Cicero: ORATORIA

[1] Si auctoritates patronorum in iudiciis valent, ab amplissimis viris L. Corneli causa defensa est; si usus, a peritissimis; si ingenia, ab eloquentissimis; si studia, ab amicissimis et cum beneficiis cum L. Cornelio tum maxima familiaritate coniunctis. Quae sunt igitur meae partes? Auctoritatis tantae quantam vos in me esse voluistis, usus mediocris, ingeni minime voluntati paris.

[1] If the authorities of patrons have weight in trials, the cause of L. Cornelius has been defended by the most distinguished men; if practice, by the most expert; if talents, by the most eloquent; if zeal, by the most friendly, and by those joined to L. Cornelius both by services and by the greatest familiarity. What, then, are my parts? Of authority as great as you have wished to be in me, of practice middling, of talent by no means equal to my desire.

Nam ceteris a quibus est defensus hunc debere plurimum video; ego quantum ei debeam, alio loco; principio orationis hoc pono, me omnibus qui amici fuerint saluti et dignitati meae, si minus referenda gratia satis facere potuerim, praedicanda et habenda certe satis esse facturum.

For I see that he owes very much to the others by whom he has been defended; as for how much I owe him, elsewhere. At the beginning of the speech I lay down this: that, to all who have been friends to my safety and dignity, if I should be less able to make satisfaction by returning gratitude, I will certainly make it up sufficiently by gratitude to be proclaimed and to be held in remembrance.

[2] Quae fuerit hesterno die Cn. Pompei gravitas in dicendo, iudices, quae facultas, quae copia, non opinione tacita vestrorum animorum, sed perspicua admiratione declarari videbatur. Nihil enim umquam audivi quod mihi de iure subtilius dici videretur, nihil memoria maiore de exemplis, nihil peritius de foederibus, nihil inlustriore auctoritate de bellis, nihil de re publica gravius, nihil de ipso modestius, nihil de causa et crimine ornatius:

[2] What gravity in speaking Gnaeus Pompeius displayed yesterday, judges, what faculty, what abundance, seemed to be made manifest not by the silent opinion of your minds, but by plain admiration. For I have never heard anything that seemed to me to be said more subtly about law, nothing with greater recollection about examples, nothing more expertly about treaties, nothing with more illustrious authority about wars, nothing more gravely about the republic, nothing more modestly about himself, nothing more ornately about the cause and the charge:

[3] ut mihi iam verum videatur illud esse quod non nulli litteris ac studiis doctrinae dediti quasi quiddam incredibile dicere putabantur, ei qui omnis animo virtutes penitus comprehendisset omnia quae faceret . Quae enim in L. Crasso potuit, homine nato ad dicendi singularem quandam facultatem, si hanc causam ageret, maior esse ubertas, varietas, copia quam fuit in eo qui tantum potuit impertire huic studio temporis quantum ipse a pueritia usque ad hanc aetatem a continuis bellis et victoriis conquievit?

[3] so that now it seems to me true—that which some, devoted to letters and to the studies of doctrine, were thought to say as though something incredible—that for one who had thoroughly comprehended all the virtues in mind, everything he did would . For what, in L. Crassus, a man born to a certain singular faculty of speaking, if he were pleading this case, could have been a greater richness, variety, and copiousness than there was in him who has been able to impart to this study just as much time as he himself has had rest from continuous wars and victories from boyhood up to this age?

[4] Quo mihi difficilior est hic extremus perorandi locus. Etenim ei succedo orationi quae non praetervecta sit auris vestras, sed in animis omnium penitus insederit, ut plus voluptatis ex recordatione illius orationis quam non modo ex mea, sed ex cuiusquam oratione capere possitis. Sed mos est gerundus non modo Cornelio, cuius ego voluntati in eius periculis nullo modo deesse possum, sed etiam Cn. Pompeio, qui sui facti, sui iudici, sui benefici voluit me esse, ut apud eosdem vos, iudices, nuper in alia causa fuerim, et praedicatorem et actorem.

[4] Wherefore this final place of perorating is more difficult for me. For I succeed an oration which has not been merely carried past your ears, but has settled deep in the minds of all, so that you can take more delight from the recollection of that speech than not only from mine, but from anyone’s oration. But a custom is to be borne not only for Cornelius, whose will in his perils I can in no way fail, but also for Cn. Pompeius, who wished me to be of his deed, of his judgment, of his benefaction, so that before you the same, judges, recently in another cause I was both a proclaimer and an advocate.

[5] Ac mihi quidem hoc dignum re publica videtur, hoc deberi huius excellentis viri praestantissimae gloriae, hoc proprium esse vestri offici, hoc satis esse causae ut, quod fecisse Cn. Pompeium constet, id omnes ei licuisse concedant. Nam verius nihil est quam quod hesterno die dixit ipse, ita L. Cornelium de fortunis omnibus dimicare ut nullius in delicti crimen vocaretur. Non enim furatus esse civitatem, non genus suum ementitus, non in aliquo impudenti mendacio delituisse, non inrepsisse in censum dicitur: unum obicitur, natum esse Gadibus, quod negat nemo.

[5] And to me indeed it seems that this is worthy of the commonwealth, owed to the most outstanding glory of this excellent man, proper to your duty, sufficient cause that what Gnaeus Pompeius is agreed to have done, all concede to have been lawful for him. For nothing is truer than what he himself said yesterday: that Lucius Cornelius fights for all his fortunes in such a way as to be called into the charge of no offense. For he is not said to have stolen citizenship, not to have falsified his lineage, not to have hidden in some shameless mendacity, not to have crept into the census: one thing is objected—that he was born at Gades, which no one denies.

Cetera accusator fatetur, hunc in Hispania durissimo bello cum Q. Metello, cum C. Memmio et in classe et in exercitu fuisse; ut Pompeius in Hispaniam venerit Memmiumque habere quaestorem coeperit, numquam a Memmio discessisse, Carthagine esse obsessum, acerrimis illis proeliis et maximis, Sucronensi et Turiensi, interfuisse, cum Pompeio ad extremum belli tempus fuisse.

The accuser admits the rest: that this man was in Spain in a most harsh war with Q. Metellus, with C. Memmius, both in the fleet and in the army; that when Pompey came into Spain and began to have Memmius as quaestor, he never departed from Memmius; that he was besieged at Carthage; that he took part in those very fierce and very great battles, the Sucronensian and the Turiensian; that he was with Pompey to the very end of the war.

[6] Haec sunt propria Corneli, pietas in rem publicam nostram, labor, adsiduitas, dimicatio, virtus digna summo imperatore, spes pro periculis praemiorum; praemia quidem ipsa non sunt in eius facto qui adeptus est, sed in eius qui dedit. Donatus igitur est ob eas causas a Cn. Pompeio civitate. Id accusator non negat, sed reprehendit, ut in Cornelio causa ipsius probetur, poena quaeratur, in Pompeio causa laedatur, poena sit nulla nisi famae: sic innocentissimi hominis fortunas, praestantissimi imperatoris factum condemnari volunt.

[6] These are the proper traits of Cornelius: piety toward our commonwealth, labor, assiduity, struggle, virtue worthy of a highest commander, a hope of rewards proportioned to dangers; indeed the rewards themselves are not in the deed of him who has obtained them, but in that of him who gave them. Therefore he was granted citizenship by Gnaeus Pompeius for these reasons. This the accuser does not deny, but reproves, so that in Cornelius his cause may be approved, yet a penalty be sought; in Pompey the cause may be damaged, yet there be no penalty except of reputation: thus they wish the fortunes of a most innocent man and the deed of a most outstanding commander to be condemned.

Ergo in iudicium caput Corneli, factum Pompei vocatur. Hunc enim in ea civitate in qua sit natus honestissimo loco natum esse concedis, et ab ineunte aetate relictis rebus suis omnibus in nostris bellis nostris cum imperatoribus esse versatum, nullius laboris, nullius obsessionis, nullius proeli expertem fuisse. Haec sunt omnia cum plena laudis tum propria Corneli, nec in iis rebus crimen est ullum.

Therefore the person of Cornelius is called into judgment, the deed of Pompey. For you concede that this man, in that commonwealth in which he was born, was born in a most honorable station, and from his earliest age, with all his own affairs left behind, has been engaged in our wars with our commanders, to have been a stranger to no toil, no siege, no battle. All these things are both full of praise and proper to Cornelius, and in these matters there is no charge at all.

[7] Vbi igitur est crimen? Quod eum Pompeius civitate donavit. Huius crimen?

[7] Where, then, is the charge? That Pompey conferred citizenship upon him. Is this his crime?

Minime, nisi honos ignominia putanda est. Cuius igitur? Re vera nullius, actione accusatoris eius unius qui donavit; qui si adductus gratia minus idoneum hominem praemio adfecisset, quin etiam si virum bonum sed non ita meritum, si denique aliquid non contra ac liceret factum diceretur, sed contra atque oporteret, tamen esset omnis eius modi reprehensio a vobis, iudices, repudianda.

By no means, unless honor is to be thought ignominy. Whose, then? In truth, no one’s, by the action of the accuser against that one man who granted it; who, if led by favor he had bestowed a reward on a man less suitable—nay even on a good man but not so deserving—if, finally, it were said that something was done not contrary to what was lawful, but contrary to what was fitting, nevertheless every reprehension of that sort ought by you, judges, to be repudiated.

[8] Nunc vero quid dicitur? Quid ait accusator? Fecisse Pompeium quod ei facere non licuerit; quod gravius est quam si id factum ab eo diceret quod non oportuisset.

[8] Now indeed, what is said? What does the accuser say? That Pompey has done what it was not licit for him to do; which is more grave than if he were saying that the thing had been done by him which ought not to have been done.

Est enim aliquid quod non oporteat, etiam si licet; quicquid vero non licet, certe non oportet.

For there is something that ought not, even if it is permitted; but whatever is not permitted, certainly ought not.

Hic ego nunc cuncter sic agere, iudices, non esse fas dubitari quin, quod Cn. Pompeium fecisse constet, id non solum licuisse sed etiam decuisse fateamur?

Am I now to hesitate to act thus, judges—to acknowledge that it is not divinely lawful to doubt that what Gnaeus Pompeius is established to have done was not only licit but even decorous?

[9] Quid enim abest huic homini quod, si adesset, iure haec ei tribui et concedi putaremus? Vsusne rerum? qui pueritiae tempus extremum principium habuit bellorum atque imperiorum maximorum, cuius plerique aequales minus saepe castra viderunt quam hic triumphavit, qui tot habet triumphos quot orae sunt partesque terrarum, tot victorias bellicas quot sunt in rerum natura genera bellorum.

[9] For what is absent from this man, which, if it were present, we would think that these things might rightly be attributed and conceded to him? Is it experience of affairs? he who made the very end of his boyhood the beginning of the greatest wars and commands, whose most contemporaries have seen a camp less often than he has celebrated a triumph, who has as many triumphs as there are shores and regions of the earth, as many martial victories as there are, in the nature of things, kinds of war.

An ingenium? quin etiam ipsi casus eventusque rerum non duces, sed comites eius consiliorum fuerunt: in quo uno ita summa fortuna cum summa virtute certavit ut omnium iudicio plus homini quam deae tribueretur. An pudor, an integritas, an religio in eo, an diligentia umquam requisita est?

Or ingenuity? Nay rather, even the very chances and events of affairs were not leaders, but companions of his counsels: in this one man the highest Fortune contended so with the highest Virtue that, in the judgment of all, more was attributed to the man than to the goddess. Or has modesty, integrity, religion in him, or diligence, ever been lacking?

Quem provinciae nostrae, quem liberi populi, quem reges, quem ultimae gentes castiorem, moderatiorem, sanctiorem non modo viderunt, sed aut sperando umquam aut optando cogitaverunt?

Whom did our provinces, whom the free peoples, whom kings, whom the farthest nations see as more chaste, more moderate, more holy—not only see, but ever even conceive in hope or in desire?

[10] Quid dicam de auctoritate? quae tanta est quanta in his tantis virtutibus ac laudibus esse debet. Cui senatus populusque Romanus amplissimae dignitatis praemia dedit non postulanti, imperia vero etiam recusanti, huius de facto, iudices, ita quaeri ut id agatur, licueritne ei facere quod fecit, an vero non dicam non licuerit, sed nefas fuerit—contra foedus enim, id est contra populi Romani religionem et fidem fecisse dicitur—non turpe rei publicae, nonne vobis?

[10] What shall I say about authority? which is as great as it ought to be in the face of such great virtues and praises. To him the Senate and People of Rome gave the rewards of the most ample dignity when he did not request them, indeed even commands when he refused; that about this man’s act, judges, inquiry should be made in such a way that the issue is whether it was licit for him to do what he did, or indeed—not to say it was not licit—but that it was a sacrilege—for he is said to have acted against the treaty, that is, against the religion and good faith of the Roman people—is this not disgraceful to the Republic, is it not to you?

[11] Audivi hoc de parente meo puer, cum Q. Metellus Luci filius causam de pecuniis repetundis diceret, ille, ille vir, cui patriae salus dulcior quam conspectus fuit, qui de civitate decedere quam de sententia maluit—hoc igitur causam dicente, cum ipsius tabulae circumferrentur inspiciendi nominis causa, fuisse iudicem ex illis equitibus Romanis gravissimis viris neminem quin removeret oculos se totum averteret, ne forte, quod ille in tabulas publicas rettulisset, dubitasse quisquam verumne an falsum esset videretur: nos Cn. Pompei decretum, iudices, de consili sententia pronuntiatum recognoscemus, cum legibus conferemus, cum foederibus, omnia acerbissima diligentia perpendemus?

[11] I heard this about my father when I was a boy, when Quintus Metellus, son of Lucius, was pleading a case on a charge of extortions: that man, that very man, to whom the safety of the fatherland was sweeter than the sight of it, who preferred to depart from the state rather than from his judgment—so, with this man pleading the case, when his own account-books were being carried around for the purpose of inspecting the name, there was no judge from among those Roman knights, most grave men, who did not remove his eyes turn himself entirely away, lest perchance, as to what he had entered into the public records, anyone might seem to have doubted whether it was true or false: shall we, judges, re-examine Gnaeus Pompeius’s decree, pronounced by the opinion of his council, compare it with the laws, with the treaties, weigh all things with the most rigorous diligence?

[12] Athenis aiunt, cum quidam apud eos qui sancte graviterque vixisset testimonium publice dixisset et, ut mos Graecorum est, iurandi causa ad aras accederet, una voce omnis iudices ne is iuraret reclamasse. Graeci homines spectati viri noluerunt religione videri potius quam veritate fidem esse constrictam: nos etiam in ipsa religione et legum et foederum conservanda qualis fuerit Cn. Pompeius dubitabimus?

[12] They say that at Athens, when a certain man among them who had lived sanctly and gravely had given testimony publicly and, as is the custom of the Greeks, was approaching the altars for the purpose of swearing, all the judges with one voice cried out in protest that he should not swear. the Greeks, men of tested worth, did not wish it to seem that faith was bound by religion rather than by truth: shall we even hesitate, in the very matter of preserving religion and the laws and treaties, what sort of man Cn. Pompeius was?

[13] Vtrum enim inscientem vultis contra foedera fecisse an scientem? Si scientem,—O nomen nostri imperi! O populi Romani excellens dignitas!

[13] Do you wish to say that he acted against the treaties unwittingly or knowingly? If knowingly,—O name of our empire! O excellent dignity of the Roman people!

O Cn. Pompei sic late longeque diffusa laus ut eius gloriae domicilium communis imperi finibus terminetur! O nationes, urbes, populi, reges, tetrarchae, tyranni,—testes Cn. Pompei non solum virtutis in bello sed etiam religionis in pace! Vos denique, mutae regiones, imploro, et sola terrarum ultimarum; vos, maria, portus, insulae, litora!

O Gnaeus Pompey’s renown, so widely and far diffused that the dwelling-place of that glory is bounded by the borders of the common empire! O nations, cities, peoples, kings, tetrarchs, tyrants,—witnesses of Gnaeus Pompey not only of virtue in war but also of religion in peace! You, finally, mute regions, I implore, and the solitudes of the farthest lands; you, seas, harbors, islands, shores!

Quae est enim ora, quae sedes, qui locus in quo non exstent huius cum fortitudinis tum vero humanitatis, cum animi tum consili impressa vestigia? Hunc quisquam, incredibili quadam atque inaudita gravitate virtute constantia praeditum, foedera scientem neglexisse violasse rupisse dicere audebit?

For what shore, what seat, what place is there in which there are not extant the impressed vestiges of this man’s—both of fortitude and indeed of humanity, both of spirit and of counsel? Will anyone dare to say that this man, endowed with a certain incredible and unheard-of gravity, virtue, and constancy, knowing the treaties, has neglected, violated, broken them?

[14] Gratificatur mihi gestu accusator: inscientem Cn. Pompeium fecisse significat, quasi vero levius sit, cum in tanta re publica versere et maximis negotiis praesis, facere aliquid quod scias non licere, quam omnino non scire quid liceat! Etenim utrum Hispania bellum acerrimum et maximum gesserat quo iure Gaditana civitas esse nesciebat, an, cum ius illius populi nosset, interpretationem foederis non tenebat? Id igitur quisquam Cn. Pompeium ignorasse dicere audebit quod mediocres homines, quod nullo usu, nullo studio praediti militari, quod librarioli denique scire profiteantur?

[14] The accuser, by his gesture, does me a favor: he intimates that Gnaeus Pompey acted in ignorance—as though it were a lighter thing, when you are engaged in so great a Republic and preside over the greatest affairs, to do something which you know is not permitted than not to know at all what is permitted! For was it that he, who in Spain had waged a most fierce and very great war, did not know under what law the Gaditanian commonwealth existed; or, though he knew the law of that people, did he not grasp the interpretation of the treaty? Will anyone, then, dare to say that Gnaeus Pompey was ignorant of that which ordinary men—men endowed with no experience, no military study—and, finally, mere petty clerks profess to know?

[15] Equidem contra existimo, iudices, cum in omni genere ac varietate artium, etiam illarum quae sine summo otio non facile discuntur, Cn. Pompeius excellat, singularem quandam laudem et praestabilem esse scientiam in foederibus, pactionibus, condicionibus populorum, regum, exterarum nationum, in universo denique belli iure atque pacis; nisi forte ea quae nos libri docent in umbra atque otio, ea Cn. Pompeium neque cum requiesceret litterae, neque cum rem gereret regiones ipsae docere potuerunt.

[15] Indeed, on the contrary, I think, judges, since in every kind and variety of arts, even those which are not easily learned without utmost leisure, Cn. Pompey excels, that there is a certain singular praise and a preeminent knowledge in treaties, pactions, conditions of peoples, kings, foreign nations, and, in fine, in the universal law of war and of peace; unless perhaps the things which books teach us in shade and leisure, neither letters when he took rest nor the regions themselves when he was conducting affairs, were able to teach Cn. Pompey.

Atque, ut ego sentio, iudices, causa dicta est. Temporum magis ego nunc vitiis quam genere iudici plura dicam; est enim haec saeculi quaedam macula atque labes, virtuti invidere, velle ipsum florem dignitatis infringere. Etenim si Pompeius abhinc annos quingentos fuisset,

And, as I perceive, judges, the case has been pleaded. I will now speak more about the vices of the times than about the kind of judgment; for this is a certain stain and blemish of the age: to envy virtue, to wish to infringe the very flower of dignity. For indeed, if Pompeius had lived five hundred years ago,

[16] is vir a quo senatus adulescentulo atque equite Romano saepe communi saluti auxilium expetisset, cuius res gestae omnis gentis cum clarissima victoria terra marique peragrassent, cuius tres triumphi testes essent totum orbem terrarum nostro imperio teneri, quem populus Romanus in singularibusque decorasset,—si nunc apud nos id quod is fecisset contra foedus factum diceretur, quis audiret? Nemo profecto; mors enim cum exstinxisset invidiam, res eius gestae sempiterni nominis gloria niterentur. Cuius igitur audita virtus dubitationi locum non daret, huius atque perspecta obtrectatorum voce laedetur?

[16] that man, from whom the senate, when he was a very young man and a Roman knight, would often seek help for the common safety; whose achievements, with most illustrious victory, had traversed peoples of every nation by land and sea; whose three triumphs were witnesses that the whole orb of lands is held under our imperium; whom the Roman people had adorned with distinguished and singular honors,—if now among us it were said that what he had done was done against a treaty, who would listen? No one indeed; for when death had extinguished envy, his deeds would shine with the glory of an eternal name. Therefore, the virtue of one whose, when heard of, would not allow room for doubt—shall this man’s, when seen and thoroughly inspected, be wounded by the voice of detractors?

[17] Omittam igitur Pompeium iam oratione mea reliqua, sed vos, iudices, animis ac memoria tenetote. De lege, de foedere, de exemplis, de perpetua consuetudine civitatis nostrae renovabo ea quae dicta sunt; nihil enim mihi novi, nihil integri neque M. Crassus, qui totam causam et pro facultate et pro fide sua diligentissime vobis explicavit, neque Cn. Pompeius, cuius oratio omnibus ornamentis abundavit, ad dicendum reliquit. Sed quoniam me recusante placuit ambobus adhiberi hunc a me quasi perpoliendi quendam operis extremum laborem, peto a vobis ut me offici potius quam dicendi studio hanc suscepisse operam ac munus putetis.

[17] I will therefore omit Pompey now from the remainder of my oration, but you, judges, hold him fast in your minds and memory. Concerning the law, the treaty, the examples, the perpetual custom of our state I will renew what has been said; for neither M. Crassus, who has most diligently unfolded to you the whole cause both according to his ability and his good faith, nor Cn. Pompeius, whose oration abounded in all ornaments, has left me anything new or untouched to say. But since, I refusing, it pleased both that this, as it were, certain final labor of polishing the work be applied by me, I ask from you to think that I have undertaken this work and service from duty rather than from zeal for speaking.

[18] Ac prius quam adgrediar ad ius causamque Corneli, quiddam de communi condicione omnium nostrum deprecandae malivolentiae causa breviter commemorandum videtur. Si quo quisque loco nostrum est, iudices, natus, aut si, in qua fortuna est nascendi initio constitutus, hunc vitae statum usque ad senectutem obtinere debet, et si omnes quos aut fortuna extulit aut ipsorum inlustravit labor et industria poena sunt adficiendi, non gravior L. Cornelio quam multis viris bonis atque fortibus constitui lex vitae et condicio videretur: sin autem multorum virtus, ingenium, humanitas ex infimo genere et fortunae gradu non modo amicitias et rei familiaris copias consecuta est, sed summam laudem, honores, gloriam, dignitatem, non intellego cur potius invidia violatura virtutem L. Corneli quam aequitas vestra pudorem eius adiutura videatur.

[18] And before I approach the law and the cause of Cornelius, it seems that something about the common condition of us all must briefly be recalled for the sake of deprecating malevolence. If each of us, judges, must keep whatever place in which he was born, or if he must maintain to old age that status of life in which, at the beginning of being born, he was placed by fortune, and if all those whom either fortune has lifted up or whose own labor and industry have made illustrious are to be afflicted with punishment, the law and condition of life would not seem to be fixed more grievously for L. Cornelius than for many good and brave men; but if, however, the virtue, talent, and humanity of many from the lowest stock and step of fortune have attained not only friendships and the resources of private property, but the highest praise, honors, glory, and dignity, I do not understand why envy should seem rather about to violate the virtue of L. Cornelius than your equity about to aid his modesty.

[19] Itaque quod maxime petendum est a vobis idcirco non peto, iudices, ne de vestra sapientia atque de vestra humanitate dubitare videar: est autem petendum ne oderitis ingenium, ne inimici sitis industriae, ne humanitatem opprimendam, ne virtutem puniendam putetis. Illud peto, ut, si causam ipsam per se firmam esse et stabilem videritis, hominis ipsius ornamenta adiumento causae potius quam impedimento esse malitis.

[19] Therefore what is most to be asked from you I do not ask for that reason, judges, lest I seem to doubt your wisdom and your humanity: what must be asked, however, is that you not hate ingenuity, that you not be enemies to industry, that you not think humanity ought to be oppressed, that virtue ought to be punished. This I ask: that, if you see that the case itself is firm and stable per se, you prefer that the man’s own ornaments be a help to the case rather than an impediment.

Nascitur, iudices, causa Corneli ex ea lege quam L. Gellius Cn. Cornelius ex senatus sententia tulerunt; qua lege videmus <rite> esse sanctum ut cives Romani sint ii quos Cn. Pompeius de consili sententia singillatim civitate donaverit. Donatum esse L. Cornelium praesens Pompeius dicit, indicant publicae tabulae. Accusator fatetur, sed negat ex foederato populo quemquam potuisse, nisi is populus fundus factus esset, in hanc civitatem venire.

The case of Cornelius, judges, arises from that law which L. Gellius and Cn. Cornelius carried by decree of the Senate; by which law we see it to have been <duly> ordained that Roman citizens are those whom Cn. Pompeius, by the opinion of his council, has individually endowed with citizenship. Pompeius himself, being present, says that L. Cornelius was granted it; the public records indicate it. The accuser admits this, but denies that from a federate people anyone could have been able to come into this commonwealth, unless that people had been made a “fundus.”

[20] O praeclarum interpretem iuris, auctorem antiquitatis, correctorem atque emendatorem nostrae civitatis, qui hanc poenam foederibus adscribat, ut omnium praemiorum beneficiorumque nostrorum expertis faciat foederatos! Quid enim potuit dici imperitius quam foederatos populos fieri fundos oportere? nam id non magis est proprium foederatorum quam omnium liberorum.

[20] O most illustrious interpreter of law, author of antiquity, corrector and emender of our commonwealth, who would ascribe this penalty to the treaties, so as to make the foederates deprived of all our rewards and benefactions! For what could be said more inexpertly than that federate peoples ought to be made fundi? for that is no more proper to the foederates than to all free peoples.

Sed totum hoc, iudices, in ea fuit positum semper ratione atque sententia ut, cum iussisset populus Romanus aliquid, si id adscivissent socii populi ac Latini, et si ea lex, quam nos haberemus, eadem in populo aliquo tamquam in fundo resedisset, ut tum lege eadem is populus teneretur, non ut de nostro iure aliquid deminueretur, sed ut illi populi aut iure eo quod a nobis esset constitutum aut aliquo commodo aut beneficio uterentur.

But all this, judges, was always positioned on this rationale and opinion: that, when the Roman People had ordered something, if the allied peoples and the Latins had adopted it, and if that law which we held had settled in some people as though in a fundus, then that people would be bound by the same law, not so that anything of our right be diminished, but so that those peoples might enjoy either that law which had been established by us, or some convenience or benefit.

[21] Tulit apud maiores nostros legem C. Furius de testamentis, tulit Q. Voconius de mulierum hereditatibus; innumerabiles aliae leges de civili iure sunt latae; quas Latini voluerunt, adsciverunt; ipsa denique Iulia, qua lege civitas est sociis et Latinis data, qui fundi populi facti non essent civitatem non haberent. In quo magna contentio Heracliensium et Neapolitanorum fuit, cum magna pars in iis civitatibus foederis sui libertatem civitati anteferret. Postremo haec vis est istius et iuris et verbi, ut fundi populi beneficio nostro, non suo iure fiant.

[21] Gaius Furius carried a law among our ancestors on testaments, Quintus Voconius carried one on women’s inheritances; innumerable other laws on civil right were carried; those which the Latins wished, they adscited; finally the Julian law itself, by which citizenship was given to the allies and the Latins, provided that those who had not been made fundi of the people would not have citizenship. In this there was great contention of the Heracleans and the Neapolitans, since a great part in those communities preferred the liberty of their own treaty to citizenship. Finally, this is the force of that both law and term, that they become fundi of the people by our beneficium, not by their own right.

[22] Cum aliquid populus Romanus iussit, id si est eius modi ut quibusdam populis, sive foederatis sive liberis, permittendum esse videatur ut statuant ipsi non de nostris sed de suis rebus, quo iure uti velint, tum utrum fundi facti sint an non quaerendum esse videatur; de nostra vero re publica, de nostro imperio, de nostris bellis, de victoria, de salute fundos populos fieri noluerunt. Atqui si imperatoribus nostris, si senatui, si populo Romano non licebit propositis praemiis elicere ex civitatibus sociorum atque amicorum fortissimum atque optimum quemque ad subeunda pro salute nostra pericula, summa utilitate ac maximo saepe praesidio periculosis atque asperis temporibus carendum nobis erit.

[22] When the Roman people has ordered something, if it is of such a kind that it seems proper to allow certain peoples, whether federate or free, to decide for themselves—not about our affairs but about their own—by what law they wish to make use, then it seems the question is whether they have been made domains of the Roman people or not; but concerning our commonwealth, our empire, our wars, our victory, our safety, they did not wish peoples to be made domains. And yet, if it shall not be permitted to our commanders, to the senate, to the Roman people, by setting forth rewards, to draw forth from the communities of our allies and friends each of the bravest and best to undergo dangers for our safety, we shall be deprived, in perilous and harsh times, of a very great utility and a very frequent safeguard.

[23] Sed, per deos immortalis, quae est ista societas, quae amicitia, quod foedus, ut aut nostra civitas careat in suis periculis Massiliensi propugnatore, careat Gaditano, careat Saguntino, aut, si quis ex his populis sit exortus qui nostros duces auxilio laboris, commeatus periculo suo iuverit, qui cum hoste nostro comminus in acie saepe pugnarit, qui se saepe telis hostium, qui dimicationi capitis, qui morti obiecerit, nulla condicione huius civitatis praemiis adfici possit?

[23] But, by the immortal gods, what is that society, what friendship, what foedus, that either our state should lack, in its own dangers, a Massiliote champion, lack a Gaditanian, lack a Saguntine; or, if there has arisen from these peoples someone who has aided our leaders with the help of his toil, who has assisted with supplies at his own peril, who has often fought hand-to-hand with our enemy in the battle-line, who has often exposed himself to the weapons of the enemy, to a contest of life and death, to death itself, he cannot on any condition be honored with the rewards of this citizenship?

[24] Etenim in populum Romanum grave est non posse uti sociis excellenti virtute praeditis, qui velint cum periculis nostris sua communicare; in socios vero ipsos, et in eos de quibus agimus foederatos, iniuriosum et contumeliosum est iis praemiis et iis honoribus exclusos esse fidelissimos et coniunctissimos socios quae pateant stipendiariis, pateant hostibus, pateant saepe servis. Nam stipendiarios ex Africa, Sicilia, Sardinia, ceteris provinciis multos civitate donatos videmus, et, qui hostes ad nostros imperatores perfugissent et magno usui rei publicae nostrae fuissent, scimus civitate esse donatos; servos denique, quorum ius, fortuna, condicio infima est, bene de re publica meritos persaepe libertate, id est civitate, publice donari videmus.

[24] For indeed, as regards the Roman people, it is grievous not to be able to use allies endowed with excellent virtue, who are willing to make common cause with our perils by their own; but as regards the allies themselves, and those federates of whom we are speaking, it is injurious and contumelious that the most faithful and most closely conjoined allies are excluded from those rewards and those honors which lie open to stipendiaries, lie open to enemies, lie open often to slaves. For we see many stipendiaries from Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, and the other provinces endowed with citizenship, and we know that those who, being enemies, had fled for refuge to our generals and had been of great use to our commonwealth have been endowed with citizenship; slaves, finally—whose right, fortune, and condition are lowest—when they have deserved well of the commonwealth, we very often see publicly presented with liberty, that is, with citizenship.

[25] Hanc tu igitur, patrone foederum ac foederatorum, condicionem statuis Gaditanis, tuis civibus, ut, quod iis quos magnis adiutoribus tuis armis subegimus atque in dicionem nostram redegimus liceat, si populus Romanus permiserit, ut ab senatu, etiam per imperatores nostros civitate donentur, id ne liceat ipsis? Qui si suis decretis legibusve sanxissent ne quis suorum civium castra imperatorum populi Romani iniret, ne quis se pro nostro imperio in periculum capitis atque in vitae discrimen inferret, Gaditanorum auxiliis, cum vellemus, uti nobis ut liceret, privatus vero ne quis vir et animo et virtute praecellens pro nostro imperio periculo suo dimicaret, graviter id iure ferremus, minui auxilia populi Romani, debilitari animos fortissimorum virorum, alienigenarum nos hominum studiis atque paterna virtute privari.

[25] Therefore do you, patron of treaties and of the treaty-bound, set this condition for the Gaditanians, your fellow-citizens, that what is permitted to those whom, with your great helpers , we have subdued by arms and brought back under our dominion—namely, if the Roman people allows it, that by the senate, even by our commanders, they be endowed with citizenship—shall not be permitted to them themselves? If they had sanctioned by their decrees or laws that none of their citizens enter the camps of the commanders of the Roman people, that no one, for our imperium, thrust himself into capital peril and into the hazard of life; that it be permitted to us, when we wished, to use the auxiliaries of the Gaditanians, but that no private man, preeminent in both spirit and virtue, fight for our imperium at his own risk, we should rightly take it grievously—that the aids of the Roman people are being diminished, that the spirits of the bravest men are being debilitated, that we are being deprived of the zeal of foreign men and of paternal valor.

[26] Atqui nihil interest, iudices, utrum haec foederati iura constituant, ut ne cui liceat ex iis civitatibus ad nostrorum bellorum pericula accedere, an, quae nos eorum civibus virtutis causa tribuerimus, ea rata esse non possint; nihil enim magis uteremur iis adiutoribus, sublatis virtutis praemiis, quam si omnino iis versari in nostris bellis non liceret. Etenim cum pro sua patria pauci post genus hominum natum reperti sint qui nullis praemiis propositis vitam suam hostium telis obiecerint, pro aliena re publica quemquam fore putatis qui se opponat periculis non modo nullo proposito praemio, sed etiam interdicto?

[26] And yet it makes no difference, judges, whether the foederate allies establish these rights, that it be not permitted to anyone from those communities to approach the perils of our wars, or that the things which we have granted to their citizens for the sake of valor cannot stand ratified; for we would make no greater use of those auxiliaries, the rewards of valor having been removed, than if it were not permitted to them at all to be engaged in our wars. For indeed, since, from the birth of the human race, few have been found who, with no rewards set forth, have thrown their life to the missiles of the enemy for their own fatherland, do you suppose there will be anyone who, for another’s republic, will expose himself to dangers not only with no reward proposed, but even interdicted?

[27] Sed cum est illud imperitissime dictum de populis fundis, quod commune liberorum est populorum, non proprium foederatorum,—ex quo intellegi necesse est aut neminem ex sociis civem fieri posse aut etiam posse ex foederatis,—tum vero ius omne noster iste magister mutandae civitatis ignorat, quod est, iudices, non solum in legibus publicis positum, sed etiam in privatorum voluntate. Iure enim nostro neque mutare civitatem quisquam invitus potest, neque si velit mutare non potest, modo adsciscatur ab ea civitate cuius esse se civitatis velit: ut, si Gaditani sciverint nominatim de aliquo cive Romano ut sit is civis Gaditanus, magna potestas sit nostro civi mutandae civitatis, nec foedere impediatur quo minus ex civi Romano civis Gaditanus possit esse.

[27] But when that most unskilled assertion is made about peoples as estates, which is common to free peoples, not proper to federate ones,—from which it must needs be understood either that no one from the allies can become a citizen, or that even from the federates one can,—then indeed our so‑called master is ignorant of the whole law of changing citizenship, which, judges, is grounded not only in public laws but also in the will of private persons. For by our law no one can be forced to change his citizenship against his will, nor, if he wishes to change, is he unable, provided he be adscited by that civitas of which he wishes to be a citizen: as, if the Gaditanians shall have expressly decreed by name concerning some Roman citizen that he be a Gaditanian citizen, great power is thereby given to our citizen for changing his citizenship, nor is he hindered by the treaty from being able to be, from a Roman citizen, a Gaditanian citizen.

[28] Duarum civitatum civis noster esse iure civili nemo potest: non esse huius civitatis qui se alii civitati dicarit potest. Neque solum dicatione, quod in calamitate clarissimis viris Q. Maximo, C. Laenati, Q. Philippo Nuceriae, C. Catoni Tarracone, Q. Caepioni, P. Rutilio Zmyrnae vidimus accidisse, ut earum civitatum fierent cives, hanc ante amittere non potuissent quam hoc solum civitatis mutatione vertissent, sed etiam postliminio potest civitatis fieri mutatio. Neque enim sine causa de Cn. Publicio Menandro, libertino homine, quem apud maiores legati nostri in Graeciam proficiscentes interpretem secum habere voluerunt, ad populum latum ut is Publicius, si domum revenisset et inde Romam redisset, ne minus civis esset.

[28] By the civil law, none of our people can be a citizen of two commonwealths: it can be that he is not of this commonwealth who has dedicated himself to another commonwealth. And not only by dication—which in misfortune we saw befall most illustrious men, Q. Maximus, C. Laenas, Q. Philippus at Nuceria, C. Cato at Tarraco, Q. Caepio, P. Rutilius at Smyrna—so that they became citizens of those communities, since they could not have lost this citizenship before they had altered this single point by a change of citizenship; but even by postliminy a change of citizenship can come to be. Nor indeed was it without cause that concerning Cn. Publicius Menander, a freedman, whom, among our ancestors, our envoys proceeding into Greece wished to have with them as an interpreter, it was brought before the people that this Publicius, if he should return home and from there return to Rome, should be none the less a citizen.

Multi etiam superiore memoria cives Romani sua voluntate, indemnati et incolumes, his rebus relictis alias se in civitates contulerunt.

Many also, in the memory of the last generation, Roman citizens of their own will, uncondemned and unharmed, with these things left behind, betook themselves into other cities.

[29] Quod si civi Romano licet esse Gaditanum sive exsilio sive postliminio sive reiectione huius civitatis,—ut iam ad foedus veniam, quod ad causam nihil pertinet: de civitatis enim iure, non de foederibus disceptamus,—quid est quam ob rem civi Gaditano in hanc civitatem venire non liceat? Equidem longe secus sentio. Nam cum ex omnibus civitatibus via sit in nostram, cumque nostris civibus pateat ad ceteras iter civitates, tum vero, ut quaeque nobiscum maxime societate amicitia sponsione pactione foedere est coniuncta, ita mihi maxime communione beneficiorum praemiorum civitatis contineri videtur.

[29] But if it is permitted to a Roman citizen to be a Gaditanian, whether by exile or by postliminium or by rejection from this community,—to come now to the foedus, which pertains nothing to the case: for we are disputing about the right of citizenship, not about foedera,—what is the reason why it should not be permitted to a Gaditanian citizen to come into this city? For my part, I judge far otherwise. For since from all city-states there is a way into ours, and since for our citizens the road to the other city-states lies open, then indeed, in proportion as each is most closely conjoined with us by societas, amity, sponsion, paction, and treaty, so it seems to me that it ought most of all to be bound by a communion of the benefits and rewards of citizenship.

Atqui ceterae civitates omnes non dubitarent nostros homines recipere in suas civitates, si idem nos iuris haberemus quod ceteri; sed nos non possumus et huius esse civitatis et cuiusvis praeterea, ceteris concessum est.

And yet all the other cities would not hesitate to receive our men into their own cities, if we had the same right as the rest; but we cannot be both of this citizenship and of any other besides—this has been conceded to the others.

[30] Itaque in Graecis civitatibus videmus Atheniensis, Rhodios, Lacedaemonios, ceteros undique adscribi multarumque esse eosdem homines civitatum. Quo errore ductos vidi egomet non nullos imperitos homines, nostros civis, Athenis in numero iudicum atque Areopagitarum, certa tribu, certo numero, cum ignorarent, si illam civitatem essent adepti, hanc se perdidisse nisi postliminio reciperassent. Peritus vero nostri moris ac iuris nemo umquam, qui hanc civitatem retinere vellet, in aliam se civitatem dicavit.

[30] And so in the Greek commonwealths we see the Athenians, the Rhodians, the Lacedaemonians, and the rest enrolling men from everywhere, and that the same men belong to many cities. By this error led, I myself have seen some unskilled men—our own citizens—at Athens among the number of judges and of the Areopagites, in a certain tribe, in a certain number, while they were unaware that, if they had attained that citizenship, they had lost this one unless they were received back by postliminy. But no one ever expert in our custom and law, who wished to retain this citizenship, has declared himself into another city.

Sed hic totus locus disputationis atque orationis meae, iudices, pertinet ad commune ius mutandarum civitatum: nihil habet quod sit proprium religionis ac foederum. Defendo enim rem universam, nullam esse gentem ex omni regione terrarum, neque tam dissidentem a populo Romano odio quodam atque discidio, neque tam fide benivolentiaque coniunctam, ex qua nobis interdictum sit ne quem adsciscere civem aut civitate donare possimus.

But this whole locus of my disputation and oration, judges, pertains to the common law of changing citizenships: it has nothing that is proper to religion and treaties. For I am defending the whole matter, that there is no nation from every region of the earth—neither so dissentient from the Roman people by a certain hatred and dissension, nor so conjoined by faith and benevolence— with respect to which it is interdicted to us to enroll anyone as a citizen or to bestow citizenship.

[31] O iura praeclara atque divinitus iam inde a principio Romani nominis a maioribus nostris comparata, ne quis nostrum plus quam unius civitatis esse possit,—dissimilitudo enim civitatum varietatem iuris habeat necesse est,—ne quis invitus civitate mutetur neve in civitate maneat invitus! Haec sunt enim fundamenta firmissima nostrae libertatis, sui quemque iuris et retinendi et dimittendi esse dominum. Illud vero sine ulla dubitatione maxime nostrum fundavit imperium et populi Romani nomen auxit, quod princeps ille creator huius urbis, Romulus, foedere Sabino docuit etiam hostibus recipiendis augeri hanc civitatem oportere; cuius auctoritate et exemplo numquam est intermissa a maioribus nostris largitio et communicatio civitatis.

[31] O splendid laws, procured by our ancestors and, as it were, divinely from the very beginning of the Roman name, that none of us can belong to more than one civitas—for the dissimilarity of communities must needs carry a variety of law—that no one be changed in citizenship against his will nor remain in a civitas against his will! For these are the firmest foundations of our liberty: that each be master of his own right, both of retaining and of relinquishing it. And this, without any doubt, most of all established our empire and increased the name of the Roman people: that that princeps, the creator of this city, Romulus, by the Sabine treaty taught that this commonwealth ought to be enlarged even by receiving enemies; by whose authority and example the largess and sharing of citizenship has never been discontinued by our ancestors.

Itaque et ex Latio multi, ut Tusculani, ut Lanuvini, et ex ceteris generibus gentes universae in civitatem sunt receptae, ut Sabinorum, Volscorum, Hernicorum; quibus ex civitatibus nec coacti essent civitate mutari, si qui noluissent, nec, si qui essent civitatem nostram beneficio populi Romani consecuti, violatum foedus eorum videretur.

And so both from Latium many—such as the Tusculans, such as the Lanuvians—and from other groups entire peoples were received into the citizenship, such as the Sabines, the Volsci, the Hernici; from which commonwealths neither would they be compelled to be changed in citizenship, if any did not wish it, nor, if any had obtained our citizenship by the benefaction of the Roman People, would their treaty seem to have been violated.

[32] Etenim quaedam foedera exstant, ut Cenomanorum, Insubrium, Helvetiorum, Iapydum, non nullorum item ex Gallia barbarorum, quorum in foederibus exceptum est ne quis eorum a nobis civis recipiatur. Quod si exceptio facit ne liceat, ubi necesse est licere. Vbi est igitur foedere Gaditano, ne quem populus Romanus Gaditanum recipiat civitate?

[32] Indeed, certain treaties exist, such as those of the Cenomani, the Insubres, the Helvetii, the Iapydes, likewise of some barbarians from Gaul, in whose treaties it is excepted that none of them be received by us as a citizen. And if an exception brings it about that it is not permitted, then where it must be permitted. Where, therefore, is it the Gaditanian treaty, that the Roman People should not receive any Gaditanian into citizenship?

Nusquam. Ac sicubi esset, lex id Gellia et Cornelia, quae definite potestatem Pompeio civitatem donandi dederat, sustulisset. 'Exceptum,' inquit, 'est foedus, Si qvid sacrosanctvm est.' Ignosco tibi, si neque Poenorum iura calles (reliqueras enim civitatem tuam) neque nostras potuisti leges inspicere; ipsae enim te a cognitione sua iudicio publico reppulerunt.

Nowhere. And if it were anywhere, the Gellian and Cornelian law, which had given to Pompey a definite power of bestowing citizenship, would have removed it. 'It is excepted,' he says, 'by the treaty, If anything is sacrosanct.' I excuse you, if you are neither versed in the Punic laws (for you had abandoned your state) nor were able to inspect our laws; for they themselves have repelled you from acquaintance with them by public judgment.

[33] Quid fuit in rogatione ea quae de Pompeio a Gellio et a Lentulo consulibus lata est, in quo aliquid sacrosanctum exceptum videretur? Primum enim sacrosanctum esse nihil potest nisi quod populus plebesve sanxit; deinde sanctiones sacrandae sunt aut genere ipso aut obtestatione et consecratione legis aut poenae, cum caput eius qui contra fecerit consecratur. Quid habes igitur dicere de Gaditano foedere eius modi?

[33] What was there in that rogation which, concerning Pompey, was carried by the consuls Gellius and Lentulus, in which anything sacrosanct would seem to have been excepted? For, first, nothing can be sacrosanct unless what the people or the plebs has sanctioned; then sanctions are to be made sacred either by the very kind, or by the obtestation and consecration of the law or of a penalty, when the head of him who has acted against it is consecrated. What, therefore, have you to say about a Gaditan treaty of that sort?

utrum capitis consecratione an obtestatione legis sacrosanctum esse confirmas? Nihil omnino umquam de isto foedere ad populum, nihil ad plebem latum esse neque legem neque poenam consecratam esse dico. De quibus igitur etiam si latum esset ne quem civem reciperemus, tamen id esset quod postea populus iussisset ratum, nec quicquam illis verbis Si qvid sacrosanctvm est exceptum videretur, de iis, cum populus Romanus nihil umquam iusserit, quicquam audes dicere sacrosanctum fuisse?

do you affirm it to be sacrosanct by consecration of the head, or by the obtestation of the law? I say that nothing at all ever about that treaty was brought before the people, nothing before the plebs, and that neither a law nor a consecrated penalty was enacted. Therefore, concerning which matters even if it had been proposed that we should not receive any citizen, nevertheless that would be ratified which the people should afterward have ordered, nor would anything seem to be excepted by those words “If anything is sacrosanct”; about these, since the Roman People has never ordered anything, do you dare to say that anything was sacrosanct?

[34] Nec vero oratio mea ad infirmandum foedus Gaditanorum, iudices, pertinet; neque enim est meum contra ius optime meritae civitatis, contra opinionem vetustatis, contra auctoritatem senatus dicere. Duris enim quondam temporibus rei publicae nostrae, cum praepotens terra marique Carthago nixa duabus Hispaniis huic imperio immineret, et cum duo fulmina nostri imperi subito in Hispania, Cn. et P. Scipiones, exstincti occidissent, L. Marcius, primi pili centurio, cum Gaditanis foedus fecisse dicitur. Quod cum magis fide illius populi, iustitia nostra, vetustate denique ipsa quam aliquo publico vinculo religionis teneretur, sapientes homines et publici iuris periti, Gaditani, M. Lepido Q. Catulo consulibus a senatu de foedere postulaverunt.

[34] Nor indeed does my oration, judges, pertain to undermining the treaty of the Gaditanians; for it is not my part to speak against the right of a most well-deserving city, against the opinion of antiquity, against the authority of the senate. For in certain hard times of our republic, when Carthage, overpowerful by land and sea, leaning on the Two Spains, was threatening this imperium, and when the two thunderbolts of our empire, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, having been extinguished, had fallen suddenly in Spain, Lucius Marcius, a centurion of the first spear, is said to have made a treaty with the Gaditanians. And since that was held more by the good faith of that people, by our justice, and by antiquity itself, than by any public bond of religion, wise men and experts in public law, the Gaditanians, in the consulship of M. Lepidus and Q. Catulus, petitioned the senate concerning a treaty.

Tum est cum Gaditanis foedus vel renovatum vel ictum; de quo foedere populus Romanus sententiam non tulit, qui iniussu suo nullo pacto potest religione obligari.

Then the treaty with the Gaditani was either renewed or struck; concerning which treaty the Roman people did not take a vote, who, without their own authorization, cannot by any compact be bound in religious obligation.

[35] Ita Gaditana civitas, quod beneficiis suis erga rem publicam nostram consequi potuit, quod imperatorum testimoniis, quod vetustate, quod Q. Catuli, summi viri, auctoritate, quod iudicio senatus, quod foedere, consecuta est; quod publica religione sanciri potuit, id abest; populus enim se nusquam obligavit. Neque ideo est Gaditanorum causa deterior; gravissimis enim et plurimis rebus est fulta. Sed isti disputationi certe nihil est loci; sacrosanctum enim nihil potest esse nisi quod per populum plebemve sanctum est.

[35] Thus the Gaditanian community has obtained what it could achieve by its services toward our republic, by the testimonies of imperators, by antiquity, by the authority of Q. Catulus, a most eminent man, by the judgment of the senate, by the treaty; that which could be sanctioned by public religion is lacking; for the people has nowhere obligated itself. Nor on that account is the cause of the Gaditani the worse; for it is propped by very weighty and very numerous considerations. But for that disputation certainly there is no place; for nothing can be sacrosanct unless that which has been made sacred by the people or the plebs.

Quod si hoc foedus, quod populus Romanus auctore senatu, commendatione et iudicio vetustatis, voluntate et sententiis suis comprobat, idem suffragiis comprobasset, quid erat cur ex ipso foedere Gaditanum in civitatem nostram recipi non liceret? Nihil est enim aliud in foedere nisi ut pia et aeterna pax sit. Quid id ad civitatem?

But if this treaty—which the Roman People, with the Senate as author, by the recommendation and judgment of antiquity, and by its own will and opinions, approves—had likewise approved by suffrages, what reason was there why by the treaty itself it should not be permitted that a Gaditanian be received into our citizenship? For there is nothing else in a treaty except that there be a pious and eternal peace. What has that to do with citizenship?

Adiunctum illud etiam est, quod non est in omnibus foederibus: Maiestatem popvli Romani comiter conservanto. Id habet hanc vim, ut sit ille in foedere inferior.

This also is adjoined, which is not in all treaties: Let them courteously conserve the Majesty of the Roman People. This has this force, that he be inferior in the treaty.

[36] Primum verbi genus hoc 'conservanto,' quo magis in legibus quam in foederibus uti solemus, imperantis est, non precantis. Deinde cum alterius populi maiestas conservari iubetur, de altero siletur, certe ille populus in superiore condicione causaque ponitur cuius maiestas foederis sanctione defenditur. In quo erat accusatoris interpretatio indigna responsione, qui ita dicebat, 'comiter' esse 'communiter,' quasi vero priscum aliquod aut insolitum verbum interpretaretur.

[36] First, this verbal form 'conservanto,' which we are more accustomed to use in laws than in treaties, is of one commanding, not beseeching. Then, when the majesty of one people is ordered to be preserved, and concerning the other it is silent, surely that people is placed in the superior condition and case whose majesty is defended by the treaty’s sanction. In this the accuser’s interpretation was unworthy of an answer, who thus said that 'comiter' was 'communiter,' as though he were interpreting some archaic or unusual word.

Comes benigni, faciles, suaves homines esse dicuntur; 'qui erranti comiter monstrat viam,' benigne, non gravate; 'communiter' quidem certe non convenit.

Courteous men are said to be benign, facile, and suave; 'he who courteously shows the way to one who is erring' does so kindly, not grudgingly; 'communiter' indeed certainly does not fit.

[37] Et simul absurda res est caveri foedere ut maiestatem populi Romani 'communiter' conservent, id est ut populus Romanus suam maiestatem esse salvam velit. Quod si iam ita esset, ut esse non potest, tamen de nostra maiestate, nihil de illorum caveretur. Potestne igitur nostra maiestas Gaditanis benigne conservari, si ad eam retinendam Gaditanos praemiis elicere non possumus?

[37] And at the same time it is an absurd thing to be provided by treaty that they should "in common" conserve the majesty of the Roman people—that is, that the Roman people should wish its own majesty to be safe. But even if it were so, as it cannot be, nevertheless provision would be made about our majesty, nothing about theirs. Can, then, our majesty be kindly conserved by the Gaditani, if to retain it we cannot elicit the Gaditani by rewards, ?

Potest esse ulla denique maiestas, si impedimur quo minus per populum Romanum beneficiorum virtutis causa tribuendorum potestatem imperatoribus nostris deferamus?

Can there be any majesty at all, if we are hindered from conferring upon our commanders, through the Roman People, the power of bestowing benefactions for the sake of virtue?

[38] Sed quid ego disputo quae mihi tum, si Gaditani contra me dicerent, vere posse dici viderentur? Illis enim repetentibus L. Cornelium responderem legem populum Romanum iussisse de civitate tribuenda; huic generi legum fundos populos fieri non solere; Cn. Pompeium de consili sententia civitatem huic dedisse, nullum populi nostri iussum Gaditanos habere; itaque nihil esse sacrosanctum quod lege exceptum videretur; si esset, tamen in foedere nihil esse cautum praeter pacem; additum esse etiam illud, ut maiestatem illi nostram conservare deberent, quae certe minueretur si aut adiutoribus illorum civibus uti in bellis nobis non liceret aut praemi tribuendi potestatem nullam haberemus.

[38] But why do I argue what would then, if the Gaditanians were speaking against me, seem to me truly able to be said? For when they were pressing their claim, I would answer that Lucius Cornelius had by statute directed the Roman people concerning the granting of citizenship; that for this kind of statutes peoples are not wont to be made “fundi”; that Gnaeus Pompeius, on the advice of his council, had given citizenship to this man, that the Gaditanians have no order of our people; and so nothing is sacrosanct that seems to be excepted by a law; if there were, nevertheless in the treaty nothing is stipulated except peace; this also has been added, that they ought to preserve our majesty, which certainly would be lessened if either it were not permitted to us to use their citizens as helpers in our wars, or we had no power of bestowing a reward.

[39] Nunc vero quid ego contra Gaditanos loquar, cum id quod defendo voluntate eorum, auctoritate, legatione ipsa comprobetur? qui a principio sui generis aut studio rei publicae ~ii ab omni studio sensuque Poenorum mentis suas ad nostrum imperium nomenque flexerunt; qui, cum maxima bella nobis inferrentur, moenibus excluserunt, classibus insecuti sunt, corporibus opibus copiis depulerunt; qui et veterem illam speciem foederis Marciani semper omni sanctiorem arce duxerunt, et hoc foedere Catuli senatusque auctoritate se nobiscum coniunctissimos esse arbitrati sunt; quorum moenia, delubra, agros ut Hercules itinerum ac laborum suorum, sic maiores nostri imperi ac nominis populi Romani terminos esse voluerunt.

[39] Now indeed, what should I say against the Gaditani, since that which I am defending is corroborated by their own will, by their authority, by the embassy itself? who from the beginning, either by the character of their own race or by zeal for the Republic, they turned their minds away from all zeal and feeling of the Punics toward our imperium and name; who, when very great wars were being brought against us, shut out from their walls, pursued them with fleets, drove them off with their bodies, resources, and forces; who both always held that ancient form of the Marcian treaty as in every respect a stronghold more sacred than any, and by this treaty of Catulus and the authority of the senate judged themselves to be most closely conjoined with us; whose walls, shrines, and fields our ancestors wished to be—as Hercules [made] the boundaries of his journeys and labors—so the boundaries of the imperium and name of the Roman people.

[40] Testantur et mortuos nostros imperatores, quorum vivit immortalis memoria et gloria, Scipiones, Brutos, Horatios, Cassios, Metellos, et hunc praesentem Cn. Pompeium, quem procul ab illorum moenibus acre et magnum bellum gerentem commeatu pecuniaque iuverunt, et hoc tempore ipsum populum Romanum, quem in caritate annonae, ut saepe ante fecerant, frumento suppeditato levarunt, se hoc ius esse velle, ut sibi et liberis, si qui eximia virtute fuerit, sit in nostris castris, sit in imperatorum praetoriis, sit denique inter signa atque in acie locus, sit his gradibus ascensus etiam ad civitatem.

[40] Our dead commanders also bear witness—whose immortal memory and glory live on—the Scipios, the Brutuses, the Horatii, the Cassii, the Metelli, and this present Gnaeus Pompeius, whom, waging a sharp and great war far from their walls, they aided with supply and with money; and, at this time, the Roman people itself, whom, in the dearness of the annona, as they had often done before, they relieved by furnishing grain—that they wish to have this right: that for themselves and their children, if anyone shall have been of exceptional virtue, there be a place in our camps, in the praetoria of commanders, finally among the standards and in the battle-line, and that by these steps there be an ascent even to citizenship.

[41] Quod si Afris, si Sardis, si Hispanis agris stipendioque multatis virtute adipisci licet civitatem, Gaditanis autem officiis vetustate fide periculis foedere coniunctis hoc idem non licebit, non foedus sibi nobiscum sed iniquissimas leges impositas a nobis esse arbitrabuntur. Atque hanc, iudices, non a me fingi orationem, sed me dicere quae Gaditani iudicarint res ipsa declarat. Hospitium multis annis ante hoc tempus cum L. Cornelio Gaditanos fecisse publice dico.

[41] But if it is permitted for Africans, for Sardinians, for Spaniards, penalized in their lands and in tribute, to obtain citizenship by virtue, while to the Gaditani—joined to us by services, antiquity, fidelity, dangers, and a treaty—the same will not be permitted, they will suppose that not a treaty was struck with us but that most iniquitous laws were imposed by us. And this, judges, is shown by the fact itself, that this speech is not being invented by me, but that I am saying what the Gaditani have judged. I say that many years before this time the Gaditani publicly entered into guest-friendship (hospitium) with L. Cornelius.

Proferam tesseram; legatos excito; laudatores ad hoc iudicium, summos homines ac nobilissimos, deprecatores huius periculi missos videtis; re denique multo ante Gadibus inaudita, fore ut huic ab illo periculum crearetur . . . gravissima autem in istum civem suum Gaditani senatus consulta fecerunt.

I will bring forth the token; I summon the legates; you see laudators for this judgment, men of the highest rank and most noble, sent as deprecators of this danger; a matter, finally, long before unheard-of at Gades, that danger should be created for this man by that one . . . moreover, the Gaditanians made the gravest senatorial decrees against this their own citizen.

[42] Potuit magis fundus populus Gaditanus fieri, quoniam hoc magno opere delectare verbo, si tum fit fundus cum scita ac iussa nostra sua sententia comprobat, quam cum hospitium fecit, ut et civitate illum mutatum esse fateretur et huius civitatis honore dignissimum iudicaret? Potuit certius interponere iudicium voluntatis suae quam cum etiam accusatorem huius multa et poena notavit? Potuit magis de re iudicare quam cum ad vestrum iudicium civis amplissimos legavit testis huius iuris, vitae laudatores, periculi deprecatores?

[42] Could the Gaditanian people have become more a “fundus,” since they are greatly delighted by this word, if one becomes “fundus” when by their own vote they ratify our enactments and commands, than when they established hospitium, so that they both confessed that he had been changed in citizenship and judged him most worthy of the honor of this city? Could they have interposed a more certain judgment of their will than when they even marked this man’s accuser with mulct and penalty? Could they have judged more decisively about the matter than when to your tribunal they sent as legates most distinguished citizens—witnesses of this right, laudators of his life, deprecators of his peril?

[43] Etenim quis est tam demens quin sentiat ius hoc Gaditanis esse retinendum, ne saeptum sit iis iter perpetuum ad hoc amplissimum praemium civitatis, et magno opere iis esse laetandum huius L. Corneli benivolentiam erga suos remanere Gadibus, gratiam et facultatem commendandi in hac civitate versari? Quis est enim nostrum cui non illa civitas sit huius studio, cura, diligentia commendatior? Omitto quantis ornamentis populum istum C. Caesar, cum esset in Hispania praetor, adfecerit, controversias sedarit, iura ipsorum permissu statuerit, inveteratam quandam barbariam ex Gaditanorum moribus disciplinaque delerit, summa in eam civitatem huius rogatu studia et beneficia contulerit.

[43] For who is so demented as not to sense that this right must be retained for the Gaditani, lest their route perpetuity to this amplest premium of citizenship be hemmed in, and that they must greatly rejoice that this L. Cornelius’s benevolence toward his own remains at Gades, and that his favor and the faculty of commending operate in this city? For which of us is that commonwealth not more commended by this man’s zeal, care, and diligence? I omit with what ornaments C. Caesar, when he was praetor in Hispania, adorned that people, how he settled controversies, established their rights by his grant, erased a certain inveterate barbarism from the customs and discipline of the Gaditani, and, at this man’s request, conferred the highest ardors and benefactions upon that state.

Multa praetereo quae cotidie labore huius et studio aut omnino aut certe facilius consequantur. Itaque et adsunt principes civitatis et defendunt amore ut suum civem, testimonio ut nostrum, officio ut ex nobilissimo civi sanctissimum hospitem, studio ut diligentissimum defensorem commodorum suorum.

I pass over many things which every day, by this man’s labor and zeal, they either obtain altogether or at any rate more easily. And so the leading men of the city are present and defend him—by affection, as their own citizen; by testimony, as ours; by duty, as a most sacred guest-friend from a most noble citizen; by zeal, as the most diligent defender of their interests.

[44] Ac ne ipsi Gaditani arbitrentur, quamquam nullo incommodo adficiantur, si liceat eorum civis virtutis causa in nostram civitatem venire, tamen hoc ipso inferius esse suum foedus quam ceterorum, consolabor et hos praesentis, viros optimos, et illam fidelissimam atque amicissimam nobis civitatem, simul et vos non ignorantis, iudices, admonebo, quo de iure hoc iudicium constitutum sit, de eo numquam omnino esse dubitatum.

[44] And lest the Gaditani themselves suppose that—although they suffer no inconvenience, if it be permitted that their fellow-citizen, for the sake of merit, come into our citizenship—yet by this very fact their treaty is inferior to that of others, I will console both these men here present, most excellent men, and that city most faithful and most friendly to us; and at the same time I will remind you also, judges, who are not unaware, under what law this judgment has been established, that about it there has never at all been any doubt.

[45] Quos igitur prudentissimos interpretes foederum, quos peritissimos bellici iuris, quos diligentissimos in exquirendis condicionibus civitatum atque causis esse arbitramur? eos profecto qui iam imperia ac bella gesserunt. Etenim si Q. Scaevola ille augur, cum de iure praediatorio consuleretur, homo iuris peritissimus, consultores suos non numquam ad Furium et Cascellium praediatores reiciebat, si nos de aqua nostra Tusculana M. Tugionem potius quam C. Aquilium consulebamus, quod adsiduus usus uni rei deditus et ingenium et artem saepe vincit, quis dubitet de foederibus et de toto iure pacis et belli omnibus iuris peritissimis imperatores nostros anteferre?

[45] Whom, then, do we judge to be the most prudent interpreters of treaties, the most expert in the law bellic, the most diligent in inquiring into the conditions of states and into their causes? Surely those who have already borne commands and waged wars. For indeed, if that Q. Scaevola the Augur, when he was consulted about the praediatorial law, a man most skilled in law, sometimes referred those consulting him back to Furius and Cascellius, praediators (auctioneers/speculators), if we, about our Tusculan water, consulted M. Tugio rather than C. Aquilius, because assiduous use devoted to a single matter often overcomes both native talent and art (skill), who would doubt, concerning treaties and the entire law of peace and war, to prefer our commanders to all even the most expert in law?

[46] Possumusne igitur tibi probare auctorem exempli atque facti illius quod a te reprenditur, C. Marium? Quaeris aliquem graviorem, constantiorem, praestantiorem virtute, prudentia, religione? Is igitur Iguvinatem M. Annium Appium, fortissimum virum virtute praeditum, civitate donavit: cum Camertinum foederum sanctissimum atque aequissimum sciret esse.

[46] Can we then put forward to you as the author of the precedent and of that deed which is by you reprehended, Gaius Marius? Do you seek someone more grave, more constant, more preeminent in virtue, prudence, and religion? He then granted citizenship to the Iguvine, Marcus Annius Appius, a most brave man endowed with the virtue; though he knew the Camertine treaties to be the most sacred and most equitable.

Potest igitur, iudices, L. Cornelius condemnari, ut non C. Mari factum condemnetur?

Can, then, judges, L. Cornelius be condemned, without the deed of C. Marius being condemned?

[47] Exsistat ergo ille vir parumper cogitatione vestra, quoniam re non potest, ut conspiciatis eum mentibus, quoniam oculis non potestis; dicat se non imperitum foederis, non rudem exemplorum, non ignarum belli fuisse; se P. Africani discipulum ac militem, se stipendiis, se legationibus bellicis eruditum, se, si tanta bella attigisset quanta gessit confecit, si tot consulibus meruisset quotiens ipse consul fuit, omnia iura belli perdiscere ac nosse potuisse; sibi non fuisse dubium quin nullo foedere a re publica bene gerenda impediretur; a se ex coniunctissima atque amicissima civitate fortissimum quemque esse delectum; neque Iguvinatium neque Camertium foedere esse exceptum, quo minus eorum civibus a populo Romano praemia virtutis tribuerentur.

[47] Let that man, then, stand forth for a little while in your thought, since in reality he cannot, that you may behold him with your minds, since with your eyes you cannot; let him say that he was not unskilled in treaty-law, not raw in exemplars, not ignorant of war; that he was the disciple and soldier of Publius Africanus; that he was trained by campaigns and by military legations; that he—if he had only touched as many wars as he waged and completed, if he had served under as many consuls as often as he himself was consul—could have thoroughly learned and known all the laws of war; that it was not doubtful to him that by no foedus would he be hindered from administering the commonwealth well; that by him, from a most closely conjoined and most friendly civitas, each of the bravest men had been selected; that neither the Iguvinates nor the Camertes were excepted by any foedus, so as to prevent rewards of valor from being granted to their citizens by the Roman people.

[48] Itaque cum paucis annis post hanc civitatis donationem acerrima de civitate quaestio Licinia et Mucia lege venisset, num quis eorum, qui de foederatis civitatibus esset civitate donatus, in iudicium est vocatus? Nam Spoletinus T. Matrinius, unus ex iis quos C. Marius civitate donasset, dixit causam ex colonia Latina in primis firma et inlustri. Quem cum disertus homo L. Antistius accusaret, non dixit fundum Spoletinum populum non esse factum,—videbat enim populos de suo iure, non de nostro fundos fieri solere,—sed cum lege Apuleia coloniae non essent deductae, qua lege Saturninus C. Mario tulerat ut in singulas colonias ternos civis Romanos facere posset, negabat hoc beneficium re ipsa sublata valere debere.

[48] And so, when, a few years after this donation of citizenship, a most sharp inquiry concerning citizenship had come under the Licinian and Mucian law, was any of those who, being from federate communities, had been endowed with citizenship, called into court? For a man of Spoleto, T. Matrinius, one of those whom C. Marius had granted citizenship, pleaded his case, from a Latin colony, preeminently firm and illustrious. When the eloquent man L. Antistius was prosecuting him, he did not say that the Spolentine fundus had not been made a people—for he saw that “peoples” are wont to be made on the basis of their own right, not that “estates” are wont to be made on the basis of ours—but since colonies had not been established under the Apuleian law, by which law Saturninus had carried for C. Marius that he might be able to make three Roman citizens in each colony, he was denying that this beneficium ought to have force, the thing itself having been removed.

[49] Nihil habet similitudinis ista accusatio; sed tamen tanta auctoritas in C. Mario fuit ut non per L. Crassum, adfinem suum, hominem incredibili eloquentia, sed paucis ipse verbis causam illam gravitate sua defenderit et probarit. Quis enim esset, iudices, qui imperatoribus nostris in bello, in acie, in exercitu dilectum virtutis, qui sociis, qui foederatis in defendenda re publica nostra spem praemiorum eripi vellet? Quod si vultus C. Mari, si vox, si ille imperatorius ardor oculorum, si recentes triumphi, si praesens valuit aspectus, valeat auctoritas, valeant res gestae, valeat memoria, valeat fortissimi et clarissimi viri nomen aeternum.

[49] That accusation bears no resemblance; yet so great was the authority in Gaius Marius that, not through Lucius Crassus, his kinsman, a man of incredible eloquence, but with a few words himself he defended and proved that cause by his own gravitas. For who, judges, would wish to wrest from our imperators, in war, in the battle line, in the army, the selection for valor; who would wish to snatch from the allies, from the federates, the hope of rewards in defending our commonwealth? And if the countenance of Gaius Marius, if his voice, if that imperatorial ardor of the eyes, if the recent triumphs, if his present aspect availed, let authority avail, let deeds done avail, let memory avail, let the eternal name of a most brave and most illustrious man avail.

Sit hoc discrimen inter gratiosos civis atque fortis, ut illi vivi fruantur opibus suis, horum etiam mortuorum, si quisquam huius imperi defensor mori potest, vivat auctoritas immortalis.

Let this be the distinction between well-favored citizens and the brave, that the former while alive enjoy their own resources, but of the latter even when dead—if any defender of this empire can die—there lives an immortal authority.

[50] Quid? Cn. Pompeius pater rebus Italico bello maximis gestis P. Caesium, equitem Romanum, virum bonum, qui vivit, Ravennatem foederato ex populo nonne civitate donavit? Quid?

[50] What? Did not Cn. Pompeius the father, with the greatest deeds accomplished in the Italic War, grant citizenship to P. Caesius, a Roman knight (eques), a good man, who is alive, a Ravennate from a federated people? What?

cohortis duas universas Camertium <C. Marius>? Quid? Heracliensem Alexam P. Crassus, vir amplissimus, ex ea civitate quacum prope singulare foedus Pyrrhi temporibus C. Fabricio consule ictum putatur? Quid?

What? Did <C. Marius> grant citizenship to two entire cohorts of the Camertes? What? Did Publius Crassus, a most distinguished man, grant citizenship to Alexas the Heracleian, from that city with which an almost singular treaty is thought to have been struck in the time of Pyrrhus, Gaius Fabricius being consul? What?

Massiliensem Aristonem <L.> Sulla? Quid? quoniam de Gaditanis agimus, idem <serv>os novem Gaditanos?

Ariston the Massiliote — did <L.> Sulla not grant citizenship? What? And since we are dealing with the Gaditanians, the same man granted it to nine Gaditanian slaves?

Quid? vir sanctissimus et summa religione ac modestia, Q. Metellus Pius, Q. Fabium Saguntinum? Quid?

What? the most holy man and of the highest religion and modesty, Q. Metellus Pius, Q. Fabius the Saguntine? What?

hic qui adest, a quo haec quae ego nunc percurro subtilissime sunt omnia perpolita, M. Crassus, non Aveniensem foederatum civitate donavit, homo cum gravitate et prudentia praestans, tum vel nimium parcus in largienda civitate?

this man who is present, by whom all these things which I now run through have been most subtly polished, M. Crassus—did he not grant citizenship to an Avenionese federate? a man outstanding in gravitas and prudence, and indeed even overly sparing in the bestowing of citizenship?

[51] Hic tu Cn. Pompei beneficium vel potius iudicium et factum infirmare conaris, qui fecit quod C. Marium fecisse audierat, fecit quod P. Crassum, quod L. Sullam, quod Q. Metellum, quod denique domesticum auctorem patrem suum facere viderat? Neque vero id in uno Cornelio fecit; nam et Gaditanum Hasdrubalem ex bello illo Africano et Mamertinos Ovios et quosdam Vticensis et Saguntinos Fabios civitate donavit. Etenim cum ceteris praemiis digni sunt qui suo labore et periculo nostram rem publicam defendunt, tum certe dignissimi sunt qui civitate ea donentur pro qua pericula ac tela subierunt.

[51] Here you try to undermine the benefaction—or rather the judgment and the deed—of Gnaeus Pompey, who did what he had heard that Gaius Marius had done, did what Publius Crassus, what Lucius Sulla, what Quintus Metellus, what, finally, his domestic author, his own father, he had seen do? Nor indeed did he do that in the case of one Cornelius; for he also granted citizenship to Hasdrubal of Gades from that African war, and to the Mamertine Ovii, and to certain Uticans, and to the Saguntine Fabii. For indeed, while those who defend our republic by their own toil and danger are worthy of other rewards, yet surely they are most worthy to be endowed with that citizenship for which they have undergone perils and missiles.

Atque utinam qui ubique sunt propugnatores huius imperi possent in hanc civitatem venire, et contra oppugnatores rei publicae de civitate exterminari! Neque enim ille summus poeta noster Hannibalis illam magis cohortationem quam communem imperatoriam voluit esse:

And would that those who are everywhere defenders of this empire could come into this citizenship, and, contrariwise, that the assailants of the republic be exterminated from the citizenship! For our greatest poet did not wish that that exhortation of Hannibal be more Hannibal’s than a common one of a commander:

Hostem qui feriet, erit, inquit, mihi Carthaginiensis,
Quisquis erit.

Whoever shall strike the enemy, will be, says he, a Carthaginian to me,
Whoever he shall be.

Cuius civitatis sit, id habent hodie leve et semper habuerunt, itaque et civis undique fortis viros adsciverunt et hominum ignobilium virtutem persaepe nobilitatis inertiae praetulerunt.

Of what city he may be, they hold that a light matter today, and they have always held it; and thus they have admitted as citizens brave men from everywhere, and very often they have preferred the virtue of ignoble men to the inertia of nobility.

[52] Habetis imperatorum summorum et sapientissimorum hominum, clarissimorum virorum, interpretationem iuris ac foederum: dabo etiam iudicum qui huic quaestioni praefuerunt, dabo universi populi Romani, dabo sanctissimum et sapientissimum iudicium etiam senatus. Iudices cum prae se ferrent palamque loquerentur quid essent lege Papia de M. Cassio Mamertinis repetentibus iudicaturi, Mamertini publice suscepta causa destiterunt. Multi in civitatem recepti ex liberis foederatisque populis [liberati] sunt: nemo umquam est de civitate accusatus, quod aut populus fundus factus non esset, aut quod foedere civitatis mutandae ius impediretur.

[52] You have the interpretation of law and of treaties by the highest commanders and the wisest men, by the most illustrious men; I will also give that of the judges who presided over this quaestio, I will give that of the whole Roman people, I will give the most sacred and most wise judgment of the senate as well. When the judges were declaring and openly saying what they were going to decide by the Papian law concerning M. Cassius, with the Mamertines prosecuting for recovery, the Mamertines, though the case had been publicly undertaken, desisted. Many have been received into citizenship from free and allied peoples, and [freed]; no one has ever been accused regarding citizenship, either because the people had not been made a fundus, or because by the treaty the right of changing citizenship was impeded.

[53] Audebo etiam hoc contendere, numquam esse condemnatum quem constaret ab imperatore nostro civitate donatum. Cognoscite nunc populi Romani iudicium multis rebus interpositum atque in maximis causis re ipsa atque usu comprobatum. Cum Latinis omnibus foedus esse ictum Sp. Cassio Postumo Cominio consulibus quis ignorat?

[53] I will even dare to contend this: that never has anyone been condemned whom it was established had been granted citizenship by our emperor. Recognize now the judgment of the Roman people, attested by many matters and, in the greatest causes, proven in very fact and by use. Who is ignorant that a treaty was struck with all the Latins, when Spurius Cassius and Postumus Cominius were consuls?

quod quidem nuper in columna ahenea meminimus post rostra incisum et perscriptum fuisse. Quo modo igitur L. Cossinius Tiburs, pater huius equitis Romani, optimi atque ornatissimi viri, damnato T. Caelio, quo modo ex eadem civitate T. Coponius, civis item summa virtute et dignitate,—nepotes T. et C. Coponios nostis,—damnato C. Masone civis Romanus est factus?

which indeed we lately remember to have been engraved and fully inscribed on a bronze column behind the rostra. In what way, then, did L. Cossinius, a Tiburtine, the father of this Roman knight—a man most excellent and most distinguished—upon T. Caelius being condemned; in what way, from that same state, did T. Coponius, likewise a citizen of the highest virtue and dignity—you know the grandsons T. and C. Coponius—upon C. Maso being condemned, become a Roman citizen?

[54] An lingua et ingenio patefieri aditus ad civitatem potuit, manu et virtute non potuit? Anne de nobis trahere spolia foederatis licebat, de hostibus non licebat? An quod adipisci poterant dicendo, id eis pugnando adsequi non licebat?

[54] Or could an access to citizenship be laid open by tongue and ingenuity, and not by hand and virtue? Or was it permitted to our federates to draw spoils from us, but not from enemies? Or what they could acquire by speaking, was it not permitted them to attain by fighting?

An accusatori maiores nostri maiora praemia quam bellatori esse voluerunt?

Or did our ancestors want greater rewards for the accuser than for the warrior?

Quod si acerbissima lege Servilia principes viri ac gravissimi et sapientissimi cives hanc Latinis, id est foederatis, viam ad civitatem populi iussu patere passi sunt, neque ius est hoc reprehensum Licinia et Mucia lege, cum praesertim genus ipsum accusationis et nomen <et> eius modi praemium quod nemo adsequi posset nisi ex senatoris calamitate neque senatori neque bono cuiquam nimis iucundum esse posset, dubitandum fuit quin, quo in genere iudicum praemia rata essent, in eodem iudicia imperatorum valerent? Num fundos igitur factos populos Latinos arbitramur aut Serviliae legi aut ceteris quibus Latinis hominibus erat propositum aliqua ex re praemium civitatis?

If by the most bitter Servilian law leading men and the most weighty and most wise citizens allowed this road to citizenship for the Latins—that is, the federates—to lie open by the people’s order, and this right has not been censured by the Licinian and Mucian law, since especially the very kind of accusation and the name and the premium of that sort—which no one could attain except out of a senator’s calamity—could not be overly pleasant either to a senator or to any good man, was there any room to doubt that, in the category in which rewards were ratified by verdicts, in that same the judgments of commanders would have force? Are we then to think that the Latin peoples were reduced to estates either by the Servilian law or by the others by which a premium of citizenship was set forth for Latin men on account of some matter?

[55] Cognoscite nunc iudicium senatus, quod semper iudicio est populi comprobatum. Sacra Cereris, iudices, summa maiores nostri religione confici caerimoniaque voluerunt; quae cum essent adsumpta de Graecia, et per Graecas curata sunt semper sacerdotes et Graeca omnino nominata. Sed cum illam quae Graecum illud sacrum monstraret et faceret ex Graecia deligerent, tamen sacra pro civibus civem facere voluerunt, ut deos immortalis scientia peregrina et externa, mente domestica et civili precaretur.

[55] Learn now the judgment of the senate, which has always been approved by the judgment of the people. The Rites of Ceres, judges, our ancestors wished to be conducted with the highest religion and ceremony; and since they were taken from Greece, they have always been tended by Greek priestesses and are wholly named in Greek. But although they chose from Greece the woman who would display and perform that Greek rite, nevertheless they wished a citizen to perform the rites on behalf of the citizens, so that she might pray to the immortal gods with foreign and external science, but with a domestic and civil mind.

Has sacerdotes video fere aut Neapolitanas aut Veliensis fuisse, foederatarum sine dubio civitatum. Mitto vetera; proxime dico ante civitatem Veliensibus datam de senatus sententia C. Valerium Flaccum, praetorem urbanum, nominatim ad populum de Calliphana Veliense, ut ea civis Romana esset, tulisse. Num igitur aut fundos factos Veliensis, aut sacerdotem illam civem Romanam factam non esse, aut foedus et a senatu et a populo Romano violatum arbitramur?

I see that these priestesses were for the most part either Neapolitan or Velian, of federate communities without a doubt. I pass over the ancient cases; I say most recently that, before citizenship was granted to the Velienses, by the decision of the senate Gaius Valerius Flaccus, the urban praetor, brought by name to the people a measure concerning Calliphana, a Velian, that she should be a Roman citizen. Do we then suppose either that the Velienses were made into landed estates, or that that priestess was not made a Roman citizen, or that the treaty was violated both by the senate and by the Roman people?

[56] Intellego, iudices, in causa aperta minimeque dubia multo et plura et a pluribus peritissimis esse dicta quam res postularet. Sed id factum est, non ut vobis rem tam perspicuam dicendo probaremus, verum ut omnium malivolorum iniquorum invidiosorum animos frangeremus; quos ut accusator incenderet, ut aliqui sermones hominum alienis bonis maerentium etiam ad vestras auris permanarent et in iudicio ipso redundarent, idcirco illa in omni parte orationis summa arte adspergi videbatis; tum pecuniam L. Corneli, quae neque invidiosa est et, quantacumque est, eius modi est ut conservata magis quam correpta esse videatur; tum luxuriam, quae non crimine aliquo libidinis, sed communi maledicto notabatur; tum Tusculanum, quod Q. Metelli fuisse meminerat et L. Crassi, Crassum emisse de libertino homine, Soterico Marcio, ad Metellum pervenisse de Vennoni Vindici bonis non tenebat. Simul illud nesciebat, praediorum nullam esse gentem, emptionibus ea solere saepe ad alienos homines, saepe ad infimos, non legibus tamquam tutelas pervenire.

[56] I understand, judges, that in a case open and hardly at all doubtful, far more, and by many more most skilled men, has been said than the matter demanded. But this was done, not that we might prove to you by speaking a matter so transparent, but that we might break the spirits of all the ill‑wishers, unjust, envious men; whom the accuser might inflame, so that some talk of people mourning over others’ goods might even seep to your ears and overflow in the very trial—therefore you saw those topics sprinkled with the highest art in every part of the speech: then the money of L. Cornelius, which is not invidious, and, whatever its amount, is of such a sort that it seems to have been preserved rather than snatched; then extravagance, which was being marked not by any charge of lust, but by common slander; then the Tusculan estate, which he remembered had been Q. Metellus’s and L. Crassus’s—Crassus bought it from a freedman, Soteric Marcius—he did not grasp that it had come to Metellus from the goods of Vennonius Vindex. At the same time he did not know this: that landed estates have no clan, that by purchases they are wont often to pass to outsiders, often to the lowest, and not to come by laws as though by guardianships.

[57] Obiectum est etiam quod in tribum Clustuminam pervenerit; quod hic adsecutus est legis de ambitu praemio minus invidioso quam qui legum praemiis praetoriam sententiam et praetextam togam consequuntur. Et adoptatio Theophani agitata est, per quam Cornelius nihil est praeterquam propinquorum suorum hereditates adsecutus.

[57] It has also been objected that he came into the Clustumina tribe; that he attained this by the reward of the law on ambitus (electoral bribery), a less invidious prize than that by which those, by the rewards of laws, obtain a praetorian judgment and the toga praetexta. And the adoption by Theophanes was bandied about, through which Cornelius acquired nothing except the inheritances of his kinfolk.

Quamquam istorum animos, qui ipsi Cornelio invident, non est difficillimum mitigare. More hominum invident, in conviviis rodunt, in circulis vellicant: non illo inimico, sed hoc malo dente carpunt.

Although the minds of those who envy Cornelius himself are not very difficult to mitigate. In the way of men they envy, at banquets they gnaw, in circles they nip: they do not rend with an enemy’s tooth, but with this ill tooth they carp.

[58] Qui amicis L. Corneli aut inimici sunt aut invident, ii sunt huic multo vehementius pertimescendi. Nam huic quidem ipsi quis est umquam inventus inimicus aut quis iure esse potuit? Quem bonum non coluit, cuius fortunae dignitatique non concessit?

[58] Those who are either enemies to, or envy, the friends of L. Cornelius are to be by him feared much more vehemently. For as to this very man himself, who has ever been found an enemy to him, or who could be so by right? What good man has he not cultivated, to whose fortune and dignity has he not conceded?

Versatus in intima familiaritate hominis potentissimi, in maximis nostris malis atque discordiis neminem umquam alterius rationis ac partis non re, non verbo, non vultu denique offendit. Fuit hoc sive meum sive rei publicae fatum, ut in me unum omnis illa inclinatio communium temporum incumberet. Non modo non exsultavit in ruinis nostris vestrisque sordibus Cornelius, sed omni officio,—acrimis, opera, consolatione,—omnis me absente meos sublevavit.

Having been engaged in the innermost familiarity of a most powerful man, amid our greatest ills and discords he never offended anyone of a different plan and party, not in deed, not in word, not, finally, in look. It was this fate, whether mine or the commonwealth’s, that upon me alone that whole inclination of our common times should incumber. Not only did Cornelius not exult over our ruins and your disgraces, but with every service,—by arms, by effort, by consolation,—he, with me absent, supported all my people.

[59] Quorum ego testimonio ac precibus munus hoc meritum huic et, ut a principio dixi, iustam et debitam gratiam refero, speroque, iudices, ut eos qui principes fuerunt conservandae salutis aut dignitatis meae diligitis et caros habetis, sic, quae ab hoc pro facultate hominis, pro loco facta sunt, et grata esse vobis et probata. Non igitur a suis, quos nullos habet, sed a suorum, qui et multi et potentes sunt, urgetur inimicis; quos quidem hesterno die Cn. Pompeius copiosa oratione et gravi secum, si vellent, contendere iubebat, ab hoc impari certamine atque iniusta contentione avocabat.

[59] On the testimony and pleas of these men I render to this man this deserved service and, as I said at the beginning, a just and due gratitude; and I hope, judges, that just as you love and hold dear those who were leaders in preserving my safety or my dignity, so the things that have been done by this man, according to the capacity of a man and according to his station, will be both pleasing to you and approved. He is therefore not pressed by enemies of his own—for he has none—but by the enemies of his supporters, who are both many and powerful; whom indeed yesterday Gnaeus Pompeius, with a copious and weighty oration, was bidding, if they wished, to contend with himself, and was drawing them away from this unequal combat and unjust contention.

[60] Et erit aequa lex et nobis, iudices, atque omnibus qui nostris familiaritatibus implicantur vehementer utilis, ut nostras inimicitias ipsi inter nos geramus, amicis nostrorum inimicorum temperemus. Ac si mea auctoritas satis apud illos in hac re ponderis haberet, cum me praesertim rerum varietate atque usu ipso iam perdoctum viderent, etiam ab illis eos maioribus discordiis avocarem. Etenim contendere de re publica, cum id defendas quod esse optimum sentias, et fortium virorum et magnorum hominum semper putavi, neque huic umquam labori officio muneri defui.

[60] And there will be an equitable law both for us, judges, and very useful to all who are strongly entangled in our familiarities, that we ourselves should conduct our enmities among ourselves, and that we should be temperate toward the friends of our enemies. And if my authority had weight enough with them in this matter, since, especially, they see me by the variety of affairs and by experience itself now thoroughly taught, I would even call them away from those greater dissensions. For indeed to contend about the commonwealth, when you defend that which you judge to be best, I have always thought to belong to brave men and great men; nor have I ever been lacking to this toil, duty, and office.

Sed contentio tam diu sapiens est quam diu aut proficit aliquid, aut, si non proficit, non obest civitati.

But contention is wise only so long as it either accomplishes something, or, if it does not accomplish, it does not harm the state.

[61] Voluimus quaedam, contendimus, experti sumus: obtenta non sunt. Dolorem alii, nos luctum maeroremque suscepimus. Cur ea quae mutare non possumus convellere malumus quam tueri?

[61] We wanted certain things, we contended, we experienced a trial: they were not obtained. Others took on dolor; we have taken up mourning and lamentation. Why do we prefer to uproot those things which we cannot change rather than to guard them?

C. Caesarem senatus et genere supplicationum amplissimo ornavit et numero dierum novo: idem in angustiis aerari victorem exercitum stipendio adfecit, imperatori decem legatos decrevit, lege Sempronia succedendum non censuit. Harum ego sententiarum et princeps et auctor fui, neque me dissensioni meae pristinae putavi potius adsentiri quam praesentibus rei publicae temporibus et concordiae convenire. Non idem aliis videtur: sunt fortasse in sententia firmiores.

The senate adorned Gaius Caesar both with the most ample kind of supplications and with a new number of days; likewise, in the straits of the treasury it endowed the victorious army with stipend, decreed to the imperator ten legates, and judged that, under the Sempronian law, there should not be succession. Of these opinions I was both the first speaker and the author, nor did I think I ought rather to assent to my former dissension than to suit the present times of the commonwealth and concord. Not the same seems to others: perhaps they are firmer in their opinion.

Reprendo neminem, sed adsentior non omnibus; neque esse inconstantis puto sententiam tamquam aliquod navigium atque cursum ex rei publicae tempestate moderari.

I reprove no one, but I do not assent to all; nor do I think it inconstancy to moderate one’s opinion, like some ship and its course, by the tempest of the Republic.

[62] Sed si qui sunt quibus infinitum sit odium in quos semel susceptum sit, quos video esse non nullos, cum ducibus ipsis, non cum comitatu adsectatoribusque confligant. Illam enim fortasse pertinaciam non nulli, virtutem alii putabunt, hanc vero iniquitatem omnes cum aliqua crudelitate coniunctam. Sed si certorum hominum mentis nulla ratione, iudices, placare possumus, vestros quidem animos certe confidimus non oratione nostra, sed humanitate vestra esse placatos.

[62] But if there are any whose hatred, once undertaken against certain persons, is infinite—whom I see to be not a few—let them clash with the leaders themselves, not with the retinue and followers. For that some will perhaps consider pertinacity, others virtue; but this all will deem iniquity conjoined with a certain cruelty. But if, judges, we can by no reasoning placate the minds of certain men, we surely trust that your spirits are placated not by our oration, but by your humanity.

[63] Quid enim est cur non potius ad summam laudem huic quam ad minimam fraudem Caesaris familiaritas valere debeat? Cognovit adulescens; placuit homini prudentissimo; in summa amicorum copia cum familiarissimis eius est adaequatus. In praetura, in consulatu praefectum fabrum detulit; consilium hominis probavit, fidem est complexus, officia observantiamque dilexit.

[63] For what reason is there why Caesar’s familiarity should not rather avail to the highest praise for this man than to the slightest discredit? The young man made his acquaintance; he pleased a most prudent man; amid the greatest abundance of friends he was matched with his most intimate associates. In the praetorship, in the consulate, he appointed him prefect of the engineers; he approved the man’s counsel, embraced his fidelity, loved his services and observance.

Fuit hic multorum illi laborum socius aliquando: est fortasse nunc non nullorum particeps commodorum. Quae quidem si huic obfuerint apud vos, non intellego quod bonum cuiquam sit apud talis viros profuturum.

He was at one time his companion in many labors; perhaps now he is a participant in some advantages. Which things indeed, if they have been a hindrance to him before you, I do not understand what good could be profitable to anyone before such men.

[64] Sed quoniam C. Caesar abest longissime, atque in iis est nunc locis quae regione orbem terrarum, rebus illius gestis imperium populi Romani definiunt, nolite, per deos immortalis, iudices, hunc illi acerbum nuntium velle perferri, ut suum praefectum fabrum, ut hominem sibi carissimum, non ob ipsius aliquod delictum, sed ob suam familiaritatem vestris oppressum sententiis audiat. Miseremini eius qui non de suo peccato sed huius summi et clarissimi viri facto, non de aliquo crimine sed periculo suo de publico iure disceptat. Quod ius si Cn. Pompeius ignoravit, si M. Crassus, si Q. Metellus, si Cn. Pompeius pater, si L. Sulla, si P. Crassus, si C. Marius, si senatus, si populus Romanus, si qui de re simili iudicarunt, si foederati populi, si socii, si illi antiqui Latini, videte ne utilius vobis et honestius sit illis ducibus errare quam hoc magistro erudiri.

[64] But since Gaius Caesar is very far away, and is now in those regions which, by the range of his exploits, mark out the imperium of the Roman People as the bounds of the world, do not, by the immortal gods, judges, be willing that this bitter message be carried to him—that his prefect of engineers, a man dearest to him, has been crushed by your sentences, not for any offense of his own, but for his intimacy with Caesar. Take pity on him who pleads not about his own fault but about the deed of this highest and most illustrious man, not about any crime but about his own peril concerning public law. If Gnaeus Pompeius was ignorant of this law, if Marcus Crassus, if Quintus Metellus, if Gnaeus Pompeius the father, if Lucius Sulla, if Publius Crassus, if Gaius Marius, if the Senate, if the Roman People, if those who judged in a like matter, if the federate peoples, if the allies, if those ancient Latins—see to it that it is more useful for you and more honorable to err with those leaders than to be schooled by this teacher.

Sed si de certo, de perspicuo, de utili, de probato, de iudicato vobis iure esse constituendum videtis, nolite committere ut in re tam inveterata quicquam novi sentiatis.

But if you see that law is to be established by you from what is certain, perspicuous, useful, approved, adjudicated, do not allow that in so inveterate a matter you should hold anything new.

[65] Simul et illa, iudices, omnia ante oculos vestros proponite: primum esse omnis etiam post mortem reos clarissimos illos viros qui foederatos civitate donarunt; deinde senatum qui hoc iudicavit, populum qui iussit, iudices qui adprobarunt. Tum etiam illud cogitate, sic vivere ac vixisse Cornelium ut, cum omnium peccatorum quaestiones sint, non de vitiorum suorum poena, sed de virtutis praemio in iudicium vocetur. Accedat etiam illud, ut statuatis hoc iudicio utrum posthac amicitias clarorum virorum calamitati hominibus an ornamento esse malitis.

[65] At the same time also, judges, set all those things before your eyes: first, that even after death all those most illustrious men who bestowed citizenship upon the federates stand as defendants; next, the Senate which judged this, the People who ordered it, the judges who approved. Then consider also this, that Cornelius lives and has lived in such a way that, though there are inquiries into all transgressions, he is called into judgment not concerning the penalty of his vices, but concerning the reward of virtue. Let this also be added: that by this judgment you determine whether hereafter the friendships of renowned men you prefer to be for men a calamity or an ornament.

Postremo illud, iudices, fixum in animis vestris tenetote, vos in hac causa non de maleficio L. Corneli, sed de beneficio Cn. Pompei iudicaturos.

Finally, judges, hold this fixed in your minds: that in this case you will judge not about the malefaction of L. Cornelius, but about the benefaction of Cn. Pompeius.