Aquinas: De Principio Individuationis

Quoniam duae sunt in homine potentiae cognoscitivae, scilicet sensus et intellectus, manifestum est illas diversitatem supponere ex parte obiectorum suorum. Sciendum est autem quod in cognitione humana fundamentum et origo est sensus, unde propinquior est rei extraneae supra quam tota actio virium sensitivarum fundatur, secundum philosophum in libro Perihermeneias. Unde propter manifestam passionem sensuum a sensibilibus tanquam a propinquo ortam, passiones intellectuum dixit esse similitudines rerum, de passionibus vero sensuum nullam mentionem fecit ibi.

Since there are two cognitive powers in the human being, namely sense and intellect, it is manifest that these suppose a diversity on the part of their objects. Moreover, it must be known that in human cognition the foundation and origin is sense; whence it is nearer to the external thing, upon which the whole action of the sensitive powers is founded, according to the Philosopher in the book On Interpretation (Perihermeneias). Whence, on account of the manifest passion of the senses arising from sensibles as from what is proximate, he said that the passions of the intellects are similitudes of things, but of the passions of the senses he made no mention there.

Quod tamen principaliter factum est, quia passiones intellectivae sunt causae vocum immediatius quam passiones sensuum, de quibus tunc agere intendebat. Certum est autem accidentia ipsa, sive propria sive communia, esse sensibilia, sive obiecta sensuum, ut habetur in libro secundo de anima. Unde, cum super proprium obiectum unius potentiae altera non feratur nisi per accidens, sicut oculus videt dulce inquantum est album vel nigrum, impossibile est intellectum ferri super illa accidentia nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet agit circa ipsa phantasmata quae sunt a parte ipsorum sensibilium accidentium; et hoc est per modum cuiusdam reflexionis.

Which, however, was done principally because the intellectual passions are causes of voices more immediately than the passions of the senses, about which he then intended to treat. It is certain, moreover, that the accidents themselves, whether proper or common, are sensibles, that is, objects of the senses, as is stated in Book Two of On the Soul. Hence, since over the proper object of one power another is not carried except per accidens—just as the eye sees the sweet insofar as it is white or black—it is impossible for the intellect to be directed upon those accidents except per accidens, namely insofar as it works around the very phantasms which are on the side of those sensible accidents; and this is in the mode of a certain reflection.

Reflexio autem est duplex: una ab origine potentiae, altera ab origine obiecti. Primo namque quaelibet potentia fertur super obiectum suum proprium, et illud habet determinare actum ipsius potentiae; unde ultra non transit actus potentiae quam sub forma ulteriori ipsius principalioris obiecti; aliter namque non esset id proprium eius obiectum; proprium enim obiectum est, per cuius informationem potentia actum suum exercet, sicut se habet color ad visum, et sonus ad auditum. Quidditas autem rei sensibilis est obiectum intellectus proprium, ut dicitur in tertio de anima: unde quocumque anima se vertit, hoc obiectum est sibi ratio agendi.

Reflection, moreover, is twofold: one from the origin of the power, the other from the origin of the object. For first, each power is carried toward its proper object, and that has to determine the act of the power itself; whence the act of the power does not pass beyond except under the further form of that more principal object; otherwise, indeed, that would not be its proper object; for the proper object is that by whose information the power exercises its act, just as color stands to sight, and sound to hearing. But the quiddity (essence) of the sensible thing is the proper object of the intellect, as is said in the third of On the Soul: whence, wherever the soul turns itself, this object is for it the reason for acting.

Potest igitur vel redire in se per actum et potentiam suam, vel redire per obiectum in ipsam originem obiecti, scilicet per phantasmata in species sensibilium. Ideo isti sunt duo modi reflexionis suae, quarum altera cognoscit se et quae a parte sua sunt; altera vero quae sunt a parte obiecti sui. In utroque vero modo sua cognitio ad aliquid singulare terminatur.

Therefore it can either return into itself by its act and its power, or return through the object into the very origin of the object, namely through phantasms into the species of sensibles. Hence these are two modes of its reflection: of which one knows itself and the things that are on its own side; the other, the things that are on the side of its object. And in either mode its cognition is terminated at some singular.

Cum enim in ipso suo obiecto figitur acies, rationem universalis apprehendit, quod solum in istis inferioribus ab intellectu determinatur ut proprium obiectum, cum omnia singularia apud nos materialia sint: materia enim impedit intellectum, singulare vero non: materia namque non est scibilis nisi per analogiam ad formam, ut dicitur primo physicorum. Si autem esset apud nos singulare insensibile et immateriale, quod tamen est impossibile, ipsum per se sine aliqua abstractione cognosceretur, quia singularitas non impedit intellectum, sed materialitas. Cum ergo intellectus tendit in originem sui obiecti, in sensibilia scilicet, reflectitur super obiecta aliarum virium cognoscitivarum.

Since indeed when its acumen is fixed upon its very object, it apprehends the reason of the universal, which alone among these lower things is determined by the intellect as its proper object, since all singulars among us are material: for matter impedes the intellect, but the singular does not; for matter is not knowable except through an analogy to form, as is said in the first of the Physics. But if there were among us a singular that is insensible and immaterial—which, however, is impossible—it would be known per se without any abstraction, because singularity does not impede the intellect, but materiality. When therefore the intellect tends toward the origin of its object, namely into sensibles, it is reflected upon the objects of the other cognitive powers.

Cum vero ad se redit, non tendit in obiectum alicuius alterius virtutis: quia potentialitas animae ratione cuius ipsa non potest esse completum obiectum intellectus proprii, nisi ducta ad actum per speciem principalis obiecti, ut docet philosophus in tertio de anima, quia anima intelligit se sicut et alia. Sed intelligit alia per speciem. Ergo non est materialitas quae facit esse ut obiectum alterius potentiae; facit tamen quemdam modum singularitatis, non qui sit alicuius rei completae in specie, sed quia esse animae terminatur per receptibilitatem suae naturae, cuius potentialitas maior est potentialitate angelorum, quia magis distat a deo in gradu naturae quam angelus.

But when it returns to itself, it does not tend toward the object of any other power: because the potentiality of the soul—by reason of which it itself cannot be the complete object of its own intellect unless led into act through the species of its principal object, as the Philosopher teaches in the third of De Anima, since the soul understands itself just as it does other things. But it understands other things through a species. Therefore it is not materiality which makes it to be as the object of another potency; it does, however, make a certain mode of singularity, not one which belongs to some thing complete in species, but because the being (esse) of the soul is terminated by the receptivity of its nature, whose potentiality is greater than the potentiality of angels, because it is more distant from God in the grade of nature than an angel.

Deus enim actus purus est: et quanto sibi aliquid minus appropinquat, tanto plus potentialitatis et minus actualitatis habet: non solum enim materia, sed etiam quaecumque potentialitas passiva de ratione obiecti intellectus minus habet: quia dicit philosophus, nono metaphysicorum, quod unumquodque intelligitur secundum quod est actu ens. Unde anima ad obiecta duplicem cognitionis modum habet. Unum in se, ut separata accipitur: tunc enim cognoscibilis est secundum modum sui esse, quia est actus perficiens suam potentialitatem.

For God is pure act: and the less anything approaches to Him, by so much the more it has of potentiality and the less of actuality: for not only matter, but even any passive potentiality, has less of the notion of the object of the intellect: because the philosopher says, in Book 9 of the Metaphysics, that each thing is understood according as it is a being in act. Whence the soul has a double mode of cognition with respect to objects. One, in itself, inasmuch as it is taken as separate: for then it is knowable according to the mode of its being, because it is act perfecting its potentiality.

Non enim in anima sunt duo actus, scilicet sua essentia quae est sua potentialitas, et esse suum, sed esse suum est sua actualitas, ratione cuius ipsa essentia animae est actus corporis: omnis enim forma participat actum, qui est primus per essentiam; sed hoc analogice fit. Duos autem actus eiusdem ordinis impossibile est aliquod unum participare simul, sicut impossibile est eamdem materiam duas formas substantiales simul participare. Alium autem modum cognitionis habet a se, inquantum nata est per sensus cognoscere: unde non est cognoscibilis in statu in quo accipitur aliquid per sensum, nisi per species rei sensibilis; et ideo omnis cognitio sua de se ipsa proprie est reflexa.

For there are not two acts in the soul, namely its essence, which is its potentiality, and its being; rather, its being is its actuality, by reason of which the very essence of the soul is the act of the body: for every form participates in act, which is first by essence; but this happens analogically. Yet it is impossible that any one thing simultaneously participate in two acts of the same order, just as it is impossible that the same matter simultaneously participate in two substantial forms. It has, however, another mode of cognition from itself, insofar as it is by nature apt to know through the senses: whence it is not knowable, in the state in which something is received through sense, except through the species of the sensible thing; and therefore all its cognition of itself about itself is properly reflexive.

Nunc ergo restat ostendere, ubi separatur cognitio sensus et intellectus a se mutuo. Manifestum est enim intellectum incipere ubi sensus desinit. Sensus autem exteriores ipsa sensibilia accidentia, communia scilicet et propria, habent pro suis per se obiectis.

Now therefore it remains to show where the cognition of sense and of intellect is separated from one another. For it is manifest that the intellect begins where sense ceases. But the external senses have the sensible accidents themselves—namely the common and the proper—as their per se objects.

Quidditas autem rei particularis in particulari non spectat ut per se obiectum ad illos sensus exteriores, cum quidditas ista substantia sit et non accidens; nec ad intellectum pertinet ut per se obiectum eius propter suam materialitatem. Ideo quidditas rei materialis in ipsa sua particularitate est obiectum rationis particularis, cuius est conferre de intentionibus particularibus: loco cuius in brutis aestimativa naturalis est. Quae potentia per sui coniunctionem cum intellectu, ubi est ratio ipsa quae confert de universalibus, participat vim collativam: sed quia pars sensitivae est, non abstrahit omnino a materia.

But the quiddity of a particular thing, as particular, does not present itself as a per se object to those exterior senses, since that quiddity is a substance and not an accident; nor does it pertain to the intellect as its per se object on account of its materiality. Therefore the quiddity of a material thing, in its very particularity, is the object of the particular reason, whose office is to compare concerning particular intentions; in place of which in brutes there is the natural estimative. This power, through its conjunction with the intellect—where reason itself is that which compares concerning universals—participates in the collative force; but because it is a part of the sensitive part, it does not abstract altogether from matter.

Unde obiectum suum proprium manet quidditas particularis materialis. Hoc autem non est quod illa potentia apprehendat materiam in se, cum ipsa non possit sciri nisi per analogiam ad formam; sed quia collatio de materia in ordine ad formam per ipsam materiam individuatam spectat ad hanc potentiam, sicut considerare de materia in communi in ordine ad formam speciei, spectat ad rationem superiorem. Ex his facile est videre quomodo materia est principium individuationis: hoc enim intendimus ostendere.

Whence its own proper object remains the material particular quiddity. But this is not to say that that power apprehends matter in itself, since it itself cannot be known except through an analogy to form; but because the collation concerning matter in its ordering to form, through matter itself individuated, pertains to this power, just as to consider matter in common in its ordering to the form of the species pertains to the higher reason. From these it is easy to see how matter is the principle of individuation: for this indeed we intend to show.

Sciendum est ergo quod individuum apud nos in duobus consistit. Est enim individuum in sensibilibus ipsum ultimum in genere substantiae, quod de nullo alio praedicatur: immo ipsum est prima substantia, secundum philosophum in praedicamentorum, et primum fundamentum omnium aliorum. Natura enim formae materialis, cum ipsa non possit esse hoc aliquid completum in specie, cuius solum esse est incommunicabile, est communicabilis quantum est de ratione sua; sed est incommunicabilis solum ratione suppositi, quod est aliquid completum in specie, quod cuilibet formae non convenit, ut dictum est.

It must be known, then, that the individual, with us, consists in two things. For the individual in sensibles is the very ultimate in the genus of substance, which is predicated of no other; nay rather, it itself is primary substance, according to the Philosopher in the Categories, and the first foundation of all the others. For the nature of the material form, since it itself cannot be this something complete in species—whose being alone is incommunicable—is communicable in so far as pertains to its ratio; but it is incommunicable only by reason of the suppositum, which is something complete in species, which does not befit just any form, as has been said.

Ideo quantum est de ratione sua, communicabilis est, ut dictum est. Communicatio autem sua est, ut dictum est, per hoc quod recipitur in aliis. Ideo quantum est de natura sua, communicabilis est, et in multis recipi potest, et recipitur secundum unam rationem, cum una sit ratio speciei in omnibus sui individuis.

Therefore, insofar as it is of its own rationale, it is communicable, as has been said. Moreover, its communication is, as has been said, through the fact that it is received in others. Therefore, insofar as it is of its own nature, it is communicable, and it can be received in many, and it is received according to one rationale, since there is one rationale of the species in all its own individuals.

Sed quia ipsa esse non habet, ut dictum est, quia esse est solius suppositi, et suppositum incommunicabile est, ut dictum est, ideo ipsa forma materialis diversificatur secundum multa esse incommunicabilia, manens una secundum rationem multis communicatam: sua autem receptio est in materia, quia ipsa materialis est. Ex quo patet quod de natura sua sibi relinquitur unitas rationis in communicatione sua, et quod redditur incommunicabilis per receptionem suam in materia. Ex quo enim recipitur in materia, efficitur individuum, quod est incommunicabile, et primum fundamentum in genere substantiae, ut completum aliorum de se praedicabilium subiectum.

But because it does not have being (esse) itself, as has been said—since being is of the sole supposit, and the supposit is incommunicable, as has been said—therefore the material form itself is diversified according to many incommunicable beings, while remaining one according to the notion communicated to many: moreover, its reception is in matter, because it itself is material. Whence it is clear that by its own nature there is left to itself a unity of notion in its communication, and that it is rendered incommunicable through its reception in matter. For from the fact that it is received in matter, it is made an individual, which is incommunicable, and the first foundation in the genus of substance, as a complete subject of other things predicable of itself.

In via autem generationis semper incompletum est prius completo, licet in via perfectionis sit totum e contrario. Illud ergo quod est primum subiectum omnium in via generationis, et incompletum, quod de nullo illius generis praedicatur, materia scilicet, necessario erit primum principium esse incommunicabilis, quod est proprium individui. Aliud est in quo salvatur ratio individui apud nos, determinatio scilicet eius ad certas particulas temporis et loci, quia proprium est sibi esse hic et nunc, et haec determinatio debetur sibi ratione quantitatis determinatae.

But on the way of generation the incomplete is always prior to the complete, although on the way of perfection the whole is the other way around. Therefore that which is the first subject of all on the way of generation, and incomplete, which is predicated of none of that genus—namely matter—will necessarily be the first principle of incommunicable being, which is proper to the individual. There is another thing in which, for us, the notion (ratio) of the individual is preserved, namely its determination to certain particles of time and place, because it is proper to it to be here and now; and this determination is owed to it by reason of determined quantity.

Et ideo materia sub quantitate determinata est principium individuationis: materia enim sola est primum principium individuationis, quo ad illud in quo salvatur ratio primi in genere substantiae, quod tamen impossibile est reperiri sine corpore et quantitate. Et ideo quantitas determinata dicitur principium individuationis, non quod aliquo modo causet subiectum suum quod est prima substantia, sed concomitatur eam inseparabiliter, et determinat eam ad hic et nunc. Illud ergo quod cadit sub ratione particulari, est hoc aliquid per naturam materiae; quod autem cadit sub sensu exteriori, est per quantitatem.

And therefore matter under determined quantity is the principle of individuation: for matter alone is the first principle of individuation, with respect to that in which the account of the first in the genus of substance is preserved, which nevertheless it is impossible to find without body and quantity. And therefore determined quantity is called the principle of individuation, not because it in any way causes its subject, which is first substance, but it accompanies it inseparably, and determines it to the here and now. Therefore that which falls under the particular account is a this‑something by the nature of matter; but that which falls under exterior sense is by quantity.

Sed huic obiici potest quod materia de sui natura communis est, sicut et forma, cum possit una sub pluribus formis esse. Unde haec communitas sua potest impedire ipsam, ne sit principium primum individuationis. Sed sciendum est quod impossibile est formam uniri materiae quin sit particularis et quin eam sequatur quantitas determinata, per quem modum non est ultra communicabilis materia alteri formae, quia haec quantitas cum alia forma reperiri non potest cum eadem determinatione.

But to this it can be objected that matter by its own nature is common, just as form is, since it can be one and the same under several forms. Whence this its communality can impede it, lest it be the first principle of individuation. But it should be known that it is impossible for form to be united to matter without its being particular and without a determinate quantity following it, in which mode the matter is no longer communicable to another form, because this quantity cannot be found with another form with the same determination.

Et ideo materia non est communicabilis secundum eamdem determinationem, sicut forma est, ut dictum est. Ratio enim materiae sub forma aliqua est alia a ratione sua sub alia forma, quia certificatur ratio sua per determinationem quantitatis, quae in diversa proportione et dimensione requiritur ad diversas formas. Essentia tamen materiae non diversificatur sub diversis formis sicut ratio sua: ratio enim materiae non est una et communis sicut sua essentia est: ratio enim formae in diversis materiis est una, licet secundum esse sit diversa.

And therefore matter is not communicable according to the same determination, as form is, as has been said. For the notion (ratio) of matter under some form is other than its notion under another form, because its notion is certified by the determination of quantity, which is required in different proportion and dimension for different forms. Nevertheless, the essence of matter is not diversified under diverse forms as its notion is: for the notion of matter is not one and common as its essence is. For the notion of form in diverse matters is one, although according to being it is diverse.

Et ideo communitas, secundum essentiam tantum quae est ipsius materiae et non secundum eamdem rationem, non impedit materiam esse primum principium individuationis. Sed advertendum est quod accidentia non individuantur per materiam primam, sed per subiectum proprium quod est ens actu individuantur, sicut et formae substantiales per materiam primam, quae est earum subiectum. Et haec de principio individuationis ad praesens sufficiunt.

And therefore the commonality, according only to the essence which belongs to matter itself and not according to the same account, does not prevent matter from being the first principle of individuation. But it should be noted that accidents are not individuated by prime matter, but are individuated by the proper subject which is a being in act, just as substantial forms are by prime matter, which is their subject. And these things about the principle of individuation suffice for the present.