acting is diminished or constrained, and thus (by proposition 38 of this) joy is directly good, etc. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XLII: Hilaritas excessum habere nequit sed semper bona est et contra melancholia semper mala.

PROPOSITION 42: Cheerfulness cannot have excess but is always good, and conversely melancholy is always bad.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hilaritas (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 11 partis III) est lætitia quæ quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc consistit quod corporis omnes partes pariter sint affectæ hoc est (per propositionem 11 partis III) quod corporis agendi potentia augetur vel juvatur ita ut omnes ejus partes eandem ad invicem motus et quietis rationem obtineant atque adeo (per propositionem 39 hujus) hilaritas semper est bona nec excessum habere potest. At melancholia (cujus etiam definitionem vide in scholio propositionis 11 partis III) est tristitia quæ quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc solo consistit quod corporis agendi potentia absolute minuitur vel coercetur adeoque (per propositionem 38 hujus) semper est mala. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Hilarity (see its definition in the scholium of proposition 11 of part 3) is joy which, insofar as it is referred to the body, consists in this: that all the parts of the body are equally affected, that is (by proposition 11 of part 3) that the body’s power of acting is increased or assisted, so that all its parts obtain among themselves the same ratio of motion and rest; and thus (by proposition 39 of this) hilarity is always good and cannot have excess. But melancholy (whose definition also see in the scholium of proposition 11 of part 3) is sadness which, insofar as it is referred to the body, consists solely in this: that the body’s power of acting is absolutely diminished or constrained; and thus (by proposition 38 of this) it is always bad. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XLIII: Titillatio excessum habere potest et mala esse; dolor autem eatenus potest esse bonus quatenus titillatio seu lætitia est mala.

PROPOSITION 43: Titillation can have excess and be bad; pain, however, can to that extent be good, insofar as titillation or joy is bad.

DEMONSTRATIO: Titillatio est lætitia quæ quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc consistit quod una vel aliquot ejus partes præ reliquis afficiuntur (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 11 partis III) cujus affectus potentia tanta esse potest ut reliquas corporis actiones superet (per propositionem 6 hujus) eique pertinaciter adhæreat atque adeo impediat quominus corpus aptum sit ut plurimis aliis modis afficiatur adeoque (per propositionem 38 hujus) mala esse potest. Deinde dolor qui contra tristitia est, in se solo consideratus non potest esse bonus (per propositionem 41 hujus). Verum quia ejus vis et incrementum definitur potentia causæ externæ cum nostra comparata (per propositionem 5 hujus) possumus ergo hujus affectus infinitos virium concipere gradus et modos (per propositionem 3 hujus) atque adeo eundem talem concipere qui titillationem possit coercere ut excessum non habeat et eatenus (per primam partem propositionis hujus) efficere ne corpus minus aptum reddatur ac proinde eatenus erit bonus. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Titillation is joy which, insofar as it is referred to the body, consists in this: that one or several of its parts are affected more than the rest (see its definition in the scholium to proposition 11 of part 3), whose affect’s power can be so great that it surpasses the remaining actions of the body (by proposition 6 of this) and pertinaciously adheres to it, and thus hinders the body from being apt to be affected in very many other ways, and so (by proposition 38 of this) it can be bad. Next, pain, which on the contrary is sadness, considered in itself alone cannot be good (by proposition 41 of this). But because its force and increase are defined by the power of the external cause compared with ours (by proposition 5 of this), we can therefore conceive infinite degrees and modes of the forces of this affect (by proposition 3 of this), and thus conceive the same such as can restrain titillation so that it does not have excess, and to that extent (by the first part of this proposition) bring it about that the body is not rendered less apt, and accordingly to that extent it will be good. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XLIV: Amor et cupiditas excessum habere possunt.

PROPOSITION 44: Love and cupidity can have excess.

DEMONSTRATIO: Amor est lætitia (per definitionem 6 affectuum) concomitante idea causæ externæ; titillatio igitur (per scholium propositionis 11 partis III) concomitante idea causæ externæ amor est atque adeo amor (per propositionem præcedentem) excessum habere potest. Deinde cupiditas eo est major quo affectus ex quo oritur major est (per propositionem 37 partis III). Quare ut affectus (per propositionem 6 hujus) reliquas hominis actiones superare potest, sic etiam cupiditas quæ ex eodem affectu oritur, reliquas cupiditates superare ac proinde eundem excessum habere poterit quem in præcedenti propositione titillationem habere ostendimus. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Love is joy (by definition 6 of the affects), with the concomitant idea of an external cause; therefore titillation (by the scholium to proposition 11 of part 3), with the concomitant idea of an external cause, is love, and thus love (by the preceding proposition) can have excess. Next, desire is the greater, the greater the affect from which it arises (by proposition 37 of part 3). Wherefore, as an affect (by proposition 6 of this) can surpass the other actions of the human being, so also the desire which arises from the same affect can surpass the other desires, and accordingly can have the same excess which in the preceding proposition we have shown titillation to have. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hilaritas quam bonam esse dixi, concipitur facilius quam observatur. Nam affectus quibus quotidie conflictamur, referuntur plerumque ad aliquam corporis partem quæ præ reliquis afficitur ac proinde affectus ut plurimum excessum habent et mentem in sola unius objecti contemplatione ita detinent ut de aliis cogitare nequeat et quamvis homines pluribus affectibus obnoxii sint atque adeo rari reperiantur qui semper uno eodemque affectu conflictentur, non desunt tamen quibus unus idemque affectus pertinaciter adhæreat. Videmus enim homines aliquando ab uno objecto ita affici ut quamvis præsens non sit, ipsum tamen coram habere credant, quod quando homini non dormienti accidit, eundem delirare dicimus vel insanire nec minus insanire creduntur qui amore ardent quique noctes atque dies solam amasiam vel meretricem somniant quia risum movere solent.

SCHOLIUM: The hilarity which I said to be good is conceived more easily than it is observed. For the affects with which we daily conflict are for the most part referred to some part of the body which is affected before the rest, and consequently the affects for the most part have an excess and so detain the mind in the contemplation of a single object in such a way that it cannot think of others; and although men are liable to many affects and thus those are rare who are always conflicted by one and the same affect, nevertheless there are not lacking those to whom one and the same affect adheres pertinaciously. For we see men sometimes so affected by one object that, although it is not present, nevertheless they believe they have it before them; which, when it happens to a man not sleeping, we say that he is delirious or insane; nor are they believed to be less insane who burn with love and who night and day dream only of the mistress or a prostitute, because they are wont to move laughter.

At cum avarus de nulla alia re quam de lucro vel de nummis cogitet et ambitiosus de gloria etc. hi non creduntur delirare quia molesti solent esse et odio digni æstimantur. Sed revera avaritia, ambitio, libido etc.

But when a miser thinks of nothing else than profit or money, and an ambitious man of glory, etc., these are not believed to be raving, because they are wont to be troublesome and are esteemed worthy of hatred. But in truth avarice, ambition, libido, etc.

delirii species sunt quamvis inter morbos non numerentur.

are species of delirium, although they are not numbered among diseases.

PROPOSITIO XLV: Odium nunquam potest esse bonum.

PROPOSITION 45: Hatred can never be good.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hominem quem odimus destruere conamur (per propositionem 39 partis III) hoc est (per propositionem 37 hujus) aliquid conamur quod malum est. Ergo etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: We endeavor to destroy the man whom we hate (by Proposition 39 of Part 3), that is (by Proposition 37 of this Part), we endeavor something which is evil. Therefore, etc. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Nota me hic et in sequentibus per odium illud tantum intelligere quod est erga homines.

SCHOLIUM: Note that here and in the subsequent sections I understand by hatred only that which is toward men.

COROLLARIUM I: Invidia, irrisio, contemptus, ira, vindicta et reliqui affectus qui ad odium referuntur vel ex eodem oriuntur, mali sunt, quod etiam ex propositione 39 partis III et propositione 37 hujus patet.

COROLLARY 1: Envy, derision, contempt, anger, vengeance, and the remaining affects that are referred to hatred or arise from the same, are evil, as is also evident from proposition 39 of part 3 and proposition 37 of this.

COROLLARIUM II: Quicquid ex eo quod odio affecti sumus, appetimus, turpe et in civitate injustum est. Quod etiam patet ex propositione 39 partis III et ex definitione turpis et injusti, quas vide in scholiis propositionis 37 hujus.

COROLLARY 2: Whatever we desire as a result of being affected by hatred is shameful and, in the state, unjust. Which also is evident from proposition 39 of part 3 and from the definition of the shameful and the unjust; see them in the scholia to proposition 37 of this.

SCHOLIUM: Inter irrisionem (quam in I corollario malam esse dixi) et risum magnam agnosco differentiam. Nam risus ut et jocus mera est lætitia adeoque modo excessum non habeat, per se bonus est (per propositionem 41 hujus). Nihil profecto nisi torva et tristis superstitio delectari prohibet. Nam qui magis decet famem et sitim extinguere quam melancholiam expellere?

SCHOLIUM: Between derision (which in the 1 corollary I said to be evil) and laughter I acknowledge a great difference. For laughter, as also jest, is pure joy, and so, provided it does not have excess, is good in itself (by proposition 41 of this). Nothing indeed but grim and sad superstition forbids taking delight. For who would deem it more fitting to extinguish hunger and thirst than to expel melancholy?

Mea hæc est ratio et sic animum induxi meum. Nullum numen nec alius nisi invidus mea impotentia et incommodo delectatur nec nobis lacrimas, singultus, metum et alia hujusmodi quæ animi impotentis sunt signa, virtuti ducit sed contra quo majore lætitia afficimur eo ad majorem perfectionem transimus hoc est eo nos magis de natura divina participare necesse est. Rebus itaque uti et iis quantum fieri potest delectari (non quidem ad nauseam usque nam hoc delectari non est) viri est sapientis.

This is my rationale, and thus have I disposed my mind. No numen, nor anyone other than the envious, takes delight in my impotence and incommodity; nor does he lead us to virtue by tears, sobs, fear, and other such things which are signs of an impotent mind, but on the contrary, the more we are affected with joy, the more we pass over to greater perfection, that is, the more it is necessary that we participate in the divine nature. Therefore, to use things and to take delight in them as far as can be done (not indeed to the point of nausea, for that is not to take delight) is the part of a wise man.

Viri inquam sapientis est moderato et suavi cibo et potu se reficere et recreare ut et odoribus, plantarum virentium amœnitate, ornatu, musica, ludis exercitatoriis, theatris et aliis hujusmodi quibus unusquisque absque ullo alterius damno uti potest. Corpus namque humanum ex plurimis diversæ naturæ partibus componitur quæ continuo novo alimento indigent et vario ut totum corpus ad omnia quæ ex ipsius natura sequi possunt, æque aptum sit et consequenter ut mens etiam æque apta sit ad plura simul intelligendum. Hoc itaque vivendi institutum et cum nostris principiis et cum communi praxi optime convenit; quare si quæ alia, hæc vivendi ratio optima est et omnibus modis commendanda nec opus est de his clarius neque prolixius agere.

It is, I say, the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and likewise with odors, with the amenity of green plants, with adornment, music, athletic exercises, theaters, and other things of this sort which each person can use without any harm to another. For the human body is composed of very many parts of diverse nature, which continually need new and varied aliment, so that the whole body may be equally apt for all the things that can follow from its nature, and consequently that the mind also may be equally apt for understanding more things at once. This plan of living therefore agrees most excellently both with our principles and with common praxis; wherefore, if any other, this manner of living is the best and to be commended in every way, nor is there need to treat these matters more clearly nor more prolixly.

PROPOSITIO XLVI: Qui ex ductu rationis vivit, quantum potest conatur alterius in ipsum odium, iram, contemptum etc. amore contra sive generositate compensare.

PROPOSITIO 46: He who lives under the guidance of reason strives, as far as he can, to compensate another’s hatred, anger, contempt, etc., against him with love in return, or with generosity (magnanimity).

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes odii affectus mali sunt (per corollarium I præcedentis propositionis) adeoque qui ex ductu rationis vivit, quantum potest conabitur efficere ne odii affectibus conflictetur (per propositionem 19 hujus) et consequenter (per propositionem 37 hujus) conabitur ne etiam alius eosdem patiatur affectus. At odium odio reciproco augetur et amore contra extingui potest (per propositionem 43 partis III) ita ut odium in amorem transeat (per propositionem 44 partis III). Ergo qui ex ductu rationis vivit, alterius odium etc. amore contra compensare conabitur hoc est generositate (cujus definitionem vide in scholio propositionis 59 partis III). Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: All the affects of hatred are bad (by Corollary 1 of the preceding Proposition), and so he who lives by the guidance of reason will, as far as he can, endeavor to bring it about that he is not afflicted by the affects of hatred (by Proposition 19 of this Part), and consequently (by Proposition 37 of this Part) will endeavor that another also not suffer the same affects. But hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred and, on the contrary, can be extinguished by love (by Proposition 43 of Part 3), so that hatred passes over into love (by Proposition 44 of Part 3). Therefore, he who lives by the guidance of reason will endeavor to compensate another’s hatred, etc., with love on the contrary, that is, with generosity (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 59 of Part 3). Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Qui injurias reciproco odio vindicare vult, misere profecto vivit. At qui contra studet odium amore expugnare, ille sane lætus et secure pugnat; æque facile pluribus hominibus ac uni resistit et fortunæ auxilio quam minime indiget. Quos vero vincit, ii læti cedunt, non quidem ex defectu sed ex incremento virium; quæ omnia adeo clare ex solis amoris et intellectus definitionibus sequuntur ut opus non sit eadem sigillatim demonstrare.

SCHOLIUM: He who wishes to vindicate injuries with reciprocal hatred surely lives miserably. But he who on the contrary strives to overcome hatred by love, he indeed fights glad and secure; just as easily does he resist many men as one, and he needs the aid of Fortune as little as possible. Those whom he conquers yield gladly, not indeed from defect but from an increment of powers; all which things follow so clearly from the mere definitions of love and intellect that there is no need to demonstrate the same severally.

PROPOSITIO XLVII: Spei et metus affectus non possunt esse per se boni.

PROPOSITION 47: The affects of hope and fear cannot be good per se.

DEMONSTRATIO: Spei et metus affectus sine tristitia non dantur. Nam metus est (per 13 affectuum definitionem) tristitia et spes (vide explicationem 12 et 13 affectuum definitionum) non datur sine metu ac proinde (per propositionem 41 hujus) hi affectus non possunt esse per se boni sed tantum quatenus lætitiæ excessum coercere possunt (per propositionem 43 hujus) Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The affects of hope and fear are not given without sadness. For fear is (by Definition 13 of the affects) sadness, and hope (see the explanation of Definitions 12 and 13 of the affects) is not given without fear; and therefore (by Proposition 41 of this) these affects cannot be good in themselves, but only insofar as they can restrain an excess of joy (by Proposition 43 of this). Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Huc accedit quod hi affectus cognitionis defectum et mentis impotentiam indicant et hac de causa etiam securitas, desperatio, gaudium et conscientiæ morsus animi impotentis sunt signa. Nam quamvis securitas et gaudium affectus sint lætitiæ, tristitiam tamen eosdem præcessisse supponunt nempe spem et metum. Quo itaque magis ex ductu rationis vivere conamur eo magis spe minus pendere et metu nosmet liberare et fortunæ quantum possumus imperare conamur nostrasque actiones certo rationis consilio dirigere.

SCHOLIUM: To this is added that these affects indicate a defect of cognition and an impotence of mind, and for this cause even security, desperation, joy, and the stings of conscience are signs of an impotent mind. For although security and joy are affects of gladness, yet they suppose that sadness has preceded them, namely hope and fear. Hence, the more we strive to live under the guidance of reason, the more we strive to depend less on hope and to free ourselves from fear, and to command Fortune as far as we can, and to direct our actions by the sure counsel of reason.

PROPOSITIO XLVIII: Affectus existimationis et despectus semper mali sunt.

PROPOSITION 48: The affects of esteem and of contempt are always evil.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hi enim affectus (per 21 et 22 affectuum definitiones) rationi repugnant adeoque (per propositiones 26 et 27 hujus) mali sunt. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For these affects (by the 21st and 22nd definitions of the affects) are repugnant to reason and hence (by propositions 26 and 27 of this) are evil. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XLIX: Existimatio facile hominem qui existimatur superbum reddit.

PROPOSITION 49: Esteem easily makes the man who is esteemed proud.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si videmus aliquem de nobis plus justo præ amore sentire, facile gloriabimur (per scholium propositionis 41 partis III) sive lætitia afficiemur (per 30 affectuum definitionem) et id boni quod de nobis prædicari audimus, facile credemus (per propositionem 25 partis III) atque adeo de nobis præ amore nostri plus justo sentiemus hoc est (per definitionem 28 affectuum) facile superbiemus. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: If we see someone feel more than is just about us out of love, we shall easily boast (by the scholium of proposition 41 of Part 3) or be affected with joy (by the 30th definition of the affects), and that good which we hear is predicated of us we shall readily believe (by proposition 25 of Part 3), and thus we shall feel more than is just about ourselves out of love of ourselves; that is (by definition 28 of the affects) we shall easily become proud. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO L: Commiseratio in homine qui ex ductu rationis vivit, per se mala et inutilis est.

PROPOSITION 50: Pity in a man who lives by the guidance of reason is in itself bad and useless.

DEMONSTRATIO: Commiseratio enim (per 18 affectuum definitionem) tristitia est ac proinde (per propositionem 41 hujus) per se mala; bonum autem quod ex ea sequitur, quod scilicet hominem cujus nos miseret, a miseria liberare conamur (per corollarium III propositionis 27 partis III) ex solo rationis dictamine facere cupimus (per propositionem 37 hujus) nec nisi ex solo rationis dictamine aliquid quod certo scimus bonum esse, agere possumus (per propositionem 27 hujus) atque adeo commiseratio in homine qui ex ductu rationis vivit, per se mala est et inutilis. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For commiseration (per the 18th definition of the affects) is sadness and therefore (per proposition 41 of this) bad per se; but the good which follows from it, namely that we try to free the man for whom we feel pity from misery (per corollary 3 of proposition 27 of part 3), we desire to do from the sole dictate of reason (per proposition 37 of this); nor can we do anything that we know for certain to be good except from the sole dictate of reason (per proposition 27 of this); and therefore commiseration in a man who lives under the guidance of reason is bad and useless per se. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur quod homo qui ex dictamine rationis vivit, conatur quantum potest efficere ne commiseratione tangatur.

COROLLARY: Hence it follows that the man who lives by the dictate of reason strives as much as he can to bring it about that he is not touched by commiseration.

SCHOLIUM: Qui recte novit omnia ex naturæ divinæ necessitate sequi et secundum æternas naturæ leges et regulas fieri, is sane nihil reperiet quod odio, risu aut contemptu dignum sit nec cujusquam miserebitur sed quantum humana fert virtus, conabitur bene agere ut aiunt et lætari. Huc accedit quod is qui commiserationis affectu facile tangitur et alterius miseria vel lacrimis movetur, sæpe aliquid agit cujus postea ipsum pœnitet tam quia ex affectu nihil agimus quod certo scimus bonum esse quam quia facile falsis lacrimis decipimur. Atque hic expresse loquor de homine qui ex ductu rationis vivit.

SCHOLIUM: He who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature and are done according to the eternal laws and rules of nature will assuredly find nothing worthy of hatred, laughter, or contempt, nor will he commiserate anyone, but, so far as human virtue allows, will endeavor, as they say, to act well and to rejoice. To this it is added that he who is easily touched by the affect of commiseration and is moved by another’s misery or tears often does something which he himself afterwards repents, both because from affect we do nothing which we know for certain to be good, and because we are easily deceived by false tears. And here I speak expressly of the man who lives under the guidance of reason.

Nam qui nec ratione nec commiseratione movetur ut aliis auxilio sit, is recte inhumanus appellatur. Nam (per propositionem 27 partis III) homini dissimilis esse videtur.

For he who is moved neither by reason nor by commiseration to be of help to others is rightly called inhuman. For (by Proposition 27 of Part 3) he seems to be dissimilar to a human being.

PROPOSITIO LI: Favor rationi non repugnat sed cum eadem convenire et ab eadem oriri potest.

PROPOSITION 51: Favor does not conflict with reason, but can agree with it and originate from it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Est enim favor amor erga illum qui alteri benefecit (per 19 affectuum definitionem) atque adeo ad mentem referri potest quatenus hæc agere dicitur (per propositionem 59 partis III) hoc est (per propositionem 3 partis III) quatenus intelligit ac proinde cum ratione convenit etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For favor is love toward him who has done good to another (by the 19th definition of the affects), and thus can be referred to the mind insofar as this is said to act (by proposition 59 of part 3), that is (by proposition 3 of part 3) insofar as it understands, and accordingly it agrees with reason, etc. Q.E.D.

ALITER: Qui ex ductu rationis vivit, bonum quod sibi appetit alteri etiam cupit (per propositionem 37 hujus); quare ex eo quod ipse aliquem videt alteri benefacere, ipsius benefaciendi conatus juvatur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 partis III) lætabitur idque (ex hypothesi) concomitante idea illius qui alteri benefecit ac proinde (per 19 affectuum definitionem) ei favet. Q.E.D.

OTHERWISE: He who lives under the duct (guidance) of reason also desires for another the good which he seeks for himself (by Proposition 37 of this Part); wherefore, from the fact that he himself sees someone benefit another, his conatus of benefitting is aided, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), he will rejoice, and this (by the hypothesis) with the concomitant idea of him who has benefited another, and hence (by the 19th definition of the affects) he favors him. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Indignatio prout ipsa a nobis definitur (vide 20 affectuum definitionem) est necessario mala (per propositionem 45 hujus) sed notandum quod quando summa potestas desiderio quo tenetur tutandæ pacis, civem punit qui alteri injuriam fecit, eandem civi indignari non dico quia non odio percita ad perdendum civem sed pietate mota eundem punit.

SCHOLIUM: Indignation, in so far as it is defined by us (see the 20th definition of the affects), is necessarily evil (by Proposition 45 of this); but it should be noted that when the supreme power, by the desire by which it is held to safeguard peace, punishes a citizen who has done injury to another, I do not say that it is indignant at the citizen, because it punishes him not incited by hatred to destroy the citizen, but moved by duty.

PROPOSITIO LII: Acquiescentia in se ipso ex ratione oriri potest et ea sola acquiescentia quæ ex ratione oritur, summa est quæ potest dari.

PROPOSITION 52: Acquiescence in oneself can arise from reason, and only that acquiescence which arises from reason is the highest that can be given.

DEMONSTRATIO: Acquiescentia in se ipso est lætitia orta ex eo quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur (per 25 affectuum definitionem). At vera hominis agendi potentia seu virtus est ipsa ratio (per propositionem 3 partis III) quam homo clare et distincte contemplatur (per propositiones 40 et 43 partis II). Ergo acquiescentia in se ipso ex ratione oritur. Deinde nihil homo dum se ipsum contemplatur, clare et distincte sive adæquate percipit nisi ea quæ ex ipsius agendi potentia sequuntur (per definitionem 2 partis III) hoc est (per propositionem 3 partis III) quæ ex ipsius intelligendi potentia sequuntur adeoque ex sola hac contemplatione summa quæ dari potest acquiescentia oritur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Acquiescence in oneself is joy arisen from the fact that a man contemplates himself and his power of acting (by definition 25 of the emotions). But the true power of acting of man, or virtue, is reason itself (by proposition 3 of part 3), which a man contemplates clearly and distinctly (by propositions 40 and 43 of part 2). Therefore acquiescence in oneself arises from reason. Next, while a man contemplates himself, he perceives nothing clearly and distinctly, that is, adequately, except those things which follow from his power of acting (by definition 2 of part 3), that is (by proposition 3 of part 3), which follow from his power of understanding; and so from this contemplation alone the highest acquiescence that can be given arises. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Est revera acquiescentia in se ipso summum quod sperare possumus. Nam (ut propositione 25 hujus ostendimus) nemo suum esse alicujus finis causa conservare conatur et quia hæc acquiescentia magis magisque fovetur et corroboratur laudibus (per corollarium propositionis 53 partis III) et contra (per corollarium propositionis 55 partis III) vituperio magis magisque turbatur, ideo gloria maxime ducimur et vitam cum probro vix ferre possumus.

SCHOLIUM: Acquiescence in oneself is indeed the highest thing that we can hope for. For (as we have shown in proposition 25 of this Part) no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of some end; and because this acquiescence is more and more fostered and corroborated by praises (by the corollary of proposition 53 of part 3), and on the contrary (by the corollary of proposition 55 of part 3) is more and more disturbed by blame, therefore we are led most of all by glory, and can scarcely bear life with disgrace.

PROPOSITIO LIII: Humilitas virtus non est sive ex ratione non oritur.

PROPOSITION 53: Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason.

DEMONSTRATIO: Humilitas est tristitia quæ ex eo oritur quod homo suam impotentiam contemplatur (per 26 affectuum definitionem). Quatenus autem homo se ipsum vera ratione cognoscit eatenus suam essentiam intelligere supponitur hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III) suam potentiam. Quare si homo dum se ipsum contemplatur, aliquam suam impotentiam percipit, id non ex eo est quod se intelligit sed (ut propositione 55 partis III ostendimus) ex eo quod ipsius agendi potentia coercetur. Quod si supponamus hominem suam impotentiam concipere ex eo quod aliquid se potentius intelligit cujus cognitione suam agendi potentiam determinat, tum nihil aliud concipimus quam quod homo se ipsum distincte intelligit sive (per propositionem 26 hujus) quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur.

DEMONSTRATION: Humility is sadness which arises from this, that a man contemplates his impotence (by the 26th definition of the affects). Insofar, however, as a man knows himself by true reason, to that extent he is presupposed to understand his essence, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3) his power. Wherefore, if a man, while he contemplates himself, perceives some impotence of his, that is not from his understanding himself but (as we have shown by Proposition 55 of Part 3) from the fact that his power of acting is constrained. But if we suppose that a man conceives his impotence from the fact that he understands something more powerful than himself, by the cognition of which he determines his power of acting, then we conceive nothing else than that the man understands himself distinctly, or (by Proposition 26 of this Part) that his power of acting is aided.

Quare humilitas seu tristitia quæ ex eo oritur quod homo suam impotentiam contemplatur, non ex vera contemplatione seu ratione oritur nec virtus sed passio est. Q.E.D.

Wherefore humility, or the sadness which arises from the fact that a man contemplates his impotence, does not arise from true contemplation or reason, nor is it a virtue but a passion. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO LIV: Pœnitentia virtus non est sive ex ratione non oritur sed is quem facti pœnitet, bis miser seu impotens est.

PROPOSITION 54: Penitence is not a virtue, that is, it does not arise from reason, but he who repents of a deed is twice wretched or impotent.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus prima pars demonstratur ut præcedens propositio. Secunda autem ex sola hujus affectus definitione (vide 27 affectuum definitionem) patet. Nam primo prava cupiditate, dein tristitia vinci se patitur.

DEMONSTRATION: The first part of this is demonstrated as the preceding proposition. The second, however, is evident from the definition of this affect alone (see definition 27 of the affects). For first by perverse cupidity, then by sadness, he allows himself to be conquered.

SCHOLIUM: Quia homines raro ex dictamine rationis vivunt, ideo hi duo affectus nempe humilitas et pœnitentia et præter hos spes et metus plus utilitatis quam damni afferunt atque adeo quandoquidem peccandum est, in istam partem potius peccandum. Nam si homines animo impotentes æque omnes superbirent, nullius rei ipsos puderet nec ipsi quicquam metuerent, qui vinculis conjungi constringique possent? Terret vulgus nisi metuat; quare non mirum quod prophetæ qui non paucorum sed communi utilitati consuluerunt, tantopere humilitatem, pœnitentiam et reverentiam commendaverint.

SCHOLIUM: Because humans rarely live by the dictate of reason, therefore these two affects, namely humility and penitence, and besides these hope and fear, bring more utility than damage; and hence, since one must sin, one should rather sin in that direction. For if men, impotent in soul, were all alike to be proud, they would be ashamed of nothing, nor would they themselves fear anything—who could be joined and constrained by bonds? The common crowd terrifies unless it fears; wherefore it is not a wonder that the prophets, who looked not to the utility of a few but to the common utility, so greatly commended humility, penitence, and reverence.

Et revera qui hisce affectibus sunt obnoxii, multo facilius quam alii duci possunt ut tandem ex ductu rationis vivant hoc est ut liberi sint et beatorum vita fruantur.

And indeed those who are subject to these affections can be led much more easily than others to live at length by the guidance of reason, that is, to be free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.

PROPOSITIO LV: Maxima superbia vel abjectio est maxima sui ignorantia.

PROPOSITION 55: The greatest pride or abjection is the greatest ignorance of oneself.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex definitionibus 28 et 29 affectuum.

DEMONSTRATION: It is evident from definitions 28 and 29 of the affects.

PROPOSITIO LVI: Maxima superbia vel abjectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat.

PROPOSITION 56: The greatest superbity or abjection indicates the greatest impotence of mind.

DEMONSTRATIO: Primum virtutis fundamentum est suum esse conservare (per corollarium propositionis 22 hujus) idque ex ductu rationis (per propositionem 24 hujus). Qui igitur se ipsum ignorat, omnium virtutum fundamentum et consequenter omnes virtutes ignorat. Deinde ex virtute agere nihil aliud est quam ex ductu rationis agere (per propositionem 24 hujus) et qui ex ductu rationis agit, scire necessario debet se ex ductu rationis agere (per propositionem 43 partis II); qui itaque se ipsum et consequenter (ut jam jam ostendimus) omnes virtutes maxime ignorat, is minime ex virtute agit hoc est (ut ex definitione 8 hujus patet) maxime animo est impotens atque adeo (per propositionem præcedentem) maxima superbia vel abjectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The first foundation of virtue is to conserve one’s being (by the corollary of Proposition 22 of this), and that under the leading of reason (by Proposition 24 of this). Therefore he who is ignorant of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues and, consequently, of all the virtues. Next, to act from virtue is nothing other than to act under the leading of reason (by Proposition 24 of this); and he who acts under the leading of reason must necessarily know that he acts under the leading of reason (by Proposition 43 of Part 2); he, therefore, who most of all is ignorant of himself and consequently (as we have just now shown) of all the virtues, least of all acts from virtue, that is (as is evident from Definition 8 of this) is most impotent in mind; and thus (by the preceding proposition) the greatest pride or abjection indicates the greatest impotence of mind. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc clare sequitur superbos et abjectos maxime affectibus esse obnoxios.

COROLLARY: Hence it clearly follows that the proud and the abject are most liable to affects.

SCHOLIUM: Abjectio tamen facilius corrigi potest quam superbia quandoquidem hæc lætitiæ, illa autem tristitiæ est affectus atque adeo (per propositionem 18 hujus) hæc illa fortior est.

SCHOLIUM: Abjection, however, can be corrected more easily than pride, since pride is an affect of joy, but abjection of sadness; and thus (by Proposition 18 of this) pride is stronger than abjection.

PROPOSITIO LVII: Superbus parasitorum seu adulatorum præsentiam amat, generosorum autem odit.

PROPOSITION 57: The proud man loves the presence of parasites or adulators, but hates that of the generous.

DEMONSTRATIO: Superbia est lætitia orta ex eo quod homo de se plus justo sentit (per definitiones 28 et 6 affectuum) quam opinionem homo superbus quantum potest fovere conabitur (vide scholium propositionis 13 partis III) adeoque superbi parasitorum vel adulatorum (horum definitiones omisi quia nimis noti sunt) præsentiam amabunt et generosorum qui de ipsis ut par est, sentiunt, fugient. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Pride is joy arising from the fact that a man feels about himself more than is just (by definitions 28 and 6 of the affects), which opinion the proud man will strive to foster as much as he can (see the scholium to Proposition 13 of Part 3), and so the proud will love the presence of parasites or adulators (I have omitted the definitions of these because they are too well known) and will flee the generous, who think about them as is fitting. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Nimis longum foret hic omnia superbiæ mala enumerare quandoquidem omnibus affectibus obnoxii sunt superbi sed nullis minus quam affectibus amoris et misericordiæ. Sed hic minime tacendum est quod ille etiam superbus vocetur qui de reliquis minus justo sentit atque adeo hoc sensu superbia definienda est quod sit lætitia orta ex falsa opinione quod homo se supra reliquos esse putat. Et abjectio huic superbiæ contraria definienda esset tristitia orta ex falsa opinione quod homo se infra reliquos esse credit. At hoc posito facile concipimus superbum necessario esse invidum (vide scholium propositionis 55 partis III) et eos maxime odio habere qui maxime ob virtutes laudantur nec facile eorum odium amore aut beneficio vinci (vide scholium propositionis 41 partis III) et eorum tantummodo præsentia delectari qui animo ejus impotenti morem gerunt et ex stulto insanum faciunt.

SCHOLIUM: It would be too long to enumerate here all the evils of pride, since the proud are liable to all affects, but to none less than to the affects of love and mercy. But here it must by no means be kept silent that he too is called proud who thinks less than is just of the rest; and thus in this sense pride is to be defined as joy arising from a false opinion that a man deems himself above the rest. And abjection, contrary to this pride, would be defined as sadness arising from a false opinion that a man believes himself below the rest. But this posited, we easily conceive that the proud man is necessarily envious (see the scholium to Proposition 55 of Part 3), and that he holds in the greatest hatred those who are most praised on account of their virtues, nor is their hatred easily conquered by love or by beneficence (see the scholium to Proposition 41 of Part 3), and that they are delighted only by the presence of those who humor his impotent mind and make from a fool a madman.

Abjectio quamvis superbiæ sit contraria, est tamen abjectus superbo proximus. Nam quandoquidem ejus tristitia ex eo oritur quod suam impotentiam ex aliorum potentia seu virtute judicat, levabitur ergo ejus tristitia hoc est lætabitur si ejus imaginatio in alienis vitiis contemplandis occupetur, unde illud proverbium natum: solamen miseris socios habuisse malorum; et contra eo magis contristabitur quo se magis infra reliquos esse crediderit; unde fit ut nulli magis ad invidiam sint proni quam abjecti et ut isti maxime hominum facta observare conentur ad carpendum magis quam ad eadem corrigendum et ut tandem solam abjectionem laudent eaque glorientur sed ita ut tamen abjecti videantur. Atque hæc ex hoc affectu tam necessario sequuntur quam ex natura trianguli quod ejus tres anguli æquales sint duobus rectis et jam dixi me hos et similes affectus malos vocare quatenus ad solam humanam utilitatem attendo.

Although abjection is contrary to pride, nevertheless the abject man is nearest to the proud man. For since his sadness arises from the fact that he judges his own impotence from others’ power or virtue, his sadness will therefore be lightened, that is, he will rejoice, if his imagination is occupied in contemplating others’ vices, whence that proverb was born: a solace to the miserable to have had companions in misfortunes; and conversely he will be the more saddened the more he has believed himself to be below the rest; whence it comes about that none are more prone to envy than the abject, and that these especially strive to observe men’s deeds to carp at them rather than to correct the same, and that at last they praise only abjection and boast of it, but in such a way, however, that they may nonetheless seem abject. And these follow from this affect as necessarily as from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and I have already said that I call these and similar affects bad, insofar as I attend only to human utility.

Sed naturæ leges communem naturæ ordinem cujus homo pars est, respiciunt; quod hic in transitu monere volui ne quis putaret me hic hominum vitia et absurda facta narrare, non autem rerum naturam et proprietates demonstrare voluisse. Nam ut in præfatione partis tertiæ dixi, humanos affectus eorumque proprietates perinde considero ac reliqua naturalia. Et sane humani affectus si non humanam, naturæ saltem potentiam et artificium non minus indicant quam multa alia quæ admiramur quorumque contemplatione delectamur.

But the laws of nature have regard to the common order of nature, of which man is a part; which I wished here to note in passing, lest anyone should think that I am here recounting human vices and absurd deeds, and not that I have wished to demonstrate the nature of things and their properties. For, as I said in the preface of Part 3, I consider human affects and their properties just as I do other natural things. And indeed human affects, if not the human, at least indicate no less the potency and artifice of nature than many other things which we admire and in the contemplation of which we take delight.

Sed pergo de affectibus ea notare quæ hominibus utilitatem adferunt vel quæ iisdem damnum inferunt.

But I proceed, concerning the affects, to note those which bring utility to human beings, or which upon those same inflict damage.

PROPOSITIO LVIII: Gloria rationi non repugnat sed ab ea oriri potest.

PROPOSITION 58: Glory is not repugnant to reason but can arise from it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex 30 affectuum definitione et ex definitione honesti, quam vide in scholio I propositionis 37 hujus.

DEMONSTRATION: It is evident from the 30th definition of the affects and from the definition of the honorable, which see in Scholium 1 of Proposition 37 of this.

SCHOLIUM: Vana quæ dicitur gloria est acquiescentia in se ipso quæ sola vulgi opinione fovetur eaque cessante cessat ipsa acquiescentia hoc est (per scholium propositionis 52 hujus) summum bonum quod unusquisque amat; unde fit ut qui vulgi opinione gloriatur, quotidiana cura anxius nitatur, faciat, experiatur ut famam conservet. Est namque vulgus varius et inconstans atque adeo nisi conservetur fama, cito abolescit; imo quia omnes vulgi captare applausus cupiunt, facile unusquisque alterius famam reprimit, ex quo quandoquidem de summo quod æstimatur bono certatur, ingens libido oritur se invicem quocunque modo opprimendi et qui tandem victor evadit, gloriatur magis quod alteri obfuit quam quod sibi profuit. Est igitur hæc gloria seu acquiescentia revera vana quia nulla est.

SCHOLIUM: The vainglory so called is an acquiescence in oneself which is fostered solely by the opinion of the crowd, and that ceasing, the acquiescence itself ceases, that is (per the scholium of Proposition 52 of this) the supreme good which each person loves; whence it comes about that he who glories in the crowd’s opinion, anxious with daily care, strives, does, makes trial, so as to conserve his fame. For the crowd is variable and inconstant, and thus, unless fame be conserved, it quickly fades away; nay indeed, because all desire to catch the applause of the crowd, each easily represses another’s fame, whence, since there is contest over the highest thing that is esteemed as good, a vast libido arises of oppressing one another by whatever means, and he who at length comes out the victor glories more that he has harmed the other than that he has benefited himself. Therefore this glory, or acquiescence, is truly vain because it is nothing.

Quæ de pudore notanda sunt, colliguntur facile ex iis quæ de misericordia et pœnitentia diximus. Hoc tantum addo quod ut commiseratio sic etiam pudor quamvis non sit virtus, bonus tamen est quatenus indicat homini qui pudore suffunditur, cupiditatem inesse honeste vivendi, sicut dolor qui eatenus bonus dicitur quatenus indicat partem læsam nondum esse putrefactam; quare quamvis homo quem facti alicujus pudet, revera sit tristis, est tamen perfectior impudenti qui nullam habet honeste vivendi cupiditatem. Atque hæc sunt quæ de affectibus lætitiæ et tristitiæ notare susceperam.

The things to be noted about shame are easily gathered from what we have said about pity and penitence. This only I add: that, just as commiseration, so also shame, although it is not a virtue, is nevertheless good insofar as it indicates to the man who is suffused with shame a desire is present of living honorably, just as pain, which is called good to that extent, insofar as it indicates that the injured part is not yet putrefied; wherefore, although the man who is ashamed of some deed is indeed sad, he is nevertheless more perfect than the impudent one who has no desire of living honorably. And these are the things which I had undertaken to note concerning the affects of joy and sadness.

Ad cupiditates quod attinet, hæ sane bonæ aut malæ sunt quatenus ex bonis aut malis affectibus oriuntur. Sed omnes revera quatenus ex affectibus qui passiones sunt in nobis ingenerantur, cæcæ sunt (ut facile colligitur ex iis quæ in scholio propositionis 44 hujus diximus) nec ullius usus essent si homines facile duci possent ut ex solo rationis dictamine viverent, ut jam paucis ostendam.

As for desires, these indeed are good or bad insofar as they arise from good or bad affects. But all of them, in truth, insofar as they are engendered from affects which are passions in us, are blind (as is easily gathered from what we said in the scholium to proposition 44 of this) and would be of no use if men could readily be led to live by the dictate of reason alone, as I shall now show briefly.

PROPOSITIO LIX: Ad omnes actiones ad quas ex affectu qui passio est, determinamur, possumus absque eo a ratione determinari.

PROPOSITION 59: To all actions to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can, without it, be determined by reason.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex ratione agere nihil aliud est (per propositionem 3 et definitionem 2 partis III) quam ea agere quæ ex necessitate nostræ naturæ in se sola consideratæ sequuntur. At tristitia eatenus mala est quatenus hanc agendi potentiam minuit vel coercet (per propositionem 41 hujus); ergo ex hoc affectu ad nullam actionem possumus determinari quam non possemus agere si ratione duceremur. Præterea lætitia eatenus mala est quatenus impedit quominus homo ad agendum sit aptus (per propositiones 41 et 43 hujus) atque adeo eatenus etiam ad nullam actionem determinari possumus quam non possemus agere si ratione duceremur.

DEMONSTRATION: To act from reason is nothing else (by Proposition 3 and Definition 2 of Part III) than to do those things which follow from the necessity of our nature considered in itself alone. But sadness is bad to that extent insofar as it diminishes or constrains this power of acting (by Proposition 41 of this); therefore from this affect we can be determined to no action which we could not do if we were led by reason. Moreover joy is bad to that extent insofar as it prevents a man from being apt for acting (by Propositions 41 and 43 of this) and so, to that extent also, we can be determined to no action which we could not do if we were led by reason.

Denique quatenus lætitia bona est eatenus cum ratione convenit (consistit enim in eo quod hominis agendi potentia augetur vel juvatur) nec passio est nisi quatenus hominis agendi potentia non eo usque augetur ut se suasque actiones adæquate concipiat (per propositionem 3 partis III cum ejus scholio). Quare si homo lætitia affectus ad tantam perfectionem duceretur ut se suasque actiones adæquate conciperet, ad easdem actiones ad quas jam ex affectibus qui passiones sunt, determinatur, aptus, imo aptior esset. At omnes affectus ad lætitiam, tristitiam vel cupiditatem referuntur (vide explicationem quartæ affectuum definitionis) et cupiditas (per 1 affectuum definitionem) nihil aliud est quam ipse agendi conatus; ergo ad omnes actiones ad quas ex affectu qui passio est, determinamur, possumus absque eo sola ratione duci. Q.E.D.

Finally, insofar as joy is good, to that extent it agrees with reason (for it consists in this: that a man’s power of acting is increased or aided), nor is it a passion except insofar as the man’s power of acting is not increased to such a point that he adequately conceives himself and his actions (by proposition 3 of part 3 with its scholium). Wherefore, if a man affected with joy were led to such perfection that he adequately conceived himself and his actions, he would be fit—indeed fitter—for the same actions to which he is now determined by affects which are passions. But all affects are referred to joy, sadness, or desire (see the explanation of the fourth definition of the affects), and desire (by the 1st definition of the affects) is nothing other than the very endeavor of acting; therefore, to all the actions to which we are determined by an affect which is a passion, we can, without it, be led by reason alone. Q.E.D.

ALITER: Actio quæcunque eatenus dicitur mala quatenus ex eo oritur quod odio aut aliquo malo affectu affecti sumus (vide corollarium I propositionis 45 hujus). At nulla actio in se sola considerata bona aut mala est (ut in præfatione hujus ostendimus) sed una eademque actio jam bona jam mala est; ergo ad eandem actionem quæ jam mala est sive quæ ex aliquo malo affectu oritur, ratione duci possumus (per propositionem 19 hujus). Q.E.D.

OTHERWISE: Any action is said to be bad only insofar as it arises from the fact that we are affected by hatred or by some bad affect (see corollary 1 of proposition 45 of this). But no action, considered in itself alone, is good or bad (as we showed in the preface of this), but one and the same action is now good, now bad; therefore to the same action which is now bad, or which arises from some bad affect, we can be led by reason (by proposition 19 of this). Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Explicantur hæc clarius exemplo. Nempe verberandi actio quatenus physice consideratur et ad hoc tantum attendimus quod homo brachium tollit, manum claudit totumque brachium vi deorsum movet, virtus est quæ ex corporis humani fabrica concipitur. Si itaque homo ira vel odio commotus determinatur ad claudendam manum vel brachium movendum, id ut in parte secunda ostendimus, fit quia una eademque actio potest jungi quibuscunque rerum imaginibus atque adeo tam ex iis imaginibus rerum quas confuse quam quas clare et distincte concipimus, ad unam eandemque actionem determinari possumus.

SCHOLIUM: These things are explained more clearly by an example. Namely, the action of beating, insofar as it is considered physically and we attend only to this, that a man raises his arm, closes his hand, and moves the whole arm downward with force, is a power which is conceived from the fabric of the human body. If, therefore, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is determined to close his hand or to move his arm, this, as we showed in Part Two, happens because one and the same action can be joined to whatever images of things; and thus both from those images of things which we conceive confusedly and from those which we conceive clearly and distinctly, we can be determined to one and the same action.

Apparet itaque quod omnis cupiditas quæ ex affectu qui passio est, oritur, nullius esset usus si homines ratione duci possent. Videamus jam cur cupiditas quæ ex affectu qui passio est, oritur, cæca a nobis appellatur.

It thus appears that every desire which arises from an affect which is a passion would be of no use, if men could be led by reason. Let us now see why desire which arises from an affect which is a passion is called by us blind.

PROPOSITIO LX: Cupiditas quæ oritur ex lætitia vel tristitia quæ ad unam vel ad aliquot, non autem ad omnes corporis partes refertur, rationem utilitatis totius hominis non habet.

PROPOSITION 60: Desire which arises from joy or sadness that is referred to one or to several, but not to all, parts of the body does not take account of the utility of the whole man.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ponatur exempli gratia corporis pars A vi alicujus causæ externæ ita corroborari ut reliquis prævaleat (per propositionem 6 hujus); hæc pars vires suas amittere propterea non conabitur ut reliquæ corporis partes suo fungantur officio. Deberet enim vim seu potentiam habere vires suas amittendi, quod (per propositionem 6 partis III) est absurdum. Conabitur itaque illa pars et consequenter (per propositiones 7 et 12 partis III) mens etiam illum statum conservare adeoque cupiditas quæ ex tali affectu lætitiæ oritur, rationem totius non habet.

DEMONSTRATION: Let, for example, a part A of the body be so corroborated by the force of some external cause that it prevails over the rest (by Proposition 6 of this); this part will not therefore endeavor to lose its own powers so that the remaining parts of the body may perform their function. For it would have to have a force or power of losing its own powers, which (by Proposition 6 of Part 3) is absurd. Therefore that part will strive, and consequently (by Propositions 7 and 12 of Part 3) the mind also, to preserve that state; and thus the desire which arises from such an affect of joy does not have regard for the whole.

Quod si contra supponatur pars A coerceri ut reliquæ prævaleant, eodem modo demonstratur quod nec cupiditas quæ ex tristitia oritur, rationem totius habeat. Q.E.D.

But if, on the contrary, it be supposed that part A is coerced so that the remaining parts prevail, it is shown in the same way that not even the desire which arises from sadness has regard to the whole. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Cum itaque lætitia plerumque (per scholium propositionis 44 hujus) ad unam corporis partem referatur, cupimus ergo plerumque nostrum esse conservare nulla habita ratione integræ nostræ valetudinis : ad quod accedit quod cupiditates quibus maxime tenemur (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus) temporis tantum præsentis, non autem futuri habent rationem.

SCHOLIUM: Since therefore joy for the most part (by the scholium to proposition 44 of this) is referred to one part of the body, we therefore for the most part desire to conserve what is ours with no regard had for our entire health : to which there is added that the desires by which we are especially held (by the corollary to proposition 9 of this) have regard only to the present time, and not to the future.

PROPOSITIO LXI: Cupiditas quæ ex ratione oritur, excessum habere nequit.

PROPOSITION 61: Desire which arises from reason cannot have excess.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cupiditas (per 1 affectuum definitionem) absolute considerata est ipsa hominis essentia quatenus quocunque modo determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum adeoque cupiditas quæ ex ratione oritur hoc est (per propositionem 3 partis III) quæ in nobis ingeneratur quatenus agimus, est ipsa hominis essentia seu natura quatenus determinata concipitur ad agendum ea quæ per solam hominis essentiam adæquate concipiuntur (per definitionem 2 partis III) : si itaque hæc cupiditas excessum habere posset, posset ergo humana natura in se sola considerata se ipsam excedere sive plus posset quam potest, quod manifesta est contradictio ac proinde hæc cupiditas excessum habere nequit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Desire (by definition 1 of the affects), considered absolutely, is the very essence of man, insofar as it is conceived as determined in whatever way to do something; and so desire which arises from reason, that is (by proposition 3 of part 3) which is engendered in us insofar as we act, is the very essence or nature of man, insofar as it is conceived as determined to do the things which are adequately conceived through the essence of man alone (by definition 2 of part 3): if therefore this desire could have an excess, then human nature, considered in itself alone, could exceed itself, that is, could be able to do more than it can, which is a manifest contradiction; and therefore this desire cannot have an excess. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO LXII: Quatenus mens ex rationis dictamine res concipit, æque afficitur sive idea sit rei futuræ vel præteritæ sive præsentis.

PROPOSITION 62: Insofar as the mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is affected equally whether the idea is of a future thing or past or present.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid mens ducente ratione concipit, id omne sub eadem æternitatis seu necessitatis specie concipit (per corollarium II propositionis 44 partis II) eademque certitudine afficitur (per propositionem 43 partis II et ejus scholium). Quare sive idea sit rei futuræ vel præteritæ sive præsentis, mens eadem necessitate rem concipit eademque certitudine afficitur et sive idea sit rei futuræ vel præteritæ sive præsentis, erit nihilominus æque vera (per propositionem 41 partis II) hoc est (per definitionem 4 partis II) habebit nihilominus semper easdem ideæ adæquatæ proprietates atque adeo quatenus mens ex rationis dictamine res concipit, eodem modo afficitur sive idea sit rei futuræ vel præteritæ sive præsentis. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Whatever the mind, with reason leading, conceives, it conceives all that under the same aspect of eternity or necessity (by corollary 2 of Proposition 44 of Part 2) and is affected with the same certitude (by Proposition 43 of Part 2 and its scholium). Wherefore, whether the idea be of a future or past thing or a present, the mind conceives the thing with the same necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether the idea be of a future or past thing or a present, it will nonetheless be equally true (by Proposition 41 of Part 2), that is (by Definition 4 of Part 2), it will nonetheless always have the same properties of an adequate idea; and thus, insofar as the mind conceives things by the dictate of reason, it is affected in the same way, whether the idea be of a future or past thing or a present. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Si nos de rerum duratione adæquatam cognitionem habere earumque existendi tempora ratione determinare possemus, eodem affectu res futuras ac præsentes contemplaremur et bonum quod mens ut futurum conciperet, perinde ac præsens appeteret et consequenter bonum præsens minus pro majore bono futuro necessario negligeret et quod in præsenti bonum esset sed causa futuri alicujus mali, minime appeteret, ut mox demonstrabimus. Sed nos de duratione rerum (per propositionem 31 partis II) non nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus et rerum existendi tempora (per scholium propositionis 44 partis II) sola imaginatione determinamus quæ non æque afficitur imagine rei præsentis ac futuræ; unde fit ut vera boni et mali cognitio quam habemus non nisi abstracta sive universalis sit et judicium quod de rerum ordine et causarum nexu facimus ut determinare possimus quid nobis in præsenti bonum aut malum sit, sit potius imaginarium quam reale atque adeo mirum non est si cupiditas quæ ex boni et mali cognitione quatenus hæc futurum prospicit, oritur, facilius rerum cupiditate quæ in præsentia suaves sunt, coerceri potest, de quo vide propositionem 16 hujus partis.

SCHOLIUM: If we could have an adequate cognition of the duration of things and determine by reason the times of their existence, we would contemplate future things and present with the same affect, and the good which the mind conceived as future it would desire just as much as the present; and consequently it would necessarily neglect the present good less for the sake of a greater future good; and what would be good in the present but the cause of some future evil, it would not desire at all, as we shall soon demonstrate. But we can have nothing except a very inadequate cognition of the duration of things (by proposition 31 of part II), and we determine the times of the existence of things (by the scholium of proposition 44 of part II) solely by imagination, which is not equally affected by the image of a present thing as by that of a future; whence it comes about that the true cognition of good and evil which we have is nothing but abstract or universal, and the judgment which we make concerning the order of things and the nexus of causes, so that we may be able to determine what for us in the present is good or evil, is rather imaginary than real; and thus it is not a wonder if the desire which arises from the cognition of good and evil, insofar as this looks forward to the future, can more easily be coerced by the desire for things which in the present are pleasant, on which see proposition 16 of this part.

PROPOSITIO LXIII: Qui metu ducitur et bonum ut malum vitet, agit, is ratione non ducitur.

PROPOSITION 63: He who is led by fear and does good in order to avoid evil, acts, but he is not led by reason.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes affectus qui ad mentem quatenus agit hoc est (per propositionem 3 partis III) qui ad rationem referuntur, nulli alii sunt quam affectus lætitiæ et cupiditatis (per propositionem 59 partis III) atque adeo (per 13 affectuum definitionem) qui metu ducitur et bonum timore mali agit, is ratione non ducitur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: All affects which pertain to the mind insofar as it acts, that is (by Proposition 3 of Part 3) which are referred to reason, are none other than affects of gladness and desire (by Proposition 59 of Part 3), and thus (by Definition 13 of the affects) he who is led by fear and does the good out of fear of evil is not led by reason. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Superstitiosi qui vitia exprobrare magis quam virtutes docere norunt et qui homines non ratione ducere sed metu ita continere student ut malum potius fugiant quam virtutes ament, nil aliud intendunt quam ut reliqui æque ac ipsi fiant miseri et ideo non mirum si plerumque molesti et odiosi sint hominibus.

SCHOLIUM: The superstitious, who know how to reproach vices rather than to teach virtues, and who strive not to lead men by reason but to restrain them by fear, so that they flee evil rather than love the virtues, intend nothing else than that the rest become as miserable as they themselves; and therefore it is no wonder if for the most part they are troublesome and odious to men.

COROLLARIUM: Cupiditate quæ ex ratione oritur, bonum directe sequimur et malum indirecte fugimus.

COROLLARY: By desire which arises from reason, we follow the good directly and flee the evil indirectly.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam cupiditas quæ ex ratione oritur, ex solo lætitiæ affectu quæ passio non est, oriri potest (per propositionem 59 partis III) hoc est ex lætitia quæ excessum habere nequit (per propositionem 61 hujus) non autem ex tristitia ac proinde hæc cupiditas (per propositionem 8 hujus) ex cognitione boni, non autem mali oritur atque adeo ex ductu rationis bonum directe appetimus et eatenus tantum malum fugimus. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For the cupidity which arises from reason can arise from the affect of joy alone, which is not a passion (by proposition 59 of part 3), that is, from a joy which cannot have excess (by proposition 61 of this), but not from sadness; and accordingly this cupidity (by proposition 8 of this) arises from the cognition of the good, and not of the evil; and thus under the guidance of reason we directly seek the good and only to that extent flee the evil. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Explicatur hoc corollarium exemplo ægri et sani. Comedit æger id quod aversatur timore mortis; sanus autem cibo gaudet et vita sic melius fruitur quam si mortem timeret eamque directe vitare cuperet. Sic judex qui non odio aut ira etc.

SCHOLIUM: This corollary is explained by the example of a sick man and a healthy man. The sick man eats what he abhors from fear of death; the healthy man, however, rejoices in food and thus enjoys life better than if he feared death and desired to avoid it directly. So a judge who not from hatred or ire, etc.

sed solo amore salutis publicæ reum mortis damnat, sola ratione ducitur.

but solely from love of the public welfare he condemns the accused to death, guided by reason alone.

PROPOSITIO LXIV: Cognitio mali cognitio est inadæquata.

PROPOSITION 64: Cognition of evil is inadequate cognition.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cognitio mali (per propositionem 8 hujus) est ipsa tristitia quatenus ejusdem sumus conscii. Tristitia autem est transitio ad minorem perfectionem (per 3 affectuum definitionem) quæ propterea per ipsam hominis essentiam intelligi nequit (per propositiones 6 et 7 partis III) ac proinde (per definitionem 2 partis III) passio est quæ (per propositionem 3 partis III) ab ideis inadæquatis pendet et consequenter (per propositionem 29 partis II) ejus cognitio nempe mali cognitio est inadæquata. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The cognition of evil (by proposition 8 of this) is sadness itself, insofar as we are conscious of the same. But sadness is a transition to a lesser perfection (by the 3rd definition of the affects), which therefore cannot be understood through man’s essence itself (by propositions 6 and 7 of part 3) and accordingly (by definition 2 of part 3) is a passion, which (by proposition 3 of part 3) depends on inadequate ideas and consequently (by proposition 29 of part 2) its cognition—namely, the cognition of evil—is inadequate. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur quod si mens humana non nisi adæquatas haberet ideas, nullam mali formaret notionem.

COROLLARY: Hence it follows that if the human mind had only adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil.

PROPOSITIO LXV: De duobus bonis majus et de duobus malis minus ex rationis ductu sequemur.

PROPOSITION 65: Of two goods we shall follow the greater, and of two evils the lesser, by the guidance of reason.

DEMONSTRATIO: Bonum quod impedit quominus majore bono fruamur, est revera malum; malum enim et bonum (ut in præfatione hujus ostendimus) de rebus dicitur quatenus easdem ad invicem comparamus et (per eandem rationem) malum minus revera bonum est; quare (per corollarium propositionis 63 hujus) ex rationis ductu bonum tantum majus et malum minus appetemus seu sequemur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: A good which impedes our enjoying a greater good is in truth an evil; for evil and good (as we showed in the preface of this) are said of things insofar as we compare the same to one another, and (by the same reason) a lesser evil is in truth a good; wherefore (by the corollary of proposition 63 of this) by the guidance of reason we shall desire or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Malum minus pro majore bono ex rationis ductu sequemur et bonum minus quod causa est majoris mali, negligemus. Nam malum quod hic dicitur minus, revera bonum est et bonum contra malum; quare (per corollarium propositionis 63 hujus) illud appetemus et hoc negligemus. Q.E.D.

COROLLARY: We will follow the lesser evil for the sake of a greater good by the guidance of reason, and we will neglect the lesser good which is the cause of a greater evil. For the evil which here is called lesser is in truth good, and the good, contrariwise, evil; wherefore (by the corollary of proposition 63 of this) we will desire that and neglect this. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO LXVI: Bonum majus futurum præ minore præsenti et malum præsens minus præ majore futuro ex rationis ductu appetemus.

PROPOSITION 66: By the guidance of reason, we shall seek a greater future good rather than a lesser present [good], and a present lesser evil rather than a greater future [evil].

DEMONSTRATIO: Si mens rei futuræ adæquatam posset habere cognitionem, eodem affectu erga rem futuram ac erga præsentem afficeretur (per propositionem 62 hujus); quare quatenus ad ipsam rationem attendimus, ut in hac propositione nos facere supponimus, res eadem est sive majus bonum vel malum futurum sive præsens supponatur ac proinde (per propositionem 65 hujus) bonum futurum majus præ minore præsenti etc. appetemus. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: If the mind could have adequate cognition of a future thing, it would be affected with the same affect toward the future thing as toward the present (by Proposition 62 of this); wherefore, insofar as we attend to reason itself, as in this proposition we suppose ourselves to do, the case is the same whether a greater good or evil be supposed future or present, and therefore (by Proposition 65 of this) we shall desire the greater future good before the lesser present, etc. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Malum præsens minus quod est causa majoris futuri boni, ex rationis ductu appetemus et bonum præsens minus quod causa est majoris futuri mali, negligemus. Hoc corollarium se habet ad præcedentem propositionem ut corollarium propositionis 65 ad ipsam propositionem 65.

COROLLARY: We shall, under the guidance of reason, seek the present lesser evil which is the cause of a greater future good, and we shall neglect the present lesser good which is the cause of a greater future evil. This corollary stands to the preceding proposition as the corollary of proposition 65 to proposition 65 itself.

SCHOLIUM: Si igitur hæc cum iis conferantur quæ in hac parte usque ad propositionem 18 de affectuum viribus ostendimus, facile videbimus quid homo qui solo affectu seu opinione homini qui ratione ducitur, intersit. Ille enim velit nolit ea quæ maxime ignorat, agit; hic autem nemini nisi sibi morem gerit et ea tantum agit quæ in vita prima esse novit quæque propterea maxime cupit et ideo illum servum, hunc autem liberum voco, de cujus ingenio et vivendi ratione pauca adhuc notare libet.

SCHOLIUM: If therefore these be compared with those which in this Part, up to proposition 18, concerning the powers of the affects, we have shown, we shall easily see what difference there is between the man who is moved by mere affect or opinion and the man who is led by reason. For the former, whether he will or not, acts upon the things which he most of all ignores; but the latter accommodates no one except himself, and does only those things which he knows to be of first importance in life and which therefore he most desires; and so I call that one a slave, but this one free, of whose character and way of living I am still pleased to note a few things.

PROPOSITIO LXVII: Homo liber de nulla re minus quam de morte cogitat et ejus sapientia non mortis sed vitæ meditatio est.

PROPOSITION 67: A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his sapience is a meditation not of death but of life.

DEMONSTRATIO: Homo liber hoc est qui ex solo rationis dictamine vivit, mortis metu non ducitur (per propositionem 63 hujus) sed bonum directe cupit (per corollarium ejusdem propositionis) hoc est (per propositionem 24 hujus) agere, vivere, suum esse conservare ex fundamento proprium utile quærendi atque adeo nihil minus quam de morte cogitat sed ejus sapientia vitæ est meditatio. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The free man, that is, one who lives by the dictate of reason alone, is not led by fear of death (by Proposition 63 of this), but desires the good directly (by the corollary of the same Proposition), that is (by Proposition 24 of this), to act, to live, to preserve his being on the foundation of seeking his own useful; and so he thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom is the meditation of life. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO LXVIII: Si homines liberi nascerentur, nullum boni et mali formarent conceptum quamdiu liberi essent.

PROPOSITION 68: If human beings were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil as long as they were free.

DEMONSTRATIO: Illum liberum esse dixi qui sola ducitur ratione; qui itaque liber nascitur et liber manet, non nisi adæquatas ideas habet ac proinde mali conceptum habet nullum (per corollarium propositionis 64 hujus) et consequenter (nam bonum et malum correlata sunt) neque boni. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: I have said that he is free who is led by reason alone; he therefore who is born free and remains free has nothing but adequate ideas and hence has no concept of evil (by the corollary of proposition 64 of this) and consequently (for good and evil are correlatives) neither of good. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hujus propositionis hypothesin falsam esse nec posse concipi nisi quatenus ad solam naturam humanam seu potius ad Deum attendimus, non quatenus infinitus sed quatenus tantummodo causa est cur homo existat, patet ex 4 propositione hujus partis. Atque hoc et alia quæ jam demonstravimus, videntur a Mose significari in illa primi hominis historia. In ea enim nulla alia Dei potentia concipitur quam illa qua hominem creavit hoc est potentia qua hominis solummodo utilitati consuluit atque eatenus narratur quod Deus homini libero prohibuerit ne de arbore cognitionis boni et mali comederet et quod simulac de ea comederet, statim mortem metueret potius quam vivere cuperet.

SCHOLIUM: That the hypothesis of this proposition is false, and can be conceived only insofar as we attend to human nature alone, or rather to God, not insofar as he is infinite but only insofar as he is the cause why man exists, is clear from proposition 4 of this part. And this, and other things which we have already demonstrated, seem to be signified by Moses in that history of the first man. For in it no other power of God is conceived than that by which he created man, that is, the power by which he provided solely for man’s utility; and to that extent it is narrated that God forbade the free man to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he ate of it, immediately he would fear death rather than desire to live.

Deinde quod inventa ab homine uxore quæ cum sua natura prorsus conveniebat, cognovit nihil posse in natura dari quod ipsi posset illa esse utilius sed quod postquam bruta sibi similia esse credidit, statim eorum affectus imitari inceperit (vide propositionem 27 partis III) et libertatem suam amittere quam Patriarchæ postea recuperaverunt ducti spiritu Christi hoc est Dei idea a qua sola pendet ut homo liber sit et ut bonum quod sibi cupit, reliquis hominibus cupiat, ut supra (per propositionem 37 hujus) demonstravimus.

Then, when a wife had been found by man who altogether agreed with his nature, he knew that nothing could be given in nature that could be more useful to him than she; but that after he believed the brutes to be similar to himself, he immediately began to imitate their affects (see proposition 27 of Part 3) and to lose his liberty, which the Patriarchs later recovered, led by the Spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God, on which alone it depends that man be free and that the good which he desires for himself he desire for the other men, as above (by proposition 37 of this) we have demonstrated.

PROPOSITIO LXIX: Hominis liberi virtus æque magna cernitur in declinandis quam in superandis periculis.

PROPOSITION 69: The virtue of the free man is discerned to be equally great in declining as in overcoming perils.

DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus coerceri nec tolli potest nisi affectu contrario et fortiore affectu coercendo (per propositionem 7 hujus). At cæca audacia et metus affectus sunt qui æque magni possunt concipi (per propositiones 5 et 3 hujus). Ergo æque magna animi virtus seu fortitudo (hujus definitionem vide in scholio propositionis 59 partis III) requiritur ad audaciam quam ad metum coercendum hoc est (per definitiones 40 et 41 affectuum) homo liber eadem animi virtute pericula declinat qua eadem superare tentat. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: An affect can be restrained, and cannot be removed, except by a contrary affect and by restraining it with a stronger affect (by proposition 7 of this). But blind audacity and fear are affects which can be conceived as equally great (by propositions 5 and 3 of this). Therefore an equally great strength of mind, or fortitude (see the definition of this in the scholium to proposition 59 of part 3), is required for restraining audacity as for restraining fear; that is (by definitions 40 and 41 of the affects), the free man avoids dangers with the same strength of mind with which he attempts to overcome them. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Homini igitur libero æque magnæ animositati fuga in tempore ac pugna ducitur sive homo liber eadem animositate seu animi præsentia qua certamen fugam eligit.

COROLLARY: Therefore, for the free man, a timely flight is deemed of equally great spiritedness as a fight, or the free man chooses flight with the same spiritedness or presence of mind with which he chooses the contest.

SCHOLIUM: Quid animositas sit vel quid per ipsam intelligam, in scholio propositionis 59 partis III explicui. Per periculum autem id omne intelligo quod potest esse causa alicujus mali nempe tristitiæ, odii, discordiæ etc.

SCHOLIUM: What spiritedness is, or what I understand by it, I have explained in the scholium to proposition 59 of part III. By danger, however, I understand everything that can be a cause of some evil, namely sadness, hatred, discord, etc.

PROPOSITIO LXX: Homo liber qui inter ignaros vivit, eorum quantum potest beneficia declinare studet.

PROPOSITION 70: The free man who lives among the ignorant strives to decline their benefits as much as he can.

DEMONSTRATIO: Unusquisque ex suo ingenio judicat quid bonum sit (vide scholium propositionis 39 partis III); ignarus igitur qui in aliquem beneficium contulit, id ex suo ingenio æstimabit et si minoris ab eo cui datum est æstimari videt, contristabitur (per propositionem 42 partis III). At homo liber reliquos homines amicitia sibi jungere (per propositionem 37 hujus) nec paria hominibus beneficia ex eorum affectu referre sed se et reliquos libero rationis judicio ducere et ea tantum agere studet quæ ipse prima esse novit: ergo homo liber ne ignaris odio sit et ne eorum appetitui sed soli rationi obsequatur, eorum beneficia quantum potest declinare conabitur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Each person judges from his own ingenium what is good (see the scholium of proposition 39 of part 3); therefore the ignorant man who has conferred a beneficium upon someone will estimate it from his own ingenium, and if he sees it being valued at less by him to whom it was given, he will be saddened (by proposition 42 of part 3). But the free man strives to join other men to himself by friendship (by proposition 37 of this), and not to repay to men equivalent beneficia according to their affect, but to lead himself and the rest by the free judgment of reason, and to do only those things which he himself knows to be primary: therefore the free man, lest he be hated by the ignorant, and that he may obey not their appetite but reason alone, will try to decline their beneficia as much as he can. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Dico "quantum potest". Nam quamvis homines ignari sint, sunt tamen homines qui in necessitatibus humanum auxilium quo nullum præstabilius est, adferre queunt atque adeo sæpe fit ut necesse sit ab iisdem beneficium accipere et consequenter iisdem contra ex eorum ingenio congratulari; ad quod accedit quod etiam in declinandis beneficiis, cautio esse debet ne videamur eosdem contemnere vel præ avaritia remunerationem timere atque ita dum eorum odium fugimus, eo ipso in eorum offensionem incurramus. Quare in declinandis beneficiis ratio utilis et honesti habenda est.

SCHOLIUM: I say “as far as he can.” For although men may be ignorant, nevertheless there are men who, in necessities, are able to bring human aid, than which none is more excellent, and thus it often happens that it is necessary to receive a benefit from these same persons, and consequently to congratulate these same persons in return, according to their disposition; to which there is added that even in declining benefits, there ought to be caution lest we seem to contemn them or to fear remuneration out of avarice, and so, while we flee their hatred, by that very fact we incur their offense. Wherefore, in declining benefits, account must be taken of the useful and the honorable.

PROPOSITIO LXXI: Soli homines liberi erga invicem gratissimi sunt.

PROPOSITION 71: Only free men are most grateful toward one another.

DEMONSTRATIO: Soli homines liberi sibi invicem utilissimi sunt et maxima amicitiæ necessitudine invicem junguntur (per propositionem 35 hujus et I ejus corollarium) parique amoris studio sibi invicem benefacere conantur (per propositionem 37 hujus) adeoque (per 34 affectuum definitionem) soli homines liberi erga se invicem gratissimi sunt. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Only free men are most useful to one another and are joined to one another by the greatest necessity of friendship (by proposition 35 of this and its corollary 1), and with an equal zeal of love they strive to do good to one another (by proposition 37 of this), and so (by definition 34 of the affects) only free men are most grateful toward one another. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Gratia quam homines qui cæca cupiditate ducuntur, invicem habent, mercatura seu aucupium potius quam gratia plerumque est. Porro ingratitudo affectus non est. Est tamen ingratitudo turpis quia plerumque hominem nimio odio, ira vel superbia vel avaritia etc.

SCHOLIUM: The gratitude which men who are led by blind cupidity have toward one another is for the most part commerce or bird-catching rather than gratitude. Moreover, ingratitude is not an affect. Yet ingratitude is base, because for the most part it arises from a man’s excessive hatred, anger, or pride, or avarice, etc.

affectum esse indicat. Nam qui præ stultitia dona compensare nescit, ingratus non est et multo minus ille qui donis non movetur meretricis ut ipsius libidini inserviat nec furis ut ipsius furta celet vel alterius similis. Nam hic contra animum habere constantem ostendit qui scilicet se nullis donis ad suam vel communem perniciem patitur corrumpi.

indicates that it is an affect. For he who, through stupidity, does not know how to compensate gifts is not ungrateful; and much less is he ungrateful who is not moved by the gifts of a prostitute so as to serve her libido, nor by those of a thief so as to conceal his thefts, or of some other similar person. For this man, on the contrary, shows that he has a constant mind, namely, that he allows himself to be corrupted by no gifts to his own or the common ruin.

PROPOSITIO LXXII: Homo liber nunquam dolo malo sed semper cum fide agit.

PROPOSITION 72: A free man never acts by malicious deceit, but always in good faith.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si liber homo quicquam dolo malo quatenus liber est, ageret, id ex dictamine rationis ageret (nam eatenus tantum liber a nobis appellatur) atque adeo dolo malo agere virtus esset (per propositionem 24 hujus) et consequenter (per eandem propositionem) unicuique ad suum esse conservandum consultius esset dolo malo agere hoc est (ut per se notum) hominibus consultius esset verbis solummodo convenire, re autem invicem esse contrarios, quod (per corollarium propositionis 31 hujus) est absurdum. Ergo homo liber etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: If a free man were to do anything with malicious deceit, insofar as he is free, he would do it by the dictate of reason (for only to that extent is he called free by us), and thus to act with malicious deceit would be a virtue (by proposition 24 of this), and consequently (by the same proposition) it would be more expedient for each person, for the preservation of his being, to act with malicious deceit; that is (as is self-evident), it would be more expedient for men to agree only in words, but in reality to be mutually contrary, which (by the corollary of proposition 31 of this) is absurd. Therefore the free man, etc. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Si jam quæratur quid si homo se perfidia a præsenti mortis periculo posset liberare, an non ratio suum esse conservandi omnino suadet ut perfidus sit? Respondebitur eodem modo quod si ratio id suadeat, suadet ergo id omnibus hominibus atque adeo ratio omnino suadet hominibus ne nisi dolo malo paciscantur vires conjungere et jura habere communia hoc est ne revera jura habeant communia, quod est absurdum.

SCHOLIUM: If now it be asked what, if a man could free himself from a present danger of death by perfidy, does not reason for preserving his own being altogether advise that he be perfidious? It will be answered in the same way, that if reason advises this, it therefore advises it for all men, and thus reason altogether advises men not to make pacts except by malicious fraud to conjoin forces and to have rights in common, that is, that they should not really have rights in common, which is absurd.

PROPOSITIO LXXIII: Homo qui ratione ducitur magis in civitate ubi ex communi decreto vivit quam in solitudine ubi sibi soli obtemperat, liber est.

PROPOSITION 73: A man who is guided by reason is freer in a state where he lives by common decree than in solitude where he obeys himself alone.

DEMONSTRATIO: Homo qui ratione ducitur, non ducitur metu ad obtemperandum (per propositionem 63 hujus) sed quatenus suum esse ex rationis dictamine conservare conatur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 66 hujus) quatenus libere vivere conatur, communis vitæ et utilitatis rationem tenere (per propositionem 37 hujus) et consequenter (ut in scholio II propositionis 37 hujus ostendimus) ex communi civitatis decreto vivere cupit. Cupit ergo homo qui ratione ducitur, ut liberius vivat, communia civitatis jura tenere. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: A man who is led by reason is not led by fear to obey (by proposition 63 of this), but insofar as he strives to preserve his being by the dictate of reason, that is (by the scholium of proposition 66 of this), insofar as he strives to live freely, to keep to the rule of common life and utility (by proposition 37 of this), and consequently (as we have shown in scholium 2 of proposition 37 of this) he desires to live by the common decree of the state. Therefore the man who is led by reason, in order that he may live more freely, desires to hold the common laws of the state. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc et similia quæ de vera hominis libertate ostendimus, ad fortitudinem hoc est (per scholium propositionis 59 partis III) ad animositatem et generositatem referuntur. Nec operæ pretium duco omnes fortitudinis proprietates hic separatim demonstrare et multo minus quod vir fortis neminem odio habeat, nemini irascatur, invideat, indignetur, neminem despiciat minimeque superbiat. Nam hæc et omnia quæ ad veram vitam et religionem spectant, facile ex propositione 37 et 46 hujus partis convincuntur nempe quod odium amore contra vincendum sit et quod unusquisque qui ratione ducitur, bonum quod sibi appetit, reliquis etiam ut sit, cupiat.

SCHOLIUM: These and similar things which we have shown about man’s true liberty are referred to fortitude, that is (by the scholium to proposition 59 of Part 3) to spirited courage and generosity. Nor do I deem it worth the effort to demonstrate here separately all the properties of fortitude, and much less that a man of fortitude hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant at no one, despises no one, and least of all is proud. For these, and all things which pertain to true life and religion, are easily proved from proposition 37 and 46 of this part, namely, that hatred must be overcome by love in return, and that everyone who is led by reason desires that the good which he seeks for himself should be for others also.

Ad quod accedit id quod in scholio propositionis 50 hujus partis et aliis in locis notavimus quod scilicet vir fortis hoc apprime consideret nempe quod omnia ex necessitate divinæ naturæ sequantur ac proinde quicquid molestum et malum esse cogitat et quicquid præterea impium, horrendum, injustum et turpe videtur, ex eo oritur quod res ipsas perturbate, mutilate et confuse concipit et hac de causa apprime conatur res ut in se sunt, concipere et veræ cognitionis impedimenta amovere ut sunt odium, ira, invidia, irrisio, superbia et reliqua hujusmodi quæ in præcedentibus notavimus atque adeo quantum potest conatur uti diximus bene agere et lætari. Quousque autem humana virtus ad hæc consequenda se extendat et quid possit in sequenti parte demonstrabo.

To this is added what in the scholium to proposition 50 of this part and in other places we have noted, namely, that the man of fortitude especially considers this: that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and therefore whatever he thinks to be troublesome and evil, and whatever moreover seems impious, horrendous, unjust, and shameful, arises from his conceiving things themselves in a disturbed, mutilated, and confused way; and for this cause he especially strives to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the impediments of true cognition, such as hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and other things of this sort which we have noted above; and thus, as far as he can, he strives, as we have said, to act well and to rejoice. How far, however, human virtue extends itself to achieving these things, and what it can do, I shall demonstrate in the following part.

APPENDIX: Quæ in hac parte de recta vivendi ratione tradidi, non sunt ita disposita ut uno aspectu videri possint sed disperse a me demonstrata sunt prout scilicet unum ex alio facilius deducere potuerim. Eadem igitur hic recolligere et ad summa capita redigere proposui.

APPENDIX: What I have transmitted in this part concerning the right method of living are not so arranged that they can be seen at a single glance, but have been demonstrated by me in a scattered way, inasmuch as I could more easily deduce one thing from another. The same things, therefore, I have proposed here to recollect and to reduce to the chief heads.

CAPUT I: Omnes nostri conatus seu cupiditates ex necessitate nostræ naturæ ita sequuntur ut vel per ipsam solam tanquam per proximam suam causam possint intelligi vel quatenus naturæ sumus pars quæ per se absque aliis individuis non potest adæquate concipi.

CHAPTER 1: All our endeavors or desires follow from the necessity of our nature in such a way that they can be understood either through it alone, as through their proximate cause, or insofar as we are a part of Nature which by itself, without other individuals, cannot be adequately conceived.

CAPUT II: Cupiditates quæ ex nostra natura ita sequuntur ut per ipsam solam possit intelligi, sunt illæ quæ ad mentem referuntur quatenus hæc ideis adæquatis constare concipitur; reliquæ vero cupiditates ad mentem non referuntur nisi quatenus res inadæquate concipit et quarum vis et incrementum non humana sed rerum quæ extra nos sunt potentia definiri debet et ideo illæ recte actiones, hæ autem passiones vocantur; illæ namque nostram potentiam semper indicant et hæ contra nostram impotentiam et mutilatam cognitionem.

CHAPTER 2: The desires which follow from our nature in such a way that they can be understood through it alone are those which are referred to the mind, insofar as this is conceived to consist of adequate ideas; but the remaining desires are not referred to the mind except insofar as it conceives things inadequately, and whose force and increase ought to be defined not by human power but by the power of things which are outside us; and therefore the former are rightly called actions, but the latter passions; for the former always indicate our power, and the latter, on the contrary, our impotence and mutilated cognition.

CAPUT III: Nostræ actiones hoc est cupiditates illæ quæ hominis potentia seu ratione definiuntur, semper bonæ sunt, reliquæ autem tam bonæ quam malæ possunt esse.

CHAPTER 3: Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by human potency or by reason, are always good; the remaining ones, however, can be both good and bad.

CAPUT IV: In vita itaque apprime utile est intellectum seu rationem quantum possumus perficere et in hoc uno summa hominis felicitas seu beatitudo consistit; quippe beatitudo nihil aliud est quam ipsa animi acquiescentia quæ ex Dei intuitiva cognitione oritur : at intellectum perficere nihil etiam aliud est quam Deum Deique attributa et actiones quæ ex ipsius naturæ necessitate consequuntur, intelligere. Quare hominis qui ratione ducitur finis ultimus hoc est summa cupiditas qua reliquas omnes moderari studet, est illa qua fertur ad se resque omnes quæ sub ipsius intelligentiam cadere possunt, adæquate concipiendum.

CHAPTER 4: In life, therefore, it is supremely useful to perfect the intellect or reason as much as we can, and in this one thing the highest human felicity or beatitude consists; for indeed beatitude is nothing else than the very acquiescence of the mind which arises from the intuitive cognition of God : but to perfect the intellect is also nothing else than to understand God and God’s attributes and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore the ultimate end of the man who is led by reason, that is, the highest desire by which he strives to moderate all the rest, is that by which he is borne toward conceiving adequately himself and all things which can fall under his intelligence.

CAPUT V: Nulla igitur vita rationalis est sine intelligentia et res eatenus tantum bonæ sunt quatenus hominem juvant ut mentis vita fruatur quæ intelligentia definitur. Quæ autem contra impediunt quominus homo rationem perficere et rationali vita frui possit, eas solummodo malas esse dicimus.

CHAPTER 5: Therefore no rational life exists without intelligence, and things are good only to that extent, insofar as they help a human to enjoy the life of the mind, which is defined by intelligence. But those things which, on the contrary, impede a man from perfecting reason and enjoying a rational life, these alone we say to be evil.

CAPUT VI: Sed quia omnia illa quorum homo efficiens est causa, necessario bona sunt, nihil ergo mali homini evenire potest nisi a causis externis nempe quatenus pars est totius naturæ cujus legibus humana natura obtemperare et cui infinitis modis pene sese accommodare cogitur.

CHAPTER 6: But since all those things of which man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, nothing therefore evil can befall man except from external causes, namely insofar as he is a part of the whole of nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey and to which it is forced to accommodate itself in almost infinite modes.

CAPUT VII: Nec fieri potest ut homo non sit naturæ pars et communem ejus ordinem non sequatur sed si inter talia individua versetur quæ cum ipsius hominis natura conveniunt, eo ipso hominis agendi potentia juvabitur et fovebitur. At si contra inter talia sit quæ cum ipsius natura minime conveniunt, vix absque magna ipsius mutatione iisdem sese accommodare poterit.

CHAPTER 7: Nor can it come to pass that man is not a part of nature and does not follow its common order; but if he is conversant among such individuals as agree with the very nature of the man, thereby the man’s power of acting will be helped and fostered. But if, on the contrary, he be among such as least agree with his nature, he will scarcely be able, without a great change of himself, to accommodate himself to the same.

CAPUT VIII: Quicquid in rerum natura datur quod judicamus malum esse sive posse impedire quominus existere et vita rationali frui queamus, id a nobis removere ea via quæ securior videtur, licet et quicquid contra datur quod judicamus bonum sive utile esse ad nostrum esse conservandum et vita rationali fruendum, id ad nostrum usum capere et eo quocunque modo uti nobis licet et absolute id unicuique summo naturæ jure facere licet quod ad ipsius utilitatem conferre judicat.

CHAPTER 8: Whatever is given in the nature of things which we judge to be evil or able to impede us from existing and from enjoying rational life, it is permitted to remove from us by that way which seems safer; and conversely whatever is given which we judge to be good or useful for conserving our being and enjoying rational life, it is permitted for us to take to our use and to employ in whatever way; and absolutely, by the highest right of nature, it is permitted for each person to do that which he judges to contribute to his own utility.

CAPUT IX: Nihil magis cum natura alicujus rei convenire potest quam reliqua ejusdem speciei individua adeoque (per caput 7) nihil homini ad suum esse conservandum et vita rationali fruendum utilius datur quam homo qui ratione ducitur. Deinde quia inter res singulares nihil novimus quod homine qui ratione ducitur, sit præstantius, nulla ergo re magis potest unusquisque ostendere quantum arte et ingenio valeat quam in hominibus ita educandis ut tandem ex proprio rationis imperio vivant.

CHAPTER 9: Nothing can agree more with the nature of any thing than the other individuals of the same species; and so (by Chapter 7) nothing is given to a man more useful for preserving his own being and for enjoying a rational life than a man who is led by reason. Next, since among singular things we know nothing that is more preeminent than a man who is led by reason, by nothing, therefore, can each person show more how much he is worth in art and ingenuity than by educating human beings in such a way that at length they live under the command of their own reason.

CAPUT X: Quatenus homines invidia aut aliquo odii affectu in se invicem feruntur eatenus invicem contrarii sunt et consequenter eo magis timendi quo plus possunt quam reliqua naturæ individua.

CHAPTER 10: Insofar as humans are borne by envy or by some affect of hatred against one another, to that extent they are mutually contrary, and consequently the more to be feared, in proportion as they have more power than the other individuals of nature.

CAPUT XI: Animi tamen non armis sed amore et generositate vincuntur.

CHAPTER 11: Minds, however, are conquered not by arms but by love and generosity.

CAPUT XII: Hominibus apprime utile est consuetudines jungere seseque iis vinculis astringere quibus aptius de se omnibus unum efficiant et absolute ea agere quæ firmandis amicitiis inserviunt.

CHAPTER 12: It is especially useful for human beings to join associations and to bind themselves fast with those bonds by which they may more aptly make of all of themselves one, and absolutely to do those things which serve for the firming of friendships.

CAPUT XIII: Sed ad hæc ars et vigilantia requiritur. Sunt enim homines varii (nam rari sunt qui ex rationis præscripto vivunt) et tamen plerumque invidi et magis ad vindictam quam ad misericordiam proclives. Unumquemque igitur ex ipsius ingenio ferre et sese continere ne eorum affectus imitetur, singularis animi potentiæ opus est.

CHAPTER 13: But for these things art and vigilance are required. For human beings are various (for they are rare who live by the prescript of reason), and yet for the most part envious and more with a proclivity to revenge than to mercy. Therefore, to bear each one according to his own disposition and to contain oneself lest one imitate their affections, is the work of a singular power of mind.

At qui contra homines carpere et vitia potius exprobrare quam virtutes docere et hominum animos non firmare sed frangere norunt, ii et sibi et reliquis molesti sunt; unde multi præ nimia scilicet animi impatientia falsoque religionis studio inter bruta potius quam inter homines vivere maluerunt ut pueri vel adolescentes qui parentum jurgia æquo animo ferre nequeunt, militatum confugiunt et incommoda belli et imperium tyrannidis præ domesticis commodis et paternis admonitionibus eligunt et quidvis oneris sibi imponi patiuntur dummodo parentes ulciscantur.

But those who, on the contrary, know how to carp at men and to upbraid vices rather than to teach virtues, and to not firm up the minds of men but to break them, are troublesome both to themselves and to the rest; whence many, namely from excessive impatience of spirit and a false zeal of religion, have preferred to live among brutes rather than among men, just as boys or adolescents who cannot bear with an even mind the quarrels of parents flee to soldiering and choose the inconveniences of war and the imperium of tyranny before domestic conveniences and paternal admonitions, and allow any burden whatsoever to be imposed upon themselves, provided only that they may take vengeance on their parents.

CAPUT XIV: Quamvis igitur homines omnia plerumque ex sua libidine moderentur, ex eorum tamen communi societate multo plura commoda quam damna sequuntur. Quare satius est eorum injurias æquo animo ferre et studium iis adhibere quæ concordiæ et amicitiæ conciliandæ inserviunt.

CHAPTER 14: Although therefore men for the most part moderate everything by their own desire, yet from their common society far more benefits than damages ensue. Wherefore it is wiser to bear their injuries with equanimity and to apply zeal to those things which serve to conciliate concord and friendship.

CAPUT XV: Quæ concordiam gignunt sunt illa quæ ad justitiam, æquitatem et honestatem referuntur. Nam homines præter id quod injustum et iniquum est, etiam ægre ferunt quod turpe habetur sive quod aliquis receptos civitatis mores aspernatur. Amori autem conciliando illa apprime necessaria sunt quæ ad religionem et pietatem spectant.

CHAPTER 15: The things that engender concord are those which are referred to justice, equity, and honesty. For people, besides what is unjust and iniquitous, also bear with difficulty what is held as base, or when someone spurns the accepted customs of the commonwealth. But for conciliating love, those things are especially necessary which pertain to religion and piety.

De quibus vide scholia I et II propositionis 37 et scholium propositionis 46 et scholium propositionis 73 partis IV.

Concerning which see scholia 1 and 2 of proposition 37, and the scholium of proposition 46, and the scholium of proposition 73 of part 4.

CAPUT XVI: Solet præterea concordia ex metu plerumque gigni sed sine fide. Adde quod metus ex animi impotentia oritur et propterea ad rationis usum non pertinet ut nec commiseratio quamvis pietatis speciem præ se ferre videatur.

CHAPTER 16: Besides, concord is wont for the most part to be begotten from fear, but without trust. Add that fear arises from the mind’s impotence, and therefore does not pertain to the use of reason; nor does commiseration, although it may seem to bear the appearance of piety.

CAPUT XVII: Vincuntur præterea homines etiam largitate, præcipue ii qui non habent unde comparare possint illa quæ ad vitam sustentandam necessaria sunt. Attamen unicuique indigenti auxilium ferre vires et utilitatem viri privati longe superat. Divitiæ namque viri privati longe impares sunt ad id suppeditandum.

CHAPTER 17: Moreover, men are also won by largess, especially those who do not have whence they can procure the things which are necessary for sustaining life. Nevertheless, to bring help to each indigent person far surpasses the powers and the utility of a private man. For indeed the riches of a private man are by far unequal to supplying that.

Unius præterea viri facultas limitatior est quam ut omnes sibi possit amicitia jungere; quare pauperum cura integræ societati incumbit et ad communem tantum utilitatem spectat.

Moreover, the faculty of a single man is more limited than that he can join all to himself by friendship; wherefore the care of the poor rests upon the entire society and looks only to the common utility.

CAPUT XVIII: In beneficiis accipiendis et gratia referenda alia prorsus debet esse cura, de qua vide scholium propositionis 70 et scholium propositionis 71 partis IV.

CHAPTER 18: In the receiving of benefits and in returning gratitude, an entirely different care ought indeed to be taken; on which see the scholium of Proposition 70 and the scholium of Proposition 71 of Part 4.

CAPUT XIX: Amor præterea meretricius hoc est generandi libido quæ ex forma oritur et absolute omnis amor qui aliam causam præter animi libertatem agnoscit, facile in odium transit nisi, quod pejus est, species delirii sit atque tum magis discordia quam concordia fovetur. Vide scholium propositionis 31 partis III.

CHAPTER 19: Meretricious love, that is, the libido of begetting which arises from form, and absolutely every love which acknowledges any cause other than freedom of mind, passes easily into hatred unless, what is worse, it be a species of delirium; and then discord rather than concord is fostered. See the scholium of proposition 31 of part 3.

CAPUT XX: Ad matrimonium quod attinet, certum est ipsum cum ratione convenire si cupiditas miscendi corpora non ex sola forma sed etiam ex amore liberos procreandi et sapienter educandi, ingeneretur et præterea si utriusque, viri scilicet et fœminæ amor non solam formam sed animi præcipue libertatem pro causa habeat.

CHAPTER 20: As to matrimony, it is certain that it accords with reason if the desire of mingling bodies be engendered not from form alone but also from the love of begetting children and educating them wisely, and furthermore if the love of both, namely of the man and of the woman, has as its cause not form alone but chiefly the freedom of the mind.

CAPUT XXI: Gignit præterea adulatio concordiam sed fœdo servitutis crimine vel perfidia; nulli quippe magis adulatione capiuntur quam superbi qui primi esse volunt nec sunt.

CHAPTER 21: Adulation furthermore begets concord, but with the foul crime of servitude or perfidy; for indeed none are more captured by adulation than the proud who wish to be first and are not.

CAPUT XXII: Abjectioni falsa pietatis et religionis species inest. Et quamvis abjectio superbiæ sit contraria, est tamen abjectus superbo proximus. Vide scholium propositionis 57 partis IV.

CHAPTER 22: In abjection there is a false semblance of piety and religion. And although abjection is contrary to pride, yet the abject man is nearest to the proud man. See the scholium of proposition 57 of part IV.

CAPUT XXIII: Confert præterea concordiæ pudor in iis tantum quæ celari non possunt. Deinde quia ipse pudor species est tristitiæ, ad rationis usum non spectat.

CHAPTER 23: Furthermore, shame contributes to concord only in those things which cannot be concealed. Then, because shame itself is a species of sadness, it does not pertain to the use of reason.

CAPUT XXIV: Cæteri tristitiæ erga homines affectus directe justitiæ, æquitati, honestati, pietati et religioni opponuntur et quamvis indignatio æquitatis speciem præ se ferre videatur, ibi tamen sine lege vivitur ubi unicuique de factis alterius judicium ferre et suum vel alterius jus vindicare licet.

CHAPTER 24: The remaining affections of sadness toward men are directly opposed to justice, equity, honesty, piety, and religion; and although indignation may seem to bear the appearance of equity, nevertheless one lives without law where it is permitted to each to pass judgment on another’s deeds and to vindicate his own or another’s right.

CAPUT XXV: Modestia hoc est cupiditas hominibus placendi quæ ex ratione determinatur, ad pietatem (ut in scholio I propositionis 37 partis IV diximus) refertur. Sed si ex affectu oriatur, ambitio est sive cupiditas qua homines falsa pietatis imagine plerumque discordias et seditiones concitant. Nam qui reliquos consilio aut re juvare cupit ut simul summo fruantur bono, is apprime studebit eorum sibi amorem conciliare; non autem eos in admirationem traducere ut disciplina ex ipso habeat vocabulum nec ullas absolute invidiæ causas dare.

CHAPTER 25: Modesty, that is, the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is referred to Piety (as we said in the scholium to Proposition 37 of Part 4). But if it arises from affect, it is ambition, or a desire by which men, under the false image of piety, for the most part stir up discords and seditions. For he who desires to help others by counsel or by deed, so that together they may enjoy the highest good, will especially strive to conciliate their love to himself; not, however, to draw them into admiration, so that the discipline may have its appellation from himself, nor to give any causes of envy whatsoever.

In communibus deinde colloquiis cavebit hominum vitia referre et de humana impotentia non nisi parce loqui curabit : at largiter de humana virtute seu potentia et qua via possit perfici ut sic homines non ex metu aut aversione sed solo lætitiæ affectu, moti ex rationis præscripto quantum in se est, conentur vivere.

In common colloquies he will beware of recounting the vices of men, and will take care to speak of human impotence only sparingly : but copiously of human virtue or power, and by what way it may be perfected, so that thus men, not from fear or aversion but by the sole affect of joy, moved by the prescript of reason, so far as it is in them, may endeavor to live.

CAPUT XXVI: Præter homines nihil singulare in natura novimus cujus mente gaudere et quod nobis amicitia aut aliquo consuetudinis genere jungere possumus adeoque quicquid in rerum natura extra homines datur, id nostræ utilitatis ratio conservare non postulat sed pro ejus vario usu conservare, destruere vel quocunque modo ad nostrum usum adaptare nos docet.

CHAPTER 26: Besides human beings we know nothing singular in nature whose mind we may rejoice in, and which we can conjoin to ourselves by friendship or by some genus of consuetude; and so whatever in the nature of things is given outside humans, the rationale of our utility does not require us to conserve, but, according to its various use, teaches us to conserve, destroy, or in whatever way adapt it to our use.

CAPUT XXVII: Utilitas quam ex rebus quæ extra nos sunt, capimus, est præter experientiam et cognitionem quam acquirimus ex eo quod easdem observamus et ex his formis in alias mutamus, præcipua corporis conservatio et hac ratione res illæ imprimis utiles sunt quæ corpus ita alere et nutrire possunt ut ejus omnes partes officio suo recte fungi queant. Nam quo corpus aptius est ut pluribus modis possit affici et corpora externa pluribus modis afficere, eo mens ad cogitandum est aptior (vide propositiones 38 et 39 partis IV). At hujus notæ perpauca in natura esse videntur; quare ad corpus ut requiritur nutriendum necesse est multis naturæ diversæ alimentis uti. Quippe humanum corpus ex plurimis diversæ naturæ partibus componitur quæ continuo alimento indigent et vario ut totum corpus ad omnia quæ ex ipsius natura sequi possunt, æque aptum sit et consequenter ut mens etiam æque apta sit ad plura concipiendum.

CHAPTER 27: The utility which we take from things that are outside us is, besides the experience and cognition which we acquire from observing the same and from changing their forms into others, chiefly the conservation of the body; and in this respect those things are above all useful which can feed and nourish the body so that all its parts may rightly discharge their office. For the more the body is apt to be affected in more ways and to affect external bodies in more ways, the more apt the mind is for cogitation (see propositions 38 and 39 of part 4). But very few of this kind seem to exist in nature; wherefore, for the body to be nourished as is required, it is necessary to use many aliments of diverse nature. Indeed, the human body is composed of very many parts of diverse nature which continuously need nourishment, and of a varied sort, so that the whole body may be equally apt for all the things which can follow from its nature, and consequently that the mind also may be equally apt for conceiving more things.

CAPUT XXVIII: Ad hæc autem comparandum vix uniuscujusque vires sufficerent nisi homines operas mutuas traderent. Verum omnium rerum compendium pecunia attulit, unde factum ut ejus imago mentem vulgi maxime occupare soleat quia vix ullam lætitiæ speciem imaginari possunt nisi concomitante nummorum idea tanquam causa.

CHAPTER 28: But for procuring these things, the strength of each individual would scarcely suffice unless men exchanged mutual services. Yet money has brought a compendium for all things; whence it has happened that its image is wont most of all to occupy the mind of the crowd, because they can scarcely imagine any form of joy unless the idea of coins accompanies as the cause.

CAPUT XXIX: Sed hoc vitium eorum tantum est qui non ex indigentia nec propter necessitates nummos quærunt sed quia lucri artes didicerunt quibus se magnifice efferunt. Cæterum corpus ex consuetudine pascunt sed parce quia tantum de suis bonis se perdere credunt quantum sui corporis conservationi impendunt. At qui verum nummorum usum norunt et divitiarum modum ex sola indigentia moderantur, paucis contenti vivunt.

CHAPTER 29: But this vice belongs only to those who seek coins not from indigence nor on account of necessities, but because they have learned the arts of lucre, by which they magnifically exalt themselves. For the rest, they feed the body by custom, but sparingly, because they believe that they lose from their own goods just as much as they expend on the preservation of their body. But those who know the true use of coins and moderate the measure of riches by indigence alone live content with few things.

CAPUT XXX: Cum igitur res illæ sint bonæ quæ corporis partes juvant ut suo officio fungantur et lætitia in eo consistat quod hominis potentia quatenus mente et corpore constat, juvatur vel augetur, sunt ergo illa omnia quæ lætitiam afferunt, bona. Attamen quoniam contra non eum in finem res agunt ut nos lætitia afficiant nec earum agendi potentia ex nostra utilitate temperatur et denique quoniam lætitia plerumque ad unam corporis partem potissimum refertur, habent ergo plerumque lætitiæ affectus (nisi ratio et vigilantia adsit) et consequenter cupiditates etiam quæ ex iisdem generantur, excessum; ad quod accedit quod ex affectu id primum habeamus quod in præsentia suave est nec futura æquali animi affectu æstimare possumus. Vide scholium propositionis 44 et scholium propositionis 60 partis IV.

CHAPTER 30: Since therefore those things are good which help the parts of the body to perform their proper office, and joy consists in this: that the power of man, insofar as it consists of mind and body, is helped or increased, therefore all those things which bring joy are good. Yet since, conversely, things do not act to the end that they affect us with joy, nor is their power of acting measured by our utility, and finally since joy is for the most part referred chiefly to one part of the body, therefore the affects of joy for the most part (unless reason and vigilance be present), and consequently also the cupidities which are generated from the same, tend to excess; to which there is added this: that, under affect, we prize first that which is pleasant in the present, nor can we estimate future things with an equal affect of mind. See the scholium of proposition 44 and the scholium of proposition 60 of part 4.

CAPUT XXXI: At superstitio id contra videtur statuere bonum esse quod tristitiam et id contra malum quod lætitiam affert. Sed ut jam diximus (vide scholium propositionis 45 partis IV) nemo nisi invidus mea impotentia et incommodo delectatur. Nam quo majore lætitia afficimur, eo ad majorem perfectionem transimus et consequenter eo magis de natura divina participamus nec lætitia unquam mala esse potest quam nostræ utilitatis vera ratio moderatur.

CHAPTER 31: But superstition, on the contrary, seems to determine that good is that which brings sadness, and conversely that evil is that which brings joy. But as we have already said (see the scholium of proposition 45 of Part 4), no one except an envious man takes delight in my impotence and disadvantage. For the greater the joy with which we are affected, the more we pass over to greater perfection, and consequently the more we partake of the divine nature; nor can joy ever be evil, insofar as it is moderated by the true reason of our utility.

At qui contra metu ducitur et bonum ut malum vitet, agit, is ratione non ducitur.

But he who, on the contrary, is led by fear and acts so as to shun the good as evil, is not led by reason.

CAPUT XXXII: Sed humana potentia admodum limitata est et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur atque adeo potestatem absolutam non habemus res quæ extra nos sunt, ad nostrum usum aptandi. Attamen ea quæ nobis eveniunt contra id quod nostræ utilitatis ratio postulat æquo animo feremus si conscii simus nos functos nostro officio fuisse et potentiam quam habemus non potuisse se eo usque extendere ut eadem vitare possemus nosque partem totius naturæ esse cujus ordinem sequimur. Quod si clare et distincte intelligamus, pars illa nostri quæ intelligentia definitur hoc est pars melior nostri, in eo plane acquiescet et in ea acquiescentia perseverare conabitur.

CHAPTER 32: But human power is very much limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, and thus we do not have absolute power of adapting the things that are outside us to our use. Nevertheless, we shall bear with equanimity the things that befall us contrary to what the reason of our utility demands, if we are conscious that we have performed our office, and that the power we have could not have extended itself so far that we could have avoided the same, and that we are a part of the whole of Nature, whose order we follow. But if we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined by intelligence—that is, the better part of us—will plainly acquiesce in this, and will endeavor to persevere in that acquiescence.

Nam quatenus intelligimus nihil appetere nisi id quod necessarium est nec absolute nisi in veris acquiescere possumus adeoque quatenus hæc recte intelligimus eatenus conatus melioris partis nostri cum ordine totius naturæ convenit.

For insofar as we understand that we desire nothing except that which is necessary, and that we cannot absolutely acquiesce except in truths, therefore insofar as we rightly understand these things, to that extent the striving (conatus) of the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature.

Finis quartæ partis

End of the fourth part