Justinian•DIGESTA
Abbo Floriacensis1 work
Abelard3 works
Addison9 works
Adso Dervensis1 work
Aelredus Rievallensis1 work
Alanus de Insulis2 works
Albert of Aix1 work
HISTORIA HIEROSOLYMITANAE EXPEDITIONIS12 sections
Albertano of Brescia5 works
DE AMORE ET DILECTIONE DEI4 sections
SERMONES4 sections
Alcuin9 works
Alfonsi1 work
Ambrose4 works
Ambrosius4 works
Ammianus1 work
Ampelius1 work
Andrea da Bergamo1 work
Andreas Capellanus1 work
DE AMORE LIBRI TRES3 sections
Annales Regni Francorum1 work
Annales Vedastini1 work
Annales Xantenses1 work
Anonymus Neveleti1 work
Anonymus Valesianus2 works
Apicius1 work
DE RE COQUINARIA5 sections
Appendix Vergiliana1 work
Apuleius2 works
METAMORPHOSES12 sections
DE DOGMATE PLATONIS6 sections
Aquinas6 works
Archipoeta1 work
Arnobius1 work
ADVERSVS NATIONES LIBRI VII7 sections
Arnulf of Lisieux1 work
Asconius1 work
Asserius1 work
Augustine5 works
CONFESSIONES13 sections
DE CIVITATE DEI23 sections
DE TRINITATE15 sections
CONTRA SECUNDAM IULIANI RESPONSIONEM2 sections
Augustus1 work
RES GESTAE DIVI AVGVSTI2 sections
Aurelius Victor1 work
LIBER ET INCERTORVM LIBRI3 sections
Ausonius2 works
Avianus1 work
Avienus2 works
Bacon3 works
HISTORIA REGNI HENRICI SEPTIMI REGIS ANGLIAE11 sections
Balde2 works
Baldo1 work
Bebel1 work
Bede2 works
HISTORIAM ECCLESIASTICAM GENTIS ANGLORUM7 sections
Benedict1 work
Berengar1 work
Bernard of Clairvaux1 work
Bernard of Cluny1 work
DE CONTEMPTU MUNDI LIBRI DUO2 sections
Biblia Sacra3 works
VETUS TESTAMENTUM49 sections
NOVUM TESTAMENTUM27 sections
Bigges1 work
Boethius de Dacia2 works
Bonaventure1 work
Breve Chronicon Northmannicum1 work
Buchanan1 work
Bultelius2 works
Caecilius Balbus1 work
Caesar3 works
COMMENTARIORUM LIBRI VII DE BELLO GALLICO CUM A. HIRTI SUPPLEMENTO8 sections
COMMENTARIORUM LIBRI III DE BELLO CIVILI3 sections
LIBRI INCERTORUM AUCTORUM3 sections
Calpurnius Flaccus1 work
Calpurnius Siculus1 work
Campion8 works
Carmen Arvale1 work
Carmen de Martyrio1 work
Carmen in Victoriam1 work
Carmen Saliare1 work
Carmina Burana1 work
Cassiodorus5 works
Catullus1 work
Censorinus1 work
Christian Creeds1 work
Cicero3 works
ORATORIA33 sections
PHILOSOPHIA21 sections
EPISTULAE4 sections
Cinna Helvius1 work
Claudian4 works
Claudii Oratio1 work
Claudius Caesar1 work
Columbus1 work
Columella2 works
Commodianus3 works
Conradus Celtis2 works
Constitutum Constantini1 work
Contemporary9 works
Cotta1 work
Dante4 works
Dares the Phrygian1 work
de Ave Phoenice1 work
De Expugnatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum1 work
Declaratio Arbroathis1 work
Decretum Gelasianum1 work
Descartes1 work
Dies Irae1 work
Disticha Catonis1 work
Egeria1 work
ITINERARIUM PEREGRINATIO2 sections
Einhard1 work
Ennius1 work
Epistolae Austrasicae1 work
Epistulae de Priapismo1 work
Erasmus7 works
Erchempert1 work
Eucherius1 work
Eugippius1 work
Eutropius1 work
BREVIARIVM HISTORIAE ROMANAE10 sections
Exurperantius1 work
Fabricius Montanus1 work
Falcandus1 work
Falcone di Benevento1 work
Ficino1 work
Fletcher1 work
Florus1 work
EPITOME DE T. LIVIO BELLORUM OMNIUM ANNORUM DCC LIBRI DUO2 sections
Foedus Aeternum1 work
Forsett2 works
Fredegarius1 work
Frodebertus & Importunus1 work
Frontinus3 works
STRATEGEMATA4 sections
DE AQUAEDUCTU URBIS ROMAE2 sections
OPUSCULA RERUM RUSTICARUM4 sections
Fulgentius3 works
MITOLOGIARUM LIBRI TRES3 sections
Gaius4 works
Galileo1 work
Garcilaso de la Vega1 work
Gaudeamus Igitur1 work
Gellius1 work
Germanicus1 work
Gesta Francorum10 works
Gesta Romanorum1 work
Gioacchino da Fiore1 work
Godfrey of Winchester2 works
Grattius1 work
Gregorii Mirabilia Urbis Romae1 work
Gregorius Magnus1 work
Gregory IX5 works
Gregory of Tours1 work
LIBRI HISTORIARUM10 sections
Gregory the Great1 work
Gregory VII1 work
Gwinne8 works
Henry of Settimello1 work
Henry VII1 work
Historia Apolloni1 work
Historia Augusta30 works
Historia Brittonum1 work
Holberg1 work
Horace3 works
SERMONES2 sections
CARMINA4 sections
EPISTULAE5 sections
Hugo of St. Victor2 works
Hydatius2 works
Hyginus3 works
Hymni1 work
Hymni et cantica1 work
Iacobus de Voragine1 work
LEGENDA AUREA24 sections
Ilias Latina1 work
Iordanes2 works
Isidore of Seville3 works
ETYMOLOGIARVM SIVE ORIGINVM LIBRI XX20 sections
SENTENTIAE LIBRI III3 sections
Iulius Obsequens1 work
Iulius Paris1 work
Ius Romanum4 works
Janus Secundus2 works
Johann H. Withof1 work
Johann P. L. Withof1 work
Johannes de Alta Silva1 work
Johannes de Plano Carpini1 work
John of Garland1 work
Jordanes2 works
Julius Obsequens1 work
Junillus1 work
Justin1 work
HISTORIARVM PHILIPPICARVM T. POMPEII TROGI LIBRI XLIV IN EPITOMEN REDACTI46 sections
Justinian3 works
INSTITVTIONES5 sections
CODEX12 sections
DIGESTA50 sections
Juvenal1 work
Kepler1 work
Landor4 works
Laurentius Corvinus2 works
Legenda Regis Stephani1 work
Leo of Naples1 work
HISTORIA DE PRELIIS ALEXANDRI MAGNI3 sections
Leo the Great1 work
SERMONES DE QUADRAGESIMA2 sections
Liber Kalilae et Dimnae1 work
Liber Pontificalis1 work
Livius Andronicus1 work
Livy1 work
AB VRBE CONDITA LIBRI37 sections
Lotichius1 work
Lucan1 work
DE BELLO CIVILI SIVE PHARSALIA10 sections
Lucretius1 work
DE RERVM NATVRA LIBRI SEX6 sections
Lupus Protospatarius Barensis1 work
Macarius of Alexandria1 work
Macarius the Great1 work
Magna Carta1 work
Maidstone1 work
Malaterra1 work
DE REBUS GESTIS ROGERII CALABRIAE ET SICILIAE COMITIS ET ROBERTI GUISCARDI DUCIS FRATRIS EIUS4 sections
Manilius1 work
ASTRONOMICON5 sections
Marbodus Redonensis1 work
Marcellinus Comes2 works
Martial1 work
Martin of Braga13 works
Marullo1 work
Marx1 work
Maximianus1 work
May1 work
SUPPLEMENTUM PHARSALIAE8 sections
Melanchthon4 works
Milton1 work
Minucius Felix1 work
Mirabilia Urbis Romae1 work
Mirandola1 work
CARMINA9 sections
Miscellanea Carminum42 works
Montanus1 work
Naevius1 work
Navagero1 work
Nemesianus1 work
ECLOGAE4 sections
Nepos3 works
LIBER DE EXCELLENTIBUS DVCIBUS EXTERARVM GENTIVM24 sections
Newton1 work
PHILOSOPHIÆ NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA4 sections
Nithardus1 work
HISTORIARUM LIBRI QUATTUOR4 sections
Notitia Dignitatum2 works
Novatian1 work
Origo gentis Langobardorum1 work
Orosius1 work
HISTORIARUM ADVERSUM PAGANOS LIBRI VII7 sections
Otto of Freising1 work
GESTA FRIDERICI IMPERATORIS5 sections
Ovid7 works
METAMORPHOSES15 sections
AMORES3 sections
HEROIDES21 sections
ARS AMATORIA3 sections
TRISTIA5 sections
EX PONTO4 sections
Owen1 work
Papal Bulls4 works
Pascoli5 works
Passerat1 work
Passio Perpetuae1 work
Patricius1 work
Tome I: Panaugia2 sections
Paulinus Nolensis1 work
Paulus Diaconus4 works
Persius1 work
Pervigilium Veneris1 work
Petronius2 works
Petrus Blesensis1 work
Petrus de Ebulo1 work
Phaedrus2 works
FABVLARVM AESOPIARVM LIBRI QVINQVE5 sections
Phineas Fletcher1 work
Planctus destructionis1 work
Plautus21 works
Pliny the Younger2 works
EPISTVLARVM LIBRI DECEM10 sections
Poggio Bracciolini1 work
Pomponius Mela1 work
DE CHOROGRAPHIA3 sections
Pontano1 work
Poree1 work
Porphyrius1 work
Precatio Terrae1 work
Priapea1 work
Professio Contra Priscillianum1 work
Propertius1 work
ELEGIAE4 sections
Prosperus3 works
Prudentius2 works
Pseudoplatonica12 works
Publilius Syrus1 work
Quintilian2 works
INSTITUTIONES12 sections
Raoul of Caen1 work
Regula ad Monachos1 work
Reposianus1 work
Ricardi de Bury1 work
Richerus1 work
HISTORIARUM LIBRI QUATUOR4 sections
Rimbaud1 work
Ritchie's Fabulae Faciles1 work
Roman Epitaphs1 work
Roman Inscriptions1 work
Ruaeus1 work
Ruaeus' Aeneid1 work
Rutilius Lupus1 work
Rutilius Namatianus1 work
Sabinus1 work
EPISTULAE TRES AD OVIDIANAS EPISTULAS RESPONSORIAE3 sections
Sallust10 works
Sannazaro2 works
Scaliger1 work
Sedulius2 works
CARMEN PASCHALE5 sections
Seneca9 works
EPISTULAE MORALES AD LUCILIUM16 sections
QUAESTIONES NATURALES7 sections
DE CONSOLATIONE3 sections
DE IRA3 sections
DE BENEFICIIS3 sections
DIALOGI7 sections
FABULAE8 sections
Septem Sapientum1 work
Sidonius Apollinaris2 works
Sigebert of Gembloux3 works
Silius Italicus1 work
Solinus2 works
DE MIRABILIBUS MUNDI Mommsen 1st edition (1864)4 sections
DE MIRABILIBUS MUNDI C.L.F. Panckoucke edition (Paris 1847)4 sections
Spinoza1 work
Statius3 works
THEBAID12 sections
ACHILLEID2 sections
Stephanus de Varda1 work
Suetonius2 works
Sulpicia1 work
Sulpicius Severus2 works
CHRONICORUM LIBRI DUO2 sections
Syrus1 work
Tacitus5 works
Terence6 works
Tertullian32 works
Testamentum Porcelli1 work
Theodolus1 work
Theodosius16 works
Theophanes1 work
Thomas à Kempis1 work
DE IMITATIONE CHRISTI4 sections
Thomas of Edessa1 work
Tibullus1 work
TIBVLLI ALIORVMQUE CARMINVM LIBRI TRES3 sections
Tünger1 work
Valerius Flaccus1 work
Valerius Maximus1 work
FACTORVM ET DICTORVM MEMORABILIVM LIBRI NOVEM9 sections
Vallauri1 work
Varro2 works
RERVM RVSTICARVM DE AGRI CVLTURA3 sections
DE LINGVA LATINA7 sections
Vegetius1 work
EPITOMA REI MILITARIS LIBRI IIII4 sections
Velleius Paterculus1 work
HISTORIAE ROMANAE2 sections
Venantius Fortunatus1 work
Vico1 work
Vida1 work
Vincent of Lérins1 work
Virgil3 works
AENEID12 sections
ECLOGUES10 sections
GEORGICON4 sections
Vita Agnetis1 work
Vita Caroli IV1 work
Vita Sancti Columbae2 works
Vitruvius1 work
DE ARCHITECTVRA10 sections
Waardenburg1 work
Waltarius3 works
Walter Mapps2 works
Walter of Châtillon1 work
William of Apulia1 work
William of Conches2 works
William of Tyre1 work
HISTORIA RERUM IN PARTIBUS TRANSMARINIS GESTARUM24 sections
Xylander1 work
Zonaras1 work
Dig. 41.3.0. De usurpationibus et usucapionibus.
41.2.0. On acquiring or losing possession.
Digest 41.3.0. On usurpations and usucapions.
Dig. 41.6.0. Pro donato.
41.5.0. As heir or as possessor.
Dig. 41.6.0. As donee.
Quarundam rerum dominium nanciscimur iure gentium, quod ratione naturali inter omnes homines peraeque servatur, quarundam iure civili, id est iure proprio civitatis nostrae. et quia antiquius ius gentium cum ipso genere humano proditum est, opus est, ut de hoc prius referendum sit.
Ownership of certain things we acquire by the law of nations, which by natural reason is equally observed among all human beings; of others, by the civil law, that is, by the proper law of our city. And because the law of nations is more ancient, having been handed down together with the human race itself, it is necessary that this be treated first.
Illud quaesitum est, an fera bestia, quae ita vulnerata sit, ut capi possit, statim nostra esse intellegatur. trebatio placuit statim nostram esse et eo usque nostram videri, donec eam persequamur, quod si desierimus eam persequi, desinere nostram esse et rursus fieri occupantis: itaque si per hoc tempus, quo eam persequimur, alius eam ceperit eo animo, ut ipse lucrifaceret, furtum videri nobis eum commisisse. plerique non aliter putaverunt eam nostram esse, quam si eam ceperimus, quia multa accidere possunt, ut eam non capiamus: quod verius est.
the question was asked whether a wild beast which has been so wounded that it can be captured is immediately understood to be ours. trebatius held that it is at once ours and is to be regarded as ours so long as we pursue it; but if we cease to pursue it, it ceases to be ours and again becomes that of the occupier: and so, if during the time in which we are pursuing it another should take it with the intention of making lucre for himself, he is deemed to have committed theft against us. most have thought that it is not otherwise ours than if we have actually taken it, because many things can happen such that we do not take it: which is the truer view.
Pavonum et columbarum fera natura est nec ad rem pertinet, quod ex consuetudine avolare et revolare solent: nam et apes idem faciunt, quarum constat feram esse naturam: cervos quoque ita quidam mansuetos habent, ut in silvas eant et redeant, quorum et ipsorum feram esse naturam nemo negat. in his autem animalibus, quae consuetudine abire et redire solent, talis regula comprobata est, ut eo usque nostra esse intellegantur, donec revertendi animum habeant, quod si desierint revertendi animum habere, desinant nostra esse et fiant occupantium. intelleguntur autem desisse revertendi animum habere tunc, cum revertendi consuetudinem deseruerint.
The nature of peacocks and pigeons is feral, nor is it pertinent to the matter that by custom they are wont to fly away and fly back; for bees do the same, whose nature is agreed to be feral. Some also keep deer so tame that they go into the woods and return, yet no one denies that their nature too is feral. But as to those animals which by custom are accustomed to go away and return, such a rule has been approved: that they are understood to be ours so long as they have a mind to return; but if they have ceased to have a mind to return, they cease to be ours and become the property of those who take possession. And they are understood to have ceased to have a mind to return when they have abandoned the habit of returning.
Gallinarum et anserum non est fera natura: palam est enim alias esse feras gallinas et alios feros anseres. itaque si quolibet modo anseres mei et gallinae meae turbati turbataeve adeo longius evolaverint, ut ignoremus ubi sint, tamen nihilo minus in nostro dominio tenentur. qua de causa furti nobis tenebitur, qui quid eorum lucrandi animo adprehenderit.
Hens and geese are not of a wild nature: for it is clear that there are other wild hens and other wild geese. And so, if in any manner my geese and my hens, being disturbed, have flown off so far that we do not know where they are, nevertheless they are held no less in our dominion. For which cause he who has apprehended any of them with a profit-seeking intent will be held liable to us for theft.
Quod si vis fluminis partem aliquam ex tuo praedio detraxerit et meo praedio attulerit, palam est eam tuam permanere. plane si longiore tempore fundo meo haeserit arboresque, quas secum traxerit, in meum fundum radices egerint, ex eo tempore videtur meo fundo adquisita esse.
But if the force of the river should detach some part from your estate and bring it to my estate, it is clear that it remains yours. Plainly, if for a longer time it has adhered to my land and the trees which it carried along have put down roots in my land, from that time it is deemed to have been acquired for my estate.
Insula quae in mari nascitur ( quod raro accidit) occupantis fit: nullius enim esse creditur. in flumine nata ( quod frequenter accidit), si quidem mediam partem fluminis tenet, communis est eorum, qui ab utraque parte fluminis prope ripam praedia possident, pro modo latitudinis cuiusque praedii, quae latitudo prope ripam sit: quod si alteri parti proximior sit, eorum est tantum, qui ab ea parte prope ripam praedia possident.
An island which arises in the sea ( which rarely happens) becomes the property of the occupier: for it is believed to belong to no one. in a river born ( which frequently happens), if indeed it holds the middle part of the river, it is common to those who on either side of the river possess estates near the bank, in proportion to the breadth of each estate, that breadth which lies near the bank: but if it is nearer to one side, it belongs only to those who on that side possess estates near the bank.
Quod si uno latere perruperit flumen et alia parte novo rivo fluere coeperit, deinde infra novus iste rivus in veterem se converterit, ager, qui a duobus rivis comprehensus in formam insulae redactus est, eius est scilicet, cuius et fuit.
But if a river should break through on one side and on the other side begin to flow in a new channel, then lower down this new channel turns itself back into the old, the field which, encompassed by two channels, has been reduced into the form of an island belongs, of course, to the one to whom it also belonged.
Quod si toto naturali alveo relicto flumen alias fluere coeperit, prior quidem alveus eorum est, qui prope ripam praedia possident, pro modo scilicet latitudinis cuiusque praedii, quae latitudo prope ripam sit: novus autem alveus eius iuris esse incipit, cuius et ipsum flumen, id est publicus iuris gentium. quod si post aliquod temporis ad priorem alveum reversum fuerit et ^ ^ flumen, rursus novus alveus eorum esse incipit, qui prope ripam eius praedia possident. cuius tamen totum agrum novus alveus occupaverit, licet ad priorem alveum reversum fuerit flumen, non tamen is, cuius is ager fuerat, stricta ratione quicquam in eo alveo habere potest, quia et ille ager qui fuerat desiit esse amissa propria forma et, quia vicinum praedium nullum habet, non potest ratione vicinitatis ullam partem in eo alveo habere: sed vix est, ut id optineat.
But if, with the entire natural channel left, the river begins to flow elsewhere, the former channel is indeed theirs who possess estates near the bank, according to the measure, namely, of the breadth of each estate which lies along the bank; but the new channel begins to be of the same status as the river itself, that is, public by the law of nations. And if after some time it has returned to the former channel and ^ ^ the river, the new channel again begins to be theirs who possess estates near its bank. However, if the new channel has occupied the whole field of someone, although the river has returned to the former channel, nevertheless he whose field that had been, strictly speaking, can have nothing in that channel, because both that field which it had been has ceased to be, its own form having been lost, and, because it has no neighboring estate, he cannot by reason of vicinity have any share in that channel: but it is scarcely the case that this prevails.
Cum quis ex aliena materia speciem aliquam suo nomine fecerit, nerva et proculus putant hunc dominum esse qui fecerit, quia quod factum est, antea nullius fuerat. sabinus et cassius magis naturalem rationem efficere putant, ut qui materiae dominus fuerit, idem eius quoque, quod ex eadem materia factum sit, dominus esset, quia sine materia nulla species effici possit: veluti si ex auro vel argento vel aere vas aliquod fecero, vel ex tabulis tuis navem aut armarium aut subsellia fecero, vel ex lana tua vestimentum, vel ex vino et melle tuo mulsum, vel ex medicamentis tuis emplastrum aut collyrium, vel ex uvis aut olivis aut spicis tuis vinum vel oleum vel frumentum. est tamen etiam media sententia recte existimantium, si species ad materiam reverti possit, verius esse, quod et sabinus et cassius senserunt, si non possit reverti, verius esse, quod nervae et proculo placuit.
when someone has made some form out of another’s material under his own name, nerva and proculus think that the one who made it is the owner, because what has been made previously belonged to no one. sabinus and cassius think that a more natural rationale is effected, namely that the one who was owner of the material is likewise owner of what has been made from that same material, because without material no form can be effected: for example, if out of gold or silver or bronze I have made some vessel, or out of your boards I have made a ship or a cupboard or benches, or out of your wool a garment, or out of your wine and honey mulsum, or out of your medicaments a plaster or an eye-salve, or out of your grapes or olives or ears wine or oil or grain. there is, however, also a middle opinion of those judging rightly, that if the form can be returned to the material, what both sabinus and cassius held is truer; if it cannot be returned, what pleased nerva and proculus is truer.
for example, a cast vessel can be reverted to the raw mass of gold or silver or bronze, but wine or oil or grain cannot be reverted to grapes and olives and ears; and not even mulsum can be reverted to honey and wine, nor can a plaster or collyria (eye-salves) be reverted to the medications. yet some seem to me to have said rightly that it ought not to be doubted that grain shaken out from another’s ears belongs to the one whose the ears also were: for since the grains which are contained in the ears have their own perfect form (species), he who shook out the ears does not make a new form (species), but uncovers the one that is.
Voluntas duorum dominorum miscentium materias commune totum corpus efficit, sive eiusdem generis sint materiae, veluti vina miscuerunt vel argentum conflaverunt, sive diversae, veluti si alius vinum contulerit alius mel, vel alius aurum alius argentum: quamvis et mulsi et electri novi corporis sit species.
The will of two owners mixing materials makes the whole body common, whether the materials are of the same kind, as when they mixed wines or fused silver, or of different kinds, as when one contributed wine and another honey, or one gold and another silver: although both mulsum and electrum are a species of a new body.
Cum in suo loco aliquis aliena materia aedificaverit, ipse dominus intellegitur aedificii, quia omne quod inaedificatur solo cedit. nec tamen ideo is qui materiae dominus fuit desiit eius dominus esse: sed tantisper neque vindicare eam potest neque ad exhibendum de ea agere propter legem duodecim tabularum, qua cavetur, ne quis tignum alienum aedibus suis iunctum eximere cogatur, sed duplum pro eo praestet. appellatione autem tigni omnes materiae significantur, ex quibus aedificia fiunt.
When someone builds on his own land with another’s materials, he himself is understood to be the owner of the building, because everything that is built in accedes to the soil. Nor, however, on that account has the one who was the owner of the materials ceased to be their owner: but for the time being he can neither vindicate them nor bring an action to compel their production on account of the law of the Twelve Tables, by which it is provided that no one be compelled to remove another’s beam joined to his house, but that he should render double for it. By the appellation “beam” all materials are signified out of which buildings are made.
Illud recte quaeritur, an, si in aedificium vendiderit is qui aedificaverit et ab emptore longo tempore captum postea dirutum sit, adhuc dominus materiae vindicationem eius habeat. causa dubitationis est, an eo ipso, quo universitas aedificii longo tempore capta est, singulae quoque res, ex quibus constabat, captae essent: quod non placuit.
It is rightly inquired whether, if the one who built has sold the building and, after it has been taken by the buyer through long possession, it is later torn down, the owner of the materials still has a vindication of them. The cause of doubt is whether by the very fact that the universality of the building was taken by long possession, the individual things also, of which it consisted, were taken; which was not approved.
Ex diverso si quis in alieno solo sua materia aedificaverit, illius fit aedificium, cuius et solum est et, si scit alienum solum esse, sua voluntate amisisse proprietatem materiae intellegitur: itaque neque diruto quidem aedificio vindicatio eius materiae competit. certe si dominus soli petat aedificium nec solvat pretium materiae et mercedes fabrorum, poterit per exceptionem doli mali repelli, utique si nescit qui aedificavit alienum esse solum et tamquam in suo bona fide aedificavit: nam si scit, culpa ei obici potest, quod temere aedificavit in eo solo, quod intellegeret alienum.
Conversely, if someone on another’s soil has built with his own material, the building becomes that of the person who also owns the soil; and if he knows the soil is another’s, he is understood, by his own will, to have lost ownership of the material: and so, not even upon the building’s being torn down does a vindication of that material lie. Certainly, if the owner of the soil claims the building and does not pay the price of the material and the wages of the craftsmen, he can be repelled by the exception of dolus malus (fraud), especially if the one who built did not know the soil belonged to another and built in good faith as on his own: for if he knows, fault can be imputed to him, because he rashly built on that soil which he understood to be another’s.
Si alienam plantam in meo solo posuero, mea erit: ex diverso si meam plantam in alieno solo posuero, illius erit: si modo utroque casu radices egerit: antequam enim radices ageret, illius permanet, cuius et fuit. his conveniens est, quod, si vicini arborem ita terra presserim, ut in meum fundum radices egerit, meam effici arborem: rationem enim non permittere, ut alterius arbor intellegatur, quam cuius fundo radices egisset. et ideo prope confinium arbor posita, si etiam in vicinum fundum radices egerit, communis est.
If I have set another’s plant in my soil, it will be mine; conversely, if I have set my plant in another’s soil, it will be his—provided that in either case it has struck roots; for before it struck roots, it remains the property of him whose it was. Consistent with this is that, if I have pressed a neighbor’s tree with earth in such a way that it has put forth roots into my estate, the tree becomes mine; for reason does not permit that a tree be considered to belong to anyone other than the one into whose land it has driven its roots. And therefore, a tree placed near the boundary, if it has also put forth roots into the neighbor’s estate, is common property.
Qua ratione autem plantae quae terra coalescunt solo cedunt, eadem ratione frumenta quoque quae sata sunt solo cedere intelleguntur. ceterum sicut is, qui in alieno solo aedificavit, si ab eo dominus soli petat aedificium, defendi potest per exceptionem doli mali, ita eiusdem exceptionis auxilio tutus esse poterit, qui in alienum fundum sua impensa consevit.
By the same reasoning by which plants that coalesce with the earth cede to the soil, by that same reasoning the grain too that has been sown is understood to cede to the soil. Moreover, just as he who has built on another’s soil, if the owner of the soil demands the building from him, can be defended by the exception of dolus malus, so by the aid of the same exception he will be protected who has sown, at his own expense, on another’s estate.
Litterae quoque licet aureae sint, perinde chartis membranisque cedunt, ac solo cedere solent ea quae aedificantur aut seruntur. ideoque si in chartis membranisve tuis carmen vel historiam vel orationem scripsero, huius corporis non ego, sed tu dominus esse intellegeris. sed si a me petas tuos libros tuasve membranas nec impensas scripturae solvere velis, potero me defendere per exceptionem doli mali, utique si bona fide eorum possessionem nanctus sim.
Letters, even though they be golden, in like manner accede to the papers and parchments, just as things that are built or sown are accustomed to accede to the soil. And therefore, if on your papers or parchments I write a poem or a history or a speech, of this corporeal thing you, not I, will be understood to be the owner. But if you demand from me your books or your parchments and are unwilling to pay the expenses of the writing, I shall be able to defend myself by the exception of malicious fraud, especially if I have obtained possession of them in good faith.
Sed non uti litterae chartis membranisve cedunt, ita solent picturae tabulis cedere, sed ex diverso placuit tabulas picturae cedere. utique tamen conveniens est domino tabularum adversus eum qui pinxerit, si is tabulas possidebat, utilem actionem dari, qua ita efficaciter experiri poterit, si picturae impensam exsolvat: alioquin nocebit ei doli mali exceptio: utique si bona fide possessor fuerit qui solverit. adversus dominum vero tabularum ei qui pinxerit rectam vindicationem competere dicimus, ut tamen pretium tabularum inferat: alioquin nocebit ei doli mali exceptio.
But not just as letters yield to paper or to parchment, do pictures use to yield to their panels, but contrariwise it has been decided that the panels yield to the picture. Yet in any case it is suitable that a useful action be given to the owner of the panels against the one who painted, if he was possessing the panels, by which he will be able to proceed effectively, provided he pays out the expense of the picture; otherwise the defense of fraudulent dealing (dolus malus) will hurt him—at any rate if the one who has disbursed was a possessor in good faith. But against the owner of the panels we say that to the one who painted a direct vindication lies, provided that he tenders the price of the panels; otherwise the defense of fraudulent dealing will hurt him.
Nihil autem interest, utrum ipse dominus per se tradat alicui rem an voluntate eius aliquis. qua ratione si cui libera negotiorum administratio ab eo qui peregre proficiscitur permissa fuerit et is ex negotiis rem vendiderit et tradiderit, facit eam accipientis.
However, it makes no difference whether the owner himself delivers a thing to someone on his own, or someone does so with his consent. On this rationale, if free administration of his affairs has been granted to someone by one who is departing abroad, and he, in the course of the business, has sold and delivered the thing, he makes it the recipient’s.
Interdum etiam sine traditione nuda voluntas domini sufficit ad rem transferendam, veluti si rem, quam commodavi aut locavi tibi aut apud te deposui, vendidero tibi: licet enim ex ea causa tibi eam non tradiderim, eo tamen, quod patior eam ex causa emptionis apud te esse, tuam efficio.
Sometimes even without delivery (tradition), the bare will of the owner suffices for transferring the thing, as when I sell to you a thing which I had lent to you for use, or leased to you, or deposited with you: for although I did not deliver it to you for that purpose, nevertheless, because I allow it to be with you by reason of the purchase, I make it yours.
Hoc amplius interdum et in incertam personam collocata voluntas domini transfert rei proprietatem: ut ecce qui missilia iactat in vulgus, ignorat enim, quid eorum quisque excepturus sit, et tamen quia vult quod quisque exceperit eius esse, statim eum dominum efficit.
Moreover, at times even the will of the owner, placed upon an uncertain person, transfers the proprietorship of the thing: for example, one who throws missilia into the crowd—for he is ignorant which of them each person will catch—and yet, because he wills that whatever each one has caught be his, immediately makes that person the owner.
Alia causa est earum rerum, quae in tempestate maris levandae navis causa eiciuntur: hae enim dominorum permanent, quia non eo animo eiciuntur, quod quis eas habere non vult, sed quo magis cum ipsa nave periculum maris effugiat. qua de causa si quis eas fluctibus expulsas vel etiam in ipso mari nanctus lucrandi animo abstulerit, furtum committit.
Another ground concerns those things which, in a tempest of the sea, are cast out for the sake of lightening the ship: for these remain the property of their owners, because they are not thrown out with the intention that someone does not wish to have them, but in order that the danger of the sea may the more be escaped together with the ship itself. For which cause, if anyone, having found them driven out by the waves or even upon the sea itself, carries them off with a mind to profit, he commits theft.
Igitur quod servi nostri ex traditione nanciscuntur sive quid stipulentur vel ex qualibet alia causa adquirunt, id nobis adquiritur: ipse enim, qui in potestate alterius est, nihil suum habere potest. ideoque si heres institutus sit, nisi nostro iussu hereditatem adire non potest, et si iubentibus nobis adierit, hereditas nobis adquiritur, perinde atque si nos ipsi heredes instituti essemus. et his convenienter scilicet legatum nobis per eundem adquiritur.
Therefore, whatever our slaves obtain by delivery or whatever they stipulate or acquire from any other cause is acquired for us: for he who is in the power of another can have nothing of his own. And therefore, if he should be instituted heir, he cannot enter upon the inheritance unless by our order; and if, with us commanding, he enters, the inheritance is acquired for us, just as if we ourselves had been instituted heirs. And consistently with these points, of course, a legacy is acquired for us through that same person.
De his autem servis, in quibus tantum usum fructum habemus, ita placuit, ut quidquid ex re nostra ex operis suis adquirant, id nobis adquiratur, si quid vero extra eas causas persecuti sint, id ad dominum proprietatis pertinet. itaque si is servus heres institutus sit legatumve quid aut ei donatum fuerit, non mihi, sed domino proprietatis adquiritur.
Concerning those slaves, moreover, in whom we have only usufruct, it has been resolved thus: that whatever from our property, from their works, they acquire, that is acquired for us; but if they have obtained anything outside those causes, that pertains to the owner of the property. And so, if that slave has been instituted heir, or if any legacy or any gift has been given to him, it is acquired not for me, but for the owner of the property.
Idem placet de eo, qui nobis bona fide possidetur, sive liber sit sive alienus servus: quod enim placuit de usufructuario, idem probatur etiam de bonae fidei possessore. itaque quod extra duas causas adquiritur, id vel ad ipsum pertinet, si liber est, vel ad dominum eius, si servus est.
The same is held concerning one who is possessed by us in good faith, whether he be free or another’s slave: for what has been settled concerning the usufructuary is likewise approved concerning the possessor in good faith. And so what is acquired outside the two causes pertains either to himself, if he is free, or to his owner, if he is a slave.
Sed bonae fidei possessor cum usuceperit servum, quia eo modo dominus fit, ex omnibus causis per eum sibi adquirere potest: usufructuarius vero usucapere servum non potest, primum quia non possidet, sed habet ius utendi fruendi, deinde quoniam scit servum alienum esse.
But a good‑faith possessor, when he has usucapted a slave, since in that way he becomes owner, can through him acquire for himself on all grounds; the usufructuary, however, cannot usucapt a slave—first, because he does not possess, but has the right of using and enjoying, and then because he knows the slave is another’s.
Quod in litore quis aedificaverit, eius erit: nam litora publica non ita sunt, ut ea, quae in patrimonio sunt populi, sed ut ea, quae primum a natura prodita sunt et in nullius adhuc dominium pervenerunt: nec dissimilis condicio eorum est atque piscium et ferarum, quae simul atque adprehensae sunt, sine dubio eius, in cuius potestatem pervenerunt, dominii fiunt.
What someone shall have built on the shore will be his: for public shores are not such as those which are in the patrimony of the people, but like those which were in the first instance set forth by nature and have as yet come into the dominion of no one: nor is the condition of these unlike that of fishes and wild beasts, which, as soon as they have been apprehended, without doubt become the property of him into whose power they have come.
Illud videndum est, sublato aedificio, quod in litore positum erat, cuius condicionis is locus sit, hoc est utrum maneat eius cuius fuit aedificium, an rursus in pristinam causam reccidit perindeque publicus sit, ac si numquam in eo aedificatum fuisset. quod propius est, ut existimari debeat, si modo recipit pristinam litoris speciem.
It must be considered, after the building that had been set on the shore has been removed, what the condition of that place is—that is, whether it remains with him whose the building was, or whether it falls back again into its pristine condition and be in like manner public, as if it had never been built upon. The latter is nearer to the truth, as it ought to be judged, provided only that it resumes the former appearance of the shore.
In agris limitatis ius alluvionis locum non habere constat: idque et divus pius constituit et trebatius ait agrum, qui hostibus devictis ea condicione concessus sit, ut in civitatem veniret, habere alluvionem neque esse limitatum: agrum autem manu captum limitatum fuisse, ut sciretur, quid cuique datum esset, quid venisset, quid in publico relictum esset.
In delimited fields it is settled that the right of alluvion has no place: and this both the deified Pius established, and Trebatius says that a field which, enemies having been subdued, was granted on this condition, that it should come into the civitas, has alluvion and is not delimited: but a field captured by hand (by force of arms) was delimited, so that it might be known what had been given to each, what had been sold, and what had been left in the public.
Liber homo, qui bona fide mihi servit, id quod ex operis suis aut ex re mea pararet, ad me pertinere sine dubio aristo ait: quod vero quis ei donaverit aut ex negotio gesto adquisierit, ad ipsum pertinere. sed hereditatem legatumve non adquiri mihi per eum, quia neque ex re mea neque ex operis suis id sit nec ulla eius opera esset in legato, in hereditate aliquatenus, quia per ipsum adiretur ( quod et varium lucullum aliquando dubitasse), sed verius esse non adquiri, etiamsi testator ad me voluisset pertinere. sed licet ei minime adquirit, attamen, si voluntas evidens testatoris appareat, restituendam esse ei hereditatem.
A free man, who in good faith serves me, Aristo says without doubt that what he would procure from his own works or from my property pertains to me; but what someone gives to him or what he has acquired from business transacted pertains to himself. But an inheritance or a legacy is not acquired for me through him, because that is neither from my property nor from his works, nor would there be any act of his in a legacy; in an inheritance, to some extent, because it would be entered upon through him (and even Varius Lucullus sometimes doubted this), yet the truer view is that it is not acquired, even if the testator had wished it to pertain to me. But although it is in no way acquired for me, nevertheless, if the testator’s evident will appears, the inheritance must be restored to me.
but Trebatius [holds that], if a free man serving in good faith, at the command of the one whom he serves, had entered upon an inheritance, the latter himself becomes heir, and it does not matter what he intended, but what he did. Labeo, on the contrary, [allows that] only if he had done this out of necessity; but if it was so that he himself also willed it, he himself becomes heir.
Quotiens autem dominium transfertur, ad eum qui accipit tale transfertur, quale fuit apud eum qui tradit: si servus fuit fundus, cum servitutibus transit, si liber, uti fuit: et si forte servitutes debebantur fundo qui traditus est, cum iure servitutium debitarum transfertur. si quis igitur fundum dixerit liberum, cum traderet, eum qui servus sit, nihil iuri servitutis fundi detrahit, verumtamen obligat se debebitque praestare quod dixit.
Whenever ownership is transferred, it is transferred to the one who receives it in such condition as it was with the one who delivers: if the estate was servient, it passes with its servitudes; if free, as it was. And if by chance servitudes were owed to the estate that is delivered, it is transferred with the right of the servitudes owed. Therefore, if someone should say, while delivering, that an estate is free, when it is servient, he detracts nothing from the estate’s right of servitude; nevertheless, he binds himself and will have to make good what he said.
Si servus meus tibi bona fide serviret et rem emisset traditaque ei esset, proculus nec meam fieri, quia servum non possideam, nec tuam, si non ex re tua sit parata. sed si liber bona fide tibi serviens emerit, ipsius fieri.
If my slave were serving you in good faith and had bought a thing and it had been delivered to him, Proculus [holds] that it becomes neither mine, because I do not possess the slave, nor yours, if it was not procured from your resources. But if a free person serving you in good faith has bought it, it becomes his.
Qui bona fide alicui servit, sive servus alienus est sive homo liber est, quidquid ex re eius cui servit adquirit, ei adquirit, cui bona fide servit. sed et si quid ex operis suis adquisierit, simili modo ei adquirit: nam et operae quodammodo ex re eius cui servit habentur, quia iure operas ei exhibere debet, cui bona fide servit.
One who serves someone in good faith, whether he is a slave belonging to another or a free man, whatever he acquires from the property of the one whom he serves, he acquires for him to whom he serves in good faith. But also if he has acquired anything from his own services, in a similar way he acquires it for him: for even services are in a certain manner held to be from the property of the one whom he serves, because by law he ought to render services to him to whom he serves in good faith.
Tamdiu autem adquirit, quamdiu bona fide servit: ceterum si coeperit scire esse eum alienum vel liberum, videamus, an ei adquirit. quaestio in eo est, utrum initium spectamus an singula momenta: et magis est, ut singula momenta spectemus.
However, he acquires for so long as he serves in good faith: but if he begins to know that he is another’s or a free man, let us see whether he acquires for him. The question herein is whether we look to the beginning or to each several moment; and the better view is that we look to each several moment.
Si quis duobus bona fide serviat, utrique adquiret, sed singulis ex re sua. quod autem ex re alterius est, utrum pro parte ei, cui bona fide servit, pro parte domino, si servus sit, aut, si liber sit, ei cui bona fide servit, an vero ei debeat adquirere totum, ex cuius re est, videamus. quam speciem scaevola quoque tractat libro secundo quaestionum: ait enim, si alienus servus duobus bona fide serviat et ex unius eorum re adquirat, rationem facere, ut ei dumtaxat in solidum adquirat.
If someone serves two persons in good faith, he will acquire for each, but for each from his own property. But as to what is from the property of another, whether he should acquire it partly for him whom he serves in good faith and partly for the owner, if he be a slave, or, if he be free, for him whom he serves in good faith, or rather should he acquire the whole for the one from whose property it is—let us consider. This kind Scaevola also treats in the second book of the Questions: for he says that, if another’s slave serves two in good faith and acquires from the property of one of them, reason makes it that he acquires for that one alone in solidum (for the whole).
but if he adds the name of the one from whose property he stipulates, he says there is no doubt that it is acquired to that one alone, because even if he should stipulate from that person’s property for another of the owners, by stipulating by name he will acquire the whole (the solidum) to him. and he demonstrates below that, although not by name nor by my order, yet since he stipulated from my property, while he was in good faith serving several, he acquires to me alone. for this too is a received rule: whenever a common slave cannot acquire for all, he acquires to that one alone for whom he can.
Sed si meis tabulis navem fecisses, tuam navem esse, quia cupressus non maneret, sicuti nec lana vestimento facto, sed cupresseum aut laneum corpus fieret. proculus indicat hoc iure nos uti, quod servio et labeoni placuisset: in quibus propria qualitas exspectaretur, si quid additum erit toto cedit, ut statuae pes aut manus, scypho fundus aut ansa, lecto fulcrum, navi tabula, aedificio cementum: tota enim eius sunt, cuius ante fuerant.
But if you had made a ship out of my planks, the ship would be yours, because the cypress would not remain, just as the wool does not remain once a garment has been made, but a cypress or woolen body would come into being. Proculus indicates that we use the law which had pleased Servius and Labeo: in cases where the proper quality is looked to, if anything is added it yields to the whole, as a foot or hand to a statue, a bottom or handle to a cup, a support to a couch, a plank to a ship, mortar to a building: for the wholes are his to whom they had previously belonged.
Arbor radicitus eruta et in alio posita priusquam coaluerit, prioris domini est, ubi coaluit, agro cedit, et si rursus eruta sit non ad priorem dominum revertitur: nam credibile est alio terrae alimento aliam factam.
A tree uprooted by the roots and placed in another place, before it has taken root, is the former owner’s; when it has taken root, it cedes to the field; and if it is uprooted again, it does not revert to the former owner: for it is credible that, by a different nourishment of the earth, it has been made other.
Quidquid infecto argento alieni argenti addideris, non esse tuum totum argentum fatendum est: at contra si tuum scyphum alieno plumbo plumbaveris alienove argento ferruminaveris, non dubitatur scyphum tuum esse et a te recte vindicari.
Whatever of another’s silver you shall have added to unworked silver, it must be confessed that the whole silver is not yours; but on the contrary, if you have plumbed your cup with another’s lead or have soldered it with another’s silver, it is not doubted that the cup is yours and is rightly vindicated by you.
Cum partes duorum dominorum ferrumine cohaereant, hae cum quaereretur utri cedant, cassius ait pro portione rei aestimandum vel pro pretio cuiusque partis. sed si neutra alteri accessioni est, videamus, ne aut utriusque esse dicenda sit, sicuti massa confusa, aut eius, cuius nomine ferruminata est. sed proculus et pegasus existimant suam cuiusque rem manere.
When parts belonging to two owners cohere by solder, and when the question is asked to which of the two they cede, Cassius says that valuation must be made according to the proportion of the thing, or according to the price of each part. But if neither is an accession to the other, let us consider whether it should not be said either to belong to both, as a confused mass, or to him in whose name it was soldered. But Proculus and Pegasus think that each person’s thing remains his own.
Inter eos, qui secundum unam ripam praedia habent, insula in flumine nata non pro indiviso communis fit, sed regionibus quoque divisis: quantum enim ante cuiusque eorum ripam est, tantum, veluti linea in directum per insulam transducta, quisque eorum in ea habebit certis regionibus.
Among those who have estates along a single bank, an island arisen in the river does not become common as an undivided whole, but with the regions also divided: for as much as lies in front of each one’s bank, to that extent— as if a line drawn straight through the island— each of them will have in it in definite regions.
Ergo si insula nata adcreverit fundo meo et inferiorem partem fundi vendidero, ad cuius frontem insula non respicit, nihil ex ea insula pertinebit ad emptorem eadem ex causa, qua nec ab initio quidem eius fieret, si iam tunc, cum insula nasceretur, eiusdem partis dominus fuisset.
Therefore, if an island, having arisen, has accrued to my estate, and I have sold the lower part of the estate, to whose frontage the island does not face, nothing of that island will pertain to the purchaser, for the same reason by which he would not have become its owner from the beginning, even if at that very time, when the island was being born, he had been the owner of that same part.
Celsus filius, si in ripa fluminis, quae secundum agrum meum sit, arbor nata sit, meam esse ait, quia solum ipsum meum privatum est, usus autem eius publicus intellegitur. et ideo cum exsiccatus esset alveus, proximorum fit, quia iam populus eo non utitur.
Celsus the son says that if on the bank of a river, which is adjacent to my field, a tree has grown, it is mine, because the ground itself is my private property, while its use is understood to be public. And therefore, when the channel has dried up, it becomes the neighbors’, because the people no longer use it.
Tribus modis insula in flumine fit, uno, cum agrum, qui alvei non fuit, amnis circumfluit, altero, cum locum, qui alvei esset, siccum relinquit et circumfluere coepit, tertio, cum paulatim colluendo locum eminentem supra alveum fecit et eum alluendo auxit. duobus posterioribus modis privata insula fit eius, cuius ager propior fuerit, cum primum extitit: nam et natura fluminis haec est, ut cursu suo mutato alvei causam mutet. nec quicquam intersit, utrum de alvei dumtaxat solo mutato an de eo, quod superfusum solo et terrae sit, quaeratur, utrumque enim eiusdem generis est.
In three ways an island in a river comes to be: first, when the river flows around a field that was not of the channel; second, when it leaves dry a place that had been of the channel and begins to flow around it; third, when by gradual colluvial accretion it made a place projecting above the channel and increased it by alluvion. By the two latter modes a private island comes to be, belonging to him whose field was nearer, from the moment it first existed: for such also is the nature of a river, that, with its course changed, it changes the legal status of the channel. Nor does it make any difference whether the question is only about the soil of the channel having been changed or about that which lies upon the soil and the earth, for both are of the same kind.
Alluvio agrum restituit eum, quem impetus fluminis totum abstulit. itaque si ager, qui inter viam publicam et flumen fuit, inundatione fluminis occupatus esset, sive paulatim occupatus est sive non paulatim, sed eodem impetu recessu fluminis restitutus, ad pristinum dominum pertinet: flumina enim censitorum vice funguntur, ut ex privato in publicum addicant et ex publico in privatum: itaque sicuti hic fundus, cum alveus fluminis factus esset, fuisset publicus, ita nunc privatus eius esse debet, cuius antea fuit.
alluvion restores the field which the rush of the river has wholly carried off. and so if a field, which was between the public road and the river, was occupied by the river’s inundation, whether it was occupied gradually or not gradually, but, by the same rush, restored upon the river’s recession, it pertains to the former owner: for rivers perform the office of censors, so as to adjudge from private into public and from public into private: and so, just as this estate, when it had become the river’s channel, would have been public, so now it ought to be private to him to whom it previously belonged.
Thensaurus est vetus quaedam depositio pecuniae, cuius non exstat memoria, ut iam dominum non habeat: sic enim fit eius qui invenerit, quod non alterius sit. alioquin si quis aliquid vel lucri causa vel metus vel custodiae condiderit sub terra, non est thensaurus: cuius etiam furtum fit.
A treasure is a certain ancient deposit of money, of which no memory exists, so that now it has no owner: for thus it becomes the property of the one who has found it, because it is not another’s. Otherwise, if someone has hidden something under the earth either for the sake of gain or out of fear or for safekeeping, it is not a treasure; and theft can even be committed of it.
In eo quod servo castrensi ante aditam hereditatem filii familias militis legatur, vel eo, quod stipulatur servus, tractatur apud Marcellum libro vicensimo, ex cuius persona vel stipulatio vires habeat vel legatum. et puto verius, quod et scaevolae videtur et ipse Marcellus tractat, si quidem adeatur hereditas, omnia ut in hereditario servo, si adita non sit, ut in proprio patris esse spectanda: et si usus fructus fuerit huic servo relictus, modo patri videri delatum, modo heredi, nec a persona in personam creditur transisse.
In the matter that a legacy is bequeathed to a camp-slave before the inheritance of a soldier who is a son-in-power has been entered upon, or in the matter of that which the slave stipulates, it is treated by Marcellus in the twentieth book, from whose persona either the stipulation or the legacy derives its force. And I think it more correct, which also seems to Scaevola and which Marcellus himself discusses: if indeed the inheritance is entered upon, everything is to be viewed as in the case of an hereditary slave; if it is not entered upon, as being in the father’s own property. And if a usufruct has been left to this slave, it is to be seen as conferred now upon the father, now upon the heir, nor is it believed to have passed from person to person.
Eadem distinctione quis utetur etiam, si res fuerit subtracta: aut cessare aut non furti actionem dicet, si ex testamento adierit, quoniam hereditati furtum non fit, aut, si non adierit, patri dabitur furti actio.
By the same distinction someone will proceed even if the thing has been removed: he will say either that the action for theft ceases or that there is no action for theft, if he has entered upon [the inheritance] under the testament, since theft is not committed against an inheritance; or, if he has not entered, the action for theft will be given to the father.
Cum in corpus quidem quod traditur consentiamus, in causis vero dissentiamus, non animadverto, cur inefficax sit traditio, veluti si ego credam me ex testamento tibi obligatum esse, ut fundum tradam, tu existimes ex stipulatu tibi eum deberi. nam et si pecuniam numeratam tibi tradam donandi gratia, tu eam quasi creditam accipias, constat proprietatem ad te transire nec impedimento esse, quod circa causam dandi atque accipiendi dissenserimus.
When indeed we agree as to the corpus that is delivered, but disagree as to the causes, I do not perceive why the delivery should be inefficacious; as, for example, if I believe myself to be obligated to you under a testament to deliver an estate, while you suppose it to be owed to you under a stipulation. For even if I hand over counted-out money to you for the sake of a donation, and you receive it as if it were on loan, it is established that ownership passes to you, nor is it an impediment that we have disagreed concerning the cause of the giving and the receiving.
Si unus ex dominis servo communi pecuniam donavit, in potestate domini est, quemadmodum servo communi pecuniam donet. nam si hoc solum egerit, ut ea separetur a suis rationibus et in peculio servi sit, manebit eiusdem domini proprietas: si vero eo modo pecuniam servo communi donaverit, quomodo alienis servis donare solemus, fiet sociorum communis pro portione, quam in servo habebunt.
If one of the masters has donated money to a common slave, it is in the master’s power in what manner he donates money to the common slave. For if he has effected only this, that it be separated from his own accounts and be in the slave’s peculium, the ownership will remain with that same master; but if he has donated money to the common slave in the manner in which we are accustomed to donate to another’s slaves, it will become common to the partners in proportion to the share that they have in the slave.
Sed ut sequens quaestio locum habeat, constituamus socium ita servo communi pecuniam donasse, ut proprietatem suam manere vellet. si ex hac pecunia servus fundum comparaverit, erit is fundus communis sociorum pro portione dominii: nam et si furtivis nummis servus communis fundum comparaverit, sociorum erit pro portione dominii. neque enim ut fructuarius servus ex re fructuarii non adquirit proprietario, ita et communis servus ex re alterius domini non adquirit alteri domino.
But in order that the following question may have a place, let us establish that a partner gave money to the common slave as a gift in such a way that he wished his ownership to remain his. If from this money the slave should purchase an estate, that estate will be common to the partners in proportion to ownership; for even if with stolen coins the common slave should purchase an estate, it will belong to the partners in proportion to ownership. For it is not the case that, just as a usufructuary’s slave does not acquire for the proprietor from the property of the usufructuary, so also a common slave does not acquire for the other owner from the property of one owner.
but just as, in those things which are acquired from elsewhere, the condition of the usufructuary and of the common slave is different—namely, when the one does not acquire for the usufructuary, the other acquires for the masters—so, what shall have been acquired from the property of the usufructuary will pertain to him alone, whereas what the common slave shall have acquired from the property of the other master will pertain to both masters.
Fructuarius servus si dixerit se domino proprietatis per traditionem accipere, ex re fructuarii totum domino adquiret: nam et sic stipulando ex re fructuarii domino proprietatis adquireret.
If a slave of the usufructuary should say that he is receiving by delivery for the owner of the (bare) ownership, he will acquire the whole for the owner from the assets of the usufructuary; for even by stipulating in this way he would acquire from the assets of the usufructuary for the owner of the (bare) ownership.
Si, cum mihi donare velles, iusserim te servo communi meo et titii rem tradere isque hac mente acciperet, ut rem titii faceret, nihil agetur: nam et si procuratori meo rem tradideris, ut meam faceres, is hac mente acceperit, ut suam faceret, nihil agetur. quod si servus communis hac mente acceperit, ut duorum dominorum faceret, in parte alterius domini nihil agetur.
If, when you were willing to donate to me, I should order you to deliver the thing to the slave common to me and Titius, and he were to receive it with this intention, to make the thing Titius’s, nothing will be effected: for also if you should deliver the thing to my procurator, in order to make it mine, and he should receive it with this intention, to make it his own, nothing will be effected. But if the common slave should receive it with this intention, to make it belong to the two masters, as to the share of the other master nothing will be effected.
Attius fundum habebat secundum viam publicam: ultra viam flumen erat et ager lucii titii: fluit flumen paulatim primum omnium agrum, qui inter viam et flumen esset, ambedit et viam sustulit, postea rursus minutatim recessit et alluvione in antiquum locum rediit. respondit, cum flumen agrum et viam publicam sustulisset, eum agrum eius factum esse, qui trans flumen fundum habuisset: postea cum paulatim retro redisset, ademisse ei, cuius factus esset, et addidisse ei, cuius trans viam esset, quoniam eius fundus proximus flumini esset. id autem, quod publicum fuisset, nemini accessisset.
Attius had an estate next to the public road: beyond the road there was a river and the field of Lucius Titius: the river gradually, first of all, surrounded the whole field which was between the road and the river and removed the road; afterward, bit by bit, it receded and by alluvion returned to its ancient place. He gave the opinion that, when the river had taken away the field and the public road, that field had become the property of the one who had his estate across the river; afterward, when it had gradually gone back, it had taken away from him to whom it had become and had added to him whose land was across the road, since his estate was nearest to the river. But that which had been public accrued to no one.
Quaesitum est, si is, cui liber homo bona fide serviret, decesserit eique is heres extiterit, qui liberum eum esse sciat, an aliquid per eum adquirat. non esse ait, ut hic bona fide possessor videatur, quando sciens liberum possidere coeperit, quia et si fundum suum quis legaverit, heres, qui eum legatum esse sciat, procul dubio fructus ex eo suos non faciet: et multo magis si testator eum alienum bona fide emptum possedit. et circa servorum igitur operam ac ministerium eandem rationem sequendam, ut, sive proprii sive alieni vel legati vel manumissi testamento fuerint, nihil per eos heredibus, qui modo eorum id non ignorarent, adquiratur.
It was asked, if the one to whom a free man was serving in bona fide should die, and there should arise as his heir one who knows that he is free, whether he acquires anything through him. He says he does not, since this man does not appear to be a bona fide possessor, when he has begun to possess a free man knowingly; for even if someone has bequeathed his own estate, the heir who knows that it is a legacy will, without doubt, not make the fruits from it his own—and much more so if the testator possessed it as another’s, bought in bona fide. And therefore, concerning the labor and service of slaves, the same ratio is to be followed: namely, that whether they were their own or another’s, or were legated, or were manumitted by testament, nothing is acquired through them by heirs who, for their part, were not ignorant of that fact concerning them.
Statuas in civitate positas civium non esse, idque trebatius et pegasus: dare tamen operam praetorem oportere, ut, quod ea mente in publico positum est, ne liceret privato auferre nec ei qui posuerit. tuendi ergo cives erunt et adversus petentem exceptione et actione adversus possidentem iuvandi.
that statues set up in the city are not the property of the citizens, and so hold Trebatius and Pegasus: nevertheless the praetor ought to give his diligence, so that what has been placed in the public with that intention it may not be permitted for a private person to remove, nor even for the one who set it up. therefore the citizens are to be protected, and to be aided by an exception against the claimant and by an action against the possessor.
Cum servus, in quo alterius usus fructus est, hominem emit et ei traditus sit, antequam pretium solvat, in pendenti est, cui proprietatem adquisierit: et cum ex peculio, quod ad fructuarium pertinet, solverit, intellegitur fructuarii homo fuisse: cum vero ex eo peculio, quod proprietarium sequitur, solverit, proprietarii ex post facto fuisse videtur.
When a slave, over whom another has a usufruct, buys a man and the man has been delivered to him, before he pays the price it is pending to whom he has acquired the ownership; and when he pays from the peculium that pertains to the usufructuary, it is understood that the man was the usufructuary’s; but when he pays from that peculium which follows the owner, he is deemed to have been the owner’s, ex post facto.
Pomponius tractat: cum pastori meo lupi porcos eriperent, hos vicinae villae colonus cum robustis canibus et fortibus, quos pecoris sui gratia pascebat, consecutus lupis eripuit aut canes extorserunt: et cum pastor meus peteret porcos, quaerebatur, utrum eius facti sint porci, qui eripuit, an nostri maneant: nam genere quodam venandi id erant nancti. cogitabat tamen, quemadmodum terra marique capta, cum in suam naturalem laxitatem pervenerant, desinerent eorum esse qui ceperunt, ita ex bonis quoque nostris capta a bestiis marinis et terrestribus desinant nostra esse, cum effugerunt bestiae nostram persecutionem. quis denique manere nostrum dicit, quod avis transvolans ex area aut ex agro nostro transtulit aut quod nobis eripuit?
Pomponius treats: when wolves were snatching my shepherd’s pigs, a colonus of a neighboring villa, with robust and strong dogs which he fed for the sake of his own flock, having pursued, snatched them from the wolves, or the dogs wrested them away; and when my shepherd demanded the pigs, the question was asked whether the pigs became the property of the one who took them, or remained ours: for by a certain genre of hunting they had obtained them. He was considering, however, that just as things captured on land and sea, when they had come into their natural liberty, ceased to belong to those who had taken them, so too items from our goods captured by marine and terrestrial beasts cease to be ours, when the beasts have escaped our pursuit. Who, finally, says that it remains ours, what a bird flying over has carried off from our threshing-floor or from our field, or what it has snatched from us?
if, therefore, it does cease, then, if it has been liberated from the beast’s mouth, it will be the occupier’s, just as a fish or a boar or a bird, which has escaped our power, if it be captured by another, becomes his. But he thinks rather that it remains ours so long as it can be recovered; although in birds and fishes and wild beasts what he writes is true. The same man says that, even if something has been lost by shipwreck, it does not immediately cease to be ours; finally, that he who has carried it off is held liable in fourfold.
and indeed it is better to say that even what is snatched from the wolf remains ours, so long as what has been snatched can be recovered. if, therefore, it remains, I judge that an action of theft also lies: for although the tenant farmer may not have pursued with the intent of stealing (though he could also have been of this intent), yet even if he did not pursue with this intent, nevertheless, when he does not return it to the one demanding it back, he seems to suppress and to intercept. wherefore I think that he is liable both for theft and for the action ad exhibendum, and that the pigs produced by him can be vindicated.
Communis servus si ex re alterius dominorum adquisierit, nihilo minus communi id erit, sed is, ex cuius re adquisitum fuerit, communi dividundo iudicio eam summam praecipere potest: nam fidei bonae convenit, ut unusquisque praecipuum habeat, quod ex re eius servus adquisierit. sed si aliunde servus communis adquisierit, omnibus sociis pro parte dominii hoc adquiritur.
If a common slave has acquired from the property of one of the masters, nevertheless it will be common; but he from whose property it was acquired can, by the action for division of common property, take that amount by preference: for it accords with good faith that each have as a preferential share what the slave has acquired from his property. But if the common slave has acquired from elsewhere, this is acquired for all the partners in proportion to their share of ownership.
Bonae fidei emptor non dubie percipiendo fructus etiam ex aliena re suos interim facit non tantum eos, qui diligentia et opera eius pervenerunt, sed omnes, quia quod ad fructus attinet, loco domini paene est. denique etiam priusquam percipiat, statim ubi a solo separati sunt, bonae fidei emptoris fiunt. nec interest, ea res, quam bona fide emi, longo tempore capi possit nec ne, veluti si pupilli sit aut vi possessa aut praesidi contra legem repetundarum donata ab eoque abalienata sit bonae fidei emptori.
The good‑faith buyer, without doubt, by taking/harvesting the fruits even from another’s property, makes them his own for the time being, not only those which came through his diligence and labor, but all, since, as regards fruits, he is almost in the place of the owner. Finally, even before he actually takes them, as soon as they are separated from the soil, they become the good‑faith buyer’s. Nor does it matter whether the thing which I bought in good faith can be acquired by long time (usucapion) or not—for example, if it belongs to a ward, or is possessed by force, or was given to a provincial governor contrary to the Lex Repetundarum and by him alienated to a good‑faith buyer.
In contrarium quaeritur, si eo tempore, quo mihi res traditur, putem vendentis esse, deinde cognovero alienam esse, quia perseverat per longum tempus capio, an fructus meos faciam. pomponius verendum, ne non sit bonae fidei possessor, quamvis capiat: hoc enim ad ius, id est capionem, illud ad factum pertinere, ut quis bona aut mala fide possideat: nec contrarium est, quod longum tempus currit, nam e contrario is, qui non potest capere propter rei vitium, fructus suos facit.
On the contrary it is asked, if at the time when the thing is delivered to me I think it to be the seller’s, then afterwards I learn it is another’s, since acquisition by long time persists, do I make the fruits mine? Pomponius says it is to be feared that he is not a possessor in good faith, although he may acquire: for this pertains to law, that is, to acquisition (usucapion), that to fact, namely whether one possesses in good or in bad faith; nor is it contrary that long time runs, for conversely he who cannot acquire on account of a defect of the thing makes the fruits his own.
Quod fructuarius ex re sua donat, ex re eius est: sed si eo animo id fecerit, ut ad proprietatis dominum pertineat, dicendum est illi adquiri. si autem extraneus ei donet indistincte, soli proprietario adquiritur. eadem dicemus in homine libero, qui bona fide mihi servit, ut, si ei aliquid donaverim, meum sit.
What the usufructuary donates out of his own property is out of his property; but if he has done this with the intention that it pertain to the owner of the bare ownership, it must be said to be acquired to him. If, however, a stranger donates to him without distinction, it is acquired to the proprietor alone. We will say the same in the case of a free man who in good faith serves me, namely that, if I have given him anything, it is mine.
Quamvis quod in litore publico vel in mari exstruxerimus, nostrum fiat, tamen decretum praetoris adhibendum est, ut id facere liceat: immo etiam manu prohibendus est, si cum incommodo ceterorum id faciat: nam civilem eum actionem de faciendo nullam habere non dubito.
Although what we have constructed on the public shore or in the sea becomes ours, nevertheless the praetor’s decree must be invoked, so that it may be permitted to do it; nay more, he must even be restrained by force, if he does it to the inconvenience of others; for I do not doubt that he has no civil action to compel a doing.
Homo liber hereditatem nobis adquirere non potest, qui bona fide nobis servit: adquiret, si tamen sponte sua sciens condicionem suam adierit: nam si iussu nostro adierit, neque sibi neque nobis adquiret, si non habuerit animum sibi adquirendi: quod si eam mentem habuit, sibi adquirit.
A free man who in good faith serves us cannot acquire an inheritance for us: he will acquire it, however, if of his own accord, aware of his condition, he has entered upon it; for if he has entered upon it at our order, he will acquire neither for himself nor for us, if he has not had the intention of acquiring for himself; but if he had that mind, he acquires for himself.
Non solum si eos emerimus, sed etiam si donati fuerint nobis aut ex dotis nomine aut ex legati pertinere ad nos coeperunt aut ex hereditate, idem praestabunt: nec solum si nostros putaverimus, sed et si communes aut fructuarios, ut tamen, quod adquisituri non essent, si re vera communes aut usuarii essent, id hodieque non adquirant.
Not only if we have bought them, but even if they have been given to us as a donation, or have begun to pertain to us under the title of a dowry or by way of a legacy, or from an inheritance, they will afford the same; and not only if we have supposed them to be ours, but even if [we have supposed them to be] common or in usufruct, provided, however, that what they would not be going to acquire, if in truth they were common or subject to usus, that they do not acquire even today.
Quidquid tamen liber homo vel alienus quive bona fide nobis servit non adquirit nobis, id vel sibi liber vel alienus servus domino suo adquiret: excepto eo quod vix est, ut liber homo possidendo usucapere possit, quia nec possidere intellegitur, qui ipse possideretur. sed nec per servum alienum, quem nos bona fide possidemus, dominus peculiari nomine ignorans usucapere poterit, sicuti ne per fugitivum quidem, quem non possidet.
Whatever, however, a free man or another’s slave, or one who in good faith serves us, does not acquire for us, that the free man will acquire for himself, and the other’s slave will acquire for his own master: except for the case—which scarcely occurs—that a free man could usucapt by possessing, since he is not even understood to possess who himself would be possessed. But neither through another’s slave, whom we possess in good faith, will the owner, being unaware, be able to usucapt under the title of peculium, just as not even through a fugitive, whom he does not possess.
In laqueum, quem venandi causa posueras, aper incidit: cum eo haereret, exemptum eum abstuli: num tibi videor tuum aprum abstulisse? et si tuum putas fuisse, si solutum eum in silvam dimisissem, eo casu tuus esse desisset an maneret? et quam actionem mecum haberes, si desisset tuus esse, num in factum dari oportet, quaero.
A boar fell into the snare which you had set for the purpose of hunting: while it was sticking in it, I took it out and carried it off: do I seem to you to have carried off your boar? And if you think it was yours, if I had released it, set free, into the forest, in that case would it have ceased to be yours or would it have remained? And what action would you have against me, if it had ceased to be yours? I ask whether an action in factum ought to be granted.
he responded: let us examine the snare, whether it makes a difference that I placed it in public or on private (property), and, if I placed it on private (property), whether on my own or on another’s; and, if on another’s, whether I placed it with the permission of the one whose estate it was or without his permission: furthermore, whether the boar was so caught in it that he could not extricate himself, or whether by struggling longer he was going to extricate himself. nevertheless I think this is the sum: that, if it came into my power, it became mine. but if, however, you had released my wild boar into its natural liberty and by that act it had ceased to be mine, an action on the facts ought to be granted to me, just as it was answered when a certain person threw another’s cup from a ship.
Insula est enata in flumine contra frontem agri mei, ita ut nihil excederet longitudo regionem praedii mei: postea aucta est paulatim et processit contra frontes et superioris vicini et inferioris: quaero, quod adcrevit utrum meum sit, quoniam meo adiunctum est, an eius iuris sit, cuius esset, si initio ea nata eius longitudinis fuisset. proculus respondit: flumen istud, in quo insulam contra frontem agri tui enatam esse scripsisti ita, ut non excederet longitudinem agri tui, si alluvionis ius habet et insula initio propior fundo tuo fuit quam eius, qui trans flumen habebat, tota tua facta est, et quod postea ei insulae alluvione accessit, id tuum est, etiamsi ita accessit, ut procederet insula contra frontes vicinorum superioris atque inferioris, vel etiam ut propior esset fundo eius, qui trans flumen habet.
An island has arisen in the river opposite the front of my field, such that its length did not exceed the region of my estate: thereafter it was gradually increased and advanced opposite the frontages both of my upper neighbor and my lower: I ask whether what has accreted is mine, since it is joined to my property, or of that legal status to which it would belong, if at the beginning it had been born of that length. Proculus answered: That river, in which you wrote that an island had arisen opposite the front of your field in such a way that it did not exceed the length of your field, if it has the right of alluvion, and the island at the outset was nearer to your farm than to the one who held across the river, has become wholly yours, and whatever afterwards by alluvion accrued to that island is yours, even if it accrued in such a way that the island advanced opposite the frontages of the upstream and downstream neighbors, or even so as to be nearer to the holding of the one who holds across the river.
Item quaero, si, cum propior ripae meae enata est insula et postea totum flumen fluere inter me et insulam coepit relicto suo alveo, quo maior amnis fluerat, numquid dubites, quin etiam insula mea maneat et nihilo minus eius soli, quod flumen reliquit, pars fiat mea? rogo, quid sentias scribas mihi. proculus respondit: si, cum propior fundo tuo initio fuisset insula, flumen relicto alveo maiore, qui inter eam insulam fuerat et eum fundum vicini, qui trans flumen erat, fluere coepit inter eam insulam et fundum tuum, nihilo minus insula tua manet.
Likewise I inquire whether, if an island has emerged nearer to my bank and afterwards the whole river began to flow between me and the island, leaving its own channel in which the larger river had flowed, you have any doubt that the island too remains mine and that nonetheless the soil which the river has left becomes a part of mine? I ask that you write me what you think. proculus responded: if, when the island had at the beginning been nearer to your estate, the river, leaving the larger channel which had been between that island and the estate of the neighbor who was across the river, began to flow between that island and your estate, nonetheless the island remains yours.
But the riverbed which was between that island and the neighbor’s estate ought to be divided down the middle, such that the part nearer to your island is yours, but the part nearer to the neighbor’s field is understood to be his. I understand that also when, on the other side of the island, the channel of the river has dried up, the island has ceased to be an island; but, in order that the matter might be more easily understood, they call the field which had been an island an “island.”
Hereditas in multis partibus iuris pro domino habetur adeoque hereditati quoque ut domino per servum hereditarium adquiritur. in his sane, in quibus factum personae operaeve substantia desideratur, nihil hereditati quaeri per servum potest. ac propterea quamvis servus hereditarius heres institui possit, tamen quia adire iubentis domini persona desideratur, heres exspectandus est.
the inheritance is in many parts of the law held as owner, and accordingly the inheritance too, as an owner, acquires through the hereditary slave. but in those matters in which a personal act or the substance of services is required, nothing can be sought for the inheritance through a slave. and therefore, although a hereditary slave can be instituted as heir, nevertheless, because the person of the master who orders the entry is required, an heir must be awaited.
Si is qui in aliena potestate est thensaurum invenerit, in persona eius cui adquirit hoc erit dicendum, ut, si in alieno agro invenerit, partem ei adquirat, si vero in parentis dominive loco invenerit, illius totus sit, si autem in alieno, pars.
If one who is under another’s power should find a treasure, this must be said with respect to the persona of the one for whom he acquires: namely, if he has found it in another’s field, let him acquire a share for him; but if he has found it in the place of a parent or a master, let the whole be that man’s; if, however, in another’s, a share.
Si communis servus in alieno invenerit, utrum pro dominii partibus an semper aequis adquiret? et simile est atque in hereditate vel legato vel quod ab aliis donatum servo traditur, quia et thensaurus donum fortunae creditur, scilicet ut pars, quae inventori cedit, ad socios, pro qua parte servi quisque dominus est, pertineat.
If a common slave should find something on another’s property, does he acquire according to the shares of dominion, or always in equal shares? And it is similar as in an inheritance or a legacy, or in what is delivered to the slave as a gift by others, because a treasure (thesaurus) is believed to be a gift of Fortune, namely that the part which goes to the finder pertains to the partners in proportion to the share of the slave of which each is owner.
Si communis servus in domini unius fundo proprio invenit, de parte, quae soli domino semper cedit, non est dubium, quin solius domini praedii sit: verum an aliquid ex parte ferat alter socius, videndum est, et numquid simile sit, atque cum stipulatur servus iussu unius domini aut per traditionem aliquid accipit vel nominatim alteri: quod magis dici poterit.
If a common slave finds [something] on the private fundus of one master, as to the portion which always cedes to the owner of the soil, there is no doubt that it belongs to the owner of the praedium alone; but it must be considered whether the other partner takes anything by way of a share, and whether it is similar to the case when the slave, by order of one of the masters, stipulates or receives something by tradition, or expressly for the other by name: which can more readily be affirmed.
Quod si servus, in quo usus fructus alienus est, invenerit in eius locum, qui servum proprium habet, an totum illius sit? et si in alieno, an partem eidem adquirat an vero fructuario? inspectio in illo est, num ex operis servi adquiratur.
But if a slave, in whom there is another’s usufruct, should find something on the premises of him who has the slave as his own, is it wholly his? And if on another’s [premises], does he acquire a share for that same man, or rather for the fructuary? The inquiry is this: whether it is acquired from the works of the slave.
imagine him, while digging the earth, to have found it, so that this is said to belong to the usufructuary: but what he finds suddenly, placed in a hidden spot, doing nothing, but as he was otherwise walking, should be the property of the owner. I for my part think that not even a share of that pertains to the usufructuary: for no one seeks treasure by the labor of slaves, nor was he at that time digging the earth for that purpose, but was expending effort on another matter, and fortune gave something different. and so, if he finds it in the field of the usufructuary himself, I think he will have only a share, as the owner of the field would have, and that the other share pertains to him whose is the ownership in the slave.
Quod si creditor invenerit, in alieno videbitur invenisse: partem itaque sibi, partem debitori praestabit, nec recepta pecunia restituet, quod iure inventoris, non creditoris ex thensauro apud eum remansit. quae cum ita sint, et cum ex principis auctoritate creditor ut proprium agrum tenere coepit iure dominii, intra constitutum luendi tempus pignoris causa vertitur: post transactum autem tempus thensaurum in eo inventum ante solutam pecuniam totum tenebit. oblato vero intra constitutum tempus debito, quoniam universa praestantur atque in simplici petitore revocantur, restitui debebit, sed pro parte sola, quia dimidium inventori semper placet relinqui.
But if the creditor has found it, he will be seen to have found it on another’s property: consequently he will provide a part to himself and a part to the debtor, and, even upon receiving the money, he will not restore it, since by the right of the finder, not of the creditor, it remained with him from the treasure(-trove). Since these things are so, and since by the emperor’s authority the creditor began to hold the field as his own, by right of ownership, within the fixed time for redemption it is treated as being for the sake of a pledge; but after the time has elapsed, he will hold in full the treasure found there before the money has been paid. If, however, the debt is tendered within the set time, since all things are delivered up and revert to the simple claimant (petitor), it must be restored, but only for a part, because it is always approved that a half be left to the finder.
Si epistulam tibi misero, non erit ea tua, antequam tibi reddita fuerit. paulus: immo contra: nam si miseris ad me tabellarium tuum et ego rescribendi causa litteras tibi misero, simul atque tabellario tuo tradidero, tuae fient. idem accidet in his litteris, quas tuae dumtaxat rei gratia misero, veluti si petieris a me, uti te alicui commendarem, et eas commendaticias tibi misero litteras.
If I send you a letter, it will not be yours before it has been delivered to you. paulus: nay, rather the contrary: for if you send your courier to me and I, for the sake of replying, send letters to you, as soon as I have handed them to your courier, they become yours. The same will happen with those letters which I send solely for the sake of your affair, as, for example, if you should ask me to commend you to someone, and I send you those commendatory letters.
Si qua insula in flumine publico proxima tuo fundo nata est, ea tua est. paulus: videamus ne hoc falsum sit de ea insula, quae non ipsi alveo fluminis cohaeret, sed virgultis aut alia qualibet levi materia ita sustinetur in flumine, ut solum eius non tangat, atque ipsa movetur: haec enim propemodum publica atque ipsius fluminis est insula.
If some island has been formed in a public river next to your estate, it is yours. paulus: let us consider whether this is not false in the case of that island which does not cohere to the river’s very channel, but is supported in the river by brushwood or any other light material in such a way that its soil does not touch, and the island itself moves: for such an island is almost public and is an island of the river itself.
Paulus: si insula in flumine nata tua fuerit, deinde inter eam insulam et contrariam ripam alia insula nata fuerit, mensura eo nomine erit instruenda a tua insula, non ab agro tuo, propter quem ea insula tua facta fuerit: nam quid interest, qualis ager sit, cuius propter propinquitatem posterior insula cuius sit quaeratur?
Paulus: if an island born in a river has become yours, and then between that island and the opposite bank another island is born, the measure under that head is to be taken from your island, not from your field, on account of which that island had become yours; for what difference does it make what kind of field it is, when the question, by reason of propinquity, is whose the later island is?
Dominiumque rerum ex naturali possessione coepisse nerva filius ait eiusque rei vestigium remanere in his, quae terra mari caeloque capiuntur: nam haec protinus eorum fiunt, qui primi possessionem eorum adprehenderint. item bello capta et insula in mari enata et gemmae lapilli margaritae in litoribus inventae eius fiunt, qui primus eorum possessionem nanctus est.
And Nerva the son says that dominion of things began from natural possession, and that a vestige of this matter remains in those things which are taken on land, sea, and sky: for these immediately become those of them who first shall have apprehended possession of them. Likewise, things captured in war, and an island born in the sea, and gems, pebbles, pearls found on the shores become his who first has obtained possession of them.
Furiosus, et pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate, non potest incipere possidere, quia affectionem tenendi non habent, licet maxime corpore suo rem contingant, sicuti si quis dormienti aliquid in manu ponat. sed pupillus tutore auctore incipiet possidere. ofilius quidem et nerva filius etiam sine tutoris auctoritate possidere incipere posse pupillum aiunt: eam enim rem facti, non iuris esse: quae sententia recipi potest, si eius aetatis sint, ut intellectum capiant.
an insane person, and a ward without the authority of a tutor, cannot begin to possess, because they do not have the intention of holding, even though they directly touch the thing with their own body, just as if someone were to place something in the hand of a sleeping person. but a ward, with the tutor authorizing, will begin to possess. ofilius indeed and nerva the son say that a ward can begin to possess even without the authority of a tutor: for that is a matter of fact, not of law: which opinion may be accepted, if they are of such an age that they grasp understanding.
Si vir uxori cedat possessione donationis causa, plerique putant possidere eam, quoniam res facti infirmari iure civili non potest: et quid attinet dicere non possidere mulierem, cum maritus, ubi noluit possidere, protinus amiserit possessionem?
If a husband cedes possession to his wife for the purpose of a donation, the majority think that she possesses, since a matter of fact cannot be invalidated by the civil law; and what is the point of saying that the woman does not possess, when the husband, once he was unwilling to possess, immediately lost possession?
Item adquirimus possessionem per servum aut filium, qui in potestate est, et quidem earum rerum, quas peculiariter tenent, etiam ignorantes, sicut sabino et cassio et iuliano placuit, quia nostra voluntate intellegantur possidere, qui eis peculium habere permiserimus. igitur ex causa peculiari et infans et furiosus adquirunt possessionem et usucapiunt, et heres, si hereditarius servus emat.
likewise we acquire possession through a slave or a son who is in our power, and indeed of those things which they hold in their peculium, even while we are ignorant, as pleased sabinus and cassius and julianus, because they are understood to possess by our will, we having permitted them to have a peculium. therefore, on a peculium-ground, both an infant and a lunatic acquire possession and usucapt, and so does the heir, if a slave of the inheritance buys.
Per servum, qui in fuga sit, nihil posse nos possidere nerva filius ait, licet respondeatur, quamdiu ab alio non possideatur, a nobis eum possideri ideoque interim etiam usucapi. sed utilitatis causa receptum est, ut impleatur usucapio, quamdiu nemo nactus sit eius possessionem. possessionem autem per eum adquiri, sicut per eos, quos in provincia habemus, cassii et iuliani sententia est.
through a slave who is in flight, nerva the son says that we can possess nothing, although it is answered that, so long as he is not possessed by another, he is possessed by us and therefore in the meantime can even be acquired by usucapion. but for the sake of utility it has been accepted that usucapion be completed so long as no one has obtained possession of him. and that possession is acquired through him, just as through those whom we have in a province, is the opinion of cassius and julian.
Per servum corporaliter pignori datum non adquirere nos possessionem iulianus ait ( ad unam enim tantum causam videri eum a debitore possideri, ad usucapionem), nec creditori, quia nec stipulatione nec ullo alio modo per eum adquirat, quamvis eum possideat.
julian says that through a slave corporally given in pledge we do not acquire possession (for he is considered to be possessed by the debtor for only one cause, for usucapion), nor does the creditor, because he acquires through him neither by stipulation nor by any other mode, although he possesses him.
Veteres putaverunt non posse nos per servum hereditarium adquirere, quod sit eiusdem hereditatis. itaque agitatur, num haec regula longius producenda sit, ut, si plures servi legati sint, per unum an possint ceteri possideri. idem tractatus est, si pariter empti vel donati sunt.
The ancients thought that we cannot acquire through a hereditary slave, because he belongs to the same inheritance. and so it is debated whether this rule should be extended further, namely that, if several slaves have been bequeathed, whether through one the rest can be possessed. the same point has been treated if they have been bought or donated together.
Haec, quae de servis diximus, ita se habent, si et ipsi velint nobis adquirere possessionem: nam si iubeas servum tuum possidere et is eo animo intret in possessionem, ut nolit tibi, sed potius titio adquirere, non est tibi adquisita possessio.
These matters, which we have said about slaves, stand thus, if they themselves also are willing to acquire possession for us: for if you order your slave to possess, and he enters into possession with the intention not to acquire it for you, but rather to acquire it for Titius, possession has not been acquired for you.
Per procuratorem tutorem curatoremve possessio nobis adquiritur. cum autem suo nomine nacti fuerint possessionem, non cum ea mente, ut operam dumtaxat suam accommodarent, nobis non possunt adquirere. alioquin si dicamus per eos non adquiri nobis possessionem, qui nostro nomine accipiunt, futurum, ut neque is possideat cui res tradita sit, quia non habeat animum possidentis, neque is qui tradiderit, quoniam cesserit possessione.
Possession is acquired for us through a procurator, tutor, or curator. But when they have obtained possession in their own name, not with the mind that they were only lending their service, they cannot acquire it for us. Otherwise, if we were to say that possession is not acquired for us through those who receive it in our name, it would result that neither he would possess to whom the thing has been delivered, because he does not have the mind of a possessor, nor he who delivered it, since he has departed from possession.
Si iusserim venditorem procuratori rem tradere, cum ea in praesentia sit, videri mihi traditam priscus ait, idemque esse, si nummos debitorem iusserim alii dare. non est enim corpore et tactu necesse adprehendere possessionem, sed etiam oculis et affectu argumento esse eas res, quae propter magnitudinem ponderis moveri non possunt, ut columnas, nam pro traditis eas haberi, si in re praesenti consenserint: et vina tradita videri, cum claves cellae vinariae emptori traditae fuerint.
If I should order the seller to deliver the thing to a procurator, when it is present, it is held to have been delivered to me, Priscus says; and it is the same, if I should order the debtor to give the coins to another. For it is not necessary to apprehend possession by body and touch, but also by the eyes and by intention; as an argument are those things which cannot be moved on account of the greatness of their weight, such as columns, for they are held as delivered if they have agreed with the thing present; and wines are considered delivered when the keys of the wine-cellar have been delivered to the buyer.
Municipes per se nihil possidere possunt, quia universi consentire non possunt. forum autem et basilicam hisque similia non possident, sed promiscue his utuntur. sed nerva filius ait, per servum quae peculiariter adquisierint et possidere et usucapere posse: sed quidam contra putant, quoniam ipsos servos non possideant.
municipes cannot possess anything by themselves, because the whole body cannot consent. however, they do not possess the forum and the basilica and similar things, but use these in common. but Nerva the son says that, through a slave, those things which they have acquired by way of peculium they can both possess and acquire by usucapion: but some think the contrary, since they do not possess the slaves themselves.
Et apiscimur possessionem corpore et animo, neque per se animo aut per se corpore. quod autem diximus et corpore et animo adquirere nos debere possessionem, non utique ita accipiendum est, ut qui fundum possidere velit, omnes glebas circumambulet: sed sufficit quamlibet partem eius fundi introire, dum mente et cogitatione hac sit, uti totum fundum usque ad terminum velit possidere.
And we acquire possession by body and mind, neither by mind by itself nor by body by itself. But what we have said, that we ought to acquire possession by body and mind, is not to be understood thus, that he who wishes to possess an estate must circumambulate all the clods; rather it suffices to enter any part of that estate, provided he be with this mind and cogitation, namely, that he wishes to possess the whole estate up to its boundary.
Neratius et proculus et solo animo non posse nos adquirere possessionem, si non antecedat naturalis possessio. ideoque si thensaurum in fundo meo positum sciam, continuo me possidere, simul atque possidendi affectum habuero, quia quod desit naturali possessioni, id animus implet. ceterum quod brutus et manilius putant eum, qui fundum longa possessione cepit, etiam thensaurum cepisse, quamvis nesciat in fundo esse, non est verum: is enim qui nescit non possidet thensaurum, quamvis fundum possideat.
Neratius and Proculus also [hold] that we are not able to acquire possession by mind alone, if natural possession does not precede. And so, if I know that a treasure has been placed on my land, I immediately possess it, as soon as I shall have had the intention of possessing, because what is lacking to natural possession, the mind makes up. But what Brutus and Manilius think—that he who has acquired a fundus by long possession has also acquired the treasure, although he does not know that it is on the fundus—is not true: for he who does not know does not possess the treasure, although he does possess the fundus.
Ex plurimis causis possidere eandem rem possumus, ut quidam putant et eum, qui usuceperit et pro emptore, et pro suo possidere: sic enim et si ei, qui pro emptore possidebat, heres sim, eandem rem et pro emptore et pro herede possideo: nec enim sicut dominium non potest nisi ex una causa contingere, ita et possidere ex una dumtaxat causa possumus.
From very many causes we can possess the same thing, as some think, and that he who has acquired by usucapion possesses both as purchaser and in his own right: for thus also, if I should be heir to him who was possessing as purchaser, I possess the same thing both as purchaser and as heir: for it is not the case that, just as ownership cannot accrue except from a single cause, so too can we possess from a single cause only.
Ex contrario plures eandem rem in solidum possidere non possunt: contra naturam quippe est, ut, cum ego aliquid teneam, tu quoque id tenere videaris. sabinus tamen scribit eum qui precario dederit et ipsum possidere et eum qui precario acceperit. idem trebatius probabat existimans posse alium iuste, alium iniuste possidere, duos iniuste vel duos iuste non posse.
On the contrary, several cannot possess the same thing in solidum: for it is against nature that, when I hold something, you too seem to hold it. sabinus, however, writes that both the one who has given it by precarium and the one who has received it by precarium possess. the same trebatius approved this, thinking that one person can possess justly and another unjustly, but that two cannot unjustly nor two justly.
whom Labeo reprehends, since in the sum of possession it does not matter much whether one possesses justly or unjustly: which is truer. For the same possession can no more be with two persons than that you should seem to stand in the place in which I stand, or that, in the place in which I sit, you should seem to sit.
In amittenda quoque possessione affectio eius qui possidet intuenda est: itaque si in fundo sis et tamen nolis eum possidere, protinus amittes possessionem. igitur amitti et animo solo potest, quamvis adquiri non potest.
In the losing of possession as well, the intention of the one who possesses must be considered: and so, if you are on the estate and yet do not wish to possess it, you will immediately lose possession. therefore it can be lost by intention alone, although it cannot be acquired (so) [by intention alone].
Si servus, quem possidebam, pro libero se gerat, ut fecit spartacus, et iudicium liberale pati paratus sit, non videbitur a domino possideri, cui se adversarium praeparat. sed hoc ita verum est, si diu in libertate moratur: alioquin si ex possessione servitutis in libertatem reclamaverit et liberale iudicium imploraverit, nihilo minus in possessione mea est et animo eum possideo, donec liber fuerit pronuntiatus.
If a slave whom I was possessing conducts himself as a free man, as spartacus did, and is prepared to undergo a suit for liberty, he will not be seen as being possessed by the master, for whom he prepares himself as an adversary. But this is true thus, if he stays long in freedom: otherwise, if from the possession of slavery he has cried out for freedom and has implored a suit for liberty, nonetheless he is in my possession, and I possess him in intention, until he has been pronounced free.
Ceterum animo nostro, corpore etiam alieno possidemus, sicut diximus per colonum et servum, nec movere nos debet, quod quasdam etiam ignorantes possidemus, id est quas servi peculiariter paraverunt: nam videmur eas eorundem et animo et corpore possidere.
Moreover we possess by our mind, and even by another’s body, as we have said, through a colonus (tenant-farmer) and a slave; nor ought it to move us that we even possess certain things while unaware, that is, those which slaves have peculiarly acquired in their peculium: for we seem to possess them, by the mind and by the body of those same persons.
Nerva filius res mobiles excepto homine, quatenus sub custodia nostra sint, hactenus possideri, id est quatenus, si velimus, naturalem possessionem nancisci possimus. nam pecus simul atque aberraverit aut vas ita exciderit, ut non inveniatur, protinus desinere a nobis possideri, licet a nullo possideatur: dissimiliter atque si sub custodia mea sit nec inveniatur, quia praesentia eius sit et tantum cessat interim diligens inquisitio.
Nerva the son: movable things, with the exception of a human being, in so far as they are under our custody, are possessed to this extent—that is, to the extent that, if we wish, we can obtain natural possession. For cattle, as soon as it has strayed, or a vessel has so fallen out that it cannot be found, at once cease to be possessed by us, although it is possessed by no one; unlike the case where it is under my custody and not found, because its presence subsists, and only a diligent inquisition meanwhile ceases.
Item feras bestias, quas vivariis incluserimus, et pisces, quos in piscinas coiecerimus, a nobis possideri. sed eos pisces, qui in stagno sint, aut feras, quae in silvis circumseptis vagantur, a nobis non possideri, quoniam relictae sint in libertate naturali: alioquin etiam si quis silvam emerit, videri eum omnes feras possidere, quod falsum est.
Likewise, the wild beasts which we have shut up in vivaria, and the fish which we have cast into fishponds, are possessed by us. But those fish which are in a pond, or wild animals which wander in enclosed woods, are not possessed by us, since they have been left in their natural liberty; otherwise even if someone had bought a wood, he would be considered to possess all the wild animals—which is false.
Si rem apud te depositam furti faciendi causa contrectaveris, desino possidere. sed si eam loco non moveris et infitiandi animum habeas, plerique veterum et sabinus et cassius recte responderunt possessorem me manere, quia furtum sine contrectatione fieri non potest nec animo furtum admittatur.
If you have handled a thing deposited with you for the purpose of committing theft, I cease to possess. But if you have not moved it from its place and have a mind to deny, most of the ancients, and Sabinus and Cassius, rightly responded that I remain the possessor, because theft cannot be committed without handling, nor is theft admitted by intention alone.
Genera possessionum tot sunt, quot et causae adquirendi eius quod nostrum non sit, velut pro emptore: pro donato: pro legato: pro dote: pro herede: pro noxae dedito: pro suo, sicut in his, quae terra marique vel ex hostibus capimus vel quae ipsi, ut in rerum natura essent, fecimus. et in summa magis unum genus est possidendi, species infinitae.
The kinds of possessions are as many as the causes of acquiring what is not our own, as for a purchaser: as for a donee: as for a legatee: as for a dowry: as for an heir: as for one surrendered in noxal surrender: as for one’s own, as in those things which we seize on land and sea, even from enemies, or which we ourselves have made so that they might be in the nature of things. And in sum, rather there is one genus of possessing, the species are infinite.
Quod autem quintus mucius inter genera possessionum posuit, si quando iussu magistratus rei servandae causa possidemus, ineptissimum est: nam qui creditorem rei servandae causa vel quia damni infecti non caveatur, mittit in possessionem vel ventris nomine, non possessionem, sed custodiam rerum et observationem concedit: et ideo, cum damni infecti non cavente vicino in possessionem missi sumus, si id longo tempore fiat, etiam possidere nobis et per longam possessionem capere praetor causa cognita permittit.
But what Quintus Mucius set among the kinds of possession—namely, when by order of a magistrate we possess for the purpose of preserving the thing—is most inept: for when he sends a creditor into possession for the sake of preserving the thing, or because no security is given for damage not yet done, or in the name of the unborn child, he grants not possession, but custody of the things and observation: and therefore, when we have been sent into possession because a neighbor does not give security for damage not yet done, if this is for a long time, the praetor, upon cognizance of the cause, permits us also to possess and to acquire through long possession.
Clam possidere eum dicimus, qui furtive ingressus est possessionem ignorante eo, quem sibi controversiam facturum suspicabatur et, ne faceret, timebat. is autem qui, cum possideret non clam, se celavit, in ea causa est, ut non videatur clam possidere: non enim ratio optinendae possessionis, sed origo nanciscendae exquirenda est: nec quemquam clam possidere incipere, qui sciente aut volente eo, ad quem ea res pertinet, aut aliqua ratione bonae fidei possessionem nanciscitur. itaque, inquit pomponius, clam nanciscitur possessionem, qui futuram controversiam metuens ignorante eo, quem metuit, furtive in possessionem ingreditur.
We say that one possesses clandestinely who has entered upon possession furtively while he was ignorant whom he suspected would make a controversy against him and, to prevent it, he feared. But he who, although he was not possessing clandestinely, concealed himself, is in such a case that he does not seem to possess clandestinely: for it is not the method of maintaining possession that must be inquired into, but the origin of acquiring it; nor does anyone begin to possess clandestinely who acquires possession with the knowledge or will of the person to whom the thing pertains, or by some rationale of good-faith possession. And so, says pomponius, he acquires possession clandestinely who, fearing a future controversy, enters into possession furtively while the person whom he fears is unaware.
Qui ad nundinas profectus neminem reliquerit et, dum ille a nundinis redit, aliquis occupaverit possessionem, videri eum clam possidere labeo scribit: retinet ergo possessionem is, qui ad nundinas abiit ^ abit^: verum si revertentem dominum non admiserit, vi magis intellegi possidere, non clam.
Labeo writes that if someone, having set out to the market-days, has left no one behind, and while he is returning from the market someone has occupied the possession, he is seen to possess clandestinely: therefore he who went to the market retains the possession, he who went to the market abiit ^ abit^: but if he has not admitted the owner on his return, he is rather understood to possess by force (vi), not clandestinely (non clam).
Idem pomponius bellissime temptat dicere, numquid qui conduxerit quidem praedium, precario autem rogavit non ut possideret, sed ut in possessione esset ( est autem longe diversum: aliud est enim possidere, longe aliud in possessione esse: denique rei servandae causa, legatorum, damni infecti non possident, sed sunt in possessione custodiae causa): quod si factum est, utrumque procedit.
The same Pomponius most excellently attempts to say, whether someone who has indeed leased an estate, but requested by precarium not that he should possess, but that he should be in possession ( it is, however, far different: for to possess is one thing, to be in possession is far another: finally, for the sake of preserving the thing, of legatees, of damage not yet done (damnum infectum), they do not possess, but are in possession for the sake of custody): and if this has been done, both proceed.
Si quis et conduxerit et rogaverit precario, uti possideret, si quidem nummo uno conduxit, nulla dubitatio est, quin ei precarium solum teneat, quia conductio nulla est, quae est in uno nummo: sin vero pretio, tunc distinguendum, quid prius factum est.
If someone both has leased and has asked by way of precarium, to possess for use, if indeed he leased for a single coin, there is no doubt that only the precarium holds for him, because a lease which is for a single coin is no lease; but if for a price, then a distinction must be made as to what was done first.
Pomponius refert, cum lapides in tiberim demersi essent naufragio et post tempus extracti, an dominium in integro fuit per id tempus, quo erant mersi. ego dominium me retinere puto, possessionem non puto, nec est simile fugitivo: namque fugitivus idcirco a nobis possideri videtur, ne ipse nos privet possessione: at in lapidibus diversum est.
Pomponius reports that, when stones had been submerged in the Tiber by a shipwreck and after a time extracted, the question was whether dominion remained intact during the period in which they were submerged. I think I retain dominion, I do not think I retain possession; nor is it similar to the case of a fugitive (runaway slave): for a fugitive is for that reason deemed to be possessed by us, lest he himself deprive us of possession; but with stones it is different.
Praeterea quaeritur, si quis hominem venditori redhibuerit, an accessione uti possit ex persona eius. et sunt qui putent non posse, quia venditionis est resolutio redhibitio: alii emptorem venditoris accessione usurum et venditorem emptoris, quod magis probandum puto.
Furthermore it is asked, if someone has redhibited a man to the seller, whether he can make use of accession from his person. And there are those who think he cannot, because redhibition is a dissolution of the sale; others [think] that the buyer will make use of the seller’s accession, and the seller of the buyer’s, which I think is rather to be approved.
Quaesitum est, si heres prius non possederat, an testatoris possessio ei accedat. et quidem in emptoribus possessio interrumpitur, sed non idem in heredibus plerique probant, quoniam plenius est ius successionis quam emptionis: sed suptilius est quod in emptorem, et in heredem id quoque probari.
It has been asked, if the heir had not previously possessed, whether the testator’s possession accrues to him. And indeed, in purchasers possession is interrupted, but many approve that it is not the same in heirs, since the ius of succession is fuller than that of purchase; but the subtler view is that the same—namely, that possession is interrupted—be approved both for the purchaser and for the heir.
Si is, qui precario concessit, accessione velit uti ex persona eius cui concessit, an possit, quaeritur. ego puto eum, qui precario concessit, quamdiu manet precarium, accessione uti non posse: si tamen receperit possessionem rupto precario, dicendum esse accedere possessionem eius temporis, quo precario possidebatur.
If he who granted by precarium should wish to make use of accession from the person of him to whom he granted, the question is whether he can. I think that he who granted by precarium, so long as the precarium remains, cannot make use of accession; if, however, he has recovered possession with the precarium broken, it must be said that the possession of that time during which it was possessed by precarium accrues.
Ex facto quaeritur, si quis manumissus ex causa peculiari habeat rem non concesso sibi peculio, deinde dominus velit retracta possessione accessione uti, an possit. et placuit non esse dandam hanc accessionem, quae clam habita est.
From the facts it is asked whether, if someone manumitted on the ground of the peculium has a thing, the peculium not having been granted to him, then the master, after possession has been retracted, wishes to make use of accession—whether he can. And it was decided that this accession, which was held clandestinely, is not to be given.
Sed et legatario dandam accessionem eius temporis, quo fuit apud testatorem, sciendum est. an heredis possessio ei accedat, videamus: et puto, sive pure sive sub condicione fuerit relictum, dicendum esse id temporis, quo heres possedit ante existentem condicionem vel restitutionem rei, legatario proficere. testatoris autem semper proderit legatario, si legatum vere fuit vel fideicommissum.
But it must also be understood that the accession of time, during which the thing was with the testator, is to be given to the legatee. Let us see whether the heir’s possession accrues to him: and I think that, whether it was left purely or under a condition, it must be said that the time during which the heir possessed, before the condition came into existence or before the restitution of the thing, benefits the legatee. Moreover, the testator’s [time] will always profit the legatee, if the bequest was truly a legacy or a fideicommissum.
Rem, quae nobis subrepta est, perinde intellegimur desinere possidere atque eam, quae vi nobis erepta est. sed si is, qui in potestate nostra est, subripuerit, quamdiu apud ipsum sit res, tamdiu non amittimus possessionem, quia per huiusmodi personas adquiritur nobis possessio. et haec ratio est, quare videamur fugitivum possidere, quod is, quemadmodum aliarum rerum possessionem intervertere non potest, ita ne suam quidem potest.
A thing which has been surreptitiously stolen from us we are understood to cease to possess, just as one which has been snatched from us by force. But if someone who is in our power has pilfered it, so long as the thing is with him, so long we do not lose possession, because possession is acquired for us through persons of this sort. And this is the rationale why we are deemed to possess a fugitive, because he, just as he cannot disturb the possession of other things, so he cannot even disturb the possession of himself.
Quod meo nomine possideo, possum alieno nomine possidere: nec enim muto mihi causam possessionis, sed desino possidere et alium possessorem ministerio meo facio. nec idem est possidere et alieno nomine possidere: nam possidet, cuius nomine possidetur, procurator alienae possessioni praestat ministerium.
What I possess in my own name, I can possess in another’s name: for I do not change for myself the cause of possession, but I cease to possess and by my ministry make another the possessor. Nor is it the same to possess and to possess in another’s name: for he possesses, in whose name it is possessed; the procurator furnishes ministry to another’s possession.
Si furioso, quem suae mentis esse existimas, eo quod forte in conspectu inumbratae quietis fuit constitutus, rem tradideris, licet ille non erit adeptus possessionem, tu possidere desinis: sufficit quippe dimittere possessionem, etiamsi non transferas. illud enim ridiculum est dicere, quod non aliter vult quis dimittere, quam si transferat: immo vult dimittere, quia existimat se transferre.
If to a madman, whom you suppose to be of sound mind, because perchance he was situated in the appearance of unshadowed repose, you have delivered a thing, although he will not have acquired possession, you cease to possess: for it suffices to relinquish possession, even if you do not transfer it. For that is ridiculous to say, that one only wishes to relinquish if he transfers: on the contrary, he wishes to relinquish, because he thinks that he is transferring.
Si venditorem quod emerim deponere in mea domo iusserim, possidere me certum est, quamquam id nemo dum attigerit: aut si vicinum mihi fundum mercato venditor in mea turre demonstret vacuamque se possessionem tradere dicat, non minus possidere coepi, quam si pedem finibus intulissem.
If I have ordered the seller to deposit what I have bought in my house, it is certain that I possess, although no one has yet touched it; or if the seller, to me the purchaser, from my tower demonstrates a neighboring estate and says that he delivers vacant possession, I have no less begun to possess than if I had set foot within the boundaries.
Quod scriptum est apud veteres neminem sibi causam possessionis posse mutare, credibile est de eo cogitatum, qui et corpore et animo possessioni incumbens hoc solum statuit, ut alia ex causa id possideret, non si quis dimissa possessione prima eiusdem rei denuo ex alia causa possessionem nancisci velit.
What is written among the ancients, that no one can change for himself the cause of possession, is credible to have been intended of one who, applying himself to possession with both body and mind, determined only this: that he should possess it on another cause; not of one who, after dismissing the first possession of the same thing, wishes to acquire possession anew from another cause.
Si quis rem, quam utendam dederat, vendiderit emptorique tradi iusserit nec ille tradiderit, alias videbitur possessione dominum intervertisse, alias contra. nam nec tunc quidem semper dominus amittit possessionem, cum reposcenti ei commodatum non redditur: quid enim si alia quaepiam fuit iusta et rationabilis causa non reddendi, non utique ut possessionem eius interverteret?
If someone sells a thing which he had given to be used, and has ordered it to be delivered to the buyer, and that man has not delivered it, at times he will be seen to have interverted the owner’s possession, at times the contrary. For not even then does the owner always lose possession, when the commodatum is not returned to him as he demands it: for what if there was some other just and reasonable cause for not returning it, surely not so as to intervert his possession?
In his, qui in hostium potestatem pervenerunt, in retinendo iura rerum suarum singulare ius est: corporaliter tamen possessionem amittunt: neque enim possunt videri aliquid possidere, cum ipsi ab alio possideantur: sequitur ergo, ut reversis his nova possessione opus sit, etiamsi nemo medio tempore res eorum possederit.
In the case of those who have come into the power of the enemy, there is a singular right in retaining the rights of their things: nevertheless, corporally they lose possession: for they cannot be considered to possess anything, since they themselves are possessed by another: it follows therefore that, upon their return, a new possession is needed, even if no one has possessed their things in the meantime.
Item quaero, si vinxero liberum hominem ita, ut eum possideam, an omnia, quae is ^ si^ possidebat, ego possideam per illum. respondit: si vinxeris hominem liberum, eum te possidere non puto: quod cum ita se habeat, multo minus per illum res eius a te possidebuntur: neque enim rerum natura recipit, ut per eum aliquid possidere possimus, quem civiliter in mea potestate non habeo.
Likewise I ask, if I have bound a free man in such a way that I possess him, whether I possess through him all the things that he ^ if^ possessed. He responded: If you have bound a free man, I do not think that you possess him; since this is so, much less will his things be possessed by you through him; for the nature of things does not admit that we can possess anything through one whom I do not have in my civil power.
Quod servus tuus ignorante te vi possidet, id tu non possides, quoniam is, qui in tua potestate est, ignoranti tibi non corporalem possessionem, sed iustam potest adquirere: sicut id, quod ex peculio ad eum pervenerit, possidet. nam tum per servum dominus quoque possidere dicitur, summa scilicet cum ratione, quia, quod ex iusta causa corporaliter a servo tenetur, id in peculio servi est et peculium, quod servus civiliter quidem possidere non posset, sed naturaliter tenet, dominus creditur possidere. quod vero ex maleficiis adprehenditur, id ad domini possessionem ideo non pertinet, quia nec peculii causam adprehendit.
That which your slave, you being unaware, possesses by force, that you do not possess, since he who is in your power, for you being ignorant, can acquire for you not corporal possession, but just (lawful) possession; just as he possesses that which has come to him from the peculium. For then the master too is said to possess through the slave, with the highest reason, of course, because what is held corporeally by the slave from a just cause is in the slave’s peculium; and the peculium, which the slave indeed could not possess civilly, but holds naturally, the master is deemed to possess. But what is seized by way of misdeeds does not for that reason pertain to the master’s possession, because it does not lay hold of the cause of the peculium either.
Quod autem solo animo possidemus, quaeritur, utrumne usque eo possideamus, donec alius corpore ingressus sit, ut potior sit illius corporalis possessio, an vero ( quod quasi magis probatur) usque eo possideamus, donec revertentes nos aliquis repellat aut nos ita animo desinamus possidere, quod suspicemur repelli nos posse ab eo, qui ingressus sit in possessionem: et videtur utilius esse.
But as to that which we possess by mind alone, the question is whether we possess it until someone else has entered in body, so that his corporal possession is the stronger, or rather ( quod quasi more approved) that we possess it until, as we are returning, someone repels us, or we thus cease to possess in mind because we suspect that we can be repelled by him who has entered into possession: and this seems to be more expedient.
Locus certus ex fundo et possideri et per longam possessionem capi potest et certa pars pro indiviso, quae introducitur vel ex emptione vel ex donatione vel qualibet alia ex causa. incerta autem pars nec tradi nec capi potest, veluti si ita tibi tradam: " quidquid mei iuris in eo fundo est": nam qui ignorat, nec tradere nec accipere id, quod incertum est, potest.
A determinate place from an estate can both be possessed and be taken by long possession, and likewise a determinate share pro indiviso, which is established either from purchase or from donation or from any other cause whatsoever. But an indeterminate share can neither be delivered nor taken, as, for example, if I deliver to you thus: “whatever of my right there is in that estate”; for one who is ignorant cannot deliver nor receive that which is uncertain.
Si aliquam rem possideam et eandem postea conducam, an amittam possessionem? multum refert in his, quid agatur: primum enim refert, utrum sciam me possidere an ignorem: et utrum quasi non meam rem conducam an quasi meam: et sciens meam esse, utrum quasi proprietatis respectu an possessionis tantum. nam et si rem meam tu possideas et ego emam a te possessionem eius rei vel stipuler, utilis erit et emptio et stipulatio, et sequitur, ut et precarium et conductio specialiter possessionis solius conducendae vel precario rogandae animus interveniat.
If I possess some thing and afterwards lease the same, do I lose possession? Much depends in these matters on what is being done: first, it matters whether I know that I am in possession or am ignorant; and whether I lease it as if it were not my thing or as if it were mine; and, knowing it to be mine, whether with respect to proprietorship or only to possession. For even if you possess my thing and I buy from you the possession of that thing or stipulate for it, both the purchase and the stipulation will be effective, and it follows that both in precarium and in letting (conductio) there intervenes a specific intention that only the possession be leased or be asked for by precarium.
Possessionem pupillum sine tutoris auctoritate amittere posse constat, non ut animo, sed ut corpore desinat possidere: quod est enim facti, potest amittere. alia causa est, si forte animo possessionem velit amittere: hoc enim non potest.
It is established that a ward can lose possession without the guardian’s authority, not as to animus (intention), but as to corpus (physical control) he ceases to possess: for since this is a matter of fact, he can lose it. The case is different if perchance he should wish to abandon possession by animus: for this he cannot do.
Quod per colonum possideo, heres meus nisi ipse nactus possessionem non poterit possidere: retinere enim animo possessionem possumus, apisci non possumus. sed quod pro emptore possideo per colonum etiam, usucapiet etiam heres meus.
What I possess through a tenant-farmer (colonus), my heir will not be able to possess unless he himself has obtained possession: for we can retain possession by intention (animus), we cannot acquire it. But what I possess pro emptore through a tenant-farmer as well, my heir also will acquire by usucapion.
Si ego tibi commodavero, tu titio, qui putet tuum esse, nihilo minus ego id possidebo. et idem erit, si colonus meus fundum locaverit aut is, apud quem deposueram, apud alium rursus deposuerit. et id quamlibet per plurium personam factum observandum ita erit.
If I have lent it to you, and you to Titius, who thinks it to be yours, nonetheless I shall possess it. And the same will be the case if my colonus has leased out the fundus, or he with whom I had deposited it has in turn deposited it with another. And this is to be observed thus, however it has been done through the person of several persons.
Infans possidere recte potest, si tutore auctore coepit, nam iudicium infantis suppletur auctoritate tutoris: utilitatis enim causa hoc receptum est, nam alioquin nullus sensus est infantis accipiendi possessionem. pupillus tamen etiam sine tutoris auctoritate possessionem nancisci potest. item infans peculiari nomine per servum possidere potest.
An infant can properly possess, if he began with his guardian as authorizer, for the infant’s judgment is supplied by the guardian’s authority: for this has been accepted for the sake of utility, since otherwise there is no sense in an infant’s receiving possession. A pupil (ward), however, can also acquire possession without the guardian’s authority. Likewise an infant can possess, in the name of a peculium, through a slave.
Fundi venditor etiamsi mandaverit alicui, ut emptorem in vacuam possessionem induceret, priusquam id fieret, non recte emptor per se in possessionem veniet. item si amicus venditoris mortuo eo, priusquam id sciret, aut non prohibentibus heredibus id fecerit, recte possessio tradita erit. sed si id fecerit, cum sciret dominum mortuum aut cum sciret heredes id facere nolle, contra erit.
Even if the seller of an estate has mandated someone to induct the buyer into vacant possession, before this is done the buyer does not rightly enter into possession on his own. Likewise, if a friend of the seller, after he has died, before the friend knew it, or with the heirs not prohibiting, has done this, the delivery of possession will be proper. But if he has done it when he knew the owner was dead, or when he knew the heirs were unwilling to do it, the opposite will be the case.
Si me in vacuam possessionem fundi corneliani miseris, ego putarem me in fundum sempronianum missum et in cornelianum iero, non adquiram possessionem, nisi forte in nomine tantum erraverimus, in corpore consenserimus. quoniam autem in corpore consenserimus, an a te tamen recedet possessio, quia animo deponere et mutare nos possessionem posse et celsus et Marcellus scribunt, dubitari potest: et si animo adquiri possessio potest, numquid etiam adquisita est? sed non puto errantem adquirere: ergo nec amittet possessionem, qui quodammodo sub condicione recessit de possessione.
If you send me into the vacant possession of the cornelian estate, and I would think that I had been sent into the sempronian estate and went into the cornelian, I shall not acquire possession, unless perhaps we have erred only in the name but have consented as to the corporeal thing. but since we have consented as to the corporeal thing, it can be doubted whether possession will nevertheless depart from you, because both Celsus and Marcellus write that we are able by intention to lay down and to change possession: and if possession can be acquired by intention, has it perhaps also been acquired? but I do not think that one who errs acquires: therefore he will not lose possession either, who has in a certain way withdrawn from possession under a condition.
Sed si non mihi, sed procuratori meo possessionem tradas, videndum est, si ego errem, procurator meus non erret, an mihi possessio adquiratur. et cum placeat ignoranti adquiri, poterit et erranti. sed si procurator meus erret, ego non errem, magis est, ut adquiram possessionem.
But if you deliver possession not to me, but to my procurator, it must be considered whether, if I err and my procurator does not err, possession is acquired for me. And since it is acceptable that it be acquired for one ignorant, it can also be for one erring. But if my procurator errs and I do not err, it is more correct that I acquire possession.
Qui pignoris causa fundum creditori tradit, intellegitur possidere. sed et si eundem precario rogaverit, aeque per diutinam possessionem capiet: nam cum possessio creditoris non impediat capionem, longe minus precarii rogatio impedimento esse non debet, cum plus iuris in possessione habeat qui precario rogaverit quam qui omnino non possidet.
He who, for the purpose of a pledge, delivers an estate to a creditor is understood to possess. But even if he shall have asked for the same by precarium, he will likewise acquire by prolonged possession: for since the creditor’s possession does not impede acquisition, far less ought a precarium request to be an impediment, since he who has asked by precarium has more right in possession than one who does not possess at all.
Si quis possessionem fundi ita tradiderit, ut ita demum cedere ea dicat, si ipsius fundus esset, non videtur possessio tradita, si fundus alienus sit. hoc amplius existimandum est possessiones sub condicione tradi posse, sicut res sub condicione traduntur neque aliter accipientis fiunt, quam condicio exstiterit.
If someone has delivered possession of a landed estate in such a way that he says he yields it only then, if the estate were his, possession is not deemed to have been delivered, if the estate is another’s. Moreover, it is to be judged that possessions can be transferred under a condition, just as things are transferred under a condition, and they do not otherwise become the recipient’s than when the condition has come to exist.
Si is, qui titio servum vendiderat, heredi eius eum tradiderit, poterit heres rerum hereditariarum possessionem per eum adprehendere, quia non servus iure hereditario, sed actio ex empto ad eum pervenit: nam et si ex stipulatu vel ex testamento servus testatori debitus fuisset et heres eum accepisset, non prohiberetur rerum hereditariarum possessionem per eundem adquirere.
If the one who had sold a slave to Titius were to deliver him to Titius’s heir, the heir will be able to apprehend possession of the hereditary goods through him, because it is not the slave that comes to him by hereditary right, but the action ex empto comes to him; for likewise, if by stipulation (ex stipulatu) or by testament (ex testamento) a slave had been owed to the testator and the heir had received him, he would not be prevented from acquiring possession of the hereditary goods through that same person.
Interesse puto, qua mente apud sequestrum deponitur res. nam si omittendae possessionis causa et hoc aperte fuerit approbatum, ad usucapionem possessio eius partibus non procederet: at si custodiae causa deponatur, ad usucapionem eam possessionem victori procedere constat.
I think it matters with what intention a thing is deposited with a sequester. For if it is for the purpose of abandoning possession, and this has been openly approved, the possession would not proceed toward usucapion on his side; but if it is deposited for the sake of custody, it is agreed that that possession proceeds to usucapion for the victor.
Si forte colonus, per quem dominus possideret, decessisset, propter utilitatem receptum est, ut per colonum possessio et retineretur et contineretur: quo mortuo non statim dicendum eam interpellari, sed tunc demum, cum dominus possessionem apisci neglexerit. aliud existimandum ait, si colonus sponte possessione discesserit. sed haec ita esse vera, si nemo extraneus eam rem interim possiderit, sed semper in hereditate coloni manserit.
If by chance the colonus, through whom the lord possessed, had died, it has been accepted, for the sake of utility, that through the colonus possession both be retained and be continued: upon his death it is not to be said at once that it is interrupted, but only then, when the lord has neglected to acquire possession. He says a different judgment is to be made if the colonus has of his own accord departed from the possession. But these things are true thus, if no outsider has in the meantime possessed the thing, but it has always remained in the inheritance of the colonus.
Servum tuum a titio bona fide emi et traditum possedi, deinde cum comperissem tuum esse, ne eum peteres, celare coepi. non ideo magis hoc tempore clam possidere videri me ait: nam retro quoque, si sciens tuum servum non a domino emerim et, cum clam eum possidere coepissem, postea certiorem te fecerim, non ideo desinere me clam possidere.
I bought your slave from Titius in good faith and, once he had been delivered, I possessed him; then, when I discovered that he was yours, in order that you might not claim him, I began to conceal him. He says that for that reason I am not on that account to be thought at this time the more to be possessing clandestinely: for likewise in the former case, if, knowing that your slave was not the seller’s, I had bought him not from the owner and, after I had begun to possess him clandestinely, I had afterwards informed you, I would not for that reason cease to possess clandestinely.
Si servum meum bonae fidei emptori clam abduxerim, respondit non videri me clam possidere, quia neque precarii rogatione neque conductione suae rei dominum teneri et non posse causam clandestinae possessionis ab his duabus causis separari.
If I have secretly removed my slave from a good‑faith purchaser, he replied that I do not seem to possess clandestinely, because the owner of his own property is held by neither a precarium request nor by a lease (conductio), and the ground of clandestine possession cannot be separated from these two grounds.
Si quis fundum emerit, cuius particulam sciebat esse alienam, iulianus ait, si pro diviso sciat alienam esse, posse eum reliquas partes longa possessione capere: sed si pro indiviso licet ignoret quis sit locus, aeque eum capere posse, quod sine ullius damno pars, quae putatur esse vendentis, per longam possessionem ad emptorem transit.
If anyone should buy a fundus, a portion of which he knew was alien, Julian says that, if he knows it to be alien pro diviso, he can take the remaining parts by long possession; but if pro indiviso, although he may be ignorant which place it is, he can equally acquire it, because without anyone’s damage the part which is supposed to be the seller’s passes by long possession to the buyer.
Peregre profecturus pecuniam in terra custodiae causa condiderat: cum reversus locum thensauri memoria non repeteret, an desisset pecuniam possidere, vel, si postea recognovisset locum, an confestim possidere inciperet, quaesitum est. dixi, quoniam custodiae causa pecunia condita proponeretur, ius possessionis ei, qui condidisset, non videri peremptum, nec infirmitatem memoriae damnum adferre possessionis, quam alius non invasit: alioquin responsuros per momenta servorum, quos non viderimus, interire possessionem. et nihil interest, pecuniam in meo an in alieno condidissem, cum, si alius in meo condidisset, non alias possiderem, quam si ipsius rei possessionem supra terram adeptus fuissem.
Being about to set out abroad, he had buried money in the ground for safekeeping: when, on returning, he did not recall from memory the place of the treasure, it was asked whether he had ceased to possess the money, or, if he later recognized the place, whether he would immediately begin to possess. I said that, since the money was buried for safekeeping, the right of possession did not seem to be extinguished for the one who had buried it, nor does weakness of memory bring loss to a possession which no one else has invaded; otherwise we should be replying that possession perishes at the moments when we have not seen the slaves. And it makes no difference whether I had buried the money on my own land or on another’s, since, if another had buried it on my land, I would possess in no other way than if I had acquired possession of the thing itself above ground.
Quaesitum est, cur ex peculii causa per servum ignorantibus possessio quaereretur. dixi utilitatis causa iure singulari receptum, ne cogerentur domini per momenta species et causas peculiorum inquirere. nec tamen eo pertinere speciem istam, ut animo videatur adquiri possessio: nam si non ex causa peculiari quaeratur aliquid, scientiam quidem domini esse necessariam, sed corpore servi quaeri possessionem.
It was asked why, on account of the peculium, possession would be sought through a slave while the masters were unaware. I said that, for the sake of utility, it has been accepted by a singular rule of law, lest masters be compelled at every moment to inquire into the kinds and causes of peculia. Yet that instance does not extend so far as to make it seem that possession is acquired by intention: for if something is sought not on a peculium-cause, the master’s knowledge is indeed necessary, but possession is sought by the body (corporeal act) of the slave.
Quibus explicitis, cum de amittenda possessione quaeratur, multum interesse dicam, per nosmet ipsos an per alios possideremus: nam eius quidem, quod corpore nostro teneremus, possessionem amitti vel animo vel etiam corpore, si modo eo animo inde digressi fuissemus, ne possideremus: eius vero, quod servi vel etiam coloni corpore possidetur, non aliter amitti possessionem, quam eam alius ingressus fuisset, eamque amitti nobis quoque ignorantibus. illa quoque possessionis amittendae separatio est. nam saltus hibernos et aestivos, quorum possessio retinetur animo,
With these matters set forth, when inquiry is made about the losing of possession, I would say it makes much difference whether we possessed by ourselves or through others: for as to that which we held with our own body, possession is lost either by intention or even by body, provided only that we had departed from there with the intention not to possess; but as to that which is possessed by the body of slaves or even of tenant-farmers, possession is not otherwise lost than if another had entered upon it, and it is lost even without our knowing. There is also that distinction in the losing of possession. For the winter and summer pastures, the possession of which is retained by intention,
Quamvis saltus proposito possidendi fuerit alius ingressus, tamdiu priorem possidere dictum est, quamdiu possessionem ab alio occupatam ignoraret. ut enim eodem modo vinculum obligationum solvitur, quo quaeri adsolet, ita non debet ignoranti tolli possessio quae solo animo tenetur.
Although another, with the purpose of possessing, had entered the woodland pastures, he is said to continue to possess the former so long as he was ignorant that the possession had been occupied by another. For just as the bond of obligations is dissolved in the same manner in which it is accustomed to be acquired, so possession, which is held by mind alone, ought not to be taken away from one who is ignorant.
Si rem mobilem apud te depositam aut ex commodato tibi, possidere neque reddere constitueris, confestim amisisse me possessionem vel ignorantem responsum est. cuius rei forsitan illa ratio est, quod rerum mobilium neglecta atque omissa custodia, quamvis eas nemo alius invaserit, veteris possessionis damnum adferre consuevit: idque nerva filius libris de usucapionibus rettulit. idem scribit aliam causam esse hominis commodati omissa custodia: nam possessionem tamdiu veterem fieri, quamdiu nemo alius eum possidere coeperit, videlicet ideo, quia potest homo proposito redeundi domino possessionem sui conservare, cuius corpore ceteras quoque res possumus possidere.
If, in the case of a movable thing deposited with you or held by you from commodatum, you resolve to possess it yourself and not to return it, it has been answered that I at once lose possession, even though unaware. Perhaps the reason for this is that, with movable things, neglected and abandoned custody, although no one else has seized them, is wont to bring loss of the old possession: and Nerva the son reported this in the books on usucapions. He likewise writes that there is another ground in the case of a slave lent on commodatum when custody is omitted: for the possession remains “old” so long as no one else has begun to possess him, evidently because a man, with the intention of returning to his master, can preserve for the master the possession of himself—by whose body we can also possess other things.
Praedia cum servis donavit eorumque se tradidisse possessionem litteris declaravit. si vel unus ex servis, qui simul cum praediis donatus est, ad eum, qui donum accepit, pervenit, mox in praedia remissus est, per servum praediorum possessionem quaesitam ceterorumque servorum constabit.
He donated the estates together with the slaves, and declared by letters that he had delivered possession of them. If even one of the slaves, who was donated together with the estates, came to him who received the gift and was soon sent back to the estates, it will be established that possession of the estates was acquired through that slave, and likewise of the other slaves.
Quarundam rerum animo possessionem apisci nos ait labeo: veluti si acervum lignorum emero et eum venditor tollere me iusserit, simul atque custodiam posuissem, traditus mihi videtur. idem iuris esse vino vendito, cum universae amphorae vini simul essent. sed videamus, inquit, ne haec ipsa corporis traditio sit, quia nihil interest, utrum mihi an et cuilibet iusserim custodia tradatur.
Labeo says that we acquire possession of certain things by the mind: for example, if I buy a heap of wood and the seller has ordered me to take it away, then as soon as I have put custody in place, it is deemed to have been delivered to me. The same in law holds for wine sold, when all the amphorae of the wine are together at once. But let us see, he says, whether this is corporeal delivery itself, since it makes no difference whether I have ordered that custody be delivered to me or even to anyone whatsoever.
I think this question consists in this: whether, even if the pile or the amphorae have not been physically laid hold of, nonetheless they are to be seen as delivered. I see no difference whether I myself keep the pile in custody or someone, by my mandate, keeps it; in both cases possession will have to be assessed as, in a certain kind, of the mind.
Quod autem dicit lex atinia, ut res furtiva non usucapiatur, nisi in potestatem eius, cui subrepta est, revertatur, sic acceptum est, ut in domini potestatem debeat reverti, non in eius utique, cui subreptum est. igitur creditori subrepta et ei, cui commodata est, in potestatem domini redire debet.
What the Atinian law says—that a stolen thing is not to be acquired by usucapion unless it returns into the power of him from whom it was stolen—is thus understood: it must return into the power of the owner, not, at any rate, into that of the one from whom it was stolen. Therefore, whether it was stolen from a creditor or from the one to whom it was lent for use, it must return into the power of the owner.
Labeo quoque ait, si res peculiaris servi mei subrepta sit me ignorante, deinde eam nanctus sit, videri in potestatem meam redisse: commodius dicitur, etiamsi sciero, redisse eam in meam potestatem ( nec enim sufficit, si eam rem, quam perdidit ignorante me, servus adprehendat): si modo in peculio eam esse volui: nam si nolui, tunc exigendum est, ut ego facultatem eius nactus sim.
Labeo also says that, if a thing belonging to my slave’s peculium has been surreptitiously taken while I was unaware, and then he has come upon it, it is seen to have returned into my power: it is said more fittingly that, even if I shall have known, it has returned into my power ( for it is not sufficient if the slave apprehends that thing which he lost with me unaware): provided only that I have wished it to be in the peculium: for if I did not wish it, then it must be required that I myself have obtained the faculty over it.
Item si eam rem, quam servus subripuerit, peculiari nomine teneat, non videri in potestatem meam reversam pomponius ait, nisi ita habere coeperimus, quemadmodum habuimus, antequam subriperetur, aut, cum rescissemus, in peculio eum habere concessimus: item labeo.
Likewise, if the thing which a slave has filched he holds under the title of the peculium, pomponius says it is not seen as having returned into my power, unless we have begun to have it as we had it before it was stolen, or, when we found out, we allowed him to have it in his peculium: likewise labeo.
Si rem, quam apud te deposueram, lucri faciendi causa vendideris, deinde ex paenitentia redemeris et eodem statu habeas: sive ignorante me sive sciente ea gesta sint, videri in potestatem meam redisse secundum proculi sententiam, quae et vera est.
if the thing which I had deposited with you you sold for the purpose of making profit, then out of repentance you bought it back and hold it in the same condition: whether these things were done with me ignorant or with me knowing, it is deemed to have returned into my power, according to Proculus’s opinion, which also is true.
Tunc in potestatem domini redisse dicendum est, cum possessionem eius nactus sit iuste, ut avelli non possit, sed et tamquam suae rei: nam si ignorans rem mihi subreptam emam, non videri in potestatem meam reversam.
Then it is to be said that it has returned into the owner’s power when he has lawfully obtained possession of it, in such a way that it cannot be torn away, and indeed as of his own property; for if, being unaware, I purchase a thing filched from me, it is not considered to have returned into my power.
Sed et si, ut servum meum manumitterem, alius mihi furtivam ancillam dederit eaque apud me conceperit et pepererit, usu me non capturum. idemque fore etiam, si quis eam ancillam mecum permutasset aut in solutum dedisset, item si donasset.
But also, if, so that I might manumit my slave, someone else were to give me a stolen slave-girl, and she were to conceive and give birth in my keeping, I would not acquire by usucapion. And the same would be the case even if someone were to exchange that slave-girl with me or were to give her in payment (in solutum), likewise if he were to donate her.
Si antequam pariat, alienam esse rescierit emptor, diximus non posse eum usucapere: quod si nescierit, posse. quod si, cum iam usucaperet, cognoverit alienam esse, initium usucapionis intueri debemus, sicut in emptis rebus placuit.
If before she gives birth the purchaser has found out that she is another’s, we have said that he cannot acquire by usucapion: but if he has not known, he can. But if, when he was already acquiring by usucapion, he learned that she was another’s, we ought to look to the beginning of the usucapion, just as has been approved in bought things.
Lana ovium furtivarum si quidem apud furem detonsa est, usucapi non potest, si vero apud bonae fidei emptorem, contra: quoniam in fructu est, nec usucapi debet, sed statim emptoris fit. idem in agnis dicendum, si consumpti sint, quod verum est.
The wool of stolen sheep, if indeed it was shorn while in the thief’s hands, cannot be usucapted; but if while with a purchaser in good faith, the contrary: since it belongs among fruits, it ought not to be usucapted, but at once becomes the buyer’s. The same is to be said of lambs, if they have been consumed, which is true.
Si rem pignori datam debitor subripuerit et vendiderit, usucapi eam posse cassius scribit, quia in potestatem domini videtur pervenisse, qui pignori dederit, quamvis cum eo furti agi potest: quod puto rectius dici.
If the debtor has filched a thing given in pledge and has sold it, Cassius writes that it can be acquired by usucapion, because it seems to have come into the power of the owner—the one who gave it in pledge—although an action for theft can be brought against him: which I think is more correctly said.
Si tu me vi expuleris de fundi possessione nec adprehenderis possessionem, sed titius in vacuam possessionem intraverit, potest longo tempore capi res: quamvis enim interdictum unde vi locum habeat, quia verum est vi me deiectum, non tamen verum est et vi possessum.
If you expel me by force from possession of the estate and do not apprehend possession, but Titius enters into vacant possession, the thing can be taken by long time (usucapion): for although the interdict unde vi has a place, because it is true that I was ejected by force, nevertheless it is not true that it also was possessed by force.
Libertatem servitutium usucapi posse verius est, quia eam usucapionem sustulit lex scribonia, quae servitutem constituebat, non etiam eam, quae libertatem praestat sublata servitute. itaque si, cum tibi servitutem deberem, ne mihi puta liceret altius aedificare, et per statutum tempus altius aedificatum habuero, sublata erit servitus.
It is more correct that freedom from servitudes can be acquired by usucapion, because the Lex Scribonia abolished that usucapion which established a servitude, not also that which affords freedom with the servitude taken away. And so, if, when I owed you a servitude—suppose it was not permitted to me to build higher—and I have maintained a higher building for the statutory time, the servitude will be removed.
Naturaliter interrumpitur possessio, cum quis de possessione vi deicitur vel alicui res eripitur. quo casu non adversus eum tantum, qui eripit, interrumpitur possessio, sed adversus omnes. nec eo casu quicquam interest, is qui usurpaverit dominus sit nec ne: ac ne illud quidem interest, pro suo quisque possideat an ex lucrativa causa.
Possession is naturally interrupted when someone is cast out of possession by force or a thing is snatched from someone. In which case possession is interrupted not only against him who snatches, but against all. Nor in that case does it make any difference whether the one who has usurped be owner or not; nor even does it matter whether one possesses as his own or from a lucrative cause.
Scaevola libro undecimo quaestionum scribit Marcellum existimasse, si bos apud furem concepit vel apud furis heredem pariatque apud furis heredem, usucapi ab herede distractum iuvencum non posse: sic, inquit, quemadmodum nec ancillae partus. scaevola autem scribit se putare usucapere posse et partum: nec enim esse partum rei furtivae partem. ceterum si esset pars, nec si apud bonae fidei emptorem peperisset, usucapi poterat.
scaevola, in the eleventh book of Questions, writes that Marcellus thought that, if a cow conceived while with a thief or with the thief’s heir and also gave birth while with the thief’s heir, a calf alienated by the heir could not be usucapted: thus, he says, just as neither can the offspring of a handmaid. scaevola, however, writes that he thinks even the offspring can be usucapted: for the offspring is not a part of the stolen thing. moreover, if it were a part, then not even if she had given birth while with a good‑faith purchaser could it be usucapted.
Si is, qui pro emptore possidebat, ante usucapionem ab hostibus captus sit, videndum est, an heredi eius procedat usucapio: nam interrumpitur usucapio, et si ipsi reverso non prodest, quemadmodum heredi eius proderit? sed verum est eum in sua vita desisse possidere, ideoque nec postliminium ei prodest, ut videatur usucepisse. quod si servus eius, qui in hostium potestate est, emerit, in pendenti esse usucapionem iulianus ait: nam si dominus reversus fuerit, intellegi usucaptum: si ibi decesserit, dubitari, an per legem corneliam ad successores eius pertineat.
If the person who was possessing as purchaser (pro emptore) is captured by the enemy before usucaption, it must be considered whether usucaption goes forward to his heir; for usucaption is interrupted, and if it does not benefit him when he returns, how will it benefit his heir? But the truth is that he ceased to possess in his own lifetime, and therefore not even postliminy benefits him so that he may be deemed to have usucapt. But if his slave, who is in the power of the enemy, has purchased, Julian says the usucaption is in suspense; for if the master returns, it is understood that usucaption has been completed; if he dies there, it is doubted whether, by the Cornelian Law, it pertains to his successors.
Marcellus says that the legal fiction can be taken more fully, for just as one returned by postliminy can have greater right in those matters which the slaves have transacted than in those which he himself or through a slave possessed when he came into the hands of the enemy. For it is received that an inheritance in certain respects functions in the stead of a person. And therefore usucapion has no place in successors.
Si servus, quem possidebam, fugerit, si pro libero se gerat, videbitur a domino possideri: sed hoc tunc intellegendum est, cum, si adprehensus fuerit, non sit paratus pro sua libertate litigare: nam si paratus sit litigare, non videbitur a domino possideri, cui se adversarium praeparavit.
If a slave whom I possessed has fled, if he conducts himself as a free man, he will be deemed to be in the master’s possession; but this is to be understood when, if he should be apprehended, he is not prepared to litigate for his liberty: for if he is prepared to litigate, he will not be deemed to be in the master’s possession, against whom he has prepared himself as an adversary.
Servi nomine, qui pignori datus est, ad exhibendum cum creditore, non cum debitore agendum est, quia qui pignori dedit, ad usucapionem tantum possidet, quod ad reliquas omnes causas pertinet, qui accepit possidet, adeo ut adici possit et possessio eius qui pignori dedit.
In respect of a slave who has been given in pledge, the action ad exhibendum is to be brought against the creditor, not against the debtor, because the one who gave in pledge possesses only for usucapion; whereas, for all other causes, the one who received [in pledge] possesses, to such an extent that even the possession of him who gave in pledge can be added.
Si hominem emisti, ut, si aliqua condicio extitisset, inemptus fieret, et is tibi traditus est et postea condicio emptionem resolvit: tempus, quo apud emptorem fuit, accedere venditori debere existimo, quoniam eo genere retro acta venditio esset redhibitioni similis, in qua non dubito tempus eius qui redhibuerit venditori accessurum, quoniam ea venditio proprie dici non potest.
If you bought a slave, on the terms that, if some condition should arise, he would become as if unbought, and he was delivered to you and afterwards the condition rescinded the purchase: I judge that the time during which he was with the buyer ought to accrue to the seller, since in that kind the sale, being treated as undone retroactively, is similar to redhibition, in which I do not doubt that the time of the one who redhibits will accrue to the seller, since that cannot properly be called a sale.
Ei, a quo fundum pro herede diutius possidendo capturus eram, locavi eum: an ullius momenti eam locationem existimes, quaero: quod si nullius momenti existimas, an durare nihilo minus usucapionem eius fundi putes. item quaero, si eidem vendidero eum fundum, quid de his causis, de quibus supra quaesii, existimes. respondit: si is, qui pro herede fundum possidebat, domino eum locavit, nullius momenti locatio est, quia dominus suam rem conduxisset: sequitur ergo, ut ne possessionem quidem locator retinuerit, ideoque longi temporis praescriptio non duravit.
To the person from whom I was going to capture the farm by possessing it longer as heir, I leased it: I ask whether you think that lease of any moment; and if you think it of no moment, whether you suppose that the usucapion of that farm nonetheless continues. Likewise I ask, if I sell that farm to the same man, what you think concerning those cases about which I asked above. He answered: If the one who was possessing the farm as heir leased it to the owner, the lease is of no moment, because the owner would have hired his own thing: it follows therefore that not even the lessor retained possession, and so the prescription of long time did not endure.
Eum, qui aedes mercatus est, non puto aliud quam ipsas aedes possidere: nam si singulas res possidere intellegetur, ipsas non possidebit: separatis enim corporibus, ex quibus aedes constant, universitas aedium intellegi non poterit. accedit eo, quod, si quis singulas res possidere dixerit, necesse erit dicat possessione superficiei tempori de mobilibus statuto locum esse, solum se capturum esse ampliori: quod absurdum et minime iuri civili conveniens est, ut una res diversis temporibus capiatur, ut puta cum aedes ex duabus rebus constant, ex solo et superficie, et universitas earum possessionem temporis immobilium rerum omnium mutet.
I do not think that he who has purchased a building possesses anything other than the building itself: for if he is understood to possess the individual things, he will not possess it itself; for, the bodies being separated out of which a building consists, the universality (aggregate) of the building cannot be understood. Moreover, if someone were to say that he possesses the individual things, it will be necessary that he say that, for possession of the surface, the time set for movables applies, while the soil would be taken by a more ample (longer) period: which is absurd and least consonant with the civil law, that one and the same thing be acquired at different times, as, for instance, when a building consists of two things, the soil and the surface, and their universality would change the rule of time of possession for all immovable things.
Si autem demolita domus est, ex integro res mobiles possidendae sunt, ut tempore, quod in usucapione rerum mobilium constitutum est, usucapiantur. et non potes recte uti eo tempore, quo in aedificio fuerunt: nam quemadmodum eas solas et separatas ab aedificio non possedisti, sic nec penes te singulae aut separatae fuerunt et cohaerentibus his in aedificio, depositis aedibus, quae hoc quoque ipsum continent. neque enim recipi potest, ut eadem res et ut res soli et tamquam mobilis sit possessa.
But if the house has been demolished, the movable things must be possessed anew, so that, within the time that has been established for the usucapion of movable things, they may be acquired by usucapion. And you cannot rightly make use of the time during which they were in the building: for just as you did not possess them alone and separated from the building, so neither were they in your control singly or separated; and, while they were adhering in the building, the premises, which also themselves contain this very thing, held them. For it cannot be accepted that the same thing has been possessed both as a res soli and as if movable.
Celsus libro trigensimo quarto errare eos ait, qui existimarent, cuius rei quisque bona fide adeptus sit possessionem, pro suo usucapere eum posse nihil referre, emerit nec ne, donatum sit nec ne, si modo emptum vel donatum sibi existimaverit, quia neque pro legato neque pro donato neque pro dote usucapio valeat, si nulla donatio, nulla dos, nullum legatum sit, idem et in litis aestimatione placet, ut, nisi vere quis litis aestimationem subierit, usucapere non possit.
Celsus, in the thirty-fourth book, says that they err who think that, of whatever thing someone has in good faith acquired possession, he can usucapt it as his own, with no difference whether he bought it or not, whether it was donated or not, provided only that he believed it had been bought or donated for himself; for neither for a legacy nor for a donation nor for a dowry does usucapion avail, if there was no donation, no dowry, no legacy. The same is held also for the valuation of the suit (litis aestimatio), namely, that unless one has truly undergone the valuation of the suit, he cannot usucapt.
Cum solus heres essem, existimarem autem te quoque pro parte heredem esse, res hereditarias pro parte tibi tradidi. propius est, ut usu eas capere non possis, quia nec pro herede usucapi potest quod ab herede possessum est neque aliam ullam habes causam possidendi. ita tamen hoc verum est, si non ex transactione id factum fuerit.
When I was the sole heir, but supposed that you too were heir for a share, I delivered to you the hereditary things in part. It is more likely that you cannot acquire them by usucapion, because neither can there be usucapion pro herede of what has been possessed by an heir, nor do you have any other cause for possessing. However, this is true only if it was not done by reason of a settlement.
Rerum mixtura facta an usucapionem cuiusque praecedentem interrumpit, quaeritur. tria autem genera sunt corporum, unum, quod continetur uno spiritu et graece hynwmenon vocatur, ut homo tignum lapis et similia: alterum, quod ex contingentibus, hoc est pluribus inter se cohaerentibus constat, quod sunymmenon vocatur, ut aedificium navis armarium: tertium, quod ex distantibus constat, ut corpora plura non soluta, sed uni nomini subiecta, veluti populus legio grex. primum genus usucapione quaestionem non habet, secundum et tertium habet.
It is asked whether, once a mixture of things has been made, it interrupts the prior usucaption of each. Now there are three kinds of bodies: one, which is contained by one spirit and in Greek is called hynwmenon, as a man, a beam, a stone, and the like; a second, which consists of things that are in contact, that is, of several that cohere among themselves, which is called sunymmenon, as a building, a ship, a cabinet; a third, which consists of things that are at a distance from each other, such as several bodies not detached, but subjected to one name, for instance a people, a legion, a flock. The first kind presents no question in regard to usucaption; the second and the third do.
Labeo libris epistularum ait, si is, cui ad tegularum vel columnarum usucapionem decem dies superessent, in aedificium eas coniecisset, nihilo minus eum usucapturum, si aedificium possedisset. quid ergo in his, quae non quidem implicantur rebus soli, sed mobilia permanent, ut in anulo gemma? in quo verum est et aurum et gemmam possideri et usucapi, cum utrumque maneat integrum.
Labeo, in the books of Letters, says that if someone, who had ten days remaining for the usucapion of roof-tiles or of columns, had thrown them into a building, nonetheless he would usucapt just the same, if he had possessed the building. What then as to those things which indeed are not implicated in the things of the soil (immovables), but remain movables, as a gem in a ring? In which case it is true that both the gold and the gem are possessed and usucapted, since each remains intact.
even if its nature is such that it persists through additions of bodies, nevertheless there is no usucaption of the entire flock, but, just as possession is of the individual animals, so too is usucaption. nor, if something bought has been intermixed with the flock for the sake of augmenting it, will the ground of possession on that account be changed, so as to make it that, if the rest of the flock is of my dominion, this sheep too; rather, the individuals will have their own ground, such that, if any are stolen, they are indeed of the flock, yet are not acquired by usucaption.
Si servus meus vel filius peculiari vel etiam meo nomine quid tenet, ut ego per eum ignorans possideam vel etiam usucapiam: si is furere coeperit, donec in eadem causa res fuerit, intellegendum est et possessionem apud me remanere et usucapionem procedere, sicuti per dormientes quoque eos idem nobis contingeret. idemque in colono et inquilino, per quos possidemus, dicendum est.
If my slave or son holds something by reason of his peculium or even in my name, so that I through him, unknowing, possess or even acquire by usucapion: if he begins to be insane, so long as the thing remains in the same condition, it is to be understood that both possession remains with me and usucapion proceeds, just as the same would befall us through them when they are sleeping. And the same is to be said regarding a colonus (tenant-farmer) and an inquilinus (lodger), through whom we possess.
Si vi aut clam aut precario possessionem nactus quis postea furere coeperit, et possessio et causa eadem durat de hoc, quod precario furiosus habet, quemadmodum interdicto quoque uti possidetis furiosi nomine recte experimur eius possessionis nomine, quam ante furorem per se vel post furorem per alium nactus est.
If someone, having gotten possession by force or secretly or by precarium, afterwards begins to be insane, both the possession and the same cause persist as to that which the insane person holds by precarium; just as by the interdict uti possidetis we also rightly proceed in the name of the insane person, on the footing of that possession which he acquired before his madness by himself, or after his madness through another.
Si quis id, quod possidet, non putat sibi per leges licere usucapere, dicendum est, etiamsi erret, non procedere tamen eius usucapionem, vel quia non bona fide videatur possidere vel quia in iure erranti non procedat usucapio.
If anyone, as to that which he possesses, does not think it is permitted to him by the laws to acquire it by usucapion, it must be said that, even if he errs, nevertheless his usucapion does not proceed, either because he does not appear to possess in good faith, or because usucapion does not proceed for one erring in law.
Non solum bonae fidei emptores, sed et omnes, qui possident ex ea causa, quam usucapio sequi solet, partum ancillae furtivae usu suum faciunt, idque ratione iuris introductum arbitror: nam ex qua causa quis ancillam usucaperet, nisi lex duodecim tabularum vel atinia obstaret, ex ea causa necesse est partum usucapi, si apud eum conceptus et editus eo tempore fuerit, quo furtivam esse matrem eius ignorabat.
Not only purchasers in good faith, but also all who possess on that ground which usucapion is accustomed to follow, make the offspring of a stolen slave-girl their own by use (usucapion); and I judge this to have been introduced by the rationale of law: for from whatever cause someone would usucapt a slave-girl, unless the Law of the Twelve Tables or the Atinian Law stood in the way, from that cause it is necessary that the offspring be usucapted, if she was conceived and born with him at a time when he did not know that her mother was stolen.
Quod vulgo respondetur ipsum sibi causam possessionis mutare non posse, totiens verum est, quotiens quis scieret se bona fide non possidere et lucri faciendi causa inciperet possidere: idque per haec probari posse. si quis emerit fundum sciens ab eo, cuius non erat, possidebit pro possessore: sed si eundem a domino emerit, incipiet pro emptore possidere, nec videbitur sibi ipse causam possessionis mutasse. idemque iuris erit etiam, si a non domino emerit, cum existimaret eum dominum esse.
What is commonly answered—that a man cannot change for himself the cause of possession—is true as often as someone knew that he was not possessing in good faith and began to possess for the sake of making lucre; and this can be proved by the following. If someone buys an estate, knowing that it did not belong to the seller, he will possess in the capacity of a possessor; but if he buys the same from the owner, he will begin to possess in the capacity of a purchaser, nor will he be seen to have changed the cause of possession for himself. And the same will be the law even if he bought from a non‑owner, while supposing him to be the owner.
likewise here, if by the owner he shall have been instituted heir, or shall have received possession of his goods, he will begin to possess the farm as heir. furthermore, if he shall have had a just cause for estimating that he had stood as heir or as possessor of the goods to the owner, he will possess the farm as heir, nor will he seem to have changed for himself the cause of possession. since therefore these things are received in the person of him who has possession, how much more ought they to be received in the tenant-farmer, who neither while the owner lives nor after his death has any possession?
Si dominus fundi homines armatos venientes existimaverit atque ita profugerit, quamvis nemo eorum fundum ingressus fuerit, vi deiectus videtur: sed nihilo minus id praedium, etiam antequam in potestate domini redeat, a bonae fidei possessore usucapitur, quia lex plautia et iulia ea demum vetuit longa possessione capi, quae vi possessa fuissent, non etiam ex quibus vi quis deiectus fuisset.
If the owner of a farm has supposed armed men to be coming and thus has fled, although none of them had entered the farm, he is considered to have been ejected by force; but nonetheless that estate, even before it returns into the power of the owner, is acquired by usucapion by a good‑faith possessor, because the Lex Plautia and Iulia forbade to be taken by long possession only those things which had been possessed by force, not also those from which someone had been cast out by force.
Si mihi titius, a quo fundum petere volebam, possessione cesserit, usucapionis causam iustam habebo. sed et is, a quo ex stipulatu fundum petere volebam, cedendo mihi possessione, si solvendi causa id fecerit, eo ipso efficiet, ut fundum longo tempore capiam.
If Titius, from whom I wanted to claim the estate, should cede possession to me, I shall have a just cause for usucaption. But likewise he from whom I wanted to demand the estate under a stipulation, by ceding possession to me—if he does this for the purpose of payment—will by that very act bring it about that I acquire the estate by long time.
Qui pignori rem dat, usucapit, quamdiu res apud creditorem est: si creditor eius possessionem alii tradiderit, interpellabitur usucapio: et quantum ad usucapionem attinet, similis est ei qui quid deposuit vel commodavit, quos palam est desinere usucapere, si commodata vel deposita res alii tradita fuerit ab eo, qui commodatum vel depositum accepit. plane si creditor nuda conventione hypothecam contraxerit, usucapere debitor perseverabit.
He who gives a thing in pledge usucapts so long as the thing is with the creditor: if the creditor has delivered its possession to another, the usucapion will be interrupted; and, so far as usucapion is concerned, he is like one who has deposited or lent something for use, whom it is plain cease to usucapt if the loaned or deposited thing has been delivered to another by him who received the loan or the deposit. Clearly, if the creditor has contracted a hypothec by bare agreement, the debtor will continue to usucapt.
Si rem tuam, cum bona fide possiderem, pignori tibi dem ignoranti tuam esse, desino usucapere, quia non intellegitur quis suae rei pignus contrahere. at si nuda conventione pignus contractum fuerit, nihilo minus usucapiam, quia hoc quoque modo nullum pignus contractum videtur.
If, while I was possessing in good faith, I give your thing to you in pledge, being ignorant that it is yours, I cease to acquire by usucapion, because it is not understood that anyone contracts a pledge over his own thing. But if the pledge should have been contracted by bare convention, nonetheless I shall usucapt, because even in this way no pledge is considered to have been contracted.
Si rem pignori datam creditoris servus subripuerit, cum eam creditor possideret, non interpellabitur usucapio debitoris, quia servus dominum suum possessione non subvertit. sed et si debitoris servus subripuerit, quamvis creditor possidere desinat, tamen debitori usucapio durat, non secus ac si eam creditor debitori tradidisset: nam quantum ad usucapiones attinet, servi subtrahendo res non faciunt deteriorem dominorum condicionum. facilius optinebitur, si precario possidente debitore servus eius subripuerit.
If a thing given in pledge is filched by the creditor’s slave, while the creditor possessed it, the debtor’s usucaption will not be interrupted, because a slave does not overthrow his master from possession. But also, if the debtor’s slave has filched it, although the creditor ceases to possess, nevertheless usucaption endures for the debtor, just as if the creditor had delivered it to the debtor: for, as far as usucaptions are concerned, by removing things slaves do not make their masters’ condition worse. It will be more easily maintained, if, with the debtor possessing by precarium, his slave has filched it.
for leasing (conductio) affords the same as if the thing were with the creditor: for in this case the creditor possesses. But even if both have intervened, both a request for a precarium and a leasing, the creditor is understood to possess, and the request for a precarium is not interposed for this purpose, that the debtor have possession, but that it be permitted to him to hold the thing.
Si homo, cuius usus fructus legatus erat, ab herede numquam possessus subreptus fuisset, quaesitum est, quia heres furti actionem non haberet, an usucapi possit. sabinus respondit nullam eius rei usucapionem esse, cuius nomine furti agi possit, agere autem furti eum, qui frui deberet, posse. quod si accipiendum est, ut fructuarius poterit uti frui: aliter enim homo in causa non perduceretur.
If a man (slave), whose usufruct had been bequeathed, having never been possessed by the heir, had been stolen, the question was raised, since the heir would not have an action for theft, whether it could be acquired by usucapion. Sabinus responded that there is no usucapion of a thing in whose name one can sue for theft, and that he who ought to enjoy (frui) can bring the action for theft. And if this is to be accepted, the usufructuary will be able to use and to enjoy; for otherwise the man would not be brought into the proper legal position.
Potest pluribus modis accidere, ut quis rem alienam aliquo errore deceptus tamquam suam vendat forte aut donet et ob id a bonae fidei possessore res usucapi possit: veluti si heres rem defuncto commodatam aut locatam vel apud eum depositam existimans hereditariam esse alienaverit.
It can occur in several ways that someone, deceived by some error, sells or perhaps donates another’s thing as though it were his own, and on that account the thing can be acquired by usucapion by a possessor in good faith: for instance, if an heir, supposing that a thing loaned for use or leased to the deceased, or deposited with him, was hereditary, has alienated it.
Item si quis aliqua existimatione deceptus crediderit ad se hereditatem pertinere, quae ad eum non pertineat, et rem hereditariam alienaverit, aut si is, ad quem usus fructus ancillae pertinet, partum eius existimans suum esse, quia et fetus pecudum ad fructuarium pertinet, alienaverit,
Likewise, if someone, deceived by some supposition, has believed that an inheritance pertains to him which does not pertain to him, and has alienated an hereditative thing; or if he to whom the usufruct of a female slave pertains, supposing her offspring to be his, since the offspring of herd-animals also pertains to the fructuary, has alienated it,
Quam rem ipse quidem non potest usucapere, quia intellegit alienum se possidere et ob id mala fide possidet. sed si alii bona fide accipienti tradiderit, poterit is usucapere, quia neque vi possessum neque furtivum possidet: abolita est enim quorundam veterum sententia existimantium etiam fundi locive furtum fieri.
Which thing he himself indeed cannot acquire by usucapion, because he understands that he is possessing another’s property and on that account possesses in bad faith. But if he has delivered it to another who receives in good faith, that man can acquire by usucapion, since he possesses it as neither seized by force nor stolen: for the opinion of certain ancients has been abolished, who thought that theft could be committed even of a farm or a site.
Cum vir praedium dotale vendidit scienti vel ignoranti rem dotis esse, venditio non valet. quam defuncta postea muliere in matrimonio confirmari convenit, si tota dos lucro mariti cessit. idem iuris est, cum is, qui rem furtivam vendidit, postea domino heres exstitit.
When a man sells a dotal estate to a buyer knowing or unknowing that the thing belongs to the dowry, the sale is not valid. Which, after the woman has afterwards died in marriage, is agreed to be confirmed, if the whole dowry has gone to the husband’s profit (lucre). The same rule of law applies when he who sold a stolen thing has afterwards become heir to the owner.
Iusto errore ductus titium filium meum et in mea potestate esse existimavi, cum adrogatio non iure intervenisset: eum ex re mea quaerere mihi non existimo. non enim constitutum est in hoc, quod in homine libero qui bona fide servit placuit: ibi propter adsiduam et cottidianam comparationem servorum ita constitui publice interfuit, nam frequenter ignorantia liberos emimus, non autem tam facilis frequens adoptio vel adrogatio filiorum est.
Led by an excusable error, I supposed that Titius was my son and under my power, although the arrogation had not lawfully intervened: I do not think that I may claim him on the ground of my own interest. For what has been established in the case of a free man who serves in good faith has not been established here: there it was of public concern that it be so established because of the constant and everyday comparison with slaves, for we frequently buy free persons in ignorance, whereas the adoption or arrogation of sons is not so easy or frequent.
Etsi possessionis, non contractus initium, quod ad usucapionem pertinet, inspici placet, nonnumquam tamen evenit, ut non initium praesentis possessionis, sed causam antiquiorem traditionis, quae bonam fidem habuit, inspiciamus, veluti circa partum eius mulieris, quam bona fide coepit possidere: non enim ideo minus capietur usu puer, quod alienam matrem, priusquam eniteretur, esse cognovit. idem in servo postliminio reverso dictum est.
Although it is accepted to consider the beginning of possession, not of the contract, which pertains to usucapion, nevertheless it sometimes happens that we look not to the beginning of the present possession, but to the earlier cause of the tradition/delivery which had good faith, as for instance in regard to the offspring of that woman whom he began to possess in good faith: for the boy will not for that reason be the less acquired by usucapion, because he knew that the mother belonged to another before she was delivered. The same has been said in the case of a slave returned by postliminium.
Filius familias emptor alienae rei, cum patrem familias se factum ignoret, coepit rem sibi traditam possidere: cur non capiat usu, cum bona fides initio possessionis adsit, quamvis eum se per errorem esse arbitretur, qui rem ex causa peculiari quaesitam nec possidere possit? idem dicendum erit et si ex patris hereditate ad se pervenisse rem emptam non levi praesumptione credat.
A son under paternal power, being the purchaser of another’s property, when he is unaware that he has become paterfamilias, begins to possess the thing delivered to him: why should he not acquire by usucapion, since good faith is present at the inception of possession, although he, through mistake, supposes himself to be one who cannot even possess a thing acquired by reason of a peculium? The same is to be said also if he believes, on no slight presumption, that the thing bought has come to him from his father’s inheritance.
Non mutat usucapio superveniens pro emptore vel pro herede, quo minus pignoris persecutio salva sit: ut enim usus fructus usucapi non potest, ita persecutio pignoris, quae nulla societate dominii coniungitur, sed sola conventione constituitur, usucapione rei non peremitur.
Supervening usucaption pro emptore or pro herede does not change matters so as to impair the enforcement of the pledge: for just as a usufruct cannot be usucapted, so the pursuit (enforcement) of a pledge, which is joined with no association of dominion but is constituted solely by convention (agreement), is not extinguished by usucaption of the thing.
Si, cum apud hostes dominus aut pater agat, servus aut filius emat, an et tenere incipiat? si quidem ex causa peculii possedit, usucapionem inchoari nec impedimento domini captivitatem esse, cuius scientia non esset in civitate necessaria. si vero non ex causa peculii comparetur, usu non capi nec iure postliminii quaesitum intellegi, cum prius esset, ut, quod usucaptum diceretur, possessum foret.
If, when the master or the father is among the enemy, the slave or the son buys, does he also begin to hold? If indeed he has possessed by reason of peculium, usucapion is initiated, and the master’s captivity is no impediment, since his knowledge would not be necessary in the state. But if it is procured not by reason of peculium, it is not taken by usucapion, nor is it understood to have been acquired by the right of postliminy, since it is first required that what is said to have been usucaptured should have been possessed.
Praescriptio longae possessionis ad optinenda loca iuris gentium publica concedi non solet. quod ita procedit, si quis, aedificio funditus diruto quod in litore posuerat ( forte quod aut deposuerat aut dereliquerat aedificium), alterius postea eodem loco extructo, occupantis datam exceptionem opponat, vel si quis, quod in fluminis publici deverticulo solus pluribus annis piscatus sit, alterum eodem iure prohibeat.
The prescription of long possession is not usually conceded for obtaining public places of the law of nations. This proceeds thus: if someone, after a building which he had placed on the shore has been utterly demolished (perhaps a building which he had either set down or had abandoned), when another’s has afterwards been erected in the same place, should oppose the exception granted to the occupier; or if someone, because he alone has fished for many years in a side-channel of a public river, should prohibit another on the same claim.
Si existimans debere tibi tradam, ita demum usucapio sequitur, si et tu putes debitum esse. aliud, si putem me ex causa venditi teneri et ideo tradam: hic enim nisi emptio praecedat, pro emptore usucapio locum non habet. diversitatis causa in illo est, quod in ceteris causis solutionis tempus inspicitur neque interest, cum stipulor, sciam alienum esse nec ne: sufficit enim me putare tuum esse, cum solvis: in emptione autem et contractus tempus inspicitur et quo solvitur: nec potest pro emptore usucapere, qui non emit, nec pro soluto, sicut in ceteris contractibus.
If, thinking that I owe you, I deliver, only then does usucapion follow, if you also think it is owed. It is otherwise if I think I am bound ex causa venditi and for that reason deliver: for here, unless a purchase has preceded, usucapion pro emptore has no place. The reason for the difference in that case is that in other causes the time of payment is considered, and it makes no difference, when I stipulate, whether I know it to be another’s or not: for it suffices that I suppose it to be yours when you pay. But in a purchase both the time of the contract and the time when payment is made are considered: nor can one usucapt pro emptore who did not buy, nor pro soluto, as in the other contracts.
Si quid est subreptum, id usucapi non potest, antequam in domini potestatem pervenerit. paulus: immo forsitan et contra: nam si id, quod mihi pignori dederis, subripueris, erit ea res furtiva facta: sed simul atque in meam potestatem venerit, usucapi poterit.
If anything has been surreptitiously taken, it cannot be acquired by usucapion before it has come into the owner's power. paulus: nay, perhaps even the contrary: for if you have subrepted that which you gave to me in pledge, that thing will have become a stolen item; but as soon as it has come into my power, it can be acquired by usucapion.
Pro emptore possidet, qui re vera emit, nec sufficit tantum in ea opinione esse eum, ut putet se pro emptore possidere, sed debet etiam subesse causa emptionis. si tamen existimans me debere tibi ignoranti tradam, usucapies. quare ergo et si putem me vendidisse et tradam, non capies usu?
He possesses as buyer who has in fact bought; nor is it enough that he be merely in that opinion, that he thinks he possesses as buyer, but there must also underlie a cause of purchase. If, however, thinking that I owe, I deliver to you who are ignorant, you will acquire by usucapion. Why then, even if I suppose that I have sold and I deliver, will you not take by usucapion?
namely because in the other contracts the time of the tradition suffices; thus, in fact, if I knowingly stipulate for an alien thing, I shall usucapt, provided that, when it is delivered to me, I suppose it to be his: but in a purchase even that time is inspected at which it is contracted: therefore he must both have bought in good faith and have acquired possession in good faith.
Si sub condicione emptio facta sit, pendente condicione emptor usu non capiat. idemque est et si putet condicionem extitisse, quae nondum exstitit: similis est enim ei, qui putat se emisse. contra si exstitit et ignoret, potest dici secundum sabinum, qui potius substantiam intuetur quam opinionem, usucapere eum.
If a purchase has been made under a condition, while the condition is pending the buyer does not take by use (does not acquire by usucapion). And the same holds if he thinks the condition has come into being when it has not yet come into being: for he is similar to one who thinks he has bought. Conversely, if it has come into being and he is unaware, it can be said—according to Sabinus, who regards substance rather than opinion—that he acquires by usucapion.
there is, however, some diversity, because in the former case, when he thinks the thing is alien, namely the seller’s, he has the buyer’s disposition (affection); but when he does not yet think that the condition has come into existence, it is as though he does not yet think that he has bought it for himself. which can be put more plainly thus: if, when the deceased had bought, it is delivered to his heir, who does not know that the deceased had bought, but thinks it is being delivered to him on another ground, does usucapion cease?
Sabinus, si sic empta sit, ut, nisi pecunia intra diem certum soluta esset, inempta res fieret, non usucapturum nisi persoluta pecunia. sed videamus, utrum condicio sit hoc an conventio: si conventio est, magis resolvetur quam implebitur.
Sabinus [holds that], if it were bought on this terms, that unless the money were paid within a fixed day the thing would become unbought, he will not usucapt unless the money has been paid. But let us see whether this is a condition or a convention: if it is a convention, it will be rather resolved (dissolved) than fulfilled.
Si in diem addictio facta sit, id est nisi si quis meliorem condicionem attulerit, perfectam esse emptionem et fructus emptoris effici et usucapionem procedere iulianus putabat: alii et hanc sub condicione esse contractam, ille non contrahi, sed resolvi dicebat, quae sententia vera est.
If an addictio in diem has been made—that is, “unless someone should bring a better condition”—Julian thought that the purchase was perfected, that the fruits became the buyer’s, and that usucapion proceeded; others held that this too was contracted under a condition, but he said that it is not contracted, but rather resolved, which opinion is true.
Cum stichum emissem, dama per ignorantiam mihi pro eo traditus est. priscus ait usu me eum non capturum, quia id, quod emptum non sit, pro emptore usucapi non potest: sed si fundus emptus sit et ampliores fines possessi sint, totum longo tempore capi, quoniam universitas eius possideatur, non singulae partes.
When I had bought Stichus, Dama was delivered to me in his stead through ignorance. Priscus says that I will not acquire him by usucapion, because that which has not been bought cannot be usucapted on behalf of the buyer; but if an estate has been bought and more ample boundaries have been possessed, the whole is acquired by long time (usucapion), since its universitas is possessed, not the individual parts.
Tutor ex pupilli auctione rem, quam eius putabat esse, emit. servius ait posse eum usucapere: in cuius opinionem decursum est eo, quod deterior causa pupilli non fit, si propius habeat emptorem, et, si minoris emerit, tutelae iudicio tenebitur ac si alii minoris addixisset: idque et a divo traiano constitutum dicitur.
A tutor, from the ward’s auction, bought a thing which he supposed to belong to the ward. Servius says he can acquire it by usucapion; and practice has followed this opinion, on the ground that the ward’s position is not made worse if he has the purchaser nearer; and, if he buys it for a lower price, he will be liable by an action on guardianship just as if he had knocked it down to another for less: and this too is said to have been established by the deified Trajan.
Pomponius quoque in his, quae nomine domini possideantur, domini potius quam servi voluntatem spectandam ait: quod si peculiari, tunc mentem servi quaerendam. et si servus mala fide possideat eaque dominus nanctus sit, ut suo nomine possideat, adempto puta peculio, dicendum est, ut eadem causa sit possessionis et ideo usucapio ei non magis procedat.
Pomponius also says that, in those things which are possessed in the name of the master, the will of the master rather than of the slave is to be regarded; but if it is a matter of the peculium, then the mind/intention of the slave is to be sought. And if the slave should possess in bad faith, and the master has gotten hold of those things so as to possess them in his own name—namely, with the peculium taken away—it must be said that the cause of the possession is the same, and therefore usucapion does not proceed for him any more.
Si servus bona fide emerit peculiari nomine, ego ubi primum cognovi sciam alienam, processuram usucapionem celsus ait: initium enim possessionis sine vitio fuisse: sed si eo tempore quo emit, quamquam id bona fide faciat, ego alienam rem esse sciam, usu me non capturum.
If a slave has bought in good faith in the name of the peculium, when I first come to know that it is another’s, Celsus says usucapion will proceed: for the inception of possession was without vice. But if at the time when he buys, although he does this in good faith, I know the thing to be another’s, I shall not acquire by usucapion.
Si a pupillo emero sine tutoris auctoritate, quem puberem esse putem, dicimus usucapionem sequi, ut hic plus sit in re quam in existimatione: quod si scias pupillum esse, putes tamen pupillis licere res suas sine tutoris auctoritate administrare, non capies usu, quia iuris error nulli prodest.
If I buy from a pupil without the guardian’s authority, whom I suppose to be of age, we say that usucapion follows, so that here there is more in the thing than in estimation; but if you know him to be a pupil, yet think that pupils are permitted to administer their own affairs without the guardian’s authority, you will not take by usucapion, because an error of law benefits no one.
Si a furioso, quem putem sanae mentis, emero, constitit usucapere utilitatis causa me posse, quamvis nulla esset emptio et ideo neque de evictione actio nascitur mihi nec publiciana competit nec accessio possessionis.
If I buy from a madman, whom I suppose to be of sound mind, it is established that, for the sake of utility, I am able to acquire by usucapion, although there was no purchase; and therefore neither does an action on eviction arise for me, nor does the Publician action lie, nor is there accession of possession (tacking).
Si defunctus bona fide emerit, usucapietur res, quamvis heres scit alienam esse. hoc et in bonorum possessore et in fideicommissariis, quibus ex trebelliano restituitur hereditas, ceterisque praetoriis successoribus observatum est.
If the decedent has purchased in bona fide, the thing will be acquired by usucapion, although the heir knows it to be alien. This has been observed also in the bonorum possessor and in fideicommissaries, to whom by the Trebellianus the inheritance is restored, and in the other praetorian successors.
Si rem alienam emero et, cum usucaperem, eandem rem dominus a me petierit, non interpellari usucapionem meam litis contestatione. sed si litis aestimationem sufferre maluerim, ait iulianus causam possessionis mutari ei, qui litis aestimationem sustulerit, idemque esse, si dominus ei, qui rem emisset a non domino, donasset: eaque sententia vera est.
If I buy another’s property and, while I am usucapting, the owner should demand that same thing from me, my usucapion is not interrupted by the litis contestation. But if I should prefer to undergo the litis estimation, Julian says that the cause of possession is changed for him who has borne the litis estimation; and the same is the case if the owner had made a gift to him who had bought the thing from a non-owner: and this opinion is true.
Emptor fundi partem eius alienam esse non ignoraverat: responsum est nihil eum ex eo fundo longa possessione capturum. quod ita verum esse existimo, si, quae pars aliena esset in eo fundo, emptor ignoraverat: quod si certum locum esse sciret, reliquas partes longa possessione capi posse non dubito.
The purchaser of the estate had not been unaware that a part of it was alien: it was answered that he would acquire nothing from that estate by long possession. I consider this to be true thus, if the purchaser had been ignorant which part in that estate was alien; but if he knew it to be a definite place, I do not doubt that the remaining parts can be acquired by long possession.
Qui fundum pro emptore possidebat, antequam diutinam possessionem impleret, decessit: servi, qui in possessionem relicti fuerant, discesserunt relinquendae eius gratia: quaesitum est, an nihilo minus heredi tempus longae possessionis procedere potest. respondit etiam discedentibus servis hoc tempus heredi procedere.
He who was possessing a landed estate for the buyer died before he completed long-continued possession; the slaves who had been left in possession departed for the sake of abandoning it. It was asked whether nonetheless the time of long possession could accrue to the heir. He answered that even with the slaves departing, this time does accrue to the heir.
Si fundum cornelianum pro emptore longa possessione capiam et partem ex vicini fundo ei adiciam, utrum eam quoque partem reliquo tempore pro emptore capiam an integro statuto tempore? respondi: partes, quae emptioni fundi adiciuntur, propriam ac separatam condicionem habent, et ideo possessionem quoque earum separatim nancisci oportere et longam possessionem earum integro statuto tempore impleri.
If I acquire by long possession the Cornelian estate as purchaser and add to it a part from the neighbor’s estate, do I also acquire that part as purchaser with the remaining time, or with the entire prescribed time? I answered: the parts which are added to the purchase of the estate have their own and separate condition, and therefore the possession of them too must be obtained separately, and their long possession must be completed in the entire prescribed (statutory) time.
Servus meus titio mandavit, ut fundum ei emeret, eique manumisso titius possessionem tradidit: quaesitum est, an longa possessione caperet. respondit, si servus meus mandaverit titio, ut fundum emeret, et manumisso ei titius fundum tradiderit, cum putaret peculium ei concessum esse vel etiam cum ignoraret peculium concessum non esse, nihilo minus servum diutina possessione capere, quia aut scit servus peculium sibi concessum non esse aut scire debet et per hoc similis est ei, qui se creditorem esse simulat. quod si scierit titius peculium manumisso concessum non esse, donare potius quam indebitum fundum solvere intellegendus est.
My slave gave an order to Titius that he should buy a farm for him, and to him, once manumitted, Titius handed over possession: it was asked whether he would acquire by long possession. He answered: if my slave has instructed Titius to buy a farm, and after he was manumitted Titius delivered the farm to him, whether he thought that the peculium had been granted to him, or even when he was unaware that the peculium had not been granted, nonetheless the slave acquires by long-continued possession (usucapion), because either the slave knows that the peculium has not been granted to him or he ought to know it, and through this he is similar to one who pretends that he is a creditor. But if Titius knew that the peculium had not been granted to the manumitted man, he is to be understood to be making a donation rather than to be discharging an unowed obligation by paying the farm.
Qui bona fide alienum fundum emit et possessionem eius amisit, deinde eo tempore adprehendisset, quo scit rem alienam esse, non capiet longo tempore, quia initium secundae possessionis vitio non carebit, nec similis est ei, qui emptionis quidem tempore putat fundum vendentis esse, sed cum traditur, scit alienum esse: cum enim semel amissa fuerit possessio, initium rursus reciperatae possessionis spectari oportet. quare si eo tempore redhibeatur homo, quo emptor scit alienum esse, usucapio non contingit, quamvis antequam venderet, in ea causa fuerit, ut usucaperet. idem iuris est in eo, qui de fundo deiectus possessionem per interdictum reciperavit sciens iam alienum esse.
He who in good faith buys another’s farm and has lost its possession, and then were to retake it at a time when he knows the thing is another’s, will not acquire by long-time prescription, because the beginning of the second possession will not be free of defect; nor is he like the one who at the time of purchase indeed thinks the farm to be the seller’s, but when it is delivered knows it to be another’s: for when once possession has been lost, one ought to look to the beginning of the possession recovered anew. Wherefore, if at a time when the buyer knows it to be another’s the slave is redhibited, usucapion does not ensue, although before he sold, he had been in a condition to usucapt. The same law stands in the case of one who, having been ejected from the farm, recovered possession through an interdict, already knowing it to be another’s.
Procurator tuus si fundum, quem centum aureis vendere poterat, addixerit triginta aureis in hoc solum, ut te damno adficeret, ignorante emptore, dubitari non oportet, quin emptor longo tempore capiat: nam et cum sciens quis alienum fundum vendidit ignoranti, non interpellatur longa possessio. quod si emptor cum procuratore collusit et eum praemio corrupit, quo vilius mercaretur, non intellegetur bonae fidei emptor nec longo tempore capiet: et si adversus petentem dominum uti coeperit exceptione rei voluntate eius venditae, replicationem doli utilem futuram esse.
If your procurator has knocked down for thirty aurei an estate which he could have sold for one hundred aurei, for this sole purpose of subjecting you to loss, the buyer being ignorant, it ought not be doubted that the buyer acquires by long time; for even when someone knowingly sold another’s estate to a person unaware, long possession is not interrupted. But if the buyer colluded with the procurator and corrupted him with a bribe, so that he might buy more cheaply, he will not be understood as a buyer in good faith nor will he acquire by long time; and if, against the owner bringing suit, he begins to use the exceptio that the thing was sold with the owner’s consent, a replication of fraud will be effective.
Furtiva res non intellegitur redisse in domini potestatem, quamvis possideret eam, si modo ignoraverit subreptam sibi esse: si igitur servum, qui tibi subreptus erat, ignoranti tibi tuum esse pignori dedero et soluta pecunia eum titio vendidero, titius usucapere non poterit.
A stolen thing is not understood to have returned into the owner’s power, although he possessed it, provided he did not know that it had been filched from him: therefore, if a slave who had been stolen from you I have given to you in pledge while you are unaware that he is yours, and, the money having been paid, I have sold him to titio, titius will not be able to acquire by usucapion.
Liber homo, qui bona fide nobis servit, isdem modis ex re nostra adquirit nobis, quibus per servum nostrum adquirere solemus: quare sicut traditione, ita usucapione rem nostram faciemus interveniente libera persona, et si peculii nomine, quod nos sequi debet, emptio contracta fuerit, etiam ignorantes usucapiemus.
A free man who serves us in good faith acquires for us, out of our property, in the same ways by which we are accustomed to acquire through our slave: wherefore, just as by traditio, so by usucapion we will make the thing our own with a free person intervening; and if a purchase has been contracted in the name of the peculium, which ought to follow us, we will usucapt even while ignorant.
Si quis, cum sciret venditorem pecuniam statim consumpturum, servos ab eo emisset, plerique responderunt eum nihilo minus bona fide emptorem esse, idque verius est: quomodo enim mala fide emisse videtur, qui a domino emit? nisi forte et is, qui a luxurioso et protinus scorto daturo pecuniam servos emit, non usucapiet.
If someone, when he knew that the seller would immediately consume the money, bought slaves from him, the majority responded that he was nonetheless a buyer in good faith, and this is truer: for how does he seem to have bought in bad faith, who buys from the owner? Unless perhaps even he who buys slaves from a profligate, who will forthwith give the money to a prostitute, will not acquire by usucapion.
Servus domino ancillam, quam subripuerat, pro capite suo dedit: ea concepit: quaesitum est, an dominus eum partum usucapere possit. respondit: hic dominus quasi emptor partum usucapere potest, namque res ei abest pro hac muliere et genere quodammodo venditio inter servum et dominum contracta est.
A slave gave to his master a maidservant, whom he had filched, for his own head: she conceived: it was asked whether the master can usucapt (acquire by usucapion) the offspring. he responded: this master, as if a purchaser, can usucapt the offspring, for he is out property on account of this woman and, in a certain way, a sale has been contracted between the slave and the master.
Quod volgo traditum est eum, qui existimat se quid emisse nec emerit, non posse pro emptore usucapere, hactenus verum esse ait, si nullam iustam causam eius erroris emptor habeat: nam si forte servus vel procurator, cui emendam rem mandasset, persuaserit ei se emisse atque ita tradiderit, magis esse, ut usucapio sequatur.
What has been commonly handed down—that one who supposes he has bought something, but has not, cannot usucapt in the capacity of a buyer—he says is true only to this extent: if the buyer has no just cause for that error. For if perhaps a slave or a procurator, to whom he had given a mandate to have the thing bought, has persuaded him that he bought it and thus delivered it, it is rather the case that usucapion follows.
Alienam aream bona fide emit et ante impletam diutinam possessionem aedificare coepit: ei denuntiante domino soli intra tempora diutinae possessionis, perseveravit: quaero, utrum interpellata sit an coepta duraverit. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur non esse interpellatam.
He bought another’s plot in good faith and, before the long possession was completed, began to build: when the owner of the soil gave him notice within the periods of long possession, he persisted: I ask whether it was interpellated or whether what had been begun endured. he responded that, according to the matters that were set forth, it was not interpellated.
Intestatae sororis hereditas obvenit duobus fratribus, quorum alter absens erat, alter praesens: praesens etiam absentis causam agebat, ex qua hereditate suo et fratris sui nomine fundum in solidum vendidit lucio titio bona fide ementi: quaesitum est, cum scierit partem fundi absentis esse, an totum fundum longa possessione ceperit. respondit, si credidisset mandatu fratris venisse, per longum tempus cepisse.
The inheritance of an intestate sister fell to two brothers, of whom one was absent, the other present: the present one was even conducting the cause of the absent, and from that inheritance, in his own and his brother’s name, he sold the land in solidum to lucio titio, buying in good faith: it was asked, since he knew that part of the land belonged to the absent one, whether he had taken the whole land by long possession. He replied that, if he had believed that he (the seller) had come with his brother’s mandate, he had acquired by long time.
Qui legatorum servandorum causa in possessionem mittitur, non interpellat possessionem eius, qui pro herede usucapit: custodiae enim causa rem tenet. quid ergo est? etiam impleta usucapione ius pignoris retinebit, ut non prius discedat, quam si solutum ei legatum fuerit aut eo nomine satisdatum.
He who is put into possession for the sake of preserving legacies does not interrupt the possession of him who is acquiring by usucapion as heir: for he holds the thing for the cause of custody. What then? Even when usucapion has been completed he will retain a right of pledge, so that he does not depart before the legacy has been paid to him or surety has been given on that account.
Quod volgo respondetur causam possessionis neminem sibi mutare posse, sic accipiendum est, ut possessio non solum civilis, sed etiam naturalis intellegatur. et propterea responsum est neque colonum neque eum, apud quem res deposita aut cui commodata est, lucri faciendi causa pro herede usucapere posse.
What is commonly answered—that no one can change for himself the cause of possession—is to be taken thus: that possession is understood not only in the civil sense but also in the natural. And therefore it has been answered that neither the tenant-farmer (colonus) nor the one with whom a thing has been deposited, or to whom it has been lent for use, can, for the sake of gain, acquire by usucapion as heir (pro herede).
Filium quoque donatam rem a patre pro herede negavit usucapere servius, scilicet qui existimabat naturalem possessionem penes eum fuisse vivo patre. cui consequens est, ut filius a patre heres institutus res hereditarias a patre sibi donatas pro parte coheredum usucapere non possit.
Servius also denied that a son could acquire by usucapion, as heir, a thing donated by his father, namely because he thought that natural possession was with him while the father was alive. From which it follows that a son instituted heir by his father cannot acquire by usucapion, for the share of the coheirs, hereditary things that were donated to him by the father.
Si inter virum et uxorem donatio facta sit, cessat usucapio. item si vir uxori rem donaverit et divortium intercesserit, cessare usucapionem cassius respondit, quoniam non possit causam possessionis sibi ipsa mutare: alias ait post divortium ita usucapturam, si eam maritus concesserit, quasi nunc donasse intellegatur. possidere autem uxorem rem a viro donatam iulianus putat.
If a donation has been made between husband and wife, usucapion ceases. Likewise, if a husband has donated a thing to his wife and a divorce has intervened, Cassius answered that usucapion ceases, because she cannot change for herself the cause of possession; otherwise, he says that after the divorce she will usucapt in this way, if the husband has conceded it to her, as if he were understood to have donated it now. Moreover, Julian thinks that the wife does possess a thing donated by the husband.
Qui pro donato coeperat usucapere, manumittendo nihil egit, quia nec dominium nanctus fuerit: quaesitum est, an usucapere desierit. respondi eum de quo quaeritur omisisse videri possessionem et ideo usucapionem interruptam.
He who, on the basis of a gift, had begun to acquire by usucaption, by manumitting did nothing, since he had not even obtained ownership: it was asked whether he had ceased to usucapt. I answered that the person in question appears to have abandoned possession, and therefore the usucaption is interrupted.
An pars pro derelicto haberi possit, quaeri solet. et quidem si in re communi socius partem suam reliquerit, eius esse desinit, ut hoc sit in parte, quod in toto: atquin totius rei dominus efficere non potest, ut partem retineat, partem pro derelicto habeat.
Whether a part can be held as derelict is commonly asked. And indeed, if in a thing held in common a partner has relinquished his share, it ceases to be his, so that there is in respect of a part what there is in respect of the whole: but the owner of the entire thing cannot bring it about that he retains a part and holds a part as derelict.
Si id, quod pro derelicto habitum possidebas, ego sciens in ea causa esse abs te emerim, me usucapturum constat nec obstare, quod in bonis tuis non fuerit: nam et si tibi rem ab uxore donatam sciens emero, quia quasi volente et concedente domino id faceres, idem iuris est.
If that which you were possessing as held for derelict, I—knowing it to be in that condition—buy from you, it is settled that I will usucapt, nor does it hinder that it was not in your goods: for even if I knowingly buy from you a thing donated to you by your wife, because you would do that as if with the owner willing and conceding, the same law holds.
Id, quod quis pro derelicto habuerit, continuo meum fit: sicuti cum quis aes sparserit aut aves amiserit, quamvis incertae personae voluerit eas esse, tamen eius fierent, cui casus tulerit ea, quae, cum quis pro derelicto habeat, simul intellegitur voluisse alicuius fieri.
That which someone has held as derelict becomes mine at once: just as when someone has scattered bronze money or has lost birds, although he may have wished them to be for an indeterminate person, nevertheless they become the property of him to whom chance has carried them—those things which, when one regards them as derelict, he is at the same time understood to have wished to become someone’s.
Sempronius thetidi status quaestionem facere temptabat, quasi de serva sua nata sit. qui iam testato conventus a procula nutrice thetidis in solvendis alimentis respondit non se habere, unde alimenta eiusdem exsolvat, sed debere eam patri suo restituere lucio titio: idque ex illa in testationem redegisset, ut postea nullam quaestionem pateretur ab eodem sempronio, lucius titius seiae proculae solutis alimentis puellam vindicta manumisit: quaero, an possit rescindi libertas thetidis. paulus respondit, quoniam dominus ancillae, ex qua thetis nata est, thetidem pro derelicto habuisse videtur, potuisse eam a lucio titio ad libertatem perduci.
Sempronius was attempting to institute a question of status against thetis, as if she had been born from his own female slave. He, already summoned under attestation by procula, the nurse of thetis, concerning the payment of aliments, replied that he did not have whence to pay her aliments, but that he ought to restore her to her father, lucius titius; and he reduced this from her into attestation, to the effect that thereafter he would suffer no further question from the same Sempronius. lucius titius, the aliments having been paid to seia procula, manumitted the girl by the vindicta. I ask whether the liberty of thetis can be rescinded. Paul answered that, since the master of the female slave from whom thetis was born seems to have considered thetis as abandoned (pro derelicto), she could have been brought by lucius titius to liberty.
Pro legato potest usucapi, si res aliena legata sit aut testatoris quidem sit, sed adempta codicillis ignoratur: in horum enim persona subest iusta causa, quae sufficit ad usucapionem. idem potest dici et si in nomine erit dubitatio, veluti si titio legatum sit, cum sint duo titii, ut alter eorum de se cogitatum existimaverit.
One may usucapt by reason of a legacy, if the thing bequeathed is another’s property, or does indeed belong to the testator but it is unknown that it was withdrawn by codicils: for in the case of these persons there is a just cause which suffices for usucapion. The same can be said also if there is doubt as to the name, for instance if it has been bequeathed to Titius, when there are two men named Titius, so that one of them has supposed it was intended for himself.
Et primum de tempore videamus, quando pro dote quis usucapere possit, utrum post tempora nuptiarum an vero et ante nuptias. est quaestio volgata, an sponsus possit ( hoc est qui nondum maritus est) rem pro dote usucapere. et iulianus inquit, si sponsa sponso ea mente tradiderit res, ut non ante eius fieri vellet, quam nuptiae secutae sint, usu quoque capio cessabit: si tamen non evidenter id actum fuerit, credendum esse id agi iulianus ait, ut statim res eius fiant et, si alienae sint, usucapi possint: quae sententia mihi probabilis videtur.
And first let us see about the time, when someone may acquire by usucapion on account of a dowry, whether after the time of the nuptials or indeed also before the nuptials. There is a widespread question, whether a sponsus can (that is, one who is not yet a husband) usucapt a thing on account of the dowry. And iulianus says, if the sponsa delivered the things to the sponsus with this intention, that she would not wish them to become his before the nuptials have followed, usucapion too will be in abeyance; if, however, it has not been clearly so transacted, iulianus says it is to be believed that the matter is being carried on so that the things at once become his and, if they are another’s, they can be usucapt: which opinion seems to me probable.
Duae filiae intestato patri heredes exstiterunt et mancipia communia singulae in dotem dederunt et post aliquot annos morte patris familiae herciscundae iudicium inter eas dictatum est. quaesitum est, cum mariti bona fide mancipia in dotem accepta ut dotalia multis annis possederunt, an usucepisse videantur, si qui accipiebant, dantis credidissent esse. respondit nihil proponi, cur non usucepissent.
Two daughters, on their father’s dying intestate, became heirs, and each gave common slaves (mancipia) in dowry; and after some years, an action for partition of the inheritance (iudicium familiae herciscundae) was appointed between them. It was asked, since the husbands possessed in good faith for many years the slaves received as dowry as dotal, whether they appear to have acquired them by usucapion, if those who were receiving believed them to belong to the giver. He answered that nothing is presented why they should not have usucapted.
Pro suo possessio talis est. cum dominium nobis adquiri putamus, et ex ea causa possidemus, ex qua adquiritur, et praeterea pro suo: ut puta ex causa emptionis et pro emptore et pro suo possideo, item donata vel legata vel pro donato vel pro legato etiam pro suo possideo.
Possession pro suo is of this sort. When we suppose that dominion is being acquired for us, and we possess by that cause by which it is acquired, and, moreover, pro suo: for instance, on the cause of purchase I possess both pro emptore (as purchaser) and pro suo (as one’s own); likewise, in the case of things donated or bequeathed, I possess either pro donato (as donee) or pro legato (as legatee), and also pro suo.
Sed si res mihi ex causa iusta puta emptionis tradita sit et usucapiam, incipio quidem et ante usucapionem pro meo possidere. sed an desinam ex causa emptionis post usucapionem, dubitatur: et mauricianus dicitur existimasse non desinere.
But if a thing has been delivered to me on a just ground, say of purchase, and I acquire it by usucapion, I indeed begin even before the usucapion to possess as my own. But whether I cease to do so on the ground of purchase after the usucapion is a matter of doubt; and mauricianus is said to have considered that one does not cease.
Est species possessionis, quae vocatur pro suo. hoc enim modo possidemus omnia, quae mari terra caelo capimus aut quae alluvione fluminum nostra fiunt. item quae ex rebus alieno nomine possessis nata possidemus, veluti partum hereditariae aut emptae ancillae, pro nostro possidemus: similiter fructus rei emptae aut donatae aut quae in hereditate inventa est.
There is a species of possession, which is called pro suo. For in this way we possess all things which we capture from sea, land, or sky, or which become ours by the alluvion of rivers. Likewise we possess as our own those things born from things possessed under another’s name, as, for instance, the offspring of an inherited or a purchased slave-girl; similarly, the fruits of a thing bought or donated or found in an inheritance.
Hominem, quem ex stipulatione te mihi debere falso existimabas, tradidisti mihi: si scissem mihi nihil debere, usu eum non capiam: quod si nescio, verius est, ut usucapiam, quia ipsa traditio ex causa, quam veram esse existimo, sufficit ad efficiendum, ut id quod mihi traditum est pro meo possideam. et ita neratius scripsit idque verum puto.
You delivered to me a man whom you falsely supposed you owed me from a stipulation: if I knew that he owed me nothing, I would not acquire him by usucapion; but if I do not know, it is more correct that I acquire by usucapion, because the delivery itself, on the basis of a cause which I consider to be true, suffices to bring it about that what has been delivered to me I possess as my own. And thus Neratius wrote, and I think that is true.
Si ancillam furtivam emisti fide bona ex ea natum et apud te conceptum est ita possedisti, ut intra constitutum usucapioni tempus cognosceres matrem eius furtivam esse, trebatius omni modo, quod ita possessum esset, usucaptum esse. ego sic puto distinguendum, ut, si nescieris intra statutum tempus, cuius id mancipium esset, aut si scieris neque potueris certiorem dominum facere, aut si potueris quoque et feceris certiorem, usucaperes: sin vero, cum scires et posses, non feceris certiorem, contra esse: tum enim clam possedisse videberis, neque idem et pro suo et clam possidere potest.
If you bought a stolen slave-girl in good faith, and from her a child was born and was conceived under your roof, and you possessed him in such a way that within the period set for usucapion you learned that his mother was stolen, Trebatius says that in every way what was so possessed has been usucapted. I think it must be distinguished thus: if you did not know within the set time whose mancipium that was, or if you knew and were not able to inform the owner, or even if you were able and did inform him, you would usucapt; but if, however, when you knew and were able, you did not inform him, the contrary is the case: for then you will be seen to have possessed clandestinely, nor can the same person possess both as his own and clandestinely.
Si pater cum filiis bona quae habebat partitus sit ex ea causa post mortem patris ea teneant, quod inter eos conveniret, ut ea divisio rata esset: usucapio his procedet pro suo in his rebus, quae alienae in bonis patris inveniuntur.
If a father with his sons has partitioned the goods which he had, for this cause—that after the father’s death they should hold them, because it was agreed among them that that division be ratified—usucapion will proceed for them as for their own in those things which are found to be another’s among the father’s goods.
Sed id, quod quis, cum suum esse existimaret, possederit, usucapiet, etiamsi falsa fuerit eius existimatio. quod tamen ita interpretandum est, ut probabilis error possidentis usucapioni non obstet, veluti si ob id aliquid possideam, quod servum meum aut eius, cuius in locum hereditario iure successi, emisse id falso existimem, quia in alieni facti ignorantia tolerabilis error est.
But a person will usucapt (acquire by usucapion) that which he has possessed while he supposed it to be his own, even if his supposition was false. This, however, is to be interpreted thus: that a plausible error of the possessor does not stand in the way of usucapion—for example, if I possess something because I falsely suppose that my slave, or the person whose place I have succeeded to by hereditary right, purchased it—since ignorance of another’s act is a tolerable error.